Philosophy in Review/Comptes rendus philosophiques

Editor / Directeur

David Kahane
Philosophy in Review
Department of Philosophy
4-115 Humanities Centre
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2E5
Tel: 780-492-8549
Fax: 780-492-9160
E-Mail: pir@ualberta.ca

Francophone associate editor / directeur adjoint francophone

Alain Voizard
Département de philosophie
Université du Québec à Montréal
C.P. 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville
Montréal, QC
Canada H3C 3P8

Courriel: voizard.alain@uqam.ca

Anglophone associate editors / directeurs adjoints anglophones

Robert Burch — *Continental philosophy, history of philosophy*
Glenn Griener — *Ethics, bioethics*
Cressida Heyes — *Feminism*
David Kahane — *Political, social, and legal philosophy*
Bernard Linsky — *Logic and philosophy of language*
Jeffrey Pelletier — *Cognitive science, philosophy of mind*
Oliver Schulte — *Epistemology, philosophy of science*
Martin Tweedale — *Ancient and medieval philosophy, metaphysics*
Jennifer Welchman — *Ethics, bioethics, history of philosophy*

As a rule, P.I.R. publishes only invited reviews. However, we will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English.

En général, C.R.P. ne publie que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, nous prendrions en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais.

Subscription prices for a volume of six issues

Institutions	*Individuals*	*Students*
$110 (Canadian)	$53 (Canadian)	$39 (Canadian)
US$110/Cdn$165 (Foreign)	US$52/Cdn$77 (Foreign)	US$43/Cdn$63 (Foreign)

Prix de l'abonnement à un volume de six numéros

Institutions	*Individus*	*Etudiants*
$110 (Canada)	$53 (Canada)	$39 (Canada)
US$110/Cdn$165 (Hors-Canada)	US$52/Cdn$77(Hors-Canada)	US$43/Cdn$63 (Hors-Canada)

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing and Publishing

9 - 3151 Lakeshore Road, Suite 403
Kelowna, BC, Canada V1W 3S9
Tel: 250-764-6427
Fax: 250-764-6428
E-mail: app@silk.net

Publications Mail Registration No. 08491 – ISSN 1206-5269

© 2000 Academic Printing and Publishing

Published six times a year

Volume XX, No. 5
October • octobre 2000

Table of Contents • Table des matières

Raymond Angelo Belliotti, *Stalking Nietzsche* 311
Morgan Rempel

Brian Bix, ed., *Analyzing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory* 315
Hans Oberdiek

Jeremy Butterfield and **Constantine Pagonis, eds.**,
From Physics to Philosophy 318
William Seager

David Campbell and **Michael J. Shapiro, eds.**,
Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics 320
Jay Drydyk

Allen Carlson, *Aesthetics and the Environment* 324
Thomas Heyd

Georg Cavallar, *Kant and the Theory and Practice of*
International Right 327
Antonio Franceschet

William E. Conklin, *The Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse:*
The Juridical Production and the Disclosure of Suffering 329
Brian Hendrix

Laurence D. Cooper, *Rousseau and Nature:*
The Problem of the Good Life 331
D.G. Wright

Richard Creath and **Jane Maienschein, eds.**,
Biology and Epistemology 333
Doris Schroeder

Christian Delacampagne, *A History of Philosophy in the*
Twentieth Century 335
Thomas Mathien

Hent de Vries, *Philosophy and the Turn to Religion* 337
Karl Simms

Rema Rossini Favretti, Giorgio Sandri and **Roberto Scazzieri, eds.**,
Incommensurability and Translation:
Kuhnian Perspectives on Communication and Theory Change 339
Stefano Gattei

Judith Green, *Deep Democracy: Community, Diversity,*
and Transformation 341
Mark C. Vopat

M.A.R. Habib, *The Early T.S. Eliot and Western Philosophy* 343
Paul Shaw

Paget Henry, *Caliban's Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy* 346
Clevis Headley

Mailed in October/November 2000.

Ellen A. Herda, *Research Conversations and Narrative: A Critical Hermeneutic Orientation in Participatory Inquiry*. 349
William A. Martin

Paul Horwich, *Meaning*. 350
Sanford Goldberg

S.L. Hurley, *Consciousness in Action*. 354
Dan Silber

Douglas M. Jesseph, *Squaring the Circle: the War Between Hobbes and Wallis* 357
J.J. MacIntosh

Vukan Kuic, *Yves Simon: Real Democracy* 359
Brian E. Butler

Helen Lang, *The Order of Nature in Aristotle's Physics: Place and the Elements*. 360
Lee Perlman

G.W. Leibniz and **Samuel Clarke**, *Correspondence* 363
Peter Loptson

Glenn McGee, ed., *Pragmatic Bioethics* 365
Anthony Skelton

Noburu Notomi, *The Unity of Plato's* ***Sophist****: Between the Sophist and the Philosopher* 367
Mark L. McPherran

Thomas L. Pangle and **Peter J. Ahrensdorf**, *Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace* 320
Jay Drydyk

John Perry, *Dialogue on Good, Evil, and the Existence of God* 370
Murdith McLean

Karl R. Popper, *All Life is Problem Solving*. 372
Stefano Gattei

Rush Rhees, *Moral Questions* 374
Stephen Satris

Aaron Ridley, *Nietzsche's Conscience* 311
Morgan Rempel

Jill Robbins, *Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature* 376
Samuel J. Julian

Peter Roeper and **Hugues Leblanc**, *Probability Theory and Probability Semantics*. 378
François Lepage

Ian Shapiro, *Democratic Justice* 380
Colin Farrelly

Eddy M. Souffrant, *Formal Transgression: John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of International Affairs*. 382
Don A. Habibi

Christopher W. Tindale, *Acts of Arguing: A Rhetorical Model of Argument* 384
David M. Godden

Richard Wollheim, *On the Emotions* 387
Aldo Mosca

Raymond Angelo Belliotti
Stalking Nietzsche.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1998. Pp. 187.
US$55.00. ISBN 0-313-30700-8.

Aaron Ridley
Nietzsche's Conscience.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1998.
Pp. 163.
US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-3557-9);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8553-3).

It is rare these days to come across a first-rate book purportedly on Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy, of which the first and foremost concern turns out to indeed be the philosophy of Nietzsche. To have encountered *two* such books in short order, is an uncommon treat. As both Raymond Belliotti and Aaron Ridley point out early on in their respective studies, and as students of the wildly disparate secondary literature are well aware, in a good deal of the material (scholarly and otherwise) invoking the name of Nietzsche, his actual philosophy turns out to be of only peripheral interest. From Elizabeth Nietzsche's infamous editing of her brother's works a century ago, through the Nazi interpreters of the 1930s and 40s, to the efforts of countless late-twentieth-century linguists, social theorists, semioticians, cultural critics, postmodernists, etc., there is of course a well established tradition of Nietzsche's philosophy serving less as an object of direct scrutiny itself, than an infinitely malleable touchstone for varied and often contradictory intellectual side trips (that were the philosopher alive today he simply would not recognize). As Ridley emphasizes at the very outset of his work, writers on Nietzsche exhibit a remarkable tendency to 'make off with' his ideas rather than genuinely examining them (1). This is certainly and quite consciously *not* the case with the two books in question here. Yet, this refreshing affinity notwithstanding, these are two very different looks at Nietzsche's philosophy.

Despite its curious title, Belliotti's *Stalking Nietzsche* proves to be a straightforward and cleverly constructed general introduction to Nietzsche's thinking *as a whole*. Each chapter begins with a clear and brief exposition of Nietzsche's musings on a particular cluster of related themes. Chapter One reviews the highlights of the philosopher's scattered reflections on perspectivism, truth, and reality. Chapter Two does likewise for morality and nihilism. In Chapter Three Belliotti bravely endeavors, in 38 pages, to do justice to the cardinal yet notoriously elusive Nietzschean notions of the will to power, the eternal recurrence, and the superman. Chapter Four treats Nietzsche's thoughts on the matters of literary style, rhetoric, and tragedy, while the Fifth and final chapter addresses his understanding of Dionysus and Apollo, his political theory, and his ongoing emphasis on self-mastery and perfectionism.

While each chapter begins with Belliotti's concise overview of Nietzsche's challenging thoughts on these matters, it is how each chapter *ends* that ultimately makes *Stalking Nietzsche* a genuinely valuable work. Belliotti is acutely aware that Nietzsche's commitment to utilizing varied critical 'perspectives' and tendency to mingle 'aphorisms, metaphors, calculated exaggerations…[and] self-referential paradoxes' (5) virtually ensures that academic interpreters (insofar as they endeavor to capture and systematize Nietzsche's thinking) regularly misrepresent and falsify the very spirit of his philosophy. Accordingly, Belliotti opts to close each chapter with a very fluid dialogue between two passionate interlocutors. It is through this evolving and animated debate of each chapter's principal themes that the reader is afforded not only numerous opportunities but various vantage points from which to consider Nietzsche's (easy answer resistant) philosophy.

One can imagine a newcomer to Nietzsche *first* confronting the philosopher's own sometimes alarmingly fluid reflections on a given topic (the superman, for example); *then* examining Belliotti's concise exposition of Nietzsche's reflections on that topic; and *lastly* benefiting from the conceptual jousting practiced by his two interlocutors. Indeed, what makes each chapter's dialogues both especially helpful and true to the spirit of Nietzsche's thought is their fundamental plasticity. While each discourse sees Nietzsche-sympathizer Fegatio championing the philosopher's general conclusions and defending them from the familiar criticisms of Appolonia (an archetypal exponent of the Anglo-American analytic philosophical tradition), there is enough give and take between these embodied poles of the contemporary academic response to Nietzsche that our interlocutor's respective positions come to be formulated, and reformulated, in various ways. I agree with Belliotti's conviction that 'the power of Nietzsche's thought resides in his broad themes, not in specific pronouncements' (7). And by treading and re-treading over the basic ideas underlying a handful of broad Nietzschean themes from varied critical perspectives rather than exhaustively scrutinizing (and attempting to concretize) one or two, *Stalking Nietzsche* serves double duty as an effectively 'Nietzschean' forum for considering these broad, fluid themes, and a book well suited to newcomers to his prose.

Also well suited to beginners and undergraduates are the interlocutors' efforts to connect Nietzsche's philosophy to everyday life. How would my behavior change if I adopted the posture of a superman? If Nietzsche is right about perspectivism, how might that impact my beliefs? In essence, what Fegatio and Appolonia are asking (and inviting us to consider) is refreshingly simple: How can reading Nietzsche change one's life? By linking Nietzsche's philosophy with straightforward questions of real-world conduct Belliotti endeavors to have his interlocutors *exemplify* rather than simply explain Nietzsche's broad themes. And in this he is largely successful.

While Fegatio's defense of Nietzsche is in places awkwardly slavish — when challenged concerning fundamental problems with Nietzsche's philosophy, he repeatedly attributes any limitations to his own rendering of the philosopher's position rather than the questionable position itself — and

Appolonia's critique sometimes trite — 'isn't Nietzsche just the Dennis Rodman of philosophy'? (22) — their spirited dialogue is consistently rewarding the informative. While those who have spent any time in a philosophy department may find the ongoing 'Continental' / 'Analytic' debate somewhat overdrawn, *Stalking Nietzsche*'s lively depiction of these familiar theoretical stances as they bear on Nietzsche interpretation provides readers less familiar with this intellectual divide (undergraduates, for example) not only with a crash course in divergent ways to read Nietzsche, but in departmental politics as well.

Where Belliotti's book uses *two* characters to better understand broad aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole, Aaron Ridley's *Nietzsche's Conscience* employs *six* characters in a meticulous analysis of just one of the philosopher's works. The work in question is *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche's major treatise on ethics and arguably his most important book, while the half-dozen characters, all Nietzsche's own, are encountered in its 150 pages. It is Ridley's keen interest in the *Genealogy*'s unorthodox use of these six personality-types, that both propels his book, and sets it apart not only from other works on Nietzsche's moral philosophy, but from any other volume on Nietzsche's thought.

As any reader who has spent time with Nietzsche's prose can attest, he is an extraordinarily *personal* philosopher. Nietzsche's writing (like Dostoyevsky's) consistently conveys an unflinching and at times disconcertingly personal sense of the type of man that he was. But this aspect of Nietzsche's writing — along with his allied observation that 'every great philosophy [is] ... a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir' (*Beyond Good and Evil*, 6) — has already been the subject of scholarly interest. What is unique to Ridley's vision of Nietzsche qua *personal* thinker, is his steadfast focus on the philosopher's remarkable tendency to think in terms of, and organize his *Genealogy* around, a handful of 'personality-types' (priests, slaves, masters, etc.). 'Nietzsche', observes Ridley, 'thinks through particular types of person, [in] that he uses these personalities as arguments ... [as] magnets for issues' (14).

Nietzsche's Conscience is effectively organized with each of its six chapters devoted to the reasonably well-defined cluster of issues that the *Genealogy* regularly associates with each character. Under Chapter One's character heading — *The Slave* — for example, Ridley gathers together and methodically examines such ever-orbiting Nietzschean notions as 'bad conscience', power, '*ressentiment*' and self-aggrandizement. Chapter Two — *The Priest* — does likewise with asceticism, transcendentalism, and (again) power, while Chapter Three — *The Philosopher* — sees Ridley delicately unpacking many of the *Genealogy*'s loaded remarks concerning truth, enlightenment and morality. In Chapters Four and Five, devoted to *The Artist*, and *The Scientist*, Ridley explores the *Genealogy*'s unorthodox but ongoing aesthetic sensibility, and Nietzsche's deeply mixed feelings and suspicions concerning science, respectively. The book's final chapter — *The Noble* — finds Ridley revisiting the same themes discussed in Chapter One (particularly '*ressentiment*' and conscience), but from the abundant and 'life affirming' outlook of the

Nietzschean noble, rather than the weak, reactive, and life-denying perspective of the slave.

Ridley's strategy of elucidating the sometimes intimating *Genealogy of Morals* via the ideas, interests, and issues surrounding its six central personality-types seems so natural, that one wonders why it has not been done before. But because of the varying degrees of penetrability of the issues *associated with* each of these six personalities, some of Ridley's always thorough character-studies are more reader-friendly than others. And unfortunately for both Ridley and his readers, some of the book's most unwieldy passages are encountered very early on.

In Chapter One — *The Slave* — for example, his rendering of Nietzsche's admittedly elusive notions of 'conscience' in general, and 'bad conscience' in particular, seems more serpentine than the undeniably 'convoluted' (17) notions he endeavors to clarify. A case in point is Ridley's uncharacteristically thorny distinction 'between the "raw", *good* bad, and *bad* bad conscience' (25). While Nietzsche's notion of the 'bad conscience' is indeed one of his most difficult, I fear newcomers to Nietzsche may emerge from Ridley's exegesis of this theme with their perplexity compounded. But such passages are rare in *Nietzsche's Conscience*, and Chapter One's difficult beginning is more than made up for by its subtle and helpful division of the *Genealogy*'s famous diagnosis of early Judeo-Christianity's 'slave revolt in morality' into an *immanent* phase and a *transcendent* phase.

Another very valuable distinction, made throughout Chapters Two and Three, goes a long way toward clarifying Nietzsche's ongoing but seemingly counter-intuitive linkage of priests and philosophers *vis à vis* the matter of asceticism. Ridley's delicate differentiation of the 'ascetic *ideals*' of the priest, and the 'ascetic *procedures*' (59) adopted by the philosopher, brings significant nuance to one of the *Genealogy*'s central concerns (asceticism).

Perhaps surprisingly, given the *Genealogy*'s overriding interest in slaves, masters, and asceticism, Chapter Five of *Nietzsche's Conscience* — *The Scientist* — proves to be of particular value. One of the things to emerge from Ridley's examination of this easily neglected Nietzschean character is a much needed clarification of the philosopher's celebrated attack on the notion of truth. Since, as Ridley points out, Nietzsche is 'seldom bothered enough about terminology' (99) to advance a *systematic* critique of truth, the *Genealogy*'s repeated and passionate criticisms of it are easily misunderstood to be far more sweeping than they actually are. What is not apparent from a cursory reading of Nietzsche (but Ridley makes clear by situating the philosopher's musings on truth within the larger matter of his abiding commitment to perspectivism) is that the real target of Nietzsche's bile is not the notion of truth *per se*, but 'faith in truth as complete, final, and transcendent' (102). This valuable distinction may appear straightforward enough, but it is one that commentators routinely fail to make. As such, it is typical of the patient scholarship of *Nietzsche's Conscience* and well representative of Ridley's contribution to our understanding of Nietzsche in general, and his groundbreaking *Genealogy of Morals* in particular.

As surely as the animated debates of his two interlocutors support and effectively embody Belliotti's cardinal assertion that 'the power of Nietzsche's thought resides in his broad themes, not in specific pronouncements' (7), Ridley's assiduous exploration of the issues associated with the *Genealogy*'s six personality-types sheds much needed light on the complex and sometimes concealed concepts that often underlie those broad themes.

Morgan Rempel
University of Toronto

Brian Bix, ed.
Analyzing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1998. Pp. 340.
Cdn$101.50; US$59.00. ISBN 0-19-826583-2.

Jules Coleman is too young for a *festschrift*, but more than deserving of one: his contributions to legal philosophy during the past twenty-five years have few rivals in range, subtlety, impact — and wit. His most original contributions have been in the field of tort theory. He has been a sympathetic expositor, but persistent critic, of the law and economics approach. What is more important, he has been a leader in developing his own theory of corrective justice. Additionally, Coleman has been a proponent of 'inclusive' legal positivism, a position H.L.A. Hart adopted in the *Postscript* to *The Concept of Law*.

Most of the twelve essays collected here — plus Coleman's own essay — focus on these topics. Most, but not all, were presented at a conference held at Quinnipiac Law School in 1996. For a collection of this sort, the standard is high. The authors come not primarily to praise, but to reflect further on issues Coleman raises. Each is worth reading on its own, and together, they make an impressive set.

Brian Bix, the editor, has grouped the essays into four sections, though some could easily be found in more than one. The collection begins with two important essays by Andrei Marmor (on objectivity in the law) and Scott J. Shapiro (the difference rules make), who extend and refine positions they have published elsewhere.

Several essays concern 'inclusive' (or 'incorporationalist') positivism. Legal positivism claims that the existence of law ultimately rests on social convention, the acceptance of a Hartian 'rule of recognition' or something like it. Incorporationalists like Coleman argue that no *further* restrictions need

to be placed on the conditions of legal validity set out by the rule of recognition. It is therefore possible that unenacted moral rules can be *incorporated* or *included* as law in *some* (e.g., American, Canadian) legal systems just in case there exists a convention among judges to treat them as law. Exclusive positivists, such as Joseph Raz, on the other hand, argue that a moral rule can only become part of a legal system if some authoritative body *enacts* or *practices* it.

Does it matter which is correct? The answer is yes. For what unites positivists from Austin and Bentham to Raz and Coleman is a profoundly *moral* stance: it is important to keep clear, all agree, that the (true) claim that something is law does not settle its moral authority, as Blackstone and Dworkin — in very different ways — do. Therefore, the 'thinner' the version of positivism, the more one can drive this point home. It is equally important, of course, that anyone's account of positivism 'fit the facts'. Frederick Schauer's essay nicely sorts out the issues, and criticizes Coleman for having a theory that is slightly too fat, principally because Coleman believes that a legal theory must specify why legal systems have *authority*. The same reasons that lead Coleman to remove substantive moral claims from the concept of law, Schauer argues, should lead him to remove the concept of authority from it as well.

The heart of the book, however, consists of reflections on Coleman's well-known theory of corrective justice that, in its original formulating, rested on the annulment thesis. According to it, wrongful gains and losses produced by various transactions are to be eliminated, or annulled. Coleman, however, came to be dissatisfied with the annulment thesis as stated:

> Corrective justice [under the annulment thesis] requires that wrongful losses be annulled, but on whom does the duty to repair fall? The annulment thesis does not appear to impose this responsibility on anyone in particular ... [C]orrective justice ... gives no one in particular any special reason for acting, for annulling wrongful gains or losses. (*Risks and Wrongs* [New York: Cambridge University Press 1992], 309)

Under pressure from Stephen Perry, Coleman identified *agent-neutrality* as the culprit. Perry further develops his criticisms. He finds Coleman at war with himself because he grounds a duty to compensate for wrongful losses in *fault* yet believes that decisions about corrective justice and tort are, at bottom, political. In the essay following, however, Matthew Kramer argues that Coleman should return to his earlier version of the annulment thesis, if only Coleman would adopt an Aristotelian conception of gains and losses. Together this pair of essays will add not only to our understanding of Coleman, but to our understanding of the virtues and vices of the corrective theory generally.

Coleman has argued that social cooperation, not market competition, is basic to human interaction. Jeremy Waldron explores three models of cooperation derived from Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. Each, he argues, can be reconciled with rational choice theory that lies at the heart of the law and

economics movement that Coleman has done so much to explain and undermine.

A word must be said about the oddest essay in the collection: an ambivalent tribute to Coleman by Guido Calebresi. He praises Coleman for clarifying ambiguities that arise when categories from one discipline get used carelessly in another, but chides him for indulging in philosophical abstractions, which he believes is endemic among philosophers. Perhaps Calebresi is just getting back at philosophers because of his terrifying encounter as a seven year-old at the hands of C.L. Stevenson, who lectured him for five solid hours on what philosophers do! Were this to have happened recently, Stevenson could easily be charged with philosophical child abuse. The essay, otherwise, adds little of substance.

Essays by Martha Fineman, Robin West, Mark Tushnet, and Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr. address issues raised by Coleman, but not always discussed by him. Culp, for instance, extends his criticism of tort law for not taking race seriously, offering us a principle to guide judges, legislators, and juries: namely, one that would tilt toward tort rules that did not support white supremacy. He gently but explicitly criticizes Coleman (and, by implication, anyone) who ignores ways in which race interacts with law to create unjust consequences.

Tushnet's essay, however, does engage directly with Coleman (and Brian Leiter's) criticism of the indeterminacy thesis. Coleman and Leiter argue in 'Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority' (142 *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 543 [1993]) that attacks on legal determinacy from critical legal studies fail. Tushnet responds that indeterminacy can (almost) always arise because there are always background rules that a savvy lawyer can manipulate to his client's advantage.

In many ways, however, the essays by Fineman, West, Tushnet and Culp appear to argue not that analytic jurisprudence is wrong, but that it is wrong-headed: academic lawyers should address different, more pressing social issues. But, as mentioned above, Coleman believes that *part* of any serious attempt to address serious moral and political issues is to be clear about the nature of law — and not, as many critics mistakenly believe — the *word* 'law'.

This Coleman himself stresses in the final essay that extends his views on the matters taken up in this book. This sixty-five page essay stands as a clear, vigorous, and witty development of his thought. Nor, fortunately, is it the last word, for there is much more under development and bound to interest anyone who finds analytic jurisprudence worth doing. It is a book well-worth having in one's library, personal or institutional.

Hans Oberdiek
Swarthmore College

Jeremy Butterfield and
Constantine Pagonis, eds.
From Physics to Philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1999.
Pp. xv + 235.
US$59.95. ISBN 0-521-66025-4.

The papers collected here are for the most part the proceedings of a special conference held in June 1997 to mark the retirement of Michael Redhead and they admirably reflect his main interests in the philosophy of quantum mechanics and the relationship between physics and metaphysics. The authors of the nine articles range from well established veterans (such as Arthur Fine, John Earman and Harvey Brown as well as the unique philosopher-physicist Abner Shimony) to upcoming youngsters (e.g., Rob Clifton, Gordon Belot and Simon Saunders). All but one of the papers are technically very sophisticated, if not downright daunting. Some typical passages: 'the standard field configuration space in this case is the space of bispinor functions whose values are not complex numbers but complex Grassmann numbers' (82), 'the hyperplane-dependent tensor operators ... comprise, on any single hyperplane, the generators of a unitary representation of the Poincaré group' (149). Modern philosophy of physics has become pretty much as mathematically sophisticated as modern physics, and the best workers are now fully versed in the arcane languages of relativist quantum field theory no less than the 'traditional' subjects of classical relativity and non-relativistic quantum mechanics (but I suppose we shall soon need the philosophy of supersymmetric string theory). It is important to note that despite their technical bravura, the philosophical significance of modern physical theory is never underplayed in these pieces, although most of the articles deal with rather fine points and only French's and, to a lesser extent, Earman's and Belot's articles engage with traditional issues in the philosophy of science.

Is it merely an eccentricity or something more significant that the realistic 'hidden variable' interpretation of quantum physics developed and long defended by David Bohm figures prominently in a surprising number of the articles? A typical physicist's attitude is more like that of Sam Treiman (of impeccable credentials as Higgins emeritus professor at Princeton) who in his excellent popular account of quantum physics quickly dismisses Bohm's interpretation as 'highly nonlocal and, in any case, rather forced' (*The Odd Quantum*, 187). In the volume under review, Bohm is the physicist most widely referred to and his views affect — more or less tangentially — several articles while others explicitly deal with Bohmian themes. One article (Cushing and Bowman) provides an extensive, highly interesting if ultimately inconclusive discussion of chaos in the context of Bohm's quantum mechanics. Saunders's article attempts the revivication of Dirac's particle-and-hole theory in support of a particle based interpretation of pilot-wave theory, but again the results are inconclusive and, admits Saunders, suffer

from the not insignificant fault of being literally *incredible* (Saunders quotes a general dictum from Putnam: 'what is the point of an interpretation of quantum mechanics that one cannot *believe*?' [88]).

All but two of the papers address philosophical issues of quantum mechanics. The exceptions are the article of Shimony and the joint effort of Earman and Belot. The latter is a fascinating discussion of the prospects of formulating general relativity as a gauge theory (likely essential for the marriage of quantum mechanics with this last non-quantized holdout of classical physics). Evidently, this is not going to be easy for both technical and philosophical reasons. Spectacularly interesting from a philosophical point of view is the apparent conclusion that reformulated relativity may not admit any notion of *change* or temporality (let alone any kind of *becoming*). All physically significant quantities (at least, gauge invariant quantities) end up as constants of evolution — there is *no* change of state over time. Amazingly, there are physicists who cleave to the Parmenidean line.

The most 'purely philosophical' article in the collection is Shimony's, which discusses (in keeping with an unspoken theme of this book, tentatively) the question of whether the laws of nature could be the product of some process akin to that of biological evolution. After discussing some seminal thinkers who espoused law-evolution such as Leibniz, Peirce and Whitehead, Shimony addresses the remarkable theory of Lee Smolin, which asserts that new universes are being constantly spawned in vast numbers with the fundamental laws of physics being more or less subtly different in each new universe. Via Smolin's grand (if not grandiose) mechanism, one can provide a non-theological explanation of the so-called fine-tuning of 'our' laws of nature for the creation and sustenance of life. Smolin's account is, however, not pure metaphysics — it does make some, albeit difficult to test, empirical predictions. Shimony wisely remarks in conclusion what seems irrefutably correct, though perhaps rather deflationary: 'however far the evolutionary explanation can be expressed, it will presuppose a theatre within which natural selection takes place, and this theatre must have some basic properties that are not susceptible to an evolutionary explanation' (220).

All in all, this is a fine collection of articles, mostly narrowly focussed, demanding and aimed at specialists in the philosophy of physics. They reveal the remarkable depth of knowledge of current philosophers of science but also the fact that the most basic philosophical issues in physics remain entirely unsettled.

William Seager
University of Toronto at Scarborough

David Campbell and
Michael J. Shapiro, eds.
Moral Spaces:
Rethinking Ethics and World Politics.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
1999. Pp. xx + 268.
US$19.95. ISBN 0-8166-3276-6.

Thomas L. Pangle and
Peter J. Ahrensdorf
Justice Among Nations:
On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace.
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1999.
Pp. xi + 362.
US$45.00. ISBN 0-7006-0959-8.

Awareness of duties transcending borders has recently become especially acute and widespread. Both books reviewed here are motivated by this awareness, yet they express it from within radically different orientations. Pangle and Ahrensdorf adopt an international relations perspective, in which the central issue is whether ethics belongs at all to discussions of international affairs. Their book is a history of ideas concerning this issue from Thucydides to Waltz and Walzer. The Campbell and Shapiro volume interrogates normative presuppositions about borders and boundaries in the thought of recent, mainly continental philosophers such as Levinas, Derrida and Kristeva, with historical references to figures like Nietzsche, Weber, and Fanon.

Pangle and Ahrensdorf narrate the Western tradition as something like a family feud between 'idealists' and 'realists'. The latter are not moral realists but, on the contrary, international-relations realists, who believe the only interests that belong on the international stage are national interests, contrasted with normative values, which realists would banish from international discourse altogether. One might think, then, that this could not be a normative debate, inasmuch as the relevance of the normative would be denied by the realists. To their credit, Pangle and Ahrensdorf show that this is itself a normative position, as it always has been — beginning with Thucydides.

The Athenian 'realists' argued that community interests compel city-states to engage not only in self-defense but in retribution, conquest, and empire-building. To be protected are not only the city-state and its members, but their honour, virtue and ideals as well. If all this is compulsory, it cannot be justly condemned; hence moral judgment has no purchase on international relations (16). But this is not a view that a society — especially Athenian society — could easily hold, for its implication is that the society can only rally around its interests, never around the conviction that they are right.

For Plato and Aristotle, who were clear that it was the virtue of life within a polis that would justify its defense, the question had altered. Now it was whether there could be any limits to the aggression and imperialism that may be visited on outsiders and foreign powers, if the goal were defense of the polis and the good life within it. Nor was this tension altogether removed by the cosmopolitanism of Cicero who held, without regard for national boundaries, that, '... the interest of each is a common interest ... we are all embraced by one and the same law of nature; and ... we are certainly prohibited by the law of nature from doing wrong to one another' (65). For he maintained that, in practice, ties of citizenship and family are stronger and more effective than commitments owed to strangers (71-2).

This gave way to the more extreme perception that local politics are invariably nasty, dysfunctional, and incapable of justice, and this early Christian view found expression in Augustine's distinction between the city of man and the city of God. But, for the Christians, it posed a further problem, a dilemma: Does 'Love thy neighbour' justify defensive war or peacekeeping? If not, how can cosmopolitan Christian virtue be stably realized in a peaceful world order? Thus the worries of Plato and Aristotle — on behalf of the polis — came to ensnare the more cosmopolitan Christians as well.

Here Pangle and Ahrensdorf find their focal point: neither can we afford to ignore or abstain from the nastiness of local politics, nor can we afford to abandon cosmopolitan ethical thought to enjoy the comforts of whatever passes for a *modus vivendi*. Thus they plot modern European political thought as follows.

Macchiavelli is taken to warn that measuring political arrangements (national or international) by standards of sin and redemption is delusional. Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu finesse the Macchiavellian challenge by, on the one hand, conceding that a world hooked on immaterial goods and immortal glory is bound to dysfunctionally betray its own ideals. Alternatively, if a community sets its goal more modestly as the rational pursuit of its members' interests domestically, then this is a community that is more likely to promote peace, trade, and international relations of mutual benefit.

Countering this is the perception that this world, even if it succeeds in becoming comfortable, may yet remain soulless. This perception is attributed to a vast array of thinkers and positions, ranging from Rousseau and Kant to Marxism, Wilsonian liberalism, and fascism. In this light, realism at first appears to plead for modest pursuit of ordinary interests, rather than raising the risk of catastrophic warfare by acting out idealistic longings and Crusades.

The authors suggest that this latter debate could be deepened by an exercise in historical inversion, by re-integrating some pre-Macchiavellian alternatives. In particular, they recommend reverting to (a) an attitude of Stoical dualism, admitting without illusions the nastiness of human social (and international) relations, while (b) abandoning the imaginary drama of social self-realization in favour of conscientious recognition of natural law.

As a review of the Western canon of normative thought on international relations in a single volume, this is a book I was happy to read. But from my perspective the focus and plot were not the most interesting. I would much rather have seen the colonial conflict of conscience as the focal point, with greater saliency given to Francisco de Vitoria's recognition of the harm caused by irresponsible application of moral beliefs in defense of lucrative deployment of power — which in Vitoria's context was Spanish colonial power in the Americas. Recognizing that natural law doctrine could not responsibly justify the horrors of the conquest, he correctly gauged the boundaries of ethical discourse, and his efforts to articulate just war doctrine within those boundaries enriched natural law theory as well as saving it from irresponsibility. By contrast, no few of the works surveyed in this book gauged the boundaries of ethical discourse quite badly. Showing the difference is a task that Pangle and Ahrensdorf, regrettably, did not attempt.

Unfortunately for the hapless reviewer, what Campbell and Shapiro's collection of essays does best is to resist narrative overview. The editors claim, 'The most general insight that integrates our studies is a recognition of the radical entanglement between moral discourses and spatial imaginaries' (ix). Parsing this to mean there is nothing that (a) is more general than this and (b) is an insight and (c) integrates their studies, I would have to agree. But judge for yourself:

David Warner finds that the notion of acting responsibly towards others is problematic, no matter whether it is responsible action by individuals, by nation-states, or by a global community, and he suggests that the very notion of responsibility is flawed by its association with that Nietzschean bugbear, 'ressentiment.'

David Campbell whets the appetite for Levinas's account of responsibility towards others as a metaphysically fundamental relation, prior even to the formation of subjectivity, and he shows how uneasily this sits with Levinas's nationalist politics.

Michael J. Shapiro's point seems to be this: 'A recognition of the extraordinary lengths to which one must go to challenge a given structure of intelligibility, to intervene in resident meanings, opens up possibilities for a spatio-temporally situated politics and ethics of discourse' (58).

Michael Dillon claims that 'it is the "inter" — the articulated and articulating *in-between* — that continental thought and international relations share,' and he also gives us to believe that this illuminates that group of people who are more 'in-between than all others, namely refugees.' Which would, I fear, leave refugee readers feeling insultingly unilluminated, if not exploited, by this article, even though it purports to put refugees at the centre of philosophical attention.

William Connolly's 'democratized Nietzschean' account of the 'politics of becoming' reminds us that the stock of ideas, values, and sensitivities that are prominent in the ethical or political discourse of a community (whether local or global) is not fixed but dynamic, and our thinking, our judgments,

and our perspectives are necessarily reshaped every time a new group solidarizes to struggle against its particular injuries and powerlessness.

Kate Manzo argues against drawing a line too firmly between post-colonial and post-modern thought, since both contain elements of 'critical humanism', insofar as they put forward various accounts of the meaning and possibility of dignity, worth, and freedom.

Bonnie Honig's interesting exploration of the biblical book of Ruth, with its critical take on prior commentaries by Cynthia Ozick and Julia Kristeva, sketches some conflicting portrayals of immigrants. Rejecting the choice between thinking of Ruth as a good assimilator or thinking of her as bringing an openness to diversity into the Israelite community, she instead develops Kristeva's proposal that family, community, state, and region are 'transitional objects' of attachment, sequenced upwards, ultimately towards attachment and responsibility towards humanity. Drawing attention to social conditions that are necessary for such transitions to be negotiated successfully, she finds that these conditions were lamentably unavailable to Ruth, as they are unavailable to many contemporary national and ethnic communities.

Patricia Molloy focuses on the responsiveness to the other that Levinas finds at the root of the ethical. This, she contends, needs to be distinguished from empathy and sympathy, which she illustrates nicely with Sister Helen's responsiveness and sense of obligation to death-row inmate Matthew Poncelet — a character whose abusiveness makes empathy and sympathy quite impossible — in the film 'Dead Man Walking'.

Richard Maxwell draws our attention to a little-known fact about market research, that while corporate information collection is indeed a surveillance system, it relies for its inputs on person-to-person contact carried out by interviewers, and these contacts need to be free and personal; Maxwell suggests they have more in common with confessions than with spying. Interestingly but unsurprisingly, the moral norms that govern these personal interactions (e.g., mutual respect, dignity, etc.) are ignored in decision-making about how that information is to be used.

Of these diverse articles, Connolly's restatement of the 'politics of becoming' seems promising, except that one is left wondering whether any and all 'new cultural identities forged out of old energies, injuries, and differences' are to have equal claims to our attention and support. That, of course, would be impossible, since protracted struggles around race, class and ethnicity typically generate group identities that are antithetical; moreover, it hardly follows, from having such an identity, that one has a cause that rightly calls for support from others. More promising, then, is the work by David Campbell and Patricia Molloy on Levinas. Despite his irredeemably dogmatic metaphysics, Levinas was insightful about some ways in which the boundaries of ethical discourse are set by a nonspecific responsibility towards others. Molloy does a service by contrasting this sense of responsibility with empathy and sympathy, and Campbell has begun the important work of re-thinking

Levinas's insights into the boundaries of the ethical so as to disentangle them from the boundaries of cultures, peoples, and countries.

Jay Drydyk
Carleton University

Allen Carlson
Aesthetics and the Environment.
New York: Routledge 2000. Pp. xxii + 250.
$90.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-20683-9).

This book brings together nearly all of Carlson's essays in environmental aesthetics published in diverse places over a period of twenty years, plus several new additions that round out the picture of his contributions to a thriving new field. The book is divided into two parts, the first aiming at a certain theoretical perspective, and the second at its illustration and refinement.

Carlson begins in Part I with the assumption that aesthetics has the job of guiding us in aesthetic appreciation and that in the case of the natural environment there is a problem because it is 'chaotic and unruly.' Specifically, we find that 'we are confronted by, if not intimately and totally engulfed in, something that forces itself upon all of our senses, is constantly in motion, is limited neither in time nor in space, and is constrained concerning neither its nature nor its meaning' (xviii). Given this challenge, Carlson develops an account of 'the natural environmental model' of aesthetic appreciation.

He articulates this model by contrasting 'appropriate' aesthetic appreciation with appreciation that is stunted or misguided in a variety of ways. He argues that appreciation that focuses on formal qualities misunderstands it as limited to the sensorily apparent; appreciation that supposes the need for disinterestedness assumes that the appreciator is passive. Neither supposition is correct, Carlson argues.

He also proposes that neither the appreciation of landscape paintings nor the appreciation of static art objects, such as sculptures, does justice to what goes on when the object of appreciation is the ever-open ended and -changing natural environment. He proceeds to argue that, just as there is 'correct' aesthetic appreciation of artworks, depending on knowledge of their design and *arthistorical* origins, there is also 'correct' appreciation of natural environments, based on knowledge of their *natural* origins.

This perspective is applied next in the clarification of how it may be that the natural environment seems to be wholly aesthetically good. Carlson's

explanation of this is that, since nature is not a human artefact, it cannot be judged by the criteria appropriate to the critique of artworks. Instead, since science is our guide regarding the nature of the natural environment, and since the categories of science aim to make the natural world more intelligible in terms of 'order, regularity, harmony, balance, tension, resolution, and so forth' (93), science-guided aesthetic appreciation, unsurprisingly, makes nature appear in a positive aesthetic light.

Carlson finishes Part I with his most complete statement of what differentiates the appreciation of art and the appreciation of nature by taking note of how we appreciate certain kinds of *avant-garde* art and anti-art. The resulting model for the aesthetic appreciation of nature is what he calls 'order appreciation'. In Part II Carlson takes his previous proposals for 'appropriate' aesthetic appreciation of the natural environment as exemplary of aesthetic appreciation in general, thus issuing in a 'universal aesthetics'. The basic idea that structures this project is that aesthetic appreciation is appropriate insofar as it is *object-* rather than only *subject*-oriented.

Carlson makes his case for this approach by applying it to various aesthetic problems: why the 'eyesore argument' is seen as correctly leading to the propriety of 'cleaning up the environment'; why some sorts of environmental art may appear as 'affronts to nature'; why Japanese gardens, even while artefacts, may mostly escape our critical judgement; why we may be able to aesthetically enjoy contemporary, largescale agricultural landscapes, despite their monotony and their affront to ecological good sense; how to appreciate architecture, even if this art form can very obtrusively take its place in the middle of our living space.

Finally, while assessing the contributions of literature to appropriate appreciation of landscapes, Carlson considers the aesthetic relevance of a diversity of descriptions, including the formal, the scientific, the historical, and the functional, as well as what he calls the nominal, the mythological and the cultural, which itself includes the imaginative and the literary (237). Interestingly, Carlson is willing to grant that, given certain conditions, all of these descriptions, except for the cultural, may enhance aesthetic appreciation of landscapes, which seems a change of perspective from Part I where natural science, along with common sense descriptions, were given exclusive rights to guide aesthetic appreciation of the natural environment. In critique of the book I offer the following queries.

From the beginning Carlson seems to assume that aesthetic appreciation of the natural environment is in need of *guidance*, presumably from philosophical aesthetics, because experience of that environment is taken to be '*unruly and chaotic*'. This claim, however, remains unconfirmed by psychology, history or anthropology; these fields point, rather, toward the fact that human experience normally is highly structured and that aesthetic appreciation is commonly present in human societies across individuals, times, spaces and cultures.

If we take Carlson's proposal to be directed toward 'correct' or 'appropriate' aesthetic appreciation, instead of toward its very existence, we have new

cause to wonder, for we may ask, correctness and appropriateness according to which standards or to what purpose? Carlson frequently claims that object-oriented aesthetic appreciation is more 'fruitful' or 'true', but the questions recur then: fruitful given what aims? true given what standards?

Central to 'correct' or 'appropriate' appreciation of the natural environment, according to Carlson, is that it be guided by the categories of natural science since this discipline supposedly reveals nature for what it is, thus freeing us from subjection to mere appearance. The contrast is with appreciation guided by cultural or personal categories. This perspective is problematic in at least three respects.

First, it overlooks the critiques issuing from within philosophy of science that point toward the incomplete and always provisional character of the 'truths' of science. Second, it overlooks that our natural science itself is part of a culture and not a (magical?) grasp of the ultimate being of the world. Finally, the point of such proposed aesthetic discipline, requiring that we see our natural environment through the *dicta* of natural scientific theory, may be questioned.

Even if we may grant that appreciation of certain activities, such as art or sport viewing *may* be heightened by disciplining one's gaze or grasp with a particular sort of knowledge, it remains unclear if this is the case in the aesthetic appreciation of the natural environment. It may well be that all sorts of other perspectives, garnered through one's personal intercourse with nature and structured by non-scientific aspects of one's culture, may be more 'fruitful' in generating aesthetic pleasure, insight or depth.

In conclusion we may note that, however much we disagree with Carlson's analyses and conclusions, he has done us a great service in opening the door to a carefully argued, new look at what is aesthetic appreciation of our natural environment. We owe Carlson our gratitude for having provided us with a richly textured, provocative set of texts that will undoubtedly be of great value to students of philosophical aesthetics, geography and environmental studies.

Thomas Heyd
University of Victoria

Georg Cavallar
Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right.
Cardiff: University of Wales Press 1999.
Pp. x + 214.
US$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7083-1509-7);
US$27.50 (paper: ISBN 0-7083-1508-9).

From about the time of John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* (1971), Immanuel Kant's political philosophy has become a significant resource for (mainly liberal) political theorists. But it has only been in the last ten years that Kant's thinking on international politics has enjoyed some popularity. Some of the compelling reasons for this are the end of the Cold War and the growing awareness of internationalization and globalization processes. The end of a bipolar, East-West stalemate has given hope to advocates of a world order based on international law, cooperation among states, human rights, and market-driven economic prosperity. The forward march of global economic integration, multilateral trading regimes, and the technological-communications revolution has led to the (invariably problematical) perception of a cosmopolitan, global community. The virtue of Kant is that he anticipates all of this, making him an obviously perfect philosopher or apologist of present-day international politics. However, the problems of Kant's international writings are his frustrating inconsistencies, contradictions, and opaque language — all of which render his legacy all-too-likely to be misinterpreted and misapplied.

Georg Cavallar's book is a timely, well-founded interpretation of Kant's international thought that addresses several of the most salient difficulties in understanding what Kant *meant*, in addition to what he ought to *mean* to us today *vis-à-vis* world politics. Kant's philosophy is built upon a series of dualistic categories ('freedom' and 'nature' being perhaps the most salient and profound); his theory of international politics absorbs or retains his dualistic structure. Accordingly, there is textual evidence of not one but two Kantian postures: On the one hand, he claims that perpetual peace is impossible because the state of nature will continue to reign internationally; that states are moral persons in which foreign states ought not intervene, no matter how unjust they may appear; and that loose, voluntary federation among robustly sovereign or independent states is the best solution. On the other hand, Kant makes statements that a gradual mitigation of anarchy will render perpetual peace a plausible goal; that a state's internal and external sovereignty are contingent upon popular legitimation; and that a cosmopolitan world-republic is the ultimate purpose of international transformation. Cavallar claims that it is wrong and superficial to assume — as many do — that Kant is in contradiction. He also suggests that it is misleading to appeal to only one of these two Kantian vantage points without taking into account the larger whole of his critical philosophy.

The whole of Kant's philosophy includes a foundational commitment to juridical rightfulness among individuals and among states — a commitment that is unconditionally legislated by pure practical reason. But this philosophy also includes a large measure of historical and teleological judgement that allows the thinker of international politics to mediate between the limited accomplishments of existing juridical states (and the interstate system) and the unconditioned ends of reason. Cavallar labels this approach of Kant's 'evolutionary' because it assumes that progress from the concrete and material conditions of international injustice to the abstract and formal demands of global justice is a tenable (but long term) moral-political project. Cavallar also suggests that this evolutionary perspective is more-or-less appropriate for today's world as it was to the Europe of 1795: he sees the need of only minor restatement and reformulation of Kant's central points.

This book has many strengths as an introduction to Kant's international political thought: It is well written and avoids the temptation of reproducing Kant's turgid prose and technical jargon; it is based on an extensive knowledge of the historical and international political context in which Kant wrote; it is grounded upon an equally impressive array of secondary sources in German, something other English monographs fail to achieve. Nevertheless, there are some notable shortcomings. Cavallar is perhaps too uncritical of this 'founding father' in that, while his thesis is plausible, much more is required to make it significant. Although it is relatively clear that Kant intended to bring the antinomies of reason and history together through a perspective of historical-teleological judgement, it is far from clear (at least in the evidence brought forward) that Kant's project achieves this goal or indeed that it is a worthy goal. Similarly, there is something problematical about Cavallar's (probably unnecessary) conclusion that the metaphysical foundations of Kant's thought — *viz.*, 'the concepts of freedom and moral agency' — are ontologically secure and universally valid (151). Placed at the end of the book, this statement begs the question and skirts over a whole series of recent debates in social and political thought. These debates are not, as Cavallar dismisses them, mere 'trendy' attempts to avoid truth. His polemic should not detract from an otherwise fine and thoughtful piece of writing.

Antonio Franceschet
(Department of Political Science)
University of Alberta

William E. Conklin
The Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse: The Juridical Production and the Disclosure of Suffering.
Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company
1998. Pp. 304.
US$77.95. ISBN 1-84014-071-2.

Next to language, with which it shares many theoretical difficulties, juridical law is perhaps the most pervasive product of human culture. While there are almost as many critical accounts of law as there are of language, Conklin's project is somewhat different in that it focuses on legal discourse in order to criticize legal practice and theory.

Conklin's attack on the law, and much of legal theory along with it, proceeds in two stages. First, there is a convincing account of how legal procedures, institutions, and their discursive vocabulary fail to address the 'embodied meanings' which provide the initial impetus to a plea for legal remedy. Following the critique, there is a more general suggestion of a positive, corrective project whereby the law can 'unconceal' the experiences of its subjects as they themselves intend them to be understood. 'Justice,' Conklin claims, 'lies in the heterology of voices embedded in the silent intertext between dialogic partners' (244).

One might question the very idea that the primary aim of legal practice ought to be addressing subjective experiences as such, but in any case Conklin brings forth some convincing examples of legal injustice. These include the case of a woman who is consistently denied the opportunity to be interviewed for a job for which she is qualified, the internment of Japanese-Canadians and Japanese-Americans during and after the Second World War, and, most strikingly, the disappearance of an entire Inuit community from the governmental field of view — a vanishing act which persisted for decades and continues even now despite that community's explicit recognition in recent legal proceedings. Conklin argues that whenever one comes before the law, whether in an actual courtroom or through one of its officers, one is inexorably swallowed-up by the discursive practices of the juridical machine. One's actual experiences and one's identity as a living, particular human being is set aside, replaced instead by legal concepts and categories — legal signs, to use a general term. According to Conklin's argument, if signs refer to an external referent or remain tied to cognitive objects then the embodied meanings of the non-knower (the victim, the criminal, the layperson) are concealed, as well as the experiential world that non-knower presupposes when making meaningful claims or statements about their experiences. Supposedly, the law necessarily denies the presence of these experiences because it must remain authoritative — 'Legal discourse is a master discourse' (23) — hence to recognize that subjective meanings have entered in the legal procedure would be anathema to the objective ideal of legal authority, that is, the perfect enclosure of all (legally-addressed) meaning within

legal concepts. On this account, the victim's experience of suffering is translated into another world of meaning, thus causing a second harm against him or her, and furthermore the judges and officers of the courts now in their very actions overlook the concealed meanings of the victims as well as their own professional prejudices. In so far as it seeks to be objective and authoritative, the law tends to overwhelm any non-legal experiences it attempts to take into account, causing 'a suffering which transpires as the legal discourse subtly and slowly transforms one's story into a narrative which fails to address an individual's meanings as he or she has experienced them' (3).

Conklin, therefore, is directly attacking the correctness of translating individual experiences into universal categories of law — a fundamental presupposition of law as we know it. While he shows that this procedure is fraught with danger, his alternative arrangements are not convincingly presented. Conklin focuses almost exclusively on the perspective of the victim of injustice and the officers of the court; he does not adequately show how a *criminal* justice system would function if based on a dialogical ethics that does make use of universal legal concepts.

Pointing to legal injustices is not an especially difficult task, as any honest lawyer, judge, or police officer can attest. The sheer scope of the law's authority combined with the fact that it is applied by human beings guarantees injustice aplenty. Conklin faces a more difficult task in demonstrating that our understanding of the law itself is largely erroneous. Not only professional practices but also the theoretical underpinnings of the law are, according to Conklin, seriously flawed. Thus his theoretical critique covers a great deal of ground. Most every form of legal theory, from legal positivism to Critical Legal Studies, comes up for judgment.

A recurring theme is the 'absent foundation' of law. Conklin draws upon theories of desire, Derrida's account of spectral authority, Heidegger's critique of Western metaphysics, and many other critical perspectives, all in order to argue that legal authority has no real foundation other than its own discursive attempt to provide itself with an authoritative foundation. Hence legal statutes and past cases are seen as if they are themselves authoritative (and always have been) rather than recognized as deriving their power through a continuous reinterpretation by legal professionals. The same can be said of the law itself in so far as it remains authoritative only so long as ... it remains authoritative. That some insist upon resting the authority of law on a mythical or external foundation is, according to Conklin, a dead-end which obscures a sort of bad infinity of legal concepts. 'The legal positivist project,' Conklin opines, 'manifests the very endeavor which Heidegger has attributed to the tradition of Western metaphysics' (111). Conklin's suggests that analytical legal theory in particular desires an external foundation of legal authority, that it grounds this authority by projecting it into an (absent) external object, and that it fails to recognize that this authoritative other which it believes to pre-exist the law is actually constituted by the law's own activity. This line of thought brings to mind Slavov Zizek's work, particularly his book *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. Zizek's careful and deep analysis of

the retroactive constitution of subjects and the ideologies, however, may be more helpful in understanding the actual workings of institutional systems (like the law) and, most importantly, the limited alternatives to them.

Indeed, *The Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse* uses many different approaches to show that legal discourse fails to achieve justice. So many approaches, in fact, that one begins to wish that a more restricted set of sources had been used instead of drawing upon such a large amount of eclectic and difficult material. At times it seems that sources are being referred to which are secondary or tertiary to the main points of the argument, and though Conklin himself may well have envisioned a clear and forceful argument, the reader may feel swamped by the tides of intellectual thought which make their way into the book. The breadth of vision is admirable, but that vision is not always clearly and succinctly presented in such a way as to encourage a careful appropriation of it. The critique of legal discourse is convincing, but the multiplicity of critical vectors employed in that critique tends to swamp Conklin's positive project — resituating justice within a dialogic relationship. Moreover, the positive project deserves more space than the final chapter and conclusion granted it. What alternative do we have to legal institutions as they presently exist? How will recasting these institutions in the light of a dialogic ethics fulfill the practical necessities of legal coercion and social order? These are the especially interesting questions that come to mind when reading this book. Those who care to reach this point of questioning by following Conklin's path will cover a great deal of ground in the process.

Brian Hendrix
McMaster University

Laurence D. Cooper
Rousseau and Nature:
The Problem of the Good Life.
University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press 1999. Pp. xiv + 223.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01922-0);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01923-9).

Cooper's recent text seeks to broker a resolution to a long-standing impasse in Rousseau scholarship concerning the relationship between nature and conscience. Should conscience in Rousseau be seen a-historically as the ever present and unchanging voice of nature within, or, as a distinctively cultural acquisition for which nature provides at best a distant model devoid of direct prescriptive content? A bit of both, Cooper suggests. Nature's 'innermost

principle, expressed in civilized human beings through conscience, is constant. Every human being retains a natural love of harmonious order' (9). But while this love of order is as immanent in the soul for Rousseau as it was for Plato, it is not, as Cooper sees it, directly prescriptive: 'conscience is not the full-throated moral guide that the a-historicist interpreters ... suggest it is. Conscience is, rather, a general principle, a love of order, whose manifestations are very far ranging but whose guidance is much less direct and articulate than the a-historicists suggest' (9). Through an analysis of the role of the *amour de soi* / *amour propre* distinction, Cooper attempts to show how the nature which is immanent in conscience can ground and direct normative life without becoming directly prescriptive.

By taking nature to be an under-determining principle in this fashion, Cooper is able to develop the intriguing thesis that Rousseau (unlike Plato) was a pluralist about possible forms of the good life, and it is here that his text breaks new ground. According to Cooper's reading, the patriotic citizen of the *Social Contract*, the natural man in civil society (Emile), and the 'post-civilized' dreamer of the autobiographies 'stand atop separate but equally valid scales' (2). In each of these exemplary lives, a latent quotient of *amour de soi* guards against the destructive forms of *amour propre*, and within the limits set by this 'template', the passions are sublimated and preserved in a love of justice, morality, and beauty. But while the result will be significantly different in each of these divergent forms of the good life, conscience as 'love of order' remains a constant element, undergirding and unifying them.

Rousseau scholars often fragment the corpus according to their specialized interests, with the political writings attracting one audience, the autobiographies another, and *Emile* still a third. The fact that Cooper devotes serious attention to each of these sources in the development of his thesis is therefore a welcome departure, but in trying to assimilate the entire canon to a unifying theory, he creates certain problems for himself. First, the grounds for assuming that a single comprehensive schema will be able to embrace sources written in such disparate styles and at such different times in Rousseau's life are perhaps shaky; Cooper cites at the outset (ix) Rousseau's insistence in the *Dialogues* that his writings form a 'systematic' whole, and he proceeds in that spirit, making but *one* reference to a position on which Rousseau seems to have changed his mind over the years (97-8). And while he concedes that Rousseau nowhere explains 'existence' (21) or 'order' (92), or ever calls conscience a 'principle of the soul' (94), each is a crucial, fixed element in Rousseau's thought if Cooper is correct. There is perhaps too often a sense of architectonic invention in Cooper's construction of Rousseau's position.

If Cooper is forced to critically construct the terms which unify Rousseau's metaphysical and moral theories, it is because the terms which Rousseau *does* use prove to be highly unstable. Apparent inconsistencies must routinely be ironed out through an appeal to the changing exigencies of Rousseau's rhetorical purposes (154), or, quite the opposite, through insisting on

the irrelevance of the rhetorical context; the overtly 'literary' qualities of Rousseau's texts 'should not be taken to mean that ... he does not quite mean everything he says — least of all when he makes categorical, philosophical statements' (87). Sometimes the context matters, sometimes only the precise wording, but Cooper does not present the reader with the hermeneutic principles which justify his decision in either case.

Beyond clarifying the historical facts about Rousseau's anthropology and metaphysics, Cooper presents his reading as one which might be useful for political philosophy; Rousseau attempts to derive normative principles from an a-teleological view of nature, and it is certainly this view of nature which is dominant today (xiii). But this is perhaps misleading, for to have anything like this instructional value, we would have to assess the plausibility and coherence of Rousseau's metaphysics, and Cooper's text is almost exclusively exegetical and interpretive. It is only toward the end of the book that Cooper begins to question Rousseau, acknowledging as a 'problem' that Rousseau has not, in the end, been able to separate the natural from the unnatural. 'Nature, characterized above all by order, contains within itself the potential for disorder [through generating the conditions which will give birth to *amour propre*]. Does not this latent potential speak against the interpretation of nature as altogether harmonious?' (160). Indeed it does, and it is this question which would have to stand at the front of any attempt to consider the political relevance of Rousseau's theory of nature. Until such an examination is performed, Rousseau's account of nature — at least as described by Cooper — is of questionable utility for contemporary political and moral theory. Cooper's text may be a useful prolegomena to such an inquiry, but it is not that inquiry itself.

D.G. Wright
Toronto

Richard Creath and
Jane Maienschein, eds.
Biology and Epistemology.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2000.
Pp. xviii + 295.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-59290-9);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-59701-3).

In the twentieth century, physics was the centre of interest for philosophers of science. Popper's concept of falsification, Kuhn's exploration of paradigm shifts and Feyerabend's notion of the theory-ladenness of observation represented major achievements in the field. In the new millennium, biology is

likely to replace physics as the main playing field for philosophers of science. Jane Maienschein's and Richard Creath's timely contribution to the *Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology* shows the way by uniting eminent scholars, e.g., Michael Ruse, Kenneth Schaffner and Richard Lewontin, with key themes, e.g., new experimentalism, epistemological pluralism or the historical model of scientific theory. The collection of thirteen essays is divided into three parts.

Contributions in the first part examine Darwin's theory of evolution as it developed in the midst of nineteenth-century philosophy and culture. Michael Ruse's excellent piece claims that philosophical ideas played a major role in Darwin's work. He argues that Darwin tried to satisfy both John Herschel's ideal of good science (direct empirical evidence or strong analogy) and William Whewell's ideal of good science (consilience). Jon Hodge contradicts Ruse and maintains that Whewell had no significant influence on Darwin who modelled his theory according to Herschel's philosophy of science only. A third approach on the relationship between Darwin and his contemporary philosophers of science is taken by David Hull who argues that the exchange between scientists and philosophers was very one-sided in the nineteenth century. He particularly refers to the refusal of all major philosophers of science (Herschel, Lyell, Whewell and J.S. Mill) to support Darwin's theory of evolution. In the last contribution on Darwin, Robert Richards calls for a historical model of theories to put an end to the 'pernicious presentism' (81) in the history of science. He supports this call by claiming that Darwin accepted both progressivity and recapitulation, ideas that are very much rejected by contemporary Neo-Darwinists.

The second part is opened by David Magnus's brilliant chapter which describes two epistemologies, naturalism aiming for consilience and experimentation aiming for control. By contrasting the views of mutation theorists (e.g., de Vries) and isolationists (e.g., Jordan), Magnus shows that even predictive and theoretical success (naturalists) cannot displace a dominant epistemology (experimentation). Jane Maienschein's own chapter compares the relevance of two systems of metaphysics, vitalism and materialism, by looking at the debate between epigenesists and preformationists. William Bechtel asks how new technical instruments can become accepted as producing knowledge rather than artefacts by establishing consilience with other techniques.

The third part is highly technical and relevant scientific knowledge is helpful though not essential. Frederic Holmes looks at the discovery of the Krebs cycle and the ornithine cycle of urea synthesis to claim that scientific discovery is gradual rather than sudden. R.C. Lewontin examines scientific aims within population genetics and argues that the discovery of universals should not be included. Marga Vicedo claims that entity realism as expressed by new experimentalists such as Hacking or Cartwright suffers from an ahistorical view of knowledge. Evelyn Fox Keller's chapter deals with developmental biology, a field which, in her opinion, cannot grow under the sole epistemology of experimental control. Similarly, Helen Longino supports

epistemological pluralism and illustrates her claim with examples from the behavioural sciences. The book is concluded by an afterword from Kenneth Schaffner.

The collection will open new horizons for scientists who subscribe to the genetic paradigm that experimental control and gene identification will answer all questions within biology. Particularly contributions from the second and the third part throw doubt on this mainstream 'certainty'. However, scepticism about the genetic paradigm does not commit authors to relativism. The fine line between critical analysis of non-epistemic values in biology on the one hand and postmodernist rejection of all objectivity on the other hand is not crossed by any author. Apart from an index and details on contributors, this diverse and challenging book leaves nothing to wish for. *Biology and Epistemology* is a notable contribution to the philosophy of science which persuasively shows why biology will be 'the next big thing' (Schaffner, 292) in the field.

Doris Schroeder
University of Central Lancashire

Christian Delacampagne
A History of Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. Trans. M.B. DeBevoise.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
1999. Pp. xviii + 330.
US$42.50. ISBN 0-8018-6016-4.

To write a narrative of the philosophy of any century is an accomplishment. To do so for the philosophy of the century just ending, the century most salient to current practice, marked by a vast expansion in the numbers of philosophical practitioners, in a single volume of moderate length, is an astonishing feat. Delacampagne has achieve this *tour de force* and produced an accessible and mostly fair account as well.

Three factors have contributed to this success. The first is his breadth of knowledge: he has a solid grasp of the three dominant philosophical cultures of the period: French, German, and Anglo-American, and of the interaction between them. The second is the fact that he is a philosophical amateur in the best sense. He is currently a professor of French in the United States. During most of his career he served as a cultural diplomat, ultimately the French cultural attaché in Boston. His approach to philosophy does not neglect technical discussions in the field, but it connects them to the broader

contexts in which they arise and suggests the influence they have had in areas outside the profession.

The third factor is Delacampagne's principle of selection, signaled by his choice of title. A brief presentation of a century of philosophy must leave a lot out, and should not do so haphazardly. Delacampagne writes about philosophy *engaged* in the great political and social events of the period. He places philosophy *in* the century, holding that it 'is essentially a political activity' (xi), and he does so from an explicitly leftist, but non-dogmatic, viewpoint. The five large chapters are organized around major politico-cultural developments in Euro-American society during the period: the consolidation of scientific achievement at the beginning of the century, the apparent end of traditional European values at the time of the First World War, the rise of Nazism and its dreadful consequences, particularly *Shoah*, the fifty year struggle of the Cold War, and the late-century questioning of reason often associated with the so-called Culture Wars.

Philosophical contributions and careers are sometimes split among a number of these chapters, to reflect the ways in which the thinkers involved have responded to these developments. The philosophers included are selected from those 'who have substantially modified the configuration of this common space' (xvii), of the historically determined problems which have become the field of study for most of those commonly regarded as philosophers during the period. While this criterion keeps the work fairly close to the interests of professionals in the three principal cultures, it does not restrict the account to holders of academic appointments in philosophy. Considerable space is given to influential non-professionals (Lenin, Spengler, Gramsci, Benjamin), and to professionals in other disciplines (De Saussure, Arendt, Lévi-Strauss). On the other hand Delacampagne acknowledges that certain interesting efforts to refocus philosophical discussion have been left out because they have remained on the margins of professional discussion.

While Delacampagne is openly leftist and accords some thinkers from that tradition more respect than they have had since the 1960s (Sartre) or since the end of the Cold War (Althusser), he is careful to take seriously and to treat with sympathy (Leo Strauss), or at least respect (Popper), a number of prominent thinkers on the Right.

Despite the merits of the book as a history of the engagement of philosophy with the important events of the century, there are two points at which it could be improved. Delacampagne's treatment of Heidegger is too strongly influenced by his recognition of the man's serious moral and intellectual failings as a collaborator with Nazism and trivializer of the Holocaust. He asks whether this political involvement is intrinsic to his philosophy or incidental to it (143), argues for the former, and then finds difficulty explaining Heidegger's post-war relations with certain Jewish intellectuals, and influence on them and a number of French Leftists. A reading more charitable to Heidegger as a thinker and more aware of human complexity would have revealed the sides of both the person and his position that would attract such associations.

There is also an omission in the book: two chapters remain to be written. Two movements gained strength throughout the century, and met with considerable success in its last forty years. Each provoked important questions about the human condition, moral and political values, the received view of reason and its progress. Each has affected discussion among professional philosophers, and has created new subcommunities of them. These movements are feminism and anti/post-colonialism. Almost no women — let alone feminists — appear here. There is but a single reference to Fanon. Such ultramarginalization deserves remedy.

Thomas Mathien
University of Toronto

Hent de Vries
Philosophy and the Turn to Religion.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Pp. xx + 476.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8018-5994-8);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8018-5996-6).

De Vries here reads Derrida's recently-developed figure of the *adieu* in two potentially contradictory ways simultaneously: as an *adieu*, a point of departure, and as *à dieu*, to God. The first he calls an apothatic, or negative theologic, gesture, and the second a cataphatic, or positive theologic, one. Derrida's recent turn towards religion is seen as drawing an analogy between deconstruction and negative theology, which is not to say that they are identical: negative theology is 'propositional' (99), privileging an indestructible unity of word and name, and promising 'an ultimate intuition' (100), whereas deconstruction, at least in its earlier guise, is and does none of these things. However, Derrida's recent 'turn' is characterised as 'an *epochē* of sorts' (101), suspending these anticipated deconstructive critiques of negative theology in favour of a line of inquiry which is so close to it as to be almost parodic.

Thus, de Vries' reading of Derrida is very much weighted towards the *via negativa*. In this 'deconstructive' (bearing in mind the above caveat), or negative theologic, view, 'God ... already contradict[s] Himself': 'the very notion of God implies and demands a full presence of Himself to Himself, an adequate self-reference, self-representation, or auto-affection' (102), and yet God *is* not, 'is' outside of all being and time, in eternity, and is the very name of that which is *a priori* to all being whatever. *God*, therefore, is the ultimate proper name (and de Vries performs a useful analysis in terms of Kripkean

rigid designators [149]), naming the same 'thing' in all possible worlds, and yet not possibly existing *within* any possible world. Contemplation of the name of God, therefore, runs the double risk of idolatry and its opposite, blasphemy, since on the one hand it implies that God and the Name of God become indistinguishable, while on the other hand it denies the existential referent of the one true name. De Vries calls this an 'aporia' (85), and sees deconstruction as affirming that the risk of idolatry and blasphemy are necessary constituents of the theological. This claim rests on a different analysis of the *gift* from that to be found in the recent work of Jean-Luc Marion. Whereas Marion sees the phenomenology of religion as an avoidance of confusion between the essence of what is given and its being-given (and thereby sees the phenomenology of religion as a discourse of revelation), de Vries follows Derrida in claiming that the given and the giving are always already inextricably confused — hence, deconstruction shares with negative theology a characteristic of being a discourse of the hidden, or of the spectral.

The notion that Being is *given* comes, of course, from Heidegger, and de Vries' reading of Heidegger's early lecture course, *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*, is perhaps the most interesting part of his book, not least because this work by Heidegger has only recently been made available, and not yet in English. De Vries examines the role of the *kairos*, the appointed time, in Heidegger's reading of Paul's conversion, and points out that it is regulated by the *hōs mē*, the 'as if not' or 'as though it were not', which 'leaves everything as it is even though it makes all the difference in the world' (200). 'What is at issue here,' claims de Vries, 'is an intentional attitude or rather *disposition* that in its Pauline form ... remains principally at odds with every possible psychological, anthropological, historical, epistemological, and axiological characterisation' (201). This is significant in terms of Heidegger scholarship, since it shows that Heidegger had already arrived at a 'non-vulgar' concept of time some time before that developed in the famous footnote on Hegel in *Being and Time*, and that, moreover, this concept is not incompatible with Christianity, at least in its primitive form. It is also significant to the understanding of the 'meaning' of negative theology, insofar as religious meaning cannot be understood through the Husserlian notion of a 'formal indication', but only by Pauline revelation in its structure of repetition, an a-logical *ur*-phenomenon which leaves everything exactly the same while subtly altering one's attitude in some way. In the early Heidegger and in Derrida, according to de Vries, this 'original Christian experience of factical life' then becomes 'a key to the understanding of factical life as such' (240).

What, then, of God? That God is there, while being 'a necessary postulate,' is 'less a theoretical assumption warranted by proof than an affirmation that resembles the mystical' (354). The proper mode of address concerning God is thus *witnessing*: 'God must witness the witness witness if the witness is to witness at all. But, then again, if God, the absolute witness, is the witness, then to witness is, in a sense, merely secondary or even superfluous, that is to say, not to witness or to witness in vain' (354). De Vries performs a similar

act of witnessing towards the words of Derrida. As an *explication du texte* his book is accurate and comprehensive, but it does not amount to an 'argument' (24), contrary to his claim.

Karl Simms
(Department of English)
University of Liverpool

Rema Rossini Favretti, Giorgio Sandri and **Roberto Scazzieri, eds.**
Incommensurability and Translation: Kuhnian Perspectives on Communication and Theory Change.
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar 1999.
Pp. xiii + 507.
US$100.00. ISBN 1-85898-943-4.

This volume consists primarily of articles emerging from the International Conference on 'Languages of Science', organized by the University of Bologna in October 1995. It is constructed around the late developments of Thomas Kuhn's work in history and philosophy of science, exploring an evolutionary theory of scientific knowledge and providing the basis for a new linguistic approach to methodology. The issue of linguistic transformation (from human experience to its representation in description and knowledge) emerges as a critical step in most contributions, and suggests the emergence of a commonality of themes across a wide spectrum of scholarly interests. Contributors from the fields of philosophy, history of science, linguistics, logic and economics take inspiration from Kuhn's work to address a wide range of issues in the pragmatic dimension of language, the internal ambiguity of linguistic standards, and the critical role of constructive translation as a bridge between seemingly incommensurable paradigms and cultures. The introductory essay by the editors outlines the intellectual project associated with the volume and proposes a unifying framework for the variety of research lines by which the linguistic roots of knowledge are currently evaluated.

In the Eighties and Nineties, Kuhn's thought underwent what has been called a 'linguistic turn', that is, an increasing tendency to emphasize the role played by taxonomic lexicons and language learning processes in the characterization of scientific revolutions and incommensurability. Indeed, Kuhn's published works of the last two decades document successive stages of development in an evolving reflection upon incommensurability; the

opening essay of the volume represents the latest published statement of his views.

Kuhn focuses on *language* as the key element of knowledge acquisition and theory formation. He argues that language and, more specifically, structured lexicons, are constitutive of phenomenal worlds and possible experiences of them: the term 'theory' replaces both the abused term 'paradigm' and its revised, too general version, 'disciplinary matrix', which ranges from methodology to ontology (many of the authors still use the old terminology). He develops a taxonomic version of the incommensurability thesis, according to which incommensurable theories employ different systems of taxonomic categories; the (restricted) set of the terms that refer to such categories are interdefined, and translation problems arise between them. Every scientific theory displays a taxonomically ordered network of kind-concepts or kind-terms (which may be natural, social or scientific). These are functional for both constituting phenomenal worlds and formulating scientific problems, and since meanings are tied to lexical structures, all earlier characterizations of incommensurability in the sense of problem, meaning and world changes are unified by the underlying notion of structural lexical change. Incommensurability is not the product of a failure of translation of individual concepts: scientists, as well as historians, face incommensurability problems because they construct different lexical taxonomies, and thus classify the world differently. Members of different scientific communities (*i.e.*, of different language communities that share and employ different lexicons) can learn from each other through interpretation. Bilingualism ensures the possibility of communication and of rational theory appraisal and choice: meaning variance and problems of translation do not imply the impossibility of comparison, nor does incommensurability imply relativism.

Knowledge, according to Kuhn, is 'embedded in and projected from language' (34): the authors consider language primarily as a means by which human experience is 'construed' and transformed, rather than simply as means by which human experience is 'described' and turned into an intersubjective cognitive endowment. Within this context, the notion of localized translation failure between interdefined sets of terms, a central feature of Kuhn's later account of incommensurability (and one of the most significant refinements of his original position), is taken up to argue that local incommensurability and imperfect translation entail greater emphasis upon the pragmatical dimension of language, and suggest that argumentation and dialogue, rather than explicit rules of inference, could be a critical element in inducing the intertranslatability of languages and the emergence of widely shared, yet dynamic, standards of communication.

Contributions to the second section of the volume, 'Communicating Science', are meant to assess the role of linguistic standards in the communication of scientific knowledge: they address the issue of how to identify the fundamental patterns of scientific communication, how to relate them with the structures of ordinary language, and how to set up a suitable analytical framework for the interpretation of scientific discourse. Attention is drawn,

in particular, to the critical role of debate in scientific communication, suggesting that the dynamics of scientific knowledge are closely intertwined with the dynamics of scientific 'dialogues', in which knowledge is accumulated by moving from one discourse stage to another. It follows that objectivity and rationality come to be redefined in terms of the 'rhetorical' rules governing scientific debate, while the progressive character of knowledge emerges as an epistemic property internal to scientific dialectics.

This, however, poses a serious problem to any realist views of science. Kuhn's denial that lexicons may be true or false takes the form of a denial of correspondence between theory and reality: truth is internal to lexicons in the sense that its use is restricted to assessing claims made within the context of a lexicon. As such, truth's scope is severely limited: rejecting the *correspondence theory of truth*, Kuhn rejects the idea that the categorial structure of a theory may reflect the 'world in itself', independently of the theory. We can only evaluate the assertions stated within a given lexical context: their logical status is that of meanings and words in general — a convention we can justify only in a pragmatic way.

Stefano Gattei
University of Milan

Judith Green
Deep Democracy:
Community, Diversity, and Transformation.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
1999. Pp. iii + 243.
US$57.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-9270-1);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-9271-X).

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent political reorganization of Eastern European countries along Western democratic lines, it would appear that the ideals embodied in the formal institutional structures of the democratic state have been embraced by a good portion of the world's populations. Yet, according to Judith Green, the institution of formal democratic structures is not an indication that individuals have embraced democratic ideals. In fact, the general reliance on formal structural democracy has resulted in a less deeply felt commitment to democratic ideals, not only in newly emerging democratic states, but in already existing societies such as the United States. The problem with relying on formal democratic structures as opposed to a deeply understood conception of democracy is that '*a purely formal democracy is existentially unsustaining and culturally unsustainable,*

as well as ideologically hollow and operationally subvertible' (vi). The solution to the problems inherent with purely formal conceptions of democracy is more democracy or what Green terms 'deep democracy' which is *a realistic, historically grounded ideal, a desired and desirable future possibility that is yet to be*' (ix).

Green's deep democracy is a radical pragmatism based upon the work of John Dewey, Alain Locke, Cornel West and Martin Luther King Jr. By synthesizing and reconstructing the views of these various philosophers, Green believes that positive social and individual democratic transformation can occur which is sensitive to racial, cultural, historical, economic and geographic diversity. Such a transformation would improve upon our currently flawed, and purely formal democratic model, by moving us away from the concept of the 'Great Society' toward that of the 'Great Community' (30).

The philosophy of deep democracy is not presented in its entirety, but is developed throughout the first five chapters of the book. Chapter one defends the notion of a deeply democratic community against postmodernist critiques which claim that such communities are inherently oppressive (x). Having dispensed with the theoretical objections to the deeply democratic community in the first chapter, chapter two considers which of two schools of thought — the pragmatism of John Dewey or the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas — is best able to aid in developing a 'practical philosophy of democratic transformation in community life' (15). In the end, Green concludes that Dewey's pragmatism, when informed by the critical theory of Habermas, results in a 'radical critical pragmatism' particularly suited to the task at hand.

Chapter three builds on the previous chapter by considering how Dewey's philosophy, when properly reconstructed, can help in guiding the transformation of our current formal democratic societies into 'the deeply democratic community' (55). Although Dewey provides a valuable starting point for the development of deep democracy, his work is incomplete and requires supplementation.

In chapter four, Green attempts to fill out Dewey's general prescriptions for deepening democracy by combining them with the work of Alain Locke. Locke offers a much needed 'critical-empirical' social science or anthropology that aids deepening democracy by finding commonalities between various groups. According to Green, part of the process of forging a deeper sense of democracy between individuals and individual communities is demonstrating their shared fundamental 'common human values' (186), as well as demonstrating how different cultural values can be tolerated within a democratic society.

While the work of both Dewey and Locke contributes substantially to Green's theory of deep democracy, in and of themselves they lack the motivational force necessary to bring about the changes in individuals' perceptions and attitudes toward others, and their concomitant commitment to 'transforming our democratically deficient societies' (135). In order to facilitate this transformation of the individual and consequently of demo-

cratic institutions, Green appeals to West's and King's prophetic pragmatisms as examples of how effective social transformation can be accomplished, even in instances where there is powerful social oppositions to such change. The powerful transformative effect prophetic pragmatism can have on entrenched power structures is especially apparent in the way in which it was used during the 1950s and 1960s Civil Rights Movement in the United States. Green holds that the methods employed by King in the Civil Rights Movement can further inform the development of radical pragmatism.

Finally, chapters six and seven illustrate the ways that deep democracy can and has been attained through real world applications of the philosophy of radical pragmatism. Included are examples of alternative banking practices in India which offer 'micro-loans' to small rural businesses, and Green's own work with various communities around Seattle which were attempting to 'rebuild the public square' through initiatives involving education, job creation for the city's poor and underemployed, and more inclusive citizen participation in public decision making (212).

While Green's book touches on a number of interesting questions in democratic theory, some of her more compelling points are obscured by the particular approach she takes to developing her philosophy. In particular, the exegesis of Dewey's work is at times excessive. Additionally, it should be noted that although Green situates herself within the pragmatic tradition, her approach is more akin to postmodernist and continental philosophizing. Consequently, such an approach may not appeal to those interested in more traditional analytic approaches to social and political theorizing.

Mark C. Vopat
University of Western Ontario

M.A.R. Habib
The Early T.S. Eliot and Western Philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1999.
Pp. xii + 289.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-521-62433-9.

'Footfalls echo in the memory / Down the passage which we did not take / Towards the door we never opened ... ' In 1915, Eliot stood at the doorway of academic philosophy but chose poetry instead. Rafey Habib's scholarly and fascinating book describes the philosophy Eliot took with him when he crossed that crucial threshold.

A remarkable polymath, tracing Eliot's formative reading would be interesting enough: but Habib argues that the separate currents in this extraordinary intellect are part of a wider river, flowing powerfully through Eliot's

life (1888-1965). Four currents Habib analyses in depth: the central role of idealism in his philosophy, the anti-bourgeois dialectic in his political writings, the insistent note of irony in his poetry and the seminal place of tradition in his aesthetics. The common factor? 'The One and the Many', almost a mantra by the end of Habib's book.

Henri Bergson, a seminal influence, suggested that the central task of philosophy was 'to lay down the general conditions of the direct, immediate observation of oneself by oneself'. Such a self-consciousness marks a great deal of the early Eliot, personally and artistically, from the morbid self-questioning of Prufrock to the multiple narrative voices of 'The Waste Land'.

Faced with the fragmentation of his life in this period, would Eliot not instinctively be drawn to the promise of unity and wholeness in others? But — the crucial question — is the thinker shaped by his reading, or drawn to his reading by his thoughts? Habib's answer is complex and not altogether satisfactory.

Marx is something of a ghost at this intellectual feast. Habib wants to depict vast eddies of intellectual currents in the great river of ideas and there is often more than a hint of Marxist inevitability in his account. Hobsbawm, Lukacs and Marcuse are all quoted approvingly, and Eagleton's influence acknowledged in the Preface. But how did Eliot's ferocious intellect select from within his voracious reading? What did he disagree with, or pass through unscathed and which parts of his thought owe little to anyone, and are most genuinely his own?

The four themes in this book — philosophical, political, poetic and aesthetic — work variably. Philosophically, Habib makes most progress when showing Eliot at work on specific predecessors. The chapters on Bergson (Ch 2) and Kant (Ch 4) are first-rate. Much of this work we have seen already, but it is good to see it here in its proper context. When Habib dissects one mind working on another, it is clear and compelling. What is much less convincing is Habib's 'pure' philosophy. 'The One and the Many' occurs countless times, but nowhere do we find even a paragraph of sustained explanation of what this question is and why it has gripped philosophy for so long. Too often, it seems a weak equivalent of 'how parts relate to wholes'. If he could convince us the question is (a) important and (b) difficult, he could yet have the overall focus he seeks.

On Eliot's doctoral dissertation on Bradley's 'Appearance and Reality' Habib makes more progress than most. It's a doubly difficult work, because the original Bradley is far from easy and because Eliot is using it in a highly allusive way. Habib senses that Eliot's dissertation has a number of philosophical fish to fry apart from Bradley. He lands a fair few, but plenty escape.

His chapter on Realism (Ch 7) nowhere gets a confident grip on this slippery term, and generalising over three centuries doesn't inspire confidence. 'Realism is not just a literary technique but a vast historical phenomenon with economic, ideological, philosophic and religious ramifications' (188). Can anything so wide be meaningful? Why not concentrate, say, on the 'Metaphysical Realism' of universals and particulars? But when he writes

'Hence, at its deepest level, Eliot's problem with realism goes back to its incoherent treatment of the connection between universals and particulars' (201), it is possibly not only Eliot who has problems.

Habib is on stronger ground on Eliot's embryonic political and aesthetic awareness. 'Bourgeois' is too often used without proper definition, but the broad thrust of a rejection of New England roots in search of the ill-defined grail of 'Europe', creating in the process its own 'Tradition', is compelling.

On the poems themselves this fine book really scores. Habib brings the wealth of his dense learning to his critical readings and his contention that the irony is all pervasive and centrally important is convincingly demonstrated. Irony in Eliot's hands is so much more than a literary trope, and its full philosophical place in the realism/idealism debate is well presented. Habib drives us back to the texts themselves, and occasionally alters permanently our reading of them, such as his focus on the words 'smile' in 'Portrait of a Lady' and 'real' and 'unreal' in 'The Waste Land', with credit to Bernard Bergonzi.

Habib's decision to tackle 'The Waste Land' selectively, concentrating on the diversity of narrative voices centred on the pseudo-narrator Tiresias, gives an excellent reading of the poem as well as a powerfully focused conclusion to the book. Talking to himself, shoring these fragments against his ruin, the narrative voice becomes an ironic paradigm for early Eliot as both man and thinker, mocking idealism and irony, and parodying bourgeois behaviour and ill-founded individualism by turn.

Philosophically, aesthetically, politically, things weren't what they used to be. But then they never were. So let us go then, you and I, and face the probably inevitable sense of fragmentation we feel today looking back at the apparent wholeness of yesterday. Does Eliot solve this problem, or merely encapsulate it in an unforgettable way, the ultimate objective correlative? 'Its [The Waste Land's] deepest irony, perhaps', Habib writes in conclusion, 'is that, unable to offer a solution for the malaise of contemporary experience, it articulately embodies the problem'. But isn't that precisely where the philosopher and the artist diverge, one to seek to *solve* the great intellectual questions, the other to carve them in marble? And isn't that why Eliot himself finally chose the marble?

Paul Shaw
University of Liverpool

Paget Henry
Caliban's Reason:
Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy.
New York: Routledge 2000. Pp. xiii + 304.
US$80.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-92645-9);
US$21.99 (paper: ISBN 0-415-92646-7).

This book is the latest contribution to the Routledge *Books in the Africana Thought* series, and it introduces a developing philosophical tradition to those philosophers who have an interest in issues such as race, racism, agency, subjectivity, and postcolonialism, etc.. Henry politely repels the seductive lure of ideological posturing, convoluted nationalist rhetoric, and emotionally charged clichés. By avoiding these distractions, the flow of the text overrides any sort of theoretical or analytical cognitive turbulence. Similarly, one will not find in it narratives of pathology organized around innocent colonial subjects terrorized into passivity by colonial masters.

The main issues discussed are the cosmogonic/ontogenetic and hierophanic nature of African philosophy, its colonial invisibility in Afro-Caribbean philosophy, and the two major schools of Caribbean thought: Poeticism and Historicism. These issues are, in turn, oriented around self, agency, ego formation, and social reality. Poeticists link any genuine transformation of Caribbean society to prior changes in the self conception, agency and ego genesis of Afro-Caribbean subjects through the creative media of the arts. Historicists maintain that institutional changes in the social, economic and political realities of Caribbean society must precede any meaningful transformation of self and agency.

In order to set the stage for his discussion, Henry volunteers a characterization of philosophy and of Afro-Caribbean philosophy. Philosophy, according to Henry, 'is an intertextually embedded discursive practice, and not an isolated or absolutely autonomous one' (2). He goes on to state that Afro-Caribbean philosophy is 'an internally differentiated and intertextually embedded discourse. Its formation and current structure reflect the imperial history of the cultural system that has been housed by the larger discursive field of Caribbean society' (3). I consider this intertextual understanding of Afro-Caribbean philosophy constructive, for it betrays Henry's embrace of existential phenomenology; he is after a description of the being-in-the world of Afro-Caribbean subjects, hence the title *Caliban's Reason*. The text consists of three sections, divided into ten chapters. Part One explores foundational issues in Afro-Caribbean philosophy: The African philosophical heritage, the historicism of C.L.R. James, the poeticism and existentialism of Frantz Fanon, and the poeticism of Wilson Harris. Henry argues that Afro-Caribbean philosophy must rescue the African philosophical heritage from 'clouds of invisibility'. Correctly describing the colonial reality as creating circumstances that lead to a 'battle for space' among various discursive formations, he argues that this battle still rages and that Afro-Caribbean philosophy can fulfill its destiny to the extent that it, among other things,

reclaims its African heritage. Ego formation and displacement, as well as spirituality, are some of the main themes of the African philosophical tradition.

James, being an historicist, argues for the central importance of history, claiming that it is on the historical stage that social and political change takes place. But, while emphasizing a social ontology grounded in history, James unfortunately goes along with the European denigration of traditional African thought. Here, Henry's discussion of James is revealing, for he demonstrates that the premodern/modern distinction is operative in James's thinking. Africa is premodern and primitive, whereas Europe is modern and advanced.

Fanon wishes to arrest the process of identity destruction that accompanies the racialization of Africans facilitated through colonial discourses that consider Africans primitive and inferior to Europeans. Referring to the 'existential deviations' of the colonial encounter and the 'zones of nonbeing' suffered by blacks as a consequence of ego collapse, he emphasizes the creative opportunity to reclaim the self in the midst of egological disasters. Despite Fanon's original contribution to the study of the trauma of colonial situation, I think that Henry should have qualified Fanon's thinking in such a way as to point out his possible embrace of pathology while not sufficiently emphasizing collective agency.

It is Harris who avoids the limitations of James and Fanon. Harris warns about attempts to treat everyday realities as absolute. In emphasizing the universal consciousness that intrudes upon everyday cultural realities, Harris denounces the folly of adopting a conception of self that is ontically grounded in its own partiality. Self-renewal and cultural renewal emerge from the crises characteristic of conflicts between self and world, as well as those between cultures. Finally, Harris urges a greater openness to symmetries in order to avoid the asymmetries that breed fanaticism.

Section Two focuses on poststructuralism, rationality and Africana thought. It leads off with a discussion of Sylvia Wynter's poststructuralist and postcolonial poeticism. Wynter introduces the notion of liminal categories, categories that directly oppose the foundational categories of any ideological discourse. She claims that all systems of thought tend to support binary conceptual structures that later undermine themselves. Being a Caribbean poeticist, she states that Caribbean thinkers should not only expose the liminality of Western thought but should, as well, expose the structural flaws built into various ideological schemes in the Caribbean that have resulted in historical wreckage. Wynter, as Henry correctly understands, is a significant thinker because she champions a sensible construal of postmodernism that does not flirt with nihilistic tendencies.

In considering Africana thought, Henry maintains that the Africana philosophical tradition is a phenomenological history of Africana subjectivity, an inquiry into the various constructions of agency. This collaborative effort is the project of making visible the black humanity that has been rendered invisible.

Henry, in Part Three, pursues a reconstruction of Caribbean historicism in its Pan-Africanist manifestations. Blyden defends a providential historicism, viewing history as the arena of providence where racial conflict follows a logic determined by God. Garvey embraced a racial historicism, viewing history as trapped in a cycle of racial struggles, but he too fails to extend any legitimacy to traditional African thought and culture. Rastafarians continue in the tradition of racial and historical providential historicism, currently oscillating between attributing the cause of their suffering to the evil actions of their oppressors, and attributing it to the 'disobedient ways' of their African ancestors. Henry's discussion here exposes the paralysis of thought that literalism can induce.

Henry discusses Caribbean Marxism in light of the Neoliberal and Linguistic turns. Because of shortage of space, I will examine the more philosophically relevant discussion of the postmodernist and poststructuralist challenge to Caribbean Marxism. There are roughly three arguments directed against the effectiveness of Marxism in the Caribbean context: (1) discursive totalizing, (2) specular doubling, and (3) structural complicity. Henry claims that these have not produced effective barriers to revolutionary action, hence we should not take the postmodernist challenge seriously. Finally, in discussing the prospects of a reconstruction of Caribbean historicism, Henry discusses internal problems of unity and totalizing strategies, contextual problems, and problems of praxis. The general thrust of this discussion is to move Caribbean historicism away from its materialist infatuation and align it more closely with the immateriality of poeticism.

A minor concern is Henry's sociological deviation into the current neoliberal challenge that capitalism poses to Caribbean society, a deviation that forces his involvement with globalism. This is interesting but distracts from the immediate philosophical relevance of poeticism, historicism, and African existentialism. Furthermore, although he cautiously portrays poeticism and historicism as being involved in friendly disagreement, he should have done more to expose the philosophical shortcomings of historicism and its discursive impact, and their impeding of the theoretical development of Afro-Caribbean philosophy through an excessive emphasis on the materiality of politics. Despite these concerns, I strongly recommend this text for anyone seeking to learn more about Afro-Caribbean philosophy and Africana thought. It is itself a masterful illustration of dialectical intertextuality at its best.

Clevis Headley
Florida Atlantic University

Ellen A. Herda
Research Conversations and Narrative: A Critical Hermeneutic Orientation in Participatory Inquiry.
Westport, CT: Praeger 1999. Pp. 173.
US$59.95. ISBN 0-275-96105-2.

A small but significant work undertaking a reconciliation of Phenomenology and Practice, a daunting task Ellen A. Herda coherently composes into pedagogical praxis. Herda's presentation of phenomenological hermeneutic praxis is as much an advocation of phenomenology proper, as it is a critique upon the limitations of analytic 'objective' research. Herda quickly sets her terms, telling us that, 'hermeneutic means interpretation; thus, critical hermeneutics, in a general sense, means passing judgment on that interpretation — speaking out on its legitimacy' (3). The terms 'judging', 'understanding' and 'learning' are the focus of this work, symbolically locating this text's structural trinity.

This text is categorized into three sections, commencing with a comparison of *techne* and *phronesis*, moving through the ethical shift in hermeneutic tradition towards ontology, and finally resting in a practical discussion about social sciences research 'protocol', at least as it relates to pedagogical methodologies of 'learning'. In this work Herda follows a familiar Habermasean theme: the opportunistic affect of the interpretation of history, and understanding of one's self on positive terms leads to a healthy variety of imaginative learning that stresses knowledge of self through other, or to use Herda's terms, 'an understanding can serve ... to mediate the past, which can be related to the development of a just social text' (10).

Moreover, Herda laments that 'most of our tests [in the Humanities and Social Sciences] are designed to measure retention of information, not understanding' (133). Such pedagogy is specious considering learning and knowledge are dynamic, events involving perpetual reintroduction of texts. 'The fundamental difference here between metaphysics and hermeneutics is that an event happens, it is an action, a process,' Herda insists. 'The object, coordinated or interconnected with the subject, is an event happens' (136). Such learning, 'involves changing people's patterns of thought and action, which, in turn, happens only when an individual has achieved a fusion of horizons' (129). As such, pedagogy itself assumes a political function as learning regiments are always already morally instantiated, and constitutive of moral action. Learning, 'entails entering into moral and political discourse with a historical understanding of the issues at hand, risking part of one's tradition and current prejudices, and at times, seeing the importance of community and social cohesiveness over specific desires of the individual' (86).

This is all well and good but does Herda genuinely dramatize an ethically informed practise, and if so, what in fact is it? We are repeatedly told that, 'The move from epistemology of hermeneutics to ontology of language as the

basis for hermeneutic study puts the burden and the privilege on man to learn to listen and to wait,' but is this merely naive? (54) Ultimately, judging the success of this project relies on whether or not one believes that morality should inform all aspects of social science research. If one is already a phenomenologist, then Herda's work demonstrates, at least to some degree, how hermeneutics can help one be more communally informed when conducting research. If one is not swayed by arguments such as those found in Gadamer, Ricœur and Habermas, however, there is little here that will satisfy you. As a work of praxis then, Herda's work does authenticate how hermeneutics can be applied in social research, but, philosophically, this work opposes nothing that has not been contested before.

William A. Martin
McMaster University

Paul Horwich
Meaning.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1999.
Pp. xi + 241.
Cdn$101.00: US$55.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-823728-6);
Cdn$34.95: US$19.95
(paper: ISBN 0-19-823824-X).

Meaning is Paul Horwich's attempt to formulate and defend a use theory of meaning which is semantically deflationist in the sense that it

> minimizes theoretical aspirations by renouncing the demand for (a) any nominalistic reduction of meaning entities, (b) any analysis of the schema "*x* means *f*-ness", (c) any explanation of substantive *a priori* knowledge, (d) any non-trivial account of compositionality, and (e) any intrinsically normative meaning-constituting properties. (10-11)

The book is meant to pay off some of the debts he accrued in his important book *Truth*. Along the way, Horwich discusses a number of the most influential of what are often taken to be constraints on a theory of meaning, deriving from what is involved in (among other things) the normativity and compositionality of meaning and the apparently relational nature of meaning ascriptions. Horwich argues that his use theory of meaning is consistent with a proper understanding of each of these matters. In this brief review I want to examine two of these arguments.

I should begin however with a brief review of the distinct features of Horwich's use theory of meaning. Horwich identifies the meaning of a word with the concept it expresses and identifies concepts with properties. His central doctrine is that the meaning-properties of a given word *w* — those properties in virtue of which *w* means what it does — are a subset of the regularities of *w*'s use, as follows: 'for each word, *w*, there is a regularity of the form "All uses of *w* stem from its possession of acceptance property *A*(*x*)" where *A*(*x*) gives the circumstances in which certain specified sentences containing *w* are accepted' (45). The idea is that the data constituting 'all the facts regarding a person's linguistic behavior' can be 'unified and explained in terms of a relatively small and simple body of factors and principles including, for each word, a basic use regularity.' One implication is that we can treat two words as expressing the same concept (as having the same meaning) when they have the same basic acceptance property.

Horwich is well aware of the various sorts of objections one might level against a regularity-based use-theory of meaning; his treatment of these takes up more than half of the book. Of the objections he considers I want to discuss two: one deriving from an intuition to the effect that meaning ascriptions ought to be given a relational analysis, and the other deriving from the normativity of meaning. (In both cases considerations of space prevent the sort of detailed examination that Horwich's interesting arguments deserve.)

To begin, Horwich notes that it is natural to suppose that sentences of the form '*w* means *F*' (where '*w*' is replaced by an expression designating a word and '*F*' is replaced by an expression designating a concept) ought to receive a relational analysis. On such a view, what it is for *w* to mean *F* is for *w* to stand in some kind of (meaning-constituting) relation to *f*s (i.e., the items that fall under the concept *F*). Horwich recognizes, however, that endorsing this 'natural' assumption is inconsistent with his deflationist view, since according to that view '*w* means *F*' is analyzed as '*A*(*w*)', where '*A*(*x*)' designates the fundamental acceptance property of the concept *F*. Thus Horwich finds himself having to combat the natural relationist analysis as leading to (what for him is) an unacceptable 'inflationism' about meaning, according to which meaning is a relation holding between words and the things that fall in their extension. His objection to inflationism is two-fold: first, that theories of meaning which attempt to accommodate the inflationist (relationist) intuitions are unacceptable; and second, that the intuitions themselves are not beyond criticism.

In his attempt to make a case for the latter Horwich offers what strikes me as an important contribution to the theory of meaning. He argues that it is simply a fallacy to infer, from the correct claim that '*w* means *F*' contains the relation '*x* means *y*', to the claim that whatever constitutes the property '*x* means *y*' must itself have a relational nature (21). On the contrary, he argues, the latter claim (construed as a universally-quantified thesis) is simply false, as seen in examples of properties (i) designated by expressions with a relational form but (ii) which nonetheless are constituted by a property

that has no underlying relational nature. An example is the property designated by '*x* exemplifies *f*-ness': though the linguistic representation of this property contains the relation '*x* exemplifies *y*', the property designated by '*x* exemplifies *f*-ness' is constituted by a property which is not relational at all (i.e., the constitut*ing* property is that designated by '*f*(*x*)') (25). It is this diagnosis of and argument against relationalist analyses of meaning ascriptions that strikes me as quite interesting; and in this respect it would be worthwhile to compare Horwich's views on these matters with those of other 'deflationary' theories of meaning which make related points against 'inflated' conceptions of meaning, reference, and/or truth (Chapter 5 of Brandom's *Making It Explicit* comes to mind).

Now let us ask what can be made of these considerations. Horwich is surely right to insist that grammatical form is no infallible guide to logical form. What is more, his claim that inflationism is a substantive and non-mandatory doctrine about how to analyze meaning ascriptions will put those who favor such analyses on the alert: the 'inflationist' assumptions that guide such analyses require motivation. At the same time, however, for all Horwich says there may well remain options open to such theorists. For example, one might think to motivate relational analyses on the ground that it is only by relating words to the things they designate that we can hope to do real semantics — the worry being that everything else will leave us unable to see how language bears on the world (even if it makes clear how we use such terms as 'refers' and 'true'). To be sure, to anyone not already in the grip of such a worry the worry itself would have to be motivated, and this may prove difficult to do. But the little that Horwich does have to say for example about the representational aspect of language (27-30 and 107-11) does not strike me as having the convincing force required to convince someone in the grip of this worry to give it up (though his comments may well convince those who don't have this worry that they need not feel it). In short, an impasse worthy of further discussion.

A second objection considered by Horwich derives from the normative aspect of meaning. Kripke's Wittgenstein had argued that the meaning of a word *w* is supposed to determine the conditions of *w*'s *correct* application, and so is a normative affair. Further, Kripke's Wittgenstein had offered reasons to think that no regularity theory, based as it would be on the *actual* use of a word, can ground the standards of *correct* use of the word — with the result that no regularity theory (indeed, no merely descriptive theory) can account for the normativity of meaning. Horwich's response is to argue that, while meaning is indeed a normative affair, it is not *intrinsically* normative, but instead can be explained in part pragmatically: one ought to use one words in certain ways and no others if one aims to be understood by one's linguistic peers (186). Horwich goes further and suggests that there are still other (epistemic and moral) norms — for example, about believing and speaking the truth — which (together with practical considerations) can be used to explain the normativity of language.

However, even if this establishes that normativity need not preclude naturalistic accounts of meaning, things are not quite so clear when it comes to determining *which* norms are associated with *which* expressions. Horwich's view is that the norms associated with a given word w are those that are consequences of (descriptions of) w's fundamental acceptance property (221). But this seems merely to re-locate the problem to which Kripke's Wittgenstein had pointed, rather than to solve it. For we can now ask how we are to determine the fundamental acceptance property of w (as against skeptical hypotheses regarding which property that is). Again, an impasse worthy of further discussion.

It would be unfair in the extreme if I were to leave the impression that Horwich's theory does not have the resources with which to respond to these would-be criticisms. On the contrary, one of the greatest virtues of this short book is that where it is not explicit it is quite suggestive regarding how to handle a whole battery of objections, and I have little doubt that among his responses are materials with which to assemble responses to the foregoing. (I should add that Horwich's awareness of potential objections is quite impressive: in one chapter he lists twenty-four!) So I have little doubt that *Meaning* will considerably advance future discussions of these topics. What is more, it should advance discussions on other topics as well: in particular, on the significance of the compositionality of meaning. (In a chapter devoted to this topic, Horwich argues that the compositionality of meaning does not establish a very substantive constraint on theories of meaning — and his argument here is sure to generate a great deal of attention.) For this reason Horwich's book ought to be read by anyone with an interest in the questions which have dominated contemporary philosophy of language. And I would say further that it is *required* reading for anyone whose research deals with the logical form of meaning ascriptions, the normativity of meaning, and/or the compositionality of meaning.

Sanford Goldberg
University of Kentucky

S.L. Hurley
Consciousness in Action.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1998. Pp. xii + 506.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-674-16420-2).

Hurley's *Consciousness in Action* (henceforth *CA*) contains ten highly original, densely argued, interrelated essays on the nature and unity of consciousness, the relationships of consciousness to underlying neurophysiological processes and environmental stimuli, and the connections among consciousness, perception and action. The essays are preceded by a helpful introduction which articulates the main thematic connections among them. There is also a twenty-page appendix, which systematically outlines the arguments from each section of the book. *CA* exhibits the astonishing breadth of knowledge, technical virtuosity and subtle analyses Hurley's readers have come to expect in her work, and it puts these in the service of the (largely successful) critique of what she dubs the 'Input-Output Picture' (IOP) of the relationship between mind and world. Those held captive by this picture tend 'to regard perception and action as buffer zones mediating between mind and world,' identifying perception as 'input from world to mind' and action 'as output from mind to world' (1). Hurley charges that although there may be limiting cases in which these identifications are appropriate, the IOP's assumption that they always hold is overly simplistic. She argues for its replacement by a 'Two-Level Interdependence View' (TLIV), a view which both challenges the relative autonomy of action, perception and mind, and that accounts for their interdependence by means of a distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of mental activity.

Hurley's TLIV understands organisms, as described at the subpersonal level, as 'dynamic singularities,' that is, 'structural singularities in the field of causal flows characterized through time by a tangle of multiple feedback loops of varying orbits' (2). This dynamic singularity model is in turn supposed to explain the interdependence of perception and action as constituents of the conscious 'perspective' of human and nonhuman animals in a way that 'does not support sharp causal boundaries either between mind and world or between perception and action' (3) at the personal level. While the two levels, as described by Hurley, may well cohere in the way she claims, the explanatory relation between them does seem somewhat overstated. Rather, the TLIV presents at most a necessary (not a sufficient) condition of the personal-level interdependence of perception and action.

Hurley's presentation of her TLIV in opposition to the IOP is divided into two parts. The first focuses on the role of the unity of consciousness as a condition for animal or human perspective, the second on the interdependence of and parallels between perception and action, especially as evidenced by recent discoveries in neuropsychology. Hurley does not clearly say why these are the two sections into which a treatment of her topic would naturally break down, and this question seems especially relevant to the unity of

consciousness since there are presumably numerous other necessary conditions for the possession of a perspective. But a pathbreaking investigation of this kind should not be overly criticized for its inevitable incompleteness, especially since the foci of Hurley's approach are intrinsically related to other topics, many of which (e.g., the nature of distinctly self-conscious perspectives, the accessibility of the contents of consciousness to both cognition and intentionality, and the attack on the often assumed isomorphism of contents and their subpersonal vehicles) figure prominently as interconnected 'subplots' throughout the essays.

Although Hurley's book is interdisciplinary on the whole, most of the essays in Part I, 'Action and the Unity of Consciousness', are markedly philosophical. Her main aim is to work towards an account of the unity of perceptual consciousness that avoids the difficulties of both 'subjective' and 'objective' traditional approaches based on the IOP. Taking her cue from Kant, she argues that the unity of consciousness can be understood by reference to its occurrence as a form of synthesizing activity. Following Kant, Hurley rejects subjective views, which attempt to account for unity in terms of the contents of consciousness, because they illicitly presuppose the unity of those contents themselves. Objective views, such as those that seek to explain unity in terms of relationships between beliefs and desires, are somewhat more promising in that they try to account for unity in terms of norms of consistency governing an agent/perceiver's overall mental life. But consistency itself is merely a necessary condition of unity, for it is possible for the perceptual contents of separate (possibly duplicate) consciousnesses to be normatively consistent with each other and with the contents of their respective intentional states. Unlike Kant, who ultimately appeals to the spontaneous conceptualizing power of transcendental apperception to explain the unity of consciousness, Hurley proposes an empirical solution in terms of dynamic feedback between subpersonal-level inputs and outputs as well as between personal-level perceptual and intentional contents. The rigorous arguments Hurley sets forth do indeed show the need to construe perception as implicitly active in some way. However the case for her own specific Two-Level account is best made in the second part of her book.

The essays in Part II of *CA*, 'Perception and Action', relate Hurley's TLIV to current debates between internalists and externalists about mental content and shows how recent findings in neuropsychology can be interpreted to undermine the assumptions on which the debate rests. Internalists hold that mental content is 'autonomous' in the sense that internal states of a perceiver wholly determine what the perceiver's thoughts are about. Externalists disagree and hold that mental content is 'context-dependent' in that it intrinsically involves the world and its objects. Hurley focuses on the two types of thought experiments, those involving the notion of an Inverted Earth and those involving Inverted Qualia, that often arise in debates over the nature of mental content. She calls attention to the fact that both types involve a 'Duplication Assumption', according to which it makes sense to suppose that either internal states can be duplicated in different environ-

ments or that an organism's relations to the external world can be duplicated while internal states differ. But the Duplication Assumption can be called into question through refinements in these thought experiments that highlight the interplay between perception and action. Hurley uses modified versions of the Inverted Earth and Inverted Qualia thought experiments in which spatial features of the world are systematically distorted to argue that in such cases 'it is hard to make sense of an active, perspective-bearing creature whose central nervous system could be dynamically duplicated in certain spatially distorted environments' (9). Hurley draws the conclusion that it is the IOP underlying the Duplication Assumption that is at fault. She then draws upon neuropsychological experiments involving patients suffering from unilateral neglect, adaptation to left-right and color reversing spectacles, tactile stimulation as a substitute for visual cues, and biofeedback control over body and brain processes, to argue that the surprising results of these cases can most plausibly be explained by abandoning the IOP and replacing it with the TLIV.

Hurley's is certainly not the first theory of perception and action to depart from the IOP. As she explains in the last essay of the volume, the minority of philosophers and psychologists reacting against the IOP historically tended to deny either its linear model of the causal relationship between perception and action or its assumption that perception and action are merely instrumentally, but not constitutively, interdependent. 'Ecological' and behaviorist views of perception reject the former and latter assumptions, respectively, but they fail to integrate their insights into a view of perception and action that both accounts for the importance of feedback in their 'loopy' causal flow and shows how they are partly constitutive of one another (420-35). Hurley instead favors the development of a view that merges the best of motor theories of perception and 'control systems' theories of action. Towards the end of her essay, she summarizes her vision thus: 'Motor theory accounts for perception in motor as well as sensory terms. Control systems theory accounts for action in sensory as well as motor terms. Neither is one-sided. Both can appeal to complex dynamic feedback systems at the subpersonal level. We can combine them to get one way of filling in a Two-Level Interdependence View' (445). This last suggestion, backed by Hurley's persuasive criticism of IOP and related views, is illustrative of the skill she shows throughout *CA* in marshaling evidence so as to fit it into a broader perspective within which it can be synthesized in novel and surprising ways.

To sum up, *CA* is a significant work not only because of its depth, originality and impressive detail, but also because its integration of philosophy with neuropsychology and cognitive science provides new avenues of research for philosophers concerned about the nature of the mind, perception, and action. Perhaps the most important implication of the book's essays (although it is certainly not a new thesis) is that at the personal level, 'the self does not lurk hidden somewhere between perceptual input and behavioral output, but reappears out in the open, embodied and embedded in the

world' (3). Hurley does provide new grounds for the thesis, however, and I expect that because of this her book's impact will continue to be felt for years to come.

Dan Silber
Florida Southern College

Douglas M. Jesseph
Squaring the Circle: the War Between Hobbes and Wallis.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1999.
Pp. xiv + 419.
US$80.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-39899-4);
US$28.00 (paper: ISBN 0-226-39900-1).

This is an excellent book, dealing centrally with its title's topic, but managing along the way to discuss a number of other important mathematical issues, not to mention politics and rhetoric, religion, Latin grammar, and the implausibility of sociological reductionism, all treated with the same clarity and readability as the more mathematical topics.

There are puzzles about Hobbes and mathematics. For example, how, having begun as someone respected by the European mathematical community, did Hobbes manage so catastrophically to lose the respect of every intelligent mathematical thinker by the late 1660s, winding up with a 'program for geometry [that] did not survive the death of its founder and lone adherent' (292)? Why, having claimed in *Leviathan* that no one 'is so stupid, as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him,' was Hobbes so unshakably mistaken? Why did he enter into and so long continue his quarrel with Wallis? Why did he make the mathematically implausible claims that he did, such as that a tangent line may both touch a circle at one point and cut it at another? Jesseph has plausible, and indeed convincing, answers to these questions and a number of others.

Jesseph centres his discussion around the circle squaring controversy, a controversy in which, initially at least, it is easy to feel some sympathy with Hobbes. He was wrong about the possibility of squaring the circle, but neither he nor anyone else *knew* that at the time. In 1748 Euler pointed out that π was a solution for the equation $e^{ix} + 1 = 0$, but it was not until 1882, more than two centuries after Hobbes's death, that Lindemann proved that there could not be an algebraic solution, and that therefore π must be transcendental. Since classical constructions require that π be algebraic, squaring the circle is impossible. (Non-classical constructions were known at the time, but Hobbes's energy and polemics were employed almost entirely in the classical domain.)

Hobbes believed he could square the circle, and Wallis did not know that the thing was impossible. Nonetheless, Hobbes's attempts to square the circle, duplicate the cube, etc., were so quickly and easily demolished by Wallis and others that Huygens wondered why Wallis thought Hobbes 'worthy of such a lengthy refutation' (247n1). Hobbes's personality undoubtedly played a part in the lengthy controversy. Hobbes would 'lard and seal every asseveration with a round oath,' Hooke told Boyle in 1663, and Wallis worried about 'his arrogance, which we know will vomit poison and filth against us' (70), but 'it is unlikely that Wallis or Ward would have bothered refuting Hobbes's mathematical claims so publicly and at such length had they not seen him as a danger to the universities and religion' (293).

'[I]t is arguably the case that almost any significant seventeenth-century controversy contains a religious element' (294), and it is no surprise that this one does also. Jesseph discusses the religious and political issues in detail, but most of the book centres around mathematical issues, and Jesseph's account makes them understandable and interesting. There is a very clear discussion of the angle of contact problem (159-73), but all the mathematical points are expounded straightforwardly and clearly. The problem: since the angle of contact between a tangent line and the arc of its circle varies in size with the size of the circle, such angles are magnitudes. But, (Archimedes' axiom) given two magnitudes, if you reduce the larger by more than half and continue this process with the residue you will eventually arrive at a magnitude less than the originally smaller magnitude. However, since it must cut the circle at a point other than the point of contact, no rectilinear angle formed by a straight line intersecting the tangent at the point of contact can be smaller than the angle of contact. Paradox!

Hobbes was a materialist, and was widely taken to be an atheist. His materialism (understood as atheism) was a problem for Wallis. But it was also a problem for Hobbes, for it led him to the view that mathematics must ultimately be about material things, and that therefore points must have dimension as well as position, and lines must have breadth. But if that is granted, much of mathematics vanishes, including Pythagoras' theorem, which Aubrey famously claimed as the theorem which first led the forty-year-old Hobbes to an interest in geometry, though there is 'reason for suspecting the complete accuracy of Aubrey's account' (5n7).

Jesseph ends with a look at Hobbes and the current fashion for 'sociological reductionism'. He argues, briskly but convincingly, that 'there is little hope for a purely sociological interpretation of Hobbes's mathematical career' (349).

The few misprints are minor. At 7 n13, line 5 for 'exchanged' read 'exchange'; at 293 for 'had they had' read 'had they'. the index could be usefully enlarged. The bibliographical references section is full, interesting, and helpful.

J.J. MacIntosh
University of Calgary

Vukan Kuic
Yves Simon: Real Democracy.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc. 1999. Pp. 168.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8467-9612-X);
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-9613-8).

Today's political theorists have almost universally fallen prey to a fear of metaphysical programs and religious content. This is unfortunate. It is unfortunate because such issues are close to the center of many people's worldviews today. It is probably not a workable stance either. Philosophers such as Richard Rorty and John Rawls have thought that by positioning such 'metaphysical' issues outside of reasonable political discourse they have avoided the controversial aspects that such views seem to inevitably carry. This strategy seems bound to fail. Holders of such excluded beliefs will seldom be convinced by arguments that conclude that such ideas are not relevant to the reasoning they should use in political matters. Furthermore, democratic decision-making arguably works best in the place where technical expertise is most unhelpful. It is within such controversial (and many times metaphysical) areas that democracy must work if it is to be viable. Excluding such reasons from the discourse seems to unreasonably narrow the debate from the outset.

Kuic's examination situates Simon's democratic theory right in the center of this debate. It could hardly be otherwise. Simon is a religious thinker utilizing Thomistic philosophy (and therefore Thomistic metaphysics) to justify democratic government. As Kuic states, this is normally a tradition and a set of philosophical ideals that have been thought antithetical to democracy. Certainly if a thinker such as Simon can arrive at a convincing justification and description of democracy from these ideals, the theory advanced could provide a needed counterpoint to the purportedly antimetaphysical stances most often advocated today. A defense of democracy based upon Thomistic ideals has the further therapeutic effect of raising the question of why such a fear of metaphysical grounding should be allowed to go unquestioned.

Another aspect of Simon's theoretical work that is effectively highlighted by Kuic is the use of concrete and mundane examples to explore the decision-making context. Examples such as the choices of what kind of transportation to use on a family trip, etc., emphasize the everydayness of difficult decisions. This rootedness in the everyday also contrasts positively with the abstract and somewhat unworldly feel of more popular political philosophy of the moment. Unfortunately, Yves Simon's thought seems to somewhat disappear in Kuic's thorough setting forth of the context. More detailed exposition of ideas such as the 'superdetermined' theory of freedom of choice (crucial to an understanding Simon's thought according to Kuic) are left underexplained. Because of this, the book is better read as a companion to Simon's own works than as a thorough exposition of them. The appetite is whetted — but one is

left with the unanswered question of whether Simon's work carries any truly positive and substantive implications for democratic theory. It is a real virtue that Kuic's book inspires one to return to the source writings. On the other hand, a clearer exposition of Simon's thought might help to show how it would handle some of the problems upon which non-Thomistic theories of democracy have foundered. Further, a more critical analysis might have better shown how Simon's work could help expose the analytic errors and presuppositions of the prevailing democratic theories.

Brian E. Butler
University of North Carolina at Asheville

Helen Lang
The Order of Nature in Aristotle's Physics: Place and the Elements.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. xii + 324.
US$64.95. ISBN 0-521-62453-3.

This unusually careful and thorough interpretation of Aristotle's *Physics* and *de Caelo* begins with an interesting methodological proposition, which subsequent employment, for the most part, vindicates. Lang dubs her method of analysis the 'method of subordination'. What we regard as treatises, such as the *Physics*, are collections of *pragmateiai* each addressed to a specific problem. That there is coherence across many of these *pragmateiai*, is of course important. But we can truly apprehend what coherence there is (and, I will argue, expose discontinuities Aristotle's corpus) only if we attend to the proper order of nesting. The first step in understanding any argument in Aristotle is to identify the topic or problem that has spawned the argument. When, for instance, Aristotle discusses 'the void', he does so as one step in his attempt to understand natural motion, and through that to understand nature itself as an 'order'. His considerations of 'the void', therefore, are entirely subordinated to these purposes, and the void is rejected solely because it cannot account for motion, and in consequence cannot render the kosmos orderly. It is only by properly contextualizing his considerations of the void that we can understand them. Reciprocally, the coherence of the *Physics* as a whole, and of the *Physics* and *de Caelo* in tandem, becomes accessible to us only by cumulatively viewing the many particular arguments strictly subordinated to these larger contexts.

Not surprisingly, all of the action here is in the details. Lang's conclusions are, detached from the arguments that support them, not revolutionary. She

makes a persuasive case that the elements are 'nothing but' a tendency towards natural place, and that place, properly conceived, is solely the actuality of which all natural motion is the potential. Place renders the kosmos determinate, and by giving order to the 'inclination' of the elements, gives the motion of the elements its inherent orderliness.

Lang's picture of a kosmos that is 'nothing but' elements striving for place has the peculiar effect of making everything that we experience as the kosmos a mere accident with reference to the elements. The world that actually exists for us seems, under her reading, a conglomeration of acts of violence perpetrated on the elements; a structure of constraints on their flight to their natural place. By following through the account of the elements strictly subordinated to the problem of movement, Lang has limned a kosmos in which composition — the primary function of the elements for *our* purposes — is at best a blemish on the order of the kosmos.

If we look beyond *Physics* and *de Caelo* to *de Generatione et Corruptione* we encounter the full collision of the elements as the subject of natural motion, and the elements as the subject of the composition of the kosmos we encounter. As the subjects of natural motion, the elements are purely simple, and as such there is no natural gap between their matter and their form. If unconstrained, by their very nature they return to their place, which is their actuality and form. But as subjects of composition, the elements are not simple, but rather themselves combinations of contraries (hot/cold, wet/dry). It is only by virtue of recombining those qualities that the world gets formed. They are far, then from being 'nothing but' a tendency towards natural place.

There are important consequences of this contrast of the elements as simples and the elements as composite. Lang claims that, as subjects of natural motion, the transposition of elements proceeds hierarchically; each higher element acting as the form to the matter of the element below it. But if this is true, since all matter yearns for its form, if unconstrained the elements would all eventually transform themselves into fire, and fly to the place closest to God. As composites, however, the generation of the elements is naturally circular, and a hierarchy of elements is impossible. Circular generation of elements constitutes the kosmos of composition as a substantial realm, not merely an arena of constrained natural motion of elements yearning to return home.

Last, and most important, as simple potentialities for proper place, the potential of the elements is unidirectional, and equally singular. As composites, however, the elements have a much broader potentiality. Here we run into one of the true thickets of Aristotelian thought — an underbrush that spreads as far as his ethics. Thought of as 'matter' to be molded into composite beings, the elements appear more with an emphasis on their lack of actuality, and their pure capacity to become many things. Thought of as the primary source of motion in the kosmos, they are nothing but their actuality, constrained. It is only in the former guise that they seem capable of producing the variegated kosmos we encounter.

The elements as natural movers and as components of the kosmos, then, play very different roles. In the latter role, they seem to give us the kosmos we know, but the order and teleology of that kosmos is, at best, murky and complex. In the former role, they give us a beautiful, stark, and strictly ordered teleology. Does the fact that Lang does not at all acknowledge the compositional picture of the elements testify against her 'method of subordination'? Quite the opposite, though it does suggest a caution in our employment of this method. It is only the stark subordination of the nature of elements to the problem of motion that brings this problem into high relief. Whether or not these two presentations of the elements, and their concomitant pictures of the kosmos, are ultimately reconcilable, we must first see that there are two apparent 'tracks' in Aristotle that need such reconciliation.

That Lang does not make even slight note of this rift is perhaps justified by her 'method of subordination'. She only promises to play out the role of the elements in the problem of accounting for natural motion, and that she does very well. But along the way red flags unfurl that must trouble any student of Aristotle. When, for instance, she claims that the elements are 'nothing but' the inclination towards a particular place in the kosmos, everyone acquainted with Aristotle must respond: 'But is fire not also hot and dry?' It is difficult to accept the proposition that the irrepressibility of such questions is only a modern urge to systemization, anachronistically imposed on Aristotle.

Given these cautions, the clarity and single focus of Lang's approach is powerful, and enables us to follow one strain of Aristotle's thought all the way through. Doing so requires some fortitude, and the book's attention to detail will appeal only to very dedicated students of Aristotle, and perhaps only to those with a special interest in Aristotle's physical works. Those readers will find this book valuable.

Lee Perlman
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

G.W. Leibniz and **Samuel Clarke**
Correspondence.
Edited, with introduction, by Roger Ariew.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2000. Pp. xv + 110.
US$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-525-8);
US$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-524-X).

The Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, carried out at the end of Leibniz's life — interrupted, in fact, by his death in 1716 — is a splendid philosophical exchange. It is of rich value for the student of Leibniz's views, for the philosophical public face of Newtonianism, for Enlightenment intellectual culture, and for the perennial exploration of fundamental themes in philosophy of religion. It is a very accessible read, and it is very attractively presented in this new edition prepared by Roger Ariew.

The only flaws in Ariew's introductory material are relatively minor. He has trouble getting the name and title data straight for Leibniz's royal employers. It is 'George Augustus' (English) or 'Georg August' (German), not, as Ariew names him, 'Georg Augustus'; similarly, either 'Ernest Augustus' or 'Ernst August', not 'Ernst Augustus'. Also, Georg August, subsequently King George II of Great Britain, was Electoral Prince (not 'Elector Prince') of Hanover. And the three women of elevated status who befriended Leibniz were all of royal, not noble, rank. All of these errors occur on the very first page (vii) of Ariew's introductory essay. They are minor, trivial, and it is perhaps pedantic to note them. But they do not start Ariew's book off well, and they are matters the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century intellectual historian should get right, particularly since this is so supremely aristocratic a period.

Thereafter, all goes excellently well. The texts consist of Leibniz's five letters and Clarke's replies to each, followed by selections from previously published writings of Leibniz and Newton on the themes of the correspondence. Clarke had published the whole set together (with his own translations from French and Latin) in 1717. Ariew makes modest modernizations in Clarke's edition.

Clarke is, of course, Newton's bulldog — to adapt the phrase so famously used a century and a half later for Huxley in relation to Darwin. He — Clarke — is quite good. Sharp, obviously very intelligent, a keen polemicist, the thorough, painstaking Anglo-Saxon confronting the extravagant continental. Clarke is also a bully; Leibniz twenty-nine years his senior is badgered without mercy. Leibniz of course tries to respond in kind; he is occasionally brilliant. One wonders what degree of more genuine understanding of the interconnected system of the genius he stalks Clarke may have had.

Both Clarke and Leibniz represent world-views for which it is difficult now to feel more than selective sympathetic engagement. One reads as an interested outsider, it is a marvellous exchange, with delightful mutually

uncomprehending riposte. Common sense versus scientific realism, both against an unwavering theistic backdrop.

On Leibniz's mature metaphysical views, his side of the correspondence is helpful and revealing. Leibniz straightforwardly enunciates and commits himself to positions the world then and since has seen as extravagant if not bizarre. Among them are the doctrine of the pre-established harmony. In one place he answers a question the inquirer will find seldom clearly addressed elsewhere. 'It is true that there is no production of new simple substances' (57) must imply that you and I and all other simple monads have been in the world since its first creation. (Since the creation and annihilation of monads are for Leibniz miracles whenever they occur, monadology as such might have allowed God's perfection to bring later monads into the scheme of things.)

Leibniz's transparency also makes it difficult to accept the once orthodox and now rightly contested view that he was a metaphysical idealist. These spirited adumbrations, at the very end of his life, affirm a *body realism* as clearly as could be asked for.

The broad contours of the fundamental view of the world conveyed in this correspondence are *dualist*. This is true on both sides: Clarke and Leibniz both affirm the reality of minds and bodies, and their deep difference of kind. There are otherwise of course enormous contrasts and oppositions of view between the two. In the case of Leibniz what stands out for this reviewer is a strong sense that, as with Spinoza, the centre of gravity in the system and what motivates it is to be found in the philosophy of Descartes. The fundamental conception (for both Spinoza and Leibniz) is that something at the core in Descartes is profoundly right and sound; and the primary impetus is to get the details straight, and correct Cartesian crudities, but in a deeply Cartesian way. Leibniz sets the fundamental Cartesian picture out clearly and succinctly in 124 (fifth letter): 'All the natural forces of bodies are subject to mechanical laws, and all the natural powers of spirits are subject to moral laws. The former follow the order of efficient causes, and the latter follow the order of final causes. The former operate without liberty, like a watch; the latter operate with liberty, though they exactly agree with that machine which another cause, free and superior, has adapted to them beforehand' (64). Similarly Cartesian is Leibniz's vehement repudiation of action at a distance, and non-corpuscular forces, as occult. This of course is one of the most significant sites of clash with Newton.

Some of the most interesting features of contrast and dispute are theological. Leibniz repeatedly asserts that if God had to choose between entirely equivalent alternatives, since he is perfectly rational he could not act at all; and Clarke repeatedly denies this. Leibniz repeatedly asserts that divine perfection implies creating the most possible reality; and Clarke repeatedly denies this. Each offers what they take to be compelling proof of their view, Clarke accusing Leibniz of question-begging and Leibniz accusing Clarke of accepting unintelligible or wholly unmotivated conceptions of agency.

Throughout Clarke represents scientifically-informed common sense. Indeed, he is a scientific and common sense realist, sharply aware of contrasts between the nature of things and the evidence for it. (Clarke is also a clear, fully explicit, advocate of a sense data theory of perception.) Leibniz speaks for the convergence of what is real, or possible, and what is observable or testable. He is the proto-operationalist; and the seeker of most comprehensive theoretical account.

This volume would be an ideal choice for any course in the history of philosophy in the post-Renaissance period. Because it is so short it would work well in a general survey; or in a detailed course on Leibniz, or in Enlightenment intellectual history. It would also serve effectively in a course in philosophy of religion; or a general introductory philosophy course. The positions present themselves as clear, contrasting, and at least locally persuasive — you tend to assent to whomever of the two you are reading (given their assumptions). It is fun, lively; and importantly philosophical. Highly recommended.

Peter Loptson
University of Guelph

Glenn McGee, ed.
Pragmatic Bioethics.
Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press
1999. Pp. xvi + 302.
US$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8265-1320-4);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8265-1321-2).

Recent advances in medical technology have produced a veritable moral imbroglio, navigation out of which apparently requires a 'new' set of moral tools. As responses, various brands of practical moralizing have emerged on the scene, including the ever-present Georgetown principlism, the time-honoured casuistical, or case-centered, approach and various feminist approaches. The usual suspects, deontology and utilitarianism, of course, still remain live options.

On other fronts, the pragmatist philosophy of C.S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey is enjoying a renaissance of sorts, thanks in part to such sympathizers and proponents as Richard Rorty, Susan Haack, Hilary Putnam and Cheryl Misak, among others. The central insight behind pragmatism is that philosophical theories need to have some cash value in practice, for without practical consequences, theory is of no use for inquiry into what

ought to be done. *Pragmatic Bioethics* tries to bring this renewed interest in pragmatism into contact with practical investigations of health-care ethics. As its editor explains in his brief introduction, the contributors to this volume aim 'to make manifest the outlines and dimensions of pragmatic philosophy so that elements of a pragmatic method for inquiry in bioethics can be ascertained and discussed' (xv).

Pragmatic Bioethics is broken down into three sections and contains eighteen papers, in addition to an introduction by the editor. The first section, 'The Pragmatic Method in Bioethics', contains five essays devoted to articulating the pragmatist bioethical method. In the main, the philosophical content of these essays is somewhat thin and somewhat vague. The chapters emphasize that pragmatic bioethical decision-making employs a plethora of criteria, and relies on no logically prior morally salient criteria, e.g., good consequences, in making decisions. In other words, the authors emphasize the idea that different contexts require different considerations for use in arriving at decisions. What these essays fail to provide, however, is an overall account of what the method of pragmatism hopes to achieve when it is applied to problems in health-care ethics.

The second and third sections of the anthology attempt to put various aspects of the methodology to work by visiting it upon a few contemporary debates and issues in health care ethics, including death and dying, patient-physician relationships, alternative forms of healing, genetics, mental illness, old age, and so on. Lamentably, many of these essays provide mostly exegesis and little in the way of new elucidation of complex moral problems. Consider, for example, 'The Medical Covenant: A Roycean Perspective': C. Griffin Trotter concludes his chapter by stating that 'when faced with a conflict between patient preference and community interest, physicians should act in the spirit of loyalty ... [where] the art of loyalty requires more than applying a formula' (96). This is an important and interesting issue, but Trotter never quite articulates what acting on loyalty actually entails in these difficult situations. D. Micah Hester argues that if we take the idea of dying with dignity seriously, 'it will not be surprising to find that we are not only initially but reflectively — that is, "ethically" — obligated to help some particular terminally ill patients' (127). Rather than examining and defending this idea, Hester is content to conclude that 'through genuine, sincere, and thorough reflection we will find that moral justification exists for these acts' (128). True, but to be of any interest the paper ought to have started rather than concluded here.

Both the editor and Herman J. Saatkamp discuss how we should let morality guide the use of genetic information in social and individual choices. McGee's article discusses the possible negative impact of genetic information and its use on the relationship between parents and their children. Saatkamp begins to outline a set of pragmatist-inspired guidelines for both individual and social decision-making on the basis of genetic information. In, 'Ethical and Cultural Competence', Marian Gray Secundy discusses the nature of the 'scope of knowledge, scope of responsibility, limitations, and characteristics

of ethics consultants' (247). Her main thesis is that consultants, whatever their role, require 'a minimum level of literacy, or … cultural competence' (249). Even though it is unclear what it means, or whether it is ultimately possible, to possess cultural competence, the paper raises the important issue regarding the nature of the currency that ethics consultants traffic in. Yet, there is no explicit discussion of the role of a consultant, since Secundy thinks that no matter what the consultant's role turns out to be, cultural competence is a key component of the consultant's knowledge base.

And this gap in Secundy's essay points to a major lacuna in this anthology: there is no explicit discussion of the nature and role of the philosopher or clinician qua health-care ethics consultant. Are health-care ethicists responsible for delivering edicts? If so, what is the basis of these edicts? Or should they be primarily concerned with methodological or conceptual questions? What role ought they to play in shaping policy, if any? Whatever the proper role, this anthology does not grapple with this issue directly, and given the state and popularity of health-care ethics both in and out of the academy, it ought to have done just this.

One of the blurbs on the jacket recommends this book for use in teaching undergraduates and clinicians. This is unrealistic, for the chapters do not engage in enough stage-setting to be pedagogically useful for students and clinicians entering this area of philosophy for the first time. Moreover, the lion's share of the chapters are devoted to interpretation of the various pragmatist philosophers, posing a real impediment for those in need of a barrier-free introduction to the problems in health-care ethics. Those looking for an introduction are advised to look elsewhere.

Anthony Skelton
University of Toronto

Noburu Notomi
The Unity of Plato's ***Sophist****:*
Between the Sophist and the Philosopher.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1999.
Pp. xxi + 346.
US$64.95. ISBN 0-521-63259-5.

Noburu Notomi's book offers an exciting new interpretation of one of Plato's most difficult dialogues; a reading that attempts to answer the question of what issue it is which the dialogue *as a whole* confronts. As the dialogue's prologue indicates, this turns out to be the problem of identifying the sophist and differentiating him from the philosopher. Because this problem is due to the sophist's ability to appear wise without being so, the nature

of appearance is thus also at the center of the dialogue's concern. N's book contains a Preface, a brief outline of the dialogue, eight chapters, an *index locorum*, a general index and an excellent bibliography. I was intrigued by the author's declaration in the Preface that by examining Plato's idea of philosophy we can answer the question of whether and how 'we can take philosophy as a universal intellectual activity of human beings,' (xii) and thus help bridge the gap between Eastern and Western conceptions of philosophy. Unfortunately, this issue is never explicitly addressed in the rest of the book.

Notomi's Chapter 1, 'How to Read the *Sophist*', rightly criticizes the tendency of most scholars to focus on the central ontological, epistemological, and logical issues of the central portion of the dialogue in order to make sense of the whole. Proceeding from the ancient idea that Plato's dialogues are unified by their each having a particular aim (*skopos*), N identifies the *skopos* of the *Sophist* as the definition of the sophist. N then argues that we should see this task as being pursued in the Outer Part (216a1-236d8, 264b9-268d5) of the dialogue, with the yolk of the Middle Part (236d9-264b8) providing the groundwork for the divisions in the Outer Part. On this ingenious inversion of the standard interpretive approach, the Middle Part turns out to be a digression. N's attempt to ground this idea through the examination of four other Platonic digressions (in *Theaetetus, Republic, Statesman*, and *Philebus*), however, is not fully convincing. The all-too-brief and commonplace account of the *Theaetetus*'s digression as making us 'pause for a while and wonder what real wisdom or philosophy is' (32), for example, does not provide anything particularly illuminating in regards to the task of the Middle Part of the *Sophist*.

Chapter 2, 'The Sophist and The Philosopher', provides an overview of the role and nature of the various sophists and their place in Athenian society, and counterposes this to Plato's development of the idea of philosophy. N then argues that the sixth definition (226a-231b9) of the sophist as a purifier — as a sophist of noble lineage — makes the difficulty of separating the sophist from the philosopher manifest, forcing us readers to differentiate the Socratic method from the art of the sophist, and suggesting to us that Socrates is no longer to be taken as the model philosopher.

'How the Sophist Appears', Chapter 3, introduces the interesting idea of the 'investigatory use of appearance'. The issue of appearing is the key to the sophist's art, but since sophistical appearances are grasped by the way in which the sophist appears to philosophical inquirers, we must differentiate two uses of appearance; one is sophistical and false, while the other is philosophical and true. Chapter 4, 'Analysis of the Structure of Appearance', continues this theme by examining the sophist's use of argument as exhibition (*epideixis*) and the philosopher's antithetical art of dialectic as the tool for achieving a successful life.

Chapter 5, 'Appearance and Image', next explores the concept of appearance in light of the concept of image (*eidōlon*) in order to better grasp the art of the sophist. N focuses on six aspects of the imitative art to 'illuminate the

problematic concept of appearance' (123): the imitative artist; the art of making, the maker, and the product; the activity of showing, the viewer, and the viewpoint in seeing an image; the notion of imitation, and the relation between an image and its original; the distinction between correct and *incorrect images; the definition of image.*

Chapters 6 and 7 examine the Middle Part (236d9-264b8) of the *Sophist*, and it is here that the book makes a most valuable and original contribution by offering an account of how the disparate arguments of this part connect with the rest of the dialogue conceived of an organic whole. As N sees it, the Middle Part should be divided into two mutually dependent sections: (236d9-242b5), (242b6-264b8). Chapter 6, 'The Sophistic Counter-Attack on Philosophy', then, considers the first section. Here the difficulties concerning what is not, falsehood, image, and appearance, are portrayed as challenges offered by the sophist as a counter-attack on philosophy. In a fascinating discussion, N argues that the last difficulty concerning appearance lies at the basis of the first three problems (of what is not, falsehood, and image). In essence, the sophist here challenges the philosopher to explain how she can define the sophist in terms of appearance without falling into the incoherencies involved in the idea of appearance. By confronting this sophistic counter-attack, however, 'we are compelled to examine ourselves ... ' (202).

'The Philosophic Defence Against Sophistry', Chapter 7, considers the philosopher's defense mounted in the second section. This falls into three sections: the difficulty concerning 'what is' (242b6-251a4), the combination of the greatest kinds (251a5-259d8), and the solution to the problem of falsehood (259d9-264b8). N consciously refrains from entering into the complex discussions of these complex sections (209); and readers should concede that in principle he need not (although certain issues, such as whether or not Plato accepts change into the realm of Forms [220], are treated too brusquely). What he does do here is show (with minor reservations concerning some details) that the section illustrates the soundness of the philosophical method and its superiority to the bogus sophistic art of controversy. By the end of the discussion, the claim that 'the sophist appears to be wise, but is not wise' is shown to be saved.

N's concluding chapter, 'The Final Definition of the Sophist', examines the sophist's art of imitation in its four aspects: instrument, model, method and product. He also offers an interesting discussion of irony in connection with the differentiation of the sophist from the philosopher: unlike the philosopher who sincerely concedes his/her ignorance, the sophist is ironic by consciously concealing his/her own ignorance while deceiving others into thinking that he/she is wise. In his last pages, N tells us that although the dialogue says little about the philosopher *per se*, it shows us the nature of philosophy indirectly in the way in which the sophist is finally defined using correct dialectic. We are told, using a frequently occurring phrase, that it is by confronting 'the sophist within ourselves' that philosophy can be secured and established. That sounds right, but it is unfortunate that N does not much unpack this provocative and promising idea.

N's *The Unity of Plato's* ***Sophist*** is a bold and original contribution to the discussion of the *Sophist*. There are, of course, many individual problems of interpretation and argumentation with which readers will take issue. Never the less, the book's portrait of the dialogue's overall unity in general, and its novel account of the Middle Part in particular, is sure to provoke useful controversy. It supersedes all previous attempts to grasp the overall structure of the *Sophist*, and thus, is required reading for serious students of the dialogue.

Mark L. McPherran
University of Maine at Farmington

John Perry
Dialogue on Good, Evil, and the Existence of God.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1999. Pp. ix + 71.
US$19.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-461-8);
US$4.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-460-X).

This is the second book by Perry in a series obviously designed to support introductory philosophy courses. Like its predecessor, *Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality*, this is a brief fictional dialogue created to explicate topical issues in an accessible, dialectical setting.

Parties to the discussion are Gretchen Weirob (religious sceptic), Sam Miller (theist), and Dave Cohen (uncommitted interlocutor). Weirob bets Miller he can't reconcile the existence of God as traditionally conceived with the existence of evil, including a case of the flu afflicting Weirob. Miller attempts to show her that there is no necessary conflict, resting finally in a sketch of an Augustinian freewill defence that embraces natural as well as moral evil. Along the way, the surface is scratched of connected issues such as the compatibility of freewill with both determinism and God's foreknowledge. Weirob finally concedes, and accepts that Miller has won the right to say a prayer for her; the agreed-upon stake in the debate.

Miller's defence of the theistic position, though simply expressed, is no model of clarity. Aesthetic arguments about ugly parts contributing to a beautiful whole run together with reminders about the way that some suffering is causally necessary in pursuit of some desirable outcomes. Eventually the point emerges that some goods (e.g., freedom) may be *logically* required by other and greater goods; but the ways in which evil may be necessary are never clearly distinguished. Weirob does somewhat better in

opposition. She questions why an omnipotent God should be constrained by causal necessities, tries a version of compatibilism in reply to the freewill defence, and suggests that omniscience would be logically incompatible with freewill.

The dialogue is not a source of developed concepts and distinctions. In general, the participants in the dialogue appear to be marked in varying degrees by an exposure to philosophical discussions. But they are certainly no mouthpieces for textbook philosophy.

This looseness and comparative conceptual innocence may be an asset. The relatively unschooled discussion more nearly mirrors the approach of beginning students, and for that reason may be more accessible to them. At the same time, it may offer abundant opportunities for an instructor to point to places where clarified concepts and distinctions would advance the discussion.

There is, however, one missing distinction which seriously undermines the book's utility. The dialogue finally concerns just one aspect of the problem of evil: the 'logical' or '*a priori* problem of evil. This is the claim that the fact of any kind or amount of evil in the world is logically incompatible with its being the work of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent creator. In order to dispatch this claim, all that is required is the proposal of some state of affairs, no matter how far-fetched, that would give such a creator a morally sufficient reason to create a world with evil in it. And as Miller (following Augustine and Plantinga) shows in this dialogue, it is not difficult to make a plausible proposal to this effect.

But a far more difficult aspect of the problem is the inductive, 'evidential' question. How *likely* is it that an all-good, all-powerful God could have reason to permit the kinds and quantity of evil that we actually encounter? Here you *do* need a theodicy; a story with some degree of plausibility that might account for what we encounter by way of evil. This is a more demanding task, and the challenge is surely more gripping than the objection confined to logical compatibility.

Here and there in the discussion, the question arises of how a good and powerful God could permit the scale of horrors we actually face. But it is the strictly logical question that finally gets the attention. Confining the discussion in this way simply omits the most interesting and challenging aspect of the Problem of Evil.

Murdith McLean
St. John's College
University of Manitoba

Karl R. Popper
All Life is Problem Solving.
Trans. Patrick Camiller.
New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. xii + 171.
US$50.00. ISBN 0-415-17486-4.

Four chapters of the original German version of this book, *Alles Leben ist Problemlösen*, are omitted from this translation, having previously appeared in English. The omitted chapters have been replaced by three texts of public lectures and talks Popper gave in the last years of his life. As Popper himself notes, this collection may be seen as a sequel to *In Search of a Better World* (1995): both comprise contributions strongly oriented towards the natural sciences, and others strongly oriented towards history or politics. As always, Popper's writing is extremely clear and fascinating, weaving conjectures and refutations with significant memories of meetings and personal experiences, with important historical events.

Once again, Popper defends the unity of scientific method, both in the natural and the social sciences; criticizes inductivism and observationism; describes falsifiability as a demarcation line; illustrates his view of progress as an approach to truth; confronts the problem of scientific realism; and deals with the relationship between metaphysical ideas and the development of science (with reference to the case of Kepler).

Arguing against philosophical reductionism, the author stresses a central theme of his philosophy and of his evolutionary theory of knowledge: science is fundamentally incomplete; new theories pose new problems, and their hypothetical solutions require new explanations. Science is uncertain, and so is the human reason which aims to explain it. We are therefore exhorted not to rest with already acquired convictions, but to look for problems and their solutions.

With reference to science, Popper's thought is marked by a deep hostility to any professions of certainty or to any claims of justification. Critical rationalism emphasizes guesswork as the way knowledge grows, and criticism as the way it is controlled. Popper himself describes this by saying that knowledge evolves through a series of conjectures and refutations, of tentative solutions to problems, checked by searching and uncompromising tests. In this way fallibilism annihilates dogmatic faith in the authority of science or any other form of knowledge. Moreover, such a fallibilist attitude, with its anti-dogmatism and anti-dictatorialism, may be the basis upon which we can build a truly free and tolerant (and above all respectful) society.

Criticism, freedom and rationality are central to Popper's views on politics and the open society. As an aspect of his hostility to justificationism in any form, we are told that our actions and policies are likely to have unforeseen and unintended consequences. This is significant particularly where large scale political changes are being attempted: of great importance is thus the principle of not running the risk of irrevocable and uncontrollable mistakes.

Our knowledge is imposing, and at the same time our ignorance is unlimited. According to Popper, both theses are true, and their clash characterizes our cognitive situation. The tension between our knowledge and our ignorance is decisive for the growth of knowledge, because it shows the borders to be overcome and inspires research. Kant's great merit, with his 'Copernican revolution', has been to show that, although we are lost in a universe where our presence on a planet and in a solar system seems to be always more insignificant in light of our cosmological theories, we discover, for that very reason, that the world turns around us, who explore it actively, and cognitive exploration is a creative art.

We are free, condemned to be free because we are ontologically ignorant. On the other hand, the denial of freedom has a gnoseological foundation: the presumption to know, maybe in an absolute and certain way, which is the true god; to know the indisputable foundations of the ultimate values and, with them, the unavoidable laws of human history as a whole; to possess the truth or its criterion and, at the same time, to know the way to the perfect society. The presumption of our reason precludes all chances of devising new ideas and testing them, while the consciousness of our ignorance is the basis of our freedom. These are the characteristics of an epistemologically aware anthropology. Learning something about the world we are living in means, on the first view, to be conditioned by it; on the second it means to adventure within it.

Error struggles for the truth: it is one of the many aspects of human freedom. Popper, then, is moved by a 'moral motivation': without the possibility of self-governance, life and the quest for knowledge would be mere farces. Popper believes in an 'open universe' and theorizes, in science as well as in politics, choice or free decision.

More than once Popper proved to be conscious that even his propensity for method meant as criticism and for the open society was itself a choice. Moreover, the same decision in favour of rationalism cannot be rationally 'justified'. This makes the balance achieved by Popper's thought unsteady. But unsteadiness is the condition for life. Thus the task of the quest for truth has no end — *Unended Quest* is the title of Popper's autobiography. Like Albert Camus, Popper evokes Sisyphus, yet a Sisyphus who (unlike that of Camus) can, in the unceasing struggle with problems, be happy.

Stefano Gattei
University of Milan

Rush Rhees
Moral Questions.
Edited by D.Z. Phillips.
New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1999.
Pp. xxxi + 261.
$65.00. ISBN 0-312-22355-2.

Although Rush Rhees, one of Wittgenstein's literary executors, did not publish a great deal during his lifetime, he left a rather extensive body of philosophical manuscripts, notes, and letters when he died in 1989. D.Z. Phillips has gathered twenty-one of these writings here — one of several volumes in which Rhees's material is to appear — and five of Rhees's previously published articles.

Phillips has done a masterful job of editing, bringing together in this volume writings on ethics that come from the late forties and continue into the early seventies. In these papers, Rhees expresses a deep skepticism concerning the project of trying to develop a philosophical system that will solve questions of what one (or people in general) ought to do. 'Can philosophy give guidance in life? What are the difficulties or perplexities in which guidance is sought? What do you seek when you want to know what you ought to do? I say that no sort of (systematic) study can give you guidance in that sort of trouble. This is because there is nothing which is "the answer" before you have made it' (68-9). It is not Rhees's intention to take a stand on 'the thesis whether there really is or isn't a right answer before it is chosen.' His method is to explore and grapple with questions such as 'What do you seek when you want to know what you ought to do?' He asks this and related questions. He turns these questions over and over; he examines them from various viewpoints; he unearths concerns that lie behind such questions. Like Wittgenstein, he is involved in working through questions personally; he is not in the business of discussing 'philosophical theses' or reporting what others may have said.

Early in the book, Rhees states that 'the right decision is the one you accept' (17). He is aware that he will be mistakenly thought to be defending the easygoing but clearly wrongheaded view that in any given case the right thing for you to do is simply whatever it is that you decide to do — which sounds like the expression of a subjectivism that is totally at odds with Rhees's focus on the idea that people have to *struggle* in difficult moral situations.

In the later parts of the book Rhees discusses euthanasia, suicide, abortion, sexual morality, the place of animals in morality, and important moral concepts such as self-deception, sincerity, and suffering. Here again, Rush discounts appeals to 'moral theory' and focuses on particular cases. While discussing euthanasia, for example, he says 'I suppose I am inclined to say that the question [whether euthanasia is justified in order to relieve pain] is not one which can be discussed in a general way at all; that it is one which a man has to decide for himself when he is placed in that situation, and that

what he may say on general lines will probably have little relevance for him then' (110).

In the writings on euthanasia, Rhees pays attention to 'what we say' and in particular to what Christians say. Sometimes there seems to be the assumption that we are Christians (or at least theists). Rhees takes references to God very seriously and is at pains to explain what we mean by saying that something, e.g., someone's death, is 'God's will' (116). According to Rhees, Christian conceptions of death, though not perfect, are not terribly misguided either. They seem to provide the conceptual structure through which we live our moral life, and they seem to do so adequately.

In the sections on animals, on the other hand, Rhees states: 'I think that the Christian conception of the difference between human beings and animals is wrong ... ' (190). Philosophers might ask 'Why?' It is here that philosophers might long for arguments and wish to know why the Christian concepts that were apparently so adequate in discussions about euthanasia are not adequate in discussions about animal life and human life. Rhees writes: 'The Catholics would say that men have souls, and that animals do not. I do not understand this ... ' (193).

Many philosophers will be frustrated by the lack of argumentation. But what Rhees does give us — instead of the arguments that usually occur in journal articles and philosophy books — is an example of an intelligent and thoughtful person who takes moral questions seriously, and treats them with feeling and insight. Even for Rhees to say that he does not understand the Catholic claim above can be taken as an honest refusal to allow the claim to stand as if we all knew what it meant. Rhees requires those who wish to employ such ideas to think about them as carefully as he himself thinks about moral ideas.

Stephen Satris
Clemson University

Jill Robbins
Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature.
Chicago: Chicago University Press 1999.
Pp. xxiv + 185.
US$42.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-72112-4);
US$16.00 (paper: ISBN 0-226-72113-2).

Since the death of Emmanuel Levinas in 1995, interest in his work seems to have grown exponentially. However, despite this increased interest, the number of book-length studies of his work in English still remains relatively small. Jill Robbins's *Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature* proves to be a welcome addition to this literature.

One of the strengths of *Altered Readings* is the breadth of knowledge Robbins exhibits in her discussions, which include extensive references to the history of Western philosophy, Talmudic commentary, French and Russian literature, and French literary criticism. For this reason, this book has the potential for a relatively wide appeal. However, as Robbins writes, 'The Levinas [she] emphasize[s] is in a certain relation of proximity to the work of Maurice Blanchot, Georges Bataille, and Jacques Derrida,' because these figures 'are concerned with aesthetic as well as ethical issues' (xvi). Thus, those interested in this cluster of thinkers will find this book of highest interest.

As her title suggests, Robbins focuses on the complex relationship between literature and Levinas's philosophy, where — in line with Levinas's own usage — 'literature' is broadly construed to include not only what one commonly thinks of as falling under this category, but also (especially in Part I) the Bible (xxi). Guided by Levinas's contemporaries, especially Derrida (although not always explicitly), Robbins's approach is to 'take into account both what Levinas says about literature and how he says it' (39).

The book is divided into two parts. The first part is concerned with Levinas's uses of literature in the elaboration of his philosophy. Here Robbins emphasizes how he uses biblical citations and allusions, as well as Judaism's rich tradition of Talmudic commentary, to challenge the dominant '(Greco-) Christian conceptuality' of Western thought (43). In this respect, she succinctly frames the dominant style of Levinas's approach: 'Levinas's hermeneutic of Judaism entails a double interpretive movement: he takes a negative term for the Judaic (invariable the subordinated term within a dyadic hierarchy, as in the Pauline tropes of blindness/sight, servitude/freedom, letter/spirit), radicalizes a possibility inherent in it, and reinscribes it in order to bring out its positive force, even the alternative intelligibility that it harbors' (43).

Some of the themes discussed in Part I include language and the gift (Chapter 1), the trace and responsibility (Chapter 2), literal and figurative readings of the 'Hebrew Bible' (Chapter 3), and the face and the (im)possibility of murder (Chapter 4). The result of Robbins's discussions is not only to illuminate some of Levinas's key ideas, but also the '(Greco-) Christian

conceptuality' so long taken for granted in Western thought, as well as Judaism itself as reflected in the light of that conceptuality.

The second part of *Altered Reading* is concerned with Levinas's explicit statements about specific literary texts and, more generally, about art and aesthetic experience. Perhaps not since Plato has a philosopher *apparently* maintained such a uniformly negative view of art; Robbins's main tasks in Part II, then, are to explain precisely what Levinas's views about literature, art, and aesthetic experience are, as well as the motivation behind these views. She accomplishes these tasks, in the first instance, by unearthing the roots of Levinas's critique of aesthetic experience, ultimately exposing it, on his view, as a mode of 'participation' — which is, to put it briefly, a type of experience radically opposed to ethical transcendence (Chapter 5).

Despite this damning critique of aesthetic experience, the remainder of Part II is dedicated to exploring Levinas's ambivalent and evolving attitudes toward (and uses of) literature; first in connection with his conception of the *il y a* (there is) in his early work (Chapter 6); then in his citation of the poet Arthur Rimbaud in *Totality and Infinity* (Chapter 7); and finally in his later essays on literary figures, including S.Y. Agnon, Paul Celan, Roger Laporte, Dostoyevsky, and Blanchot (Chapter 8). Robbins's discussions of these matters ultimately exhibit how, despite appearances to the contrary, Levinas maintains that certain literary texts exceed the limits of a purely aesthetic reading and admit of a reading that, if not enacting the ethical, at least gives access to it.

Finally, *Altered Reading* includes as an appendix Robbins's own (and the only) English translation of a review essay by George Bataille originally published in 1947-48 entitled 'From Existentialism to the Primacy of Economy', in which Bataille reviews Levinas's *Existence and Existents* along with three books on Existentialism by Jean Wahl, Guido da Ruggieri, and Julien Benda. Robbins puts the essay to good use (in Chapter 6), employing a few of its major themes in her discussion of — among other things — the *il y a* and the distinction between literature and philosophy, and by using it as a springboard into an illuminating discussion of Levinas's reading of Kierkegaard; but the essay is, moreover, significant in itself for the light that it sheds on Bataille's own thought.

Samuel J. Julian
Florida Atlantic University

Peter Roeper and **Hugues Leblanc**
Probability Theory and Probability Semantics.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1999.
Pp. xii + 240.
$65.00. ISBN 0-0820-0807-0.

As indicated by its title, R and L's work is composed of two relatively independent parts. The first is a systematic and quasi-exhaustive exposition of axiomatic probability theory as understood by logicians and philosophers (it is *not* an exposition of measure theory on [0, 1]).

The first chapter is dedicated to the presentation of the axiomatizations of the probability calculus for the classical propositional calculus, namely, the axiomatizations of Kolmogorov, Carnap and Popper. The following are examined in turn: the absolute probability functions, the relative probability functions, the probability functions defined on sets of statements and, finally, the intuitionistic probability functions.

The second chapter is an extension of the results of the first chapter to infinitary languages, i.e., languages which authorize conjunctions that have countably many conjuncts, and to the predicate calculus, i.e., languages possessing a universal quantifier. The two versions of quantification are studied, viz., the objectual and substitutional versions.

The third chapter treats of the relations existing between the different axiomatizations, and many classical and less classical results are presented and synthesized by theorem 14 (55). For those interested in these questions, this chapter alone justifies the purchase of the book.

The fourth chapter, somewhat more technical, addresses the question of the representation of relative probability functions by means of classes of measure functions (measure functions being functions which resemble probability functions but are not bounded by 1).

The next chapter deals with the recursive definability of probability functions. It addresses topics such as the extension of a function defined on sets of statements to a function defined on all the sets of statements; and that of the definition of an absolute probability function on the finite sets of statements starting from its restriction on atomic statements. This chapter is very dense, very technical, and contains numerous results of the highest interest.

Finally, the sixth and last chapter of the first part addresses the question of the characterization of families of probability functions by equivalence relations on statements. Here are a few examples of the relations studied (99):

R1: A and B are logically equivalent.

R2: $P(C, A) = P(C, B)$ for every statement C of the language L.

R8: $P(A, \mathbf{T}) = P(B, \mathbf{T})$ where $\mathbf{T}$ is the tautology.

Numerous results on the relative strengths of these diverse equivalence relations are presented.

This completes the first part. Despite its title and the numerous extremely interesting results which it presents, this first part is not a general study of the probability calculus as understood by logicians and philosophers. Rather, it constitutes a very fine-grained comparative study of the different axiomatizations and of the relations between the probability functions that satisfy these axiomatizations. On this question, there is no doubt that this book will quickly become a classic.

The second part of the work is devoted to the study of the connections between probability functions and the semantic interpretation of formal languages. The basic idea is simple. It consists of abandoning the classic notion of interpretation in terms of truth-value assignment to atoms, truth-values which then extend to all of the statements of the language with the help of truth functions associated with the diverse connectors. The basic semantic notion is now that of probability. We can, for example, define the notion of validity in the following manner: A is valid iff $P(A) = 1$ for every probability function P.

As underlined by R and L, the elaboration of such a semantics faces some serious theoretical problems, the two principal ones being the following. First, we must on pain of circularity define constraints on the probabilities of complex statements without appealing to any classical semantic notions. A trivial case of such circularity is Kolmogorov's postulate which affirms the intersubstitutionality of logical equivalents in any probabilistic context. The notion of logical equivalents is a classical semantic notion. The other difficulty is the necessary abandonment of the postulate of compositionality; the probability of a complex statement is not generally a function of the probability of the atoms that have an occurrence in the complex statement.

Chapter 7 is devoted to the study of probability semantics using absolute probability functions, the probability of a statement being its degree of necessity. The authors begin by introducing Gentzen functions which take pairs of sets of statements for arguments: $G(X, Y)$ must be interpreted as the degree of entailment of the elements of Y (understood disjunctively) by those of X (understood conjunctively). The authors introduce the notion of a weight function which assigns a weight between 0 and 1 to every statement and some constraints on these functions are proposed. A set of axioms is presented and the equivalence between these two approaches is proved (116). Several variants are then presented followed by similar demonstrations of equivalence. The second section develops the same type of technique for infinitary languages.

It should be noted that none of the results of the first two sections involve the structure of statements: they rest on the notion of logical consequence.

In section 3, constraints are introduced which take into account propositional structure, the connectives being negation and conjunction. A result corresponding to the elimination of the cut in Gentzen's system is proved.

Chapter 8 presents results similar to those of the preceding chapter, but by using relative probability functions. The following are studied in order: the relation between a set and a single-conclusion consequence, Carnap's

probability functions [1952] and their generalization to the assumption sets of relative probability. Different core assumptions are considered, the most comprehensive being the set of logical truths, the less comprehensive being maximally consistent sets. Finally, some results are given for relative probability functions for infinitary languages.

The last two chapters present similar results for intuitionistic logic. Most of the proofs are given in the appendix.

This volume should find its way onto the bookshelves of all those interested in the relations between logic and the probability calculus.

François Lepage
Université de Montréal

Ian Shapiro
Democratic Justice.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1999.
Pp. xiii + 333.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-300-07825-0.

Ian Shapiro's *Democratic Justice* is a useful and welcome contribution to contemporary Anglo-American political theory. The central aspiration of *Democratic Justice* is two-fold — 'to articulate a conception of justice that accords a central place to democratizing social life, and a view of democracy that can be justice-promoting rather than justice-undermining' (21). Such an aspiration is ambitious and Shapiro puts forth his account of democratic justice in admirable fashion by recognising the complexities of the theoretical and practical issues involved and yet still manages to offer insightful suggestions as to how we could achieve a more just and democratic polity. *Democratic Justice* is a good example of how political theory can inform our judgements concerning important practical issues. Shapiro considers a number of such issues by addressing the topics of children, domestic life, work, and caring for the elderly. He designates a whole chapter to each of these important topics and effectively illustrates how different hierarchical structures permeate our whole life cycle. Shapiro does not believe that all hierarchies should necessarily be eliminated, but there are good grounds for being suspicious of them. An assessment of existing institutions and practices should be informed by the democratic idea that people appropriately rule over themselves. This entails that 'everyone affected by the operation of a particular domain of civil society should be presumed to have a say in its governance' (37).

Shapiro situates his theory of democratic justice by comparing and contrasting it with John Rawls's influential theory of justice as fairness.

The most obvious difference between the two theories concerns their scope. Rawls focuses on the basic structure of society, that is, society's main political, social, and economic institutions. This has led to a barrage of criticism. Feminists like Susan Okin, for example, have emphasised the importance of justice within the family. Shapiro shares Okin's concerns and thus his theory of democratic justice is not limited to the basic structure but applies to all the domains of civil society where people's interests are affected. Shapiro considers, for example, Okin's suggestion that the interests of those who do domestic work could be protected and promoted by requiring employers to send half of an employee's paycheck to his or her spouse. While Shapiro ultimately rejects Okin's proposal he is sympathetic to her concerns and argues that democratic justice 'bids us to find ways to condition sexual relations so as to encourage democratic governance and opposition within them' (115). Shapiro argues that we should endorse the move toward no-fault divorce in the system of default institutions and oppose the enforceability of prenuptial agreements designed to limit or waive it.

Shapiro further contrasts his theory with Rawls's by emphasising that democratic justice 'engages directly with existing institutions and practices, unmediated by speculative hypotheticals about the basic structure of a society that might in principle be designed from scratch' (234). But given the expansive scope of democratic justice I think one should be sceptical about Shapiro's claim that his theory does not (or need not) rely on speculative hypotheticals. Surely a theory that addresses such a broad range of human relationships, ranging from the family to the workshop, must consider what idealized institutional arrangements would best suit our diverse needs and interests. Shapiro invests a lot in the democratic idea that people appropriately rule over themselves. But I found it difficult to follow Shapiro's account of what the subsidiary theoretical commitments of this main idea are and how such an idea could be consistently applied to the varied stages of the human life cycle. For example, Shapiro claims that his theory is committed to the fact of pluralism and that 'democratic justice supplies no reason to prefer some conceptions [of the good life] over others. It rests, indeed, on agnosticism over whether anyone really knows what the best life is, and the conviction that rather than impose one conception it is better to structure matters so that people can grapple with this issue for themselves' (91). But this statement seems to run counter to what he proclaims in the final chapter when he claims that democratic justice is explicitly partial. 'It is intended to load the dice in favor of goals that can be realized democratically, and to give people incentives to refashion aspirations that cannot' (232). Such claims confuse the reader as to what the main theoretical commitments of democratic justice are. This task is also made more difficult by the range of topics, albeit interesting and important topics, Shapiro covers. More time could have been spent reviewing, at the end of the chapters on children, domestic life, work, and the elderly, how the policies Shapiro favours are linked to the main theoretical commitments of democratic justice.

Democratic Justice contains a wealth of important empirical information ranging from statistics (e.g., on American divorce and high school graduation rates) to a brief history of the labour movement and the fiscal pressures on Social Security. Despite some reservations about the theoretical coherency of democratic justice, I found this book a timely and engaging read. It is an important contribution to contemporary debates in political theory which have tended to focus on the issue of distributive justice without paying much attention to our commitment to the value of democracy. This insightful book is likely to help shift the debate to a more balanced approach. And this is a welcome development.

Colin Farrelly
(Department of Political Science)
University of Birmingham

Eddy M. Souffrant
Formal Transgression: John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of International Affairs.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2000.
Pp. xv + 163.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-9780-0);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-9781-9).

This ambitious book sets out to accomplish many things. By examining Mill's utilitarianism, along with his concepts of individuality, liberty, paternalism, and maturity, Souffrant argues 'for the existence of a systematic formal international philosophy that is displayed in the interconnectedness of [Mill's] social and political philosophy and his examination of foreign affairs' (xiv). Souffrant's exploration of Mill's beliefs concerning international relations aims at analyzing and criticizing Mill's support for European imperialism. He concludes that Mill's moral theory is flawed because it is used to promote the injustice of colonialism.

Formal Transgression begins on a promising note. In the Preface, Souffrant raises a host of pertinent questions: What is the distinction between colonization, colonialism, and imperialism? How did public intellectuals (e.g., Bentham, James and J.S. Mill) influence debate on foreign and domestic policy? What does philosophy say about international affairs? How does moral theory (especially utilitarianism) justify nefarious activities and policies? And, how does J.S. Mill reconcile imperialism with his beliefs in non-intervention, liberty, nonconformity, equality, etc.? These are interest-

ing questions that have been under-explored in the philosophical literature as well as in works about Mill.

Despite the promising start, the book does not provide a balanced, coherent response to these questions. To begin with, the organization of the chapters is confusing. Three of the chapters are numbered, but there are three more chapters interspersed before, between, and after the numbered ones. Following the Preface, the Prologue sets out to assess Mill's philosophy in international affairs in order to lay the foundation for expounding on his ethics and colonization. Souffrant is certainly correct that many readers overlook the qualifications Mill places on the domain of liberty (the immature are excluded), and that his support for British colonialism is quite consistent with his moral, social, and political philosophy. Unfortunately, Souffrant's assessment of Mill's foreign policy is entirely brief, general, and abstract, and thus it gives the reader no hint of just how complex and principled Mill's positions actually were. There is no mention of Mill's employment with the British East India Company, his term in Parliament, his career-long commentaries on French affairs and the Irish question, his courageous stand on the Gov. Eyre controversy in Jamaica and Britain's policy on the U.S. Civil War, his consistent opposition to racial and religious hatred, etc. Mill's professional career, journalism, philosophical writings, and political activism were not confined to the realm of abstract ideas or domestic policy, and any analysis of his views on international affairs must take them into account.

Chapter 1, 'Utilitarianism as Moral and Ethical Theory', interprets the components of Mill's ethical system. Souffrant distinguishes between ethics and the moral (30-1, 36), and tries to underline some flaws that he explains in later chapters. He emphasizes the agent to an extent that utilitarians will find hard to recognize. For example, 'When the agent acts with an end in mind, the act itself is objectively right or wrong depending upon whether it achieves the end' (16); and, 'moral behavior is contingent upon a certain degree of conformity' (28). Chapter 2 analyzes 'The Concept of Individuality: A Precursor to Mill's Philosophy of Foreign Affairs'. Here Souffrant argues that Mill's position is one of 'radical individuality', which is compromised by a 'masked conformism', and his notoriously vague concept of maturity. While I agree that Mill's concept of maturity was undefined and used to justify colonialist intervention in the name of civilization, I disagree that 'Mill holds the concept of individuality supreme above all other concepts and institutions of general utility' (66). As important as individuality is for Mill, he balances it alongside other key values, namely liberty, happiness, and growth. Moreover, Mill denounces the 'miserable individuality' of those who treat it as an end. He justified intervention for the immature/uncivilized because he believed that liberty was counter-productive until they attained a requisite level of development.

The next chapter, 'The Imperialist Touch', points out the parallel between individuality on the social level and diversity on the international level, and how Mill allows for conformism. Just as a majority are free to disapprove and ostracize nonconformists, a superpower or block of allied nations can pres-

sure and coerce a small, weak, or isolated nation to conform to the will of the powerful — or pay a steep price. Hence, Mill compromises his all-important values of individuality and diversity in the practical arena. Chapter 3, 'The Ethics of Colonization', offers a cogent explanation of Mill's utilitarian justification of British colonialism. It stands out as the best chapter, as it lays out Mill's (albeit flawed) reasoning on the benefits of empire for all concerned. The final chapter, 'Afterward(ship)', draws distinctions between colonization, colonialism, and imperialism, and denounces them as foreign intervention, cultural arrogance, subjugation based on a false sense of superiority, and an unjustified imposition of values on the weak. An underlying theme of the conclusion is that Mill's utilitarian justification of colonialism as morally good exposes the inadequacy of his moral theory.

Overall, *Formal Transgression* covers an interesting aspect of Mill and nineteenth-century European history. However, it does not deliver in terms of its goals. It does not delve into what philosophy, philosophers, or Mill have to say about international affairs. Nor does it treat the role of intellectuals in public debate adequately. It is only in the final two chapters that we get to the subject of colonialism. Moreover, Souffrant's study hardly draws upon Mill's numerous writings that are germane to this broad and important subject. And as I pointed out earlier, it does not take into account Mill's social activism and professional life — both of which were replete with foreign policy issues. In the end, the reader is far from 'a systematic formal international philosophy' based on Mill's treatment of philosophy and foreign affairs.

Don A. Habibi
University of North Carolina at Wilmington

Christopher W. Tindale
Acts of Arguing:
A Rhetorical Model of Argument.
New York: State University of New York Press
1999. Pp. xii + 245.
US$57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4388-6);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4388-4).

The last half-century witnessed dramatic changes in the study of argument. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969 [1958]) and Toulmin (1958) successfully demonstrated the essential importance of context, ignored by the previously dominant formalist approaches. Brockriede (1978) and Wenzel (1979) then prescribed three inter-related perspectives for the study of argument: product (logical); procedural (dialectical) and process (rhetorical).

Tindale offers *Acts of Arguing* as both an overview of the positions generated by these changes and as an argument for the primacy of the rhetorical model, firmly based in its Aristotelian roots, claiming that 'the most appropriate synthesis of the main perspectives in argumentation theory is one grounded in the rhetorical' (6).

Tindale begins with a consideration of contemporary product- and procedure-based theories (Ch. 1 & 2) and their accounts of such central concepts as fallacy (Ch. 6), arguing that these models do not acknowledge the hidden, but essential role of audience at their respective cores. Product-based models, cannot be primary since, Tindale argues (with Toulmin), validity is not ultimately a formal property of argument products (25); instead it is a function of such context-relative factors as relevance. Moreover, only an audience-centred (rhetorical) account of relevance is adequate. '[E]ssentially, the audience determines the argument, and ... an underlying, central sense of contextual relevance must relate to the audience' (41). Not only does process determine product, but it determines procedure as well. Dialectical models are *resolution-oriented* rather than *audience-oriented* (63) aiming at *agreement* between disputants on a thesis rather than *adherence* by an audience of a thesis. To insure objectivity, this agreement must be achieved by the observance of certain, theoretically based, procedural rules. Yet, how is it to be determined whether such rules are followed? Tindale observes that, while dialectical models purport to be rule-based, they nevertheless presuppose some kind of 'audience-as-spectator, onlooker and implicit judge' (64) who is 'not a participant in the dialogue ... but is a consumer of arguments, an appraiser of them' (65) as the administrator of dialectical rules and the arbitrator of their observance.

Having established the centrality of audience to any model of argument, Tindale proceeds (Ch. 3 & 4) to develop the concept. In meeting the charges of relativism that often face audience-based models (§4.1), Tindale argues that Perelman's Universal Audience [UA] provides the theorist with a suitably objective notion of rationality and basis for such evaluative criteria as validity without making these strictly formal or abstractly reified properties of argumentation. Tindale describes UA as a 'mental construction of the arguer' (93), 'that changes with time and with the speaker's conception of it' (89). Yet, UA begins in the concrete. To construct a UA, 'Perelman begins with a particular audience and then looks at *its* universal features' (ibid). Yet, this process requires both argumentation — 'Constructing these universal audiences involves defending one's conception of universality' (ibid) — and agreement — 'Here, agreement on the universal audience must be achieved through dialogue [rather argumentation?] before the stage of appealing to that audience' (ibid). Those sceptical of the objectivity or integrity of this process may remain unconvinced by Tindale's defence of it. Ultimately, it seems, agreement remains the *only* standard of evaluation, even in the construction of higher-order standards of evaluation.

What the theorist will not find in Tindale's book is the stipulation of a specifically operationalized model for the analysis and evaluation of argu-

mentation from a rhetorical perspective (as in, e.g., Gilbert's 1997 *Coalescent Argumentation*). Nor does Tindale compare and evaluate competing rhetorical models. Throughout the book, though, Tindale introduces and clarifies certain central concepts that any rhetorical model ought to consider. For instance, Tindale fixes the notion of context (§3.3), and some properties of audiences (§3.4), and the construction of a universal audience. To demonstrate the intrinsic centrality of audience-based models, Tindale introduces the concept of the *cognitive environment* of an audience. For Tindale, '[a] proficient use of the notions of relevance and [premise] acceptability ... requires an understanding of the *cognitive environment* of the audience' (95). Such considerations may help to provide criteria for the evaluation of rhetorical models.

On another point: at times, Tindale suggests that the confusions of contemporary argumentation theory are rooted in a neglect of its Aristotelian roots (70). Examples are the Standard Treatment of the enthymeme (9), fallacies (49, 53-4), and post-modern critiques of the Standard Model (189-90). Yet, Tindale does not offer a return to Aristotle as a resolution. Rather, Tindale claims that rhetoric is foundational to, and not the counterpart to, dialectic. Thus, there are two threads of critical argument binding Tindale's position, and it is not transparent how the two are woven together.

Minor criticisms aside, Tindale's work will not only be of interest to the career argumentation theorist, but is a fine overview of the current state of the field. It is also suitable as an intermediate text regarding the justification and application of the rhetorical perspective offering two case studies (Ch. 5), a rhetorically-based account of fallacy theory (Ch. 6), and a discussion of post-modern critiques of rationality (Ch. 7).

David M. Godden
McMaster University

Richard Wollheim
On the Emotions.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1999.
Pp. xiii + 269.
US$25.00. ISBN 0-300-07974-5.

There has been much talk, for several years now, about the exciting and promising cooperation among students of mental processes from different disciplines. Scientists almost daily report new empirical findings which challenge old theories, and compare them with the findings of their colleagues in other departments and laboratories. They also and often feel the need for conceptual revisions, and interact with philosophers who offer analyses of concepts old and new. Many philosophers interested in the mind, on the other hand, have come to the conclusion that it is virtually impossible and fundamentally mistaken to develop what used to be called philosophical psychology independently of experimental results in the empirical sciences. Given this intellectual climate, Richard Wollheim's book on the emotions, which includes three revised and expanded lectures originally given at Yale in 1991, comes as a surprise.

Wollheim declares at the outset that he is engaging in applied philosophy, which would overlap with theoretical science, but the only theory he is really concerned with is psychoanalysis, about which he has been writing for thirty-odd years (he is the author of *Sigmund Freud*, 1971, of *The Thread of Life*, 1984, and of many articles on the subject). This is a welcome reminder and challenge. But the notorious shortcoming of psychoanalytic research to date is that the evidence it adduces is limited to thoroughly analyzed case-histories that are seldom, if ever, more than clinical anecdotes. It is no coincidence that theorists should still quote Freud's own famous and epoch-making case-histories, and it is not surprising to find that Wollheim does the same.

His approach is genetic not criterial, and consists in a 'narrative' of emotion from the originating condition to expression, through several stages. His thesis that the satisfaction or frustration of a desire almost always constitutes the originating condition is not new, but his rejection of the traditional propositional account of desire, and his detailed defense of the pre-linguistic categories of basic act-desire (e.g., to merge), and thing- (or figure-) desire (e.g., for mother), are clearly motivated by his allegiance to the object-relation theory of Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott, and other contemporary psychoanalytic theorists. The same motivation leads Wollheim to a plea for what he calls the 're-psychologization' of desire and of satisfaction/frustration, and to his rejection of the semantic view of satisfaction (where a desire that *p* is said to be satisfied just in case *p* turns out to be true), in favor of the live experience, or phenomenology, of satisfaction 'by acquaintance'.

An emotional attitude is formed when an experience of satisfaction or frustration is 'extroverted,' namely attached, or imagined as corresponding,

to an object, the precipitating factor of satisfaction or frustration. This again is not new. What is original — in the philosophy of mind, that is — is the exploration of defensive responses to either satisfaction or frustration, through unconscious anxiety and the formation of another emotional attitude, this time 'malformed', namely neurotic. But unfortunately, neither Wollheim nor Freud himself tell us what unconscious anxiety is and where it comes from, and both engage in a theoretical soliloquy which nowhere appeals to empirical evidence.

Unlike Freud (and James) Wollheim treats the emotions not as occurring mental states but as persisting modifications of the mind, like the love for a person, which may manifest themselves in occurring states such as feelings or phantasies; and it is from these manifestations that we indirectly come to know our emotional dispositions. Feelings are of bodily changes — this is explicitly presented as a (revised) Jamesian view — and from their specific qualities we would infer the emotion in question. Wollheim does not address the standard objection, that in the absence of somatic phenomena — a common predicament — we would never come to know our emotions. He also tells us that the emotions have no motivational force insofar as they are conceptually distinct from the desires they generate, and that we are in the dark concerning the mechanisms of facial expression: both claims are in contradiction with the available neurophysiological evidence.

Wollheim's discussion of the moral emotions, of guilt and shame in particular, is also explicitly indebted to the psychoanalytic tradition, according to which they would be caused by the attack on the sense of self on the part of internalized authority figures. Accordingly, they would not originate like the others in the frustration of a desire. But surely the authority of the internalized figures must rest on some desire to please them in the first place; besides, if shame and guilt as well are dispositions, what exactly would be the corresponding bodily changes which are the object of feeling?

This is not an easy book. Wollheim painstakingly examines argument after argument, often arranged in categories and sub-categories which at first smack of analytic rigor but in the long run are tiresome if not pedantic. But what is worse, we are told little if anything new about the emotions. It seems that yet another exercise in philosophical psychology has proven unsatisfactory.

Aldo Mosca
(*Department of Humanities*)
New School University