Paul Faulkner & Thomas Simpson, eds. *The Philosophy of Trust*. Oxford University Press 2017. 336 pp. $85.00 USD (Hardcover ISBN 9780198732549).

Investigations into the nature and function of trust have significantly increased over the last half century, not only in philosophy but also in psychology, political studies, and the social sciences. This volume, fifteen chapter-essays and an introduction, is a welcome addition to such investigations and will appeal not only to philosophers interested in the nature of trust but also to ethicists, epistemologists, and philosophers of religion.

Editors Faulkner and Simpson introduce the text with a brief overview of three broad areas of trust studies that have been noteworthy. These include Trust and Cooperation, Trust and Knowledge, and Trust and Social Philosophy. While the chapter-essays are not firmly organized under these three broad categories, the introductory material is helpful in setting up the history and trajectory of trust studies.

In the opening essay, 'The Empowering Theory of Trust,' Victoria McGeer and Philip Pettit make the case that 'my trusting you can increase your trust-responsiveness' (14). This essay, like others in the volume, builds upon the notion that trust is a kind of reliance. Trust, however, in these cases at least, involves making clear to the trustee the assumption that she will prove reliable. The empowering argument suggests that by my making manifest my trust in you I may be boosting your own belief in your abilities and this may improve your dependability (22). This approach, a form of 'therapeutic trust,' seeks to create a higher degree of either dependability or durability (18). McGeer and Pettit make several arguments to support the basic claim that manifest trust increases dependability, but even if one is already demonstratively dependable, manifest trust can increase the durability of one's trust-responsiveness in trying situations. The authors end their essay looking at the implications that trust-responsiveness is sensitive to the ways we trust another. First is that in trusting another the trustor is not merely describing some capacity in the other but evoking, in part, that capacity. Trust-responsiveness, according to the authors, is dependent on context and not merely the trustee's character; it is a work in progress, not a fixed all or nothing status. Finally, trust-responsiveness is subject to moral norms in that the trust I make manifest in the trustee needs to fit the evidence of trustworthiness.

Trust is typically thought of as a three-place relation, A trusts B to do C, but Jacopo Domenicucci and Richard Holton challenge this conception in their essay 'Trust as a Two-Place Relation.' The three-place relation is the 'wrong place to start' because trust, as they argue, is more akin to love or friendship in which the three-place approach does not really make sense. They begin supporting their case by exploring the language of trust and distrust and how this best fits a two-place trust. Furthermore, they argue that trust is not vulnerability due to ignorance, as many suggest, but instead 'involves a preparedness to grant a certain power or control' (151). This sets up trust as two-place, in many cases, because in granting power we give ourselves to the other. We do not trust a parent or partner to do X, we simply trust them *simpliciter*. 'I trust you,' then, does not cry out for completion in the way 'I rely on you' does. Domenicucci and Holton complete their essay discussing some of the implications of trust as a two-place relation. Most interesting is how this approach fits in one's trust of institutions. Institutions are person-like but there is nothing like a reciprocal trust; institutions do not normally trust individuals. They seem to suggest that there may be pragmatic social advantages to trusting various institutions, such as national health services, rather than merely calculating how or whether to rely on them.

While Domenicucci and Holton offer how we might trust institutions, Katherine Hawley, in 'Trustworthy Groups and Organizations,' calls institutional trust into question. Hawley argues that

reliability is all we need regarding group testimony. (Much of this rides on what constitutes group testimony.) Trust as reliance plus some other factor does not make our interactions with groups and organizations any better (epistemologically or ethically) and so trustworthiness can be discarded without real damage. The question of trustworthiness and group action is less clear to Hawley and requires a larger discussion. Ultimately, Hawley questions whether the trustworthiness-reliability distinction applies to groups (247).

'Trust and belief are equally non-voluntary' (163), is the claim made by Benjamin McMyler in the essay 'Deciding to Trust.' McMyler builds his case on the claim that voluntariness is the ability to act for any reason, good or bad, but that trust (and beliefs) are not voluntary. McMyler argues one can act for any reason she holds worthwhile; she can raise her hand for the promise of fifty dollars. But this same agent cannot believe there is a pink elephant in the next room on the promise of fifty dollars (165-67). Trust, like beliefs, require the right kind of reasons. A financial incentive or threat would not be worthwhile reasons to trust an individual. According to McMyler I can decide to act as if I trust the other because of incentive, threat or in the hope to cultivate trust, but I cannot actually decide to trust (170). McMyler's case rests on the notion that trust is an attitude and not merely an action. If trust is an act it is one motivated or expressed by a psychological attitude of trust (172). McMyler concludes by affirming that trust is not merely passive but that we have some agency over trusting by settling questions much in the same way we decide to believe after rational deliberation. Trust then, unlike an action, cannot be performed for just any reason.

Completing the volume is Robert Stern's '"Trust is Basic": Løgstrup on the Priority of Trust.' The essay unpacks key works on trust by Danish philosopher and theologian Knud Ejler Løgstrup (1905-1981) and seeks to explain how Løgstrup understood trust to be basic. Løgstrup argued that trust and distrust are not two equal or parallel approaches to life for 'trust is basic; distrust is the absence of trust' (276). Stern examines four ways in which Løgstrup may have understood trust to be basic: psychologically (as infants we all begin by trusting and later learn distrust), transcendentally (trust is rationally and linguistically prior to distrust), axiologically (trust is intrinsically valuable while distrust is a privation on trust), and ontologically (trust is essential to live a good life while distrust is nonessential). Though Stern believes all four are found in Løgstrup the latter two best represent his understanding of trust as basic. When exploring the axiological priority of trust Stern suggests that trust is prior to distrust in the way that health is prior to illness. All things being equal we would not ask why one chooses health over illness and in the same manner, it would be odd to ask why someone chooses trust over distrust (284-85). Løgstrup, according to Stern, further argues that to trust is to live courageously; it is to see another as more than their story–it is to value the trusted intrinsically. Ontologically, trust is not something fashioned by society to make life better but is something given, a good for which we cannot take credit (290-91). Trust then is a requirement of a good and functioning life, not its result.

I have focused on a handful of essays that most grabbed my interest, but there is likely something here for anyone interested in the philosophy of trust or its related studies. The volume demonstrates that there is still much to think about regarding trust and how it relates to reliance, testimony, cooperation, social cohesion, ethics, and more. While Faulkner and Simpson note in the introduction that their survey is illustrative, though not exhaustive, of where trust is important, the text would have benefitted from an essay or two dealing with trust and the philosophy of religion or how trust relates to ethical or theological virtues. Overall, however, I am very pleased with the book and applaud all the contributors.

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