Philosophy in Review/Comptes rendus philosophiques

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This introductory book in ethics is written in non-technical language and designed to be accessible to general readers and to undergraduate students with no previous background in the subject. Motivated by the 'complexity and divisiveness of some of the major ethical challenges of contemporary life' (28-9), Audi's aim is to develop an ethical framework that can deliver universally applicable principles and ideals that, as the title suggests, are also flexible enough to accommodate the fact of human diversity.

The book, a slim volume of four chapters, is divided into two parts. Part 1, consisting of Chapters 1 and 2, surveys four of the most influential ethical theories: virtue ethics, Kantianism, utilitarianism, and the common-sense intuitionism articulated by W.D. Ross. It then presents Audi's own favored approach, a position he dubs 'pluralist universalism' because it synthesizes elements from each of the four major theories and thus incorporates plural dimensions of value. From the utilitarian emphasis on welfare and the Kantian injunction to treat persons as free and equal, Audi formulates a central 'triple-barreled' principle that enjoins us to '[optimize] happiness so far as possible without producing injustice or curtailing freedom (including one's own)' (17). From the virtue ethicist's focus on character traits, Audi adds the requirement that the central principle be internalized in such a way as to yield moral virtue and that moral virtue should be taught by example and by precept. And from Rossian intuitionism Audi takes his general strategy of relying on common-sense intuitions to generate specific moral standards. Chapter 2 discusses the notion of intrinsic value and, consistent with Audi's pluralistic ethical framework, identifies multiple spheres of value that he takes to be essential for a good life, including not only moral, but also hedonic, intellectual, aesthetic, spiritual and religious, social, emotional, and athletic values.

Part 2 takes up the practical application of issues discussed in Part 1. Chapter 3 attempts to show how the principles and values identified in Part1 can be applied to structure our lives, with the aim of developing an account 'that can be used by different kinds of people living in very different kinds of cultural circumstances' (56). The fourth and final chapter considers what in Audi's view are ten particularly pressing challenges for contemporary ethics (initially introduced in Chapter 1) and offers some suggestions for addressing these problems.

Disappointingly, Chapter 3 gives little concrete discussion of the issue of cultural differences, despite the fact that the title of the chapter is 'Moral Pluralism and Cultural Relativity' and the title of one of its subsections is 'The Challenge of Cultural Differences and Clashing Worldviews'. Audi's

view is that there are certain basic, universal values constitutive of a good life, but that these values are many in number and can be realized in a multitude of ways, so that 'different good lives can realize and combine these diverse goods in many different ways' (61) and 'different cultures [can] favor different combinations and weightings among them' (80). But because the discussion stays on a very general level, with no examination of hard cases or of specific examples of apparently clashing worldviews, the reader comes away with little sense of the challenge that cultural differences pose in the first place. And because the basic values identified by Audi are themselves so broad and open-ended — and his remarks about their realization in different lives so vague and undefined — one is left with little understanding of what Audi's resolution of the challenge really amounts to in concrete terms.

The discussion of ethical challenges in Chapter 4 is also less than illuminating. Audi's suggestions for dealing with the problems he identifies are best characterized as insipid. E.g.: 'The insularity problem can be solved only by changes in both belief and attitude. People must learn more about other times, places, and ways of living' (106). Several of the problems he includes also seem surprisingly banal for a list of particularly pressing ethical challenges. For example, self-indulgence, insularity, lack of good role models, low quality discourse, and media sensationalism make it onto his list, but not, say, environmental destruction, overpopulation, nuclear weapons, or human rights violations. Given the theme of the book, it is also surprising that few of Audi's selected problems seem to be directly related to issues of diversity.

Since the two parts of the book are largely self-contained, however, Part 1 could be assigned in a general ethics course independently of Part 2. Students may find Audi's survey of ethical views to be helpful for isolating the key points of contrast between the theories, and certainly his arguments against various sources of skepticism about the objectivity of value, though nothing original, would be useful in the classroom. Unfortunately, Audi's exposition of his own pluralist universalist view suffers from some of the same problems of underdevelopment that characterize other parts of the book. Missing is the sort of argumentation and elaboration needed to see how his proposed ethical principle really pans out in practice. For example, in giving us a priority rule for balancing the 'triple-barreled' values encapsulated in his central principle, Audi states that considerations of justice and freedom are to take priority over considerations of happiness, but that justice and freedom do not conflict because 'justice requires the highest level of freedom possible within the limits of peaceful coexistence, and this is as much freedom as any reasonable ideal of liberty demands' (17). But it's not obvious why this is the proper conception of justice, and we are given no argument in its support, despite the fact that on other conceptions of justice, freedom and justice might certainly conflict. As Audi notes in his preface, however, writing a short, non-technical book required him to omit much that he would have otherwise liked to include.

Elisabeth Herschbach
University of Rhode Island

In this book Bell explores in detail Deleuze's attempt to effect a systematic inversion of traditional notions of the relationship between identity and difference. More than a detailed examination of Deleuzian thought, this is an extension of Bell's own longstanding interest in difference and challenges related to notions of difference raised by post-structuralism. Bell takes as his starting point Deleuze's well known assertion in *Difference and Repetition*: 'To think is to create — there is no other creation — but to create is first of all to engender "thinking" in thought' (3). As Bell suggests, Deleuze's overall philosophical project, more broadly, consists of his efforts to make of philosophical thinking an endeavor that is creative and, therefore, not subordinate to any factors that might predetermine what it should be (3). Deleuze's philosophy of difference reflects his attempts to think difference without reducing it to any predetermining identity.

Bell notes that the commitment to 'thinking difference' is something that Deleuze shares with Derrida. Both seek to develop a philosophy of difference concerned with showing that, rather than difference being conditioned by an already established and predetermining identity, it is identity that is conditioned by a fundamental difference.

The key difference between Derrida and Deleuze, in Bell's view, concerns their respective views on systematic thought. The concept of *différance* as developed by Derrida suggests a fundamental difference or absence preventing systems from ever achieving any sense of closure. This is the other presupposed by any identity.

Bell notes Derrida's presentation, in *Of Grammatology*, of difference as an economic concept designating the production of differing or deferring (3). This continual production defers and subverts any system from achieving completion or self-identity. For Derrida, this undecidable aspect of difference is critical to the method of deconstruction (211).

By contrast, for Deleuze — and this is the point around which Bell's entire work is developed — what is crucial is the notion of a fundamental 'difference that is inseparable from dynamic systems that are at the "edge of chaos" ' (4). Deleuze's philosophy of difference, for Bell, exemplifies contemporary notions of complexity theory and dynamic systems, and this is the feature that makes it so significant in the current context. A dynamic system, for Deleuze, presupposes stable, structured strata that are in some sense complete. Without them a living organism would die. At the same time, without

unstructured, deterritorializing flows, an organism would fail to adapt and, therefore, also die. The same holds for philosophy. Without stable strata, philosophy falls into disorder and nonsense. Without unstable flows, philosophy slips towards repetition and cliché. Philosophy then must maintain its stable strata and its unstable, deterritorializing flows (the famous bodies without organs). Deleuze's work, then, bears a crucial distinction from that of Derrida. For Bell, what is developed in Deleuze is a fundamental difference that is inseparable from dynamic systems, and it is this that signals a philosophy 'at the edge of chaos'. Deleuze, unlike Derrida, expresses a need for dynamic systems whose completeness fends off a collapse into a destructive binary or either nonsense or platitudes.

The first two-thirds of Bell's book deals with examinations of Deleuze's engagements with Nietzsche, Heidegger and Spinoza. In examining Deleuze's attempts to develop a philosophy of difference Bell focuses on Spinoza. Taking as his starting point Deleuze's claim to be a Spinozist and Nietzsche's claim to Spinoza as an important precursor, Bell illustrates how Deleuze develops a philosophical approach that builds upon and re-shapes key concepts in the earlier authors' works. Deleuze is able to avoid the pitfalls of other philosophies of difference, in Bell's view. The main reason offered is that, unlike Heidegger and Derrida, for example, Deleuze, alone and in his work with Felix Guattari, develops the notion of a dynamic system at the edge of chaos, a system that is both complete and ordered and incomplete and chaotic (10).

The final third of the book, Part 2: Rethinking System, provides the most interesting portion of Bell's work, his compelling examination of Deleuze's innovative attempt to think dynamic, including virtual, systems. Bell offers a useful examination of the notion of an 'abstract machine', the concept on which Deleuze builds his philosophy at the 'edge of chaos'. The abstract machine presupposes the fundamental stability and instability of order and chaos. It entails a double articulation that is inseparable from identities. This double articulation consists of sufficient consistency, or systems (the first articulation), which can actualize unpredicted systems and identities (the second articulation). Bell's discussion is very much influenced by Christopher Langton's work on 'artificial life' and the conditions necessary for the emergence of new life forms. Langton's research found that new stable life forms could only emerge if the parameters that determine the amount of variation between generations were set at a critical point, the 'edge of chaos', which was neither so low as to inhibit variation nor so high as to render changes so rapid that stable forms could not emerge. The edge of chaos is both stable and unstable, ordered and unordered. Such is Deleuze's philosophy.

This is, to be honest, a difficult book. While rewarding the patient reader, it remains a piece that will be of interest, pretty much exclusively, to those who are undertaking advanced studies in Deleuzian thought. This is so not only because of the intensive focus on the development of the notion of difference throughout Deleuze's work, but even more because Bell has largely failed to engage with broader, less philosophical approaches to the issues raised in the current work. For example, there is not even an acknowledge-

ment of the growing debates over systems theory emerging from the social sciences, whether from conservative neo-functionalism, or from more radical approaches to global systems, such as those found within recent post-structural articulations of anarchism. Because the problem of difference has been at the centre of many recent popular developments, including the anti-oppression and affinity-based social movements that have emerged as part of the alternative globalization movements, Bell's failure to develop a more expansive discussion is something of a missed opportunity.

Jeff Shantz
Kwantlen University College

Interest in evolutionary ethics rises and recedes but never quite dissipates completely. The history of the subject can roughly be thought to have unfolded as follows: 1) Darwin and other nineteenth-century evolutionary thinkers inspire progressionist forms of evolutionary ethics like the theory notoriously defended by Herbert Spencer; 2) G.E. Moore delivers what is thought to be a lethal blow to evolutionary ethics in the form of the naturalistic fallacy; 3) E.O. Wilson inspires a new wave of evolutionary ethics that focuses on evolved human dispositions for moral behavior rather than the promotion of evolutionary progress; 4) a well publicized political backlash to stage 3; 5) a diverse aftermath of tentative explorations of what is redeemable about evolutionary ethics. This most recent stage is often preoccupied with explaining how the naturalistic fallacy can be avoided (or dismissed) so that evolutionary ethics can have a justificatory function rather than merely providing a normatively inert explanation of our human moral capacities.

Within this context, Boniolo and De Anna have assembled an intriguing, though conspicuously uneven, anthology devoted to making connections between the emerging empirical facts of contemporary biology and the philosophical ambitions of evolutionary ethics. The aim is to explore the ways that biological sciences like molecular genetics, neurobiology, ethology and neuropsychology might contribute to our understanding of human behavior and moral agency. This is, I think, a commendable aim. Too much of the evo-

lutionary ethics literature involves bold speculations about human nature without paying enough attention to the relevant biological details. The focus of this anthology is thus a refreshing change, for the papers avoid drawing sweeping conclusions and instead look at specific ways that contemporary biology may affect ethics.

In a short review it is not feasible to analyze every essay of an anthology in detail, so I will instead comment briefly on each one and try to capture its overall contribution to the collection. I begin with the best papers and then work in descending order of quality.

The paper by Christopher Lang, Elliott Sober and Karen Strier serves as a helpful reminder that even if humans share certain features with other species this need not imply that the evolutionary explanation for these features is the same in both cases. The claim that similarities in form or behavior can arise from different causes ought to be obvious when exposed, but it is surprisingly easy to lose sight of it when advocates of evolutionary ethics draw comparisons between the altruism observed among humans and the altruism observed in other species. Lang et al. offer a concise, well articulated argument that our shared naturalistic status does not license superficial assumptions about shared evolutionary histories between humans and other animals. Such claims must be argued for, and the paper rightly emphasizes that a comparative perspective is necessary to confirm hypotheses about the evolutionary history of shared traits *or* traits thought to be uniquely human. In this respect, the paper exemplifies what I take to be the theme of the anthology: one must get the details of contemporary biology straight before drawing even seemingly basic conclusions about human nature and its evolutionary history.

Aldo Fasolo follows up the Lang et al. paper with the same caution against quick generalizations about apparent homologies. This paper focuses on brain and behavior homologies and is fairly technical for readers not familiar with 'the elective stabilization of synapses' or 'histogenetic modules' (64). Yet it makes some valuable points about the methodological complexities associated with specifying homologies in relation to either morphological phenotypes or common ancestry.

Philip Kitcher's paper is a nice antidote to the tacit assumption that altruism is an all-or-nothing trait rather than one that varies in scope and intensity. Kitcher's main thesis is that altruistic behavior in humans is a product of a 'normative guidance system' that has evolved as a substitute for less efficient strategies of peacemaking like those we observe among other primates, e.g., the excessive grooming displays used to maintain cooperative coalitional substructures within chimp populations (174). Whereas chimps live in fragile societies held together by large investments in coalition signaling, humans have somehow managed to develop a rule-based capacity for normative judgment — one that allows us to live in much larger cooperative groups. This thesis is not novel, but Kitcher gives it a clear, cautious articulation, while appropriately acknowledging the importance of cultural evolutionary forces along the way.

Alex Rosenberg provides an interesting discussion of whether genomics will be able to reveal differences in genetic regulatory sequences between humans and primates (e.g., chimpanzees) that will give molecular geneticists clues about the course of evolution from our last common ancestor. The details here are important, since many working in evolutionary ethics presuppose a strong kin selection component in our disposition for altruistic behaviour — this despite the fact that, 'long before our last common ancestor with the chimps (about 5 million years ago), all the primates had ceased to live in groups in which kin altruism would be selected for' (188). This observation does not cast doubt on the existence of some basic gene for kin altruism built into our genes, but it is important for explaining the *particular type* of altruism that we and other primates have inherited from our last common ancestor, i.e. it is unlikely that *this* type of altruism is written into our genes (189). Rosenberg offers an alternative where basic cooperative patterns like reciprocating in prisoner's dilemma or ultimatum games could have been selected for, but he is admirably forthright about this being little more than a hopeful conjecture without further data to support the hypothesis.

Unfortunately, this is the extent of the papers in the anthology that are definitely worth reading. The rest of the papers fall into two groups: those that are well written and interesting, but not particularly informative for anyone likely to read this book, and those that are problematic in some important respect.

Beginning with the first group, Francisco Ayala provides an engaging essay that claims we ought to view morality as a mere byproduct of our more general intellectual capacities, since there is no evidence that morality is itself adaptive. Our moral agency is thus part of our biological nature, but only in a weak sense that implies no particular set of ethical values until cultural evolution steps in to fill in the relevant content. This is an important and, I think, exceedingly plausible thesis. The problem is that it ought to be old news for those likely to pick up this anthology. Similarly, Michael Ruse presents a restatement of his unique combination of John Mackie's metaethics and sociobiology: however, the target audience for the book ought to be well versed with his view by now, and Ruse offers no new insights or updated reflections to allow for a fresh perspective on his arguments. Finally, Stefano Parmigiani, Gabriele De Anna, Danilo Mainardi and Paola Palanza note that sex selection has played a role in shaping the human mind that ought to be investigated, since our genes have at least some influence on behavior with normative content. This, however, is not especially controversial.

The remaining three papers make up the group of contributions that are beyond being merely uninformative. Giovanni Boniolo defends a plausible thesis similar to that of Ayala, but his summary of Darwin's views on human moral capacities is superficial and he closes with a textbook lesson in false dilemma by claiming that one must either accept Darwin's solution to the question concerning the biological roots of our moral capacities or else reject Darwin's theory of evolution in its entirety (38). The paper by Boniolo and Paolo Vezzoni also misses the mark by examining the genetic basis

for clinical conditions, like Tourette's Syndrome, that 'seem to concern the moral capacity' (81) without establishing why these particular conditions are philosophically significant in ways that other contraindications for exercising one's moral capacity (e.g., psychopathy, encephalopathy) are not. Finally, Stefano Canali, Gabriele De Anna and Luca Pani discuss evolutionary psychopharmacology and 'correct' human functioning in order to argue against the thesis that psychiatric treatment is universally applicable to all humans. There are two serious problems here: (a) it is never made clear why an *evolutionary* approach is necessary for one to opt for an *individualized* approach to psychiatric treatment, and (b) it is disturbing when people like Philippa Foot speak of proper human functioning without taking into account the dissenting views of prominent philosophers of biology like David Hull and John Dupré, but it is worse when the cycle feeds back on itself and philosophers of biology refer to Foot as if she is an authority on the subject.

To conclude, anyone looking for a major breakthrough that will finally allow the field of evolutionary ethics to emerge from the shadow of the naturalistic fallacy will not find it here. Instead, they will find something far more interesting: a collection of papers willing to pay attention to biological detail and put in the (not always glamorous) work required to sort out the evolutionary roots of our human moral capacity and its potential relation to normative ethics.

Scott Woodcock
University of Victoria

Wendy Brown
Regulating Aversion:
Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2006.
Pp. 282.
US$29.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-691-12654-8).

Despite incessant theorising about difference, and frequent forebodings about the immensity of the challenge that forms of identity-related pluralism pose for liberal constitutional states, only rarely does this prefigure any sustained interrogation of the core legitimating principles of liberal constitutionalism. The temptation to ontologise difference and treat identities as intransient, and simultaneously to cling to liberalism's universalist pretensions, often produces an uneasy mix of political fatalism and liberal complacency. It is to these maladies that Brown's book offers an antidote.

Brown astutely perceives that the principle of toleration, with which the book is centrally concerned, provides an exemplary case for a deeper exploration of liberal complacency. Toleration is the concept to which contemporary liberal theory cleaves as the sine qua non of peaceful co-existence in diverse societies. It is frequently identified as the means by which liberal states quelled the devastating effects of religious conflicts in the seventeenth century. Consequently it is associated with ideas of separation between church and state and respect for individual conscience. Brown points out that these associations continue to provide normative purchase for contemporary tolerance discourse despite the fact that this discourse has come to describe wholly different objects — *groups* defined by attributes such as culture, ethnicity or sexuality rather than *persons* individuated through beliefs — and has come to be exacted from wholly different agents, e.g., schools, museums, neighbourhood associations and other civil society groups, as opposed to the state.

The main difficulty that Brown identifies with the application of a revered but outmoded discourse of tolerance to this recent profusion of subjects and objects is its tendency to *depoliticize* social and political discourse. For Brown depoliticization involves casting the existing order of things as 'inevitable, natural or accidental,' and it results from a certain blindness to extant networks of power and the historical forces that have shaped them (15). The theme of depoliticization figures prominently in this work, naturally inviting comparison with contemporaries such as Chantalle Mouffe, William Connolly and Bonnie Honig who have similarly sought to develop a political vocabulary that can comprehend the importance of power and the social reproduction of difference. Drawing upon the work Foucault and Freud, Brown nevertheless develops a unique and important theoretical perspective. In critical conversation with these thinkers, as a means of countering depoliticization, she explores two key themes which have for the most part been woefully neglected within contemporary political thought.

Political legitimacy is the first of these themes. Brown acknowledges that difference represents not simply a public policy dilemma for liberal states, but a challenge of deeper import. Emphasising the ubiquity of power for political life, Brown maintains that there can be no neutral or transcendent place from which to define a non-exclusionary collective identity. Brown analyses tolerance as a concept that serves to plug the legitimation deficits arising from impaired inclusion and to sustain the superordination of the dominant identity. Drawing on Foucault's conception of 'governmentality' she suggests that the discourse of tolerance establishes a circuitry wherein the state opaquely produces and reinforces those same differences that occasion its public commitment to tolerance. A strict separation between private and public 'overbuilds local sites of truth' and so siphons otherness onto the tolerated identity while conspiring in the self-deception of the dominant identity as unmarked. In this way, the superordination of the dominant identity is maintained and subordination is presented as mere difference.

The second important theme explored in this book is the extent to which the strategies adopted by liberal states in response to difference reproduce

features of a much broader global discourse within which liberalism has tended to position itself as a civilizational discourse. This positioning, which Brown draws on Freud's theory of group identity to explore, allows liberalism to cleave to its universalist presumption even when it encounters its limit. Brown argues that tolerance discourse presupposes linkages between civilizations with high levels of individuation on the one hand and between organicism, fundamentalism and primitivism on the other. In this way tolerance discourse effectively depoliticises liberalism's encounter with difference by recasting the other as a nativist enemy in need of the civilising project of the West.

These two themes are dramatized in Chapter 5, in which Brown offers a compelling account of the experience of visiting the Museum of Tolerance and seeks to expose the moral didacticism at work there; a didacticism that, as her description of the 'Point of View Diner' explores, presses the museum to conjure up precisely the sort of stereotypes that it ostensibly aims to disrupt. Undoubtedly one of the most deeply absorbing chapters of the book, its wider purpose appears to be to describe the microcosmic operation of a circuitry that is also characteristic of the modern state. Brown states categorically that the contradictions embodied in the Museum of Tolerance are not so much a consequence of a cynically manipulative agenda as they are reflections of contemporary currents within American political culture. Likewise she insists that even in its more comprehensive aspect depoliticization issues from a certain blindness about power and dominance rather than a conscious strategy on the part of the powerful to shore up their position (212n13).

In exposing the circuitries of contemporary tolerance talk and the role of tolerance in cloaking subordination and imperialism, this book also articulates a more fundamental idea about the nature of political theory. A strongly prescriptive role is surrendered in favour of the more modest task of developing more perspicuous analyses of the often shrouded operations of power in contemporary society. This theoretical enterprise supports the positive political strategy, proposed in the closing pages of the book, of nourishing counter-discourses and oppositional movements. However, Brown is also openly sympathetic to a republican inspired discourse of citizenship; one that could prioritise the active pursuit of collective ends and solidarities over a thin liberal conception that champions the avoidance of conflict and the regulation of mutual aversion. If the modest role that Brown attributes to political theory is not in outright conflict with this conception of citizenship, neither are these ideas related in any straightforward way. Hence future work in this vein should turn its attention to analysing the relationship between a philosophically inspired sensitivity to the operations of power, and an ethically inspiring attitude of mutual solidarity and agonistic respect.

Rachel Lawlor
University of Essex

Clare Carlisle
Kierkegaard: *A Guide for the Perplexed*.
New York: Continuum 2006.
Pp. 157.
US$110.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-8610-3);
US$19.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-8611-0).

In this book Clare Carlisle aims to provide the student with an accessible, comprehensive, and authoritative means to reach a full and detailed understanding of Kierkegaard's thought. In doing this Carlisle might fairly be said to approach Kierkegaard in a manner similar to Kierkegaard's approach to Christianity: to make things difficult, but no more difficult than they already are. Carlisle equips her book to this end by offering an overview of the philosophical, theological, and psychological aspects of Kierkegaard's thought, before applying these insights to two of his most popular texts: *Fear and Trembling* and *Philosophical Fragments*.

As one would expect from an introduction to Kierkegaard's thought, Carlisle's first chapter consists of a brief account of Kierkegaard's life and work and the relationship between them. Carlisle then moves on, in Chapter 2, to treat one of the most interesting, and increasingly popular, topics in Kierkegaard's thought: the method of 'indirect communication'. That *Kierkegaard* begins with this subject is useful, because it is a point on which numerous interpretative approaches to his work are easily seen to diverge. Carlisle outlines the connection between the method of indirect communication and Kierkegaardian subjectivity, exploring the question of why Kierkegaard's texts have the peculiar stylistic features they do.

The subject of Chapter 3 is Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel. In examining this topic Carlisle outlines how Kierkegaard's thought responds not so much to Hegel as to the Hegelian inspired theological debate of Kierkegaard's Copenhagen: specifically the controversy surrounding Hegel's logic that took place between figures such as H.L. Martensen and Bishop Jakob Mynster. This issue, so important to evaluating Kierkegaard's thought, is typically dealt with only in biographies, and Carlisle has done the student a service in treating it in an introduction.

Chapter 4 outlines Kierkegaard's views on subjectivity and truth, before connecting these with his notion of 'existence spheres' or 'life stages'. Carlisle then moves to an examination of Kierkegaard's theological and, she argues, psychologically significant observations regarding sin. To this end, much of Chapter 5 is taken up with a textual analysis of *The Concept of Anxiety* and *The Sickness Unto Death*. The final two chapters consist of textual studies of *Fear and Trembling* and *Philosophical Fragments*. That these texts are treated is useful because the first is probably the most widely used in courses on Kierkegaard and Existentialism, while study of the second provides the student with a way into the monumental *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. Carlisle concludes by briefly commenting upon the relationship between Kierkegaard's thought and subsequent continental philosophy, specifically

its influence on Sartre and Heidegger. In the back of her book Carlisle provides the student with a useful list of further reading on each of the topics covered.

As for criticism, this book could have connected Kierkegaard's thought to contemporary debate about his work. For instance, devoting the amount of attention to the topics of subjectivity and truth that Carlisle does would have provided an ideal occasion to outline how different interpretative approaches, e.g., post-modern (Roger Poole); Wittgensteinian (James Conant, D.Z. Phillips, Stephen Mulhall); and pragmatist (Peter J. Mehl), stand on these issues. In addition, the dust-cover promises an assessment of Kierkegaard's influence on Wittgenstein which is mysteriously absent from the text itself.

In summation, this book is clearly written, and provides the student with a rounded introduction to the multifaceted nature of Kierkegaard's thought in its philosophical, theological, and psychological aspects. It will, I should think, count along with C. Stephen Evans' *Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript* and John Lippitt's *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling* — all texts that come highly recommended on the Kierkegaard reading list.

Jamie Turnbull
University of Hertfordshire

John W. Cook
The Undiscovered Wittgenstein: The Twentieth Century's Most Misunderstood Philosopher.
New York: Humanity Books 2005.
Pp. 437.
US$59.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-1-59102-257-2).

Cook's third book, *The Undiscovered Wittgenstein,* continues the development of his idiosyncratic reading of Wittgenstein. In these works Cook claims to present an entirely novel account of Wittgenstein's fundamental conceptions, thereby removing much misunderstanding which surrounds them. Evidently Cook has devoted considerable time, effort, and thought to an interpretative project which the overwhelming majority of Wittgenstein scholars would regard as deeply misguided.

In his first book, *Wittgenstein's Metaphysics* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1994) he argued that Wittgenstein's views are less distinctive and perplexing than they are frequently taken to be. According to Cook Wittgenstein was principally an empiricist whose fundamental positions were

primarily appropriated from earlier thinkers in that tradition. He adopted a theory of meaning in order to reconcile empiricism and ordinary language by asserting that when the two conflicted the latter must be regarded as misleading. The empiricist standpoint of the *Tractatus*, which significantly affects the account of language presented there, remains unchanged in the *Philosophical Investigations*. For Cook Wittgenstein's central metaphysical theory of neutral monism remained virtually unchanged after 1916. He espoused phenomenalism and behaviourism. The difference between Wittgenstein's earlier and later philosophy is primarily constituted by the post-1930 change in the form of reductionism, which he favoured. His perspective on language and philosophy is little more than a generalisation of Berkeley's position.

Cook's second book *Wittgenstein: Language and Empiricism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000) built on this interpretative framework by maintaining that the neutral monism which Wittgenstein advocated essentially equated to the sort of phenomenalism which Berkeley propounded. He argued that Wittgenstein undertook metaphysical ordinary language philosophy as he reduced ordinary language to the phenomenalist language of sense-data. In Part 1 of *The Undiscovered Wittgenstein* the first three chapters reiterate the readings of Wittgenstein as an advocate of empiricism, neutral monism, phenomenalism and behaviourism, but they provide little amplification, with the exception of some extra support for these claims. In Chapter 4 Cook asserts that Wittgenstein steadfastly supported the Verifiability Principle of Meaning and that its congruence with his other ideas is evident. He devotes much effort to the attempt to demonstrate how all the positions which Wittgenstein held fit together consistently.

Cook's account of Wittgenstein as predominantly an empiricist differs from the vast majority of other scholarly interpretations. He resolutely reads many passages from Wittgenstein to support his position and judges other commentators by the extent to which they share his perspective. Cook has read Wittgenstein extensively but mistakenly adopts the standpoint that the latter is presenting philosophical theories instead of methodologies for dissolving philosophical problems. As such his perspective is directly opposed to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as therapy. Cook is unconcerned about frequently taking passages out of context despite the fact that much recent Wittgenstein scholarship indicates the problems associated with this kind of exegetical approach. He appears to presume that his favoured empiricist interpretation must have textual support in Wittgenstein's writings regardless of how well hidden it might be. Cook reads passages in whatever manner — no matter how peculiar – is required to make them fit with his view of Wittgenstein.

The second part is devoted to the application of Cook's empiricist interpretation to selected aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy, namely unconscious thought, conceptual relativism, language-games, and objectivity in science. The fundamental theme of these chapters is that reading Wittgenstein as Cook prefers resolves the problems which have surrounded these issues. He

asserts that even commentators who endorse his account of Wittgenstein as essentially an empiricist have not fully appreciated his commitment to phenomenalism, which led him to reduce grammar to phenomena. In the first chapter in this part Cook alleges that Wittgenstein's remarks about William James on the word and Freud on unconscious thought clearly indicate phenomenalist stance he took. The next chapter presents Cook's view that Wittgenstein's conceptual relativism is an implication of his phenomenalism. This is obviously an incorrect reading of Wittgenstein and Cook's justification for it is wholly unsatisfactory. In the chapters on language-games Cook claims that Wittgenstein thought both real and invented language-games can be reduced to behaviourism. He develops this account by alleging that the basis of language-games is behaviourism.

In Part 3 Cook uses his empiricist perspective to interpret and assess the writings of Wittgenstein and certain Wittgensteinians (Peter Winch, D.Z. Phillips and O.K. Bouwsma) on magic and religious beliefs. He argues that Wittgenstein regarded description as pure only if it accords with the requirements of empiricism. Cook claims that bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use is to return them from a non-empirical to an empirical employment. He maintains that Wittgenstein dealt with philosophical difficulties about magic and religious beliefs by resorting to reductionist solutions. In the chapter on primitive practices Cook regards Wittgenstein and Winch has having emotivist rather than instrumentalist views. He criticises this position by citing persuasive anthropological evidence that primitive people are instrumentalists. According to Cook, Wittgenstein's phenomenalism governed his account of religious language. Since there is nothing beyond phenomena themselves it follows that there is no transcendent God. Religious language expresses an attitude towards life and is particular to certain communities. Cook criticises Wittgenstein for being deceived by his own metaphysical views into incorrectly rejecting the idea that religious language is about the transcendent, when an examination of the usage of believers indicates that it is.

Cook's interpretation of Wittgenstein contains internal contradictions, such as that of subscribing to both neutral monism and conceptual relativism, and so he mistakenly implies that Wittgenstein did not take consistency seriously. The fundamental error of the book lies in handling Wittgenstein's methods of philosophical therapy as though they were philosophical theories. Cook's work is an illustration of the kind of mistaken interpretation that can occur if there is a determined effort to find philosophical theories, and its value lies in demonstrating the error of adopting this approach.

Mark Addis
Birmingham City University

In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle suggests that Plato's theory of Forms was motivated by Socrates' quest for definitions: 'Plato accepted [Socrates'] teaching [about definitions], but held that the problem applied not to any sensible thing but to entities of a different kind . . . . Things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were apart from these, and were all called after these; for the multitude of things which have the same name as the Form exist by participation in it' (*Metaph* 987b4-10). Correspondingly, Dancy begins his investigation into Plato's theory of Forms by examining those Platonic dialogues that are commonly, though not universally, regarded as Plato's early dialogues, in which the character Socrates is represented as seeking definitions of properties such as courage and beauty. With great attention to often unnoticed detail, Dancy examines scores of Socrates' refutations of his interlocutors' efforts to define these properties, in order to discover implicit assumptions that Socrates is making about the objects of these definitions.

Dancy's methodology is exceedingly careful. He first rehearses in detail the moves that Socrates makes in a particular refutation, next notices a puzzling gap in the reasoning, and then attempts to discover the weakest implicit assumption about the conditions on adequate definitions that would fill this gap. Dancy's hypothesis about the unstated assumption is then further confirmed by the discovery that this same assumption closes gaps in several other texts. In this way, Dancy reveals Socrates' commitment to the following three assumptions about adequate definitions: 1) the *substitutivity requirement* that the definition of F-ness specify necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being F (81-2); 2) the *paradigm requirement* that the definition provide a model by which the applicability of 'F' can be determined (115), and 3) the *explanatory requirement* that the definition explain why F things count as F (135). When these assumptions are combined with further assumptions about causality and about the 'relativity' of the attribution of at least certain predicates to ordinary physical objects, we get the distinctively Platonic forms of the *Phaedo* and *Symposium*, which, on Dancy's view, are imperceptible (245-8), other-worldly (283, 305) objects that are 'related to the things we see, hear, etc., by having in a superlative degree the same features that these things have' (282), and by being causally responsible for the features that these things have (291-313). Though his arguments do not presuppose the truth of Aristotle's thesis that Plato's Theory of the Forms developed out of Socrates' quest for adequate definitions, Dancy is quite right to suggest that his conclusions about the ontological commitments implicit in these dialogues lend additional support to it (2).

In this short review, I cannot possibly do justice to Dancy's intricate and painstaking arguments for his conclusions. Each of his detailed textual analyses contains often surprising insights into texts that have already been subject to thorough interpretive scouring. Whether one is primarily interested in the ethics or the metaphysics of the early dialogues, no one should ignore Dancy's examination of these texts. And to anyone who has been tempted, as I have been, to 'rewrite Socrates' arguments for him so that he is only committed to what we all know and love as 'platonism'' (282), I strongly recommend Dancy's study as a helpful antidote.

In the preface, Dancy thanks the referees at Cambridge University Press for recommending two ways of shortening his manuscript that was 'far too long' (xi). 'Far too long' for whom? For serious scholars of Plato — surely Dancy's most likely audience — this book is far too short to be fully satisfying.

First, the referees at Cambridge recommended that Dancy drop his discussion of the *Republic* (xi). I am astounded by this advice. Even a superficial treatment of Plato's theory of Forms must include some discussion of the passages about the Forms in the *Republic*. In such a thorough treatment of every other relevant text of Plato's early and middle period, the omission is all the more glaring. I doubt that this evidence would significantly threaten Dancy's conclusions, but other scholars will certainly disagree. For all of us, it would have been nice to see how such a competent scholar would have handled it. Hopefully, a book, or at least a very long article, on the *Republic* is forthcoming.

Second, they advised Dancy to 'curtail references to the secondary literature' (xi). Again, for Dancy's likely audience, a more thorough discussion of the secondary literature would have been most valuable. From his ample list of citations, it is obvious that Dancy has mastered the extensive secondary literature on this topic. Such a scholar is in a particularly privileged position to explain where his views fit in the interpretative debate and why we should prefer his views to those of others.

The third omission was apparently Dancy's own choice. Even though he is unusually generous in his examination of nearly every refutation of almost every definition in the early dialogues (and, for this reason alone Dancy's book is an essential reference), his conclusions are remarkably restrained. As he understands his project, he seeks only to determine the minimal assumptions about definitions and the Forms that are presupposed by the arguments that we find in Plato's texts. So, for example, Dancy recognizes that his discussion of the language of participation in the *Protagoras* will raise questions about Plato's ontological commitments when he wrote the dialogue. Yet Dancy adamantly resists such questions: 'Was Plato thinking about the question of what transmitting participation consists in when he wrote this? Did he have a theory of causality in mind? I haven't the faintest idea. Nothing in the dialogue requires it' (188). It is hard enough, Dancy often explains, to understand the logic of the arguments and the theories required by them, much more to attempt to reconstruct Plato's own philosophical reasoning

(11, 247). It *is* hard, and the value of Dancy's meticulous and sober (but often quite witty) treatment of these arguments should not be underestimated. Perhaps it would have been reckless for Dancy to have speculated further about Plato's reasoning or out of place for him to have shared his own philosophical insights into these matters, but I suspect that many readers who have a genuine philosophical interest in the nature of moral properties will be frustrated by his remarkable self-control. Having been exposed to Dancy's many insights, one imagines, as Socrates' interlocutors often did, that he knows much more than he is telling us, and that we would have benefited a great deal from his having shared just a bit more.

Jyl Gentzler
Amherst College

When offering a critical assessment of an uncommonly original philosophy, method is often as important as content. This collection of eight critical essays concerning Jorge J. E. Gracia's approach to metaphysics is methodologically arranged so as to allow Gracia himself to respond in turn to each of his interlocutors. The first ten chapters are comprised of five exchanges concerning the nature of metaphysics. Gracia, professor of philosophy at State University of New York at Buffalo and a prolific author, has argued at length that metaphysics is ultimately a categorical inquiry into the foundations of all knowledge. In his seminal work *Metaphysics and its Task: The Search for Categorical Foundations of Knowledge* (1999), around which this collection of essays revolves, Gracia makes it clear that he does not presume to propose an entirely novel definition of metaphysics. Rather, his primary interest is in arranging into a single conceptual framework the plethora of attempts to identify the fundamental task of metaphysics. The keystone is an accurate analysis of the ways in which various types of predication permit us to classify and organize our collective experience into a meaningful whole. In short, metaphysics cannot be a particular science, for a particular science focuses on one or another type of predication. But neither can metaphysics be,

strictly speaking, the study of being as being, for there is no clear conception of 'being' apart from 'being-in-a-certain-way'.

It is Garcia's diminution of the idea of being as being that contributors to this volume find most disconcerting. By folding the study of being as being into the study of its most general categories, Gracia seems to betray a long history of traditional Western metaphysics beginning with Aristotle. Thomas Sullivan and Russell Pannier argue that downplaying the investigation into being as being as well as the nature of transcendental properties such as goodness and truth sets severe limits on the metaphysical enterprise. In his response to Sullivan and Pannier, Gracia reasserts that he has no intention to exclude the study of being as being from metaphysics, but only to clarify that such a study must itself be described in categorical terms, for there is no other path toward an ultimate foundation of knowledge. Gracia points out that even Aristotle and Aquinas prove incapable of speaking of being as being in pure isolation, for they must rely on the notions of essence, accident, individuals, and other categories that endow 'being' with meaningful content, even when this content is the most general of categories. In Chapter 3, Josef Seifert offers an even stronger counterclaim to Gracia, arguing that the *only* way to understand metaphysics' ultimate task is in terms of being as being. Seifert shows that Aristotle's painstaking analysis of primary and secondary substance was clearly an attempt to penetrate being as being rather than any particular mode of being, no matter how general. He criticizes Gracia's alleged 'neutrality' in regard to the activity of metaphysics. For Gracia, metaphysical thinking does not center exclusively on linguistic, conceptual, hypothetical, or real being. Seifert argues that such neutrality actually obfuscates the very categories Gracia strives to elucidate. Gracia responds that Seifert has seriously misunderstood what he means by predication. While having a semantic function, the significance of predication is by no means exhausted by its semantic function. Predicates do not merely express 'properties', but an identity within non-identity, no matter what particular or general category is under consideration.

Jonathan Sanford examines Gracia's claims specifically through the lens of Aristotle. He explains how Aristotle distinguished between a categorical investigation of the nature of predicates and metaphysics as the study of being as being. The pure study of how subject and predicate relate falls under logic. A close examination of genera and species is the business of natural philosophy. Yet, Sanford argues, Aristotle wrestled with the idea of a further overarching wisdom that identified being as its proper object. Indeed, such a unique form of knowledge is implied throughout Aristotle's treatment of *ousia*. In his rebuttal, Gracia states rather starkly that Sanford makes a fatal mistake in 'that he unjustifiably narrows the object of metaphysics to being. He needs to be liberated from the yoke that Aristotle put on the discipline more than 2,000 years ago' (74).

Robert Delfino and Peter Redpath round out the main section of this volume with an assessment of Gracia's metaphysics in the light of neo-Thomism. Delfino finds merit it the breadth of Gracia's categorical approach to meta-

physics, but he faults him for a lack of unified vision stemming from his insufficient respect for *ens commune*. Delfino notes that traditional Western metaphysics has been just as attentive to the commonality of being as it has to the diversity of being. Peter Redpath is a bit less sympathetic to Gracia's efforts for metaphysical neutrality and inclusivity. He argues that such predispositions tend to mask what is ultimately a common-language approach to metaphysics, which, as Delfino similarly holds, corrodes the unified vision of science so vitally necessary for metaphysics.

Two essays, furnished by John Kronen and Daniel Novotny, turn to closer comparisons of Gracia with the less metaphysically inclined thinkers Albrecht Ritschl and David Hume. These two serve as a foil against which alternative categorical approaches to philosophy either lead toward or away from a general metaphysical theory. Gracia responds that Ritschl, Hume, and other critics of traditional metaphysics were actually rejecting an overly narrow conception of metaphysics which had evolved out of Aristotle. In trying to isolate being as being, traditional metaphysics had set itself up for the Humean accusation of vacuity, which in turn paved the way to succeeding extreme forms of empiricism.

This volume's subtitle well summarizes the debate uniting all of its essays: if metaphysics aims to study being as being, is it possible to transcend specific and general categories of being? Is it possible to remain neutral in respect to types of being at the outset, or does the basic distinction between the real and the non-real underpin it from the very beginning? This book exemplifies the civility that should characterize the debate without in any way sacrificing the seriousness with which it must be engaged.

Daniel B. Gallagher
Sacred Heart Major Seminary

It is remarkable that after all this time we have still not gotten Spinoza's God right, especially considering Spinoza's pronouncement in the *Ethics* that 'the human Mind has an adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence' (2p47). Deveaux takes this thought seriously and endeavors with careful and painstaking analysis to build up to an understanding of 'the essence

of Spinoza's God'. the title of the seventh and last chapter of the book that could equally serve as an alternative title for the whole meticulous study.

Deveaux offers scholars a significant new interpretation of Spinoza's God that challenges and ultimately rejects the interpretations of Jonathan Bennett, Edwin Curley, Alan Donagan, H. F. Hallett, and Steven Parchment. She shows how these interpretations involve insoluble problems, while her interpretation, which is indebted to Michael Della Rocca, can avoid these problems. This is a stimulating work, particularly for those attracted by the profundity of the metaphysics and vision of God found in Spinoza's *Ethics*, as was Albert Einstein, who remarked, 'the God I believe in is the God of Spinoza.' How can we know this God?

Deveaux begins with the 'general consensus among Spinoza scholars' that 'God is somehow identical with the attributes' (4). Understanding 'the relation of God to the attributes' is the first of three central interrelated problems explained in Chapter 1. The second problem involves understanding God's essence, and the third, most challenging problem is understanding 'the true conception of God'.

The focus of Chapter 2 is on Bennett's 'God is the thing that has attributes and modes as properties' interpretation. On this view, 'God is not the attributes' (13); they are not identical. Instead, the attributes *express* the abstract modes or 'the trans-attribute differentiae,' which form the essence of God. While Deveaux agrees with Bennett that God is not identical with the attributes and that God is not identical with God's essence (if it were Spinoza's definition of 'essence' at 2d2 would be vacuous), she explains that Bennett's view 'has the distinct disadvantage that the trans-attribute differentiae are not conceivable' (54), which makes Spinoza's claim 'that the human intellect has an adequate idea of the essence of God' (55) highly questionable.

Deveaux examines the 'God is the collection of attributes' interpretation held by Curley and Donagan in Chapter 3. One major difficulty of this view is that if God is identical to the collection of attributes, then God is a divisible entity, for 'the attributes are really distinct from one another' (55). The second major difficulty is how we can adequately conceive the collection of infinite attributes, when we can only conceive the two attributes of thought and extension. Neither Curley nor Donagan explain how the conception of one attribute, whether it is merely 'an essence' of God or 'pertains to' the essence of God, can result in the adequate conception of God as a collection of attributes (58).

Chapter 4 discusses the 'God is the totality of attributes' interpretation held by Hallett and Parchment. Although this interpretation avoids the problem of God's divisibility that arises on the 'bundle theory' conception, it does so through Hallett's somewhat puzzling view that 'the attributes are indiscerptible' or inseparable in God, whereas in the human intellect they are discerptible (36). Again, considering that for Spinoza 'the attributes are really distinct from one another,' Hallett's view is 'a metaphysical impossibility' (59). In a more recent work, Parchment similarly 'claims that God . . . is a *unity* of all possible attributes' (41). Deveaux carefully considers the several

interpretive possibilities that this view invokes and raises appropriate questions, e.g., 'How do the attributes of thought and extension, for example, combine in such a way as to become indistinct from one another in the totality?' (52) and 'What is a totality of attributes that has no attributes as parts?' (53). Ultimately, this view is also found to be mistaken.

Following the discussion of failed views, Deveaux faces the serious challenge to provide an interpretation that consistently accounts for the attributes, God's essence, and an indivisible God. That 'a thing and its essence are not identical' (77) is key to Deveaux's argument. What is the essence of God, and what is God?

Based on Part 1, Prop. 34 Deveaux argues that 'God's essence is absolutely infinite and eternal power' (78, 93). Thus neither God nor God's essence is defined by the attributes as commonly considered. Instead, God is a being that *has* infinite attributes, and these attributes *express* the essence of God. In this way, the problems regarding the relation of God to the attributes and the essence of God are solved. What about the weightiest of the three problems, namely 'the true conception of God'? Here we must be very careful, as Deveaux undoubtedly is when she distinguishes between *de re* and *de dicto* conceptions of God. Surely, it is one thing to conceive God as an ideality defined in language and something quite different to conceive God, the thing, itself. Is a *de re* conception of God possible? Deveaux answers this question affirmatively by following Spinoza's definition of 'essence' in Part 2, Def. 2, and by arguing that when we understand the attributes of either thought or extension as expressions of God's absolute and infinite power (the essence of God), the result is an adequate idea of God.

Unsurprisingly, grasping the adequate idea of God is the most difficult part of Deveaux's argument, which seemingly goes beyond Spinoza's claim in Part 2, Prop. 47 that we can know God's essence, since Deveaux shows that for Spinoza, 'God cannot be identical with God's essence' (106). If this is so, then how can it be that 'when the essence of God is given, God is given' (107)? In the concluding discussion of 'the true conception of God' (108-11) and 'the *de re* idea of God' (118-19) the focus is not on 'God' but 'God's essence'. This may lead readers to wonder whether perhaps we can have an idea of God's essence but not God itself, for as Spinoza suggestively writes in Letter 36, God is a Being 'which is absolutely indeterminate.'

Michael Strawser
University of Central Florida

This book, a lightly revised version of the Gifford Lectures given at St Andrews University in 1996, is an overview of Dummett's metaphysics. Since the author is Dummett (who probably knows his work better than anyone else), and since Dummett is almost certainly the greatest living metaphysician, it provides a substantial service to the philosophical community. Perhaps not until now has it been apparent how novel and radical is Dummett's metaphysical position.

For Dummett, the aim of metaphysics is to determine what sorts of facts obtain. He quotes with approval the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*: 'The world is the totality of facts, not of things.' He rejects Russell's view that facts are external components of reality and the Fregean position that facts (Frege's 'thoughts') exist as immaterial objects in a special realm. Facts are simply true propositions. Propositions are abstracted from our linguistic practices. So the proposition that snow is white is simply an abstraction from the use of the English sentence 'Snow is white', the French sentence '*La neige est blanc*', etc. In maintaining that the aim of metaphysics is to determine what sorts of facts obtain, that is, to determine what kinds of propositions are true, Dummett gives us a Copernican revolution in metaphysics. Traditional metaphysics asks what sorts of things exist and only then moves to semantic questions about what sorts of propositions are true. In Dummett's view, we must begin with semantic questions. Only then can we determine what sorts of things exist. His reason for reversing traditional metaphysics is that we can decide what exists only by 'adverting to the character of the propositions we take as holding good of reality [i.e., true]' (14). Consequently, we need to start with true propositions. We can determine what sorts of propositions are true without first knowing what is real. This is done, most importantly, by means of a theory of meaning that gives an account of what a speaker's understanding consists in.

One might wonder, Dummett acknowledges, why 'mere *language*' (20) provides a guide to reality. The answer begins with the hypothesis that (natural) language is the medium of our thought and of our representation of the world. We can think only what we can express in language. One might then wonder why what we are capable of thinking about is a guide to what exists. Dummett's answer reminds us that reality is constituted by facts, and facts are true propositions. To 'enquire what facts there are is to enquire what thoughts that we can grasp are true' (23). This leads Dummett to a kind of linguistic idealism. He tells us that 'objects . . . spring into existence' as we look for them and 'Our world is . . . constituted by what we know of it or could

have known of it' (92). This is certainly a radical position, but it is a little less radical than it may, at first, seem. The reality of which Dummett speaks is, in Kant's terminology, the phenomenal world: the world 'in so far as we apprehend it and are capable of coming to apprehend it' (23). He adds that, 'a reality that we can never apprehend . . . is a phantasm' (22). Only later does Dummett return to a consideration of noumena.

Having maintained that semantics is more fundamental than metaphysics, Dummett turns to consider meaning and truth. Take any (contingently) true sentence. It might have been false under different circumstances. The truth conditions of the sentence could not, however, have changed without its meaning changing. Dummett concludes that the concepts of truth and meaning are inextricably linked and must be explained together. He rejects minimalism on the grounds that its conception of truth is too impoverished to explain meaning. He also rejects truth-conditional theories of meaning, according to which to understand a sentence is to know how things must be in the world if it is true. Dummett asks us to notice that this is a piece of theoretical knowledge, or 'knowledge that'. For him, the problem with any truth-conditional theory is that, since the understanding of a sentence consists in theoretical knowledge, the theory must be circular.

Dummett's argument runs like this. A sentence is an expression of a piece of theoretical knowledge, and a theory of meaning aims to tell us what the sentence means (and, consequently, what the knowledge is). A truth-conditional theory of meaning, in attempting to tell us what the sentence means, provides us with another piece of theoretical knowledge (knowledge of what the original sentence means). Since a theory of meaning must give us a general account of the meaning of all sentences of a language, we need an account of what the sentence means that gives the meaning of the original sentence. From the perspective of a truth-conditional theory of meaning, the meaning of this sentence can be specified only by means of the original sentence. Hence the theory is circular.

Justificationism is Dummett's alternative theory of meaning. According to this, 'the understanding of a sentence . . . is to be taken to consist in an ability, when suitably placed, to recognize whether it is true or false' (59). This is held to be the only non-circular theory available. This theory of meaning has a corresponding conception of truth: to say that a sentence is true is to say that it is justifiable. Dummett is not certain how radically this position should be interpreted. In his Dewey Lectures, published as *Truth and the Past* (2003), a sentence is true iff '*anyone suitably placed in time and space*' could establish it to 'hold good'. In the Gifford Lectures, a sentence is true iff '*we*, as we are or were, are or were in a position' to establish that it holds good (vii-viii). Either conception is an epistemic or anti-realist conception of truth that leads to a rejection of the principle of bivalence. The Gifford Lecture conception of truth leads to the rejection of the principle for more classes of sentences. A lengthy discussion of sentences about the past is used to illustrate justificationist semantics. In the chapter devoted to past tense sentences the differences between the Gifford and Dewey Lectures emerges clearly.

Dummett uses his general metaphysical position to address specific metaphysical questions. For example, he gives us an argument against determinism. Determinism begins from the view that specific initial conditions, combined with laws of nature, will ineluctably lead to specific future events. Dummett's argument against determinism rests on the view that the supposition of specific initial conditions is 'a realist fantasy' (87), because we can never measure any magnitude (say a quantity of mass) with full precision, but only within certain parameters. Consequently, (given Dummett's account of truth) there is no true proposition about the precise magnitude of any quantity. Therefore, (given Dummett's metaphysics) there is no fact about the precise magnitude of any quantity. Since there is no fact about the precise magnitude of any quantity, the specific conditions presupposed by determinism do not exist. Consequently, from a given state of the world, any number of possible outcomes may ensue. Determinists are unlikely to be persuaded by this argument since they will likely deny that our inability to determine precise initial conditions proves that such conditions do not exist.

In the final chapter, Dummett offers a proof for God's existence that is an updated version of the one Berkeley offers in *Three Dialogues*. First we get something very like Berkeley's account of matter: 'for matter and radiation to exist is for it to be possible to perceive them or to infer their presence' (97). Dummett recognizes that his view seems to lead to the conclusion that each of us lives in a different world: beings (such as animals and, perhaps, aliens) with cognitive and perceptual capacities other than ours 'must inhabit different worlds from ours' (96). At the same time, Dummett wishes to preserve the common sense view that we and other beings inhabit the same world, a world in itself. It makes no sense to speak of a world that exists independently of how it is apprehended, so the common world must be apprehended by some mind. This mind does not apprehend the world in some particular way, but as it is. This mind is God. The argument can be stated even more succinctly: without God, 'no room remains for distinguishing the world as it is in itself from the world as we experience it' (96). In Dummett's view, we must make this distinction. Otherwise, we are left with 'a jumble of different worlds' (101). Therefore, God exists. Dummett gives additional arguments for believing in a creator God, with volition and motive. Realists who believe in mind- and language-independent existence, will find this argument unpersuasive. Anti-realists prepared to do without any *Ding an sich* will be similarly unmoved.

This book is the product of a mature philosopher prepared to stake out a radical position, even if it is unlikely to find favor among many of its readers. It is also the work of one of the great philosophers of our time. As such, everyone interested in metaphysics and philosophy of language should read it. It ought to be in every library with the least pretension to support research in philosophy.

James O. Young
University of Victoria

Johann Gottlieb Fichte
The System of Ethics According to the
Principles of the Wissenschaftlehre.
Trans. and eds. Daniel Breazeale and Günter
Zöller. New York: Cambridge University
Press 2005. Pp. 446.
US$75.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-57140-1);
US$29.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-57767-0).

It has long been Fichte's misfortune to have fallen between Kant and Hegel
in the history of philosophy, and thus to have assumed the status of a bridge
between them that many have felt free simply to jump over. Within the past
generation, however, there has been a major revival of interest amongst both
Anglophone and continental European scholars. A reasonable date for its com-
mencement is 1964, when the Bavarian Academy of Sciences began its mod-
ern critical edition of *J.G. Fichte-Gesamtausgabe*; Volume 10, the last in the
series to include writings Fichte published himself, appeared in 2005. In 1987
the now flourishing Internationale Johann-Gottlieb-Fichte-Gesellschaft was
established, and in 2005-6 conferences and seminars devoted to Fichte's work
were held in locations as varied as London, Vienna, Berlin, and Poitiers.

This translation of the *System der Ethik* (1798) for the series Cambridge
Texts in the History of Philosophy is a major milestone in this ongoing re-
vival. It is the first in English since 1897, and the editors could hardly be bet-
ter suited to their work. Breazeale was a co-founder of the North American
Fichte society (1991), and co-edited *Fichte: Historical Contexts/Contemporary
Perspectives* (1994); Zöller, as well as being one of the editors of the *Gesam-
tausgabe*, is author of *Fichte's Transcendental Philosophy* (1998). The results
go a considerable way towards re-establishing Fichte in the eyes of English
readers as what he always claimed himself to be, a major philosopher in his
own right, and not merely a disciple of Kant.

The importance of the volume is underlined by the fact that the *System
of Ethics* is only one of several of Fichte's works recently to have received a
fresh English rendering. The *Foundations of Natural Right*, which immedi-
ately preceded the *Ethics*, has already appeared in the same series (2000),
and the private lectures Fichte gave in Berlin in 1804 on the *Wissenschaft-
slehre* have just been edited as *The Science of Knowing* (2005). Moreover,
these volumes will shortly be followed by a collection of texts on *The Atheism
Dispute* which cost Fichte his position at Jena in 1799, and his *Addresses to
the German Nation* (1808), again to be published in the Cambridge series.

Somewhat belatedly, then, Fichte seems to have assumed the place in the
canon which he coveted. Indeed, there can be no doubt of the importance of
his response to Kant, whose fundamental mistake, he believed, was to have
left morality and the will marooned in the mysterious unknowable world of
things in themselves. Fichte was convinced that the conditions of this hith-
erto noumenal world were as susceptible of articulation as the categories
Kant had shown to underpin the world of sense experience. Accordingly, the

first two parts of the *Ethics*, slightly less than half of the whole, were devoted to a deduction of the principle of morality from the nature of the 'I', and to a demonstration of its reality in experience.

This 'I', or ego, was entirely distinct from the 'I' of ordinary experience; it was accessible only to transcendental philosophy, and encompassed what is normally called the objective or natural world as well as the subjective world of the self with which the 'I' is ordinarily associated. These intricate pages on the necessary occurrence of the self-division of this transcendental ego, and the resulting emergence of a realm of rational and universal freedom with a distinctive structure of its own to set alongside the realm of natural necessity, represented a genuine advance on Kant, and without Fichte's work a variety of later philosophical movements — including Absolute Idealism, phenomenology, and existentialism — would have lacked a rich source of inspiration.

The third and final part of the work applied the conclusions of the earlier sections to the conditions of Fichte's own society, and his philosophical brilliance is less and less in evidence as it progresses. Arguing that the moral law dictates that 'for every determinate human being, in each situation, only one determinate something is in accord with duty' (158), Fichte proposed an ethic that he himself acknowledged was really a version of Protestantism (233), with all the dogmatic encumbrances that entailed. He unintentionally left open paths to moralism (or worse, moral fanaticism) in insisting that conscience offered an absolute criterion of correctness in respect to one's duties (159), and to self-disgust in his belief that enjoyment of the body, its use as anything other than a tool of the moral law, was absolutely prohibited.

Declarations like 'In its raw state, a woman's sexual drive is the most repugnant and disgusting thing that exists in nature, and at the same time it indicates the absolute absence of all morality' (312-13) may well strike contemporary readers as saying more about Fichte himself than about their subject-matter, something that is all the more ironic because Fichte achieved an insight into the nature of the self unsurpassed until Nietzsche and Freud nearly a century later. What Fichte was opposing, of course, was the hedonistic eudaimonism of Helvetius; but what he fell back on ultimately was a parochial Christianised variety of Platonism, as unsuited to the eighteenth century as it is to the twenty-first (307, 337).

As well as the obvious benefit of a translation that renders Fichte into English as lucidly as possible given the nature of the text on which it is based, anyone using this edition will have the advantage of a short but insightful editorial introduction that sets the *Ethics* in the context of Fichte's own life, works, and relationship to Kant; a chronology of his writings; useful suggestions for further reading; an extensive glossary covering both German-English and English-German terms, occupying some thirty pages; and last but by no means least, a comprehensive index. The whole work has been prepared to the highest standards, and should do countless inquiring students and grateful scholars sterling service for generations to come.

Luke O'Sullivan

Stephen J. Finn
Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of
Natural Philosophy.
New York: Continuum 2006.
Pp. 192.
US$130.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-8642-4).

This book aims to interpret some aspects of Hobbes' natural philosophy from a political perspective. Instead of considering, as many commentators have done so far, the influence of natural philosophy on Hobbesian moral and political views, Finn approaches the question from the opposite direction and suggests that politics influenced Hobbes' conception of science. This method is clearly indebted to the on-going debate in the sociology of science and, more precisely, to Shapin and Schaffer's sociological approach to the Hobbes and Boyle controversy over experimentation (and the famous air-pump). Three major positions divide sociologists and Hobbes' commentators: a) non-epistemic factors can explain natural sciences (the strong thesis in the sociology of science); b) only epistemic factors can (the rationality thesis), with the possibility of introducing non-epistemic factors, when rationality fails (the 'arationality assumption' [22]); c) there is no priority of either epistemic or non-epistemic factors in explaining Hobbes' scientific beliefs (the 'neutral programme' [23]). Finn favors the third. This choice explains why Finn's main reference is not to *Leviathan and the Air-Pump* (which he wrongly, and embarrassingly, attributes to 'Shapin and Shapiro' throughout the book), but to an article by W. T. Lynch (*Studies in the History of the Philosophy of Science* 22 [2], 1991). Lynch's paper affirms that Hobbes' political agenda helps us understand why Hobbes adopts philosophical views that are obviously contrary to his premises in natural philosophy. Finn follows this 'middle path' (23), while introducing two changes to Lynch's hypotheses. First, the causal factor is no longer Hobbes' political agenda, i.e., 'his practical goals' (66), but his political philosophy, i.e., 'the theoretical goals of his political science' (66). Second, the effect of this non-epistemic factor is no longer to be found in Hobbesian mechanics (as in Lynch's paper), but in the Hobbesian views on truth, nominalism and reason.

Chapter 2 provides a summary of the traditional interpretation of Hobbes' philosophical system; in fact, it is mainly a survey description of some of Hobbes' works, with some remarks on textual difficulties, and a particular emphasis on political philosophy. The way Finn deals with the tricky problem of the *Short Tract*'s authorship is emblematic of his method in general: after discussing both Tönnies' attribution of the work to Hobbes and Tuck's rejection of this, Finn opts for a third solution, that of Martinich, who acknowledges that the *Short Tract* reflects ideas that may have been shared by the young Hobbes, even if there is no conclusive evidence that they are the 'actual product of the philosopher' (34).

Chapter 3 is more specifically about Hobbes' 'political agenda', of which it says that it is entirely consistent from the first literary works to the last,

and that it combines with the political philosophy proper to form a set of coherent political 'ideas' (96). In fact, according to Finn, Hobbes' political goals emerge mainly from his relatively late historical and juridical works, *Behemoth* and *A Dialogue of the Common Laws*. The historical setting thus appears to be defined from the beginning of Hobbes' literary career onwards by three major antagonists: priests (both Presbyterians and Catholics), Aristotelians, and Common Lawyers. As the perspective is said to be 'historical', it would have been useful to know more of the 'history' in this historical background.

This would have been all the more helpful since the main thesis of Chapter 4 is that the traditional interpretation, that gives priority to natural philosophy in Hobbes' philosophical system, 'fails to recognize,' says Finn, 'the implications of the historical priority of the political ideas' (100). By contrast, Finn wants to show that the first chapters of *Leviathan* on sensation, thought, language, truth and reason are 'themselves inherently political' (100), that is, they depend on Hobbes' political ideas. The crux of the proof is the idea that Hobbes' philosophy of mind depends on a materialist metaphysics that is itself motivated by the political will to win distance from the lure of religion. Anti-Aristotelianism and anti-Cartesianism in Hobbes both have the same goal, which is to combat philosophies countenancing immaterial beings, since non-corporeal beings exist in a realm that is parallel and subject to an alternative and divine authority that is thereby a rival to the sovereign. The critique of experience in *Leviathan* also has a political bias, since it can be read as a refutation of the epistemological basis of common law jurisprudence.

The last three chapters provide more evidence for the existence of a 'pattern of influence' between Hobbes' political ideas and his natural philosophy. The first piece of evidence is that the existence of two contradictory theories of truth in Hobbes' philosophy is due to the fact that, on the one hand, the conventional view — that truth is a coherent use of names arbitrarily defined — is supported by the political stance in favour of absolutism, since the king must be able to define, even without regard for truth, what 'justice', 'goodness', etc. are, if he wants to put an end to ideological conflicts; whereas, on the other hand, the adequation theory — that truth is based on the adequation of propositions to facts — relies on the belief that Hobbes' philosophy is adequate to reality, i.e. that justice, goodness, etc. are not defined arbitrarily simply for the sake of peace. Similarly, in Chapter 6, despite being supposed to have had good scientific reasons to reject nominalism (as his own geometry tends to prove), Hobbes is said to accept nominalism for political reasons, since absolutism, and the underlying voluntarism, are connected to nominalism. (Note here an interesting reflection on the medieval origins of Hobbesian voluntarism and the theology of omnipotence, 159-64.) By referring to the same political 'goal' of preserving the absolute sovereignty of the state, Chapter 7 explains the contradiction between a theory of reason as right reason and a theory of reason as arbitration: since absolutism requires that the king arbitrates between competing ideologies, it upholds a concep-

tion of reason as arbitration that opposes Hobbes' claim to have conceived the first true political philosophy.

There is obviously a lack of consistency in some parts of Hobbesian natural philosophy, and political reasons can perhaps explain some of it, but one may doubt that there is enough evidence to speak, as Finn does, of a 'politics' of truth, nominalism and reason.

Luc Foisneau
CNRS, Paris

Sean Gaston
The Impossible Mourning of Jacques Derrida.
New York: Continuum 2006.
Pp. 160.
US$29.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-9035-3).

Speaking of the irreducible unbridgeable *gap* left behind by the death of French philosopher-theorist Jacques Derrida in October 2004, in the opening remarks to this book, Gaston asks, 'How does one respond to the death of Jacques Derrida? How does one mourn for Derrida, who warned of the dangers of mourning (as idealisation and interiorisation), while insisting that mourning is, both unavoidable *and* impossible?' (25) His answer to this (of course) impossible question, laid bare in a philosophical diary of 52 days following Derrida's funeral, involves a detailed re-examination of his own Derridean inheritance. It is, at the same time, an examination of the very nature of mourning and an exploration of the gap(s) (*écarts*) and the history of the gap in Derrida's work.

In 'The Precedant (12-29 October 2004)', the first and shortest of three chapters, Gaston examines the phenomenon of the '*pre-*' as its appears in Derrida's work in relation to Plato, Kant, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger in particular. This is a meditation inaugurated in the gap and on the gap, which remarks (on) the absolute singularity of the other, on his or her absolute precedence, and thus on the heterogeneity of a *pre-* which both comes before me — before any present ('now' or in the past) — and comes from the future, as the future. Expressed here is an interminable openness to what is come (without *ends*). The chapter is thus a clever aside on what it is to write *after* Derrida both chronologically and spiritually/intellectually, when, as Derrida was always at pains to demonstrate, the possibility of 'making sense' or 'meaning-making' — of anything and anyone — is at the same time carried away by a disseminating force, by a de-ontologising *différance* which cannot

be tamed by recourse to immutable essences (Plato), to a priori conditions (Kant), to absolute knowledge (Hegel), to essential intuition (Husserl) or to gathering (Heidegger). The injunction is to live other-*wise* here, to 'Start with the gaps' (3), with a 'new understanding of writing that leaves you in tears, always' (2) and yet forms the *affirmative* condition of language and existence. Be faithful to Derrida (to whatever we inherit) but avoid as far as possible 'a "narcissistic pathos", a "reappropriation" and cannibalistic "consumption of the other" ' (2).

In the second chapter, 'Histories-Décalages (1-30 November 2004)', Gaston returns to Derrida's relationship with Hegel, referred to in *Of Grammatology* as 'the last philosopher of the book and the first thinker of writing.' The importance of Hegel for Derrida's reflexive, political and politicising position (as a man of the left) being that for all he finds antithetical in Hegel's conception of the end of history as absolute knowledge, Hegel is also the exemplary thinker of difference, of plurality, of becoming, of deviations, of *écarts*, which, *after Derrida*, form the unbridgeable gap between truth and time, whereby truth always *remains* to be thought, *without beginnings and without ends*. And as Gaston shows — recalling here Derrida's earliest deconstructive reading(s) of Husserl — for Derrida this bespeaks the fact that '[w]riting history can never be reduced simply to *either* a philosophy of history *or* a history of philosophy.' Instead, citing Derrida's contention that 'Genealogy cannot begin with the father' (*Glas* 6a), Gaston claims that for Derrida it is a 'history of *écarts* . . .' (30). As Gaston goes on to demonstrate with reference to *Spectres of Marx*, it is thus explicitly a matter of thinking another *historicity*, 'not a new history or still less a new "historicism", but another opening of event-ness as historicity . . . that permit[s] one not to renounce, but on the contrary to open up access to an affirmative thinking of the messianic and emancipatory promise as promise: as *promise* and not as onto-theological or teleo-eschatological design' (69-70). This is a universal messianic structure which escapes all *concrete* messianisms (religious and philosophical), a hospitality to the other for which, as Gaston's invocation of the Abrahamic inheritance shows, 'there is never enough time' (56).

Building on references in Chapter 2 to Austin, Cervantes, Coleridge and Shelley (amongst others), Chapter 3, 'The Gap Moves (1-17 December 2004)', focuses on Derrida's relationship to literature, in particular the relationship he perceived (and re-described) between literature and philosophy. Returning to the question 'How does one avoid the monu-memorialisation of Jacques Derrida?' Gaston continues: 'How does one write a *narrative* or a *story* even (*un récit*), of the work of Jacques Derrida after 8-9 October 2004?' (74), which remarks on the literary structure (in the widest sense) of all text(s) (fiction and non-fiction) and the spectral effects of writing in general ('As if I could avoid getting too close to spectres' [75]). Gaston proceeds to show how Derrida upsets the Platonic order of truth, the traditional interpretation of mimesis ('where the double comes *after* the simple, the imitation *after* the imitated' [84]), by following Plato's *own* (aporetic) reliance on writing, mythology and absence — the double, the imitation — to establish truth/pres-

ence in the first place (hence the locus of truth is shown to be no longer the *first place* but endlessly displaced, *disseminated*). Without simply collapsing philosophy into literature (or vice versa) Gaston reiterates the 'place of interest' Derrida identifies 'between literature and truth' (81) with discussions of autobiography, of the who or what of the diarist (e.g., in Elizabeth Bowen's *The Death of the Heart*), of writing with the date, of translation (with reference to Descartes), of the use of sympathy, empathy and the imagination in philosophical texts (in Kant, Rousseau and others), of the self-conscious 'content of the form' in the best literary texts, of the suspension of death in literature, of remembrance as an originary structure (*sans* origin) and much more; all of which help(s) to establish the limits of and between philosophy and literature as they have been traditionally understood, and to go beyond them, opening a new (and yet, paradoxically, the oldest) space for re-thinking our self-creations and human solidarities without foundation.

Gaston's book is a highly personal (and painful), challenging and complex work which despite a style eerily reminiscent of the master, and a notable lack of any criticism of the great man as such, still manages to avoid the monu-memorialisation of Jacques Derrida he so feared, and to offer even the initiated something new. As Gaston quotes approvingly in the course of the book, 'To write is always to rave, a little' (75), which can mean to show signs of madness, talking 'wildly, furiously, deliriously', or to be 'infatuated, laudatory, enthusiastic', to wander, stray, tear, pry, poke; Gaston does all of these things *after Derrida* and is to be applauded for it.

Sally Hart
University of Chichester, UK.

The issue of bioethics during armed conflict has received relatively little attention in the philosophical literature. This is odd in one sense since the acute need to develop an ethics of medical research on humans (and, derivatively, of the need to develop bioethics in general) was largely the result of the realization of the atrocities the Nazis committed during World War II in the

name of medical research. In another sense, however, it is understandable that little attention has been paid to the application of bioethics to armed conflict because many assume, along with Pellegrino and Thomasma, that 'the physician has ethical obligations that transcend self-interest, exigency, and even social, political and ethical forces' (1). As a result, many think that the moral principles that we typically employ in analyzing medical ethics — e.g., autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, justice, and so on — must apply more or less in the same way no matter what the circumstances. This is in fact the official position of the World Medical Association, which claims that 'medical ethics is the same in times of armed conflict as it is in peace time' (1).

According to Gross, this position is fundamentally wrong: while it is an overstatement to say he believes that war changes *everything,* he does believe that war changes a great deal. The reason for this is embedded within the notion of 'military necessity'. Although Gross never provides a succinct and proper definition of it, he thinks of military necessity as part of the 'ends and means of war necessary to preserve the welfare of the state, its army, and its citizens' (59). Hence, while not everything is legitimated under the rubric of military necessity, nations do have the right, under just war theory, to protect themselves and their legitimate interests. In this sense, military necessity 'reflects a concern for the collective welfare of the political community that reaches beyond individual well-being' (59). As such, it will 'sometimes override the normative force of deontological moral principles central to bioethics' (59).

In light of this, consider, e.g., the right to life, and the concomitant obligation of the state to protect the lives of its citizens. In war, states send young men (and increasingly, young women) into situations where it is a given that many will die. This will, of course, have dramatic consequences for bioethics in times of war. 'Ordinarily,' Gross says, 'individuals enjoy the right to receive medical care as an extension of their right to life' (43). But if their right to life is attenuated, then so too is their right to medical care. This, in turn, raises a whole host of other issues. Do we owe all our citizens, combatants and non-combatants alike, the same level of medical care? Or ought combatants receive priority? If they should, is this the result of a sense of obligation for the risk soldiers have placed themselves in for our protection? Or do we do it rather out of the utilitarian consideration that we get them back to the front to fight again? If we do it for the latter reason, how will this affect medical triage? Ought we to treat those soldiers first whom we can return to the front, or should we treat the more seriously wounded first, even though they will in all likelihood never be fit for combat again? What about medical treatment for our enemies, whether they be civilians, combatants, or terrorists? Do we owe them anything? Do we owe them the same treatment as our own civilians and combatants? Given all these difficult questions, we can see why Gross subtitled his book, 'the moral *dilemmas* of medicine and war' and why he also maintains that '[m]ilitary necessity, therefore, joins the pantheon of other principles that guide medicine and war as first among equals, and

forces the peculiar and noncaregiving dilemmas that characterize bioethics during armed conflict' (63).

In addition to these two dilemmas — the just distribution of medical resources in war (Chapter 3) and wartime triage (Chapter 5) — Gross deals with a number of others. In Chapter 4 he considers issues of patient autonomy for soldiers along with the derivative rights of informed consent, confidentiality and the right to die. He argues that considerations of utility and respect for individual autonomy flip-flop from peace to war. That is, in war respect for autonomy diminishes as 'patient rights pass from the hands of soldier patients to the hands of those charged with the collective welfare, with the expectation that costs to some individuals are offset by benefits to others' (136). In Chapter 6 he questions whether medical personnel can and/or ought to be considered as neutral in armed conflicts. He thinks, despite the belief of many that medical personnel are of course neutral, that such personnel actually face difficult dilemmas as they are pulled toward remaining neutral *and* toward 'civic responsibility' (210). That is, health care workers are citizens with obligations to their state as well as members of a particular profession with its own set of moral principles. The same sort of tension exists for health care workers when they consider whether torture or non-treatment (Chapter 7) or chemical and biological warfare (Chapter 8) are ever justified. Finally, in Chapter 9, Gross considers whether medicine is obligated to work actively towards peace.

Many readers will disagree with some or perhaps even all of Gross' conclusions, sometimes passionately so. I certainly would take issue with some of his claims regarding torture and chemical/biological warfare, and indeed also with his claim about the *novelty* of the threat posed by terrorism. Critics of his work, however, will have their work cut out for them because Gross displays considerable virtuosity with his subject matter as he navigates bioethics, ethical theory, the history of warfare, and contemporary geopolitics and presents incisive, penetrating and forceful arguments. As a result, I believe that this book is destined to become a classic in its field.

Robert Scott Stewart
Cape Breton University

Lisa Guenther
The Gift of the Other:
Levinas and the Politics of Reproduction.
Albany: SUNY Press 2006.
Pp. 190.
US$74.50 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-6847-0);
US$24.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-6848-7).

Lisa Guenther's accomplished, first book *The Gift of the Other*, published as part of the SUNY Series in Gender Theory, is a most deserving recipient of the Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy's Annual book prize for 2006. A feminist phenomenologist, Guenther gathers together five major thinkers in the Continental tradition in a tenacious embrace: Heidegger on death as foundational for ethical subjectivity; Derrida on the gift that death is; Cixous on the peculiar hospitalities of the feminine; Beauvoir on the significance of birth for woman, for feminism; Arendt on the radicality of the concept of natality for political and ethical life; and Levinas — *especially* Levinas — on Otherness as the initiator of a capacity for giving and for receiving. With deft argumentation and some wizardry Guenther ties these into a beautiful central knot: the thought of the gift of the other that reproduction inaugurates; and she correlates new understandings of beginning, time, and ethics (2). This book is testimony to the inexhaustible significance of the event of birth not only for feminist theory and feminist practice, but for ethical theory in general and for ethical being itself.

Readers unfamiliar with the strange idiom(s) and grammar(s) of Continental thinking in general would do well to give a careful read of Guenther's introduction for an excellent orientation session before tackling any of the individual chapters. The chapters themselves are organized around particular philosophers and what can be extracted from them by way of constructing the notion of the gift of reproduction. Chapter 1 focuses on and inverts de Beauvoir's lament on feminine historico-material realities. Chapter 2 eyeballs and expands Arendt's concept of 'natality', while Chapter 3 — where Guenther is most at home and yet wonderfully ill-at-ease, a queer daughter — is a long, sustained meditation on Levinas and welcoming. Chapters 4 and 5 reveal some of the source of that daughterly *dis*comfort as Guenther, borrowing from Kristeva and Irigaray for her efforts, aims some arrows at the less welcoming, more patriarchal parts of Levinas' ethical gifts. Chapter 6, in concert with the unprecedented imaginings of Drucilla Cornell (see especially *The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography and Sexual Harassment*), takes up some of the possible concrete, political ('legal') implications of these understandings for, especially, women and reproductive biopolitics.

What novel and important components of the gift of the Other does Guenther bring to the surface, and reconstructs for the purposes of our novel understanding? She starts with a very bold move: 'I wish to recognize in the gift of birth an imperative — and not merely the choice of an autonomous subject — to pass on this gift of time and responsibility. Perhaps it is only by giving

to Others that we may recall the givenness of our own birth, precisely in its immemoriality' (2). Guenther opens her book with the charge that the forgetting of our birth, which 'perhaps we cannot help but forget,' involves the forgetting of the unique and complex gift that is maternality. Thus, she argues, the effort to think the 'ethical and temporal significance of birth as the gift of the Other' (and, I think, the efforts of giving *simpliciter*) is a strategy which gets us into the region of a kind of unique and complex ur-generosity, 'the maternal gifts of time and existence, a quality and depth of generosity which modern, autonomous, independent agents who have forgotten their births — we, the people — seem also to have (mostly) forgotten.' Lest we imagine that 2007 feminist Guenther is entertaining here a kind of relapse into the early 1980's feminist thinking on the ethical superiority of the embodied feminine, the maternal feminine in particular, we would do well to note that she knows 'women have long been expected to give selflessly to Others without expectation of return,' and that 'there is nothing particularly feminist about the theme of maternal responsibility or self-sacrifice' (8). The task that she sets herself *qua* 2007 feminist reader of Levinas (and Derrida and Arendt), is to keep these dangers in mind, all the while carefully and honestly extracting what nevertheless appear to her to be truly profound, feminine-tinged ethical potentialities in a meditation on the peculiar gifts of reproductivity.

Guenther, walking the fine line of this near contradiction, writes, 'A touchstone for my inquiry has been Levinas' phrase, "like a maternal body". By putting emphasis on the word "like" in this phrase, I wish to destabilize any strict correlation between women and mothers, or between motherhood and responsibility. As I interpret it, the phrase may or may not refer to the biological birth of a child; I can become "like" a maternal body whether or not I physically give birth to a child. To become *like* a maternal body for someone is to become responsible for her *as if* she were my child, as if I bore this responsibility in my flesh' (7). We are forever indebted to Kant for his bold gift of that *as if.* Indeed, the ontologies of Continental thinkers help us to break with some of the divisive difficulties around possession, ownership and disavowal suffered in the politics of the 1970's and 80's, and allow just such profound and temporally-complex 'taking-on' of responsibilities as non-mothers can take on the 'like a maternal body'.

It is, above all, through an attention and allegiance to language — to what Judith Butler (2004) calls 'our participation in a wild inheritance' — that we can come to know that we are in relations of care and meaning not entirely by virtue of our or our blood parents' wise choosings and endowings, or by virtue of the needs of our children and our choice to fulfill or refuse them; but by virtue of a much wider and profound enframing which permits our participation or dwelling in the ethical project; an enframing and dwelling-in which language, built and transmitted via call and response, best evidences. This book, in its turn, responds to the complex demands of the Levinasian welcome in terms of the feminine: expectancy, the opening up of an elsewhere, substitutability, shelter without appropriation, proximity respecting privacy, reception exceeding intention, giving beyond capacity. It reads these

as basic features of language, human language — in human language, *as if* maternity.

Karen Houle
University of Guelph

Samuel Guttenplan
Objects of Metaphor.
Toronto and New York:
Oxford University Press 2005.
Pp. 305.
Cdn$144.00/US$99.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-928088-9);
Cdn$52.95/US$35.00
(paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-928089-6).

This is a dense, scholarly, and thorough examination of metaphor, a problematic linguistic, tropological, and philosophical concept that has been mired in ambiguity, Guttenplan proposes in his introduction, not because of a lack of analyses, but because of an excess of them. His account demonstrates how many studies — he examines Davidson's work extensively here — do address the 'problem' of metaphor, but do not resolve it.

Metaphor, for Guttenplan, is invariably 'assertoric' and is often judged for truth. Guttenplan suggests that metaphor is a theoretically unified phenomenon that cannot be interchanged with notions of non-literality and the figurative. It is, according to Guttenplan, a member of the trope family, and helps us understand meaning better.

His key conceptual move occurs in Chapter 2, where he outlines a theory of predication, which is the bringing to bear of information on particulars (49-59). Words and objects *share* functions in meaning-generation. Building on Frege's work, Guttenplan suggests that there is a crucial difference between what is accomplished by subject-terms and what is accomplished by predicate-terms. Reference and predication are two complementary tasks. Reference is taken to be accomplished by non-word objects which, Guttenplan suggests, should be taken to mean actions, events, states of circumstances, facts (38); and predication is assumed to be the function of words. This, he suggests, is a false distinction because in many cases we use non-word objects as predicates. He proposes the term 'qualification' instead of 'reference', proposing that qualification is a super-ordinate category that performs the same task as predication: the bringing to bear of information. For example,

a colored card with the caption 'bedroom' in a real estate agent's brochure qualifies the living room (62).

Guttenplan then proposes that in the case of metaphor we have a semantic descent. He argues that qualification in the case of metaphor takes us lower than the natural level predication. Using Romeo's phrase 'Juliet is the sun' as an example, Guttenplan proposes that, when taken at the level of ordinary language or what he calls the ground-level of language, this seems like nonsense. We therefore think of 'sun' as a word in language (and in the predicate 'is the sun'), and we think of the object the word stands for. Both the sun and the word 'sun' are objects. When we hear the sentence we move from the word-object 'sun' in natural language to the non-word object at what Guttenplan calls basement-level. That is, we descend from word-objects that are the ground-level of language to non-word objects at the basement-level. This is Guttenplan's semantic descent account of the metaphor (94-6).

Moving on to the question of transparency — the feature that enables us to sense that we have understood, without mediation, a sentence in a familiar language or even a metaphor in the midst of familiar words — Guttenplan demonstrates, in what is a fascinating reading, that transparency is a feature of metaphor too. Metaphors demand a familiarity with the basic, routine meanings of words. The presence of ordinary meanings in words ensures that 'there is something available *right from the start* which can confer intelligibility' — and this, precisely, is transparency (139).

In his longest, densest chapter, Guttenplan turns to 'embellishment' as a central feature of metaphor. His account opens with an analysis of the syntactic complexity of metaphor, and he begins by pointedly mentioning the fact that most accounts of metaphor use 'relatively simple syntactic forms' (157-8)! Metaphorical elements, he argues, can figure in any grammatical slot. Further, traditional interpretation of metaphor has proposed that metaphor involves a sharing of properties between the two objects — in the sentence 'Juliet is the sun', the object woman-Juliet seems to share properties with the object sun — but one that requires our understanding of identifying the *object* of metaphor (the qualifying object). We should have elucidated the specific object (in the above example, the sun) and see how it functions in the sentence. The key to a successful metaphorization, in this traditional interpretation of metaphor, is to see *how* the qualifying object 'sun' relates to the qualified object 'Juliet'. Thus, the sentence 'out of the crooked timber from which men are made, nothing straight can ever be built' asks us to identify the characteristic (that only non-straight things can be fabricated from crooked timber) of the objects mentioned in the metaphor (177). The object of metaphor remains available for further employment, in a continuing, larger discourse. This is the *extension* of the metaphor. Thus, argues Guttenplan, again with numerous examples, even dead metaphors are metaphors, and can be revived 'by constructing appropriately extended contexts or continuations' (186).

In his final chapter Guttenplan examines three well-known accounts of metaphor: the demonstrative account (Josef Stern), the conflated sentences

account (Roger White), and the indirect speech account (Robert Fogelin). These three accounts, he shows, circle around his own, and contain possibilities that he exploits in order to develop an account of metaphor.

Guttenplan's is an ambitious book by any stretch of imagination. The range of his exposition is vast, and the analysis thorough, with more than adequate illustrations. The ideas of transparency and predication in metaphor are particularly fascinating — if I may indulge in the personal here, especially for a literary studies specialist who has to provide 'access' to (English) literary metaphors to students, some of whom have very little English — and provide a great deal of food for thought (oops, that is metaphoric!). The semantic descent account that Guttenplan utilizes in order to explain metaphor is also, I think, a valuable approach to the subject.

My only complaint about Guttenplan's masterly study concerns his style — heavy-handed and therefore not very readable. That might be because of the audience he is addressing (philosophers, language specialists), but it restricts the book's accessibility to the larger academic audiences in other disciplines who undoubtedly have an interest in Guttenplan's subject matter.

Pramod K. Nayar
University of Hyderabad

In this sequel to his earlier *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy* (OUP 2001), Hanna attempts to construct a genuinely Kantian solution to the famous 'Two Images Problem' described by Wilfrid Sellars. The earlier book argues that the *Critique of Pure Reason* should be understood as 'cognitive-semantic' rather than ontological or even epistemological in its intentions (5), and that much of the analytical tradition is little more than a Quixotic attempt to put originally Kantian ideas into the service of reductive scientific naturalism. In Hanna's view, Kant's actual intentions were exactly the opposite. Thus, whereas Sellars (as interpreted by Hanna) makes use of Kant to argue for a solution in which the scientific image will eventually swallow up the manifest image (i.e., the everyday way in which we are aware

of the world and our inner selves), Hanna thinks that careful analysis and reconstruction of Kant's actual arguments lead instead to a solution in which the scientific image both 'explanatorily and ontologically' presupposes the manifest image. Accordingly, this book is Hanna's attempt to 'work out the elements of a fundamentally anthropocentric or humanistic, realistic, and non-reductive Kantian theory of the exact sciences' (7).

The work consists of an introduction and eight chapters, the first seven of which have been published previously as articles. The introduction lays out the 'Two Image Problem', a quick sketch of the solution proposed by scientific naturalism, and another sketch of Hanna's Kantian solution. At this point Hanna presents his solution as the 'primacy of human nature thesis' (30), which has roughly three parts: 1) theoretical reason rests ultimately on a *belief* in direct perceptual realism; 2) practical reason rests ultimately on *belief* in a world in which human moral agents are possible; 3) the combination of these two forms of belief leads necessarily to the idea of 'a scientifically knowable world in which . . . human morality must really be possible, precisely because human persons are actual and so must be really possible' (32).

Following this plan, the first part of the book (Chapters 1-4) makes a case for a specific type of direct perceptual realism derived from the Aesthetic and Logic of the first *Critique*. Hanna's basic idea is that for Kant the use of our conceptual capacities requires a non-conceptual but nevertheless cognitively relevant frame of reference related to things really outside of ourselves, which Hanna identifies with the subjective spatial/temporal frame of reference provided by our own bodies. This is an interesting point, and I think Hanna is right about Kant's admitting non-conceptual content. However the arguments he provides are sketchy and it is difficult to determine what, if anything, they establish. At times Hanna appears to think that the issue of non-conceptual content is solved simply if it can be shown that we can have meaningful perceptions independently of discursive thought. But this is irrelevant unless it can also be shown that this same content is not even implicitly (transcendentally or culturally) conceptual, i.e. that it is not in some deep sense preformed by its relation to our conceptual capacity.

Chapters 5-7 argue respectively that Kant's account of truth is dependent on the moral conception of truthfulness, that his conception of mathematics is that of a 'moral science', and that Kant's model of knowledge is essentially one of a perfected but still uniquely *human* set of cognitive activities. Hanna's point, it seems, is that Kant understands the scientific image of the world not as a fundamental reflection of an independent reality, but rather essentially as the specific normative correlate of one specific set of human activities among others, namely those devoted to theoretical inquiry. Now since this activity is subordinate, insofar as it is an activity of the human being, to other more important human activities (morality, etc.), its correlate, the scientific image, is necessarily subordinate to the correlates of these other activities. This, again, is an interesting and worthwhile argument, but I think Hanna continuously oversteps the boundaries that Kant would place on this dependence. This becomes most clear in Chapter 8, where Hanna tries to

secure the subordination of the scientific to the manifest image by asserting that for Kant the human being 'freely makes nature' by generating 'one-off' causal singularities (like the Big Bang and Black Holes), which yet are not singularities *for us* because they rest on a framework of 'constitutively' teleo-logical inner sense intuitions. Hanna here ignores the overwhelming stock of evidence to the contrary, supports his argument with a false quote (Kant says that genius gives the rule *as* nature, *als Natur*, and Hanna changes the trans-lation without comment to read '*to* nature'. thereby supporting his argument with a text that would challenge it, 448), and, it seems to me, radically misin-terprets Kant's distinction between constitutive and regulative principles.

Finally, I will just mention some of the other nuts and bolts of the main argument that appear to be based upon, or at least supported by, some very dubious readings of Kant's texts: 1) Hanna states that Logic according to Kant is a moral science; Kant says only by way of illustration that pure logic relates to applied logic in the same way that pure morality relates to the doc-trine of virtue (A 55/ B79). Not *is*, but *as*. 2) According to Hanna, Kant distin-guishes objects with 'negatively noumenal' properties from objects that are 'positively noumenal'. But Kant only ever speaks of a noumenon *used merely in a negative way* as a boundary concept, as opposed to the same noumenon used illegitimately for the supposed *positive* expansion of our field of objects. 3) Hanna thinks that according to Kant things that are too small to be vis-ible fall outside the bounds of experience, and thus that he would regard the 'microphysical particles, energy quanta, light waves, gravitational fields, etc.' of contemporary physics to be illegitimate 'positively noumenal' objects (160-171). This is in fact a key component in Hanna's understanding of how Kant's direct empirical realism refutes a central tenet of scientific realism, and yet Hanna nowhere mentions that Kant explicitly denies this is so (A 225-6/ B 272-3).

Courtney David Fugate
American University in Cairo

The nineteenth volume in the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science series is a collection of eleven essays dedicated to the topic of scientific pluralism. What is unclear, however, is exactly how the various projects undertaken by the contributors are related. Pluralist conclusions are drawn from a wide range of disciplines: quantum theory (Dickson, Chapter 3), mathematics (Hellman and Bell, Chapter 4), behavioral sciences (Longino, Chapter 6), and economic theory (Sent, Chapter 5), to name a few. Even the names given to pluralist views, like Giere's (Chapter 2) 'perspectival pluralism' or Fehr's (Chapter 8) 'explanatory pluralism'. suggest these views are really about different things. Richardson, one of many contributors aware of the diversity in the pluralist camp, says it best: 'There is something philosophically troublesome about this rich stew of current debates and historical antecedents. There is . . . a nagging sense that there is a mixing together of issues and concerns' (2). He argues that pluralism is best understood as a movement rather than a single unified approach. Insofar as Richardson is correct, two questions arise. What unites the various stances under the pluralist banner? Which aspects of these stances latch onto something unique and substantial?

The book's introduction, at least in part, is an attempt at answering these questions. In the editor's hands, scientific pluralism is characterized by its opposition to a view they call scientific monism. According to monism the goal of science is to develop a single comprehensive account of the natural world. Moreover, for the monist, the world and our methods of inquiry are such that, at least in principle, this goal is attainable. For evidence against monism, argue pluralists, one need only look at the current state of scientific inquiry which is constituted by a 'plurality of representational or classificatory schemes, of explanatory strategies, of models and theories, and of investigative questions and the strategies appropriate for investigating them' (ix). The suggestion is that this plurality may not be a temporary state of affairs and that 'ultimately the best way to investigate and explain the natural world is through multiple investigative approaches and representational systems' (xi). The strength of one's pluralist position depends on the attitude one adopts to this suggestion. The weak pluralist allows that the current state of affairs is resolvable in principle, but a permissive attitude towards plurality is desirable. The radical pluralists see little limitation on how the world can be carved up and insist that the existing pluralities are not resolvable. The editors favor a third option and espouse an empirically based pluralism

which involves 'a commitment to avoid reliance on monist assumptions in interpretation or evaluation coupled with an openness to the ineliminability of multiplicity in some scientific contexts' (xiii). Empirical pluralism is intended to be a 'substantial and consistent form of pluralism' (xiii), and support for it is thought to derive collectively from the various case studies found among the essays in the book (although the authors of these essays may not themselves advocate empirical pluralism). In this way, empirical pluralism offers a means of unifying the pluralist camp.

Although consistent, I worry that empirical pluralism may not be very substantial. For one thing, despite being empirically based, it is unclear what kind of empirical data uniquely speaks in favor of this variety of pluralism. The case studies found in the book do provide good evidence for the claim that the current state of scientific inquiry is thoroughly pluralistic. This fact, however, is consistent with both weaker and stronger forms of pluralism, and indeed with more sophisticated forms of monism. There is, after all, a gap between our observations concerning the current state of an inquiry, and both the future state of that inquiry and the standards by which one ought to evaluate its progress. This gap can be exploited by monists. If the existence and persistence of pluralities can be accommodated within other views, then it seems that empirical pluralism needs to be motivated by other, perhaps uniquely philosophical, considerations. This leads to a second worry about empirical pluralism: it is unclear what philosophical or scientific problems it can by itself hope to solve. Empirical pluralism seems capable of playing only a critical role. Monist assumptions and concepts can be challenged along pluralist lines, but empirical pluralism seems to have no resources of its own with which to address the outstanding questions.

For these reasons many pluralists are likely to be unsatisfied with empirical pluralism. Moreover, for those who fear that 'modest pluralisms are difficult to distinguish from a sophisticated form of monism' (xiii), stronger versions, which actually posit ineliminable pluralities, will seem the surest path to a substantial form of pluralism. Although many of the book's contributors flirt with stronger versions, Fehr's contribution to the book stands out in this regard. By explicitly rejecting both monism and modest forms of pluralism, her contribution is one of the most interesting and provocative.

Even for those who accept that there are ineliminable pluralities, though, there is still much room for debate. One could, for example, consistently be a pluralist about explanation, but not about the foundations of mathematics. Here we see most clearly the potential for a mixing together of concerns and issues. Different methodological principles or epistemic values can give rise to forms of pluralism. So, although perhaps united in their opposition to monism, many pluralist stances seem to have little else in common. The pluralist movement appears to be left with a dilemma. It can try to present a united front by accepting only the most general commonly held principles. This threatens to produce a watered down and facile form of pluralism. A more narrow conception of pluralism can be pursued, but this is likely to lead to a splintering of the movement and threatens to do violence to the spirit

of the movement itself. Whether or not this dilemma can be resolved, at the heart of the movement, and this book, are still a collection of case studies interesting in their own right.

Micheal McEwan
University of Waterloo

Ullrich Langer, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Montaigne.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. 266.
US$65.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-81953-4);
US$22.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-52556-5).

This collection of papers provides a cross-section of recent Montaigne scholarship. It includes work on the French essayist's logic and metaphysics, his epistemology, ethics and moral philosophy, as well as his relationship to classical antiquity and the 'New World'. The essays are of consistently high quality, though the volume will be of greatest use to experienced scholars, less helpful to new readers for whom it may not provide comprehensive introduction the title seems to suggest. This is less of a problem with this volume than a characteristic of the Cambridge series itself. Many of these 'companions' best help readers who have already broken some bread by themselves.

Was Montaigne a philosopher? The essayist himself denied the charge. Yet Montaigne's inclusion in a well-known series on philosophy will probably not surprise readers unduly. Some philosophers (e.g., Nietzsche) have admired Montaigne's seemingly disorderly presentation; others (e.g., many of his seventeenth-century readers) have been disconcerted by this same quality. For Bertrand Russell, who mentions Montaigne twice in his *History of Western Philosophy*, the author of the *Essais* was the most typical exponent of 'a large and fruitful disorder' in philosophical reflection following the breakdown of the 'medieval philosophical synthesis', a disorder Russell took (a bit simplistically) to be characteristic of the Renaissance (*HWP*, London: Routledge 2004, 6).

In his lucid introduction and a solidly argued, contextualizing first chapter, Ullrich Langer deftly sidesteps the unfruitful question of who might qualify, timelessly, as a 'philosopher', outlining instead the assumptions about philosophy that form the early modern context for Montaigne's claim: 'je ne suis pas philosophe' (*Essais* III, 9). Montaigne did engage in sophisticated

speculation on such traditionally philosophical topics as logic and metaphysics. In perhaps the most impressive contribution to the volume, Ian Maclean provides an account of Montaigne's attitudes towards knowledge and truth claims, and his conflicted, skeptically-inflected — though not entirely unsympathetic — relationship to Scholastic philosophy in its various forms. André Tournon's chapter on Montaigne's practitioner's view of justice, equity, and the law is also excellent. Other chapters that will likely be of interest to philosophical readers include Ann Hartle's account of Montaigne's skepticism, helpful when read with (and against) Frédéric Brahami's excellent short book on *Le scépticisme de Montaigne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1997). George Hoffmann's chapter on Montaigne's natural philosophy and particularly on his relationship to Lucretius and Epicureanism is an exciting glimpse of an important scholar's work in progress. There are two good essays devoted specifically to moral philosophy, by Francis Goyet and J. B. Schneewind. Goyet provides an impressive study of Montaigne's conception of prudence (phronesis/prudentia) and argues (perhaps a bit too polemically for such a forum), that Montaigne is an 'engaged' writer who wishes to effect political change through his writings. Schneewind provides a useful, trans-historical perspective on Montaigne's moral thought. He first gives a lucid account of Montaigne's response to Raimond Sebond's moral philosophy (*Essais* II, 12), reflecting in passing on the essayist's readings of Epicurean and Stoic thought. He continues with a comparison with more modern moral thinkers, notably Hobbes, Kant, Hume and Bentham. This is of course a great deal of material, and though there is a danger that diachronic readings in the history of philosophy will fix eternal 'big ideas' rather than focus on the historical contingency of the questions asked and the forms that they take, Schneewind's treatment is measured and for the most part avoids this difficulty.

Of interest to historical and literary readers will be John O'Brian's characteristically insightful chapter on Montaigne's relationship to the classical literary heritage, understood as a source of intertextual play, of philosophical argument and of models of significant moral force, and Tom Conley's astute essay on the Americas. Conley argues that Montaigne's famous 'Of Cannibals' and 'Of Coaches' are perhaps the 'first and greatest reflection on the impact of the discovery and colonization of the New World' (74). (Here a quibble: certainly not the first, but perhaps the greatest.) Conley stresses the cultural relativism and tolerance often detected in the two essays. I would have preferred more direct engagement with the theology of the Eucharist, an ideological sticking point in the religious wars (one discussed, for example, in a recent essay by George Hoffmann, mentioned by Conley in his endnotes though not discussed in the text of the essay). Conley's treatment of the question of the poor as 'the other half' of the rich should perhaps make more explicit the Neoplatonic tenor of the natives' choice of vocabulary, one that echoes 'Of Friendship' (*Essais* I, 28), in which Montaigne's closeness to Etienne de la Boétie is described in the same terms. This said, Conley's essay offers a rich and suggestive account of Montaigne's fascination with the Americas.

The title of Warren Boucher's exemplary historical essay, 'Montaigne's Legacy', a study of patronage and the commemorative value of books as commissioned objects, points up nonetheless a weakness in the volume: the dearth of material on Montaigne's reception in seventeenth-century philosophy, and in particular by Descartes and Pascal, and indeed on the publishing history of the *Essais* after 1595. This is in no way a criticism of Boucher's work. One might, however, imagine another chapter, with the same title, treating Montaigne's philosophical impact in the seventeenth century. Such an essay would be particularly useful to historians of philosophy, though some of this material is covered in other Cambridge companions, especially the volume dedicated to Pascal. An essay specifically addressing the publishing history of Montaigne's essays would also be welcome. Nevertheless, the volume is a valuable addition to Montaigne scholarship, one that will be particularly useful to specialists and to those teaching his work to undergraduate and postgraduate students.

James Helgeson
Columbia University

Nietzsche called morality the *Circe* of the philosophers because, he believed, moral assumptions had been the primary cause both of philosophical speculation and its failure. But in spite of holding that, and many other, brow-raising moral views, he has gone all but unnoticed by professional moral theorists, especially in English, until recently. The last two decades have seen increasing interest in his moral thought among moralists. In addition, today's Nietzsche interpreters exhibit a growing awareness of the significance of Nietzsche's moral thought for any understanding of his thought as a whole. Leiter and Sinhababu aim to bring both strands of interest together through a collection of eleven new essays. I agree with them that this volume 'should appeal not only to audiences with an . . . interest in understanding the positions that Nietzsche adopted, but also those primarily interested in debates in moral philosophy' (2). Contributors address normative and meta-ethical matters, moral psychology, the will to power, the free spirit, the self,

creativity, vengefulness, master and slave morality, and moral fictions. There is also a bibliography and a useful index. True to plans, each essay tends to be informative both about Nietzsche and about some contemporary debate or debates in ethics or related fields.

The essays are grouped in two parts. Part 1 has six essays under the heading of 'Normative Ethics and Moral Psychology', while Part 2 contains five essays under 'Metaethics'. The first set explores Nietzsche's positive evaluations along with his empirical and historical grounds for criticizing competing systems of ethics. The second set examines his thinking about the metaphysics and epistemology of value. But the essays can also be grouped in two's and three's.

Part 1 starts with two essays treating the will to power in ethics. Bernard Reginster's 'The Will to Power and the Ethics of Creativity' analyzes the desire to overcome resistance that is central to Nietzsche's descriptions both of the will to power and of creativity. Thomas Hurka, who the editors assure us is 'the leading proponent of perfectionism today' (2), argues that Nietzsche's moral commitments are best characterized as a version of perfectionism, which is the view that achieving excellence is the highest good. He argues that 'one of Nietzsche's contributions' to moral thought 'is to bring out sharply the distinctive features of perfectionism as a moral view' (28). He is especially pleased with Nietzsche's work for separating the process of self-perfection from hedonistic and other extraneous goals, for recognizing that perfectionism calls for rejecting many egalitarian values, and for developing a perfectionist account that does not confuse value with right. For Hurka, the will to power can be the focus for one reading of Nietzsche's perfectionism.

The papers by Reginster and Hurka are followed by two historically focused essays in moral psychology. Joshua Knobe and Brian Leiter present 'The Case for Nietzschean Moral Psychology'. And in 'Nietzschean "Animal Psychology" versus Kantian Ethics' Mathias Risse explores Kant and Nietzsche on the will and freedom. Then come two essays on related and very Nietzschean topics in moral psychology: Christopher Janaway's 'Guilt, Bad Conscience, and Self-punishment in Nietzsche's *Genealogy*' along with '*Ressentiment*, Value, and Self-Vindication: Making Sense of Nietzsche's Slave Revolt', from R. Jay Wallace. With that we move on to the more hotly anticipated essays on metaethics.

Part 2 opens with three treatments of Nietzsche's metaphysics of value. First, 'Honest Illusion: Valuing for Nietzsche's Free Spirits', by Nadeem J. Z. Hussain, treats a central problem in Nietzsche's thinking about value, one with a wide impact for interpreters, because Nietzsche billed his work as a re-thinking of the concept of the free spirit. He discussed it so often that an interpretation that ignores it is open to an immediate and very weighty charge of negligence. Both Nietzsche himself and his free spirits are variously charged with the tasks of valuing, revaluing, creating value and legislating value, but at the same time Nietzsche is widely held to be a nihilist in the sense of denying that value is a feature of the natural world. A question immediately arises: what are Nietzsche and his free spirits really doing if they are creat-

ing and legislating value while also believing that value does not exist? As a solution to this 'interpretive puzzle' Hussain suggests that 'Nietzsche's free spirits are engaged in a fictionalist simulacrum of valuing' (158).

Though they do not focus on free spirits, other essays in this volume are capable of inspiring readers to develop alternative treatments of Hussain's puzzle. For instance, as Hussain admits, there is no puzzle — or at least there is much less of one — if Nietzsche is not a value nihilist; and the proposition that he is not is supported by Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick in 'Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity: The Development of Nietzsche's Metaethics'. They argue that Nietzsche's thinking on the status of value underwent significant change during his career. In his so-called middle period he was an error theorist, holding that all moral judgments are false, which is a cognitivist position because it allows that moral judgments can be either true or false. But he eventually moves on to a version of non-cognitivism that allows humans at least to value by bestowing value in some way that is not merely a simulacrum of valuing, but is constitutive of the only kind of reality there is for value. Peter Poellner's 'Affect, Value and Objectivity' suggests that Nietzsche granted value only a phenomenal, not a metaphysical objectivity. This view, like Clark and Dudrick's, also avoids value nihilism.

The book ends with two essays on epistemological themes. Sinhababu's 'Vengeful Thinking and Moral Epistemology' is followed by Simon Blackburn's 'Perspectives, Fictions, Errors, Play', which is surely the most widely provocative essay in the volume, and by far the most fun. Blackburn delivers a thoughtful and rather stinging rebuttal of a very trendy reading of Nietzsche's perspectivism, namely, the postmodern reading in which little or no distinction is made between perspective, fiction, error and play.

Bryan Finken
University of Colorado at Denver

J. J. MacIntosh, ed.
Boyle on Atheism.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2005.
Pp. 550.
Cdn$/US$95.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8020-9018-8).

Frightened by the ferocity of a thunderstorm one summer night and thinking the Day of Judgment at hand, the young Robert Boyle resolved to spend the remainder of his days more religiously employed. Scrupulously, he repeated

the vow in the morning, under a serene and cloudless sky, so that he 'might not owe his more deliberate consecration . . . of himselfe to Piety, to any less noble Motive then that of it's owne Excellence' (23). In his subsequent career — which saw such important and influential work as *The Sceptical Chymist* (1661), *The Origins of Forms and Qualities according to the Corpuscular Philosophy* (1666), and *The Christian Virtuoso* (1690) — he was concerned not only to champion the corpuscular philosophy and the experimental method, but also to promulgate Christianity. Yet he never completed a projected treatise on atheism, although he worked on it throughout his career. In *Boyle on Atheism*, MacIntosh provides a meticulous reconstruction of Boyle's treatise, relying on the notes to be found in the manuscript remains, and the result is impressive. *Boyle on Atheism* will be of great interest to anyone interested in the thought of Robert Boyle or seventeenth-century philosophy in general.

MacIntosh comments, 'Boyle was in general more than willing to allow others to usurp his editorial duties' (xvii), and his own industrious editorial work here would doubtless have endeared him to Boyle. He opens with a fifty-page biographical sketch, focusing both on the first third of Boyle's life and the aspects that help to illuminate his theological views; it is no criticism to add that since there is no detailed biography of Boyle, the reader is left hungry for more. MacIntosh also provides a chart with datings of the manuscript fragments he used, information about people mentioned by Boyle (though the controversial faith-healer Valentine Greatrakes, mentioned on page 204, is absent), a list of notes about the manuscripts, and a bibliography running twenty pages. More importantly, he offers detailed introductions to three of the chapters to set the context for Boyle's discussion; these, like his biographical sketch, are admirably thorough and clear, providing useful information about the views of Boyle's predecessors and contemporaries, and occasionally imbued with a droll humor, as when he mentions that Boyle 'felt it necessary to remind his readers which species they were continuing when they indulged in acts of procreation' (319).

Boyle's outline for his treatise was simple enough, comprising three sections, and MacIntosh's reconstruction follows it closely. In the first section, Boyle seeks to explain why it is difficult to demonstrate the existence of God, where demonstration is to be understood in a rigorous sense, exemplified by the proofs of mathematics. The difficulty is owing both to God's metaphysical primacy and uniqueness and to the obduracy and depravity of atheists. But Boyle argued that what he called moral demonstrations are sufficient to establish the existence of God; MacIntosh quotes (78) a passage that, typical of British natural theology, offers a judicial analogy ('though the Testimony of a *Single* Witness shall not suffice to prove the accus'd party guilty of Murder; yet the Testimony of *two* Witnesses . . . shall ordinarily suffice . . .'). In the second section, Boyle calls a variety of witnesses. Some are on the stand in a perfunctory way and only for a short while, such as arguments from the innate idea of God and from the general consent of humanity. Some testify at length, such as arguments from the incorporeality of the soul and arguments from design, one of which anticipates Paley with its example of 'an Indian

or Chinois' finding 'a Watch cast on shore in some Trunk or Casket of some shipwrackt European vessel' (239).

Particularly interesting in the second section is Boyle's discussion of miracles, which MacIntosh describes as 'both subtler and more persuasive than Locke's better known ones' (200). Although Boyle regarded the world as a corporeal system, it is a system within which supernatural intervention is common. For example, God is responsible for connecting mind and body; the view verges on occasionalism, although Boyle's position is not wholly determinate. Miracles (including divine prophecies, Boyle reasoned, for only God could have accurate and reliable knowledge of the future) are a subset of these interventions. Not atypically for his time, Boyle generally regarded miracles not as providing evidence for the existence of God but rather as providing evidence for Christianity in particular. (The exception is what MacIntosh calls 'Boyle's Modal Argument', wherein Boyle argues from the indemonstrability of God's non-existence to the possibility of God's existence to the possibility of miracles; given credible testimony to the actuality of miracles, it is possible to infer God's existence.) Also noteworthy is Boyle's distinction between 'preternatural' (or 'supernatural') and 'contranatural' miracles, illustrated with reference to biblical examples. It will be disappointing henceforth to find a discussion of miracles in early modern philosophy that fails to engage with these pages of *Boyle on Atheism*.

In the third section, Boyle turns to consider why the moral demonstrations of God's existence are not universally persuasive. More interesting than his animadversions on the moral and intellectual shortcomings of the atheist is his attack on classical Epicurean atomism, which he takes to be the chief representative of contemporary atheism. In 1956 Richard Westfall influentially described Boyle as accepting atomism in his early 'Of the Atomicall Philosophy', but MacIntosh resists, arguing that Boyle, though a corpuscularian, 'was himself careful *not* to characterize himself as an atomist, and there is no particular reason to believe that he thought of himself as one' (318). The atomism that Boyle is attacking here, at any rate, is committed to explaining the universe in terms of eternal, independent, incorruptible, indestructible atoms, the attributes each of which 'flows immediately from its own nature, without the intervention of any cause or Agent' (339), all of which leaves no room for God. Boyle's characterization of his opponents is uncharitable, assuming, for example, that the atomist is committed to the Epicurean thesis that atoms move at the same rate, but his discussion is interesting not least for the way he presents contemporary problems of natural philosophy.

Glenn Branch
National Center for Science Education (United States)

S. J. McGrath
The Early Heidegger & Medieval Philosophy:
Phenomenology for the Godforsaken.
Washington, DC: Catholic University of
America Press 2006.
Pp. 268.
US$69.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8132-1471-9).

Over the last fifteen years or so, inquiry into Heidegger has been greatly en-
riched by studies of Heidegger's early development, such as Theodore Kisiel's
The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time' (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1993) and John van Buren's *The Young Heidegger* (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1994). McGrath's study provides a useful addition
to this body of scholarship, extending our understanding of Heidegger's rela-
tion to medieval theology, while offering a novel critical perspective on the
course of this relation.

McGrath argues that Heidegger's eventual rejection of medieval scholastic
theology was connected to his abandonment of Catholicism. He demonstrates
that, in the years leading up to the publication of *Being and Time* in 1927,
Heidegger's thought was increasingly shaped by a sympathy for Protestant
theology, and specifically for Luther. This led, according to McGrath, to a
rejection of philosophical theology altogether, as a discipline in which revela-
tion and reason work together (59). Heidegger's affinity with Luther results
in a 'Godforsaken' view of the world, in which human existence is felt to be
characterized most fundamentally by lack and guilt. McGrath connects this
view, which he sees as informing the analysis of *Dasein*, or human existence,
in *Being and Time*, with a specifically Lutheran anthropology of fallenness,
where both the world and human beings are in a state of radical corruption.
He claims, furthermore, that this Lutheran worldview entails a conception
of theology as radically distinct from philosophy. Because reason is corrupt
and untrustworthy, God can be approached only through revelation and faith
(159-73).

McGrath is critical of both these aspects of Heidegger's debt to Luther, viz.
an anthropology of lack and a theology of pure faith. He also wants to point
out, more basically, that Heidegger's analysis of existence is not theologically
neutral. It is guided, McGrath maintains, by a 'hidden theological agenda'
(169f.), promoting a certain version of Christianity and a particular analysis
of *Dasein* (203). The only religious positions it permits, moreover, are 'ag-
nostic piety' or 'revelational positivism', and these, McGrath suggests, are
dangerous, encouraging 'theocracy, Biblical fundamentalism, and irrational-
ity' (223). Aquinas' position, on the other hand, which asserts an *analogia
entis*, an analogous relation between the being of creatures and the being of
God, walks a laudable 'middle way between the extremes of agnosticism and
rationalism' (223).

In the course of developing these arguments McGrath offers detailed ac-
counts of a number of Heidegger's early texts. Some of the central themes

on which he focusses, such as Heidegger's concern with facticity and lived experience, have, to be sure, already been carefully examined by Kisiel and van Buren, who also discuss Heidegger's relation to, for example, St. Paul, medieval mysticism, and Luther. McGrath, however, adds a valuable detailed analysis of Heidegger's *Habilitationsschrift* (88-119), which has not received much attention to date, and a much more extended account of Heidegger's relation to Luther (151-84). He also offers a different perspective, and one worth engaging with, on the subject of Heidegger's relation to medieval scholasticism.

Having said that, serious objections can be raised against McGrath's interpretation of Heidegger's allegedly 'Godforsaken' hermeneutics, and against his view of the proper nature and role of theology. On the first point, it is fair to complain that the picture of human existence Heidegger presents in *Being and Time*, with its emphases on anxiety and lack, and its characterization of authenticity as resolute being-towards-death, is based on a decidedly partial 'ontic' fundament. In other words, the supposedly universal existential structures that *Being and Time* seeks to isolate and lay out are actually derived from a certain *kind* of being-in-the-world. It is less fair, though, to complain that these structures belong only to a 'Godforsaken' existence, one in which a relation to God is ruled out. McGrath consistently fails to take seriously the parameters of the phenomenological method. Phenomenology insists on remaining with *phenomena*, after all, understood as what shows itself within experience. The task of phenomenology is to describe the basic character — the structure or *eidos* — of these phenomena, without making use of positive theories, and *without telling a story*. Heidegger excludes theological stories from his account as much as he does biological ones. If his relation to Christian texts nonetheless remains very powerful, that is not because he has opted for a positive theology but tried to hide this fact. It is because he thinks those texts are founded upon, and exhibit, an authentic experience of being-in-the-world, one which reveals especially clearly the nature of human existence in its special relationship to time. Thus, Heidegger's phenomenological account can be seen as trying to unearth and lay bare the existential roots of certain experiences that take a particular, historically conditioned shape within a certain brand of Christian theology.

My second criticism concerns McGrath's attempt to vindicate scholastic theology. McGrath not only misunderstands the phenomenological move of bracketing theological hypotheses, he also does not fully grasp the justifications for this move. He argues, for instance, that Heidegger does not admit the possibility of a 'natural' religiousness, which obscurely grasps and longs for an infinite being (167, 247-8). But surely Heidegger would claim that the terms of this proposal involve a measure of theological interpretation, and that is exactly the sort of thing phenomenology is supposed to avoid. *Being and Time* admits a relation to a fullness of being towards which *Dasein* reaches. It does not, however, suppose that this reaching involves a relation to an *infinite divine being*. That is a theological explanation, not a phenomenological description. To make matters worse, while McGrath uses

the phrase, 'ontological religiousness', his descriptions of this religiousness tend to be couched in a specifically Christian vocabulary and set of concepts that could hardly be accepted by other theistic faiths, let alone non-theistic versions of, for instance, Hinduism or Buddhism. In the end, therefore, while expanding our understanding of Heidegger's early thought, the substantive claims in this book are unlikely to convince, or even be meaningful to, anyone except committed Christians. It is possible that Heidegger distanced himself from theology precisely because he did not want this to be true of his own writings.

Sonia Sikka
University of Ottawa

Completed as a Ph.D. thesis in 1992 but significantly updated for this publication with Oxford University Press, the book is a welcome addition to the shorter commentary by Linguiti on what, in the chronological order given by Porphyry, is the forty-sixth of the fifty-four treatises of Plotinus' *Enneads*: *On* Eudaimonia. The Greek term *eudaimonia* is variously translated as 'true happiness' (McKenna) and 'well-being' (Armstrong), but McGroarty consistently transliterates it due to the lack of a single English equivalent that does it justice. As in most recent commentaries to the *Enneads*, the material is divided into three sections: a general introduction to the treatise; the author's translation, here accompanied by the Greek text of Henry and Schwyzer's *editio minor* on facing pages (occasional changes are listed on page xix); the commentary, constituting the bulk of the work. The book is complemented by two appendices (respectively on St. Ambrose's use of this treatise in his *Jacob and the Happy Life*, and on Plotinus' view of suicide), a substantial bibliography, and indexes of the material.

In what follows I highlight two of the strategies McGroarty employs to elucidate this portion of Plotinus' text, and at the end add a cautionary remark of my own. First, as in virtually all commentaries to the *Enneads*,

McGroarty spends considerable effort identifying Plotinus' interlocutors (in this case, mostly the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but at times also the Epicureans). The fact that Plotinus is considered more likely to have had one interlocutor in mind rather than another sheds light on the argument itself, since his method, as McGroarty points out (67), is dialectical, taking into account the objections of major Greek schools of thought and showing how the issue under discussion makes better sense if understood within Plotinus' own metaphysical framework. So, for instance, against Bréhier's indication, McGroarty argues that the target of I.4 [46] 11.7-9 is Aristotle rather than Epictetus and the Stoics in general (163-4). Plotinus' reading criticizes Aristotle for holding a dichotomous view of *eudaimonia* that, as McGroarty shows, is foreign to the Stoics. Throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle claims that (some) external goods are to be sought as part of *eudaimonia*, while in Book 10 he appears to equate *eudaimonia* with contemplation (*theoria*). Plotinus' metaphysics allows him to bypass this dichotomy. His central and repeatedly emphasized contention is that *eudaimonia* must be found on the level not of the body-soul composite, but of intellect (*nous*); therefore, external goods (much like misfortunes, pains, pleasures, and all that concerns the body-soul combination) are of no consequence to it.

Second, and in direct connection with what I just mentioned, critical points about Plotinus' philosophy are brought to light through a close analysis of the text. For example, McGroarty disagrees with Rist on the crucial issue of the status of the un-descended soul vis-à-vis *eudaimonia*. Rist seems to argue that for Plotinus *eudaimonia*, once reached, cannot be lost, since there is a part of our soul that does not descend into matter but instead constantly partakes in the life of *nous*. It follows that ultimately we are happy (*eudaimôn*) all the time, and the only difference between the philosopher and the ordinary person is that the former is aware of it while the latter is not. For McGroarty this is incorrect. Even leaving aside the question of awareness (explicitly addressed in I.4 [46] 9-10), we cannot consider ourselves happy all the time simply because we all possess a higher soul. On the contrary, only the person who has managed to integrate the lower level of soul with the higher, i.e., the virtuous person, is *eudaimôn* (145-7, 171). Therefore, *eudaimonia* is a possibility open to the embodied soul, but not always actually possessed (86-7).

Here one cannot help noticing McGroarty's silence about the fact that, while *eudaimonia* is understood in terms of fullness of life in *nous*, the noetic plane is not ultimate for Plotinus. In fact, the soul's erotic ascent does not stop at this hypostatic level, but presses on toward that which is most desired, the One beyond *nous*. It would have been helpful to find a word on the relation between *eudaimonia* as the plenitude of noetic life and the soul's desire for what lies beyond *nous*, but perhaps McGrorty's silence is itself a suitable comment to Plotinus' lack of emphasis on this point in the treatise.

Finally, a caveat: one should be aware of what not to look for in McGroarty's book. Readers less familiar with the *Enneads* would have probably liked to find a justification or a thorough critical assessment of some key notions

of the Plotinian system, *in primis* of his metaphysics. This, however, is hardly the point of commentaries like McGroarty's, whose main concern is to clarify Plotinus' thinking through a detailed analysis of the text and its context. It is not an investigation into the truth or soundness of Plotinus' views.

Alberto Bertozzi
Loyola University Chicago

Claire Nouvet, Zrinka Stahuljak, and
Kent Still, eds.
Minima Memoria:
In the Wake of Jean-François Lyotard.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2007.
Pp. 280.
US$55.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-5111-7);
US$21.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-5112-4).

This volume is the most recent general collection of essays on the work of Jean-François Lyotard. In his introduction, Still suggests that the expression 'in the wake of' should be understood in the sense of tracing the passage of something through water, rather than in the sense of the literary genre of the 'wake' as memorial (xxiii). The essays collected here, he suggests, should be understood as retracing Lyotard's thought in a way which makes us 'wake-ful', and which calls out for further tracings in thought. Nevertheless, there is also a sense in which this book offers itself *in memorium* to Lyotard, who passed away in 1998. A number of the essays here were first presented, by colleagues and friends, at a colloquium held a little over a year after his death (xviii). So, in addition to the deep engagements with Lyotard's texts and ideas which may be found in these pages, we also find anecdotes, memories, expressions of affection, and the mourning of his loss. Derrida, for example, admits that he does not feel up to making an homage to Lyotard's thought and oeuvre in the form of a philosophical contribution of his own, fit for one of the many conferences in which they took part together (10), and instead ruminates on the enigmatic phrase found in one of Lyotard's texts: 'There shall be no mourning'.

Minima Memoria may be situated by its appearance 'in the wake' of two relatively recent three-volume archival collections of literature on Lyotard, both of which have the effect of charting the reception of this French philosopher in the Anglophone academy over the last thirty or so years: *Jean-Fran-çois Lyotard*, ed. Derek Robbins (London: Sage 2004), and *Jean-François*

Lyotard: Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory, ed. Victor E. Taylor and Gregg Lambert (London: Routledge 2005). These two collections demonstrate how Lyotard's reception was initially dominated by his (perhaps unfortunate) association with postmodernism. Given this, these collections are patchy, including some excellent work, but also much that focuses excessively on *The Postmodern Condition* and fails to take into account the much broader scope of his work. In contrast, *Minima Memoria* is a solid collection of 'mature' Lyotard scholarship, with most of the essays collected here displaying a powerful and subtle grasp of his thought. Arguably, Lyotard's fame suffered much the same fate as the popularity of postmodernism itself, and while some scholars have continued serious study of his work, he has not retained the wide popular appeal of other French thinkers initially associated with postmodernism, such as Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, and Baudrillard. It may perhaps be hoped, then, that a 'turning' in Lyotard's fortunes is signalled by the summing-up of the 'postmodern' reception of his work in the two three-volume sets, and a pathway to future engagement with this important thinker is initiated by the publication of *Minima Memoria*.

Despite the high standard and variety of the papers collected in *Minima Memoria*, however, it would be incorrect to think that this book represents all of the important recent work on Lyotard. (Considered in this regard, notable by their absence are at least the voices of James Williams, important for his defence of Lyotard's controversial book *Economie libidinale*, and the recent work by Keith Crome on the influence of Greek sophistry on Lyotard's thinking.) This is certainly not a criticism of the book as such, but an indication of its limits for the reader desiring to be 'brought up to date' in the field of Lyotard scholarship. Indeed, *Minima Memoria* is also quite limited in its focus on Lyotard's later works, with particular emphasis on what Gerald Sfez calls 'a second philosophy of the differend' (89) which emerged in writings after the book *Le différend* (1983). The chapters thus explore, with some repetition, key ideas and themes in Lyotard's works of the late eighties and nineties, including: childhood/infancy as a figure of that which resists representational thought (Fynsk, Ronell, Bennington); the 'affect-phrase', a supplement to the philosophy of phrases developed in *Le différend* which attempts to account for the unconscious (Glowacka, Nouvet); and his biographical work on André Malraux (Bonnefis, Naas). This emphasis on the late Lyotard is both a strength and weakness of the collection: a strength, insofar as this later material remains less explored in the secondary literature than Lyotard's work on postmodernism, the differend, and the sublime, but a weakness insofar as it continues to occlude the value of his fascinating and largely ignored major works of the seventies, *Discours, figure* (1971) and *Economie libidinale* (1974).

It is perhaps disappointing that of the twelve essays collected here, seven have been previously published elsewhere (and so may have already been read by the dedicated Lyotard scholar). More positively, however, two of these are useful translations from the important French collection *Jean-François Lyotard: L'exercise du différend*, ed. Dolorès Lyotard, Jean-Claude Milner,

and Gérald Sfez (Presses Universitaires de France 2001). In particular, Sfez's essay 'The Writings of the Differend' makes available in English the voice of an important contemporary French interpreter (Sfez's *Jean-François Lyotard: La faculté d'une phrase* was published by Galilée in 2000).

While many of the essays stay very close to Lyotard's own texts, seeking to elaborate them on their own terms, several authors show the relevance of his thought to wider issues and debates. Nouvet, for example, shows how (despite Lyotard's own lack of presumption on this issue) his work on testimony may be useful to psychoanalysts in their clinical practice, while Glowacka surveys the impact of Lyotard's thought on feminist theory, arguing that he has often been taken up and criticised for his politics of difference, without due attention being paid to his ethics of judgment. In sum, while *Minima Memoria* perhaps does not answer to all the needs in the field of contemporary Lyotard scholarship, it is nevertheless a very high calibre contribution which succeeds in uncovering the power, sensitivity, and depth of Lyotard's thought, and in demonstrating its relevance for contemporary problems. As such, it succeeds in being the kind of 'wake' the editors intended.

Ashley Woodward
University of Tasmania

Erin O'Connell
Heraclitus and Derrida:
Presocratic Deconstruction.
New York: Peter Lang Publishing 2006.
Pp. 186.
US$61.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8204-7492-2).

Toward the end of the nineteenth century Friedrich Nietzsche recommended a return to the Presocratics. Today, it seems that, as an alternative to characterizing it along the lines of logocentrism, the history of Western philosophy can be framed by the Presocratic Heraclitus on the one hand, and Jacques Derrida on the other. This, at least, is what O'Connell proposes in her provocative and well argued book. Some have written that Derrida is like a Parisian Heidegger, while others have situated him in company with French philosophers M. Foucault, F. Lyotard, G. Deleuze. O'Connell goes further and pro-poses the Presocratic deconstruction of Heraclitus; for her the appropriate comparative analysis is between the philosophies of Heraclitus and Derrida.

The book can be divided in two parts: 1) Chapters 1 to 4 involve the deconstruction of Heraclitus' thought; 2) Chapters 5 and 6 present the Heraclitean Derrida, the fulfillment of Heraclitus in Derrida.

1) O'Connell writes that these two philosophers share a distinctive and similar view of the relationship between knowledge and language, and both at the same time reject the premise of logocentrism: 'Among their most salient similarities is the fact that each engages in the work of rational philosophy while simultaneously rejecting the logocentric promise of certain knowledge. Each author takes up a self-consciously ironic position with respect to his own content and style, knowing that he cannot completely transcend the systems of logic that he critiques, and that he must use language to question language' (3).

Recent scholarship has argued that Heraclitus' ever-living fire must be not understood as a generic Milesian *archê*, and that the material monism of Heraclitus doesn't refer to any single primary cosmogonic material or substance. Following the incomparable reading of Heraclitus by C. H. Kahn, O'Connell contends that 'Heraclitus' aim is not to improve the Milesian cosmology by altering a particular doctrine but to interpret its total meaning by a radical shift in perspective' (6). This means that the root fire is above all a sort of cosmological principle, a force, a continuous process.

No doubt, the deconstruction of Heraclitus' thought gives us a critique of human reasoning and leads us to discover the very value of logos as an 'harmonious tension of strife in flux' resembling Derrida's conception of different plays. According to both philosophers logos is subjected to a permanent *aporia* that results in the continuous uncertainty of human understanding. Humans do not put together empirical or theoretical information accurately, even though they have sufficient information, even though they have enough experience. This is the meaning of the famous Heraclitean fragment (D. 2): 'Although the logos is common (shared), the many are living as if they have their own (private) intelligence (thought).'

Given that the logos per se is neither arcane nor esoteric, but experienced in common, the real problem according to Heraclitus is thinking well and paying attention to faulty thinking. The relation between the two opposites means that the full nature of each term is accurately grasped only with reference to its constant and contingent 'other', to its continuous and *discrete* value. For instance, the difference between life and death is not only unavoidably obvious; it also provokes profound emotional and philosophical reaction and is deeply important to human beings. The fullest meaning of one term cannot be experienced or defined without reference to the other. In this way Heraclitus deconstructs the incipient logocentric conception of eternal transcendental presence.

2) Looking for a philosophy after philosophy, Derrida, when asked if he would count himself a philosopher, answered: 'I have attempted more and more systematically to find a non-site, or a non-philosophical site, from which to question philosophy. But the search for a non-philosophical site does not bespeak an anti-philosophical attitude. My central question is: how can philosophy as such appear to itself as other than itself, so that it can interrogate and reflect upon itself in an original manner?' (107) Often Derrida allies himself with Nietzsche and Heidegger when he describes as *destruction* the

deconstructionism they expressed in many cases, but he is often also more cautious and prudent, and admits that deconstruction does not and cannot destroy structures from the outside. He is aware that we have no language, no syntax, and no lexicon foreign to our history. To de-construct is to analyze (from the Greek: *analuô*, unloose, set free). 'A deconstruction is ananalytical critique, in which a text, a concept, a word, is undone or taken apart in order to understand how and of what it is made' (113). In such a way Derrida subverts the authority of the classical metaphysical account that posits Being as Presence. In the afterword to *Limited, Inc.* he writes that deconstruction makes *destabilization* is its principle theme, but it is a destabilization that is already on the move in the things themselves. Writing and speech, for instance, have a common root; there is no purely phonetic writing, and speech is just as representative as writing, writing just as effective as speech (if not more so). If the word 'logos' is a verb, 'The nature of *différence* as being somehow always in motion and as producing and organizing relationship is also well illustrated by Derrida's own diction. In the context of this reference to Heraclitus *diapherein*', he refers to "the history of being" as an epoch of the *diapherein*' (153). That is the one differing from himself, the one in difference with itself.

Concluding her rigorous and fascinating study, O'Connell writes: 'While both Heraclitus and Derrida can be said to announce the loss of pure language, they also show such an entity has never existed, except by fiat or feint. Nevertheless . . . both Heraclitus and Derrida keep the dream of a more pure language very much alive' (169). This seems to me to be the same dream or mood of the imaginary Platonic *theophiles*, the philosopher seeing Beauty and Good in their purity.

Francesco Tampoia

Alexander R. Pruss
The Principle of Sufficient Reason:
A Reassessment.
New York: Cambridge University Press. 2006.
Pp. 350.
US$80.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-85959-2).

This is a masterly treatment of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) in a multitude of its philosophical guises and contexts. Usually, in Leibniz's hands for example, PSR refers to the principle that given any fact of the matter, there has to be a reason why it is so rather than otherwise. Pruss defends a version of the PSR according to which (necessarily) *contingently* true propo-

sitions always have an explanation. Given the diversity of PSR's applications such a work is long overdue, and Pruss, with his polymathic tendencies, was clearly the right author for the job. In its generality the book manages to cover virtually all the major areas of philosophy, from metaethics to philosophy of physics: this is a book that *all* philosophers should seriously consider reading — or investing in for *reference* purposes. I can certainly see myself thumbing through this work many times over the coming years. These well-earned superlatives out of the way, let's get to the contents, and then to some (minor) drawbacks with the book.

There are nineteen chapters and a short concluding chapter squeezed into a little over three hundred pages. These chapters are distributed over three parts. Part 1 provides three chapters' worth of background material. This includes a general motivation of the PSR and a restriction of the PSR to contingent truths — Pruss concedes that the PSR is potentially applicable to necessary truths too, but feels that it must await a deeper understanding of explanation in mathematics and philosophy. There follow chapters dealing with historical case studies from Parmenides to Kant (essentially arguing for and against the PSR) and, related to this discussion, the relation between the notion of a 'causal principle' and the PSR which are argued to stand and fall together — this is important for Pruss since many of his later arguments depend on the entailment relation, using causal principles to argue indirectly for the PSR (so that a commitment to some causal principle implies a commitment to the PSR).

Part 2 provides an overview of various objections to the PSR in seven chapters. These range from theistic arguments to arguments with a basis in various aspects of quantum mechanics. The first objection is a modern descendent of Hume's objection that there is no contradiction in supposing a brick to come into existence *ex nihilo*, without cause or reason. The new objection is based on cosmological considerations: there are models of general relativity with an initial singularity. This is not quite the example I would have chosen, since it is well known in physics that the initial conditions are not understood in the classical theory (the singularity requires quantum considerations, which are seemingly incompatible with classical general relativity). He mentions quantum cosmological models — supposedly the genuine article when it comes to creation *ex nihilo* (though there is much heated debate over this) — but only in a footnote. This rather mars the discussion. Theological considerations — more generally: a philosophically unsavory, causally efficacious necessary being — arise in the next chapter, where the bullet is bitten by Pruss. Chapters on objections based on modal fatalism (no contingent propositions) and the absence of free will follow. Then comes a chapter dealing with quantum indeterminism (conceptually aligned with the free will objections) and correlations; the discussion was way too loose here, almost to the point of inaccuracy. Part 2 ends with a discussion of Leibniz's use of the PSR (see below).

Part 3 considers various proposals for justifying the PSR in nine chapters. The discussion here begins with a nicely argued defense of the 'self-evidence'

of the PSR. Then comes a series of 'Thomistic' arguments based on the idea that there has to be *something* that grounds the 'being' of objects. Related 'cause-effect' considerations follow. PSR is then shown to provide a solid basis for our everyday dealings (in investigating plane crashes for example) and our epistemic workings. To finish, Pruss argues that the PSR is entailed by an 'attractive' actualist account of possibility according to which the truth-makers of alethic modal propositions are concrete entities.

I come now to some weak points of the book. One of the few problems with the book is the sheer wealth of material that isn't allowed to mature into as deep a discussion as one would like (and of which Pruss is clearly capable). Some of the chapters are just a couple of pages long, which is, stylistically, not very pretty. However, one can well understand the desire to keep a book that is clearly written as an extended argument down to a manageable size.

Rather more serious, I think, is the somewhat surprising omission of relationship between PSR and symmetry principles in physics, such as Curie's principle, symmetry breaking, gauge symmetry and so on. This absence becomes very noticeable in the discussion of the Leibniz-Clarke debate. For example, in discussing Leibniz's PSR-based attack on Newtonian absolute space and time Pruss claims that 'the argument is not likely to be used for showing space and time to be relative' but is 'more likely to act as an attempt at a *reductio ad absurdum* of the PSR' (29). This ignores a massive chunk of work done by physicists and philosophers, much of it very recent, on the 'hole argument' (of Einstein, and then of Johns Stachel, Norton, and Earman), in which an analogous argument (involving a causal version of the PSR, one of Pruss' causal principles) *is* used to defend relationalism. Both Tim Maudlin and Simon Saunders have explicitly related the original Leibnizian argument to the later Einsteinian argument and, in Saunders' case, directly to the PSR. One can find this material elsewhere, it is true, but nonetheless it would be nice to find a discussion (or at least a note) included in this book, if only for the sake of completeness.

In fact, the only poor parts, as far as I can see, are the discussions that involve physics, where there are some claims that are simply false or at least highly misleading. These are, however, very minor shortcomings: overall the book is an excellent achievement, and I can think of no sufficient reason why it should not grace the shelves of any philosopher.

Dean Rickles
University of Calgary

This interesting collection of essays on Fichte's *Foundations of Natural Right* (*FNR*) follows from a conference held in 2001 in celebration of a long-overdue new translation of this text. It contains seventeen essays in all, from both well-known figures in the study of Fichte and German Idealism and relative newcomers in the field. It covers a wide range of issues, demonstrating both the ingenuity and novelty of *FNR* and of contemporary interpretations of the same.

FNR was published in 1796 and 1797 during the height of Fichte's fame. In it Fichte unfolds a completely new understanding of natural right. As the Introduction to this collection rightly points out, four features of *FNR* deserve special mention: (1) its sharp separation of questions of morality from questions of right; (2) the necessity of recognizing the other, not only as a limit to one's own freedom, but more fundamentally in order to become even conscious of one's self; (3) the necessity to consider an *embodied* self for the expression of one's freedom and for recognition between oneself and the other to take place; and (4) the fact that the theory of natural rights is, like the *Wissenschaftslehre* (*WL*) itself, a *Reellephilosophie*. It is a 'real' (*Reelle*), or material doctrine because of its performativity. Fichte asks us to perform for ourselves the necessary constitutive acts on which his philosophy rests. He always asks us to 'think the I' because then we become aware of the self-positing nature of consciousness. It is in this sense that he claimed that the *WL* is not grounded in some assumed facts of consciousness, but on the necessary *acts* of consciousness. These acts are the *WL*'s material ground. It is with this turn to the question of actuality that Fichte comes to prioritise the actuality of right over the mere possibility of moral action (contra Kant). For Fichte questions of right and freedom do not concern descriptions of states but actions to be performed.

These four issues: 1) separation of morality and right, 2) alterity, 3) embodied selves, and 4) materialism, are addressed in essays by, respectively, Violetta Waibel and Yolanda Estes, Jeffrey Kinlaw and Hans Georg von Manz, Angelica Nuzzo and Günter Zöller, and Bruce Merrill and Scott Scribner. But this does not exhaust the variety of the collection. There are interesting papers on the relation of *FNR* to other theories of political philosophy, e.g., social contract and natural law theories (Wayne Martin, Michael Bauer, Robert R. Williams); questions of sex and gender (Bäbel Frischmann), Fichte's methodology (Daniel Breazeale); the relation between Fichte and Schelling (Michael Vater and Steven Hoeltzel); Fichte, Heidegger and Nazism (Tom Rockmore); and, lastly, *FNR* and liberation philosophy (Arnold Farr).

As it is obviously not possible to discuss all essays here, I have simply singled out a few for discussion. Breazeale distinguishes between various methods and strategies in the *FNR*. Fichte famously demanded of us to 'think the I' and to observe ourselves when doing so. Rather than discovering a certain fact of consciousness (Descartes) we experience our fundamentally active nature. This Breazeale calls the 'phenomenological-synthetic' method, thus denoting both its performative and its ampliative nature. But there is also a 'dialectical-synthetic' method, where contradictions are resolved through a 'higher level' principle. Besides these, there is a third 'method', the appeal to facts of experience. This appeal is problematic, not only for the often strange things Fichte thinks are facts, but especially because Fichte claimed to have started from necessary and unconditioned first principles. An appeal to facts that are by nature contingent thus seems out of place. This, Breazeale writes, indicates a significant difference between the *FNR* and the *WL*. With the *WL* its foundations find their actuality contained within its performative nature, since for Fichte consciousness can be nothing but self-positing. In thus grounding itself consciousness is necessarily actual. Yet it is not possible to derive the actuality of a community of sensible beings obeying the theory of natural right from the theory of natural right itself. Fichte needs to demonstrate this actuality since its mere possibility was deemed insufficient. As he cannot derive the actuality of such a community directly from first principles, he is forced to show how the theory of natural right applies to the experienced world. But this creates the subsequent problem of the status of this world. If natural right is to be a 'science' then it must explicate the necessary and actual structures of right. If these structures are indeed necessary then they cannot be straightforwardly refuted by the facts of the experienced world.

Günter Zöller and Angelica Nuzzo both discuss various aspects of embodiment. As Nuzzo writes: 'The body is first and foremost agent (not just the medium) of human concrete interpersonal activity and freedom. The body is the material principle of individuality but is also, at the same time, that which makes visible the intrinsically public and intersubjective dimension of human individuality' (71). For Fichte, Kant had only demonstrated the possibility of moral action (i.e. what is required for it to take place), now Fichte asked: how do rights apply? It is the body that comes to fill this function in a twofold way. It is my *body* that provides efficacy to freedom, and it is the *human* body that lets me recognize the other as a member of a community of rights. Zöller: 'the *Naturrecht* is the work in which both the body and the Other first receive systematic philosophical attention — not only in Fichte but in philosophy in general' (91).

What is interesting about this collection is that all articles are truly essayistic. They single out certain issues in the theory of natural right, issues that open up the text for further research. As such it gives testimony to the quite wonderful resurgence in Fichte studies. *FNR*, whose only other (and not very good) translation dates from 1869, suddenly reappears at the centre of a whole set of contemporary issues, tying together questions of self-aware-

ness and community, embodiment and politics. This reappraisal has been on going for some decades now, slowly reversing a century and a half of misinterpretation. Though we have yet to see a comprehensive study on *FNR* appear in the English language, this collection will surely serve to inspire someone to such a work.

M. Kolkman
University of Warwick

George Sher
In Praise of Blame.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2006.
Pp. 160.
Cdn$45.50/US$35.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-518742-7).

In this excellent monograph Sher sets out a defense of the practice of blaming people for wrongdoing. He argues that there is a need for such a defense because it has become increasingly common in contemporary society to claim that blaming is counterproductive and even neurotic. While punishment and even retribution continue to receive plenty of philosophical scrutiny, the attitude of blame itself has remained relatively unexamined in the literature.

Sher approaches his topic systematically. The argument is divided into six main chapters. In Chapter 2, Sher argues against the Humean claim that we blame people for bad actions that derive from their bad character, and the associated claim that we blame them because those bad actions derived from their character. Sher's counterargument considers different cases of people who act in cruel or hurtful ways and whom our moral intuitions would cause us to blame, despite the fact that we would not deem them cruel or hurtful people.

In Chapter 3, Sher examines how the disapproval of a bad action can be extended to the blame of the agent without appeal to the notion of character. He points out that an action is the joint product of the desires, beliefs, and dispositions, and he claims that these items make her who she is. Thus there is a close connection between the person's action and her identity, and so it is conceptually coherent to blame her for her actions. He employs the fact that actions stem from a large network of desires and beliefs, and this makes his

claim that they are strongly related to the person's identity more plausible, although he says very little about when changes to a person's beliefs, desires and dispositions could be said to lead to a change in the person's identity.

In his fourth chapter Sher, taking the surprising route that it can be reasonable to blame people for aspects of themselves that they cannot change, argues that it can be morally reasonable to blame people for their character traits. He agrees that we should not blame people for accidents over which they had no control, but if their action proceeded from their bad traits, such as cruelty, then we can blame them. He first shows that claims that people should not be blamed for what they cannot control have not been well defended. He then proceeds to defend his view positively, by pointing out there is such a strong connection between a trait and a person's identity that to believe a trait is reprehensible comes to the same thing as believing that the person herself is reprehensible, and thus blaming her for her bad trait.

Sher moves on to the nature of blame. In Chapter 5, he begins by addressing some views he believes to be mistaken. First, he shows the flaws in the utilitarian view that to blame someone is to express disapproval for an action or character as a way to change the person's actions or improve her character. Here the argument proceeds swiftly, because it is possible to blame people without communicating one's blame. So Sher is able to move to the position that blame is an attitude. But the question is: which attitude? Sher rejects any identification of blame with a simple belief, whether it be that the person acted badly, or that the person has stained her character. He next considers the idea, put forward by Peter Strawson, that blame is fundamentally an affective phenomenon. Sher agrees that emotions are an important common feature of blame, and need to be accounted for. However, he argues that this Strawsonian approach cannot adequately account for the blameworthiness of actions, and cannot adequately distinguish appropriate blame from inappropriate blame. Furthermore, he argues that there can be instances of blame which are not affective at all. It is possible to hold an attitude of blame to someone while experiencing no emotions of anger or hostility whatsoever.

The positive account of the nature of blame comes in Chapter 6. Sher's theory is simple: blame of someone for an action or a character trait starts from the belief that the action or character trait is bad, and from the corresponding desire that the person had not performed the action or did not have that character trait. In order to make this account plausible, Sher needs to show how this belief-desire combination can give rise to the emotions and dispositions that are so closely linked to blame. A central problem for this account is that since it is impossible to change the past, then when blame includes a wish that an action had not happened, it means wishing for the impossible, which seems to make blame irrational or at least futile. In order to ameliorate this problem, Sher proceeds with a discussion of our reactions to frustrated desires and their links to future-oriented dispositions. He does not pretend to be giving a conceptual analysis of blame, so he does not present necessary and sufficient conditions for when a person has an attitude of blame. However, he does hold that a person with standard psychological

dispositions and the appropriate belief-desire pair will go on to have the characteristic emotional reactions that we associate with blame.

The final chapter takes on the question of blameworthiness. Sher argues that, in giving an account of what it is to be blameworthy, it is not enough just to point out that person has acted badly or has a bad character. He claims that acceptance of a moral principle is conceptually linked to having the desire to blame someone when that person violates the moral principle. Thus, to explain a person's blameworthiness we must refer to the moral principle as well as the relevant bad action or character.

Sher's writing style is straightforward and methodical, although his arguments might have been clearer if he had stated his theory at the start and proceeded to justify it, rather than proceeding to his own view through a process of elimination of other positions. The topic of blame is important and Sher's views are interesting and original. While there is still plenty of room for disagreement with many of his claims, he has made a valuable contribution to the literature.

Christian Perring
Dowling College

Tara Smith
Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics:
The Virtuous Egoist.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.
Pp. 309.
US$80.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-86050-5);
US$25.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-70546-2).

This is a strongly written addition to the scholarly literature on Ayn Rand's philosophy. Its first great virtue is that it connects Rand's work to recent literature in ethics. Since the 1990's there has been a surge of interest among professional philosophers in virtue ethics, eudaimonism, naturalism, and objectivity. Rand's contemporary generation in the 1950's and 1960's tended to skepticism and non-naturalism. Brian Medlin was representative, publishing in the same year as Rand's *Atlas Shrugged* the following: 'it is now pretty generally accepted by professional philosophers that ultimate ethical principles must be arbitrary' ('Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism'. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 35 [1957]: 111-118; 111).

Our contemporary generation of philosophers has moved decisively away from that position — here Smith cites the work of Philippa Foot, Julia Annas, Berys Gaut, and Peter Railton, and notes the many positive connections between their and Rand's work of forty years ago.

Chapters 1 and 2 alone are worth the price of Smith's book for their clear and accurate overview of the central theses of Rand's ethics. Rand is a polarizing figure among intellectuals, so this second great virtue of Smith's book should not be under-estimated given the sometimes unrecognizable portraits of Rand's philosophy circulating in popular and academic publications. As Smith writes in her conclusion, 'As long as egoism is portrayed as materialistic, hedonistic, emotion-driven, or predatory, we can readily sympathize with those looking elsewhere for guidance' (285). Smith argues convincingly and refreshingly that Rand's egoism is none of those.

The central chapters of Smith's book are structured around the major virtues in Rand's system: rationality, productiveness, honesty, integrity, independence, justice, and pride. Given the centrality of virtue ethics in the current literature, Smith distinguishes Rand's *action-focused* account of virtue from the *character-focused* accounts of Rosalind Hursthouse, Alisdair MacIntrye, Paul Woodruff, and Christina and Fred Sommers. These chapters contain several gems of insight including: Smith's account of the scope of integrity and the question of whether, for example, Hitler had integrity given that he acted consistently in following his destructive policies (185); a discussion of courage as 'integrity under fire' (192); the connection between productiveness and (non-religious) spiritual values (204); accounts of productiveness and greed (217); discussions of the connections and contrasts between Aristotle's and Rand's accounts of pride (223); a fine-grained discussion of generosity and why it is neither a virtue nor a vice (256-65); and an account of egoistic love and friendship (287).

Three nits are worth picking in Smith's generally excellent work. One involves the transition she makes (23-4) from Rand's meta-ethics to her egoism. Greater stress here on the *individuality* of human life would make the argument stronger. One can accept the naturalness, objectivity, and conditionality of values — and Smith argues those well — without grasping their individuality. Egoism especially brings with it claims about individual responsibility for producing and justice in consuming. In performing their core life activities, humans are not collective beings like bees or ants; human life is individual in both production and consumption. This is especially important in response to those philosophers who do not accept this, who argue a thorough collectivity or who accept individuality with respect to production but urge collectivity with respect to distribution and consumption. Smith is aware of this — she cites in her footnotes philosophers who resist this very step — but at this juncture she moves quickly.

A second issue arises in Smith's overall strong discussion of justice. She nicely articulates Rand's defense of justice against egalitarianism (156), justice's relationships to forgiveness and mercy (164), and the connection between justice and individual rights (170). The issue here involves the scope

of Rand's conception of justice. Smith consistently defines it as 'the application of rationality to the evaluation and treatment of other individuals' (135). The issue is: Why only *others*? Rand does not restrict the scope of justice to the treatment of others but defines it more broadly to be self-inclusive and even fundamentally self-oriented. In her major theoretical essay on ethics, 'The Objectivist Ethics', Rand states that 'one must never seek or grant the unearned and undeserved, neither in matter nor in spirit (which is the virtue of Justice)' (*The Virtue of Selfishness*, 28). This characteristic statement is inclusive of self. (Leonard Peikoff's definition of justice, which Smith quotes [136], is also inclusive.) A parallel case is honesty: According to Rand, honesty is not faking reality, neither to oneself nor to others — not *only* to others. To return to justice: examples of injustice to oneself include those who undercut their own self-esteem, accept un-earned guilt, delusionally inflate their self-worth, or cultivate humility. If justice involves only the evaluation and treatment of others, such cases would have no justice component.

A third issue also involves scope-of-application questions. How does the virtue of honesty apply to dealing with the deceitful? What is the nature of responsibility when one is constrained by threats of force from others? How do moral principles apply in cases of life-or-death emergencies? Here the question in the Objectivist literature is whether Rand intended the scope of moral principles to be universal (with special application to such non-standard cases), or limited to the standard cases (implying that one steps outside the realm of morality when dealing with liars, thugs, or emergency situations). The former interpretation can rely on Rand's statement in 'The Ethics of Emergencies' that one must differentiate rules of conduct in normal and emergency situations but also that '[t]his does not mean a double standard of morality' (*The Virtue of Selfishness*, 54). The latter interpretation can rely on *Atlas Shrugged*'s statement that 'Force and mind are opposites; morality ends where a gun begins' (1023). Smith's discussion is informed and careful in defense of the latter, 'Morality is inapplicable,' position (97); but it is not decisive due to the relatively brief space she devotes to this complex set of issues.

Smith's book belongs in every college and university library, and on the shelves of philosophers interested in Rand's views and current trends in the ethics literature.

Stephen R.C. Hicks
Rockford College

L. W. Sumner
The Hateful and the Obscene:
Studies in the Limits of Free Expression.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2004.
Pp. 275.
US$60.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8020-4239-2);
US$29.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8020-8083-7).

It takes considerable skill to take the familiar and render it truly captivating
and insightful. This is only one — and perhaps not the least — of Sumner's
many admirable accomplishments in *The Hateful and the Obscene*. Sumner
constructs John Stuart Mill's comparatively familiar ideas about liberalism,
utilitarianism, and freedom of expression into a theoretical framework for
evaluating contemporary Canadian (the main jurisdictional focus of the book)
hate and obscenity law. In the course of this discussion, a legal history of the
development of obscenity law is given, beginning with the 1868 *Hicklin* case
in England up to the 1992 *Butler* decision. Further sections go on to complete
a remarkably clear and detailed account of most, if not all, of the significant
legal cases on freedom of expression in the last several decades. Anyone in-
terested in the constitutional history of Canadian criminal law on hate and
obscenity will find the book worth reading just for this aspect alone.

Sumner grounds his main argument on Mill's claim that coercive inter-
ference with any kind of expression is justified only if the expression causes
harm to others and the interference results in more benefits over costs. The
idea here is that, since liberty is a benefit, any restraint imposed on it must
be viewed as a cost. This now imposes a considerable justificatory burden on
the state to provide compelling evidence of a causal link between a particular
form of expression and its alleged harm. Sumner also maintains, following
Mill, that harm — indeed, moral value in general — must be understood in
welfarist terms. And this, Sumner explains, 'means, roughly, that whether
something is good or bad for a person depends ultimately on that person's
desires, preferences, aims, tastes, or values' (41).

What gets factored as a harm into Mill's framework is not always straight-
forward. Sumner articulates a fairly lengthy argument in defense of the
claim that neither moral corruption nor moral distress work with the harm
principle. The former fails because the 'victims' of moral corruption (pornog-
raphy/hate consumers) tend to be willing participants in their own 'harm'.
But this notion of harm is inconsistent with Mill's welfarist account of value.
Moral distress, on the other hand, clearly satisfies welfarist considerations
and hence is a relevant harm. However, Sumner argues, factoring this kind
of harm into the balancing act between the right to free expression and the
right not be harmed by its exercise would ultimately be self-defeating (47).
Too many people are too easily distressed. So if distress were considered,
we would lose the sphere of personal liberty Mill's framework is designed to
protect. This argument becomes important for Sumner's discussion of the
potential harms of defamation and degradation that many feminist scholars

have raised. Defamation is, Sumner contends, properly seen as a child of the moral distress argument, and hence is the inheritor of all the failings of its parent. An analogous fate is assigned for the degradation argument: it fails largely because it is just another appearance of the moral corruption argument.

In spite of Sumner's argument, the idea that moral corruption and distress are harms sufficient to restrict pornographic expression has had much more legal currency in Canada than any harm-based account which excludes them. The most current manifestation of this is apparent in the 1992 *Butler* decision where the Supreme Court decided that community standards of tolerance should be the measure of whether pornography causes harm in the form of the degradation or dehumanizing treatment of women. But, Sumner argues, community standards are notoriously difficult to index. This leaves courts with little or no evidence of such standards and a considerable temptation to recast their own opinions as the standards themselves. More significantly, even if the standards were easily discoverable, the criminalization of any conduct primarily because a majority is intolerant of it is inconsistent with Mill's harm principle. Nevertheless, *Butler* held that any such criminalization must be purely harm-based. Sumner concludes that the community standards test represents a fundamental 'contradiction at the heart of Canadian obscenity adjudication' (125).

Perhaps the central question of the book is whether pornography and hate speech cause relevant harm. Apart from two exceptions — child pornography and hate group recruitment — Sumner's answer is that neither pornography nor hate cause sufficient harm to override the presumption that we should favor free expression. In the case of pornography, various social studies lead Sumner to conclude that there is no clear evidence of harm. Pornography also does not contribute to women's inequality, he claims, because it does not exploit women any more than many other unrestricted aspects of popular culture (147). Moreover, women have greater equality in liberal societies where pornography is widely available, and they have more equality now than they did previously when obscenity laws were more restrictive (145).

Sumner's argument that hate speech is similarly unconnected to significant harm is surprisingly brief (about 5 pages). This brevity is puzzling in a way because Sumner has noticeably changed his mind about this matter (e.g., 200n86). He accounts for this brevity in the following ways. The alleged harm of hate propaganda does not require —where pornography does — an inquiry into whether it harms participants in its production. Furthermore, since 'moral distress stemming from pornography cannot qualify as harm for the purposes of the Harm Principle, then neither can liberal distress occasioned by hate propaganda' (158). Evidently the same goes for all of the counter-arguments provided against similar concerns in pornography, e.g., that it degrades, defames, subordinates, or silences. These arguments are apparently transferable with equal force to hate propaganda. And finally, whereas there are many studies of harm and pornography, very little investigation has been given to this question for hate.

Sumner's arguments are offered in support of a fairly robust anti-censorship policy recommendation. Not only are content-based prohibitions on any pornographic and hateful expressions unjustified, so too are existing measures of prior restraint, e.g., border seizures, censorship boards, etc. Again, there are two notable exceptions to these recommendations: child pornography and the use of hate expression to recruit members into hate groups. In child pornography, there is little doubt that participant harm is caused. There also are no serious evidential problems: the film/picture itself becomes direct evidence of the harm. In the case of hate, Sumner notices that hate literature is often used as a recruitment device for hate groups to incite the violent practice of their beliefs (162). If so, we have a significant causal harm connection. Sumner suggests, however, that this possibility is better handled by deleting section 319(2) (on the willful promotion of hatred) of the Criminal Code and then reworking section 319(1) (on the public incitement of hatred).

Section 319(2), however, may still be better suited to deal with hate group recruitment. The recruitment activities of hate groups seems to be one thing, their criminal output another. Hateful speech designed for recruitment purposes will focus primarily on the exercise of freedom of association, otherwise it will obviously run afoul of incitement restrictions. But, of course, society has a clear, harm-based interest in seeing these groups remain as small and as criminally ineffective as possible. And this interest seems best realized by restricting the promotion of hatred *per se*, than with a law that only restricts speech which directly incites criminal acts. Furthermore, the distinction between the promotion of hatred and an incitement which leads to criminal action is quite unclear with respect to group recruitment. Some hateful expression may well be very successful at promoting hatred (i.e., recruiting members) but remain ambiguous with respect to the incitement of crimes.

The claim that no content-based restrictions should be placed on hate materials is also a bit surprising given Sumner's own admission that we lack empirical studies demonstrating a causal connection. The only conclusion to be drawn from this should be that we have no reason to be any more confident that there is no causal relation than to believe that there is one. Given the very serious harms that are at stake, it would seem that having some legal recourse is a better option — in terms entirely consistent with Mill's framework — than a more permissive approach. This might further be supported by the possible deterrent effect — something Sumner does not consider at any length — that such a law might have.

There is a final point worth some attention. The entire argument of the book seems to possess a certain insular quality. Once one accepts the basic framework with all of its limitations and qualifications (especially its consequentialist and welfarist axioms) then we seem inexorably drawn to Sumner's conclusions. Many standard arguments for restrictive laws that do not share the framework assumptions become simply inadmissible. On the other hand, this feature of the book may be more of an asset than a liability. To Sumner's credit these external arguments are never simply ignored and their inadmissibility is thoroughly explained and defended. We may also dispute

his findings of fact, but it cannot be said that the significant facts are merely ignored. Sumner's efforts on Mill's behalf were never expressly intended to provide a complete defense against rival approaches. His main purpose is limited to demonstrating the philosophical relevance and usefulness of Mill's ideas to Canadian obscenity and hate laws. In this respect, *The Hateful and the Obscene* is extensively and brilliantly successful.

David Elliott
University of Regina

The central question of this book is, 'How does thought . . . get footing?' (2) That is: in virtue of what is what one thinks answerable to how things are? In answering this, through a reading of Wittgenstein's *Investigations*, Travis discusses an impressive variety of issues — proper names, privacy, perception, logic, nonsense — and the views of Austin, Dummett, McDowell, Russell and Strawson. Threaded throughout are beautiful (and compelling) examples concerning, among other things, pigs in parlours and the etiquette of fire-doors. Travis' writing is often very difficult but, given the subtlety of the points being made, not gratuitously so.

   Wittgenstein's principal target, Travis says, is a Fregean idea according to which thoughts are 'beholden . . . to the way things are' just if they are 'about an object and a concept in the right structured way.' Such a view is endemic in contemporary philosophy. Truth-conditional semantics, following Davidson, is committed to each sentence, as such, possessing a certain truth-evaluable content in virtue of the referents of its constituent parts. Likewise, representationalists in philosophy of mind, such as Fodor, hold that thoughts *are* sentences (or sentence-like entities) that, qua representations, bear truth-conditions. Opposing this is Wittgenstein's view: 'What words name (by way of concepts and objects), and the structured way they do *that*, does *not* determine, uniquely, when they would be true' (2-3). Consider, for example, the sentence, 'The car is blue'. That this names a car and applies the concept *blueness* to it

does not yet determine whether one would count it as expressing a thought whose truth requires or precludes its having black leather upholstery, or the engine's being blue, or red paint covering blue fibreglass, and so on (30).

For Travis' Wittgenstein, what determines which thought is expressed are the '*consequences* of thinking, or saying, something', what one might reasonably expect in 'the particular circumstances'. Suppose, for example, that I am choosing which car to buy. The colour of its bodywork would reasonably be expected to matter, the colour of its carburettor not. In turn, this means that what thought is expressed 'is fixed, in part, at least, by our parochial sense for things' (3-4). That is, the specific truth-evaluable content expressed on this occasion is partly determined by what we (humans) idiosyncratically take, as a matter of fact, to be of import.

In Chapter 2 Travis proceeds to consider, in the light of Wittgenstein's remarks on family-resemblance, the application of these views to singular thought, an especially important case since it there that thought has its feet most firmly in the world. Then in Chapter 3 he suggests that, for Wittgenstein, the idea that what determines what is required for the truth of a thought is our parochial judgment extends equally to thoughts concerning thought, truth, and the like. Here a threat of idealism emerges. Our judgments as to what reasonably to expect are equally determinative of the contents of thoughts about whether a stance is answerable. That is, 'a particular parochial sensibility' provides 'the measure' of whether an attitude or utterance — concerning, say, the size of a table or how nice kumquats taste — is truth-apt (146). We now seem to lack 'assurance that our would-be answerable stances are really that' (158). Travis' response, based on a novel reading of Wittgenstein's private language argument, is that someone pressing this issue is really failing to say anything at all, since (very roughly) there are no consequences that one might reasonably expect her words to have.

There are two ways in which one might think of the role that parochial judgments play in individuating thought. First, what a representation names delimits a range of possible thoughts it might express, and what is reasonably expected settles which of those thoughts is actually expressed. Second, what a representation names *provisionally* delimits a range of possible thoughts it might express, and what is reasonably expected might determine that a thought is expressed lying outside that range. Travis suggests the second when he writes: 'for any condition, C, on being some given thing to speak of . . . we are prepared to recognize, and can conceive of, circumstances in which C would not hold of *that* thing there is to speak of' (60; cf. 106-7).

Adapting an example from Putnam which Travis endorses, consider the sentence 'There is a vixen'. One might take the established usage of 'vixen' to determine that what it expresses is true if and only if there is a female fox. This, perhaps, leaves it open whether it expresses a thought that would be true of flattened road-kill or a stuffed, mounted hunting-trophy. But Travis also appears to hold that, should a creature turn out not to be a female fox (but, perhaps, a robot), it might be reasonable nonetheless to take the thought expressed to be true, that is, as lying outside the range laid down in advance.

It is hard to make sense of this picture. If a word is applied on two occasions on the basis of entirely distinct set of features, why say that the same concept is expressed on those occasions? Indeed, since the conditions of application are wholly different, one's expectations on both occasions should be wholly different. Hence, by Travis' own lights, there seems no reason to hold that on each occasion the same concept is named.

Another concern is that, for Travis' Wittgenstein, thought is indeterminate. Since it is conceivable for there to be two competing judgments as to what expectations are reasonable regarding a given utterance, it appears possible for there to be no fact of the matter as to which of two thoughts a person expresses. Travis seems to acknowledge this, stating that 'there is no longer any supposition of a *unique* right answer to the question in which way' a person 'meant her words' (128).

It is unclear that one can continue viewing thought as *real* if it is indeterminate whether any given person has a certain thought. More specifically, indeterminacy appears hard to reconcile with thought's playing a role in explaining behavior, or with the (Wittgensteinian) idea that thinkers are authoritative as to what they think.

These qualms aside, Travis' rich and subtle book is a stimulating investigation of what it takes for thought to be answerable to reality. He makes a very strong case for the idea that the truth of a thought is bound up with the consequences of thinking it, that those consequences are fixed by our judgments regarding what is reasonable, and that there is no external standpoint from which to assess those judgments. These are all recognizably Wittgensteinian themes, but Travis makes them independently attractive and eloquently demonstrates their ongoing importance.

Daniel Whiting
University of Southampton

Dale Turner
This Is Not a Peace Pipe:
Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2006.
Pp. 200.
Cdn$/US$55.00
(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8020-8016-5);
Cdn$/US$26.95
(paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8020-3792-3).

In this important discussion Turner examines the fit between liberal theory and Aboriginal rights. The fit may be possible, but recent attempts by liberal politicians (Trudeau, Chrétien) and scholars (Alan Cairns, Will Kymlicka) have failed as peace pipes.

According to Turner, to be a peace pipe a proposal must accommodate Aboriginal peoples' own understandings of their rights (hereafter, 'indigenous rights'). Turner claims (7) that accommodation requires that a proposal 1) address the legacy of colonialism, 2) respect the *sui generis* nature of indigenous rights, 3) question unilateral non-Aboriginal sovereignty over Aboriginal lands and peoples, and 4) recognize that a meaningful theory of Aboriginal rights presupposes Aboriginal participation.

Turner's criteria for assessing liberalism's proposals provide an invaluable litmus test for non-indigenous political philosophers interested in ascertaining liberalism's compatibility with indigenous axiology. Each criterion is meaningful within liberal axiology. However, liberalism's epistemology may be inconsistent with the fourth criterion. Liberal theory requires Aboriginal participation in Canadian society. However, its epistemology might not accept that for non-Aboriginals to understand Aboriginal rights they must have Aboriginal assistance. Eurocentric epistemology assumes an objective, universal knower which does not fit easily with the suggestion that knowledge of moral, specifically Aboriginal rights, requires special ways of knowing not possessed by non-indigenous philosophers. Although I accept Turner's fourth criterion, others will likely contest it.

Turner, a member of Temagami First Nation, explains why each criterion matters from an Aboriginal perspective. From a non-Aboriginal perspective, arguably the third criterion is the major obstacle to liberalism's successfully accommodating indigenous rights. Turner demonstrates that liberalism's proposals assume underlying non-Aboriginal sovereignty, thereby violating this criterion. He does not claim that the third criterion presupposes satisfaction of the fourth, though this does seem to be the case. Liberalism informed only by a Euro-centric perspective — that is, without Aboriginal participation — is unlikely to produce any account of rights and sovereignty consistent with the third criterion.

The Trudeau/Chrétien *White Paper* fails each of Turner's conditions. Rooted in liberalism's commitment to human rights and equality, it represents a government's hopes for a just society. So, in the name of liberal justice, the

'special rights' of Canada's Aboriginal peoples will disappear. If no one has Aboriginal rights or treaty rights, all Canadians are equal. On this account, Turner explains, Aboriginal peoples do not see justice or equality, because for White Paper liberalism there are only *individual* rights; Canada is one non-Aboriginal nation, with no Aboriginal perspective. Thus, the *White Paper* is '. . . a paradigm example of colonialism under the guise of renewing the political relationship on more just liberal foundations' (94). The offer is not even intended as a peace pipe.

Turner's examination of the White Paper reveals obstacles to finding a fit between liberalism and indigenous rights. His discussion of Alan Cairns' *citizens plus* proposal exposes how liberalism's proposals have been fundamentally inconsistent with Indigenous rights. Like other liberal theorists, Cairns assumes the legitimacy of Canada's *underlying* sovereignty, and he does not acknowledge the need to justify this presupposition. Indigenous rights challenge the legitimacy of non-Aboriginal sovereignty. Hence, non-Aboriginal sovereignty cannot be assumed in defining them.

Acknowledging that Will Kymlicka, like Cairns, is well intentioned in his minority-rights-based account of Aboriginal rights, Turner demonstrates that it, too, fails the peace pipe test. Assuming 'the incorporation' of Aboriginal peoples and regarding Aboriginal peoples as minorities (albeit, special minorities), Kymlicka repeats Cairn's mistake: it presumes the underlying sovereignty of the federal government. Moreover, since Kymlicka ignores the *sui generis* nature of Aboriginal rights, he does not see why indigenous rights cannot be minority right.

Turner does not include the recommendations of the 1997 report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) among liberalism's accounts of Aboriginal rights. Nevertheless, he provides a detailed assessment of it. RCAP's room for Aboriginal participation ensures it is more praiseworthy than the three peace pipes. However, it too fails to satisfy the third criterion. Assuming underlying non-Aboriginal sovereignty, it constrains Aboriginal sovereignty in ways inconsistent with indigenous rights. Thus, although it explains the principles upon which a just relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples can be established, ultimately it is another inadequate liberal proposal.

In the book's last two chapters Turner explains the responsibility of indigenous scholars (word warriors). He somewhat agrees with Kymlicka's recommendation that Aboriginal people justify their rights in ways which non-Aboriginal judges and politicians can recognize and understand. He rejects Kymlicka's view that indigenous rights must be shown to be an essential component of liberalism, since this presumes liberalism and Aboriginal understandings of Aboriginal rights are mutually consistent. Still, a dialogue with non-Aboriginal keepers of liberalism must be engaged. Indigenous word warriors, not indigenous philosophers, are called upon to engage in this dialogue.

The distinction between indigenous word warriors and indigenous philosophers is important. From a non-Aboriginal perspective Turner is an indig-

enous philosopher, from an Aboriginal perspective he is not. As he explains, indigenous philosophers are indigenous people recognized in their communities as sources of indigenous ways of knowing and possessing indigenous knowledge. Turner maintains indigenous philosophy is '. . . the source of our future well-being as indigenous peoples' (113), so the voices of indigenous philosophers must be heard. Word warriors, indigenous scholars who understand indigenous and non-indigenous ways of understanding the world, are to be spokespersons for indigenous philosophers. They must engage 'the dominant culture' in order to ensure, among other things, that Aboriginal understandings shape the normative language of Aboriginal politics. And they explain to indigenous philosophers the meaning and content of Aboriginal rights, sovereignty, and nationhood in non-indigenous legal and political discourse. Word warriors can bridge the two philosophies because of their 1) strong connections to their communities 2) education in Western European philosophy (9).

What role do non-indigenous philosophers have in the democratic dialogue which Turner hopes will transform liberalism's account of Aboriginal rights? Turner claims word warriors cannot do their job alone. 'There are many non-indigenous intellectuals who can help indigenous peoples make their arguments count' (120). This is an invitation for non-indigenous philosophers possessing a sense of justice and informed by Turner's arguments to work with indigenous word warriors to reconfigure liberalism so that it offers a peace pipe to Canada's Aboriginal peoples.

Sandra Tomsons
The University of Winnipeg

Kenneth P. Winkler, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. 468.
US$75.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-45033-1);
US$29.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-45657-9).

This book is a collection of twelve essays on various aspects of George Berkeley's thought. In his own day Berkeley (1685-1753), an Anglican Bishop of the poor diocese of Cloyne, Ireland, was considered a very committed and practical man. For his part he always considered himself a pioneer, called to think and do *new* things. He was the author of a *new* theory of vision, of the celebrated '*new* principle' of immaterialism, of a '*new* argument' to prove

the existence of God, of a bold criticism of the infinitesimal calculus, of *new* proposals to improve the Irish economy, and of a *novel* panacea — tar-water — able to cure every disease in his diocese (where there were no doctors). Berkeley was an active Christian who fostered the peaceful cohabitation of Anglicans and Catholics; he was one of the most progressive landowners in Southern Ireland, a zealous bishop always resident in his diocese and concerned for his parishioners' well-being both physical and spiritual. He also planned the foundation of St. Paul's College, in the Bermudas, for the religious and philosophical education of the natives. From a philosophical point of view, Berkeley was an atypical immaterialist empiricist, well versed in the sciences, to which he made important contributions, as well as an amateur of the mechanical arts, spending many hours in the foundries to learn metallurgical techniques.

In his introduction, Winkler explores the different facets of Berkeley's philosophy and personality, and sketches the contents of the essays comprising this volume. The first essay, by David Berman, is devoted to Berkeley's biography and career. Berman's thesis is that Berkeley was not a transparent person, as A. A. Luce held; on the contrary, Berman accepts W. Butler Yeats' interpretation, according to which Berkeley is considered a deft dissembler, willing to hide a kind of messianic and visionary 'super-religion'. In the second essay, Michael Ayers deals with the traditional question: 'Was Berkeley an empiricist or a rationalist?' In other words: which were Berkeley's Cartesian debts? Were the differences more or less numerous and important than the similarities? These questions do not seem very useful, because the labels of 'empiricism' and 'rationalism' in the modern age ought not to be used as rigid means to classify philosophers, which is obviously a desperate enterprise. In fact, the same question might be asked about every modern philosopher. Ayers' answer is quite obvious, too: Berkeley's immaterialism is an original synthesis of an empiricism finally freed from its materialistic ties (which would be highly problematic from an historical point of view), the naturalistic epistemology of common sense, and religion.

In the third paper, Robert McKim analyses the main contents of Berkeley's notebooks, known as the *Philosophical Commentaries*, with special concern about the emergence of the *esse est percipi* principle. Next, Margaret Atherton gives a scholarly exposition of Berkeley's new theory of vision. She compares the *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* (1709) with the *Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained* (1733), and then focuses on the theory's reception. Atherton maintains that the alleged success of Berkeley's theory was effectively limited to the thesis that distance perception is learned, while the language model was largely neglected.

The fifth chapter, by Winkler himself, consists of a wide analysis of Berkeley's doctrine of signs, assumed as a general model of explanation in the whole of Berkeley's works. The sixth essay, by Anthony Grayling, offers a reconstruction of Berkeley's argument for immaterialism; the seventh, by Phillip Cummins, deals with Berkeley's conception of minds and agency. At the beginning of this chapter, we read the explicit statement — quite com-

mon, though unexpressed, among the analytical philosophers — that 'Berkeley's present day reputation for philosophical acumen' (190) is founded on his three early published works: the *Essay*, A *Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710) and *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713). Fortunately, the last five essays of this volume are written from a different point of view.

Lisa Downing provides a very interesting survey of Berkeley's natural philosophy and philosophy of science, from *De motu* (1721) to *Siris* (1744). Downing's thesis is that Berkeley never maintained a kind of idealistic corpuscularianism: he was equally opposed to a realistic conception of corpuscularianism and of dynamics. That is to say, neither corpuscles nor forces should be considered real, causal explanations of natural phenomena. Berkeley instead inclined towards an instrumentalist interpretation of Newtonian dynamics.

In his essay 'Berkeley's Philosophy of Mathematics', Douglas Jesseph highlights the importance and originality of *The Analyst* (1734) in the eighteenth-century history of mathematics. Stephen Darwall, in 'Berkeley's Moral and Political Philosophy', stresses that the ethical motivation was 'the main drift and design of [Berkeley's] labours' (311). In Berkeley's 'anti-Nietzschean account of materialism and unbelief' (312), Berkeley constantly warns his readers of the practical disadvantages consequent upon the spread of free-thinking; whereas respect for morality results in general prosperity. In the eleventh essay, Patrick Kelly deals with Berkeley's economic writings, claiming that in the 'galaxy of Irish clerical economists' (339) Berkeley stands as a leading figure. We are reminded that in *The Querist* (1735-37) money, too, is considered as a sort of sign. In this volume's last paper, 'Berkeley on Religion', Stephen Clark addresses Berkeley's philosophy of religion, stated mainly in *Alciphron* (1732), but constantly present in all his works. Finally, at the end of this volume, after an appendix titled 'Berkeley's Verses on America', there are three useful tools to assist the reader: a bibliography, an index of the passages discussed or cited, and an index of names and subjects.

Silvia Parigi
University of Cassino