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Table of Contents • Table des matières

Mailed in March 2000.

James Allan
A Sceptical Theory of Morality and Law
New York: Peter Lang 1999. Pp. x + 271.
US$51.95. ISBN 0-8204-3891-X.

In *A Sceptical Theory of Morality and Law*, James Allan defends a Humean moral skepticism and applies it to problems in legal philosophy. Though Allan grounds this approach in the dubious view that '[a] theory of law implicitly or explicitly subsumes a moral theory' (1), his examination of the role moral theory plays in legal philosophy is original and provocative.

The book is divided into two parts. In the first part of the book, Allan articulates and defends Hume's view that moral values are projected, subjective preferences. On this view, all action can ultimately be explained in terms of non-rational preferences. Insofar as morality is, unlike reason, capable of motivating behavior, it follows that morality must ultimately rest on non-rational preferences. Chapters One through Three set out and defend this subjectivist position against intuitionism, realism, and Nagel's 'normative realism'.

As Allan points out, 'Hume's ... moral scepticism need[s] to be buttressed with a causal explanation of what supports and sustains a system of constraints on action' (130). Chapters Four and Five elaborate Hume's conventionalist account of justice, as well as Hume's view that moral practice is ultimately grounded in the human capacity for sympathy. Though the first part of the book contains much of great interest to the general reader, there is probably little new ground being broken here.

The most original part of the book is the second part in which Allan attempts to determine the implications of moral scepticism for problems in legal theory. Not surprisingly, Allan comes down on the side of legal positivism. As he points out, moral scepticism implies that law 'cannot in any way be a matter of "right standards" [but only] a matter of established practices' (182). Accordingly, moral scepticism is inconsistent with classical natural law theory, which claims the existence of mind-independent, objective moral standards that are necessary constraints on the content of law. If moral scepticism is true, '[h]umans order their own world' (182).

Allan argues that Dworkin's thesis that there is one right answer implicit in law to every legal dispute presupposes a commitment to moral objectivism: 'Dworkin cannot accept my areasonable, sceptical moral theory ... without also jettisoning the theoretical coherence of his "one right answer"doctrine' (159). This implies, on Allan's view, that '[i]f at some fundamental level areasonable passions, sentiments and preferences are involved in moral evaluation then Dworkin's claim that judges ... never have strong discretion must be wrong' (159). Accordingly, Allan concludes that moral scepticism rejects classical natural law theory and Dworkin's their theory in favor of a conventionalist theory of law and thus implies a commitment to some form of legal positivism.

But it is not clear that Dworkin's view about the role of morality in adjudication presupposes that moral values and judgments are objective in the sense that they are independent of human beings. What Dworkin's view implies is that there are correct answers to moral questions; this would be true, of course, if moral values and judgments are objective, but it could also be true if moral values and judgments are entirely conventional in character. Where there is no convention on some behavior *b*, perhaps the right answer is simply that morality is neutral with respect to *b*. More is needed to show Dworkin's view is inconsistent with the conventionalist accounts of morality that Allan defends.

Moreover, even if moral values are subjective, it does not follow that a legal system that requires judges to decide hard cases by reference to morality grants them strong discretion. As Dworkin formulates the notion, a judge has strong discretion if and only if legal standards 'grant [the judge] the right to make *any* decision he wishes.' A judge who has strong discretion is hence utterly unconstrained by *any* legal standards. But a law requiring judges to decide hard cases by subjective moral preferences precludes deciding those cases on the basis of other kinds of preferences and thus seems to constrain judicial decision-making.

Allan does not rest his case against Dworkin solely on moral scepticism; he believes that a positivist view of law and adjudication is supported by utilitarian considerations. As Allan correctly points out, even if moral objectivism is true, moral judgments have an irreducibly subjective quality; after all, '[d]ifferent judges, with different personalities and convictions ... will sometimes arrive at different conclusions in the same case' (159). Accordingly, Allan argues a judge who adopts Dworkin's view that courts should decide hard cases in accordance with the best justification of the society's legal practices increases uncertainty about the outcome of cases. Adopting a positivist view that requires the judge to defer to the legislature on controversial matters promotes certainty.

Allan's analysis here is intriguing but vulnerable to a number of objections. To begin with, positivism should not be construed as a theory of adjudication. Positivism leaves it up to the legal system to decide what standards govern adjudication; indeed, a rule of recognition that requires judges to decide hard cases in a Dworkinian fashion is consistent with positivism. More importantly, the thesis that judges should defer to legislatures needs elaboration in two respects. First, hard statutory cases are often difficult precisely because there is more than one holding that seems to defer to the legislature; the question, then, is how to decide among these competing possibilities. Second, hard cases arise not only with respect to statutory law, but also with respect to constitutional law and the common law — neither of which is the product of ordinary legislative enactment. Allan's analysis says little about how to decide these latter cases.

One of the highlights of the book is Allan's attempt to reconcile the notion of a pre-legal right with moral scepticism. Allan devotes considerable philosophical resources to explaining the notion of pre-legal right in terms of a

convergence of moral preferences; as Allan correctly notes, 'once moral values are held not to be mind-independent, it follows that there can be no mind-independent, objective moral rules or rights' (191). The analysis here is detailed and interesting, if not always persuasive, and is itself worth the price of the book.

If Allan's sceptical theory of law sometimes glosses over important complexities, it is also an engaging, provocative look at the extent to which theories of law and adjudication are driven by hidden meta-ethical commitments.

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St. Thomas Aquinas
On Faith and Reason. Ed. Stephen F. Brown.
Indianapolis: Hackett 1999. Pp. xvii + 293.
US$37.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-457-X);
US$10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-456-1).

St. Thomas Aquinas
On Human Nature. Ed. Thomas S. Hibbs.
Indianapolis: Hackett 1999. Pp. xxi + 274.
US$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-455-3);
US$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-454-5).

In 1997 Hackett Publishing reissued the 1945 collection *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, edited by Anton C. Pegis. This reissuing led to a reconsideration of the usefulness of such a large, two-volume work for college-level teaching, and this reconsideration in turn led to the two books here under review. The intent has been to break Thomas's thought into subject areas and to give editorial responsibility to area specialists who then in turn edit, reorganize, and in some cases even expand and supplement the relevant translations from the *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, producing from all this various topic-based editions with new introductions. The overall work produced in the above volumes is, in both cases, well-conceived and well-made.

Brown's volume, *On Faith and Reason*, supplements standard fare from the *Summa Theologica* with new material from Aquinas's *Exposition of the 'De Trinitate' of Boethius*, and, in a very nice addition to the more condensed formulations from the *Summa*, adds some selections from less technical works, such as the *Commentary on the Gospel of Saint John* and *Sermon on the Apostles' Creed*. In addition to the new translations, Brown includes a

brief general introduction and three section introductions for each of the book's three topical subdivisions: 'Faith, Reason, and Theological Knowledge', 'Reason and the Natural Knowledge of God', and 'The God of Christian Faith'.

Brown takes the common line that Aquinas was a sort of synthesizer of Christian belief and Aristotelian science. He sees Aquinas as contributing to the growth of the new science of theology by applying the rigor and logic of Aristotelian methodology to the clarification and organization of both the axioms and theorems of the faith. Brown's 'General Introduction' presents this basic picture of Aquinas in fairly accessible language, and it is by means of this picture that he organizes the material in the book. This first portion of his general introduction tries to introduce Aquinas by way of a discussion of Augustine — not a bad strategy in and of itself — however, Brown's remarks presupposes a fair amount of familiarity with Augustine, Plato, and Christian dogma. Even assuming a student has all of the requisite background for understanding the unexplained terminology and concepts, Brown's execution of the strategy is not very effective; certain connections are not made explicit that should be, and the point of including Augustine will be simply unclear to many students whatever their background. This is the anthology's biggest weakness. Fortunately, the second half of the general introduction (which prepares the student to understand the technical 'quaestio' format, and which focuses directly on Aquinas) and the section introductions are much better and will prove useful.

In a book entitled *On Faith and Reason* one would certainly expect to encounter texts which discuss the relationship between faith and reason as modes of knowing, and the first section of *On Faith and Reason* includes precisely these sorts of texts. Roughly one hundred pages in length, 'Faith, Reason and Theological Knowledge' includes an introduction to some of the key concepts needed for understanding Aquinas' theological project, including a discussion of the Aristotelian conception of a science as a body of propositions deduced from first principles, and a very useful distinction between theology as applied *deductively* to first principles and theology as applied to *clarifying* and *defending* first principles.

The second section of the book, 'Reason and the Natural Knowledge of God', presents roughly eighty pages of texts which deal with this latter application of theology. The focus is on how reason can serve to clarify and defend the first principles of revealed faith. Brown nicely details Aquinas's extension of the Aristotelian doctrine of potency and act to the doctrine of creation, as well as the Thomistic view of analogical predication. Each discussion is helpful and clear.

In a somewhat unorthodox but welcome move, Brown finishes his volume with another eighty-page section entitled 'The God of Christian Faith', in which he presents texts on the problems of scriptural exegesis and the avoidance of heresy (what Brown calls 'defensive theology'). Once again, the subject is faith and reason, but the focus of the introduction and the selected texts is on how reason serves to nuance the more difficult doctrines of the

faith, such as the incarnation and the Trinity, but with more emphasis on reason's limits in such employments. The book concludes with a key to Aquinas's sources and a very extensive bibliography.

The best part of this book is surely the completeness with which Brown has thought about what 'faith and reason' could mean, and his representation of the multi-faceted ways that faith and reason interact in Aquinas's thought. This volume does much more than simply gather the same old *Summa* passages on analogical predication and Aristotelian synthesis, although it does do that too. Brown's comparatively broad conception of faith and reason, and his inclusion of new, non-technical material makes the volume fresh and exciting.

Hibbs's volume is entitled *On Human Nature*, and includes only a general introduction. That introduction, however, is truly excellent; it is comprehensive and subtle, compressed but readable. Hibbs cuts quickly to the heart of the matter, and admirably states the Thomistic positions on the soul, the intellect, the passions, and the will. Aquinas's positions and their inherent tensions are compared with those of other philosophers, such as Descartes, Locke, and Augustine, while the Aristotelian basis of much of Aquinas's thought is skillfully kept in the background, and then brought forward just as it is needed. References to other philosophers presume little truly specialized philosophical or Christian knowledge, and the introduction will be very useful to students of diverse intellectual backgrounds.

However, sophomores beware — this introduction is far too hard to be much use to any but the more skilled student. Few undergraduates will be able to get much out of the introduction, and although the volume as a whole might be usefully assigned to lower division classes, and although it is a jewel, it will not be appreciated by most students. However, more advanced students, and certainly graduate students, will find that it helps their reading of the selected texts and that it helps them situate Aquinas's thought in the history of philosophy and understand its relations to more familiar figures.

Hibbs draws mostly on texts from the *Summa*, although he wisely begins the volume with an excerpt from Aquinas's commentary on *De Anima*. The topic areas Hibbs has chosen represent a wide array of subjects (including methodology for studying the soul, the definition of soul, the nature of intellect and the will); thus the volume could be adapted to a wide variety of teaching purposes. The bibliography is, however, disappointingly slender.

In summary, both editors have done their jobs well overall, though Hibbs has especially excelled in his introduction duties and Brown in his texts selection duties. Both introductions will prove challenging for beginning students, with Brown's being the more accessible of the two. However, none of these small faults seriously detracts from the utility of these affordable little volumes, so long as their limitations are kept in mind and planned for by the instructor.

Rondo Keele
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Alain Badiou
Manifesto for Philosophy.
Translated, edited, and with Introduction by Norman Madarasz.
Albany: State University of New York Press 1999. Pp. 181.
US$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4219-5);
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4220-9).

This text will serve as a valuable introduction to English-speaking readers of one of the most important philosophers at work in France today. Badiou, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris 8, was one of the original staff appointed by Michel Foucault in 1969 to the experimental university at Vincennes. While often associated with the work of Gilles Deleuze, Badiou's work contests many of the assumptions that have been at the center of poststructuralist French thought. This volume includes a translation of his 1989 text *Manifeste pour la philosophie* plus two additional essays published in an anthology of essays (*Conditions* [Paris: Seuil, 1992]). Together they provide a good introduction to Badiou's rejoinder to the problematic sophistry and poetizing that he finds dominating a philosophical scene still too heavily organized by the thought of Heidegger.

Badiou's work responds to what he sees as the contemporary malaise among philosophers who regard the project of philosophy as, in some sense, no longer possible. After so many 'ends' of philosophy, 'ends' of metaphysics, 'deaths' of the subject, etc., Badiou remarks that it is not surprising to find that philosophers no longer know what it means to do philosophy. This fact, he suggests, has been unfolding for over a century; in fact, in a tradition that began with Nietzsche and reached its zenith with Heidegger, philosophers have been continually desiring not to be philosophers but, rather, to be poets. It is this desire for poetry, Badiou concludes, that is in large part responsible for the tendency toward sophistry that characterizes much of the philosophical scene. Responding to this tendency, he issues a 'manifesto for philosophy,' a call for philosophy, and philosophers, to recommit themselves to the project of systematic thinking freed from historicism.

Badiou's is not, however, a simple-minded response to the excessive poetizing of the past decades. Rather, he offers a historically sensitive and nuanced account of modernity and, in so doing, suggests a comprehensive task for the future of philosophy. This task involves recognizing the compossibility of four 'generic conditions' — the matheme, the political, the poem, and love. On Badiou's account, philosophy within modernity has tended to 'suture' itself to one or the other of these conditions, with the consequence that it lost sight of its intrinsic mission, which is to think their compossibility. Modernity opened with the dominance of the mathematical condition, as 'Descartes and Leibniz [operate] under the effect of the Galilean event, whose essence was the introduction of the infinite into the matheme' (43). This is followed by the dominance of the historical-political condition, which through

Rousseau and Hegel and punctuated by the French Revolution, organizes thought in the early part of the nineteenth century. With Nietzsche and Heidegger, art in its paradigmatic form of the poem, comes to the center and under its rule emerges an anti-Platonism whose influences have yet to run their course. And lastly, operating through Freud and psychoanalysis, we find thought governed by the condition of love.

Badiou's project for philosophy is to de-suture thought from its fixation on one of these generic conditions to the exclusion or devaluation of the others. Today, he concludes, such a return of philosophy to systematic thinking is possible because we are witnessing related transformations within each of the conditions. That is to say, we have recently witnessed four events — Cantor-Gödel-Cohen's account of multiplicity, the political upheavals between May '68 and the Solidarity movement in Poland, Celan's call for the poem to think its other, and Lacan's refiguring the concept of love — that make systematic philosophy possible once again. What this means for Badiou is that the time is right for what he calls a 'Platonic gesture,' one that responds to the anti-Platonism of the last century by once again thinking Being qua Being, but now, *pace* Plato, thinking Being as 'essentially multiple' (103).

Badiou expands on these themes in various degrees of detail, but this work remains, as the title indicates, a Manifesto, a call to return philosophy to its traditional place in opposition to both the poets and the sophists, committed to systematic, and perhaps totalizing, thinking. All the details of Badiou's position are not to be found here; for that, one will have to wait for a translation of his magnum opus *L'Etre et l'événement* [*Being and Event*], a work that some regard as the most important ontological work since *Being and Time*. This text remains, nevertheless, a fascinating work by a provocative thinker whose 'Platonism of the multiple' (103) stands in sharp contrast to most of the philosophical works to have been imported from France since the sixties.

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Michael E. Bratman
Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999.
Pp. xiii + 288.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-63131-9);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-63727-9).

This is a follow-up to Bratman's 1987 book *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason*. It consists of a new introduction and thirteen previously published essays, all of which, except for two critical studies (of Davidson and Castañeda), postdate the book. The essays fall into four groups. The three essays in the first group aim to expand and elaborate the 1987 theory. The next four essays study shared agency. They attempt to draw on his theory of individuals' intentions to provide conceptions of shared intention, intentional activity, and cooperative action. Then there are two less purely analytical essays: one on responsibility, and the other on identification as discussed primarily by Harry Frankfurt. The last four essays consider important alternative treatments of intentional agency, those of Donald Davidson, Hector-Neri Castañeda, J. David Velleman, and Christine Korsgaard. Bratman's *idée maîtresse* is what he calls the planning theory of intention:

> The main idea is to see intentions as elements of stable, partial plans of action concerning present and future conduct. In settling on prior, partial plans of action we commit ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization, both over time and interpersonally. (2)

Plans in this sense are a matter of 'planning to' do something, not mere recipes: 'If I plan to do something, I intend to do it' (37, n.2). In a way this account is obviously circular: planning to do something is having a plan which one intends to carry out; so the former can hardly explain the latter. Nevertheless, the planning theory is a useful antidote to those currently popular views which focus instead on desires.

The blurb for this volume says it is 'by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action'. There are many reasons for philosophizing about action. Some are attracted by a general interest in explanation or by an interest in the mind-body problem. Others are concerned with issues of free will and responsibility. Some think that action theory is an indispensable foundation of moral theory, while others are simply interested in the nature of human (or perhaps rational) agency. Bratman belongs primarily to the latter group, though he is aware of the other questions (and that it is these other questions which are often of primary interest to other philosophers). He criticizes Korsgaard for seeming to suppose that there are only two main possibilities in the theory of action, the 'Humean' and the 'Kantian' (276). He himself opts for a 'middle ground' between Humean and Kantian approaches (11-12; 277, n.26). Oddly, he

thinks that Frankfurt also occupies this middle ground (ibid.), whereas I would have thought it obvious that Frankfurt is a Humean. Indeed, Frankfurt does not use the notion of intention at all. In the best essay in the book (#10) Bratman argues forcefully that Frankfurt's problems in pinpointing *the* desire with which the agent identifies arise from conceptualizing the issues in terms of desires rather than planning and intention: the desires with which I identify are, precisely, those which supply the guiding considerations in my deliberations.

In fact the best essays in this book are ones in which Bratman engages in debate with other specialists in the field. Essays in which he is concerned only to undertake conceptual analysis (notably essays 2 and 5-8) are markedly less interesting. Essay 2 makes the valid point that in practical reasoning we sometimes 'accept' propositions as true (for the purposes of the reasoning) even if we do not really 'believe' them. Essays 5-8 are the most disappointing in the book. Here Bratman is concerned to explicate shared agency. He takes this to involve 'shared intentions'. Are there such things? Certainly there are 'shared plans' and so, on the planning theory of intention, there must be 'shared intentions' too. Bratman thinks there are and tells us what they consist of. These essays would have benefited enormously from an excursion into legal theory. The law of conspiracy is surely a *locus classicus* for shared intentions. But Bratman does not even glance at this material. Remarkably, his account of shared agency makes no use of the notion of agreement, although this is central to the legal notion of conspiracy. He refers to 'agreement' only in the context of explicit contracts, and objects: 'binding agreements do not guarantee intentions on the part of the individual agents to act accordingly' (127, n.31).

Essays 3 and 4, deal with some interesting questions about the stability of intention. Intentions are formed in regard to the future. In the interval between forming an intention and acting, we may acquire new information and 'change our minds'. But there are other cases where we lose our commitment to our intentions without acquiring any new information. In essay 3 Bratman considers temptation and argues that the rationality of resisting it (when this is rational!) is best explained by his planning theory. Essay 4 is a subtle examination of the rationality of sticking to (or revising) intentions in other sorts of cases, e.g. Kavka's toxin puzzle, which suggests that an agent can have a reason for intending on Monday to do something on Wednesday without having a reason on Wednesday to do it. This puzzle is, and was intended by Kavka to be, relevant to the issue of nuclear deterrence: unless country A really does intend to retaliate against country B, its threat is no threat; but if country B is not deterred, what's the point of country A carrying out the threat? (Kavka's toxin puzzle shows that reasons for acting are not to be explained in terms of reasons for intending, *contra* Scanlon *What We Owe to Each Other*, 21. Scanlon, unlike Bratman, does not discuss Kavka.)

In essay 9 Bratman argues that there is some intrinsic connection between intention and responsibility. The only connection for which he provides an argument is between being responsible and being a creature that has inten-

tions, a connection which is perfectly acceptable but too weak to antagonize those of us who reject so-called 'subjective' conceptions of responsibility.

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Peter Byrne
The Moral Interpretation of Religion.
Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 1998. Pp. ix + 178.
US$26.00. ISBN 0-8028-4554-1.

Those who are committed to realism concerning the transcendent reference of religious concepts — but who remain skeptical of the truth-claims of both revealed religion and traditional philosophical theology — will find Byrne's latest book stimulating. Byrne feels that epistemic and moral doubt in the God of history and metaphysics is justified, but he cautions against abandoning religion to non-cognitivist or reductive interpretations. Byrne instead offers an exiguous revisionary realism along neo-Kantian lines that purports to secure belief in a causally efficacious transcendent reality, but which does not claim infallible reference to a particular sacred being.

Byrne distinguishes moral *interpretation* of religion from moral *arguments* for the existence of God. After considering some of the latter, Byrne concludes that they fail because they explain features of morality only by appealing to something still more mysterious. This serves to introduce what Byrne calls the secular problem of evil: evil's incompatibility with pure naturalism. He argues that morality has a deep teleology within it, such that the moral life is the constitutive means to attaining the good. But, since the natural order is at best indifferent to — and at worst diametrically opposed to — the internal structure of morality, 'morality is pointless unless the given, experienced order is part of a larger order of justice which will fulfill the deep teleology of morality' (39).

Byrne lucidly presents Kant's argument that postulating God and immortality is the only way to avoid an *absurdum practicum* between practical reason's conflicting demands for both happiness and the supreme good. Byrne approves of Kant's revisionary realism concerning the transcendent, but deems Kant's arguments for the postulates ultimately unsatisfactory. In Byrne's view, Kant is unable to generate the *absurdum practicum*, since he trades on objectionable assumptions about the necessity of happiness and goodness.

Byrne devotes a chapter to Iris Murdoch's moral Platonism and another to the Wittgensteinian positions of Stewart Sutherland and D.Z. Phillips. Byrne endorses Murdoch's phenomenological method, although he is leery of some of its results. Also, he is sympathetic to her emphasis on the moral essence of religious belief at the expense of orthodox dogma. However, he faults Murdoch's conception of a transcendent religious reality, which he argues is causally inert. He notes that 'it is debarred from playing any role in our future expectations about the goals to be achieved in human moral striving of the kind which might solve the secular problem of evil' (117). Byrne argues that Sutherland and Phillips wrongly divorce religious language from fundamental belief in a moral order. In denying this essential connection, they cannot allow religious terms to refer to a causally significant entity, and so Byrne deems their interpretations to be insufficiently realist.

The final chapter brings together the overall case for the moral interpretation of religion. Here Byrne admits that the argument is modest: 'the moral interpretation of religion presents no proof from moral experience itself, still less from natural theology, that its form of refined supernaturalism is true. So far we have perhaps two meagre forms of justification for it: an appeal to our need to have something with which to ground moral hope and a vague argument from experience' (155). To this he applies William James' famous 'will to believe' argument in order to buttress the moral interpretation.

Byrne's task is ambitious, and if he is not wholly successful, it is because he attempts to cover too much ground. In particular, his detailed exposition of other views tends to distract from the thrust of Byrne's own case. That secular morality is crippled and that traditional metaphysics ought to be eschewed are particularly controversial claims. More argument for them could certainly only help Byrne's argument.

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Claudia Card, ed.
On Feminist Ethics and Politics.
University Press of Kansas 1999. Pp. 365.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7006-0967-9);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7006-0968-7).

The book centres on moral ambiguity and compromise under oppression. Card sets the theme in her Introduction by pointing out that women acting as moral agents under oppression occupy a 'gray zone': in a 'gray zone' we make choices under great stress that perpetuate evils, even though we are at the same time victims of evil (9). So women can be both oppressed and oppressor. In this sort of environment, what constitutes moral responsibility or integrity, and how do we maintain self-respect and moral motivation? Card's collection of essays takes up the challenge of answering these questions; it is divided into four main topics.

Part One, 'Character and Moral Luck', contains articles by Sandra Lee Bartky, Marcia Homiak, and Cheshire Calhoun. Bartky begins the collection with the unsettling (but not unfamiliar) point that we who are white are guilty of white-skin privilege even though it is often imperceptible to us. Bartky claims this guilt ought to motivate political action, whether or not we actually *feel* guilty, because guilt is not a kind of emotional affect. Bartky's essay was the most troubling to me because it seems right that I (as a white woman) have such guilt, but Bartky's philosophical explanation for this is inadequate. First, her claim that guilt is not affect is a controversial claim within theory of emotion. Bartky claims guilt is a motivation for action, but if we don't feel guilty, it is unclear how guilt functions as motivation to act. Second, Bartky's answer to this challenge is to give a definition of guilt grounded in traditional moral psychology: guilt is a subjective experience arising from the cognitive awareness of the violation of moral principles (33). But such theories are philosophically troubling because of the problem of accounting for the rational violation of one's own principles; if the answer is that we internalize others' principles (the common answer in moral psychology) then that requires a philosophically convincing account.

Part Two is 'The Ethics of Feminist Politics', comprised of articles by Iris Marion Young, Amber Katherine, Jacqueline Anderson, and Anna Stubblefield. Part Three, 'Violence and Harm', brings home the pain of rape and trauma through frequent use of first-person narrative. Robin May Schott, Susan Brison, Lynne Tirrell, and Joan Callahan write on this theme. Brison's essay stands out in the collection for its own narrative, the philosophical clarity of its justification for narrative, and its appeal to the practice of self-defense as an exercise in rewriting the narrative after violent trauma. Part Four is 'Love and Respect', with essays by Chris Cuomo, Virginia Held, and Sharon Bishop. Held's essay is notable for her defense of autonomy under an ethic of care, which she offers in support of her claim that justice and a maternalistic theory of care are compatible. Its final chapter ends the book with Jean Rumsey's article on death, which might not seem to fit the theme.

But Rumsey offers a social conception of the self which allows for a more positive understanding of the trauma of death.

I found it encouraging that many essays appeal to theory of language in justifying their moral claims, partly because it is appropriate that feminist philosophy should embrace such cross-referencing (more on this below), but mostly because actions are *categorized* as subordinating or oppressive in the first place depending on the semantic content of linguistic terms. Brison suggests regarding narrative in terms of Austin's theory of speech acts: rape testimonies are performative utterances as they are acts of remaking the self (215). Tirrell advances Catharine MacKinnon's point that pornography is a form of speech; in a pornographic society this explains why any attempt by the oppressed to name their experiences is viewed as 'either complicit or crazy' (227). Giving words meaning apart from the meaning established by conventional use in patriarchal society is important, for our current conventions enforce categories describing a social reality which is morally unjust (239). Callahan argues that subordinating speech is a harm that ought to be subject to tort action: hate speech or abusive speech is not only about but addressed *to* members of target groups which keeps them in subordinate positions (246). Young recommends a concrete and positive way in which to include women in deliberative democracy: *publicly address* women in democratic debates, instead of *mentioning* us in political discussion. Treating welfare reform for low income single mothers as a problem to be solved is a way of mentioning rather than addressing women. By drawing on the contrast between addressing and mentioning, Young's essay illustrates the moral importance of the use/mention distinction.

Many essays in this collection consider the social conception of the self, the importance of narrative, the role of the emotions, and the epistemic role of bodily experiences; the themes of impartiality and responsibility run throughout. Notable contributions are Bishop and Held's responses to impartiality in traditional moral theory. Cuomo makes the point that feminist writing should not confine itself to traditional male divisions in philosophy, such as that between feminist and traditional ethics or analytic and Continental philosophy (269). This collection is a good representation of the interplay between feminist and traditional male viewpoints (e.g. Aristotle, Kant, Williams, Taylor, Nagel, Goodman), while material from traditions outside of analytic philosophy is less frequently incorporated but nevertheless represented (e.g. Camus, Freud, Kafka, Nietzsche, Habermas). The collection of essays includes work by prominent contemporary feminists, and those not included in the collection are represented in the articles, such as Daly, MacKinnon, Arendt, Dworkin, Noddings, Friedman, Frye, and Baier.

The material is suited to upper level undergraduates in the complexity and subtlety of argumentation, while its specificity of particular issues serves as a springboard for discussion of public policy and regulation. This collection would make a good course companion to Card's first anthology, *Feminist Ethics* (1991), for drawing out the philosophical and practical implications of its different feminist moral theories. A more sophisticated scholarly audience

will appreciate the diversity of moral terrain covered in essays that move feminist ethics out of its role as a subsidiary branch of ethics and into its place as a serious challenge to mainstream ethics.

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Tod Chambers
The Fiction of Bioethics: Cases as Literary Texts.
New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. xv + 207.
Cdn$113.00: US$75.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-91988-6);
Cdn$34.99: US$23.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-91989-4).

What is in a bioethics case description? A lot more than meets the eye, according to Chambers. In this book, Chambers analyzes in great detail the issue of representation in examining moral dilemmas. Analyzing an impressive amount of bioethics cases, Chambers challenges the rarely questioned assumption that case descriptions portray reality in a neutral manner. Chambers uses the tools of literary criticism to caution against the prevalent tendency to use cases solely as a means to support particular theories. The unexamined biases involved in case descriptions tend to support the predetermined point of view of the writer instead of challenging his/her theory. As a consequence, cases subtly impose the writer's perspective upon the reader. The book takes an in-depth look at how several narrative conventions have an important effect on how the reader judges relevant characteristics of an ethics case.

Chambers dismisses the distinction between real and hypothetical cases, and the commonly held assumption that real cases test theories while hypothetical ones illustrate them. Since both types of cases are necessarily representations of the events described, and as such fictional narratives, this false dichotomy does not hold. A more useful criterion to deem a case worthwhile is whether or not it has a verisimilitude property, that is, whether or not it abides with the conventions of an ethics case.

Particularly compelling is Chambers' examination of how the point of view of the narrator influences the analysis of the text. He distinguishes three typical viewpoints: the clinician's perspective which follows the same format as the one used in clinical rounds in terms of plot, the use of the passive voice and clinical terminology; the observer's perspective in which the narrator becomes virtually invisible, switching from one character to the next without

letting anyone in particular provide his/her reports directly; finally, the ethicist's point of view, somewhat unencumbered by clinical details and written as a first person account.

In addition, Chambers explores the complex issue of how the distance created by the author(s) subtly introduces moral judgements in the case. In this regard, he distinguishes between the biographical-author, the implied-author, the career-author, the case-narrator, and the philosophical-narrator. The problem when these different narrators are not explicitly acknowledged is that the reader tends to assume that they are one and the same. These different voices influence the way ethical issues are experienced and interpreted by the reader who may be unaware of the distortions they introduce. A dramatic example is provided between the closeness of a description that uses a second person account as opposed to a more impersonal third person description.

Another interesting point is made in terms of how the lack of social context in the narrative leads to further distortions. The events are usually described in anonymous clinic settings, out of the need to protect privacy. Unfortunately, this practice gives the location in which events take place not only a generic and atemporal quality but also excludes social events that may have an impact on ethical inquiry. This gives the misleading impression that anything that happens outside the clinic is not important.

Stories in general can be seen as existing on a continuum between the psychological and the apsychological. Chambers situates the bioethics case on the apsychological end. Thus, bioethics cases tend to be action driven as opposed to character driven. The characters in the plot seem to be understood in terms of their roles rather than as rich characters. In this regard, most cases define the characters by their professional titles, or at best they provide some psychological traits only to the extent they predict or explain a particular action. This tendency of presenting two-dimensional characters is consonant with the structuralist approach which examines characters in terms of roles within the plot. The observation that ethics cases are plot driven and action oriented leads the reader to see moral problems as binary problems that require a resolution in terms of selecting one of two competing principles.

Ethics cases are often described in a narrative form. Chambers claims that direct discourse is seldom included because other forms of discourse are more amenable to be controlled by the author. It is interesting to mention that a direct dialogue usually provides the dramatic effect that characterizes ethical dilemmas. *The Fiction of Bioethics*, is of particular interest because it examines a key issue; why the patient's voice is so often mediated by other voices.

Chambers' proposed model of analyzing bioethics cases in light of literary theory is commendable. However, Chambers' arguments are certainly not new. In one form or another, these critical arguments that stress the need to interpret context, narrator, tone, and so forth, have stemmed from various disciplines that are concerned with the use of cases and the narrative approach to a dilemma. It is now agreed that stories are valuable as much

for what is absent as for what is narrated. In all narratives, the writer's selection of an endpoint and a root metaphor for the story will guide the progression and the aspects that will be included or excluded. This is also true for bioethics cases.

Although not completely original, Chambers' critical approach to narratives in bioethics is refreshing and welcome. The strength of Chambers' analysis resides in how he illustrates his arguments with well-known cases. He offers a meta-analytical perspective on these cases that is rare in the literature. Alongside the structuralist tradition, Chambers is compelling in arguing that the value of stories is not solely in its content but in the plot and relationship between the roles that are illustrated. Narrative thinking is an economic strategy particularly relevant in bioethics because it guides the selection and interpretation of relevant information to highlight moral discourse. In his critical analysis Chambers is able to clearly indicate how stories are a valuable form of analogy that offers a powerful link between the specificity of individual human existence and general theories.

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Stephen R.L. Clark
The Political Animal.
New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. viii + 207.
Cdn$113.00: US$75.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-18910-1);
Cdn$37.99: US$24.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-18911-X).

This collection of essays follows upon Clark's 1997 book *Animals and their Moral Standing*. Whereas the earlier volume is mainly concerned with the implications of philosophical ethology *for* animals, here the emphasis is upon its ramifications for our own intraspecific ethic. The essays belong together as a book, but not one organized around a linearly developed argument. I will not try here to reconstruct one; instead, I will sketch Clark's general position — no simple task given its complexity, so my summary will likely not do it justice — before giving some brief evaluative remarks.

These essays are all, in one way or another, polemics directed against rationalist liberalism, by which Clark means any political ethic that grounds duties and obligations in appeals to a distantiated reason. My adjective here is not casual, since Clark's central theme is that what specifically *instantiates* human reason is our status as animals and as objects of auto-ethological

study. This is in no wise, however, another meditation on the metaphysics and epistemology of embodiment. Instead, it is a defense of the classical political ethic against the modern one. It sounds careless to speak of 'the classical ethic', but the phrase is entirely apposite with reference to Clark. An important sub-theme of his work is that both the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions have been badly caricatured since (at least) Kant's time, and that the really *serious* project in political philosophy — if only the shallow babble of the liberals could be turned off — lies in careful mediation between the properly reconstructed insights of the great classical orientations. We have of course heard this sort of thing before, from Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum and others. However, although Clark, like Nussbaum, finds important anticipations of contemporary feminist philosophy in the Greeks, the spirit hovering most prominently here is that of Chesterton; Clark's communitarianism is unapologetically that of the urbane English villager. An admirer of Chesterton cannot be unaware of the danger of tipping into fascism, and one of the highlights of this volume is Clark's perceptive and informative essay on the need for communitarian environmentalists to acknowledge their more frightening affinities — the better, Clark would have it, to avoid tempting mistakes *and* to deprive racists and vulgar nationalists of a source of innocence through association.

Having indicated the general tenor of Clark's perspective, I will give a more direct statement of his thesis. Both Plato and Aristotle framed the human political ideal in comparative terms, by reference to what other animals demonstrate about the conditions of natural social existence. Their interpretations of animal behaviour — especially Aristotle's — were often distorted by male chauvinism generated by the vicious aspects of ancient Greek family structures, but their ethology was nevertheless superior to that of the moderns, whose elevation of universal reason turns animals into the foils (along various dimensions) for the ideals of political philosophers from Hobbes and Rousseau through Rawls. However, ethology that has been improved both by scientific rigor *and* by feminist critique offers us truer comparative mirrors. Thus, for example, we now know that baboon troops are not travelling military dictatorships ruled by juntas of large males, but matralines into which males compete with one another — mainly non-violently — for admission. What has this got to do with the human political ethic? Clark is not urging that we model our political arrangements on those of baboons or elephants; a feminist version of Rousseau's fantasy would still be a fantasy. Rather, the point is that a less distorted understanding of animal societies shows us, among many other things, that peace and order do not depend absolutely, or even mainly, on the tyranny of the leviathan. We do not love our children and friends because the state prevents us by threat of force from free-riding on them; we love them, and *ought to* do so, for the same reason as the baboons and elephants love theirs: because it is natural to do so. If daily civil peace *depended* on state enforcement, the elementary coordination on which social life depends would be impossible; fortunately, it is as natural for us to be helpful and respectful to our neighbors

as it is for us to invest energy in caring for our children, and these principles are often evident in the functional 'anarchy' of (some) animal communities.

However, all of this breaks down when communities become unnaturally large; there is nothing it is natural to do with millions of strangers except, perhaps, to fear them. The demands of agriculture and (later) industry thus required that we domesticate ourselves, just as dogs, pigs and cattle were domesticated by us and by their own evolutionary advantage. Clark does not view this domestication as in itself a bad thing. However, whereas the first empire-sized states were thought (even by their rulers) to be means to higher ends, some economic and some spiritual, the contemporary secular state is often an end in itself, and here lie the roots of the sort of mindless bureaucratic tyranny that pushes domestication to the point of enslavement.

If this sounds like the summary of a dotty polemic, that is a function of condensation. These essays are the work of a learned and worldly classical scholar. For all that, I think that they are frightfully parochial. Most of the population of the world now lives, and always has, at levels of material deprivation that indeed bring their lifestyles close to those of other species, preoccupied continuously with the search for food. We know of only one device that has significantly alleviated poverty, at least in some (large) places, and that is advanced specialization of labor. Small communities that are self-sufficient are almost invariably poor, unless they happen to be on picaresque tropical islands, and Chesterton's Notting Hill imported nearly everything it consumed, at least from elsewhere in England. Community self-sustenance may be a useful panacea while we wait for the capitalists to bring about the vast improvements in basic prosperity that only economies of scale can do or ever have done; but that is all it is at best. African villages are mainly self-supporting communities, by force of circumstances, and state-level politics impinge very rarely on the daily lives of Africans; most would therefore emigrate to the great liberal empire across the ocean if they could. Clark does not imagine that animal lives lack for hardship or that economic goals are unimportant. But he gives no hint as to how his favored herds of free bipeds might organize their political economies so as to eliminate the frequent resource-crashes and fluctuations in environmental carrying capacities that indeed make most brutish lives both short and, to beings with human levels of anticipation, nasty.

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Jon Elster
Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction, and Human Behavior.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1999. Pp. xii + 252.
US$25.00. ISBN 0-262-05056-0.

Philosophers of law are typically interested in addition in order to assess its implications, especially for the criminal law. Should the fact that the user of an illicit substance is addicted ever constitute a defense from criminal liability? Is addition itself ever a sufficiently dreadful state to justify the enactment of criminal laws to prevent persons from using addictive substances? How do our responses to the latter question affect our responses to the former? Since positions on these issues should be derived largely from moral argument, we need to inquire into the moral status of addiction. Are persons less blameworthy for doing a wrongful act that is a product of their addiction? To what extent does addiction undermine autonomy and free will?

I suspect that these issues will not be resolved in the foreseeable future, largely because they are enormously complicated. Jon Elster's *Strong Feelings* certainly assists legal philosophers in understanding this complexity. Only a theorist with a tremendously broad grasp of several different disciplines — psychology, philosophy, rational choice theory, history, and social studies — could have written this ambitious and impressive book. Each page is packed full of insights and useful commentary. *Strong Feelings* eludes a simple summary, exploring themes rather than defending definitive conclusions. Elster's greatest contribution is to avoid the oversimplifications to which a number of legal philosophers with less interdisciplinary sophistication have tended to succumb.

Perhaps the most important contribution of Elster's work is to locate addictions within a broader range of what George Lowenstein has called 'visceral factors' (e.g., hunger, urges to defecate) in behavior. They have a neurobiological component but also are somewhat governed by choice. Elster's main source of fascination with addictions is that they are visceral factors in behavior that (unlike the foregoing examples) have important cultural and cognitive components. Thus an understanding of addictions requires an appreciation of the complicated interplay of neurobiology, choice, and culture. Studies of addiction that delete any of these three dimensions are necessarily incomplete and oversimplified. Animal experiments, for example, are invaluable in helping to identify the neurophysiological mechanisms in addiction. Rats, however, cannot be made to feel ashamed of their condition, and will not display the rationalization and denial that is common among addicts. Elster shows that we cannot hope to explain much about addiction — including such phenomena as initiation and relapse — without recognizing the effects of cognition and culture.

Elster is clearly correct in contending that addictive behaviors are neither fully rational nor utterly beyond the control of the agent. He provides ample evidence of how addictive cravings (to a somewhat lesser extent than emo-

tions, with which they are compared and contrasted) can undermine an agent's capacity for making rational choices. This evidence is presented in the context of Elster's well-known theory of rationality, according to which rationality involves three 'levels of optimality': An action is rational if (1) it is the best means of satisfying the beliefs and desires that the agent actually has; (2) the agent's beliefs are grounded in whatever information is available to him; and (3) the agent has invested the optimal amount of resources in gathering information. Empirical data about smokers and gamblers are invoked to support Elster's allegation that addictions can produce irrationality on all three levels. Still, addictive behavior is not totally outside the agent's choice. Although there is an enormous amount of variation from one drug to another, as well as from one culture to another, addicts typically exhibit a limited degree of sensitivity to rewards. No one should continue to believe that addicts are utterly powerless after examining Elster's evidence.

The concept of addiction itself turns out to be enormously complex, and cannot be analyzed in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Elster enumerates and discusses a number of properties that are common to many addictions: euphoria, withdrawal, craving, tolerance, cue dependence, belief dependence, objective harm, crowding out, mood alterations, desire to quit, inability to quit, denial, struggle for self-control, and relapse. Only craving seems to be a universal property of our pretheoretical concept of addiction. The nature of craving, however, varies immensely from one drug to another. The craving for cocaine, for example, is highest soon after ingestion, while the drug is producing euphoria. But the craving for heroin is highest during withdrawal, when the drug is producing dysphoria. Here, as elsewhere, the lesson to be learned is that facile generalizations about addictions must be avoided.

I find it hard to be too critical of a book that contains so much valuable information in so few pages. Still, I wish that two points had been discussed somewhat more fully. First, Elster does not provide especially persuasive arguments against the relatively popular point of view that *any* pleasant experience is potentially addictive. Can we become addicted to a food, or addicted to love? If cravings are the common component of all addictions, we may be tempted to answer affirmatively. Elster, however, mostly dismisses such claims as too metaphorical. Second, Elster might have provided more guidance about how to understand allegations that one substance is *more* or *less* addictive than another. These allegations are frequently made in order to defend a policy that prohibits one addictive substance (e.g., heroin) while allowing another (e.g., alcohol), or to penalize the use of one addictive substance (e.g., crack cocaine) more severely than another (e.g., powder cocaine). Unfortunately (for my purposes), Elster does not explicitly provide a framework for evaluating these comparative allegations.

There is no hope of progress in the issues that lead legal philosophers to take an interest in addiction unless the phenomenon of addiction is clearly understood. Jon Elster's *Strong Feelings* helps to provide the needed clarification. Although Elster himself does not explore the moral or legal implica-

tions of his findings, his work provides ample grist for the mill of the moral philosopher or the philosopher of law. The book is not a quick or an easy read. But I strongly recommend that philosophers with a serious interest in addiction invest the necessary time and effort.

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Elizabeth Fallaize, ed.
Simone de Beauvoir: A Critical Reader.
New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. x + 208.
Cdn$105.00: US$75.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-14702-6);
Cdn$38.99: US$25.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-14702-4).

Jo-Anne Pilardi
Simone de Beauvoir Writing the Self: Philosophy Becomes Autobiography.
Westport, CT: Praeger 1999. Pp. 133.
US$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-313-30253-7);
US$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-275-96334-9).

Margaret Simons
Beauvoir and the Second Sex: Feminism, Race and the Origins of Existentialism.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 1999.
Pp. xx + 263.
US$25.95. ISBN 0-8476-9256-6.

These three books are a testament to the growing quantity and sophistication of feminist scholarship on de Beauvoir, at a time when her status is transforming, at least in the English speaking world, from that of personality, novelist and inspiration for a political movement, into that of a feminist philosopher and political theorist who deserves a canonical place within the academy. This transition is particularly evident in the selection, spanning more than four decades, put together by Elizabeth Fallaize. Here there is one notable exception to the rule of increasing sophistication; the earliest paper, a reading of *She Came to Stay*, from Hazel Barnes' 1961 study of existentialist literature, which treats de Beauvoir's novel as a serious philosophical application to a concrete situation, of the description of concrete relations between

individuals in bad faith, to be found in *Being and Nothingness*. The next earliest is translated from French, and is an extract from Francis Jeanson's 1966 study, *Simone de Beauvoir ou l'enterprise du vivre*, another new translation comes from Anne Ophir's 1976 book, *Regards feminins: Beauvoir, Etcherelli, Rochefort*. There is an early and a later discussion by Elaine Marks of de Beauvoir's treatment of incontinence and dying, the first from her 1973 book, *Simone de Beauvoir: Encounters with Death* and the second from the 1986 de Beauvoir issue of *Yale French Studies*. There is also a paper from this collection by Judith Butler, and the 1980s are further represented by Jane Heath, Judith Oakley and Elizabeth Fallaize. From the 1990s there is a long paper by Sonia Kruks, and selections from Alex Hughes, Eva Lundgren-Gothlin, and Toril Moi. The book is divided into three sections, 'Readings of *The Second Sex*', 'Readings of the Autobiography' and 'Readings of the Fiction', of which the first makes up half the volume. It is in here that a growth of sophistication is most evident. The two earliest papers, by Judith Oakley and Judith Butler, are disturbingly cavalier in their rendition of the philosophical context of de Beauvoir's work. Oakley reads her as a failed anthropologist. Butler gives a garbled version of Sartre's attempt to explain how it is possible to conceive of freedom in a universe where all that exists is matter, and insinuates that he is really a Cartesian dualist. She is then able to set up a contrast between Sartre and de Beauvoir. Despite the fact that Sartre, being a man, 'identifies himself with a noncorporeal reality' (37) he is partly saved by de Beauvoir 'who takes him at his non-Cartesian best' (33).

There has been a tendency, during the 1980s, for feminists to read male philosophers as *a priori* sexists, whose philosophy always expresses a masculine subjectivity which cannot be compatible with feminism. This sets up a tension for feminists reading de Beauvoir. She said she was applying Sartre's thought, but at the same time she provided the inspiration for much 1970s feminism. One solution to this tension has been to imply, as Butler does, that despite her protestations, de Beauvoir in fact escaped the pernicious influence of her lover. This is a theme which is developed, with much more sophistication and scholarship, by Sonia Kruks. Kruks makes a detailed case for thinking that de Beauvoir is not merely following Sartre, but Kruks' case ultimately depends on a rather one-sided account of Sartre's own political philosophy. Toril Moi partly rectifies this, by discussing Sartre's 1948 essay 'Black Orpheus', in which he shows a deep interest in the nature of oppression and the paths to liberation. It is perhaps worth mentioning here that in Margaret Simons' collection there is another paper which broaches the interconnections between black and female liberation, by discussing the influence of the black American Richard Wright, and the Scandinavians Gunnar and Alva Myrdal, on de Beauvoir's analysis of women's oppression. Taken together with Moi's observations, Simons' paper indicates a yet to be fully exploited source for understanding both Sartre and de Beauvoir's thought. However following the theme of constructing de Beauvoir's independence from Sartre, Simons fails to point out that Wright was also an

influence on Sartre, and that Wright is quoted at the conclusion of Sartre's 1946 'Anti-Semite and Jew'. If feminists are to give an accurate account of the complex interplay in *The Second Sex* of themes already developed in *Being and Nothingness*, new observations derived from America and the philosophies of Hegel and Marx, they will need to take a more generous attitude towards Sartre, who should at least be properly read before he is dismissed. Even Lundgren-Gothlin's quite sophisticated discussion of the puzzling role of the master-slave dialectic in de Beauvoir's text tells us that 'de Beauvoir's interpretation of Hegel differs from Sartre's' (95) without the reader being given a clear account of Sartre's understanding of the dialectic. There certainly are apparent incompatibilities between Sartre and de Beauvoir on Hegel, but a serious comparison of the two thinkers ought to deal equally with both. The difficulties of interpretation that arise here are indicated by the fact that Toril Moi refers to 'Beauvoir's alternative to Sartre's Hegelian narrative' (84) suggesting that Sartre is more Hegelian than de Beauvoir, while Lundgren-Gothlin claims that 'like Hegel and Kojeve, but unlike Sartre in *Being and Nothingness*, Beauvoir saw a solution to this conflict [between consciousness]' (97), thus suggesting that de Beauvoir is more Hegelian than Sartre.

The selections from Jeanson, Hughes and Marks, which make up the 'Readings of the Autobiography', use de Beauvoir's autobiographical texts as material for the development of psychoanalytic accounts of her personality and writing. Given the variety of the readings that are imposed from this perspective, one is reminded of Popper's dismissal of psychoanalysis as pseudo-science. It seems particularly inappropriate to take de Beauvoir, who consciously exploited psychoanalytic themes when she thought that they resonated with her own experience, and to read her as unconsciously evincing aggressive impulses over which she had no control. Here we have de Beauvoir the spurned Oedipal daughter (Jeanson), the matricidal pre-oedipal infant (Hughes), and the repressed matricide who accuses her mother of bad faith only to deny her own (early Marks). In the next section we will again meet the Oedipal male-identified daughter, in Jane Heath's version of *She Came to Stay*, in which Xaviere is magically transformed into the repressed feminine, 'a mad-woman, an hysteric' (175) who must be symbolically killed by the male-oriented de Beauvoir, because she represents 'a dynamic and subversive femininity which exceeds all masculine efforts at containment and control' (180). Apart from Hazel Barnes' early study of *She Came to Stay*, the 'Readers of the Fiction' section is the least interesting, philosophically. This is because it is here that it is most evident that the book is oriented towards students of literature. From the point of view of a philosopher it is the fairly recent work of Kruks, Moi and Lundgren-Gothlin which opens towards a serious discussion of de Beauvoir's political philosophy, but these texts are all easily available elsewhere. Hazel Barnes' study should be mentioned here as the exception again, since her 1961 book is not so readily available. It would, however, be an expensive option to buy Fallaize's book for this one study.

Jo-Anne Pilardi's book, which discusses de Beauvoir's construction of the self through autobiography, has almost the opposite strength and weakness. The discussion of the autobiographical writings is sensitive to de Beauvoir's philosophical concerns, and offers many illuminating comparisons between the autobiography and the fiction, but the philosophical discussion is somewhat labored. To be fair, Pilardi does exactly the right thing, and tries to provide an introduction to de Beauvoir's philosophical outlook in the Introduction, and in the first two chapters. These deal with de Beauvoir's philosophical background, her treatment of self and other in the early essays and in *The Second Sex*, but here so much is covered, in so little space, that a student is likely to be confused, and an expert to be dissatisfied.

The way Pilardi sets up the discussion of the self in de Beauvoir is not exactly wrong, but is likely to be misleading. For instance, she says that de Beauvoir's account of the self/other relationship is derived from two sources, first Hegel and then Sartre's interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology (1-2). There are two problems with this. First it obscures the growing evidence that it was de Beauvoir who was first interested in self/other relationships, and influenced this aspect of Sartre's philosophy. Second, it makes Sartre sound too Husserlian. Pilardi may not have had the benefit of reading Peg Simons' 1997 piece on de Beauvoir's early philosophy, in *Simone de Beauvoir Studies*, but she does refer later to Kate and Edward Fullbrook's *Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre*, which, even if some of its claims are outrageous, does indicate that on the matter of self/other relations there is some influence from de Beauvoir to Sartre. Indeed, this can be gleaned from a 1979 interview, reprinted in Simons' collection, in which de Beauvoir exclaims that the problem of the confrontation of the other consciousness, that is the subject of *She Came to Stay*, 'was absolutely not Sartre' (10). Pilardi tries later in her work to set up a contrast between Sartre and de Beauvoir on the self. She suggests that in her early essays *The Ethics of Ambiguity* and *Pyrrhus and Cineas*, 'Beauvoir makes a claim that is a significant addition to the existential-phenomenological ontology of Sartre that she began with. As she puts it, "the me-other relationship is as indissoluble as the subject-object relationship." ' But this gets the emerging chronology of de Beauvoir's influence on Sartre the wrong way around. In *Being and Nothingness*, written before de Beauvoir's essays, there already are two indissoluble self-other relationships; the relationship between being for-itself and being in-itself, and the relationship between being for-itself and being for-others. As Pilardi discusses on pp. 3-4, already in his early work *The Transcendence of the Ego*, Sartre had made a distinction between consciousness; the for-itself, which is not reflexive, but is a pre-reflective consciousness, and the ego, which is an object for consciousness. She quotes de Beauvoir who explains, 'my ego is itself a being in the world, just like the ego of the other.' De Beauvoir goes on to mention that at this time Sartre thought that this theory solved the problem of solipsism. What Pilardi does not tell us is that by the time he wrote *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre no longer thought that this theory had solved the problem of solipsism. Even if

we can know the ego of the other in just the same way as we know our own ego (both are objects of consciousness) how can I know that the other is a consciousness? It seems to be at this point that de Beauvoir's problematisation of the other's consciousness provided Sartre with a means of avoiding the reef of solipsism on which his theory was in danger of foundering. If the Fullbrooks are right, Hegel's influence on Sartre was mediated by de Beauvoir, who exploited Hegelian themes in her novel, *She Came to Stay*. Sartre introduces the experience of the look of the other as a third irreducible ontological moment in *Being and Nothingness*. It is the experience of our sovereign consciousness being reduced to a mere object (an empirical ego) by the gaze of the other, which reveals the other consciousness. The famous passage in which a person looks through a keyhole and, hearing a footstep, experiences shame, illustrates this irreducible experience of objectification. A similar passage occurs in *She Came to Stay*, though it is related from the point of view of Francoise, for whom Pierre becomes an object of pity, as he obsessively peeks through a keyhole in order to determine what Xaviere is doing. So the passage that Pilardi quotes, 'the me-other relationship is as indissoluble as the subject-object relationship' is pure *Being and Nothingness*. What may well be true is that there would not have been these two different self-other relationships in Sartre's text had it not been for de Beauvoir. In general many of the unsympathetic readings of Sartre, which have been developed by feminists, reduce his ontology to being in-itself and being for-itself, and overlook his long discussion of being for-others.

But while Pilardi's philosophical introduction leaves something to be desired, this doesn't detract from the sensitivity of her discussion of de Beauvoir's autobiography. The self as ego is a thing in the world, it is both the thing that it is for others and the object that I create out of materials determined by others. De Beauvoir's literary attempt at self-construction is self-consciously an act of transcendence in which de Beauvoir attempts to give due credit to the limits imposed on the self by social situation and by the transcendence of others. The tensions in and complexity of this project emerge well from Pilardi's discussion.

Of all these three books it is Peg Simons' collection of essays from 1979 to 1998 which is likely to be of most enduring interest to scholars and feminists working on de Beauvoir's political philosophy. Here three interviews with de Beauvoir are reprinted. These are particularly useful since a writer's own words ought, I believe, to be given a certain authority. Of the rest, the papers grow in depth and interest with the years. The last, in particular, 'Beauvoir's early philosophy', examines diary material, only recently made available, that reveals de Beauvoir's philosophical thought during her student years. Yet, like many feminists, Simons is extremely eager to demonstrate de Beauvoir's independence from Sartre, and this gives her discussion a lopsided feel. How, for instance, can we compare what de Beauvoir wrote in 1927 with what Sartre then believed, unless we look at his writings as well as de Beauvoir's? We cannot determine her influence on him, nor her originality, unless we determine which themes in their work were common currency,

which genuinely new. Nevertheless, there is much interesting material in this essay, and in the previous two, which deal with de Beauvoir's relationship to lesbianism and to the emerging black liberation movement.

For those interested in de Beauvoir as a philosopher and political theorist whose writing has changed the face of society, these are exciting times. Her call to women to take up the pursuit of transcendence helped initiate a movement which has led to a body of women within the academy capable of giving her writing the scholarly appraisal it deserves. De Beauvoir observed that we are dependent on the liberty of others for the achievement of our goals. Her goal of transcendence could not be achieved without Sartre, nor without the women who have read her and been inspired by her. It is a little ironic that, having commended her for recognising our dependence on others, feminists feel the need to deny the interdependence that exists between her work and Sartre's. De Beauvoir was always more generous.

Scholarly discussion of de Beauvoir seems set to increase. Soon we will have available a complete English edition of her essays (many of which have never been translated). And perhaps the publishers of the defective Parshley translation of *The Second Sex* will relent and allow a new translation. Then may the scholarly work broached in these books really begin.

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Jerry A. Fodor
In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1998.
Pp. x + 219.
US$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-06198-8);
US$00.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-54090-8).

Collected here are 17 essays, most previously published in sources ranging from academic journals to *The Times Literary Supplement*. Surprisingly, the essays are remarkably consistent in both style and rigor. Some of them respond directly to Fodor's critics; many are reviews of recently published books and articles. All of them are intended to accomplish two goals: to argue for what Fodor conceives to be a series of systemic errors that obstruct progress in cognitive science, and to locate Fodor's own views relative to his critics. The essays are organized thematically into four sections.

Of particular interest in *Part I: Metaphysics* is the essay 'Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years,' which alludes to an article from

Fodor's earlier collection, *Representations* (1981). The occasion for revisiting this issue is an article by Jaegwon Kim, which argues that the reason psychological states aren't reducible is not that they are multiply realized but, rather, that they aren't projectible. This, of course, would vitiate the very possibility of a science of the mind as Fodor conceives of it. If you thought there was nothing left to say on this issue, you will be surprised by the depth and range of Fodor's response which includes a discussion of the nature of functional properties and methodological directives on inductive generalization.

Much of *Part II: Concepts* is devoted to the issues covered in the critical chapters of Fodor's recent book *Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong*. In particular, Fodor argues that among the most obstructive of the systemic errors in cognitive science is the chronic attempt to cash out the notion of concept possession in terms of criteria for application of a concept. It is, according to Fodor, simply Empiricism all over again, 'The connectionists have revived it [i.e., empiricism]; but apparently without quite realizing that that's what they're doing, and without, as far as I can tell, having anything to add that changes the picture. So now I guess we'll have to play out the argument between empiricism and rationalism all over again' (151).

In 'Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis' (Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn, 1988), the following dilemma was put to connectionists: either connectionism is a genuine alternative to classical von Neumann architecture, in which case it cannot account for the systematicity and productivity of thought, or it accounts for the systematicity and productivity of thought, in which case it isn't a genuine alternative to classical architecture (it is, rather, a mere implementation of classical architecture). No one has worked harder to meet this challenge than Paul Smolensky. In a series of recent essays he has worked out, in considerable detail, a connectionist view of representations as vectors over the activity states of the connectionist units in which these vectors are said to encode the compositional structure of classical trees, and the structural properties of these trees are claimed to *acausally* explain the facts of systematicity. Fodor devotes Chapters 9 and 10 of *Part III: Cognitive Architecture* to a discussion of Smolensky's efforts. These are deep waters. Suffice it to say that for Fodor, what is required is that the trees encoded by these vectors be tokened (as opposed to merely encoded). Only in this way can their constituents be available to do the causal work required to *really* explain systematicity.

Readers of Daniel Dennett's recent book, *Darwin's Dangerous Idea*, will know that Fodor comes in for a serious drubbing over his views concerning whether human cognitive capacities can be accounted for in terms of adaptationism (i.e., more or less traditional Darwinian evolutionary theory). It is Dennett's view that Fodor regards these capacities as miraculous and, thus, incompatible with naturalism. Chapter 15, of *Part IV: Philosophical Darwinism*, is Fodor's response. Interestingly, Fodor admits to not being an adaptationist, in the sense that he doesn't think that adaptationism, in and of itself, is likely to account for our cognitive capacities. He also nods approvingly to

the *punctuate equilibrium* theory defended by Steven J. Gould which Dennett characterizes as anti-naturalist. Yet Fodor has repeatedly characterized himself as a 'hairy naturalist.' Fodor's way out of this apparent inconsistency depends on two points. First, even minuscule differences at the level of genes can result in significant, and surprising, differences at the level of phenotypes. For example, despite our *genetic nearness* to other primates, there are significant differences in our cognitive abilities. Secondly, evolutionary processes are highly constrained by basic natural laws (i.e., laws of physics) which severely restrict the genetic variability that natural selection operates upon. The significance of these points is that the *natural* laws that constrain both the genetic variability available to natural selection and the phenotypic expression of genes are more basic than the laws of evolutionary theory but are not, for that reason, inconsistent with it; rather, they constitute the parameters within which evolutionary processes occur. Dennett devotes considerable space to these issues, and thus it is possible that the difference between the two thinkers is merely one of emphasis. I leave it to readers to judge for themselves.

There was a time when Fodor could say, without irony, that his view was 'the only game in town' for anyone prepared to take seriously the idea that mental states are causally productive of intelligent behavior in virtue of their semantic content. In recent years a number of alternatives have surfaced to vie for the attention and allegiance of those working in the field, including connectionism, the Churchlands' brand of eliminative materialism, Dennett's 'intentional stance' view, and a variety of views that appeal in one way or another to Darwinian evolutionary theory. I think it's still true, though, that Fodor's view remains the only game in town for those who are committed to an unmitigated realism. One thing is certain: no one understands better than Fodor the costs associated with the various positions and he unerringly reveals these (he is both a philosopher of first rank and an experimental psycholinguist who is more familiar than most with the experimental data that constrains theorizing in cognitive science). Without flinching, he takes on all rivals, locating them relative to his own and articulating the problems to be faced. This book is essential reading for anyone seriously interested in the present state and direction of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.

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Roger D. Gallie
Thomas Reid: Ethics, Aesthetics and the Anatomy of the Self.
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998.
US$98.00. ISBN 0-7923-5241-6.

There has been a considerable increase of interest in Thomas Reid's philosophy over the last few years. In part, it may be attributable to the contrast between Reid and Hume and the renewed interest in Hume; in part, to the interest in naturalized epistemology and the arguments that Reid's theories of perception are more naturalistic than those that follow Locke and Hume. Roger Gallie's treatment of Thomas Reid's moral and aesthetic theories is welcome and important because it adds a detailed reading of Reid on matters of judgment to the literature. It is a difficult book, however, because it mixes a number of exegetical approaches without a clear statement of Gallie's understanding of Reid's position.

Gallie begins with a consideration of 'the place of sensation or feeling in sense perception' (1). Reid's use of sensation, according to Gallie, is limited by the direct nature of perception. Reid does not belong to the sentimental school of moralist, therefore, because judgment, rather than sentiment, is the key element in moral assessment. Similarly, Gallie understands Reid to offer a theory of causation based on power and agency rather than physical succession. This allows Reid to appeal to many different forms of explanation and not just natural laws. Reid is understood as accommodating a form of folk psychology based on human beings as agents with differing motives. Gallie concludes, 'It should be clear by now that Reid is perfectly happy to accept elucidations of conduct in terms of motives of a wide variety, ranging from hunger at the one end to the nicest scruples of consciences at the other' (41).

For Reid's form of realism, a basic problem is that concepts and attributes cannot be simply Lockean ideas acquired passively. Instead, Gallie attributes to Reid what he calls a moderate thesis: 'to conceive something involves the understanding of a term for it or terms for its components' (47). Conceptualization of both individuals and rational entities then becomes a matter of how such terms are formed. This cannot be accomplished by a computational model alone, but some combination of computational and functional activities may yield the prior conceptions needed to acquire a natural language and thus the conceptions that Reid premises in his realism. Similarly, Reid's view of the mind-body relation requires mental substance but not a full Cartesian dualism according to Gallie. That is, Reid must treat the mind as the active identity of the person since body is passive, but Reid still tries to maintain a view of the person as a whole person.

Gallie turns midway through the book to moral and aesthetic judgments. Reid seems to be a moral sense theorist, but his view of sense and perception does not allow sense to be judgment. Rather the sense analogy must depend on moral first principles that are then the basis for moral judgments. This

gives Reid a more objectivist and realist view of morals and aesthetics than Hutcheson or Hume. Thus, Gallie concludes, 'it would seem, as a result moral assessment in a given case is either self-evident, or derivable via facts from self-evident principles' (108). This leaves conflicting cases to be dealt with by some form of subsumption or hierarchy of principles. Systems of morals are given an instructional role rather than establishing the principles themselves. Reid approaches this task primarily in terms of an analysis of duties. But since Reid is not relying on a system of duties for establishing morality, he can equally entertain a system based on virtues as instructive.

In the same way that a moral sense must be combined with a realist view of moral principles, a sense of taste in aesthetics must be combined with a realist view of beauty as a real excellence in objects if Reid is to combat the sentimental views of taste. So there are first principles of taste such as excellence, which make a beautiful object superior to one that does not please our taste. The forms of beauty are identified with the forms of excellence that objects can possess, and intrinsic excellence, like intrinsic moral goodness is taken to be self-evident. This means that 'whether or not an item is to be judged beautiful is, as far as Reid is concerned, a matter of a balance between varying types of beauty' (151). Finally, both beauty and grandeur or the sublime are granted to some things 'originally' while they are also present as excellences of character or mind 'derivatively' (161). This leads Gallie to reject Peter Kivy's claim that Reid has an expressive aesthetic (though Gallie misunderstands what sophisticated theories of expression claim). Instead, Reid relies on a form of analogy of attribution to relate aesthetic predicates and terms to their direct applications. This may lead him to undervalue such features as novelty, however, but Gallie concludes that Reid could simply add novelty as another factor (184), and one might extend that conclusion to other independent aesthetic predicates that appear in later analogical theories of an aesthetic sense such as Archibald Alison's. Theories of an aesthetic sense tend to multiply senses until each predicate has its own sense.

This summary is more linear than Gallie's arguments, and it may misrepresent some of Gallie's readings by making Reid's overall approach seem more consistent than it really is. Though I doubt that it is Gallie's intent, many readers will come away from this book with the conclusion that Reid is just not very consistent on the major issues under examination. Frequently, Gallie leaves the argument with alternatives from different parts of Reid's work and no clear indication which Reid ultimately favors. Gallie's very thoroughness in going to the manuscripts and correspondence further complicates the reading since presumably some of the alternatives were rejected by Reid in deciding which position to publish.

In addition, I have three brief quibbles with Gallie's procedure. First, Gallie introduces a number of contemporary positions from philosophy of mind, ethics, and aesthetics. But they are not presented fully enough to be intelligible to anyone but a specialist in the field. Second, Gallie does not pay sufficient attention to the intellectual context of the Scottish Enlightenment. This tends to distort Reid's intent. Finally, the book is abysmally edited. One

has a right to expect more. Nevertheless, it is good to have a further contribution on Reid at this time.

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Stan Godlovitch
Musical Performance: A Philosophical Study.
New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. vii + 172.
Cdn$113.00: US$75.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-19128-9);
Cdn$37.99: US$24.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-19129-7).

Philosophers interested in music have tended to focus on problems arising from listeners' experience or from the nature of musical works. This elegantly written and engaging book addresses a long-standing gap in the philosophy of music: the status and contributions of performers. Godlovitch asks what the traditional conceptions of music as a performing art and as 'made' imply, and how these traditions fare in the face of modern challenges. Part One explores the 'ecology of performance' through an idealized model of musical performance and a discussion of the environment in which musical skills are embedded. Part Two considers ways in which the primacy of traditional performance in music may be ignored, defied, or challenged, particularly through technological innovation. Engagement with other philosophers is mostly relegated to the notes.

While Godlovitch's idealized model reflects and complements various intuitions about performance, his method is not an explication of ordinary language. Four primary constituents are drawn together in performance — sounds, agents, listeners, and works. Godlovitch resists the tendency to reify musical sound and identify performances independently of players and works. He views performances as unique events, hence no sequence of sounds, considered purely as sound, constitutes a performance. Furthermore, musical performances are activities brought about by human agents with certain abilities, who hold intentions regarding their activities and beneficiaries. One aspect of Godlovitch's idealized performance model which may surprise some readers is his requirement that a model performance be listened to by an outside party with active concentrated attention. Hence lounge and restaurant 'sets,' however musically worthy, do not count as performances if patrons do not attend to them.

Godlovitch provides an initial analysis of the relation between works and performers in his idealized performance model in Part One, and expands upon some of the same themes in Part Two. He develops the notion of a 'constraint model': the conventions which a given performing tradition holds to be especially important and appropriate to a particular work. These conventions vary with time; what is imperative in one tradition may be optional in another. Godlovitch has little use for 'instantiation' as a label for the relationship between a constraint model, a work, and performances of that work, and sees no clear line between a barely tolerable performance of a certain work and an attempt which fails completely to be a performance of that work. Analogies such as the links between a poem and its readings, or a statue and its casting, are seen as unhelpful, since scores 'massively underdetermine' (82) whatever emerges in performance. Godlovitch makes the intriguing suggestion that we try instead to think of scores as frameworks — much like story lines — which await completion through collaboration by players, and the receptive approval of the musical community and audiences.

One of the main strengths of Godlovitch's account of performance is that it makes sense of individual effort in music, while placing performance squarely within a social tradition. A crucial part of his analysis is the development of the notion of a 'performance community'. These are groups of musicians unified under an instrument, a body of technique, and a standard repertoire, and function somewhat like professional trades Guilds. Performance communities establish membership credentials, regulate standards of proficiency, and maintain 'skill-centered exclusivity'. Qualifications for gaining and maintaining membership depend upon the demonstrated mastery of skills related to musicianship and musicality.

Godlovitch insists that arguments which resist technological substitution (say, against the possibility of synthesizers standing in for violins) through an appeal to empirical or essential properties prove ineffective. There is no non-arbitrary conceptual ground for limiting acceptable technological improvements. So what determines the range and choice of innovations and improvements to musical instruments? It is crucial to realize that musical instruments are not merely tools for their users. Musical instruments are valued partly because of the handicaps they impose between the player and the desired result. Instrumental challenges ensure that there are hierarchies of skill within performance communities. Performance communities work to sustain their own social structure, and tend to reject innovations which would remove handicaps and allow too many members to join the 'aristocracy of skill' (75-6).

Having set out the idealized performance model, Godlovitch turns his attention to innovations which threaten its primacy. Some forms of experimental music, including computer-assisted music and musical 'readymades' (i.e. the musical equivalents of Duchamp's urinal and bottlerack) challenge the centrality of immediate agency in performance. When primary causation is absent, the notion of performance undergoes major change; when skill is no longer essential, we are forced to reconsider the very nature of the

artforms themselves. In his discussion of musical readymades, Godlovitch argues that these either fall outside of the sphere of performance practice, or fail to free themselves from traditional expectations adhering to performance.

In the last chapter, Godlovitch considers the questions of whether a very sophisticated computer simulator could be said to give a 'performance'. In doing so, he resists 'externalist' conceptions of art (such as the institutional theory) which tend to locate all aesthetic content in publicly accessible forms, and regard reference to the inner life of the artist as aesthetically incidental. Godlovitch notes that performers' personalities capture our imagination, and our interests in musicians as individuals intertwine with our aesthetic expectations. There are aesthetic differences between listening to a performance and listening to a recording of a performance, even if the sounds produced by both were indistinguishable, and Godlovitch provides several illustrative examples. To exclude the performer's physical presence and behaviour from the aesthetic experience would seem an 'unintelligible deprivation' (142). A computer program could not sensibly be said to perform artistically because, in short, it is not a person with likes and dislikes, idiosyncrasies, a life history, and inner affective and cognitive states, all of which can be manifest in a particular performance.

I suspect that Godlovitch's account of what matters to us in performance will seem compelling to anyone who attends musical performances. Although his analysis of musical skill and performance communities accorded well with my own intuitions as an amateur musician, those without first-hand knowledge of musical performance might require more than Godlovitch provides to be convinced. Given Godlovitch's acute analysis of the social dimensions of performance communities, I was disappointed that he did not discuss ensemble playing. However these are minor defects. *Musical Performance* is a fine, thought-provoking book and will be read with profit by anyone interested in philosophical aesthetics, music, or the philosophy of technology.

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Jean-Luc Gouin
Hegel: ou de la raison intégrale.
Montréal: Bellarmin 1999.
Cdn$29.95. ISBN 2-89007-883-3.

Le projet de Jean-Luc Gouin est à la fois modeste et ambitieux. Modeste, parce qu'il se soustrait à la tentation de produire une présentation systématique de la pensée hégélienne. Ce type de présentation, on le sait, exige non seulement la maîtrise de la prolifique et complexe œuvre de Hegel, mais aussi l'épuration d'une vaste littérature secondaire ; ce qui produit des ouvrages massifs mais dont l'accès demeure difficile pour un lecteur non spécialisé. En ce sens, l'auteur se propose d'ouvrir une porte d'entrée au projet hégélien à un public plus large que celui des spécialistes.

Il ne s'agit pourtant pas d'une simple exposition pédagogique des principaux jalons du système hégélien. Le livre de Gouin est aussi ambitieux dans la mesure où il prétend emprunter une voie qui, selon lui, serait encore inexplorée par la littérature hégélienne. Entre le traité systématique et l'article spécialisé, l'ouvrage de Gouin cherche à occuper un espace oublié par l'érudition hégélienne : celui d'un ouvrage dédié à exposer la matrice dialectique de la pensée hégélienne. Le pari de Gouin est de pouvoir dévoiler à un lecteur non spécialisé la structure dialectique qui anime l'effort hégélien d'appréhender la totalité de l'étant. De la sorte, il vise non seulement a introduire mais, surtout, à rendre accessible le noyau dur du système, souvent laissé pour compte par l'érudition.

Compte tenu des objectifs qu'il se donne, Gouin structure son *Hegel* en fonction de quatre thèmes fondamentaux. Le premier chapitre, approche la conception hégélienne de l'Absolu en tant que saisie rationnelle de la totalité de l'étant et, par là même, opposée aux conceptions romantiques contemporaines de Hegel. Par ce biais, Gouin, situe le projet hégélien dans le contexte philosophico-culturel qui lui était propre et montre son parti pris rationnel face aux tendances romantiques qui constituaient 'l'air du temps' dans l'Allemagne du début du XIX^{e} siècle.

Le deuxième chapitre, le chapitre central de l'ouvrage, s'attarde à exposer la structure de la raison hégélienne. Le chapitre se veut une présentation de la logique dialectique hégélienne par le moyen de ce que Gouin appelle le « gyroscope SNRR » (Sujet, Négativité, Résultat, Réconciliation). Essentiellement, la pensée hégélienne serait une pensée du sujet. À la différence de Fichte et Schelling, cependant, le sujet hégélien n'est pas un pur Je constituant la nature, tout comme il n'est pas non plus opposé irrémédiablement à elle. Le sujet transforme le monde en le « déterminant » par sa *praxis* et son activité cognitive. Cette détermination, Spinoza oblige, est tout aussi bien *négation* de l'identité originelle du monde. Le monde n'est plus ce qu'il était avant de le connaître ou d'agir sur lui. Cette négation produit une nouvelle objectivité dans laquelle on ne peut plus soustraire l'activité du sujet. L'objet qu'on connaît n'est pas celui qu'on voulait connaître, mais celui qui *résulte* de l'activité cognitive et pratique du sujet. La dernière étape consiste à

reconnaître cette association foncière entre sujet et objet, cette identité dans la différence devrait-on dire. Le sujet, initialement opposé à un objet qu'il voulait percer, est contraint de s'y reconnaître et donc amené à se *réconcilier* avec l'objectivité.

Le chapitre suivant se consacre à montrer la prégnance de la structure « SNRR » dans la dimension concrète de la pensée hégélienne. Gouin cherche à montrer que cette structure dialectique permet à Hegel de se soustraire à une philosophie de l'être immédiat. L'être, pour Hegel, *est* en se *déterminant*, c'est-à-dire, en *n'étant pas*. Cette unité de l'être et du néant permet, selon Gouin, d'arracher l'être à sa « torpeur originelle » et d'engendrer l'Esprit (94). Gouin souligne également que la notion d'Esprit absolu est, chez Hegel, indissociable de la notion de liberté. C'est seulement lorsqu'on comprend cette association profonde entre Esprit et liberté que la conception hégélienne de l'état peut être dégagée des interprétations qui font de Hegel un penseur totalitaire.

Le quatrième chapitre s'écarte quelque peu du projet initial de privilégier la compréhension à l'interprétation critique (33) car il est constitué par une série de réflexions sur le hégélianisme dans lesquelles l'auteur adopte un ton polémique vis-à-vis certaines interprétations courantes. En abandonnant la forme purement expositive qu'il s'était proposé de garder, Gouin nous sert pourtant ses pages les plus intéressantes. Dans ce chapitre, l'auteur s'attaque à des lieux communs de la littérature sur Hegel en montrant que le système hégélien n'est pas un système clos. Loin de l'image du penseur de la dialectique qui se contredit lui-même en postulant un système de l'identité, Gouin soutient que « [l]e système hégélien ne conserve sa cohérence qu'en étant un antisystème » (126) car il n'est rien d'autre que « *le constant mouvement d'érosion de la positivité immédiate* dévoilant le rapport à la totalité par ce qu'elle n'est pas » (130). Cette critique à la fermeture du système permet à Gouin de montrer l'infondé de certains lieux communs à propos de Hegel telles que la filiation hégélienne de la «fin de l'histoire» ou l'association entre hégélianisme et totalitarisme. Dans ses réflexions sur le hégélianisme Gouin nous présente un Hegel antidogmatique, démocratique et partisan farouche de la liberté.

Le livre se clôt par un essai « Aimer, penser, mourir » dans lequel l'auteur s'interroge sur le sens existentiel du désir de réconciliation final animant le projet systématique de Hegel. Par un jeu de miroirs avec Nietzsche et Freud, Gouin rapproche le désir de penser avec le désir d'aimer et le désir de mourir. La recherche de l'Absolu n'est-elle pas analogue à la recherche de la fusion amoureuse en ce que toutes les deux nous rapprochent de l'expérience de la mort? Le désir de penser, tout comme le désir d'aimer, en tant que désirs de transcendance, comportent également, selon Gouin, la terreur de « trop transcender » : la peur de mourir.

Le livre de Gouin présente cependant un problème majeur : le chapitre central où il entend dévoiler la « matrice » de la pensée hégélienne et sur lequel ses autres analyses vont s'appuyer comporte quelques passages peu clairs et certaines erreurs. En particulier, son explication du processus de

négation de la négation nous semble hautement problématique. Gouin explique, correctement, que toute prédication est une négation du sujet. Ainsi '*a* est *b*' équivaut à dire '*a* est ~*a*'. En ce sens, dire 'la maison est grande' équivaut à dire que 'la maison' est aussi autre chose qu'une maison. Gouin poursuit comme suit : « Ayant déjà établi que '*a*' est '-*a*', on saisit maintenant que '-*a*' (ou '*b*') renvoi de même à l'autre, à sa négation, et donc à '-*b*' (ou '*c*'). Or on se rend compte que c'est le résultat d'une double négation qui, en fait, se révèle comme un *retour à l'origine*. En effet, si '*a*' est '-*a*', la négation (l'autre) de ce '-*a*' devient à nouveau '*a*' » (72).

Si l'on suit le raisonnement de Gouin, dans 'la maison est grande', 'grande' ('*b*' ou '~*a*') renvoie à sa propre négation '*c*' ou '~*b*'. Or l'énoncé 'grande est ma peine' satisfait la forme logique '*b* est *c*' ou, hégéliennement, '*b* est ~*b*'. Bien que 'ma peine' soit bien la négation de 'grande', elle ne représente pourtant pas un retour au '*a*' initial ('la maison'). Ce qui n'est pas suffisamment expliqué ici est que le rapport logique entre sujet et prédicat est à comprendre, dans un cadre hégélien, comme un rapport entre les universaux et les étants particuliers. Le processus de négation, ou l'attribution d'une propriété à un sujet, est un processus d'universalisation et d'abstraction. La négation de la négation constitue le processus inverse par lequel on retourne à l'étant particulier mais en le comprenant cette foi-ci comme un universel concret. Par conséquent, bien que toute prédication de '*a*' soit une négation de '*a*' pas toutes les négations de '*b*' (ou '~*a*') constituent des doubles négations de '*a*' au sens hégélien.

Un deuxième problème de l'ouvrage de Gouin est qu'il ne s'appuie pas sur une littérature récente. Sans nier l'actualité des commentateurs tels que Hyppolite, Marcuse, Kojève ou Glockner, l'ouvrage aurait gagné à engager le débat avec des commentateurs plus récents, en particulier ceux qui comme Charles Taylor ont aussi entrepris de rendre Hegel vivant pour des lecteurs préoccupés par des problèmes contemporains.

En somme l'ouvrage de Gouin ne réussit pas complètement son pari. Le lecteur non spécialisé ne réussira pas à voir clair dans la matrice dialectique hégélienne et ceci l'empêchera de suivre aisément le parcours que Gouin lui propose. Par contre, le chapitre portant sur les conséquences de l'hégélianisme lui permettra d'entrevoir quels sont les enjeux contemporains auxquels l'entreprise hégélienne nous convie ainsi que, pour ceux qui en ont besoin, de se détromper par rapport à certains lieux communs sur Hegel.

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Jorge J.E. Gracia
Metaphysics and Its Task: The Search for the Categorial Foundation of Knowledge.
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 1999. Pp. xix + 221.
US$54.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4213-6);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4214-4).

Gracia has given us an important exercise in meta-philosophy, one which aims to explore the nature of metaphysics (xv) but without arguing for a particular system of metaphysical truths. We might even think of the project here as one of meta-metaphysics. Seeking as well to understand the resilience of the discipline of metaphysics, but without appealing to sociological or psychological factors which may be at work, Gracia argues that metaphysics is properly understood as the study of categories. As categorial investigations are presupposed in any other intellectual endeavor, philosophy included, philosophy can exist only to the extent that metaphysics does. Hence the endurance and importance of the latter.

A crucial premise in Gracia's argument for this view is that a proper definition of metaphysics must 'make sense of the practice of metaphysics throughout its history. Its goal is not to change practice but to understand it ... to make sense of our collective experience' (xvi). The route to this definition is first understanding the nature of philosophy itself. Accordingly, we are offered this definition: 'Philosophy [is] a view of the world, or any of its parts, that seeks to be accurate, consistent, and comprehensive, and for which evidence is given as support' (10).

Having established the genus of our sought definition of metaphysics, Gracia devotes separate chapters to four candidates for the specific differentia. Ultimately, metaphysics is concluded to *not* be differentiated by 1) its unique subject matter, 2) its method, 3) its aim, or 4) the propositions it trades in. The chapter on the allegedly unique subject matter of metaphysics receives fullest treatment. Gracia rejects various candidates; substance, God, essence, transcendental, and others, arguing that to take any single one of these as the proper object of metaphysical inquiry would do injustice to the various projects and issues with which metaphysicians have been historically concerned. On the other hand, the method, aim, and propositions of metaphysics turn out to characterize other disciplines as well, making them insufficient as specific differentia.

In chapter 7 we are offered Gracia's positive account, according to which 'metaphysics is the part of philosophy that studies categories: It tries to determine and define (when possible) the most general categories, and to make explicit the interrelations and the relations of less general categories to the most general ones' (220). Recognizing that a working definition of category is required, Gracia proposes that 'Categories are whatever is expressed by predicates such as "human", "concept", and "word", be that something real, conceptual, or nominal' (134). The chief advantage of this

view is that it allows us to talk in a neutral way about categories. That is, it allows us to theorize about the role of categories without prejudging whether categories are extra-mental, conceptual, or linguistic, a commitment Gracia plausibly argues should come at the end of our discussion, after extensive argumentation, not at the beginning (140).

Ultimately, of course, we want to know what categories really are, and how the initial neutral proposal is to be modified. Here Gracia makes one of his most important contributions. In short, Gracia maintains that the provisional understanding of categories as whatever is expressed by a predicate should be our final understanding. Rather than taking categories to be highest kinds, or mere conceptual items, for instance, Gracia endorses the tolerant and neutral position that maintains categories to be whatever is expressed by predicates. His argument is that this is the only manner in which we can avoid reducing categories to what they are not. '[T]he reduction of all categories to one of them is precisely the reduction of a broader category to a narrower one ... Extra-mental entity, concept, and word are all categories, and it will not do to say that all categories have to be one of these to the exclusion of others' (201). The task for the metaphysician is to proceed to find definitions for these categories, with an eye to determining their proper relations and hierarchies. Only after such definitions are found might it be appropriate to decide whether a given category is linguistic, mental or extra-mental (206). As for traditional question of how many categories there are, this too must presumably await the results of the investigation of the definitions of the categories.

There is much in this book worthy of detailed discussion and debate. Its breadth and synoptic treatment should secure its place as an important work. I am slightly skeptical, however, about Gracia's conclusion that the 'study of categories in the way noted is in fact what most metaphysicians have done throughout the history of philosophy when they engaged in metaphysics' (200). For many are explicitly *not* talking about categories. Gracia responds that this 'should not surprise us, for it is a common place for humans to misdescribe what they do for the simple reason that their descriptions are frequently guided by prejudices rather than observation' (220). It seems, however, that if Gracia is entitled to this ploy, so too would be those who claim that metaphysics is really the study of God, or of substance, or of essence. If, on the other hand, Gracia is offering us a rational reconstruction of the history of metaphysics, one which purportedly makes sense of it by seeing metaphysics as primarily concerned with categorial investigations, we need further argument that other possible reconstructions fare not as well. One would like then to hear more from Gracia on this point.

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Charles Guignon, ed.
The Good Life.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company
1999. Pp. xv + 325.
US$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-439-1);
US$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-438-3).

Charles Guignon's new anthology *The Good Life* brings together a marvelously wide-ranging selection of philosophers' attempts to define the good life. As Guignon observes, inquiry into the question of how to live has undergone a revival in recent years, as philosophers have rediscovered what was for the ancients the central issue of philosophy. It is a question which has been unfortunately left behind in modern times, dismissed either as unanswerable or as not a respectable sort of question in an age of science.

Guignon's contribution will, one hopes, spur more attention on this most crucial and most neglected of human questions. Making selections for a modest-sized volume on such an issue is a daunting task, requiring negotiating the Scylla of breadth but superficiality and the Charybdis of detail but narrowness. On this score one has to say Guignon has done just about as well as can be done, avoiding the common mistakes of overemphasizing the present age, and also the temptation to proportionally represent every group. The volume, understandably, focuses almost entirely on Western philosophy, though Guignon includes a single selection each from Chinese and Indian philosophy.

The editor's introductions to each selection are quite helpful and accurate, with only minor points one might dispute (for example, Guignon's characterization of Taoism as 'quietude' seems to resurrect the old canard of mystical 'quietism'). In addition there are selections it is refreshing to see, including Blaise Pascal, an overly-neglected philosopher/mystic, or Emerson, again a first-rate thinker not taken seriously enough as a philosopher. One could of course have imagined alternatives, such as Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, or a critique of Western man's acquisitiveness and technology-obsession. But again, these suggestions are mere quibbles, and the skill of the selection is testified to by the fact that there is no single entry which stands out as not deserving of inclusion.

The subject headings which attempt to bring some order to an otherwise amorphous topic are of somewhat limited use. Categories like 'Self-realization' and 'Self-exploration' are rather too vague to be very helpful, and it is awkward in any case to categorize them separately from, say, 'Religious Ways of Life.' But perhaps this is testament to the difficulty of the subject, which resists being molded into the neat categories that philosophers are so fond of, such as 'rationalism' and 'empiricism.'

Guignon also manages to steer clear of that ever present danger in a book about self-realization, the hackneyed field of self-help which dominates the American public's reading habits. Only occasionally does the editor slip into the sort of trite phrases one finds in such books, such as describing Emerson's

philosophy as teaching us to 'realize our unique, inherent potential', or Montaigne as teaching us to 'embrace life on its own terms' (183). But otherwise Guignon's volume is a welcome corrective to the self-help genre and a hopeful sign that philosophers can reassert their claim to consideration of the question of the good life — and Guignon has certainly done his part, with this excellent anthology that undergraduate philosophy teachers will no doubt find extremely useful in the classroom.

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Larry Hickman, ed.
Reading Dewey: Interpretations for a Postmodern Generation.
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1998. Pp. xxi + 271.
US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-33384-9);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21179-4).

Anthologies of expository and critical essays on the philosophy of John Dewey are appearing with ever more frequency, testifying to the resilience of pragmatism and of Dewey's own peculiar contributions to this tradition. Presumably for this reason the editor, Larry Hickman, felt it necessary to distinguish this collection from other recent examples by promising essays geared specifically to the needs and interests of a 'postmodern generation'. Hickman writes: The twelve original interpretive essays in this volume locate Dewey's major works within their historical context and present a timely reevaluation of each of the major areas of his broad philosophical reach' [ix].

Whether Hickman's collection will satisfy the demands of its intended audience is difficult to say, since nothing is said about what this generation's interests are. From the essays included, it appears that locating Dewey's work in his historical context is not actually one of them. Dewey lived and worked in the late nineteenth and twentieth-century philosophy, yet with a few notable exceptions (the essays by Thomas M. Alexander, Peter T. Manicus, Gregory F. Pappas, and Charlene H. Seigfried) these essays rarely mention, let alone relate Dewey's work to, the major figures in Western philosophy in this period; e.g., John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley, Henri Bergson, Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, etc. Later twentieth-century figures fare little better. One gets the impression that the postmodern generation knows little about twentieth-century philosophy and cares less. Those who, unlike the postmodern generation, do read

twentieth-century philosophy, will regret the editor's decision to privilege the interests of this group.

But that aside, readers seeking a collection of generally accessible, well written and informative essays on some of the most important topics in Dewey's thought, all by established scholars in their fields, probably could not do better than to consult Hickman's collection. Hickman wisely opens the volume with two excellent essays exploring fundamental themes running through the whole of Dewey's thought: qualitative experience and nature in Alexander's 'The Art of Life: Dewey's Aesthetics', and community in James Campbell's 'Dewey's Conception of Community'. Dewey's *Art as Experience* offers perhaps the most accessible avenue into Dewey's thinking, but it is not for that reason the less revealing. As Alexander points out: 'Experience is basic for Dewey and he gives one of his best accounts of this central term in ... *Art as Experience*' [8]. Alexander not only illuminates Dewey's aesthetics and the role of experience within it, but also the role of aesthetic appreciation in Dewey's conception of the 'art of life'. James Campbell does a similar service in untangling Dewey's understanding of 'community', an understanding that underlies his theories of education, individual personality, and of moral and social criticism.

These two 'keynote' essays are followed by discussions of more specific areas of Dewey's philosophy: education, religion, metaphysics, inquiry, social science, political philosophy, and feminism. The merits of these essays lie primarily in their careful exposition of Dewey's contributions to the fields mentioned. Three in particular, the essays by Manicas, Siegfried, and Boisvert, accompany exposition with trenchant critical commentaries that point out real shortcomings in Dewey's approaches, but find positive resources within Dewey's philosophy for overcoming them. Some will find these the most exciting essays of the twelve, as being the most suggestive of the directions in which neopragmatists true to the spirit but not necessarily the letter of Dewey's thought might profitably go.

The last two essays were possibly intended to make good the editor's promise to locate Dewey in his historical context, but neither are strictly speaking about Dewey's philosophy at all. Both are provocative and indirectly shed some light on Dewey's thought. However both require considerably more than interest in or a casual acquaintance with Dewey's thought to benefit from them. The first, by Thelma Lavine, offers an account of American pragmatic philosophy that is breathtaking in its audacious dismissal of opposing traditions. 'What is distinctive about the American philosophic tradition,' she writes, 'is that among the various competing philosophies that survive in the contemporary western world, the classic American tradition alone attempts to identify and to reconcile the conflicting philosophical traditions of the modern West' [217]. Lavine does not attempt the impossible task of justifying this claim, but instead uses it to assess the success or failure of particular pragmatists, such as Dewey, in fulfilling this aim. Almost as astonishing as her opening sentence, quoted above, is Lavine's assessment of Dewey's efforts at reconciliation as driving him politically towards statist

socialism, considering that Dewey has usually been dismissed as a milk-toast liberal by the left. The final essay, by Joseph Margolis, is a highly critical response to Richard Rorty's identification of parallels between the philosophies of Dewey and Heidegger. Following a lengthy comparison of the views of Heidegger, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, Margolis argues for a nearer sympathy between Dewey and the phenomenalism of Merleau-Ponty.

Taken all in all, Hickman's collection provides a valuable introduction to central themes in the philosophy of one of the founders of American pragmatic philosophy, and as such deserves attention from readers interested both in American philosophy, generally, as well as Dewey's thought in particular.

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Patricia Kitcher, ed.
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Critical Essays.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
1998. Pp. xvii + 300.
US$40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8916-6);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8917-4).

Suppose you were charged with selecting up to twelve pieces of Kant scholarship with the primary purpose 'to help students read the *Critique of Pure Reason* with a greater understanding of its central themes and arguments, and with some awareness of important lines of criticism of those themes and arguments' (xvii). You might approach this task with a view to select pieces on the *First Critique* (i) that are important and influential in interpreting the concepts, issues, arguments and positions, (ii) that are representative of major objections to, and defences of, the central arguments, (iii) that are representative of the central themes and of the major subdivisions therein, and (iv) that demonstrate a clarity of expression which would be accessible to senior undergraduates. Given the aforementioned criteria, I strongly suspect that most of us who lecture on Kant would produce widely varying lists for inclusion, which suggests that the set of commentators/pieces which properly satisfy criteria (i)-(iv) is not unique. Since I do not wish to engage in an argument concerning particular preference orderings of either specific commentators or specific pieces, I shall address Kitcher's selection with only the satisfaction of such criteria in mind.

If one wishes to 'ease' students into the *First Critique* with a general discussion of some of the difficult concepts with which they will be dealing, the opening selection, Philip Kitcher's 'Kant's *A priori* Framework', provides a splendid introduction, while considering a central issue in the *First Critique*, i.e., the possibility of synthetic knowledge *a priori*. Although Kitcher's intentions are not to 'solve' the so-called problem of the 'synthetic *a priori*', his analysis offers a wealth of information regarding Kant's usage of terms such as apriority, analyticity, syntheticity, possibility, necessity, experience and knowledge.

Depending upon one's proclivities, the Strawson and Allison selections may provide the centerpiece around which many Kant courses might revolve. The Strawson selection is excerpted from *Bounds of Sense*; Allison's is excerpted from *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*. Both works have been extraordinarily influential, and the manner in which Strawson lays out the doctrines of transcendental idealism and Allison's arguments concerning anthropocentrism and epistemic conditions provide the background for a pitched battle amongst Kant commentators. The excerpts identify two entrenched positions regarding the correct interpretation of the phenomenon/noumenon distinction, with Strawson representing the two domain interpretation, and Allison representing the dual aspect (or better: two ways of considering) interpretation. The prize is the incoherence or coherence of transcendental idealism itself. I know of no two other articles that could set the stage as well.

With respect to the central arguments, themes and subdivisions, the Aesthetic and the thorny problems regarding the coherence of Kant's notion of a form of intuition are represented by a pair of articles: Falkenstein's 'Was Kant a Nativist?' and Parsons' 'Infinity and Kant's Conception of the "Possibility of Experience" '. On the one hand, Falkenstein offers a reasonable historical analysis of the nativist/empiricist dispute prior to Kant and an analysis of Kant's arguments concerning the conditions and nature of our representations of space and time. These analyses yield a controversial, but hopefully defensible, notion of what comprises a form of intuition, i.e., as 'orders in which sensations (or the data that correspond to sensation) are presented in intuition' (42). On the other hand, Parsons argues that Kant cannot both account for our geometrical knowledge and successfully limit knowledge of objects to possible experience, without either rendering the notion of form of intuition explanatorily useless or denying the type of geometrical knowledge Kant claims we possess. This represents a much deeper objection than is commonly held, and to this end Parsons deals not only with the arguments of the Aesthetic, but also with the manner in which Kant handles infinite divisibility in the second antinomical conflict.

The Analytic of Concepts is represented by a trio of articles: Patricia Kitcher's 'Kant's Cognitive Self', Ameriks' 'Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Progressive Argument' and Beck's 'Did the Sage of Königsberg Have No Dreams?' Any meaningful discussion of the Analytic of Concepts must come to grips with the status of the transcendental unity of apperception and

specify the process and content of transcendental and empirical syntheses. Kitcher offers insightful analyses of all these notions, while arguing that the Subjective Deduction (and Paralogisms) provide 'an effective reply to Hume's attack on the idea of personal identity' (59). Ameriks discusses the Transcendental Deduction (TD) proper. He argues against what he calls the received interpretation (*RI*), i.e., that the TD is not 'a proof of objectivity which will answer scepticism,' but moves 'from the assumption that there is empirical knowledge to a proof of the preconditions of that knowledge' (85). And the effort spent in justifying his interpretation vis-à-vis the *RI* provides an informative introduction to one of the most difficult and controversial parts of the *First Critique*. Beck's article is so well known that little comment is required. I simply point out that Beck, in his usual clear and concise fashion, offers analyses of Kantian notions such as experience, intuition, concept and judgment, as well as a brief interpretation of the TD.

Guyer's 'Kant's Second Analogy: Objects, Events and Causal Laws' shifts the focus to the Analytic of Principles, particularly the main interpretive lines of the Second Analogy. Guyer makes precise the principle of causation, lays out Kant's arguments for it, defends Kant against some of the major lines of objections, and even provides a promising solution to the vexing simultaneous-cause problem.

The Dialectic is represented by two selections from Wood: 'Kant's Compatibilism' and an excerpt from *Kant's Rational Theology*. The former piece endeavours to argue that the determinism Kant sees as operative in the phenomenal realm is compatible with the freedom operative in the noumenal realm, or, as Wood puts it, 'the compatibility of compatibilism and incompatibilism' (259). Wood does a credible job in analyzing the third antinomical conflict, as well as discussing the notions of transcendental and practical freedom, spontaneity, agency and causality. The latter piece is rather more critical of Kant; therein Wood argues that Kant's strategy in the Ideal of Pure Reason to undermine the ontological proof, and hence the cosmological and physicotheological proofs, is flawed at its foundation. To this end, Wood offers a fine analysis of existence and predication.

Philip Kitcher's second piece, 'Projecting the Order of Nature', also considers the Dialectic and, along with another interpretation of causality, deals with Kant's arguments concerning the regulative use of reason and the importance of systematic unification. This is a welcome piece which also demonstrates how an understanding of the Kantian project can effectively inform contemporary debate on the philosophy of science. Indeed, many instructors might find renderings of Kant which attempt to show how Kant's work can complement or inform contemporary debate to be a valuable bonus, and Pat Kitcher is to be commended for including articles which offer this bonus. Pat Kitcher's own contribution demonstrates how a plausible Kantian theory of the self may accomplish such. And Philip Kitcher's first piece offers an interpretation such that non-Kantians can better appreciate Kant.

Patricia Kitcher has drawn together a wide variety of influential pieces, which touch most of the major arguments across a broad range of themes in

almost all the main subdivisions of the *First Critique*, from various interpretive perspectives, both objections and defences, and which are student-accessible. Moreover, she includes a brief and usefully annotated bibliography. For a senior Kant course, highly recommended.

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Christine M. Koggel, ed.
Moral Issues in Global Perspective.
Peterborough, ON: Orchard Part, NY:
Broadview Press 1999.
Cdn$44.95: US$34.95. ISBN 1-55111-186-1.

Koggel clearly states her objective in offering this massive anthology, which includes over 70 authors: the 'current collections on moral issues ... tend to feature the narrow band of agreements and disagreements of Western liberal theory and practice.' She offers this collection, as an alternative, to 'challenge our thinking about morality and moral issues as it has been shaped by Western liberal theory and to extend the inquiry beyond the context of North America' (xiv). According to Koggel, the globalization of ideas (i.e., predominantly Western ideas) has increased our awareness of alternative belief systems and thereby necessitated a re-examination of the canons of the Western moral tradition. To this end, Koggel believes that the multicultural approach of this volume can serve as a basis for questioning and possibly transforming the canons of human rights, the 'essence' of human nature, and the relationship between the individual and society.

The collection is divided into three parts each focused on the questioning of one of the three canons just mentioned. There are a total of fourteen chapters, each of which has four to six articles, each from different authors. Koggel provides an introduction to each chapter in which she gives an outline of the main themes, and a brief summary of the different authors' perspectives. In addition, there are 'study questions' and 'further reading' sections at the end of each chapter. The study questions are not the 'run of the mill' type questions that simply test the student's grasp of the content; rather, they are fairly in depth, and attempt to aid the student in making connections between the various authors' views within the chapter.

Each of the three parts begins with a chapter on 'Theories and Critical Analysis', where the traditional liberal theory is presented along with several non-Western theoretical critiques of the liberal perspective. The remaining

chapters of each part focus on the application of these theories and critiques to specific issues (e.g., Gender, or Race and Ethnicity). The intention is to provide the student with the various Western and non-Western theoretical perspectives and then demonstrate how these various perspectives address specific moral issues.

Part I, 'Human Rights and Justice', presents the traditional liberal conceptions of rights and justice (as espoused by John Rawl's 'Theory of Justice', and the United Nation's 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights'), and then contrasts this conception with theoretical critiques of the attempt to universalize, or globalize, these liberal ideas. Chapter two examines the problems inherent in exporting the Western conception of rights and justice to other contexts such as Cuba, China, and South Africa.

Part II, 'Human Diversity and Equality', examines the assumptions of human nature that underlie the liberal conception of equality. In short, the Western attempt to essentialize human nature is critiqued through a presentation of various alternative conceptions. Following the initial chapter, which again focuses on theory and critique, there are five chapters that deal with the many types of discrimination arising from the attempt to export Western conceptions of diversity and equality. Chapters consist of the following issues: 'Race and Ethnicity', 'Gender', 'Sexual Orientation', (i.e., challenges to traditional heterosexual conceptions from feminism and homosexuals) 'Differential Ability', (i.e., discrimination against the disabled) and 'Poverty and Welfare'. These chapters/topics are not rigid, however. Koggel does a nice job of choosing selections that demonstrate that these issues, such as poverty and discrimination of race and gender, are woven together.

The final part, 'Individual Autonomy and Social Responsibility', begins with a chapter on traditional theories (e.g., Kant, and Mill) of individual responsibility, and the problems inherent in the extreme individualism these theories espouse. The central question is: to what degree should individual autonomy be emphasized over collective responsibility? The remaining chapters in this section examine individual responsibility as it applies to issues of 'Reproduction', 'Euthanasia and Health Care', 'Pornography and Hate Speech', 'Sexual Violence', and 'Animals and the Environment.' Included in these chapters are a number of diverse issues such as abortion in Nicaragua, organ trafficking, trafficking women in prostitution, and indigenous perspectives of nature.

Limitations exist with any anthology such as this, primarily because decisions about what to include and what not to include must be made. Koggel largely by-passes this problem with the sheer volume of contributors and by the range of issues covered. Nevertheless, some may find Koggel's characterization of the Western liberal tradition somewhat of a strawperson. Her criticisms of liberalism through the various alternative voices are definitely relevant, but the presentation of liberal theory in a few short excerpts is obviously stacking the deck to some degree. This problem, however, could easily be remedied with a few supplemental texts for a course.

In addition, Koggel's 'Preface', chapter introductions, and study questions are a bit leading. A clear agenda is certainly appropriate in a single author work, but in an anthology such as this, the narrow focus (i.e., decapitating liberalism via multiculturalism) seems out of place — that is, everything *but* the Western liberal tradition is OK.

Finally, the connection between justice and political economy is not sufficiently addressed (i.e., the commonly held view that liberalism is married to Capitalism and laissez-faire economics). The post-colonial and feminist contributions reveal that many of the inequalities and oppressive situations that presently exist are tied to long standing social structures. Making the connection between the oppressive material conditions and the global market system (which is buttressed by neo-liberal ideology) more explicit would strengthen this important point.

Despite these relatively minor criticisms, this collection should prove invaluable in a variety of undergraduate courses. It should meet an increasing demand for course readings on multiculturalism and the conflict that globalization has brought to bear on traditional conceptions of morality and justice from a Western perspective. The collection is definitely appropriate for introductory courses in ethics, where alternative perspectives are desired. However, there are a sufficient number of articles dealing with poverty, women's issues, international development, and race and ethnicity, that make the text of use in a wide variety of introductory courses. With supplemental readings, the collection could be used in more advanced undergraduate courses as well. Given the bargain price, an instructor need not feel guilty using only one-third to one-half of the articles for a particular course.

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Marcel S. Lieberman
Commitment, Value, and Moral Realism.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. xii + 210.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-521-63111-4.

Marcel Lieberman has considerably advanced the moral realism debate. He has accepted the challenge to moral realism put forward by anti-realists and noncognitivists and styled an argument that merits careful study and a response from critics of moral realism.

But the book is not only about moral realism. The main argument is such that Lieberman must cover terrain not often incorporated into metaethical debate. He draws most heavily upon action theory, cognitive science/psychol-

ogy, and philosophy of mind while also nodding in the direction of continental hermeneutics.

The text is meticulously argued; it is a full-scale defense of a central argument that is seemingly simple but as Lieberman shows, requires a methodical laying out of the essential background assumptions in order to withstand scrutiny. The book contains five chapters and a conclusion. He initially outlines his project then chapter by chapter he carefully builds his case.

The central argument answers Nicholas Sturgeon's question 'What Difference Does it Make Whether Moral Realism is True?' (*Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supplement* 24 [1986] 115-42). Lieberman forcefully contends that we can easily see the difference by inquiring into the nature of commitment. Thus, Lieberman's central argument has a more practical dimension than other defenses of moral realism which draw upon metaphysical, epistemological, scientific, or linguistic philosophical considerations. He holds that there is a most direct inroad into the thesis of moral realism: the uncontroversial fact that people have commitments.

What is a commitment? Lieberman argues that a commitment has a structure with identifiable and necessary characteristics. These characteristics include 'its stability and potential revisability; its practical necessity (or action-guiding force); and its role in self-understanding and identity' (194). Lieberman then argues that noncognitivism and anti-realism cannot accommodate these features of commitment. He analyzes Gibbard's attempts to elucidate the nature of commitment within a noncognitivist framework and he analyzes the plausibility of Rorty's antirealism accommodating these features of commitment. After showing how both Gibbard's and Rorty's accounts fall short with respect to a viable account of commitment, Lieberman is thus led to the conclusion that commitment only makes sense when cast in a moral realist framework. The central argument, Lieberman claims, is 'an *indirect* proof of moral realism: a proof in which I do not show that *moral realism itself is true, but that moral realism is the only theory capable* of explaining certain key components of our moral experience, in this case commitment' (195).

The indirect argument is an artful strategy; it is a quick and straightforward refutation of noncognitivism and antirealism that circumvents probing into every single aspect of Gibbard's norm expressivism or Rorty's neopragmatism. Lieberman illustrates how his argument can be deftly employed in his brief discussion of Blackburn's quasi-realism. He writes: 'The arguments Blackburn advances in favor of his projectivist theory are fairly complex, relating to topics in the philosophy of language and issues on supervenience. Yet in order to address the quasi-realist objections, it will not be necessary to enter into these new debates, since some of the key claims and arguments Blackburn makes can readily be answered once we see how they fit in with the earlier discussions' (190). The key claim is Blackburn's contention that a commitment is nothing more than an attitude. Lieberman's analysis shows that 'commitment is *not* simply an attitude, but is instead structured by

beliefs' (193). His defense of moral realism against the charges of the quasi-realist then, turn on the nature of commitment.

Lieberman convincingly supports his argument with case studies. His acquainting us with Eugene Debs, for instance, an activist in the American labor movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, is very helpful in focusing the question of the nature of commitment and its metaethical implications. As Lieberman says, these case studies are 'a means of orienting the reader's intuition' (56). The range of commitments he discusses is also helpful. He discusses what's involved in being committed to a political cause, in writing a paper, in learning a language, in maintaining friendships. A fruitful avenue that he does not discuss is commitment in marriage.

It is in the middle chapters (3,4,5) that Lieberman draws upon action theory, philosophy of mind, cognitive science/psychology, and hermeneutics. Lieberman draws on the work of Nagel and Charles Taylor in his discussion of values and beliefs. For him, 'The belief that the object of one's commitment is valuable, or that the commitment is worthwhile, involves the belief that it possesses certain features that other reasonable people could recognize as meriting concern, care, or attention. To this extent we believe the value is "objective"' (128). This is what Lieberman calls a weak moral objectivity that leads to a modest moral realism.

One of the most important questions from action theory that is significant for Lieberman's argument is: how shall we understand actions as opposed to behavior? He contends that there is an element of self-understanding that is part of genuine action. So Lieberman suggests — what he takes to be an innovative approach in action theory — an interpretive stance. Intention is significant for action, but can a third-person scientific perspective capture intention? Lieberman argues no and describes his defense of moral realism as parallel to defenses of folk psychology in the field of philosophy of mind.

The key components of Lieberman's argument, then, are that: 1. commitments involve beliefs, 2. commitments involve objective value beliefs, 3. moral realism is the only metaethical theory that can incorporate these elements. I will close with a few critical points concerning these key claims.

Although I accept his arguments that commitments involve beliefs and they are not solely comprised of attitudes, his notions of objective value beliefs, weak objectivity and pluralism require more elaboration. For example, he maintains that objective values 'purport to capture certain facts about human nature or the human good' (127) and involve 'requirements of human flourishing' (188). These are highly contentious notions at which Lieberman barely blinks an eye. In addition, he holds that pluralism is possible but he doesn't take the time to address the conceptual tension between moral objectivity and pluralism.

Since Lieberman defines moral realism as 'the view that moral judgments represent subject-independent facts' (2) he is open to the charge that there is a false dichotomy between saying either there are moral facts or else there's no such thing as moral objectivity, an argument clearly stated in James

Rachels's *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*. The challenge is to say why it is impossible to have moral objectivity without moral realism. I think what Rachels has in mind is that there is a third alternative besides realism and relativism, namely a Kantian objectivity — a reasons-based approach. If a moral objectivity of this kind is viable (and I'm not saying that it is) then Lieberman's argument would not quite reach a conclusion about moral realism, but only one about moral objectivity.

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Jeff Malpas and **Robert C. Solomon, eds.**
Death and Philosophy.
New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. xi + 211.
Cdn$113.00: US$75.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-19143-2);
Cdn$37.99: US$24.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-19144-0).

I checked into the Regional Hospital for elective surgery on the same day the book arrived. So, I brought it along for leisurely reading. The hospital environment provides a touch of realism to the study of death, a sort of applied thanatology. And the twenty some year old patient in the bed next to me expressed surprise 'you are reading what ... I could never do that', he said. Yet, he wondered how I (or anyone else) could find enjoyment in this (morbid) subject? Well, I said, searching the ceiling for some Socratic insight, scanning possibilities: (1) the philosopher does not fear death; (2) death characterizes us; (3) the Grim Reaper rides again .... No! None of these would do. Why not play a game, I suggested. Everyone knows the truth of the statement 'they die someday', but imagine a crystal ball that foretells your very own death. You learn that you will die in a few hours, say at 5:00 a.m. (when blood sugar level is low). So, what do you do until then, and what profound message do you leave the world? For instance, can you write an essay on the meaning of life? This is the formidable challenge that invites us into the book.

The book contains an interdisciplinary collection of articles, most of which originated a few years ago at a conference on death and dying held in the north of Auckland, New Zealand. The essays that appear here can be seated on the grim reaper's subway (Solomon's phrase) in different benches afford-

ing individualized views of the death landscape. The death experience contained within these pages (or should I say, the anticipation of the death experience) is paradoxical; either it frightens us, or it attracts us, simultaneously bringing us in for a closer look. Once inside the book, the reader is introduced to a variety of death attitudes through the eyes of two head protagonists — Heidegger and Sartre, or variations thereof: On the one side, death emerges as meaningful, timely, personal, and a source of inspiration, but on the other side of death — the ugly side — the view is chillingly meaningless, untimely, impersonal, and a source of despair. Where else does the grim subway go? The scenery lead us to choose one of two possible paths: The first path solves the paradox by settling the dispute between the raging choices facing us — either death is meaningless and all those things ... or it is not. The second path, shifts the paradox into the realm of oxymoron, not by reducing one arm of the paradox to the other, but by raising the contraries into a fresh synthesis of both/and language, namely, moving the discussion into the realm of what death is like to the dead, thereby leaving the protagonists behind! (Essays by Ames, Wicks, and Parkes). Taken as a whole, the book travels those paths toward death, and more. Another option also appears in what Flowers calls the 'bald scenario,' namely, there is nothing after death, or as Soll has it '... *to be dead is not to be at all*' (38). And a further possibility (Solomon) shifts the debate from self-interests to concerns about others, namely, the social aspect of death (how my death affects others).

In this genre, one expects to find readings from Tolstoy's *The Death of Ivan Ilich*, Heidegger's *Being and Time*, (B & T contains 33 pages of original material on death as an integral structure of Dasein), wisdom from Sartre (*The Wall* and other stories), Camus, Nietzsche, Becker, Epicurus, and possibly some Eastern philosophy. To the book's credit, it does this and more (Gabriel Marcel might have been a nice addition) since it also contains a nice selection of essays from the literary, as well as the aesthetic tradition. Since my present interests include what Heidegger 'seems to be saying' about the connection between the nothing and death, I was pleased to find that Kraus' essay addresses this very point. And I was pleased to read Steiner's essay on Elias Canetti (winner of the Nobel prize for literature in 1981), since I must confess my profound ignorance of Canetti's work.

The book opens with Horwitz' personal reflection on a journey into non-being, or in brief, a first person account of a near death experience. Although the story takes an unusual twist, I must confess that I am very skeptical of this business. Stories of the afterlife experience generally fail to distinguish between death as process and death as event (cellular and absolute death). This is not to deny the value of the experience, since in this case the experience is insightful, but it is to suggest that it is other than what the afterlife travelers claim it to be. That being said, however, the value of this story is in the telling, the superb narrative itself, not where the story goes, but how it claims to get there. My young hospital friend interrupted, 'You make the book sound interesting, not morbid at all'. Agreed, it contains

a nice mix of delightful, provocative, well researched, and well written reflections on a subject greater than which none can be conceived.

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Thomas More
Utopia.
Transl. David Wootton.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company 1999. Pp. 208.
US$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-377-8);
US$6.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-376-X).

The new edition of Thomas More's *Utopia*, translated by David Wootton, is an accessible, well-organized edition of an important text in western political philosophy. The physical layout of the book, with its wide margins and large typeface, is ideal for people who make extensive marginal notes.

Wootton's introduction provides a detailed account of the historical context in which the book was written and published. He writes of More's relationship with Erasmus, with whom Wootton closely associates *Utopia*. More is also connected to specific political, theological and intellectual issues of the day. A persistent tendency here is to show the distance between More and his modern readers, who may be tempted to read him as a forerunner of contemporary political thought. For Wootton, More is a thinker with a fixed historical position.

One valuable aspect of the introduction is the discussion of problems of translation. Some earlier translations of *Utopia* use words that, even if they meant similar things in More's time, have changed their meaning in the last four centuries. Two examples that Wootton discusses are 'machine' and 'model', both of which suggest that More's account of politics was much more scientific and empiricist than is in fact the case. It is surprising, however, that Wootton passes over the history of the word 'state', which he uses to translate '*reipublicae*'. Other translators have used 'commonwealth' or 'city', which may be more appropriate.

While the detailed historical account offered by Wootton is valuable, the danger is that the reader of *Utopia* will become lost in the people and events outside of the book, and even that the outside will begin to dominate how the book is understood, more by association than by explicit interpretation.

When Wootton turns to what More is trying to say in *Utopia*, he focuses on several basic contradictions or ambiguities that riddle the text, beginning

with the title itself. For this reason, *Utopia* could be a very effective text for teaching students to read carefully and closely. It is far from being a transparent text, and Wootton's introduction helps underline that fact.

According to Wootton, the ambiguities are intentional, and suggest that More organized *Utopia* as a Sileni, a figure from Greek history that appears ugly or corrupt on the outside but is in fact beautiful and pure within. To illustrate this point, Wootton includes a short piece by Erasmus entitled 'The Sileni of Alcibiades' at the end of the book. It is strange, though, that this latter text is treated as the key to understanding *Utopia*. The Sileni is constructed from two polar opposites: good and evil, ugly and beautiful. For example, the apparent qualities of wealth are in fact ugly, while the apparent powerlessness of religion is in fact a higher power. But More's description of *Utopia* is not as a combination of opposites or the interplay of the visible and the invisible. The island city is neither the good nor the evil, it is the different. Sorting out what More was trying to do with this account of difference is the primary task left to the reader.

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Christopher New
Philosophy of Literature: An Introduction.
New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. viii + 151.
Cdn$34.99: US$21.99. ISBN 0-415-14486-8.

Philosophy of Literature is designed as a text for a senior or graduate course in the philosophy of literature, though New does hope to reach students of literature as well. Speaking as a literary scholar and teacher, I think that hope is unlikely to be fulfilled. Cogent and jargon-free as the discussion is, it is simply too general, too abstract, and too little concerned with hermeneutic questions to meet the expectations of literary scholars. In addition, New has decided not to discuss postmodernist theories — a wise decision in many ways, but one that will preclude reaching any large literary audience.

As an introduction to philosophical discussion of literature the book is lucid and thorough. It is organized topically rather than historically — as one would expect. There are 8 chapters, the first two identifying the object — literature — followed by a chapter on each of: fiction, psychological reactions of readers, imagination, metaphor, interpretation, truth values of literature, and evaluation. New does not attempt to give an historical map of by whom, where and when particular positions about literature were held. Nor do we

find frequent references to Plato, Aristotle, the Scholastics, Hume, Kant, Schleiermacher, Wittgenstein, Searle, Gadamer, or Derrida — to mention only the most prominent. New's objective is to present analytically all possible positions rather than to survey those actually taken. Some thinkers do receive extended attention — notably Kant, Kendall Walton and Gregory Currie, with all of whom he disagrees; and John Searle and Monroe Beardsley with whom he largely agrees. New does not ignore previous discussion, but he makes no effort to survey it systematically, instead providing information in footnotes which would permit the student to discover it for herself.

New's take on the subject is a philosophy of language one, specifically, speech act theory. His touchstone for discriminating literary discourse from other varieties is grounded on the Austinian distinction between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts — though the latter term does not appear until page 94 in the chapter on metaphor:

> We can describe and extend the conclusions we have reached in a more perspicuous way, using a little more of the vocabulary of speech act theory which we referred to in Chapter 2. Let us call the aim someone has in performing an illocutionary act — what he performs it *for* — a *perlocutionary* aim or intention, and the effect he thus brings about (if he succeeds) a perlocutionary effect. [New's emphasis]

Rather oddly New articulates speech act theory in his discussion of Monroe Beardsley's theory of literature, rather than by reference to either Austin or Searle — who are relegated to a footnote.

New addresses all the contentious issues, one by one: the ontology of the literary work or art, its properties, its source, its manner and means, its meaning, and its use. He concludes that ontologically it is a speech act, but one whose locutionary force is problematic since some sentences are asserted and some are not, whose illocutionary force is similarly problematic for the same reasons — deriving from the fictionality of the literary artwork; and finally, that it is principally marked by its perlocutionary force, that is, the experience of reading/hearing/witnessing it.

Apart from his avoidance of postmodernism, New touches upon virtually every important philosophical argument about the nature of literature and its modes of procedure, and has wise and illuminating things to say about them. I particularly like his conclusion that truth in fictional worlds is largely underdetermined. It avoids the Scylla of free fantasy and the Charybdis of claims to inspired truth, while preserving the cognitive respectability of fiction. He is particularly trenchant on the issue of appraisal — where he does in fact touch on postmodern positions. For me it is the best chapter in the book — perhaps because it is the most polemical. He takes the mickey out of the relativist and subjectivist positions which dominate current literary critical discourse — without retreating to an indefensible objectivist position.

I found myself disagreeing with some of New's positions — notably his discussion of metaphor, which fails to discriminate between metaphors,

analogies, and metonymies, and also misdescribes similes. And I am not as confident as he that speech act theory offers a satisfactory solution to the problems of discriminating literary from non-literary uses of language. That said, this is a cogent, careful, comprehensive, balanced and authoritative introduction to the philosophical discussion of literature.

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Andrea Nye
The Princess and the Philosopher: Letters of Elisabeth of the Palatine to René Descartes.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 1999.
Pp. xiii + 187.
US$57.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-9264-7);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-9265-5).

Princess Elisabeth (or Elizabeth) of the Palatine (styled also Elisabeth of Bohemia: her parents were briefly king and queen of Bohemia) (1618-1680) has long been well-known as a philosophical correspondent of Descartes's. She was indeed one of Descartes's most acute critics, raising in a clear and focused manner fundamental questions about — difficulties with — Cartesian philosophy of mind. 'How can the soul of man,' she asked Descartes, 'being only a thinking substance, determine his bodily spirits to perform voluntary actions?' With this and allied questions, sustained in a correspondence, and occasional meetings, that took place from 1643 to shortly before Descartes's death in 1650, Elisabeth emerges as a tenacious and thorough philosophical thinker. Though the correspondence and meetings developed into a species of friendship — whose exact coloration remains at least a little unclear — Elisabeth retained throughout a great independence of mind, and was never won to Cartesian conclusions except where she felt her objections or concerns were answered clearly and plausibly.

Elisabeth is an attractive and impressive figure in seventeenth-century intellectual history (she played also a role, secondary but not always inconsequential, in its political history). She deserves the attention of historians of philosophy, and the idea of a book about her life specially focused upon her relationship and correspondence with Descartes is suggestive and valuable. The book under review is in many respects a disappointment as a rendering of that idea, although it has at least some redeeming features.

It appears that 26 of Princess Elisabeth's letters to Descartes have survived, and 32 of his to her. These are the numbers that the Adam Tannery edition of Descartes's work supplies. Twelve of Descartes's letters to Elisabeth are translated and published in whole or part in Anthony Kenny's edition of Descartes's Philosophical Letters. Hers to him do not seem to have been translated into English before, so we may be grateful to Andrea Nye for affording this service to scholarship in her book. The translations are not always felicitous. 'Monsieur', in mid-letter, would be more appropriately rendered as 'sir'. (On p. 111 we even find the form 'Monsieurs' — the original has 'messieurs'. If ironic emphasis were wanted — the French doesn't require it — one could render this 'eminent persons' or just 'persons' or 'individuals'.) On p. 140 we find 'I believe that you have already received the letter in which one spoke to you of another trip ...', which is not grammatical English. Other renderings are awkward or unclear, or anachronistic: e.g., on p. 64 Nye has Elisabeth say that 'it is for me very dysfunctional to deprive myself of real goals ...'.

Nye has chosen to interweave Elisabeth's letters, together with parts of some of those of Descartes or Nye's summaries of them, with interpretation and commentary on these texts and ongoing biographical and historical narrative. There is, to be sure, a case for presenting this story in this way. The aim is to catch a personal note, to seek to identify contrasting personalities and philosophical styles and views, and the vagaries of a friendship, complicated by disparities of age, social class, and the commitments of very different kinds of life station. This kind of touch is reasonably successfully achieved in Marjorie Hope Nicolson's *Conway Letters*, and Nye's effort suffers severely by comparison with this earlier classic. Nicolson provides appropriate scholarly apparatus for her set of letters. The latter are carefully numbered, they are (mostly) as complete as she was able to make them, and Nicolson went to immense pains to identify any persons, books, unusual terms, or other non-obvious reference in the letters. Nothing like this is attempted in Nye's volume. It is not merely that Nye is not providing a critical edition of the Descartes-Elisabeth correspondence. She has not aspired to, and that is fine (though one may hope that some future scholar may do so). It is rather that there is hardly any 'marshalling' of the material. We are not even told the numbers of the surviving letters, nor are any of several references it would have been helpful to have provided; nor are occasional bits of Latin translated for the reader.

Nye's scholarship is not exemplary, and sometimes it is embarrassing. She thinks that Seneca was a Greek (51), that the (sovereign) Duke of Brunswick was a baron (112), and that Spinoza lived in Geneva and was included among a list of scholars to invite to Heidelberg when he was in fact only 17 (159). One is not afforded confidence that the reader is safely in the hands of a writer-editor at home in the seventeenth-century context.

Nye's philosophical understanding is also sometimes problematic. She is very keen to contrast Descartes's pronounced dualism and hyper-rationalism (in practical life as well as in theory) with Elisabeth's more empirical and

commonsensical stance, not unreasonably. But Nye wants further to read into Elisabeth's letters anticipations of twentieth-century 'body' and other feminist theory that seem rather more dubious. Elisabeth is in fact a highly intelligent wide-awake observer of the world around her, and of the texts she reads. She has real interest in science, and in mathematics, and in natural phenomena; and she does preserve, always, impressively independent judgment. She finds Cartesian dualism implausible, and situates us as more bodily, and feeling-endowed, than does Descartes. But so would Aristotle, and he is rarely advanced as a prefiguring body theorist, or feminist.

In one passage (123), Nye misses Elisabeth's point. Elisabeth's standing observation of (with ensuing objection to) psycho-physical (substance) dualism is that if mind (soul) is truly immaterial, then it is not in any way corporeal. In particular, it is not to be conceived as smoky or vaporous or subtle matter. She urges this point again (122) against a sympathetic but shallow expositor of Cartesianism. If mind is not *in any way* corporeal, then it is deeply problematic how it can affect matter or be affected by it (particularly for a mechanist theory of nature like Descartes's). Nye, however, thinks Elisabeth is merely claiming the independence of mind from body.

Throughout the book Nye is given to subtextual projections that seem very difficult to believe. Some simply appear to go beyond the evidence the letters provide. Again and again Nye has Elisabeth react with annoyance or muted irony to Cartesian insensitivities; the actual text of the letters does not easily warrant these constructions.

Nye betrays in her readings between lines the juxtapositional egalitarianism of our age, which it is quite dubious to suppose to characterize the seventeenth century. She imagines Elisabeth continually comparing her own case and circumstances to those of Descartes, and feeling (if veiling) reproach that he fails to see how freer he is than she (and than she would like to be) to pursue the intellectual life. The text of the letters seems to show no such even tacit or veiled attitudes or comparisons, and it is highly unlikely that Elisabeth felt them. In this world of the day before the day before yesterday there was an acceptance of place (where destiny has placed one) that must seem not merely odd but not credible to the children of the *ressentiments* of our time.

The book is an interesting read. It cannot be recommended for its scholarship or its philosophy; but one does feel one knows both Descartes and Elisabeth better after reading it (and subtracting Nye's excesses of commentary), and they are very much worth getting to know better, as real people, and thinkers, in their time.

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Michael Peters and **James Marshall**
Wittgenstein:
Philosophy, Postmodernism, Pedagogy.
Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey 1999.
Pp. xvii + 227.
US$65.00. ISBN 0-89789-480-4.

An interesting publication for educators and philosophers of education is added in the *Critical Studies in Education and Culture* series edited by Henry A. Giroux. This work however surprises the reader with its contents. Peters and Marshall have produced a book which encapsulates their research efforts in the areas of philosophy of language, analytical philosophy and post-modernity, political philosophy, psychoanalysis and philosophy of education. Covering all this ground is a fearsome task. To make it even more fearsome however, the authors have taken upon themselves to prove their pet (but hard to prove) theses in all the above mentioned areas.

With the citation of only few of their most important theses one can easily understand that the authors are not afraid to walk into deep waters: one of their most important theses is that Wittgenstein's philosophy is better explained only if placed within the context of the Continental (and in particular the Vienna) intellectual and cultural background. In this, they are opposed to most of the analytical commentaries of Wittgenstein and they have their reasons for this. They believe that the analytic philosophy of education (APE) tried to gain support from the philosophy of Wittgenstein, but in so doing it misrepresented both its content and its educational value. So, taking upon themselves to protect educators from the APE's distortions of Wittgenstein, the authors refute the validity of APE's claims concerning the nature, content and context of W.'s later philosophy, and associate W. not only with figures which belong in his Viennese philosophical upbringing such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud, but also with more contemporary ones such as Foucault, Lyotard and Rorty. Thus, they associate W. and Nietzsche through their philosophy of culture and their therapeutic view of philosophy. W. and Schopenhauer also are found to hold jointly a negative attitude towards the notion of self, and this is further augmented by W.'s expressivist approach to statements of identity (69-86). In addition, W. is associated with Foucault through their common interest in questions of 'how, when investigating the self and in their positive and critical approaches to Freud, both W. and Foucault reject Freud's (and all other) scientific psychology, even though they both find that Freud contributed positively to the development of psychology as a discipline'; they also both maintain that we can understand human behaviour only by its factual exegesis, that mental illness and dreaming are not 'abnormal' in the Freudian sense, and that psychoanalysis is a way or mode of speaking within the context of established social language games and not a new or independent language game (114-21). Proceeding to the area of metaphilosophy the authors suggest that both W. and Lyotard saw their philosophical output as responses to European nihil-

ism and the end of metaphysics (123-30). They also find that Rorty's 'politics of the *ethnos*' or post-modernist bourgeois liberalism, even though influenced by Wittgenstein, deviates from the proper interpretation of W. in its approach to the question of other cultures: Rorty's cultural imperialism, which exists according to Putnam in R.'s notion of a programme, ends in uniformity in behaviour, and this goes against W.'s insistence on the differentiation not only between performances within a language game, but also between language-games themselves. The authors here find Lyotard (again) closer to W. through Lyotard's insistence to work through the status of the *we* and the question of the subject (146-8). They close their argument with the thesis that W. has a lot to offer to educational theory and practice not with the provision of a method for analyzing educational concepts (as the APE proponents advocate), but through his style of doing philosophy: W. provides non-argumentational discursive forms that are designed both to shift our thinking and to escape the picture that holds us captive (16).

With this richness of topics under discussion, any critical comments on the way the authors of the book treat their subject matter is bound to be unfair. Perhaps this is another positive side of this book: it will most probably force the APE theorists to write a book or series of articles in response, providing a more coherent and systematic support of their position.

However, we can express here one worry regarding the content of the book: if the authors tried to destroy the support which APE theorists tried to secure from W.'s philosophy, why did they also advance so many seemingly irrelevant to their main thesis positions? (for example regarding the modernist interpretation of W., Foucault and Lyotard, discussion of Rorty and Freud). Surely a refutation of the APE theorists with their own methods and topics would be sufficient. To put so many tricks under one's hat is surely confusing regarding the true aims of the book and at least not very educational! It also gives the careful reader the suspicion that something in the story is missing. Comparisons and associations seem to be done summarily, with discussion of only specific secondary literature and key texts, and not with an overview of most of the arguments and counter-arguments in both sides of the disputes (for example no mention of key bibliography in relation to rules and rule-following considerations, even though this issue is related to both the style of W. and his expressivism in identity statements).

But here this worry when compared to the scope and importance of the book for the synthesis of a coherent opposition to APE theorists seems secondary and unimportant. The onus is on APE theorists to construct sufficient counter-arguments.

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Caroline Joan S. Picart
Resentment and the 'Feminine' in Nietzsche's Politico-Aesthetics.
University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press 1999. Pp. viii + 206.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01888-7);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01889-5).

Caroline Picart's *Resentment and the Feminine in Nietzsche's Politico-Aesthetics* is very ambitious. Situated at the intersection of Nietzsche studies and feminist theory, it seeks to trace shifts in Nietzsche's pronouncements on the feminine and women, as well as his use of feminine mythic figures, from his earliest to his last writings. It aims to link these shifts to changes in Nietzsche's increasingly pessimistic political thought.

Perhaps like most ambitious books, this one's ambitions exceed its achievements, but it does realize some aspects of its overarching aims. In particular, it is valuable for its analysis of Nietzsche's use of mythic figures, masculine and feminine, at different points in his work.

An introduction sets out the book's overall scope and aims. In it, Picart differentiates her genealogical approach from approaches which make more general pronouncements about Nietzsche, women, and feminism, and approaches to Nietzsche which ignore these relationships. Picart's claim that these relationships are crucial to understanding Nietzsche's politics would be better supported if she were to have spent more time distinguishing between a political aesthetic (attributed to Nietzsche's pre-Zarathustran texts) and an aesthetic politics (found in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*). Picart also chooses, with the exception of one footnote in her next chapter, to ignore debates over whether Nietzsche should even be interpreted as a political thinker. Since her definition of the political is broad, mechanisms that delineate and maintain the boundaries separating the empowered from the disempowered, (25) the distinction between 'aesthetic-political' and 'politico-aesthetics' remains vague.

The first chapter engages with theorists who have analyzed Nietzsche's use of feminine tropes and pronouncements on women and the feminine. Picart offers a very useful and critically reflective survey of a range of contemporary positions, including those of Krell, Irigaray, Kofman, Oliver, Cixous, Burgard and Lungstrom. For the most part, she chooses to engage only with Nietzsche scholars who address issues of feminism in relation to Nietzsche. One exception is Leo Strauss. Picart observes that she was greatly influenced by Strauss' emphasis on texts which seek to communicate to two different audiences at the same time. Picart is similarly clear about the sources for her gendered approach to Nietzsche (Kristeva, Oliver and Irigaray).

The next three chapters, which form the core of the book, analyze the role the feminine plays in Nietzsche's texts, and how changes in this role are linked to Nietzsche's increasingly crude and pessimistic politics. Picart

presents Nietzsche's oeuvre as divided into three periods, pre-Zarathustran, Zarathustran, and post-Zarathustran. She regards the first period as Nietzsche's most optimistic, interprets *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as presenting a noble lie (concerning the eternal return and the overman), intended to impact differently on two different audiences, and claims that Nietzsche's last works manifest 'his all-consuming political aim ... to catalyze modernity's descent into self-destruction' (6).

In her analysis of Nietzsche's early period, Picart concentrates on *The Birth of Tragedy, Human, All Too Human*, and *The Gay Science*. Somewhat surprisingly, Picart includes the last book of *The Gay Science*, despite the fact that it was written after *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. This was the weakest chapter in Picart's book, as she tried to take on too much to do justice to her ambitions. Her analysis of Apollo and Dionysus, for instance, lacked a clear account of what each deity, before their synthesis, represented for Nietzsche. Her analysis of Nietzsche's comments about women and the feminine was insightful at points, but the treatment was glancing. It was puzzling that Picart did not engage with, or even mention, articles by Kathleen Higgins and Ruth Abbey which offer a sustained analysis of the way Nietzsche represented women in these texts, particularly since their conclusions are similar to, but more nuanced than Picart's. Given Picart's attention to the way Nietzsche tends to blur together the feminine and the maternal, an analysis of *Daybreak*, section 552 would also have been pertinent, since here Nietzsche speaks at length of his approach as akin to pregnancy.

When analyzing the way women and the feminine appear in Nietzsche's texts of this period, Picart speaks of Nietzsche's portrait of women as victims as more benign (62), although she does acknowledge that such portraits should not be taken to clear Nietzsche of charges of misogyny (63). When she contrasts Nietzsche's more complicated and ambivalent attitude toward women represented in the pre-Zarathustran texts with his later position, she speaks of shifts in his earlier work between extremely positive and extremely negative ruminations on women and the womanly (125), but her claim that the earlier texts ever present extremely positive ruminations on women seems vastly exaggerated. Finally, while she makes very interesting observations about Nietzsche's mythic politics becoming increasingly tangibly involved with the bodily (77), some of her analysis is hampered by her underdevelopment of important concepts in Nietzsche, such as that of the free spirit.

The next chapter, devoted to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and Nietzsche's presentation of Zarathustra as a kind of phallic mother, who experiences pregnancy while remaining fiercely masculine, is much more successful. While this chapter would be enriched by discussion of Graham Parkes' extensive analysis of metaphors of procreativity in Plato and Nietzsche in *Composing the Soul*, Picart makes a number of insightful observations, particularly concerning overlaps between Dionysus and Zarathustra. The fourth chapter, devoted to the post-Zarathustran period, also makes an interesting case for connections between shifts in Nietzsche's attitude toward

the masculine-feminine dichotomy, and changes in Nietzsche's willingness to be ruthless toward those he considers irredeemably decadent. However, Picart's claim that Nietzsche retreats to a concern with self-preservation needs more defense, particularly since he consistently condemns mere preservation.

The final chapter combines a summary of what Picart has achieved with a speculative attempt to avoid Nietzsche's resentment against the feminine, and to work instead toward intercultural acceptance. In these concluding speculations, Picart draws on the work of Cixous and Minh-ha, and provides a suggestive example of the direction she advocates in one of her own artworks. It is rather tentative, but shows a complicated and sensitive mind at work. On the whole, Picart's book does not always realize its ambitions, but for what it does achieve, and for its productive approach to Nietzsche, it is well worth the read for Nietzsche scholars.

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Thomas Scanlon
What We Owe to Each Other.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1999. 408 Pp.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-674-95089-5.

What We Owe to Each Other is that rarest of philosophical gems, a novel approach to a familiar topic. It is a book that everyone interested in moral philosophy must read. Scanlon offers an account of the structure, priority, and motivational basis of morality. His starting point is the familiar idea that there is a fundamental difference between acceptable and unacceptable ways of treating others; the task is to explain what it is we care about when we care about that difference. Morality is also subject to disagreement; another aim is to explain the subject matter of those disagreements. Finally, morality is important; it asserts its own priority over competing modes of valuation. A third aim is to explain that priority. In explaining each of these features of morality, Scanlon takes ordinary moral understandings more or less for granted. The point is to understand morality, not to change it.

The basic idea is a variant on the account of moral motivation that Scanlon put forward nearly twenty years ago, in his widely discussed article 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism'. When we care about morality, he argues, we do not care about bringing about desirable consequences. Instead, we care about

whether or not our acts can be justified to others. This is an intuitively powerful idea, captured in the familiar moral idea that one has reason to avoid treating someone badly because one needs to be able to 'look the other person in the eye'. But it is an idea that needs much more filling out, because some people might object to almost any way of being treated, and others might have such a low opinion of their own worth that they are willing to put up with almost anything. What is needed is some way of capturing the idea that the need to justify oneself to others is itself subject to the requirement that others be willing to accept such justifications from a suitably impartial perspective. Scanlon's way of capturing this idea is to focus on the motivation that must be shared by both those who seek to justify their conduct and those to whom they seek to justify it. That motivation is summed up in the idea that in such justification, one must appeal to principles that others cannot reasonably reject, where the qualifier 'reasonable' indicates that all are concerned that the principles they appeal to are acceptable to all who are concerned to find mutually acceptable principles. The result is not a social contract in the traditional sense because the parties are not concerned to advance their separate ends. Instead, the project of finding acceptable principles is driven by a concern with mutual acceptability itself. Another difference from the social contract tradition is that the exercise is not meant to be one that is carried out in order to justify principles. The procedure helps us to make sense of some of the salient feature of ordinary moral thought, but those features are not justified by appeal to the procedure. So it does not occupy a place in Scanlon's view parallel to say, Gauthier's ideal contract, or Rawls's original position, or Habermas's ideal speech situation. Instead it is meant to capture what it is that we care about when we are concerned to act morally. Insofar as the process of justification is meant to be entered into at all, each person enters into it in deciding what to do, or how to think, about a particular situation.

The first three chapters are devoted to a series of ground-clearing exercises. Each serves to exorcise aspects of what Scanlon calls 'the shadow of hedonism.' Although hedonism has few contemporary defenders, it has shaped many conceptions of what reasons and values must be like. By drawing our attention to the relations between reason, desire, and valuation, and to the plurality of modes of valuation, Scanlon shows that all of the metaphysical arguments about what reasons and values *must* be fail on their own terms. Instead, all are better construed as first-order normative accounts of what people have reason to do.

Chapter one, 'Reasons,' offers a general account of reasons. Its starting point is the idea that a rational creature is one that can be moved by reasons, but its central focus is various attempts by philosophers to narrow the purview of the concept of a reason. All of these have the implication that Scanlon's project in the rest of the book is impossible, so his grounds for discussing them is clear. For example, against the familiar arguments of Phillipa Foot and Bernard Williams, which aim to show that morality is not required by rationality, and that agents only have reason to do what they are

motivated to do, Scanlon argues that irrationality is a particular failing to follow through on the implications of what one has reason to do. To make such mistakes in reasoning is a failure of reason, but not the only way one can fail to be reasonable. Scanlon also responds to the widespread view that one only has reason to do those things that advance one's desires, arguing that the only concept of desire on which such a view is plausible presupposes the concept of a reason: to desire something in the sense that desires are directly connected with reasons is not to be disposed to pursue it, but to think it worth pursuing. But that is just to say that we need an independent concept of agents who have reasons. Chapter 2, 'Value' has a similar ground-clearing purpose. Consequentialists suppose that the only reasons we can have are reasons to bring about valuable states of affairs. Scanlon aims to show that the concept of a reason is prior to that of value. He does so by showing the variety of ways in which we value things; to hold that something is valuable is to suppose that there are good reasons for treating it in certain ways. Although bringing it about that there is more of something is one mode of valuing, it is not the only one. Chapter three, 'Well-Being' applies parallel reasoning top show that the reasons we have for taking an interest in others, and the interest that we take in them, are not exhausted by a concern for their well-being.

Scanlon's positive account begins with a discussion of moral motivation. The question of motivation can be separated from the question of the content of morality, because thinking about morality is thinking about how people ought to govern their conduct. We have reason to want to act in ways that can be justified to others.

Scanlon uses his contractualist account to offer a non-metaphysical account of moral responsibility. The thrust of the account is that we have reason to want to be held responsible in a certain class of cases because we have an interest in being treated by others as self-made agents. We all have a general interest in having outcomes related to our choices, so that it would be reasonable to reject a moral system that did not make responsibility central. But it would be equally reasonable to reject a moral system that did not leave room for excuses. Like utilitarian accounts of responsibility, Scanlon's account points to the moral implications of holding people responsible. But unlike a utilitarian account, his central claim is that we *each* have an interest in being held responsible.

Parallel arguments are offered to explain the moral obligations of promising and honesty. Each is explained in terms of the interests that each of us has, both as promisors and promisees, and as speakers and listeners. Scanlon argues that the obligation to keep promises is rooted in a general principle of fidelity, which all have reason to accept because all have reason to accept a principle that allows people to create expectations in others, but to reject a principle that would allow expectations to be created and broken.

Scanlon's readiness to countenance a wide range of reasons that might be put forward for or against a moral principle sometimes makes the role of unforced agreement in his view seem ambiguous. Rather than saying that

morality is about unforced agreement, why not say that it is simply about what we have reason to do, all things considered? The notion of agreement figures in Scanlon's account in two distinct ways. First, it is supposed to make sense of moral motivation. The interest we take in morality is an interest in being able to think of our conduct as defensible before those on whom it has an impact. There is an important sense in which the sort of justification relevant to such motivation is notional, because those before whom such justification is imagined are already thought to be committed to whatever is morally relevant about the situation. But the motivating idea is not empty, because if we understand moral motivation in this way, we see why we would also think of it as having the priority that it does — so understood, it commands our attention. Second, the idea of unforced agreement figures in setting the level of generality at which reasons must be given. They must be acceptable to parties who might find themselves on either side of a variety of moral relationships: promisors and promisees, people held responsible and those holding them responsible, and so on. Principles that are not acceptable from both directions can be rejected. But the grounds on which they can be rejected get specified in light of the idea that they must be acceptable to all. So, for example, choice gets its moral significance from its role in a system in which people hold themselves and each other responsible. One might object that certain reasons are shaped by the interpersonal context in which they operate, and that unforced agreement has no further work to do. I suspect that Scanlon would concede that point, for the entire point of his account is to make sense of that part of morality that governs the ways in which people may treat each other, and that part is given shape by considerations of mutual acceptability. The idea of unforced agreement does not provide a decision procedure for ethics; instead, it makes it clear to us what we are doing when we think about how to treat others.

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Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling
System der Weltalter.
Münchener Vorlesung 1827/28 in einer Nachschrift von Ernst von Lasaulx.
2nd revised edition. Edition and introduction by Siegbert Peetz.
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann 1998. Pp. xxxviii + 230.
DM 138. ISBN 3-465-02744-2.

Schelling's later philosophy has proven crucially important for twentieth-century philosophy and theology. The thought of Martin Heidegger, Franz Rosenzweig, or Paul Tillich, to name but a few, can hardly be understood independently of Schelling's influence.

In 1811, Schelling announced his intention to publish what he called *Die Weltalter (The Ages of the World)*, though this would remain a mere promise. In 1827/28 he delivered lectures on the same topic, entitled *System der Weltalter (System of the Ages of the World)*, soon after being appointed professor for philosophy at the recently established University of Munich. These lectures continued Schelling's philosophical main endeavour: to take freedom philosophically seriously and yet to philosophize in a systematic way. The lectures thus also shed light on the question of how creation, history and time ought to be conceptualised. The lectures are informed by an in-depth critique of modern transcendental philosophy, the main target of which is, doubtless, Hegel.

The edition of the 1827/28 lecture series meets an important desideratum of Schelling research, as Schelling's development can now be appreciated and assessed more fully. They do not reveal, though, many previously unknown features of Schelling's teaching, but they bring together what had so long been scattered. These lectures constitute thus the *Programmschrift* of Schelling's later thought, while yet being deeply rooted in Schelling's earlier writings. The crucial distinction between negative, i.e. merely logical, or transcendental, and positive, i.e. historical, philosophy is used in these lectures for the very first time. Schelling's 'Christian philosophy' (9) strives to criticise post-Cartesian main-stream philosophy, for the intrinsic limits of purely negative philosophy had previously not been taken into account. Schelling begins by outlining what he calls historical philosophy. This philosophy cannot but take history (and thus freedom) seriously. Detailed historical analyses are devoted to Descartes', Spinoza's, Leibniz', Kant's, Fichte's, Hegel's, and his own early thought. The historical analysis is amended by a systematic one which explores and criticises the empiricist tradition. French and British empiricism contain, as Schelling argues, valuable arguments against transcendental philosophy; and yet they fail properly to think through what can be experienced philosophically (i.e. non-empirically). This is the fact that Being is 'unpreconceivable' (*unvordenklich*). Schelling then develops the argument that God is a free and historically

acting creator and not the utterly necessary Being, as defined by Descartes and his successors. Final considerations are devoted to the question of how world and time relate to one another, which is in fact arguably the heart of Schelling's speculative philosophy of history. Referring to Joachim of Fiori's teaching, Schelling differentiates between three different ages of the world, that of the father, of the son and of the spirit. Time transcends the world, which is why Being can only be understood with reference to time. Schelling thus also explores and defends Christian trinitarian monotheism.

Peetz's edition is based upon the notes of Ernst von Lasaulx. It also contains Lasaulx's footnotes and his marginal commentaries. An introduction is devoted to the textual basis and summarises clearly Schelling's lectures. Peetz also aims at briefly situating this lecture series in the whole of Schelling's thought. Apart from the up-dated bibliography, a list of Schelling's sources is a most helpful amendment of the second edition.

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Anthony J. Sebok
Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. xiv + 327.
US$59.95. ISBN 0-521-48041-8.

Despite some shortcomings, *Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence* is an excellent study of legal positivism's reception in America over the last century. Sebok's account takes the form of an analytic narrative, with careful distinctions and conceptual delineation and relationships rather than jargon or irresponsibly used labels. Historical detail, development and the tracing of intellectual sources are secondary in the account. The brief and broad outline of Sebok's narrative is straightforward: Classical (English) legal positivism was known in America in the first quarter of the century as a version of formalism. Legal realist attacks on formalism were really attacks on positivism, although the different terminology obscured recognition of the position criticized. (Sebok does not explain the change in labels or the willingness of some mid-century theorists such as Lon Fuller and Henry Hart to identify realism and positivism.) Antiformalists wrongly conflated formalism's inadequate theory of adjudication with its potentially correct positivist theory of law. Legal process theory kept the two theories distinct, adopting a more contemporary version of positivism while rejecting formalism's theory of adjudication. It failed because it wrongly saw only two possibilities for a theory of law: either law incorporates moral criteria unrelated to institu-

tional facts or law excludes moral criteria entirely. The former, 'fundamental rights theory', threatens the separability thesis and therefore undermines positivism's distinctive commitments. The latter, 'interpretivism', apparently relies on an implausible moral skepticism and has politically unattractive conservative consequences. Legal process theorists ignored a third possibility: that positivism could allow legal criteria to incorporate moral content. Sebok ends by strongly hinting that a legal process theory committed to incorporationism and retaining its theory of adjudication is a worthwhile product.

Important parts of Sebok's account have a lot going for them. In identifying the constituent claims of formalism, realism and legal process theory, Sebok usefully focuses on substantive positions and not jurisprudential labels. Doing so allows him to draw out some of their consequences or presupposed commitments. A theory of law must specify the relationship of legal to moral norms, the content of legal norms, and the criteria for membership among legal norms. Classical positivism's standard commitments are to the separability thesis, the command theory of legal norms, and the sources thesis, respectively. Sebok describes formalism as committed to a view about the ontology of legal norms ('transcendentalism'), legal reasoning ('deductivism'), and the independence of legal from moral or political concerns ('the autonomy thesis'). His description gives him good grounds to criticize the attribution of transcendentalism and deductivism to practicing formalists. Based on the similarity of formalism's autonomy thesis to the sources and separability theses, Sebok concludes that formalism is a version of classical positivism. Although I suggest below that Sebok's conclusion is wrong, his description makes the identification plausible.

Another payoff of Sebok's description concerns the relation of realism to classical positivism. Given Sebok's identification of formalism with positivism, and realism's criticisms of formalism, realism cannot presuppose that positivism is true. Although controversial, I think Sebok is right that realism does not require the truth of any of positivism's claims. Consider realism's indeterminacy thesis: the claim that legal conclusions sometimes lack unique justifications based only on elements of the domain of legal materials. This claim explicitly or covertly employs criteria by which the legal domain is specified. A statement of the proposition reveals as much. But the criteria need not be consistent with the sources thesis or any other distinctive commitments of positivism. For some realist arguments for the indeterminacy thesis do not rely on particular specifications of the legal domain. Fact skepticism, for instance, in some of its forms was taken to support indeterminacy, and it depends on an assertion about the application of elements of the legal domain, not their nature. If correct, fact skepticism expresses a completely general truth and therefore holds even if legal materials are entirely unrelated to social practices.

Sebok's analysis of legal process theory is exceptional. As a theory of adjudication, legal process theory has three principal components: an implicit allocation of particular sorts of decisions to courts (institutional settle-

ment), a constraint on the reasons courts can adduce to reach decisions (reasoned elaboration or 'articulated consistency'), and a demand that courts publicly enunciate the reasons for their decisions (implicit in reasoned elaboration or 'articulated consistency'). Because reasoned elaboration states the procedures courts are to use in judging, and the authority of a judicial decision derives from the procedure, courts properly exercise discretion when they do so by reasoned elaboration. And because process theorists held that demand for reasoned elaboration was an institutional requirement, proper judging was an institutional matter. Attending to principles and policies underlying statutes, and consistency in reasoning, apparently were taken to be institutional demands, quite apart from their moral status. Although the connection is obscure, process theorists believed that the nature of legal materials available to courts normatively required courts to go about using them in a particular way. To modern ears, the inference is a simple non sequitur. To process theorists such as Henry Hart, who at one time found limits in Congress' power to restrict the jurisdiction of lower federal courts based on the 'essence' of the judicial function, the inference might have seemed self-evident. Sebok is particularly good at laying out Hart and Sacks' delineation of the constituents of reasoned elaboration in *The Legal Process* and nicely distinguishes their views on the authoritativeness of legal norms from their views on the moral obligation to obey such norms. Overall, Sebok's treatment of legal process theory is easily the best analytic account available, complementing the more descriptive recounting in Duxbury's *Patterns of American Jurisprudence* and Horowitz's *The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960*.

Sebok's analytic narrative, however, fails at two crucial points: in describing the conceptual relationships between positivism and formalism and between positivism and legal process theory. His narrative requires that positivism, formalism and legal process theory are theories of adjudication, so that they can be compared to one another. In fact, they are different sorts of theory. As is often noted — and by Sebok himself (cf. 30-2) — classical and contemporary positivism is a theory about the nature of law. It is not a theory of legal reasoning in general or adjudication in particular. Positivism by itself therefore has nothing to say about what sorts of decisions are or should be resolved by adjudication or the considerations courts do or should adduce in deciding them. In the postscript to the second edition of *The Concept of Law*, H.L.A. Hart regretted not having said more about legal reasoning, but the omission left his theory about the nature of law unaffected. Since formalism is a theory of adjudication, not a theory of law, Sebok cannot be right in identifying formalism and positivism. An inspection of formalism's commitments confirms this. Formalism, properly construed according to Sebok, is committed to using inductive as well as inductive inference. The deductivism often attributed to it is implausible and unsupported, as Sebok convincingly documents. But formalism's commitment, even properly understood, is to a form of judicial reasoning — an accepted or acceptable pattern of inference. It is not to a particular character of legal norms or criteria for their inclusion

among legal materials. Thus, formalism and positivism are not comparable theories. They cannot figure in the same analytic history told by Sebok. Of course, it is possible that jurisprudes working at the time misunderstood the character or relationship of positivism and formalism. But the possibility seems remote, and Sebok offers no historical evidence to suggest this occurred.

The same misattribution affects Sebok's discussion of the relation of positivism to legal process theory. Legal process theory is a theory of adjudication, as its commitments make clear. It is not a theory about the nature of law, however. Process theory therefore cannot be a form of positivism (cf. 160). By describing legal process theory as taking an 'extraordinary' interest in adjudication (128), Sebok wrongly allows the reader to infer that positivism *qua* positivism is committed to a particular theory of adjudication. Sebok makes a good case for thinking that Hart and Sacks held views about the character of legal norms and that those views had a distinctively contemporary positivist cast. But not only is the evidence somewhat inconclusive (cf. 136 n.83); it is irrelevant to Sebok's brief. For the question is not whether Hart and Sacks held beliefs x and y. Mere consistency of belief is too weak a connection. The question is whether those beliefs were connected in some stronger way, such as that legal process theory presupposes positivism.

There are two ways in which positivism and legal process theory might be connected, and neither holds. One is that they both concern the same subject matter: adjudication. This connection fails because positivism is not a theory of adjudication. Sebok at times suggests otherwise (cf. 128, 160, 200), but offers no evidence for this surprising claim. What some contemporary jurisprudes refer to as normative or adjudicatory positivism is part of a theory of adjudication, but all understand that the adjective is doing the work and that no analytic association with legal positivism is intended. Another connection might be one of entailment: legal process theory might entail the truth of positivism, as Sebok sometimes seems to suggest (268). The idea might be that a theory of adjudication's specific content could restrict the sort of norms that could be legal norms. If so, the theory could restrict the criteria of legality to positivist sorts of criteria. But legal process theory's commitment is to particular normative principles: the principles of institutional settlement and reasoned elaboration state standards for evaluating what sorts of decisions courts make and how they do so. These principles can be apply whatever the nature and source of legal norms. The demand for consistency in reason-giving, publicity, and use of principles or policies underlying statutes, for instance, is completely unaffected by their specification. A natural law theorist could embrace legal process theory's commitments without risking inconsistency. Thus, unlike positivism, legal process theory does not restrict the range of criteria which state the existence conditions of law.

Legal process theory was not subject to decisive refutation or difficult anomalies. It simply disappeared from the law journals. The usual explanation of its demise, mentioned by Sebok, is that it was thought to have politically conservative implications inconsistent with the Warren court's

social agenda. Sebok apparently thinks that legal process theory does not have these implications and that it is a defensible theory of adjudication when supplemented with a contemporary positivism's version of the incorporation thesis. However, even if positivism and legal process theory were connected, a more pessimistic speculation is possible. Legal process theory arguably fails on its adjudicatory side. For its constituent principles of adjudication are almost completely unspecified. Hart, Sacks, and Wechsler, invoked principles of institutional settlement and reasoned elaboration without explicating them much. At crucial places they simply substituted a series of rhetorical or didactic questions for the close argument necessary to define and defend these principles. The tactic is fine in a public lecture, casebook, or case commentary, the fora in which Wechsler, Hart and Sacks presented their views, when the game is instruction or gaining a dialectical advantage. But to answer the questions a structured set of normative claims is needed which gives specific content to legal process theory's component principles. Legal process theory might just lack the resources needed to do so.

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Amie L. Thomasson
Fiction and Metaphysics.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1999.
Pp. xii + 175.
US$49.95. ISBN 0-521-64080-6.

Examples drawn from fiction have been a staple of analytical philosophy of language from Frege to Russell to Kripke and beyond. However, on closer consideration fictional characters turn out to be ontologically suspect and generate a host of problems, for the theory of reference in particular. This has resulted in intricate philosophical manoeuvres devised to show that fictional characters either do not exist or do not really refer. But as any deconstructionist would be happy to tell you, the very urge to avoid reference to fictional characters may show how this apparently marginal question in fact discloses serious problems within analytic accounts of language. The prima facie decision not to admit fictional characters results in unsatisfactory accounts of fiction and hence unsatisfactory accounts of language and reference. However, the traditional antitheses of analytic accounts, viz. Meinongian theories, do not fare much better. These theories, too, accept the

supposedly freakish and outlandish nature of fiction, trying to account for it by an ontological overkill: any kind of object is admitted as an independent entity. Both these traditional views represent what Thomasson calls the 'sideshow view' of fiction, the idea that fictional characters are (if anything) entities quite unlike common or garden objects (xi).

Thomasson takes issue with these theories and claims instead that fictional objects are central to metaphysics, if their ontological status is correctly understood. As the title of the book suggests, her aim is twofold. First, she argues that an account that admits fictional characters reflects our critical practices more accurately, and this should be the starting point of any adequate theory. The other half of her argument is an ontological one: since she shares the analytical craving for parsimony and 'well-behaved theory,' she wants to show that admitting fictional objects of a certain kind is in fact 'an ontological bargain.' The major incentive for not postulating fictional objects is, as Thomasson notes, precisely a fear of a bloated ontology, a Meinongian jungle swamped with all kinds of improbable entities. However, she wants to show that postulating fictional objects of a certain kind leads to true, as opposed to false, parsimony and that this way of understanding fictional characters does not preclude naturalistic accounts of reference and knowledge.

The first part of the book develops an 'artifactual theory of fiction,' as contrasted with traditional realist and antirealist views. The foundation of Thomasson's account is a theory of cultural dependence, which she develops mainly with reference to Ingarden, who thought of fictional characters as dependent upon intentionality. Thomasson's version incorporates a Kripke-inspired account of reference, and issues in the idea that fictional objects are rigidly dependent upon literary works and created by authors. This means that fictions should be thought of as *dependent abstracta*, on a par with objects such as works of art, laws, computer programs, inventions, and other cultural artifacts.

In fact, Thomasson claims that the everyday world is generally to be thought of as the common product of spatiotemporal reality and the creative power of human intentionality (151). This idea sounds rather Popperian, all the more so as she claims that the creativity of human consciousness 'allows us to increase our chances of survival by formulating plans and examining scenarios not physically before us' (13). Curiously enough, Thomasson does not even mention the similarity between her idea of dependence and Popper's 'three worlds' ontology.

What, then, are the advantages of postulating fictional entities as dependent abstracta? According to Thomasson this yields firstly, a better theory of experience (and intentionality), and secondly, a better theory of language (allowing us to analyse statements about real objects and fictional objects in the same way). If we in addition can show that it also results in real ontological economy, we can conclude that the benefits outweigh the ontological cost. This is what Thomasson attempts to do in the second part of the book.

A key problem with traditional accounts of the ontology of fictional characters is, according to Thomasson, their piecemeal character. Problematic cases are dealt with in an ad hoc manner, which sweeps the problem under the carpet but results in an unsatisfactory overall account. Thomasson, on the other hand, argues for a 'categorial' instead of a 'piecemeal' ontology, and attempts to sketch out a potentially multi-dimensional 'category system' (120). This system is rather complex to say the very least, but Thomasson claims that it has several advantages over simpler systems, such as Chisholm's one-dimensional tree structure. Thomasson then uses this 'ontological tool' — really a kind of ontological 'periodic table' (153), organised on the axes physical-mental and real-ideal — to show that admitting fictional objects results in real as opposed to false parsimony. This system will, in the last instance, allow us to account for everything that exists in terms of spatiotemporal entities and mental states, and things dependent upon them in different ways. This, Thomasson concludes, proves that reflection upon fiction can show us how a comprehensive ontological picture can be achieved on a parsimonious basis.

Thomasson has put a lot of philosophical energy into her ambitious 'category system,' but it is difficult to say whether the philosophical gains are in proportion to the effort. If standard category systems are not suited to most everyday things (including fictional characters) (149), perhaps we should reconsider the need for such systems instead of trying to develop better ones. However, if one thinks these questions can be fruitfully addressed within such a framework, Thomasson's book is a respectable contribution to the debate, giving an example of how a mainly phenomenological approach can shed light on certain problems within analytical philosophy of language. Thomasson addresses central issues and proposes solutions that are worth consideration. There is, for example, an interesting discussion of how Kripke's sparse comments on the reference of fictional names might be developed.

All in all, the book perhaps promises more than it delivers. In spite of being named *Fiction and Metaphysics*, this is not a book in literary theory as much as a treatise in metaphysics. Thomasson's professed aim is to construct a general ontology and her treatment of fiction is subordinate to that aim. The blurb claims that Thomasson 'takes seriously the work of literary scholars and cites a wide range of literary examples to determine what sort of thing a fictional character is.' However, there is not much reference to recent literary theory, and the 'wide range of examples' promised is very much the standard fare: Hamlet, Sherlock Holmes, Mr. Pickwick, Gregor Samsa, et al. Thus this book will be of more interest to philosophers of language than to literary theorists.

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Pauline Von Bonsdorff and
Arto Haapala, eds.
Aesthetics in the Human Environment.
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Np. ISBN 952-5069-07-09.

The intention of the present collection, according to its editors, is to 'expand the scope of aesthetics to include areas of human life which lie outside the traditional core domains of aesthetics', and to 'illuminate various philosophically neglected dimensions and phenomena of everyday life through aesthetic thinking.' 'Environment' here, then, refers not just to landscapes and interiors, but also environments that are not primarily material or tangible, to the 'inhabited, cultural milieu, consisting of processes, habits, rules and structures of behaviour, interaction and thinking.' In answer to the charge that such a widening of the application of aesthetics might lead to the discipline losing its identity, the editors appeal to the fact that the history of aesthetics is not, in fact, the history of the philosophy of art, but rather that of 'a philosophy of mind that points to an area of human experience which belongs neither to the strictly cognitive nor to the moral sphere.'

Arnold Berleant, in 'On Getting Along Beautifully: Ideas for a Social Aesthetics', likewise argues that aesthetics, to reflect the meaning of 'aesthetic' in an unprejudicial fashion, must be prepared to look further than the arts and certain aspects of nature. He notes the way in which each of the preeminently situational arts (architecture, theatre, film, and television) exemplifies a distinguishable mode of aesthetic engagement, and constitutes a sequence of aesthetic situations that are essentially social, arguing that each can contribute to our understanding of how aesthetic participation carries a social significance. In order to give an account of these arts, he argues, the usual categories and principles, focusing on the aesthetic object and its properties, must be replaced by a 'social aesthetics': an aesthetics which may also be applied to other situations involving human relationships in which the aesthetic plays a leading part; as, for example, etiquette, religious and social ritual, relations with small children, close friendship, and love. Finally, and less convincingly, he suggests that the confluence of the aesthetic and the social leads to the domain of politics. His equation of the 'willing acceptance' of the object in an aesthetic situation with egalitarianism signals a theme that reappears in both Sepänmaa's and Hein's contributions to the volume.

The first sentence of Richard Shusterman's 'Human Nature at the Schlachtensee', claims that the paper 'is not the sort of standard philosophical paper one should expect in an academic book'; this, unfortunately, is an apt summary. The only merit of the ensuing personal narrative is that it might serve as a horrible warning against the notion of treating a culture as a suitable object for aesthetic enquiry: this way lies chauvinism. Cheryl Foster's 'Texture: Old Material, Fresh Novelty' interestingly argues for touch

as an alternative to vision in understanding the human environment, concluding that 'textural metaphors, more so than visual ones, fully amplify the experience of human environments.' Emily Brady, in her 'The Expressive Face', sets out to show that our aesthetic interest in the face is fundamentally grounded in the expression of emotions, rather than in formal qualities, and in doing so justifies her conclusion that 'the fashioning of appearance and the aesthetic pleasure of emotional expression come together to show how fundamental aesthetics is to our character taken as a whole.' Carolyn Korsmeyer's 'Food and the Taste of Meaning' concerns itself less with taste (in either of its meanings) than with the social role of eating. Taking a cognitivist stance on aesthetic value, she argues that, though food cannot be classified as art, food and artworks nevertheless share a number of features as 'symbol systems'. This emphasis leads her to the striking conclusion that 'the finest cuisine that is prepared for the purpose of pleasurable eating is ironically less comparable to the finest art than is the poorest ritual food that performs a larger range of symbolic functions.'

Hilde Hein's 'Epistemological Pollution' suggests that western epistemology has been 'polluted' by an excess of order, in the sense that 'the forms and procedures of knowing have gone amuck.' She posits, but does not succeed in establishing, that this epistemological malaise is fundamentally an 'aesthetic predicament,' and suggests that the aesthetic, with its toleration of the simultaneous action of thought, sense, and feeling, and aesthetic analysis, the relativism of which runs counter to the 'classic ideology of rational progressivism,' can serve where logic and science have been exhausted. Haapala's 'Stars and Quasi-Stars: On the Importance of Being Famous' both puts forward a provisional definition of the star, as a cultural creature of both aesthetic and moral significance, and examines how quasi-stardom distorts the values that genuine stars represent. Bonsdorff, in 'Erring Emotions, as Observed Through J.G. Ballard's *Crash*', makes Ballard's novel the focal point of her meditations on the human habitat, and, more especially, the human body. Ronald Hepburn's 'Restoring the Sacred: Sacred as a Concept of Aesthetics' is also avowedly a collection of personal reflections, finally condensing in an argument against the promiscuous use of the word 'sacred' within aesthetics as ultimately too portentous. It is a refreshing antidote to the transcendentalist drift of some of the other papers.

Yrjö Sepänmaa's 'Ecological Aesthetics and Humanism', argues, in a highly condensed and abstract way, that though there is a conflict between humanism and ecology, the one may ultimately serve the other if aesthetic criticism can learn to encompass what he calls 'life-style criticism.' As with several of the other papers this is more in the nature of a call to action than an analysis. Indeed, those pieces (by Foster, Brady, Korsmeyer, Haapala, and Hepburn) which appear to best justify the existence of the discipline proposed in the preface, are the more concrete and specific. Less convincing are those which enlarge on the editors' suggestion that environmental aesthetics could allow the aesthetician to take a more active role in the criticism of culture. Such a program would require a quantum leap in aesthetics' understanding

of the aesthetic — the result of which might very well be aesthetics becoming considerably more rather than less modest in its prescriptions.

Although the footnotes provide some pointers, a bibliography of works in the field would have been useful; the highly relevant work of Tom Leddy, for example, is nowhere mentioned.

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Douglas Walton
Appeal to Popular Opinion.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 1999. Pp. xi + 289.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01818-6);
US$22.50 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01819-4).

Walton's latest — as usual, a study in argumentation and informal logic — concentrates upon *argumentum ad populum*, or 'argument to the people'. Standard logic and critical thinking texts treat this argument-form as fallacious, plain and simple — the fact that (most) everyone accepts some proposition is no good reason to think that it is true. Walton, however, argues that we ought to have more respect for this common and not altogether uncomplicated kind of argument. Indeed, he points out, appeal to popular opinion is problematic just because we so often employ it in practical and political deliberation, even as we tend to distrust its claims. 'Despite the justified suspicion about "appeal to popular opinion", a democratic system of government must ultimately be based on the presumption that this type of argument is reasonable' (28).

The book first distinguishes two questions: how one decides what popular opinion actually is, and what conclusions one can rightly draw from it. On the first, Walton is mostly silent, and concentrates on the use (legitimate or not) of such opinion in argument. While early sections criticize unreflective reliance on polls to gauge public sentiment, the book as a whole is more interested in what to do with said sentiment, once it has been determined. Walton proposes to complicate the issue, by distinguishing a variety of contexts in which appeals to popular opinion may appear, and a corresponding variety of ways in which to evaluate their use.

Walton is surely right that appeal to popular opinion is hardly avoidable, and much of what he says is pure common sense. As he points out, the standard treatment is genuinely unsatisfactory. While popular opinion

rarely figures in deductively valid arguments — excepting perhaps arguments about what that opinion actually is, rather than whether it is true — there is more to life than deductive validity. In keeping with this sentiment, Walton's fifth chapter presents a capsule history of 'dialectic', the theory and practice of reasonable but non-deductive argument. The material referenced in this discussion is quite interesting, and someone wanting an introduction to argumentation theory before the Enlightenment (when, Walton thinks, deductive validity became the single standard of acceptable argument) could do well to begin here, turning to the other works discussed for more in-depth study.

Following the historical survey, Walton presents his own account of 'the new dialectic' (chapter 6; also the subject of his recent book of the same title). He argues that arguments are best evaluated as they appear in dialogues, complementary conversational exercises to any one of a variety of common ends. Some contexts of discussion are simply unconcerned with deductive validity, and we ought not fault arguments appearing in those contexts (including instances of *argumentum ad populum*) for failure to meet those standards. Those of us who have attempted to motivate students to analyse 'fallacies' in advertisements may well sympathize with Walton's account of the matter (247-9). As he quite rightly points out, it is generally only naive at best to treat advertising copy as if it were intended to present reasoned arguments — at worst, it may be an exercise in irrelevancy. Surely, we 'owe' it to advertising to recognize that it is not usually in the business of argumentation after all — which point, Walton claims, nearly everyone already understands.

What, then, of popular appeals in discussion which does mean to be reasoned and argumentative? Here, things are a little less clear. Walton makes a persuasive case for the cogency of the Aristotelian distinction between proper uses of public opinion (*endoxa*) and 'merely persuasive' or 'rhetorical' uses of same (143). That is, he makes a good case for there being such a distinction between uses, while leaving it somewhat unclear how we are to determine which are which. The difficulties he notes in Plato's treatment of the relationship between genuinely compelling argument and merely sophistical persuasion (130-3) are not entirely dissipated. While it is true that Plato sometimes presents Socrates as appealing to the opinions of his audience, or of persons at large (Walton discusses the *Protagoras*, and the *Gorgias* also comes to mind), these cases are almost always limited to discussions with persons who purport, as teachers or politicians, to speak on behalf of the public and the common good. In such cases, surely, the use of *argumentum ad populum* is relatively straightforward, and mainly acceptable — if one claims to speak for the people, then the actual opinions of the people are surely relevant to the truth of those claims. Outside of this sort of context, however, matters are not so clear. Plato and Aristotle both struggled with the question of when a society could be said to provide for properly knowledgeable public opinion, and the issue remains open even now. For his

part, Walton does not attempt to solve the problem and, while this is certainly reasonable given its magnitude, it does leave a large part of the task undone.

In the end, the main claim of the book turns out to be relatively modest. Appeal to popular opinion, Walton says, may lend some weight to one side of a deliberative or persuasive discussion, after all, so long as that opinion is adequately informed, and open to further reasoned deliberation and possible change. At the same time, the role played here is very small. Indeed, the Gricean conversational 'Maxim of Non-disputativeness' (238-41), which Walton would have us accept when we try to persuade others (or when others try to persuade use), counsels simply that we ought to accept claims about popular opinion only if we already basically accept the content of those claims, and only if they seem to pose no foreseeable problems for our own point of view. This advice is hardly controversial, but it leaves popular appeals in argument looking mainly inert. On the one hand, then, Walton persuades us that deductive proof is certainly not the only acceptable standard of argument, and that we must accept inferences which are materially adequate, and not just logically valid. On the other hand, however, the positive value of *argumentum ad populum*, even after his extensive treatment, remains in question.

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