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Edward G. Andrew
Conscience and Its Critics: Protestant Conscience, Enlightenment Reason and Modern Subjectivity.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2001.
Pp. vii + 259.
Cdn$/US$45.00. ISBN 0-8020-4859-5.

This impressive work on the relationship between Protestant conscience, the Enlightenment concept of reason and modern subjectivity explores the ways in which conscience and reason have been understood in Western thought since the Protestant Reformation, especially, although not exclusively, in the context of British political thought. This important study consists of an historical and scholarly review of the way in which conscience and reason function in the private and public spheres, and, even more significantly, explains the basis of much current political, social, ethical and legal debate which revolves around the rights of conscience. The book is invaluable for a contemporary understanding of the kind of politics expressed in the world-view and concerns of the Protestant unionist community in Northern Ireland. The wider European theological background that gives rise to the intransigent attitudes which often characterise the determination of this group not to share power with Catholics, for example, is arguably the result of a historical Protestant perception of religious and political tolerance which could paradoxically exclude the religious and political rights of Catholics. This is epitomised in the political views of such writers and thinkers as Milton, Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Blake, among many others.

The Introduction and Chapter 1 on Christian Conscience and the Protestant Reformation depict how the Protestant conception of conscience originates in its separation from reason, which came to be understood in terms of the Enlightenment notion of reason. Aquinas's earlier contribution to an understanding of conscience is rightly identified here as representing a Christian medieval pre-Reformation backdrop to this whole debate. However, it would have been useful to have given a rather more extensive account of the Thomistic view which is so important, if only in the context of juxtaposing it with subsequent Reformation and post-Reformation developments. It is worth noting that St. Thomas himself explained conscience as a function of reason and argued that it was nothing else but the application of *scientia* to some special act. The Thomistic concept of conscience as representing the law of intellect allowed him to claim that it had primacy of importance in human decision-making. It justified, for instance, Christian disobedience of a bishop even though this might occur on the basis of an erroneous conscience. The ideal, of course, is a correctly informed conscience which argues for the necessity of a teaching tradition of authority in the transmission and interpretation of revelation. Certainly, the problem of over-emphasis on the inner certainty of conscience which characterised the Reformed tradition still raises continuing questions about whether con-

science is rational or irrational, transcends reason or not, and if so, how this impinges on the relationship between subjectivity and objective reality in the realm of conscientious activity.

In all of this, the socio-political dimension of human life represents the arena in which such issues are not only debated but actively worked through, with all the consequences that this implies for individuals and societies in the legal and civic domain. This book contributes very substantially to the literature on the subject of conscience, and indicates the kinds of origins which source and fuel current as well as past debates on a whole range of ethical and national issues that still retain force as topics of urgent interest today. If it raises one single over-arching question, it is this: where do conscience and reason meet, if at all, and what are the consequences for political and social life for the individual in society? This question is repeatedly examined by Andrews as a central issue in the history of the development of the meaning of religious and political freedom, particularly as a major concern from the seventeenth century onwards.

The Lutheran origins of this debate, which compelled Luther to pit his inner certainty about how Christian revelation should be interpreted against the traditional teaching authority of the Church, provided the point of departure for subsequent discussions about the centrality and value of subjective conscience. However, while Luther tried to anchor his view of conscience to obedience to the Word of God in the authority of the Bible, the outcome was one which, as Andrews suggests, made everyone his own priest and constituted personal subjectivity as the guarantor of truth and value. Even the law is subject to conscience in this sense, as Luther conceived it. The importance of this stance for contemporary thought and political life emerges as a key outcome of the history of the understanding of conscience. Andrews competently demonstrates how difficult it is to appreciate our Western thought-world without recognising the significance of Luther as a major influence. The latter is rightly seen as providing the new turn which offered major thinkers like Descartes, Hobbes and Hume a fertile ground for developing their own views on reason, politics, religion, psychology, and on the human condition generally. The Lutheran project therefore made it possible for both the Enlightenment and its adversaries to focus on the value of subjectivity in the context of evaluating how or even whether objective truth is ever rationally attainable.

Andrews' wide ranging study also explores the contributions of Shakespeare, Milton, Locke, Paine, Bentham and Mill among many others, and Andrews concludes that Protestant conscience and Enlightenment reason are not identical. This concluding chapter might have been improved by suggesting an alternative to the Protestant concept of conscience, such as that conscience and reason in themselves may be intrinsically linked. Indeed the final chapter seemed to end somewhat abruptly. That being said, this book is mandatory reading for historians and political researchers interested in the Reformation and post-Reformation world, as well as for theologians and philosophers, and indeed for anyone who wishes to understand the way

in which our present Western thought-world is shaped and in turn shapes our contemporary ways of thinking and acting in society.

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Geoffrey Bennington
Interrupting Derrida.
New York: Routledge 2000. Pp. xiv + 241.
Cdn$119.00: US$75.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-22426-8);
Cdn$35.99: US$24.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-22427-6).

Geoffrey Bennington has not provided us with an easy book. Perhaps, even, we should not think of *Interrupting Derrida* as a book at all, since a book suggests something that has an intended structure, argument and end-point, whereas '[n]o planned aim or goal guided these pieces towards their gathering in this volume' (3). 'Volume', in fact, does seem much better, connoting a more eclectic approach, pregnant with the idea that what is bound in front of us is a part of a larger, perhaps always unfinished, collection of work(s). As such, it fits rather well this compilation of variations on a Derridean theme.

Bennington is, of course, already closely associated with Derrida, and does not allow himself to be held back by demands to simplify the famously difficult thought of his subject. For this reason, at the very least a familiarity with Derrida's work is a significant boon to understanding Bennington's arguments: coming to the collection fresh is likely to leave one mystified, and with no obvious incentive to give it the second reading that it probably merits. What Bennington presents here is not an explanation of Derrida's thought, but an extension of it. Arguably, in fact, there is not much *about* Derrida at all. In essays ranging in subject matter from the relationship of deconstruction to ethics and politics, to the reading of Mallarmé, to the teleologies of Kantian critique, the authorial voice is Bennington's speaking in a Derridean manner: the author is the interrupter of Derrida, and certainly not his decoder or messenger. At the same time, though, insofar as Bennington's approach *is* unmistakably and avowedly Derridean (he aligns himself with the 'Derridean futures' of those who 'wanted to earn the right to keep following the master' [155]), there is still a sense in which it is Derrida,

through Bennington, who is interrupting the conventional discourses of philosophy. And so even the title of this collection poses an intellectual problem: ' "Interrupting Derrida": because Derrida himself practices an art of interruption with (all due) respect to metaphysics, so that he is the interrupter ... ; but also because these essays diversely interrupt Derrida ... ' (3).

Bennington retains this slightly sideways approach throughout the papers collected here. The effect accounts for some of the dizziness the reader may feel. The first essay in the collection — breathtaking, and as close to an introduction to Derrida as one will find here — is called '*Jacques Derrida*', the name appearing in scare-quotes almost as if providing an alias or a fiction of Derrida, blurring the boundaries between Derrida and 'Derrida' in a manner reminiscent of what Derrida has done to others: in a later piece, Bennington notes that 'the "Hegel" column in *Glas* is at one and the same time utterly dependent ("parasitic") on Hegel, and radically free from Hegel, to the extent that "Hegel" becomes something like a fictional character in Derrida's work, someone whom we read in reading Derrida' (161). So, in a sense, we do not know whom we are reading: and it might be tempting to think nothing more than that the nexus we provisionally must call Bennington-Derrida enjoys playing with syntax — which is probably true — but there is, nevertheless, an intimation of something more serious. Bennington-Derrida, it would appear, invites the reader to recognise the ambiguity of the 'speaker' as an extension of the recurrent Derridean idea that there is a necessary ambiguity to texts, which demand reading, but 'leave open an essential latitude or freedom which just is what constitutes reading *as* reading rather than passive decipherment' (36).

Elsewhere, the name-games are more playful: a conference on the topic of applied Derrida, for example, provides the opportunity for a renaming — no longer shall we have Jacques, but rather Applied Derrida. Even this approach, though, belies a serious intent, in that it allows Bennington to make unexpected intellectual leaps: the paper is an excursion into the theme of the transcendental and empirical in Kant prompted by the thought that 'the demand for an application presupposes a distinction between something like theory and something like practice or praxis' (80). Applied Derrida begets a Derridean examination of the whole concept of application — Derrida applied to the very question of applying Derrida. Applied Derrida is like origami paper folded back upon itself — ap-*pli*-ed — the folds forming a cross which brings together and challenges the radical distinction of the axes of the transcendental and empirical. The queasy impetus behind the paper perhaps does not summarise well; in Bennington's hands, though, the effect is astonishing.

Difficulty aside, perhaps the one serious shortfall of this compilation is that it is editorially ill-disciplined. Themes appear and reappear not as iterative but simply as repetitive. For example, the essay *Deconstruction and Ethics* repeats two fairly substantial quotations which appeared a mere 16 pages earlier, and does not do with them anything significantly different

which could justify duplication rather than simple reference. Along similar lines, the theme of uncertainty in the nature of ethics appears, in virtually identical form, on pages 15 and 38. This is not a criticism of Bennington's argument, of course, or his forcefulness: but the question remains as to whether, even in a collection of notionally independent papers, a little re-writing for the sake of the collection might have been appropriate. On the other hand, of course, given the difficulty of both Derrida's and Bennington's texts, to have points made more than once provides for those of us lacking Bennington's intimate familiarity with the source material a vital reference point.

Bennington's volume is, at times, intensely frustrating, and perhaps it reads a little too uncritically; but it is equally often astonishingly deft, acute, and entertaining. For those familiar with Derrida, it is bound to provide food for thought; but those who are not — and this applies equally well to those who might not think that they even have the least *interest* in Derrida — will find, with patience, much that is worth hunting down, not least in the discussions of Kant and of ethics and political philosophy. And patience, the willingness not to rush to an end, temporal or teleological, seems implicit in the particularly Derridean notion of *différance* anyway.

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Silvia Benso
The Face of Things: A Different Side of Ethics.
Albany: State University of New York
Press 2000. Pp. xxxviii + 258.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4573-4);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4574-7).

Benso's first book was a reflection after Auschwitz. This book is a reflection on the application of the thinking that permitted Auschwitz to the task of destroying the planet. That thinking presupposes that the self is autonomous and self-interested, and that the other is a limit or an impediment to its self-fulfillment.

Benso's solution to this grievous misreading of self, other, and relation involves a reappropriation and union of significant insights of Levinas and Heidegger. These two make curious bedfellows. Levinas, as an inmate of a Nazi concentration camp, refused moral considerability to Bobby, perhaps

the most humane resident of the camp and 'the last Kantian in Nazi Germany' (cf. 43), because Bobby was a dog. Heidegger appreciated nature profoundly and was for a time a card-carrying Nazi. These thinkers work together because they got the opposite things right (and wrong). Levinas got it nearly right about the ethics of human relationship, and Heidegger, with help from Benso, got it right about non-human things and how we should relate to them. Levinas correctly sees ethics as the centre of philosophy, but failed to see that there must be an ethics of things as well as of persons. Heidegger discloses the significance of things, but fails to see that this entails an ethics of both things and persons that should have been, but certainly was not, central to his philosophy.

The dialectic that Benso sets in train between these two, setting the groundwork for her own *Aufhebung* in the final section, is the most interesting part of the book. She understands her sources well, and these sections are of value for disclosing what is central and most valuable in these thinkers, for remedying their respective insufficiencies, and for correlating them within an ethical framework that supercedes ontology and epistemology.

Levinas's achievement is to have identified the Greek *élan* and to have exposed the texts that produce the autistic and destructive self of Western Philosophy. The drive for system and certainty requires a reduction of the other person to the inquiring or desiring self. The other is never loved for his (*sic*) alterity but rather for his sameness. Within the framework of a subsumption of the other to the self, what resists reduction is justly negated. Levinas saw that the condition for the very possibility of love is an irreducibly other self, one which is never justly negated. He articulates the nature of the other so that it becomes apparent that what is primary is community, not the self, and communication, not domination. The insufficiency of his theory is that the other is implicitly understood as adult, and male. Here is hegemony still, and Benso (following Irigaray) roots it out. More worrisome even than his naive sexism is Levinas's reduction of all non-human others to the human. The mentality that creates Auschwitz still has a role to play in Levinas, Benso implies, so long as the objects of that thinking are animals or mountains, or anything but people. Enter Heidegger.

Heidegger makes the question concerning things a central philosophical issue, but he never gives it full justice. His interest is in the being of things, and is in a way 'anthropocentric', in the sense that the very existence of *Dasein* depends on its relation with things. Nonetheless his inquiry establishes that things cannot be fully known and therefore cannot be reduced to brute objects of instrumental understanding. Understanding them aright requires the (ethical) stance of letting them be. Benso advances Heidegger's thinking on things, criticizing Heidegger's prioritizing art over non-art objects and appropriating some of his views on art for a richer theory of non-art objects. Benso thinks he got very close to an adequate theory in the late essays, where he dynamizes things, making them events of 'thinging'. He might still be accused of ontologizing — it is the being of things he finally

discerns, and this concerns their gathering together the Heideggerian Fourfold: earth and sky, divinities and mortals.

Benso brings together the non-traditional ethics of Levinas and the Heideggerian idea of things into her own metaphysical ethics. Here the idea of wholeness supplants that of autonomy. Wholeness is a function of responsive openness to the matrix of persons and things in which one exists, as opposed by being controlled by them as is the case, ironically, with the totalitarian self. Much of her ethical construction depends on the notion of the thing as the gathering place of the Fourfold. Because this difficult notion is rather presupposed than discussed, much of the later half of the text may be somewhat opaque to those unschooled in Heidegger's philosophy. Underneath it all though is the highly plausible idea that we must attend thoughtfully to things, recognize their integrity and irreducibility in their specific 'presencing' ('faciality'), treat them 'tenderly' (a mood and attunement, 167) and live with them joyfully. Benso speaks well to this thesis, but not always with sufficient care. Her language becomes increasingly lush, idiosyncratic, and indeed marred by linguistic infelicities. More important, she is not always sufficiently attentive to the fact that when one notes all the tensions and ambiguities in a concept, such as that of a 'thing', one has unearthed elements that favor the opposing point of view as well as one's own. The thing to be brought into ethics is an unknowable and irreducible other, but it is also described in functional terms. This is perhaps the condition for describing a Heideggerian thing at all, but it is to do the same thing that her opponents do.

This book is intended to lay the groundwork for a new environmental ethics, and certainly contains ideas that can be usefully explored for that purpose. An environmental ethic based on this start would require making her Heideggerian insights accessible to the uninitiated, dealing with the transparent but unaddressed tensions between the holistic intimations of the idea of the Fourfold and the project of securing the radical alterity and irreducibility of things, and working through the on-going debate about whether Heidegger's views can support any environmental ethic at all. It will also be necessary to defend her Heideggerian assumption that everything non-human, including the most sophisticated animal, is a thing. As it is, we are in danger of being left in our usual condition — opposed to everything non-human, heedless of our own animality and begging the questions of the 'mortality', or interestedness, or even proto-linguisticality, of other animals. The project might benefit too from an examination of earlier attempts to ethically validate things (e.g., Emmanuel Mounier), of recent alternative approaches to that project (e.g., Val Plumwood), and, perhaps more than anything else, of the impressive literature documenting what is common to persons and things. For the moment, we have an excellent overview and critique of Levinas's ethics, a fine appropriation and extension of the Heideggerian account of things, and some interesting and imaginative suggestions about what a proper ethical relation to things would be like.

That is pretty much what Benso attempted to achieve in this rich and highly ambitious book.

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Bernard Bosanquet
The Philosophical Theory of the State and Related Essays.
Eds. Gerald Gaus and William Sweet.
South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press 2001.
Pp. xxxiv + 388.
US$25.00 (paper: ISBN 1-890318-65-5).

Seventy-eight years after its last edition in 1923 [repr. 1965] *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (hereafter *PTS*) makes a comeback in paperback with an excellent editorial introduction, five other related essays, a selection of letters, annotation, a guide to further reading and an index. The editors, Gerald Gaus and William Sweet, express the hope that with 'this new edition, another generation of political theorists will become acquainted with this important achievement of twentieth-century political thinking' (xxxiv).

Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923) shares the plight of the other British Idealists who occupy the middle ground between the idealist philosophy of the Germans and the pragmatic thinking of the British. While the philosophy of the British idealists is much closer to the Continental than to the British tradition, they nonetheless do not enjoy the attention and recognition which Kant and Hegel continue to receive. Bosanquet's *PTS* offers original developments of idealist insights in the context of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century academic environment. Something which his idealist predecessors did not have to deal with was the competition with the new positive sciences in the discussion of the individual, society and the state. The sociology of Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim appeared as a rival discipline to philosophy, and at the outset of *PTS* Bosanquet devotes a chapter to analysing the relation between sociology and social philosophy. While his siding with philosophy is predictable, his overall attitude is one of toleration and reconciliation. Ironically his own idealist position has received very little toleration in his and, indeed, in our own time (see editor's introduction and Peter Nicholson *The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists* [CUP 1990]).

PTS is recognised as Bosanquet's major work in political theory but it also offers us useful glimpses of his overall philosophy. What characterises

human nature is a pursuit of unity which cannot be found in isolated human beings but in the joint achievements of humankind such as art, religion and the ideal state. As human beings we have an aspiration towards completeness and coherence and the role of philosophy is to find where and how this completeness and coherence are to be achieved. While the positive sciences like sociology and social psychology aim to be impartial and recognise 'no difference of higher and lower' (82), 'philosophy is critical throughout; it desires to establish degrees of value, degrees of reality, degrees of completeness and coherence' (83). The question which *PTS* addresses and responds to positively is: 'Is social life the best, or the only life for a human soul?' (83)

The role of the state is to be the 'ultimate arbiter and regulator of claims' (182) and to promote 'the best life' which consists in the fulfilment of the human capacities. Bosanquet's theory of the state falls into the category of what Andrew Vincent calls 'ethical theory of the state' (Vincent, *Theories of the State* [Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1987]). Such theories do not address the specific character of different institutions but aim to explain human spirit by emphasising its social nature. Bosanquet argues that the distinction between the individual and society is ill conceived: the 'true individuality' can only be found once the isolated self is transcended. Mill's harm principle will never work, as the boundary between self-regarding and other-regarding actions cannot be established without contradiction (Chapter III). Bosanquet introduces another distinction — between the limited self which pursues its private interests and the genuine self which identifies itself with a wider social environment and adopts the public interest as its own. The dichotomy therefore is not between self and others but between one's 'true' and one's 'apparent interest', between 'the General Will and the Will of All'. In the first case we have a commitment to the common good which requires a 'degree of energy or effort, perhaps of self-sacrifice,' while in the second case we have 'purely private' interest characteristic for one's 'routine frame of mind' (130).

An important element of Bosanquet's social philosophy is the belief in the identity between 'social' and 'rational' and therefore in the pervasive role of reason in social life. Throughout the discussion of political obligation, self-government, liberty, rights, the general will and the end of the state, there is an underlying understanding of human nature and social life as a part of a 'scheme or systematic connection' (168) consciously or subconsciously established. 'Every social group is the external aspect of a set of corresponding mental systems in individual minds' (170). Laws reflect 'collective sentiments of society' (75) but more importantly, they express an understanding of the social good. Institutions should be considered as 'ethical ideas' (see Chapter XI). Whatever the actual origin of an institution, 'it has always the character of being recognised *as if* it has been "instituted" or established to fulfil some public or quasi public purpose' (226).

The editors acknowledge that Bosanquet's 'philosophical style is sometimes uninviting to a modern audience' (xxxi). The ideas are accessibly presented but the argument is not as tight and sharp as a philosophy student

would like it to be, therefore Bosanquet is dependent upon the good will of the reader. However, *PTS* is important both as a text in the history of political thought and as a theoretical aid to those who aim to expand the role of idealist philosophy in political theory. There is much in common between Bosanquet's belief that the nature of the individual can only be fulfilled in societal life and the ideas expressed by contemporary communitarians. Bosanquet re-articulates classical idealist viewpoints in an imaginative and picturesque language which can give aesthetic pleasure to those who are already 'converted'. To those who are not but are of an open mind the new edition of *PTS* offers a good introductory text in idealist political theory.

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Hunter Brown
William James on Radical Empiricism and Religion.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2000.
Pp. 183.
Cdn$/US$40.00. ISBN 0-8020-4734-3.

Hunter Brown's study of James's thought provides careful historical scholarship and a spirited, provocative interpretation of James's *The Will-to-Believe*. Brown is at his best in explaining the historical development of James's right-to-believe doctrine, and in exploring the ways in which it is related to and supported by his radical empiricism. The view of the Jamesian religious believer which emerges from this study is that of an open-minded and intellectually-responsible thinker, opposed to religious dogmatism.

Brown nicely articulates the crucial differences between James and evidentialists like William Clifford, who tend to see religious belief as intellectually irresponsible. But he also argues that standard objections to James (as an advocate of belief based upon subjective desire) overlook the importance of evidence and experience in James's radical empiricism. James, Brown holds, circumscribed the role of subjectivity in epistemology far more closely than is commonly recognized. As Brown argues at one point, 'While James emphasizes subjectivity in his account of religion, then, it is a subjectivity that is profoundly enriched by his conception of the wide range of relationships among subjective and non-subjective influences which constitute immediate experience as a whole' (17).

From the outset, two specific themes dominate Brown's provocative interpretation of James: 'My contention [is] that liveness and the strenuous mood should be taken as major interpretive keys to James's philosophy of religion...' (10). What Brown refers to as 'live theism' consists in beliefs that 'possess a genuine, albeit threatened, intellectual plausibility for the subject' (64). These vary greatly, of course, with the cultural milieu in which the individual is raised, and the religious traditions to which she is exposed. Brown rightly sees James as a deeply historical thinker with respect to these matters. Hence, he holds, critics have long confused James's defenses of existing belief with invitations to wishful thinking (24). The real question for James is not whether or not to *adopt* belief in the face of insufficient evidence, but rather, 'What would constitute responsible behavior towards religious belief which *already* exists, and which seems deeply reasonable to many of those who embrace it?' (26)

The strenuous mood, according to Brown, is another central but neglected part of James's philosophy of religion. It is a crucial aspect of the religious believer's moral engagement with the world, and one which emerges in response to a recognition of the deeply historical character of all existence: 'The strenuous mood is a disposition towards the world aroused by the recognition that without vigorous human collaboration with the divine, often involving costly self-sacrifice, the world as we wish it to be will never exist' (21). Brown shows excellent insight into his subject as he argues that the moral life for James 'is first and foremost about attending, and about the pursuit of moral discernment' (115).

I would briefly take issue, however, with aspects of Brown's treatment of each of these two themes. Firstly, consider Brown's association of the strenuous mood with a state of belief. According to Brown, 'the affective consequences of theism spring uniquely from the belief that theism is *true*' (132), and 'he [James] chose to defend belief rather than hypothesis-adoption in the case of theism for clear and sound reasons' (123). Granting that the strenuous mood plays a vital role in the life of religious faith and that Brown offers a useful critique of James Wernham on these issues, we may still ask whether James contrasted belief and hypothesis adoption in this way. Brown becomes so insistent on belief as a precondition for the strenuous mood and its personal rewards that he virtually ignores the role of the 'religious hypothesis' for James in *The Will to Believe* and in *Varieties*.

My second and final point of contention with Brown here regards his central notion of 'live theism' and his intended application of it to contemporary debate. Brown writes: 'When James's position on the nature of "liveness" is clarified, it will be apparent that his philosophical place is not among the fideists, with whom he is often associated, but with those philosophers who, in substantial numbers today, argue against the modern presumption of atheism, and do so on the grounds of claims about the epistemically basic character of religious belief' (27).

Brown appears to take undue liberties with James when he speaks of 'the nature of being properly basic ... in James's account,' and when he uses

Jamesian ideas of liveness ('live hypothesis', 'live option') to argue that 'religious belief, to use current terminology, can be construed as a properly *basic* belief' (27). Proponents of the proper basicality of religious beliefs (Brown cites William Alston and Alvin Plantinga) argue that a person's belief is basic just in case it is *not evidentially based* on other beliefs that person has. Construing James as an advocate of basicality, then, is quite at odds with Brown's central contention that the Jamesian approach is 'an alternative form of evidentialism' (9). On Plantinga's model, beliefs are formed in that unreflective and immediate way which indicates that a basic faculty is at work, and this again seems quite out of accord with Brown's views. Hence while it is true that these authors defend *existing* religious belief, their approach undermines rather than supports the plurality and historicity of religious belief that Brown's study of James underlines. (See Alvin Plantinga, 'Religious Belief Without Evidence', in Louis Pojman, ed., *Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology* [Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1994], 2nd ed., 485-499. Also Plantinga's 'Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism', in Philip P. Quinn and Kevin Meeker, eds., *The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity* [Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000] 172-192.)

If Brown wants, as he announces, to apply his conclusions to contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion, it seems far more sensibly tied to proponents of a *principle of deference* to authority/testimony, that is, to those who defend the subjective rationality of a broad but qualified principle of deference to the beliefs of others, including most traditional religious beliefs. A prime example of this alternative approach defending the rationality of inherited beliefs is Theodore J. Everett's 'The Rationality of Science and the Rationality of Faith', *The Journal of Philosophy* (2001) 19-42.

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Peter Carruthers and **Andrew Chamberlain, eds.**
Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-cognition.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2000.
Pp. xiv + 331.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-78331-3);
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-78908-7.

This book contains a collection of twelve essays that take an evolutionary standpoint for making claims about the nature and origin of human cognition. The work is the culmination of a two-year project including five interdisciplinary workshops and a final conference at the University of Sheffield. Considerations as diverse as the symmetries present in different styles of handaxes fashioned by our ancestors over the past 2.5 million years to studies of normal three-year-old twins in their acquisition of a theory of mind are brought to bear on the kind of mind that evolution has provided us with. Despite the diversity of approaches and material employed in the papers, the book centers on three main issues: the extent to which our minds are modular and the implications of such modularity, accounts of natural languages and their role in shaping our minds, and meta-cognition, our capacity to think about our thoughts. To help orient readers, the editors have provided a short introductory chapter giving some background to these main issues and a short summary of each essay. The editors' job is made somewhat easier by the fact that all of the essays are extremely well-written. That said, though the introduction they provide is very helpful, it could be more detailed without detracting from the collection: the essays are quite technical and cover a wide range of disciplines such that readers cannot be expected to have mastered them all. Specialists could move directly to the papers that interest them, however a more general readership, including students, could use a little more setting up of the issues.

Though they use the thought to different ends, the authors are agreed that evolutionary considerations show that the mind is largely modular. Specific modules evolved to meet particular challenges that our ancestors faced. Given that this claim is not incompatible with some degree of central cognition that has access to the various modules — indeed some of the authors consider modules that make information available to central processing — the claim seems plausible and it is cogently argued in many of the essays. Just how many modules we have evolved remains an open empirical question. One that has been posited to explain much of what makes us uniquely human is a theory of mind module, i.e., a module adapted to determine the intentions of others. A theory of mind module seems in some way connected with acquiring a natural language, though the genetic influences on theory of mind may be largely independent from those on verbal ability (61), and such a module may also underpin our capacity for conscious

thought (266). Indeed, the appeal to a theory of mind module may be the most unifying content of the book.

So how do the various papers hang together? The answer is that they do so surprisingly well because, despite the diversity of content, there is a common methodology. Ingenious and creative ideas about how adaptations of our species could have shaped our minds are explored. Now '[i]t has been objected that evolutionary explanations of already-known structures come cheap, amounting to little more than just-so stories' (2). However, this is not the case when evolutionary explanations are constrained by independent empirical evidence about the period of adaptation, as is done in these papers. 'Not only are evolutionary explanations of cognitive structures quite legitimate (and the good ones not especially cheap), but also in our view evolutionary thinking can also prove fruitful for psychology itself. For by thinking hard about the adaptive problems which our ancestors probably faced, we can generate novel, testable hypotheses concerning the cognitive adaptations which we may possess' (2-3). Of course, not all of the arguments are equally compelling, but the approach of grounding the evolutionary explanations on independently obtained data ensures that none of these arguments will be defeated on a purely a prioristic grounds. Moreover, if the mind really is a collection of largely independent modules, each adapted to meet some challenge we faced in our prehistory, cobbled together under the constraint of functionality rather than efficiency, we should not expect the subject matter to hang together particularly well. The task of giving evolutionary explanations of human cognition is not one of reverse engineering some slickly designed machinery, so inevitably no collection of explanations can hang together any better than the modular mind does itself.

The philosophical content of the volume reflects the editors' views on the role of philosophy in interdisciplinary projects more generally; 'the traditional philosophical skills of distinguishing carefully between different questions, or different variants of a theory, and of teasing out the implications of theories proposed in a given area, or uncovering the implicit assumptions of the theory proposers, are just what interdisciplinary investigation requires' (8).

Broad conceptual questions often extend beyond the sphere of a particular science, and it is in addressing such issues that philosophers have much to contribute to understanding the mind. For example, D. Murphy and S. Stich argue that the taxonomy of mental disorders adopted by the American Psychiatric Association, which is used to guide research and clinical practice, is woefully inadequate. Their most disturbing conclusion is that some disorders may not be disorders at all, but rather behaviors guided by modules that have ceased to be adaptive as our environment has changed from our hunter gatherer roots to modern societies (62-92). Determining a taxonomy is a philosophical project, yet a classification system informed by evolutionary theory could improve research and treatment, they argue.

Overall this collection is an excellent resource for anyone studying the mind. Papers can be read in any order and each has an abstract for quick

access. Since the papers were written for the volume with an interdisciplinary audience in mind, some of the most technical arguments are simply referenced — the source usually being an entire book — making the results more generally accessible. Indeed, the consolidated bibliography is a valuable resource in its own right. Some readers may feel frustration that not all of the claims made are explicitly argued for in the volume. This, however, is not a weakness of the collection, which, like the study of human cognition from an evolutionary perspective, must be seen as a beginning.

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Anne Donchin and **Laura M. Purdy, eds.**
Embodying Bioethics: Recent Feminist Advances.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1999. Pp. ix + 286.
US$63.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8924-7);
US$23.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8925-5).

I had a conversation about teaching strategies a few years ago with one of my professors who teaches feminist philosophy. She told me of a class she once taught that included three very skeptical male undergraduates, students who were not bashful about voicing their doubts about the legitimacy of feminist concerns. Initially, she allowed these students' doubts to structure the classroom discussion and found herself expending enormous energy trying to convince these three students that oppression does exist and that women do experience problems specific to their gender. After a few weeks of continued dialogue with no thawing of the students' adversarial refusal to entertain a feminist perspective, the professor, out of frustration more than anything else, gave up on these students. For the rest of the semester, she concentrated on the other students, joyfully introducing them to a wide variety of topics in feminist philosophy. By the end of the course, the three sidelined male students had become ardent feminists, and each went on to take several more classes with this professor. What had happened in the interim? The professor hypothesized that in defusing the adversarial structure of the classroom, she inadvertently created a space organized by certain core assumptions in which these three formerly obstreperous students could actually become acquainted with and explore specific issues more deeply and thoroughly.

Editors Donchin and Purdy adopt a similar strategy in their recent collection of feminist essays, *Embodying Bioethics: Recent Feminist Advances*. Rather than expending energy on efforts to convince readers of the legitimacy of feminist concerns or of the importance of feminist contributions to bioethics, the authors start with these assumptions. Thus, they move forward from a position which already involves 'a recognition that women are in a subordinate position in society, that oppression is a form of injustice and hence is intolerable, that there are further forms of oppression in addition to gender oppression (and that there are women victimized by each of these forms of oppression), that it is possible to change society in ways that could eliminate oppression, and that it is a goal of feminism to pursue the changes necessary to accomplish this' (2). From within this framework the authors are free to turn a critical eye towards some of the subtler facets of a feminist perspective thereby giving more nuanced and specific critiques.

Donchin and Purdy organize the book into three sections. The first section focuses on feminist contributions to theory with an emphasis on 'power and particularity — the powers that divide and marginalize nondominant people, and the particularities of personal lives that resist confinement within externally imposed categories' (8). Carse and Nelson's 'Rehabilitating Care' and Wolf's 'Erasing Difference: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender in Bioethics' are particularly effective and well-written contributions to this section. Tong's chapter on cocaine use during pregnancy reflects the difficulty of devising neat divisions as it fits better in the second section which gathers together a wide-ranging group of chapters loosely related to reproductive issues. Highlights include Wendy Rogers's measured critique of current medical approaches to menopause in Australia and Julien S. Murphy's examination of whether lesbians would have better access to reproductive technology if they counted as infertile couples. The seven chapters that make up the second section take the reader on a whirlwind tour to Ukraine, China, Australia, and England to great effect.

The third section is a pleasure to read; it 'consider[s] a variety of strategies for transforming bioethics and medical practice in ways that will heighten responsiveness to the situation of women and other marginalized groups' (12). Nikki Jones writes of her experience working with local organizations in West Africa to improve 'the sexual and reproductive health of women and men' (225); she discusses the challenges of improving women's health in cultures where women are devalued and proposes inclusionary strategies designed to empower local activists and ensure the successful and just translation of international values into local contexts. Barbara Nichol's self-reflective piece highlights the struggle of those trying to change patriarchal institutions from within. She writes sensitively and candidly about her transition from activist to university professor and provides healthy insight into 'one of the challenges for a feminist bioethicist concern[ing] how to move to the "center" — to lose one's marginal status, to claim the power that it gives — without selling out, losing one's critical edge, becoming absorbed, assimilated, or domesticated' (240). The final chapter in this section written

by members of the Feminist Health Care Ethics Research Network is a morbidity and mortality report on the Network's efforts to influence Canada's adoption of 'a common set of ethics guidelines for research involving humans' (254). The Network confronts the limits of careful moral argument in an essentially political process. They conclude that they 'made the mistake of restricting [their] efforts to offering carefully structured moral arguments — in a situation that demanded more explicitly political action' (267).

The stated editorial aim of this book is to 'advance feminist bioethics, shifting the direction of bioethical theory and practice from its preoccupation with abstract undifferentiated individuals to the concrete particularities that shape the lives of embodied, socially situated humans' (6). It is intended to provide a forum for 'core feminist' writings that 'continue to emphasize the simple message that justice requires eradicating inequality' (3). Towards these ends, this book is very successful. Although sometimes striking a discordant note, overall the individual contributions move the conversation forward, either interjecting a feminist voice into a specific topic or highlighting less visible facets of a debate. I doubt that this book will collect dust on my shelves; already Elisabeth Boetzkes' 'Equality, Autonomy, and Feminist Bioethics' has proved useful in my own work, and I anticipate incorporating individual chapters into my general bioethics courses (with appropriate permission, of course).

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Antony Flew
Merely Mortal? Can You Survive Your Own Death?
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books 2000.
Pp. xviii + 200.
US$26.00. ISBN 1-57392-841-0.

'You don't know about me,' said Huck Finn, 'without you have read a book by the name of *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer*; but that ain't no matter.' This book turns that on its head. For you already know all about this book if you have read Flew's *The Logic of Mortality* (Oxford: Blackwell 1987). *Merely Mortal? Can you survive your own death?* proclaims itself a 'second edition' of that work, but the pagination and contents remain the same, as do the bibliographical references (though there has been *some* work in the area in the intervening thirteen years). What is new is an eight-page introduction,

which corrects a 'misleading' argument about free will and determinism, and points out, briskly, the irrelevance of reports of out of body experiences to the topic at hand.

However, there is some point to this reissue under a different title. For one thing, the book manages nicely to target an important audience: people who are intelligent and philosophically interested but who neither need nor want the full details (particularly the full *logical* details) that a treatment intended solely for professional philosophers might offer. Such readers might not be tempted by a book entitled *The Logic of Mortality*, but might well be by the current version. For another, Flew writes clearly and interestingly, and his arguments are important for professional philosophers as well as for an intelligent general audience. If you haven't read the earlier printing, read this one, but if you *have* read the earlier version, you can stop reading now. Otherwise, new readers start here:

Flew begins historically with a look at the notions of soul that are involved in the two main traditions stemming from Plato and Aristotle. He discusses, interestingly though ultimately dismissively, the Thomistic attempt to reconcile Aristotle's notoriously incomplete account of the soul with the need to accept what St Thomas took to be revealed truth concerning human immortality, which left him with the further need to treat the individual soul as both a form and a subsistent entity.

When he turns to twentieth-century writers on the topic Flew insistently rejects 'diversionary appeals to the existence of marginal cases' (64). The 'merely conceivable cases so joyously excogitated by philosophers' (132) should not influence us, for 'it is wrong and may be ruinous to treat the logically possible as if it were actual, and to construe current terms as if their meaning either already had been or now imperatively has to be, adjusted to the realization of such conceptual possibilities' (140). Nevertheless, Flew agrees with Kripke that some truths about identity are 'not ... contingent but necessary' (118). But if identity claims are, when true, necessarily true, then (if we accept S5, say, or Brouwer) it is precisely in this area that modal terms collapse. So for questions of identity, at least, possibilities are strongly relevant. Despite the title of the book in its earlier incarnation there is no consideration of formal issues concerning identity, and in particular no look at the formal *logic* of either identity or (im)mortality.

Throughout Flew writes as a materialist, but insists, properly enough, that being a materialist does not commit one to being a 'one-legged dualist' (28). Fred Hoyle remarked, and Flew would surely agree, 'the ramifications of which matter is capable are truly astonishing. It is fashionable nowadays to use the appellation "materialist" in a derogatory sense, largely I suppose because it has become a catchword in a war of political ideologies. This apart, the notion that matter is something inert and uninteresting is surely the veriest nonsense. If there is anything more wonderful than matter in the sheer versatility of its behaviour, I have yet to hear tell of it.'

Flew stresses throughout the need to distinguish the use of 'mind' in phrases such as 'She has a better mind than he has' — the dispositional sense

of 'mind' — as opposed to the notion of mind as a *substance*, which may be either identical with the person (Socrates/Plato; Descartes, with some hesitation when writing to Princess Elisabeth; Aquinas, when speaking of angels), or a crucial component of it (Aquinas, when speaking of humans). Only the former, Flew argues, is acceptable.

Flew finds contemporaries such as Shoemaker (in his exchange with Swinburne), and central state materialists such as Campbell and Armstrong, too concessionary in their dealings with those who are more dualistically inclined. There is no mention in the text or in the bibliography of more eliminative materialists such as the Churchlands. We should, Flew thinks, have as our paradigm the kinds of considerations the authorities would invoke when asking, 'Is this the person who committed the crime?', and resist strenuously any attempt to introduce other, more esoteric, cases involving identity problems or puzzles.

We should also eschew any temptation to leap to fake explanations involving incorporeal entities, since (among other things) doing so will almost certainly involve a violation of the principle of parsimony. If, for example, we are tempted to invoke incorporeal minds as an 'explanation' for so-called out of body experiences we should note that we will *thereby* be invoking a necessarily mysterious means of obtaining and processing information, as well as an equally mysterious means of acting. However, either of these unusual abilities, if available, would equally well provide an explanation when applied not to the putative ghostly machine manipulator, but to the quite unhypothetical flesh and blood person. Invoking a mysterious entity to explain a mysterious process is not a real advance. The same point holds of ordinary thinking, of course. As Locke said, 'Pray tell us how you conceive cogitation in an unsolid created substance. It is as hard, I confess, to me to be conceived in an unsolid as in a solid substance.'

This edition shares its (minor) typographical errors with *The Logic of Mortality*. On p. 17, l. 13, for 'to implausible' read 'so implausible'. On p. 79 the reference to Robb 1984 is to the bibliographical entry for Aquinas, *Questions on the Soul*, translated by Robb. On p. 127, the Leibniz quotation is not from *Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas*, but from § 34 of the *Discourse on Metaphysics*.

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Nick Fotion
John Searle.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2000. Pp. v + 266.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-05711-7);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-05712-5).

It is good to have a book-length survey of the major writings, and major views, of John Searle, who has evolved, over more than forty years of publishing, from a specialist in the philosophy of language (speech act theory in particular), to a major player on the general philosophical scene, with views ranging from ontology, to mind, language and society. It is that sense of Searle's being a theoretician with an integrated vision of a large expanse of philosophical territory that Fotion wants to communicate, and which he succeeds in doing quite well. He does note that Searle has surprisingly little to say directly on some central topics, such as epistemology ('Searle must be suffering from attention deficit syndrome when it comes to epistemology', 236) and ethics. It is a minor pity that Searle's latest work on rationality, free will and action appeared too late to function as a corrective. We might also add the more technical subjects: philosophy of logic, mathematics, physical science etc. It is an interesting fact that many of the most influential philosophers in the twentieth-century analytical tradition seemed to have earned (been required to earn?) their wings with technical studies (Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Putnam, Kripke, Kaplan for starters).

The book is organized historically around the appearance of Searle's major books and their attendant topics: Part I, philosophy of language (*Speech Acts*, 1969; *Expression and Meaning*, 1979), Part II, philosophy of mind (*Intentionality*, 1983; *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, 1992), Part III, what Fotion labels Searle's 'philosophy of society' (*The Construction of Social Reality*, 1995). Searle's recent work on 'Realism and Truth' is included in part III, but it might better have constituted a new Part IV. This organization usefully contrasts with Searle's own bottom-up synthesis (*Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World*, 1998) in giving a feeling for the development of Searle's thought — though Fotion disavows this as his primary purpose (3-4). Since Fotion selects one among many possible paths through Searle's writings, it is useful to get at least a satellite photo of it on record.

Philosophy of Language. Fotion begins with Searle's taxonomy of speech acts: utterance, illocutionary, propositional (with sub-acts of reference and predication), and perlocutionary acts, together with his four-part conditions on, and constitutive rules for, performing such illocutionary acts. Then he reviews Searle's influential five-part taxonomy of illocutionary acts, and ends with Searle's extension of the theory to metaphor, indirect speech acts, and fiction. This is the longest part and Fotion is strongest here, probably because he worked in this area himself. Complaints: Fotion ignores the profound influence Grice's work (meaning, conversational implicature)

had on most of the above aspects of Searle's theory (not to mention Frege, on whom Searle did his D.Phil. dissertation); he under plays Searle's discussion of Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction (while discussing at some length Searle's fairly irrelevant search for 'syntactic' evidence for his illocutionary taxonomy); and he ignores Vanderveken's (and Searle's) modification and formalization of the theory of illocutionary acts — all this while including less relevant material.

Philosophy of Mind. Fotion rightly sees Searle's work on intentionality (1983) as grounding his work on language in the sense that the philosophy of language is viewed as a branch of the philosophy of mind (Grice again), but also in the sense that finding out about the structure of intentional states is facilitated by comparing them with the structure of speech acts. Fotion rehearses Searle's theory of perception, action, causation, the Network and the Background, so it is odd (given that this is mostly where the action has been in the philosophy of language-mind interface) that Fotion leaves out virtually all of Searle's discussions of how intentionality grounds his theory of meaning (vs communicative) intentions and in general justifies the view that meaning is 'in the head' (contra Putnam), supports his (Fregean) theory of proper names (contra Kripke), and indexicals-demonstratives (contra Perry and Kaplan). Searle's endorsement (1992) of 'biological naturalism', his work on the mind-body problem, consciousness, and his dispute with certain strands of cognitive science (functionalism, cognitivism, and strong artificial intelligence, not to mention behaviorism) are sympathetically reviewed, and due notice is taken of the fact that Searle was one of the first to argue extensively and forthrightly for the importance (some think, in view of Searle's 'connection principle', the over-importance) of consciousness, which is now taken for granted in the field. Complaint: these views are in many ways more controversial than Searle's views on 'language' and 'society', and here especially Fotion owes the general reader less sympathy and at least more references to the dissent.

Philosophy of Society (including Realism and Truth). This was Searle's most recent material when Fotion's book was being completed, and so has had less time to accumulate commentary and perspective. Fotion correctly emphasizes the ontological and structural foci of Searle's investigation into social facts. He gets out Searle's basic ingredients: collective intentionality, assignment of function, and constitutive rules, but he underemphasizes the iterative power of the theory, its ability to reveal nested complexity, while spending too much time on illustrative examples (e.g., the chaos game) that don't really illustrate (194). Also, given that institutions and social facts are created when persons impose status-function on things which are collectively recognized and accepted, the category of (assignment of) status function is crucial yet gets virtually no explicit discussion; neither does Searle's controversial conception of the relation between language and social institutions. Fotion ends by lauding Searle's endorsement of Enlightenment doctrine ('external, mind independent, realism', correspondence theory of objective truth) and values (rationality, scientific method) against the forces of rela-

tivism, deconstruction etc.. It's the good fight, but it's a bit depressing that it needs to be fought.

It is hard to be sure of the intended audience for the book. Generalists have Searle's own authoritative synthesis (1998), and the specialist will find Fotion's presentation of specific topics hobbled by two decisions. The first is his reluctance to cite passages to justify his interpretation. Since occasionally the remarks seem to be highly suspect, it is important to know who one is disagreeing with — Searle or Fotion. The second is Fotion's avowed aim of ignoring almost all critics — who 'use Searle for target practice' (7) — and the inclusion of which would 'needlessly complicate the discussion' (7). This, however, does not prevent Fotion from devoting many pages to his own evaluations and criticisms — which do not, on the whole, measure up in seriousness to many he ignores. That he characterizes his practice as 'very Searlian' (8) is therefore double-edged. This book will probably be most useful to readers who are studying Searle on one specific topic and want to know how that topic links, historically and conceptually, to other doctrines of Searle's, and where to find them in their original form.

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Jürgen Habermas
The Liberating Power of Symbols.
Trans. Peter Dews.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2001. Pp. 130.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-082969);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-262-58205).

This book offers to the reader an informal way of tracking the various phases of the Habermasian programme of Discourse-Theory (D-T). The informality stems from the fact that the book is put together from lectures delivered in various festive occasions, a few *laudationes* for friends and colleagues and other short papers, altogether organised in eight chapters. Apart from the first three papers, the rest have appeared previously in various journals and the German press.

The lack of a disciplined structure and of a strict scholarly style notwithstanding, there is a common thread running through the otherwise very diverse thematic of the individual chapters: this is the idea of the transformation of the Kantian transcendental philosophy of the *subject* into a tran-

scendental philosophy of *language as communication*, an idea that has informed the Habermasian project of D-T since its early stages.

This idea is introduced and explored in the first chapter through a lucid survey of the main tenets of *Ernst Cassirer's* philosophy of culture. The affinities revealed here between Cassirer's and Habermas's understanding of the role that language plays in acquiring knowledge of the world/environment, are indeed remarkable. Habermas's discussion of the maturation of Cassirer's ideas on language, which eventually amounted to the articulation of a philosophy of culture in the place of a mere philosophy of knowledge, provides the actual justification for the fragmentary character of the remaining of the book (to that extent it is no surprise that the whole book borrows its title from that first chapter): all subsequent chapters are more or less subtle contributions to the sharpening of the idea that language and culture play a pivotal, indeed constitutive, role in our acquiring knowledge of the world. Once this conclusion is granted, the way is paved for a transformation of Kantian transcendental philosophy along the lines of D-T.

Let me try to reconstruct roughly the main points of an argument that runs through the whole book.

One of the main consequences of the so-called *linguistic turn* that crystallised at the turn of the twentieth century was the realisation that any process of gaining knowledge about the environment is decisively mediated by language (or broadly by symbolic systems as Cassirer has convincingly argued). The insertion of the parameter of language poses at least two new problems for a philosophical account of knowledge: philosophers need from now on *first* to account for the impact of symbolic forms — as cultural products — upon our knowledge of the environment and, hence, upon ontology (or the way the world is structured). *Second* they need to account for the 'practical' or 'agency-laden' dimension that the insertion of culture into the process of acquiring knowledge about the environment carries with it. Despite first appearances, Habermas believes it is possible to give a non-relativist account of the emerging philosophical picture of the world.

Obviously the exchange of the *representational* role of language for a *constitutive* role leads to some sort of ontological pluralism, where anything can exist as long as it is effable via symbolic (linguistic) structures. Habermas appreciates the important insights of such a pluralist ontology: art, religion and ethics, all have an undeniable — and valuable — materiality, the rejection of which would entail an incomplete understanding of the world. This is clearly reflected in Habermas's discussion of thinkers like Jaspers, Scholem, Metz Kluge and Theunissen (Chapters 2, 4, 6, 8 and 7 respectively). However that may be, Habermas is quite careful to block the sort of scepticism/relativism that could compromise the objectivity of knowledge: he is careful in stressing that ontological categories (objects, properties, events and so on) are not completely entrusted to our (subjective) creative powers. This is argued for two reasons.

First, even if it is not possible to speak any longer for an independent reality that comes before the conceptual apparatus of language, it is still

important to preserve the notion of *reference*: reference to objects is what renders possible the conceptual articulation of a world of states of affairs. In fact, the referential function of language is reflected in its semantic-logical structures. To the extent that semantics (and logic) are non-optional, language can be taken to incorporate an inherent objectivity that elevates it above its users (in the spirit of von Wright's work, discussed in ch. 3). Thus Habermas prefers to talk of language as 'disclosing' rather than 'constituting' the various ontological categories.

The second reason mainly addresses the level of language-use and the related normativity emanating from the fact that language is the product of cultural practices. Here objectivity derives from the realisation that the employment of language in our effort to disclose the world presupposes a communicative dimension; through the standpoint of communication, language is founded upon intersubjectivity and co-operation of autonomous agents, as Habermas, following the path of Apel, has been arguing for the past three decades.

The appreciation of both the semantic-logical and the pragmatic-practical levels of language provides the means for a transformation of Kantian transcendental philosophy in a way that preserves objectivity: the *locus* at which the world is constituted or, rather, revealed is no longer that of the transcendental subject but that of a natural language; a language that is independent from the empirical subjects who employ it, but at the same time in the service of their longing for discovery.

Perhaps, at the end of the day, Habermas's intention in bringing together those pieces might not have been as innocent or as altruistic as it appeared initially: after all, he manages to use thinkers as diverse as Theunissen and Cassirer, von Wright and Johann Metz or Kluge, Apel and Jaspers, only in order to show — this time in a more informal and, for that reason, effective way — that Discourse-Theory is still the best philosophical theory we have! Or should one, instead, be charitable and — in the spirit postulated by Discourse-Theory — assume that what Habermas is trying to emphasise is that the development of sound theories results only through the acquaintance and the dialogue with diverse ideas?

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Barry Hallen
The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful: Discourse About Values in Yoruba Culture.
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 2000. Pp. xiv + 201.
US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-3806-9);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21416-5).

In 1986, Barry Hallen co-authored (with J.O. Sodipo) one of the most provocative and hotly debated technical studies in African philosophy. *Knowledge, Belief, and Witchcraft* (*KBW*, reissued by Stanford University Press 1997), distilled years of close, painstaking work on the Yoruba language into a study intent on articulating a Yoruba philosophy to a Western audience. Using Quinean linguistic analysis and phenomenology, Hallen and Sodipo argued that Yoruba culture manifests a coherent, highly sophisticated epistemological structure that is expressed most clearly by the 'onísègùn', or Yoruba herbalist sages.

The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful: Discourse about Values in Yoruba Culture (*GBB*) continues the *KBW* project by investigating specific issues within Yoruba philosophy. And while Hallen also addresses some of the criticisms raised about the earlier book, *GBB* is not simply a sequel. Readers can profit from it without knowing anything about *KBW*. In *GBB*, Hallen's main argument is that in order to understand Yoruba culture, scholars must first recognize its epistemology, that is, its views on the nature of knowledge and belief. Understanding epistemology will make it possible to grasp both moral and aesthetic issues. Despite the importance of the supernatural in Yoruba culture, its values are best appreciated through publically available epistemology, not private apprehended spirits.

GBB consist of four central studies (on Yoruba epistemology, the self, ethics, and aesthetics), bounded by a historical introduction and a short conclusion. Hallen typically works from the statements of the onísègùn (he had 15 informants from the town of Ijan-Ekìtì in Nigeria), specifically ones that bring to light some aspect of Yoruba belief. These arise from painstakingly careful interviews, and are translated into English by Hallen and Yoruba-speaking assistants (with the Yoruba original for each statement provided in an appendix). The result is a model of careful philosophical ethnography, one which does not aim to provide a (post)-structuralist or (neo)-functionalist account of Yoruba culture, but which starts from the assumption that the wisdom of Yoruba sages expresses a coherent and significant epistemological and moral world.

Chapter two, 'Moral Epistemology', provides the basis for Hallen's subsequent investigations of explicitly axiological issues. In this chapter, Hallen carefully outlines the nature of ìmò ('knowledge') and ìgbàgbò ('belief'). Knowledge, in Yoruba culture, depends on first-hand experience, and to the extent which one makes a claim that lacks first-hand experience, one has ìgbàgbò to some degree. To know something is to know its òótó, its 'truth' (or,

as Hallen argues, its certainty). Crucially, not only a statement, but more importantly a person has òótó, and it is this feature of Yoruba thought that links epistemology and moral philosophy.

Once he has established the importance of epistemology, Hallen turns to the nature of the self. In 'Me, Myself, and My Destiny', he argues that the way in which one is aware of the self — both one's own self and the selves of others — is crucial to the moral world. The Yoruba have a complex sense of personal destiny as both chosen and as pre-conscious guide through life. According to Hallen, the Yoruba recognize the tension between destiny's determinism and freedom to choose (or mis-choose) a path. Hallen, however, argues against the implication that a private or inner self exists. Indeed, Yoruba thought approaches Western behaviouristic empiricism, inasmuch as empirical evidence — and not a product of a private inner self — establishes character (*GBB* 41ff).

After surveying Yoruba epistemology and its theory of the person, Hallen deals with axiological matters. In the fourth chapter, 'The Good and the Bad', Hallen argues that the issue for the Yoruba is not so much the nature of the good, but the nature (and identifying characteristics) of the good *person*. He does not ignore the place of the supernatural in all this, but rather relates the supernatural to the reason and interpretive skill of the onísègùn. Knowing good and bad requires that the Yoruba operate within an intricate moral structure and know how to properly 'read' people. 'The Beautiful', Hallen's examination of Yoruba art, builds on this interpretive ability by arguing for a close relationship between aesthetic and moral value. It is not that the beautiful is necessarily good, but that the good is what is truly beautiful.

Approaches like Hallen's have been criticized within African philosophy. Detractors point out that investigating commonly-held beliefs is not the same as investigating philosophy, since a philosophy is held by an individual, held critically, and has a textual basis — an approach derided as 'ethnophilosophy'. Others, less familiar with African philosophy, resist the idea that anything truly philosophical can be linked to a particular origin. If for instance the Yoruba have nothing to say to the body of literature that Western philosophers have developed on 'truth', then Yoruba philosophy is merely ethnography, interesting to anthropologists but not to philosophers.

It is important to distinguish the legitimate grounds of critique of Hallen's project from illegitimate ones. Strictly speaking, Hallen is not doing ethnophilosophy. His task is to translate into terms accessible to Western scholars a system that has critical (if not textual) elements, not to either establish the existence of an indigenous system of thought to a sceptical audience or to romanticize a *Weltanschauung*. He does not argue that a philosophy exists but presumes it does, and sets out to open its corridors and closets to non-Yoruba, both Africans and non-Africans. He might be criticized on the grounds that he treats the fifteen onísègùn as one voice, but not on the grounds that he is doing ethnophilosophy.

To Hallen's credit, he recognizes that philosophy is not diminished by acknowledging its contingent origins. He recognizes that elaborating the

intricacies of a particular philosophy both enriches the wider philosophical conversation and effectively addresses the attitude, still far too prevalent, that African thought is by definition inferior or derivative. Those who strongly believe that philosophy and ethnography are mutually exclusive will not likely be convinced by this book; for others, however, Hallen argues persuasively that philosophy comes from specific places, and that Yoruba philosophy is cogent and coherent.

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John C. Haugland
Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1999. Pp. 390.
US$32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-674-38233-1);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-674-00415-9).

The star attraction in this collection of essays is the celebrated 'The Intentionality All-Stars', an All-Star Team for the intentionality league, featuring

- Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida in left field, defending the position that intentionality can 'slip quietly into the social-history curriculum, alongside transubstantiation, noumenal selves, and the divine right of kings'.
- John Searle in right field, maintaining that there really are *mental* brain states possessed of 'some mysterious causal property which biochemists are going to have to unravel'.
- 'Finally, way out on the warning track in center field, B.F. Skinner is up against the wall defending the view that science can explain behavior without reference to intentionality.'
- At first base, just infield from Searle, are right-wing phenomenologists such as Jerry Fodor, Hartry Field, and Zenon Pylyshyn, who hold that original intentionality is the province exclusively of contentful internal (mental) states.
- At second base, just infield from Skinner, are the neo-behaviourists such as Quine, Daniel Dennett, and Robert Stalnaker, who, 'unlike paleo-behaviourists, take intentional *ascription* very seriously,' conceiving of the interactions between organism and environment 'not

merely as physical stimuli and responses, but rather as perceptions and actions.'

- 'Wittgenstein might have been a shortstop.'
- At third base are the neo-pragmatists for whom social practices are the bottom line. Also known as 'left-wing (that is, socialist) phenomenologists', they include Heidegger, Sellars, and Robert Brandom, for whom social niches define contentful cultural tokens as what they are.
- Haugeland is pitching, and the reader is catching.

The few who haven't read the essay can be assured that it transcends its conceit. Many will find its inclusion sufficient reason to buy the book.

The volume consists of thirteen essays spanning two decades. The first section gathers essays from the seventies, starting with 'The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism' (1978), which argues, in Haugland's words, 'that, though the character of the explanatory grasp sought in cognitive science is scientifically unprecedented, it is nevertheless perfectly legitimate; but, second, that the systems so intelligible are themselves incapable of understanding anything.' He credits as innovative its idea that the mind is an information-processing system, its input/output ability understood in terms of how it would be characterized under the intentional interpretation. Its systemic character sets the new psychology apart from the earlier conception of psychology as seeking quantitative, equational laws. Yet intentional description enables testable ways of talking about meaningful phenomena without choosing between introspection and behaviourism. He says that such systems are incapable of understanding, construed as including insight into why certain responses make sense, or are reasonable.

> Paradigms of understanding are rather our everyday insights into friends and loved ones, our sensitive appreciation of stories and dramas, our intelligent handling of paraphernalia and institutions. It is far from clear that these are governed by fully explicable rules at all. Our talk of them is sensible because we know what we are talking about, and not just because the talk itself exhibits some formal regularities (though that too is doubtless essential).

Another essay of notable interest is 'Understanding: Dennett and Searle' (1994), which attempts the heroic task of reconciling what Dennett and Searle have to say about intentionality. Common ground includes their naturalism, their commitment to a scientific understanding of nature, their materialism in the sense that dynamic matter yields necessary and sufficient conditions for intentionality, and their opposition to traditional physical reductionism. Haugeland's project here sheds light on his late-seventies ideas about the absence of understanding in information-processing systems. He agrees with Dennett about the normative aspect of the mental, and especially the need to understand people as rational, but he interprets this 'stance' as the subject's commitment, therefore in terms of Searlean first-person subjectivity rather than Dennettian third-person heterophenomenology.

> The unity of the system is the unity of a single consistent commitment in terms of which a plurality of intentional states can be normatively beholden to their constituted satisfaction conditions. Moreover, it is the basis of the necessary *subjectivity* of intentional states. 'Subject' here cannot just mean grammatical subject: even an adding machine is the 'subject' of its states in this sense. Rather, 'subject' means something like 'author and owner' - someone who is responsible for the states in question, and to whom they matter. Surely that subject is none other than the one who is committed to the very standards that render these states intentionally normative in the first place. My commitment to getting my intentional states 'right' is what makes their intentionality my *own* - that is, *intrinsic* to me. In other words, *subjectivity* as such is constituted.

This reading is particularly welcome because Searle has so far had very little to say about the subject and subjectivity, despite their crucial importance for his overall view. Haugeland provides at least a plausible articulation. Unfortunately, his collection came out too soon to take into account Searle's The Construction of Social Reality, so his criticism of Searle for neglecting the social dimension of mind needs bolstering or revision. As for Dennett, he seems to receive the short end of Haugeland's reconciliation stick. The thesis of the indeterminacy of translation is left behind in the author's concern with rationality, and heterophenomenology is left behind by his appropriation of the 'intential stance' as an ontologically subjective state. I don't miss the indeterminacy thesis and Dennett's insistence on the third-person stance, but other readers will object on his behalf that the reconciliation is bogus.

Haugeland is an original, independent thinker. This collection includes a brief introduction entitled 'Toward A New Existentialism,' which signals his interest in understanding-as-insight and his reservations about the project of AI (or what he has dubbed Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence, GOFAI). In addition to the two essays I have scouted here, the reader will encounter 'Understanding Natural Language', 'Hume on Personal Identity', 'Analog and Analog', 'Weak Supervenience', 'Ontological Supervenience', 'Representational Genera', 'Mind Embodied and Embedded', 'Objective Perception', 'Pattern and Being', 'and 'Truth and Rule-Following'.

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T.C. Kline III and **Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds.**
Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. 2000.
Pp. xvii + 268.
US$37.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-523-1);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-522-3).

In their Introduction to this edited volume, Kline and Ivanhoe note that essays included in it support the claims that 'contrary to what one might gather from orthodox Confucian criticisms of Xunzi's work, his writings are of great importance to the development of Confucianism and to the larger field of Chinese philosophy', and that 'Xunzi is not simply a significant Chinese philosopher, but an important *world* philosopher. His insights into various aspects of virtue, nature, and moral agency speak to our own concerns as well as to those of his second-century Chinese peers' (ix). Indeed, the essays gathered here do make this case.

To begin with the second claim first, several of the pieces make this point particularly well. The strongest of the lot is also the oldest article, Henry Rosemont, Jr.'s 'State and Society in the *Xunzi*: A Philosophical Commentary'. The focus here is on social and political philosophy, rather than on narrower ethical issues, and the aim is to offer a coherent and compelling account of a vision of social order alternative to the traditionally democratic view present in Karl Popper's open society. Rosemont does not try to show that the *Xunzi* contains some sort of proto-Western view. Rather, he insists that the particular social and economic context of the ancient work has certain features that may be relevant to some societies in the contemporary world: general lack of affluence and the relative absence of an individualistic ethos. Under these conditions, he argues, the *Xunzi* develops a Chinese model of social and political life which 'will have maximum security and minimal happiness guaranteed to all,' but at the cost of some restriction of personal and intellectual freedoms, and the surrendering of the 'hope of a greatly improved tomorrow.' The open society model would, Rosemont argues, offer greater freedoms and 'the hope for increasing amounts of happiness in the future.' But at the cost of 'loss of security, and the possibility that the future will bring an increasing amount of misery' (30). Rosemont's article presents a close and intelligent reading of the *Xunzi*, an acute philosophic analysis of the position and its consequences, and a useful sense of the viability of alternative models of political order. Its republication here is a real service.

David Nivison's piece, 'Xunzi and Zhuangzi', is a second strong article supporting the claim the Xunzi has something to say to contemporary world philosophy. In the course of his discussion, Nivison provides an interesting defense of the view that Xunzi's was 'a view large enough for him to see human customs, "rites" and norms, as both products of human invention, and so "conventional," and yet as "universal" ... the fact that we see they are man-made does not insulate them from our commitment to them: their "artificiality" thus in no way renders them not really obligatory and norma-

tive' (185). Nivison's argument, working out of a discussion of the *Zhuangzi*, provides a nuanced and worthwhile defense of the position that norms can be both conventional and universal. It is an important piece for contemporary discussions of this issue.

Defense of the first claim the editors make, that Xunzi is more important in Chinese philosophy than his later Confucian critics would admit, is not directly supported in any one of the articles in the collection. Nevertheless, the effect of the whole is certainly to show that the development of the Confucian tradition has drawn on more elements of the *Xunzi* than it usually credits itself with doing. The conceptions of agency, of virtue, of morality, and of the development of human nature all have echoes in later works. And it is these concepts whose analyses form the bulk of the essays in the collection. One of the most interesting features of the volume is the fact that so many of the articles directly respond to one another — Bryan Van Norden, David Wong, T.C. Kline III, Eric Hutton, and Philip Ivanhoe all reference one another's arguments in the course of their own. While I agree with several of the authors that Van Norden's interpretations of Mengzi and Xunzi were too narrow, overlooking alternatives other than those he laid out, Van Norden did ask some interesting questions about the relation between moral agency and the traditional opposition between Mengzi and Xunzi with respect to human nature. David Wong effectively develops these questions. Wong further references Nivison's article in the course of his beautifully written discussion of how it is that Xunzi is able to articulate a move from a human nature which is naturally, originally evil, to a nature which genuinely loves and delights in morality. The other articles continue the discussion, developing the *Xunzi*'s view of human nature and moral choice.

Four articles in the collection are a bit more independent in their approach to the *Xunzi*. Anthony Cua considers the ways in which appeals to the past can be understood as having philosophical importance when analyzed in terms of the behavioral implications of certain citations of the past, rather than in terms of the apparent appeal to authority in such citations. Jonathan Schofer tries to apply contemporary analyses of the category of virtue to the virtues Xunzi discusses, offering some modest insights into the ways in which specific virtues may be understood. Joel Kupperman offers an interesting, brief account of morality as psychological constraint in the Xunzi — showing some relationship between the contemporary understanding of the roles of culture and environment in the development of moral decisions and Xunzi's view of the development of moral nature. Finally, the collection includes a piece by D.C. Lau challenging the general position, which tends to find Xunzi's view deeper, or more realistic, or more viable, or simply more interesting than Mengzi's. Lau concludes that Xunzi's position contains serious drawbacks which support the tradition's embrace of Mengzi's views.

While not all the articles are of equal strength, the volume is an important addition to the literature. The arguments are accessible, the references are clear, and the subject is of great value to both scholars of Chinese philosophy

and those interested in expanding the range of material brought to bear on issues of ethics and political philosophy.

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Julia Kristeva
Hannah Arendt: Life is Narrative.
Trans. Franklin Collins.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2001.
Pp. 100.
Cdn$/US$18.95. ISBN 0-8020-3521-3.

In these five, compact lectures, Julia Kristeva explores a question animating her own work as much as Hannah Arendt's: *Who* is the speaking subject? Two extraordinary women thinkers — both refugees of totalitarianism, both students of philosophical systems that notoriously cramp speech agency — how easily their approaches can nonetheless be polarized! Arendt's focus on 'the public space' included (however gratuitously) a consistent degradation of interiority, be it sentimental and romantic or clinical and psychoanalytic. Her style is frank and direct, its profundity and novelty rising from her phenomenological education like a secret lung. Kristeva, by contrast, founded 'semanalysis', a highly abstract, explicitly theoretical blend of semiotics and psychoanalysis. Kristeva seeks the sources of political violence in interpsychic dynamics that Arendt would have labeled fictitious — a 'dream world' with no explanatory power whatsoever for this one.

Perhaps to disarm facile comparisons, *Hannah Arendt: Life is a Narrative* shocks on the very first page. Kristeva's thesis? That Arendt's 'varied yet profoundly coherent intellectual odyssey never ceased to place *life* — in and of itself, and as a concept to be elucidated — at the very center.' (3) *'Life'? Arendt?*

The Human Condition famously linked 'life' with the 'laboring activity' — a painful and incessant struggle for individual subsistence and the reproduction of the species. Still, Kristeva reminds us, Arendt's horror at contemporary processes that would render human beings 'superfluous', culminating in wanton and massive destructions of life, led her to rethink life itself. This rethinking hinged on an appropriation of Aristotle's *zoe* (biological life) and *bios* (human lifetime) distinction. Kristeva neatly summarizes the outcome of this appropriation in her subtitle: for Arendt, 'Life is (becomes) narrative'.

Each of Kristeva's five lectures sets out to analyze some aspect of this idea, and to question the distinction upon which it rests.

First, 'life'. Kristeva explains that for Arendt 'life is not a "value" in and of itself, as it is believed by humanist ideologies' (9). Life as a *value* — consumption, reproduction, labor — leads to nihilism, for values are meant to be exchanged. Instead, Kristeva continues, 'life does not fulfil itself unless it never ceases to *inquire* into both meaning and action' (ibid.). Life as *valuing activity* is to be strictly contrasted to the idea that mere life, *zoe*, is itself to be valued. The 'who' of life (*bios*) must be understood as *the source of values*. Kristeva admiringly unfolds the idea of *bios* as narration in her outstanding second lecture; but the seeds of her critique are simultaneously sown. The third and fourth lectures highlight the extremity to which Arendt's distinction drove her: a disparaging or 'repression' of the body and its drives as themselves potential sources of evaluation. The concluding lecture encourages us to consider judgment, promise, and forgiveness as evaluative speech acts that *needn't* undermine embodiment.

Kristeva's second lecture provides a fresh interpretation of Arendtian narrative precisely because it brackets the psychoanalytic and developmental lens. Instead, Kristeva details how the *Poetics* saturates Arendt's reading of the *Nicomachean Ethics* — that is, her entire theory of action. Arendt's emphasis on narrative centers on plot as a *mimesis* of action. This *mimesis*, this repetition, simultaneously confers a character — a 'who' — and intelligibility. Thanks to these side-effects, plot as a *mimetic repetition* of action itself becomes an action, instigating interpretation and contestation. Natality is a beginning abstracted from the cycle of the species, a *rebirth* from *zoe* into a meaningful, linear coherence (*bios*) inseparable from the part one plays, and is interpreted as playing, in larger plot structures.

If Arendt's action theory indeed sprang from poetics, Kristeva is right to find her negligence of modes of expression perplexing. Arendt, claims Kristeva, was too willing to abstract elements of narrative, of plot, from their expressive conveyance, e.g., through tragic or epic *poetry*. Kristeva hastily follows the fashion here of attributing defects in Arendt's work to her *reaction against* Heidegger. According to Kristeva, Arendt offers an *apologia* for narrative. Rehabilitated narrative spotlights simultaneous processes of social cohesion and individuation that Heidegger's apotheosis of poetry, in its purportedly 'solipsistic' play of language, obscures.

For Kristeva, Arendt's reticence regarding the 'how' of expressivity indicates a repression of the centrality of *style* and a reversion to a 'Lukacs-like sociologism' (40). This critique organizes the third lecture, which discusses Arendt's *use* of narratives — stories, novels, plays — to elucidate political phenomena of the twentieth century. While Kristeva applauds Arendt's understanding that to narrate is to evaluate, she deplores Arendt's disregard ('repression') of the vitality of the linguistic medium of the narrative art. Kristeva's own theory of poetic language (the semiotic as opposed to symbolic) implicitly inform this critique. By answering the question of 'who' one is via *bios* as plot, Arendt misses the uniqueness of the 'who' that emerges through

our ways of speaking, the rhythms of language that indicate, and communicate, the vital pulse and passion of bodily *life*.

The fourth lecture elaborates this critique, now presupposing psychoanalysis. It exposes the limitations of Arendt's radical rejection of the body and sexual drives as constitutive elements of identity, of the 'who' that speaks. Arendt's overly emphatic distinction between *zoe* and *bios*, combined with her reaction against Heidegger's poetics, deafened Arendt to the expression of identity that emerges not only in the content of our speech, but through our ways of speaking.

Kristeva confesses (87) that she cannot share Arendt's faith that only persons, and not languages, can go mad. Kristeva's analysis of judgment, promise, and forgiveness in the final lecture show that Arendt's approach to political speech acts relies on language as a *sensus communis* that is itself sane. What are we to do if we suspect that language, whose rhythms speak from and to vital and not just rational processes, is not itself so very safe (88)? As a necessary supplement to a narrative account of action and the enactment of a politics of judgment, Kristeva's poetics offers a therapeutics for language — a language meant to house, not Heidegger's Being, but Arendt's plural and natal selves.

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Sonia Kruks
Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2001.
Pp. 224.
US$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-3387-8);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8417-0).

In *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics*, Sonia Kruks attempts to recover and apply a neglected tradition of existential thought in order to break the grip of the 'Enlightenment versus postmodernism' debates in feminist theory. In a series of thematically linked essays, Kruks returns repeatedly to the work of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Fanon, and — most significantly — Beauvoir. Thus perhaps the book's most valuable contribution is to remind feminist philosophers of these thinkers' arguments, and to show how their insights might relate to contemporary discussions of subjectivity, agency, and freedom. Kruks seizes on key questions in contem-

porary political philosophy, such as the possibility of individual freedom in the midst of oppression, and brings her own experience to bear in trying to push these questions beyond commonly assumed limits. The book's greatest weaknesses are the brevity of some arguments, which are often more derivative than original (although both qualities might be a boon for teaching purposes), and Kruks's tendency to set up straw persons in feminist philosophy, who can then be easily knocked down by her crusading existentialists.

In the first two chapters, Kruks explicitly sets out to recuperate Beauvoir as a thinker of greater originality and political insight than her male contemporaries, whose work might illuminate current impasses in feminist philosophy. In 'Freedoms That Matter: Subjectivity and Situation in the Work of Beauvoir, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty,' Kruks reads *The Second Sex* 'with and against the early ideas of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty' [28] and argues that Beauvoir arrived at an embodied account of human existence as structured by both freedom and constraint, moving between the realms of consciousness and materiality (superseding the erasure of material oppression with which critics have often charged Sartre). This longer essay contains much historical background and interweaving of exposition and critique, making it very useful reading for courses in existentialism, phenomenology, or any of the philosophers it treats. In 'Panopticism and Shame: Foucault, Beauvoir, and Feminism,' Kruks reads Michel Foucault in conjunction with Judith Butler, again suggesting that in Beauvoir's work we find a necessary existential ethical dimension suppressed by both later thinkers. This is a slightly disjointed chapter that covers a lot of ground: of necessity, Kruks's readings of Foucault and Butler are selective and abbreviated, and she doesn't incorporate these authors' own responses to the problems of resistance and freedom their work raises. She moves between these critiques and another recuperation of Beauvoir — this time, an account of shame that might provide the phenomenological element missing from Foucauldian accounts of panoptic power, as well as an account of agency beyond the immanence Kruks thinks they imply. This is an engaging reading of ideas already familiar from the work of Sandra Bartky and Susan Bordo (among others) using Beauvoirian language.

'The Politics of Recognition: Sartre, Fanon, and Identity Politics' begins with a rehash of the pros and cons of identity politics in feminism that is extremely well worn ground. Starting from the claim that contemporary demands for recognition are based on 'the very grounds on which recognition has been denied' [85], Kruks tentatively argues for the limits of such affirmations. She isn't always fair to the authors she mentions, and tends to set up straw persons here. For example, her claim that identity politics 'tends toward an epistemological and ethical relativism' 'grounded in claims about the group specificity of experiences and the exclusive capacity of particular identity groups to evaluate those experiences' [85] needs more evidence. Who defends this position in an interesting way? Brief quotes from June Jordan and the Combahee River Collective taken out of context don't really make the point. Kruks worries that identity politics has become overly aesthetic

and experiential (Gloria Anzaldúa is the alleged culprit here), echoing Nancy Fraser's claim that the politics of recognition elides more traditional political demands for redistribution. There's nothing new here, and it's a relief when Kruks returns to the existential tradition to show how Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*, and Sartre's *Anti-Semite and Jew* prefigure tensions in contemporary identity politics. Careful treatment of these texts leads to the conclusion that they too 'lack tools with which to theorize the interconnections between the realm of existential experience, in which the dynamics of non-recognition and self-affirmation are played out, and the broader world of processes and structures, in which the particular dynamics each describes are embedded' [104].

In chapter four Kruks returns to her dubious target, the 'epistemology of provenance'. To avoid the obvious epistemic and political dangers of making experience meaningful only to its subjects, Kruks argues that while Nancy Hartsock and Donna Haraway both provide useful feminist starting-points, they fail to offer 'a sufficient account of situated selves' or 'of how it is that the world mediates among them' [116]. Unsurprisingly, existentialism again proves key, and Kruks offers a selective and intriguing exposition and application of Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason* to this lacuna. Kruks's Sartre makes a sophisticated case that our shared practices are necessarily linked in ways that permit (indeed, require) understanding of the different practices of others.

The book's final section departs from Kruks's earlier explicit reliance on existentialist texts and ventures into less well-charted feminist territory. 'Going Beyond Discourse: Feminism, Phenomenology, and "Women's Experience" ' examines exemplary texts by Richard Rorty and Joan Scott, to argue that their attempts to account for experience solely as a product of discourse erase the embodied self and agency. Kruks argues that Rorty expels 'non-linguistic bodily experience into the realm of nature,' perpetuating a series of dualisms that sideline certain experiences more typical of women. Similarly, she claims that Scott presents us with a false dichotomy between using experience as the foundation of explanation and its object, likewise reducing 'experiencing selves, or subjects, to discursive effects' [140]. In a more constructive vein, Kruks suggests that feminists incorporate a phenomenology of embodied and affective experience as a new basis for solidarity among women. This important theme continues into the final chapter, where Kruks takes up the question of how solidarity that emerges from generosity (rather than only shared identity or interests) might be fostered among women. She articulates the grounds from which 'respectful recognition' might emerge: that is, 'a relationship in which one is deeply and actively concerned about others, but neither appropriates them as an object of one's own experience or interests nor dissolves oneself in a vicarious experience of identification with them' [155]. In this most personal and speculative of her essays, Kruks argues for attention to feeling-with through the body, coupled with the choice to make this a politicized sympathy.

For a book on feminist politics published in 2001 I might have wished for *Retrieving Experience* to be more cognizant of relevant literature (for example Elizabeth Spelman's 1997 *Fruits of Sorrow*, the essays in Toril Moi's 2000 *What is a Woman?*, or, most problematically, critical race feminism that cannot be dismissed as espousing an epistemology of provenance or over-emphasis on affirmation of identity — such as Patricia Williams's work). Nonetheless, this excellent book usefully supplements feminist interpretations of existentialist authors and adds to the rekindling of existential phenomenology within feminist political theory.

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Will Kymlicka
Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 2001. Pp. 383.
Cdn$105.00: US$65.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-829665-7);
Cdn$29.95: US$18.95
(paper: ISBN 0-19-924098-1).

This book brings together a collection of Kymlicka's recent, previously published essays, reviews, and critical notices. Covering a wide range of themes — from nationalism to indigenous rights, cosmopolitanism, and civic education — and written for very different purposes, the pieces do not necessarily put forth a unitary vision of how culturally plural liberal societies ought to respond to diversity. Rather, the essays reflect a more exploratory approach to a diverse array of topics, some of which Kymlicka has addressed only in passing in earlier writings. Although the essays do not cohere into a single argument, the insights offered in them reflect the positions developed by Kymlicka in his earlier books, particularly *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989) and *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995). In the current volume, Kymlicka continues to defend what we might call liberal egalitarian multiculturalism, or a vision of multi-nation states bound by liberal norms and institutions. The book is divided into four parts: I: The Evolution of the Minority Rights Debate; II: Ethnocultural Justice; III: Misunderstanding Nationalism; and IV: Democratic Citizenship in Multiethnic States. Several of the pieces in parts one and three revisit topics central

to Kymlicka's earlier books, namely, minority nationalism and the struggles of immigrant minorities. Here Kymlicka continues to endorse the efforts of culturally diverse states that have pursued policies of multiculturalism (such as Australia and Canada), arguing that far from hindering social cohesion, such policies help to facilitate the integration of immigrants and counteract their social and political marginalization (chapter 8, 'The Theory and Practice of Immigrant Multiculturalism', especially pp. 164-5). Moreover, Kymlicka also explores the resources within federalist political models for the accommodation of national minorities and immigrant groups, arguing that we should reject models of federalism that seek to disempower national minorities and instead strive to develop 'genuinely multination federations which seek to accommodate national minorities' (chapter 5, 'Minority Nationalism and Multination Federalism', 96). Similarly, in 'Human Rights and Ethnocultural Justice' (chapter 4), Kymlicka acknowledges that human rights as currently articulated are insufficient to protect many cultural injustices, and suggests that 'human rights standards must be supplemented with various minority rights' in order to secure justice for all citizens in liberal states.

A particular focus of part three is what has come to be called 'liberal nationalism', which combines a commitment to liberal egalitarian principles with an acknowledgement of the centrality (and tenacity) of cultural, collective identities. In several of the essays in this section, Kymlicka tries to correct misapprehensions about nationalism, such as the false dichotomy drawn between Enlightenment-style cosmopolitanism and nationalism (chapter 10, 'From Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism), and oversimple accounts of the source of national identity in works by such authors as Michael Ignatieff and William Pfaff (chapter 12, 'Misunderstanding Nationalism). Kymlicka is determined to rescue a revised form of liberal nationalism from the clutches of strident anti-nationalists who ignore the claims of cultural groups. Despite Kymlicka's caution that we must pay close attention to the ways that states reinforce and sustain national cultures (252), his accounts of the salience of ethnocultural identities sometimes seem to romanticize nationalism in problematic ways. For instance, he writes, 'the inherited view that minority nationalism represent an illiberal, exclusive and defensive reaction to modernity is multiply mistaken, at least in the context of Western democracies. Some minority nationalism represent a liberal, inclusive, and forward-looking embrace of modernity and globalization ... ' (285). At the very least, Kymlicka's discussion here tends to side-step or bracket issues of power and resources that are surely not exhausted by the role of collective identity.

The essays in parts two and four take on subjects that Kymlicka either has not addressed extensively until now, or else extend his discussions of these considerably. These sections of the book include essays on race (chapter 9, 'A Crossroad in Race Relations'), indigenous rights (chapters 6, 'Theorizing Indigenous Rights' and 7, 'Indigenous Rights and Environmental Justice'), human rights discourse (chapter 4, 'Human Rights and Ethnocultural Jus-

tice'), civic republicanism and civic education (chapter 16, 'Education for Citizenship'; chapter 17, 'Citizenship in an Era of Globalization: Commentary on Held'; and chapter 18, 'Liberal Egalitarianism and Civic Republicanism: Friends or Enemies?). For political theorists and philosophers, perhaps the most interesting pieces in the collection are those in which Kymlicka seeks to respond directly to his critics, as well as those in which he redresses omissions that have drawn criticism in the past. (An essay in part one, 'Do We Need a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights? Reply to Carens, Young, Parekh, and Forst', is also a very informative reply to critics coming from different vantage points, though holding no surprises.) In his essay on race relations — a subject that he has not previously tackled very directly — Kymlicka highlights the very different development of black communities in the United States and Canada, and the consequent differences in the political understandings of race and policies that seek to redress racial injustice. In keeping with his liberal egalitarian framework, Kymlicka makes the suggestion that not all visible minorities ought to be included in affirmative action programs, as they may not suffer any concrete disadvantages (127). This essay offers some insights into the place of race in Kymlicka's vision of multi-nation liberal states, where previously it was not clear where race fit in his scheme of national minority rights and polyethnic rights. However, this essay jumps inexplicably from section 1 ('Race in the U.S.: the Case of African-Americans') to section 3 ('Visible Minorities in Canada'), suggesting that a publisher's error may have resulted in the omission of a section. Another essay in which Kymlicka addresses a problem previously overlooked in his writing is chapter fifteen, 'Minority Nationalism and Immigrant Integration', in which he acknowledges that there are some very real tensions between the aims and concerns of minority nationalists on the one hand and immigrant groups on the other (289). His insistence that these tensions can be resolved and the goals of such diverse groups can ultimately reconciled may surprise some readers, but his argument here — as in the other essays generally — is well worth considering.

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Lorraine Y. Landry
Marx and the Postmodernism Debates: An Agenda for Critical Theory.
Westport, CT: Praeger 2000. Pp. xiii + 232.
US$65.00. ISBN 0-275-96889-8.

Postmodernism holds a nagging fascination even for many who mistrust it, partly because of its general influence on the current philosophical scene, and partly because its core claims, being powerful and challenging, can prove stubbornly difficult to dispel. In this book Lorraine Landry proposes that rather than trying to dispel them, we should drop those tenets in the spaces between other, apparently opposing schools of critique and see what comes out. In what she calls a 'fruitful tension approach', the poststructuralism of Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard is juxtaposed with Marx's work, on the one hand, and Habermas's on the other. From the resultant frictions, she seeks a new, incorporative 'agenda for critical theory' — and while it's not altogether clear that she finds one, there is much that is instructive in both the ambitions of her approach, and its lacunae.

'Fruitful tension', says Landry, arises in the discussion of discrete positions 'in their own terms as far as possible', noting similarities while avoiding 'facile syntheses and hasty dismissals' so as to delimit 'both viable theoretical and political strategies and those to be avoided' (13). After two chapters laying out the modernity/postmodernity debates from which her project begins, she spends the next three placing Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard against this landscape. Little in this first half of the book will much surprise those who are familiar with the debates, and with the secondary literature of which Landry's exposition, while being perhaps a little over-reliant on it, provides a useful inventory. The key threads of postmodern suspicions of the modern are identified thus: '(1) critiques of "strong" conceptions of reason, (2) critiques of the autonomous rational subject, and (3) critiques of the notion of knowledge as representation' (34). Landry examines the ways in which her three French exemplars both extend and subvert the critical imperatives opened up by the Enlightenment goal of rational social critique — principally, by transferring the object of analysis from concepts and the subject to the workings of language. She seeks to weave connections between the ways in which they, along with Marx and Habermas, have picked apart and transcended the cruder, more positivistic, scientistic aspects of Enlightenment thought.

The weaving gains impetus and substance in chapters 6, 7 and 8, which look more deeply at how the change of metaphilosophical parameters induced by the 'linguistic turn' can be fitted back into that Marxian concern with the material contexts of social oppression that postmodernism's critics often take it as neglecting. The fit, says Landry, may be tighter than one might expect. Most especially, Marx's 'methodological insights regarding language and ideology' are seen as contributing 'a needed emphasis on sociopolitical and material relations to a predominantly language-oriented approach to social

critique' (186). Marx's concern for what Landry calls 'objectivity' — a world beyond discourse — can serve to redirect the insights of poststructuralism and Habermasian critical theory towards 'the socio-material constraints of oppressive situations' without slipping back into what Landry regards as the shortcomings of Enlightenment rationalism.

There's a lot to be said for the aims and approach of this book. But during its course, both get a little skewed. Curious patterns arise in the playing-off of thinkers against each other. Landry is much more critical of Habermas than of Derrida or Foucault, for example. But she then makes heavy use of Habermas in racking up a number of telling criticisms of Lyotard, relying on the same rationalistic aspects of the former's approach which she has already sought to jettison. And once we get to the concluding chapters, the point of Landry's chosen approach becomes more difficult to discern. In showing that the 'postmodernism debates' are 'fuelled by complex responses to Marx's legacy', Landry recommends (142) 'a pragmatic-communication approach', in which a shared commitment to 'critical-practical engagement with the ideological features of the Enlightenment and modernity' can be brought out. But she does not fully confront the looming impediments facing any such marriage.

For instance, part of poststructuralist gospel is precisely that language should *not* be understood as primarily a medium of communication — or at least not the clean transfer of meanings between rational subjects. Another of its upshots, as Landry rightly points out, is a thoroughgoing anti-realism and linguistic relativism. Yet she never quite explains how Marx's work, Habermas's work and poststructuralism can somehow be fused in a way that is neither relativist nor anti-realist — without each of them losing something definitive in the process. It's not clear that the promise that 'the empirical links between the materiality of social power and symbolic constraints on free communication, on the one hand, and on the other, the formal analysis of distorted communication could be explored in a manner oriented more toward concrete political projects of combating various oppressions' (182) actually *needs* poststructuralist support, or could use it. Against the grain of her project's integrative intentions, the undrawn lesson here seems to be that an adequate sublation of the 'postmodernism debates' requires leaving a good deal of poststructuralist orthodoxy behind. Landry's picking and mixing of the choice bits of various thinkers' work doesn't, in the end, sit entirely easily with itself.

Something strangely absent from it is constructive attention to the work of those — Norris, Eagleton, Bernstein, Jameson, and others — whose critical engagements with postmodernism seem most pertinent to Landry's own project, and most readily co-optable in its service: a source of missing glue. The 'fruitful tension' remains a little *too* tense. This is accentuated, alas, by aspects of the book's presentation which in other circumstances might be more peripheral. Grammatical slips and muddinesses feature throughout. The extensive, meticulous use of notes, bibliography and index (which together comprise 92 out of 232 pages) provides helpful resources, but shifts

much of the substance of the narrative into discrete, displaced pockets. Many crucial points of detail — for instance, the tensions between Foucault's anti-humanism and his concern for subjective autonomy — are consigned to the back pages, where their presence intrudes less, depriving the main argument of impetus and purchase.

The claim that Marx's work still offers much — and can dislodge some of the more smug shibboleths of postmodern conventional wisdom — is timely, valid, and inspiring. But Landry's book needs a sequel, I think, before the fruits of the tensions she delineates might be fully borne.

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Andrew Light and **Mechthild Nagel, eds.**
Race, Class, and Community Identity.
Amherst, NY: Humanity Books 2000. Pp. 233.
US$55.00. ISBN 1-5739-2816-X.

The contributors to this volume, which inaugurates the series 'Radical Philosophy Today', face a curious paradox. On the one hand, the failures of institutionalized Marxism and the limitations revealed in the socialist programs of various west European states (notably Scandinavia) have placed an apologetic burden on leftist social philosophy and critical theory, or at least revealed that previously dominant paradigms of radical thought were seriously limited. The situation is further complicated by corporate liberalism's ability to flourish under conditions of globalization. On the other hand, despite claims to the place of a 'kinder, gentler America' in a 'new world order', there has never been a greater need for philosophy of the radical sort that avoids traditional academic superstitions and advocates the primacy of criticism in an increasingly unreflective American culture, now exported as a popular consumable good by plane, train, and Internet as well.

Light and Nagel's book addresses this need admirably on a number of intersecting social dimensions. Twelve essays address not only traditional concerns of radical social philosophy — gender inequality, institutionalized and persistent racism, and the nature and effects of capital — but also point in new directions. Notably, Xiaorong Li's 'The Chinese Woman' underscores the fatal limitations of both Marxist and universalist-feminist approaches to the continuing subjugation of women in China, avoiding relativism yet demonstrating the social facts unique to Chinese society. In another fruitful vein, John Brentlinger addresses the question of 'What's "Left" of Our

Spirituality?' to other Marxists, and comes to the conclusion that the reductive analysis of religious life of historical Marxism does not seem to cover the wider category of spirituality. 'I believe that the spiritual quality that has been taken from our lives,' he writes, 'can only be restored by changes in our lives: by actual work, practice, lived relationships and commitments, in which we cross the distances of class, race, ethnicity, religion, and imperialist privilege that keep us from coming together as people and as part of nature' (145). The anthology at its best mirrors not only the sentiment of Brentlinger's piece, but also its demand for action; criticism cannot be merely carried out by conceptual analysis and deconstruction of subtly oppressive categories but rather it must motivate direct action.

For example, Charles W. Mills's '"But What are you *Really*?": The Metaphysics of Race' succeeds in this respect because it not only gives good reasons to see race as socially constructed, but fleshes out these reasons by the examination of ten hypothetical 'case studies' in racial indeterminacy that focus on the importance of factors in racial identity such as culture, public- and self-awareness of ancestry. By suggesting that there are certain regularities in thinking about race as social constructed, Mills gives us ideas of how to progressively shift the purpose of race from oppression to particularization and self-realization in conditions of increasing ethnic pluralism.

Similarly, in 'Prisons, Profit, Crime, and Social Control', Stephen Hartnett contrasts the deeply institutionalized practice of punishment and forced labor in America with the startling lack of rehabilitative or deterrent results from the multi-million dollar corrections industry. While Hartnett engages in theoretical discussion of the violence that imprisonment represents, citing thinkers such as Rousseau and Beccaria, Hartnett is most persuasive in bringing to life anecdotes about prison life (like that of 'Big Will', the older prisoner who made an impression on members of a young prison gang by pouring gasoline into their locked cell and threatening to burn them alive) that emphasize the idea that rather than abstracting prisons from temptations and social pressures to criminal action, prisoners actually *immerse* their inhabitants in such a culture.

However, some pieces in the volume have certain drawbacks in failing to avoid philosophical pitfalls and fallacies that might not only invalidate their positions but also alienate potential left colleagues who do not (at least as of yet) consider themselves 'radical'. For example, Patrick Murray's and Jeanne Schuler's 'Recognizing Capital: Some Barriers to Public Discourse about Capital' seems to commit a kind of category mistake (or at least illustrate a weakness in the traditional historical materialist analysis of capital) when they identify capital as 'a particular social *form*' and, as a form, capital 'speaks to the peculiar necessity exerted by something' (103). Citing postmodern influences as derisive of this notion of form, Murray and Schuler lament the fact that this kind of anti-essentialism 'closes off the conceptual space for recognizing capital and tracking its pervasive influence throughout culture and the world' (103). Yet forms are better understood as exemplifying a kind of *logical* necessity, a kind of judgment, that may or may not carry over into

social facts. Murray and Schuler never make a case that capital, as a concept, is anything more than this, but unjustly put the burden of proof on those who see capital as only one more vague but useful vocabulary term for describing highly complex social relationships, of which many other concepts as just as true — and thus exert their own necessity.

Another rather glaring example of this comes in the conclusion to Steve Martinot's 'The Structure of Whiteness', at which point Martinot contends that 'whiteness' as a privilege is not something that someone could voluntarily renounce, as perhaps one could do with an inheritance or a job. Rather, the implication of his discussion 'might be that one cannot identify oneself as white and be antiracist at the same time. Yet a white identity cannot simply be discarded' (75). Although this is a simplification of his conclusion, Martinot's discussion clearly seems to commit the fallacy of the untestable claim, and more importantly paints whites concerned about racism into a corner. As in the case of Murray and Schuler's discussion of capital, we want room to move in discussions of race and class; we want to show the radical philosopher's commitment to wide democracy and diversity by allowing a place for everyone at the table in our deliberations. We do not do this by the replacement of one absolute concept or principle, such as 'separate but equal' or 'imperialism' by another, such as 'whiteness' or 'capital'. If we want to avoid these kinds of divisive mistakes, we will attempt to shift out of that dialectic altogether, and such a move demands difficult concessions as to our possession of the whole truth. Inasmuch as most of the contributors to Light and Nagel's anthology make this latter move by necessarily limiting the scope of their inquiries, the anthology as a whole succeeds. Insofar as radical philosophy continues to do the same, we should expect its success as well.

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Eva Mackey
The House of Difference: Cultural Politics and National Identity in Canada.
New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. ix + 199.
Cdn$135.00: US$90.00.
ISBN 0-415-18166-6.

Mackey expands upon the work of postcolonial theorists who argue that dominant power functions through the erasure of difference and the creation of a single, homogeneous culture. In opposition to these oppressive features, liberation these theorists seek through the proliferation of difference and the promotion of heterogeneous or hybrid identities. Mackey questions this opposition by examining how cultural dominance functions in Canada, not through the erasure of difference, but within a framework of plural cultures and through the very institutionalization of cultural differences.

Although there does not seem to be an overt construction of national cultural homogeneity in Canada, Mackey argues that the white Anglophone majority has cultural, economic and political dominance. Despite the proliferation of differences, this dominant group still has the power to define, limit and tolerate differences: 'If Canada is the "very house of difference," it contains a family with a distinct household head' (12). The book maps the contradictory and ambiguous ways in which cultural differences within Canada have been managed and represented in public culture and state policies as part of a unifying project — the construction of a distinct national identity. For example, she argues that pluralist policies which project a mythologized image of Canada as tolerant of its internal 'others', such as multiculturalism and the recognition of aboriginal rights, are used to manage diverse populations while simultaneously constructing a unifying national identity that differentiates Canada from other nations, primarily the 'less tolerant' United States (13-16).

Mackey describes her work as a 'multi-site' and 'events-centred' ethnography. As a social anthropologist, she combines the use of traditional anthropological methods such as interviews and participant observation in local sites (national celebrations in Southern Ontario towns), with an analysis of the construction of national identity in state policies and national public culture (museums, national art and literature, and mass media). Her methodology reflects the fact that national identity is produced both in face-to-face encounters at the local level, as well as through institutions, policies and representations at the national level. Mackey carried out her fieldwork during the referendum campaigns on constitutional reform and the Canada 125 celebrations in 1992, a period of perceived 'crisis' in national identity and unity. The timing of the fieldwork is significant because it allowed Mackey to closely analyze the government's management of the constitutional crisis through the campaigns and celebrations, and to interview people at a time when there was widespread debate about national identity. Mackey's 1992 fieldwork is the most valuable part of this book, particularly her analysis of

contemporary discourses concerning national identity and cultural pluralism (chap. 5-7).

Mackey situates her fieldwork within a broader historical examination of the construction of national identity through cultural pluralism. Chapter 2 examines early colonial policies of nation-building, including policies directed at assimilation and representations of Canada as more tolerant of its indigenous people than the United States ('the Benevolent Mountie Myth'). Chapters 3 and 4 present a critical analysis of the development of official multiculturalism and the political recognition of Aboriginal peoples during the 1970s and 1980s as a response to the threat posed by Québec separatism and the political mobilization of Aboriginal peoples and ethnic groups. Chapters 5 to 7 examine the discourse used to justify the recent neo-conservative backlash to the gains made by marginalized groups as part of a defence of national unity during a time of perceived crisis. For example, she identifies a conception of cultural pluralism that puts 'Canada first'. Underlying these changes in state policies and public views, Mackey identifies a common unifying project — the modern Western project of nation-building — and a central, axiomatic assumption, the assumption that it is necessary for a nation to have a unified and distinct identity.

Mackey argues that this assumption that a distinct national identity is necessary for a nation to be strong and sovereign should be questioned, particularly due to its connection with a specific Western conception of personhood and identity developed during the Enlightenment. She does not, however, sufficiently analyze this conception of identity, nor does she suggest alternatives: should we abandon the desire for a distinct political identity or develop a new conception? She rejects alternative heterogeneous conceptions, such as Homi K. Bhabha's conception of hybrid identity, because they are ineffective in challenging cultural dominance. Overall, the book stays at the level of critique, questioning problematic assumptions and examining problematic outcomes.

Mackey's book contributes to the critical literature on nationalism and multiculturalism as well as to the growing field of 'white' studies within critical race theory. Whereas most studies of nationalism focus on the extreme exclusionary form of ethnic nationalism, comparing it against the liberal, more tolerant and inclusive form of civic nationalism, Mackey provides a critique of Canadian civic nationalism. Mackey explores how power and cultural dominance in Canada function through more liberal, inclusionary and pluralistic formulations.

Although Mackey's analysis of multiculturalism presents arguments commonly expressed by other critics, her contribution lies in the use of her fieldwork to ground her arguments. For example, she examines how multiculturalism constructs the identity of those Canadians who do not conceive of themselves as 'multicultural', but as 'ordinary Canadians' or '*Canadian*-Canadians', by interviewing white Anglophone Canadians who regard themselves as such, and by comparing celebrations that are designated as 'multicultural' with general nationalist celebrations. Mackey's examination

of local discourses is narrowly limited to interviewing white Anglophone Canadians at nationalist festivals in small towns in Southern Ontario. Her focus here seems to be motivated by the feminist and postmodern insight that to understand dominant cultural forms, it is insufficient to study the lives and perspectives of marginalized groups; one must examine the unmarked categories such as whiteness that are often excluded from analysis. Nevertheless, her analysis of unmarked categories such as 'ordinary Canadian' and Canada's 'core culture' would be enhanced by the consideration of a broader range of public views, and by the observation of nationalist celebrations in more diverse local sites.

Towards the end of the book, Mackey briefly demonstrates the relevance of her analysis to the issues raised by global mass culture. She argues that the Western project of globalization functions in a similar way to the project of nation-building within Canada in that cultural differences are recognized, absorbed and managed within a larger overarching framework that promotes Western cultural hegemony without the production of cultural homogeneity (163-7).

The broader significance of Mackey's analysis for political philosophy lies in her grounded critique of liberal values and ideas, such as the notion of tolerance. Rather than analyzing liberal values and concepts at a theoretical level, Mackey examines how liberal values have fallen short of their ideals in the particular case of Canadian cultural politics. Mackey draws upon the postmodern critique of liberal theory, such as the argument that tolerance reproduces the dominance of those with the power to tolerate, and she examines how this occurs in the Canadian context. Overall, her book presents a significant challenge to the liberal idea that issues of power can be ameliorated simply through the inclusion of difference and a non-homogenizing notion of culture.

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Desmond Manderson
Songs without Music: Aesthetic Dimensions of Law and Justice.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 2000. Pp. xiii + 303.
US$55.00. ISBN 0-520-21688-1.

As a book on the 'aesthetic dimensions of law and justice', Manderson's book is not concerned with legal hermeneutics or jurisprudence as traditionally understood. By 'aesthetic', moreover, is meant not merely 'beauty' or 'taste', but sensory experience in general. The focus of this work, then, is not only on how 'a reaction to the form or beauty of something ... come to deeply affect [*sic*] us,' but also on how 'the aesthetic also has force because of the intense web of symbols ... which we all carry around within us' (27). More specifically, the book is about how law is constructed — despite its claims to the contrary — through the attitudes and feelings of those who construct it, and how the symbolism of the law conveys meaning aesthetically as well as, or as opposed to, linguistically.

The most substantive essay in the book takes a broadly Foucauldian look at how English statutes have changed in the way they have been understood by those who have written and read them since the Conquest, singling out the Statute of Westminster of 1275 as a turning point in the ruling elite's view of a statute's addressees and its function in addressing them: whereas previously 'legislation was largely seen as a means of communication between the king and those physically connected to him', now 'a statute referred to "the People" ' (67). Along with this comes a change in the tense in which a statute is expressed, from 'it is enacted' to 'be it enacted' (84-5), so that statutes no longer describe a decision that has been made, but themselves have the force of a command, continuing their power into the future rather than merely appealing to a past authority — the later change of terminology from 'statute' to 'act' setting the seal on this change in consciousness.

The next essay enters into the US capital punishment debate, arguing that the issue is not so much one of the justice or otherwise of 'an eye for an eye', or even of deterrence (statistics show that murderers are less likely than other criminals to re-offend; if deterrence and not justice is the reason for retaining the death penalty, why not impose it for drunk driving?), but rather one of the aesthetics of dying. Manderson provides a series of descriptions of 'dying institutionalised and made routine, marked not by violence and oblivion but by lengthy waits, gradually intensified isolation, and the slow death of hope' (127); again in Foucauldian style he points out that this process of dehumanisation was made possible by the move from public to private executions, a decision in any case made not for the sake of the dignity of the executed, but in order to prevent his heroisation.

A further essay looks 'at the ways in which the fear of boundary violation has been given symbolic expression and sensory power in relation to "drugs"': drugs, claims Manderson, 'have been constructed as a "problem" because of

what they symbolise and not because of what they do' (133). The example of late nineteenth-century Australian anti-opium laws, which were aimed at the Chinese immigrants who smoked opium rather than at white consumers of patent medicines, is held to be metonymic of the targeting of non-hegemonic social groups such as modern-day heroin users, who are likewise demonised through disapproval of their lifestyles.

An essay on 'theory and law' takes a wide-ranging overview of legal theory, and finds — again, through the rhetoric in which they are expressed — common themes and presuppositions running through otherwise quite disparate theories. For example, the formalist Weinrib and the hermeneuticist Dworkin both, it is claimed, 'reify' (166) the law in their search for coherence within it. This reification is both cause and product of the alienating effect of modernism; as a postmodern 'critical legal pluralist' Manderson prefers the metaphors of chaotics and fractals to describe the mutual influences of the 'variables' of 'judges, lawyers, bureaucrats and police' in constructing law as a dynamic and non-linear process, concluding that 'law is generated by the constant iteration and reiteration of rules and understandings, a feedback loop as inherently unpredictable as Chinese whispers' (179).

In this spirit Manderson is not content to organise his book as a conventional argument, but instead turns reading it into an aesthetic experience by structuring it as pieces of music. Hence the four main chapters entitled 'Motet', 'Requiem', 'Variations on a Theme' and 'Quartet', are preceded by a 'Prelude' and a 'Fugue', and are succeeded by a 'Quodlibet'. Thus the form of the book mirrors its content, but this is not always enlightening, since much of the 'Prelude', 'Fugue' and 'Quodlibet' are preoccupied with explaining to the reader what the book is doing, what it is going to do, or what it has done, in a regressively (and sometimes immodestly) self-referential manner, creating a 'feedback loop' of their own. While this approach is interesting in demonstrating that changes in the way in which the law is conceived have been paralleled, historically, by similar changes in attitudes to music, it is something of a distraction from the primary arguments of the book. As an exercise in aesthetic 'showing' rather than discursive 'saying' this is doubtless deliberate, but nevertheless it will not necessarily convert those who lack the 'empathy' for the other to which Manderson appeals.

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C.J. McCracken and **I.C. Tipton, eds.**
Berkeley's Principles and Dialogues:
Background Source Materials.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2000.
Pp. x + 300.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-49681-0);
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-49806-6).

The second in the Cambridge Philosophical Texts in Context series, this volume provides background texts for interpreting Berkeley's two most well-known works, the *Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710) and *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* (1713). The first half of the book includes selections from familiar figures (Descartes, Malebranche, Bayle, Locke) and lesser known contemporaries (Henricus Regius, Pierre de Lanion, Antoine Arnauld, Jean Brunet, Henry Lee, John Norris, Arthur Collier). The second half includes early reviews of Berkeley's works and reactions to his philosophy by Leibniz, Andrew Baxter, Hume, the American Samuel Johnson, Diderot, Voltaire, Kant, Herder, Reid, Mill and others. The editorial introductions and commentaries (which constitute almost half of the entire volume) indicate how these other texts discuss themes that Berkeley addresses. The selections often provide tantalizing anticipations or extensions of Berkeleyan positions.

At the outset McCracken and Tipton caution that Berkeley's doctrines on matter, abstract ideas, primary and secondary qualities, and mind cannot be characterized in terms of the 'increasingly unhappy' distinction between rationalism and empiricism (5) often associated with Cartesian or Lockean strategies. Instead they show how Berkeley's positions sound very much like those developed by some of his predecessors. In Malebranche, for example, we see Berkeley's view that God knows sensible things without sensing them (45) and that we have no clear idea of the soul (51). In the mysterious French thinker Jean Brunet, we see Berkeley's belief that thinking is always intentional and emotive. In Bayle, we see Berkeley's argument for the relativity of primary qualities and his attack on infinite divisibility. Even when McCracken and Tipton highlight differences between Berkeley and others, their juxtaposition of these texts has the effect of opening up provocative new non-Cartesian, non-Lockean ways to think about his philosophy.

This latter point is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the volume, for it forces us to reconsider what Berkeley and his contemporaries mean when they use expressions that are often read in Cartesian or Lockean rather than Malebranchean or Baylean terms. Indeed, by including other Berkeleyan contemporaries, the collection challenges our understanding of how Berkeley uses terms such as substance, idea, and being beyond even the senses in which they are used by Malebranche and Bayle. Therefore, even if, as McCracken and Tipton point out, most recent scholarship focuses on Locke's role as a source for the vocabulary and issues with which Berkeley struggles, that should not lead us to think that Berkeley gets his ideas from Locke. As

the editors note (100), Berkeley rarely mentions Locke. Indeed when juxtaposed with the other readings, Berkeleyan beliefs seem to arise despite, rather than because of, the Englishman. Instead of thinking that Berkeley's attack on Locke's abstract idea of triangle is part of a polemic strategy intended explicitly to criticize Locke (110), we might just as well conclude that Berkeley finds the Lockean enterprise fundamentally misguided. So instead of thinking that Berkeley follows Lee's 1702 criticisms of Locke, we might understand the spirit of Berkeley's doctrines as more informed by the Scholastic arguments for immateriality that are proposed by Collier (who roundly ignores Locke in favor of the English follower of Malebranche, John Norris). That approach would certainly be more consistent with the fact that Berkeley's contemporaries thought of him 'not as Locke's philosophical heir but as Malebranche's' (90). And if the editors had given us a bit more about the philosophical background and training of Lanion, Brunet, Lee, and Collier, we might have discovered reasons for thinking that ways of thinking at odds with Locke, Bayle, or Malebranche guide Berkeley's thinking.

The second half of this volume includes reactions to Berkeley's ideas, ranging from letters to Berkeley from his friend Percival and early reviews associating him with Malebranche to approving assessments by Herder and J.S. Mill. Andrew Baxter and the American Samuel Johnson raise questions about the ontological status of minds (especially minds other than my own). Hume endorses Berkeley's critique of abstract ideas and the existence of external objects. Early French critics and Diderot dismiss Berkeley as a solipsist, but Voltaire, Condillac, and especially Maupertuis find his immaterialism provocative and even persuasive. Kant's second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787) reveals how he tries to distance his 'critical idealism' from Berkeley's idealism (260) — with as little success (in the eyes of his German critics) as Berkeley's attempts to distance himself from Malebranche. Hamann and Herder treat Berkeley's philosophy favorably as a version of realism.

The last two authors included in the collection, Reid and J.S. Mill, focus on some of the pivotal themes addressed in Berkeley scholarship in the last century and a half. Reid is impressed with Berkeley's arguments, and it is from Reid we inherit the portrait of Berkeley as the second of the triumvirate of British Empiricists. He criticizes Berkeley, however, for failing to explain his doctrine of other minds and 'notions' in general — though the editors omit Reid's discussion of the latter point. Like Baxter before him, Reid chides Berkeley for not distinguishing sufficiently between the perception of an object and the object perceived. In his turn, J.S. Mill extols Berkeley's doctrine on how ideas of sight and touch are associated, his anti-abstractionism, and his anticipation of Mill's own phenomenalist account of physical reality.

As the editors conclude, the richness of Berkeley's philosophy continued to attract praise and comment after Mill. C.S. Peirce and William James saw in him a pragmatist; and A.J. Ayer and Karl Popper saw in his remarks the seeds of positivism. Indeed, 'Berkeley has been viewed as a Malebranchean,

an egoist [solipsist], a skeptic, an empiricist, an idealist, a pragmatist, a proto-positivist, and a common-sense realist' (293). This collection hints at possibilities that there are probably other ways to read Berkeley still to be discovered.

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Mark McPherran, ed.
Recognition, Remembrance & Reality: New Essays on Plato's Epistemology and Metaphysics.
Kelowna, BC: Academic Printing & Publishing 1999. Pp. xi + 157.
Cdn$/US$64.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-920980-74-0);
Cdn$/US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-920980-75-9).

This brief anthology contains eight essays on Plato's epistemology and metaphysics, including six selected from a conference held in 1999 (Arizona Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy) and two from other sources. They are unified, in the editor's words, not only by these theoretical concerns but also by a 'deeper' interest in the rhetorical functions of Plato's texts (which here mostly means accounting for his deliberate use of fallacies). The *index locorum* reveals that discussion focuses chiefly on *Theaetetus, Parmenides, Republic* and *Phaedo*. Indeed, six of the essays interpret specific arguments drawn from those dialogues, beginning with careful logical analyses and proceeding to larger theses about how the arguments are being used. The other two essays do something rather different: Asli Gocer traces Plato's use of a single concept (*hesuchia*) across the corpus, and Nicholas Smith attempts a 'reflexive' reading of the *Republic* as Platonic pedagogy. That these eight papers were 'selected' might suggest a consistently high level of quality, but in fact the book is a mixed bag: four of the essays are clearly worthwhile for anyone seriously interested in Plato's philosophy, two are borderline, and the others are of limited value.

The two best papers are by Lloyd Gerson (on the recollection argument in *Phaedo*) and Mitchell Miller (on the five mathematical studies from *Republic VII*). The reader will likely want to incorporate this material directly into her teaching. Both cast new light on some long-standing, nagging difficulty. For Gerson, the crux of the recollection argument is our ability to judge our experience of sensibles deficient *with regard to* the form they instantiate. It is not our ability to say that two sticks are equal that counts, but our ability

to judge that their equality is deficient *qua* equality. If our idea of Equality-itself were simply a generalization from experience (which Gerson would have Plato challenge), then the content of that idea could never suffice to disclaim the perfection of one of its instances; rather, the standard against which equals are compared must be an independently derived cognition — hence, recollection. This shifts the real burden of proof to the question of whether we can, in fact, make these sorts of judgments at all. Gerson brings out clearly how the causal structure of this relationship, its *explanatory* character, commits Plato to an objectivist interpretation of Forms.

Miller attempts to explain the necessary ordering of Plato's five mathematical studies: arithmetic, plane & solid geometry, astronomy and harmonics. The gem here is Miller's argument (via the Pythagorean pebble-figure representations of numbers) that for Plato arithmetic has an inherently geometrical quality: number has figure. And figure, of course, has ratio (since ratios define the respective sides, and hence the shapes, of geometrical figures). Harmonics then deals entirely with ratios. The pedagogical value of this sequence thus lies in its progressive disclosure of the essence of number as ratio. But this also points, for Miller, to a very specific anticipation of the next pedagogical step, dialectic, about which Socrates says very little. Are we to infer that forms be understood as expressible in-and-as ratios, just as ratios are expressible in-and-as figures, and figures are expressible in-and-as numbers?

The two papers on *Parmenides* also repay close attention. Richard Patterson uses three case-studies from the 'gymnastic' section to identify two discrete functions of the dialogue: first, to illustrate a value-neutral *technique* of creating or avoiding contradictions via alternative qualifications of terms; second, to show that the qualifications one ultimately chooses will reflect one's response to the issues raised in the first part of the dialogue. Mark McPherran also draws attention to fallacies, in this case the argument that gods cannot know particulars. He shows how this conclusion depends upon an illicit shift between ambiguous senses of *dunamis*. This saves the belief that gods can know us, but only at the cost of allowing a modicum of change into the eternal realm of the gods.

The two papers on *Theaetetus* have perhaps less valuable results. Mi-Kyuong Mitzi Lee proposes a novel analysis of Socrates' invocation of Protagoras and Heracleitus: he is not refuting but rather 'diagnosing' the theory that thinking is perceiving. This 'diagnosis' consists in attributing an unsavory historical origin to Theaetetus' argument, no more; but one wonders how Plato could ever have felt such a 'deconstruction' was adequate to his task here. Christopher Shields challenges Socrates' refutation of the idea that knowledge is true belief plus a *logos*. Not only does Socrates unfairly limit the discussion, but his refutation commits the straw-person fallacy by neglecting that knowledge was previously defined as a performative capacity. Shields hints that this obviously inadequate critique is actually Plato's way of endorsing the doctrine by compelling us to come to its defense, and yet

Shields refuses to take this bait himself, responding that any such 'extra-textual theorizing' is mere conjecture.

Gocer's analysis of *hesuchia* in Plato clarifies some points but really distills only the practical advice that 'calmer heads prevail'. It should hardly surprise us that Plato might recommend that. Also, her analysis, which claims to take the dialogues as a piece, ignores passages in *Phaedrus* and *Laws* where Plato praises philosophical and therapeutic uses of raving. Finally, Smith's ill-conceived attempt to read the *Republic* as an example of its own educational program leads to little else than his own conclusion (inevitable, one might think) that the attempt was, indeed, ill-conceived.

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Onora O'Neill
Bounds of Justice.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2000.
Pp. ix + 219.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-44232-X);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-44744-5).

Most contemporary theories of justice take it for granted that the state is the basic site of justice and that it is in the context of a single state that principles of justice are shaped and defined. State boundaries are thus 'the presuppositions of justice', and what this exclusionary idea of justice means for outsiders is often left aside or treated as an afterthought (4). As a famous example, John Rawls thought that the details of international justice might be worked out after a conception of justice for 'a closed society' had been developed. On this state-centric approach to justice, justice begins at home and so the claims of strangers may be seen as secondary to the claims of compatriots. Justice extended beyond borders is, at best, justice attenuated.

In this new collection of essays, most of which are revisions of previously published essays, Onora O'Neill turns this prevailing view on its head, and argues that the boundaries of states, and of other social groupings, ought to be seen as 'institutions whose justice is to be assessed' rather than 'presuppositions of justice' (4). The fact of increasing interdependency and intermingling across traditional social, cultural and political boundaries necessarily means that questions 'about the *scope* of ethical and political reasoning and about the *boundaries* of just institutions cannot be treated as mere afterthoughts in an account of justice that is convincing and useful in the contemporary world' (3). The essays thus attempt to elucidate and develop an understanding of justice that is neither limited nor determined by the

traditional boundaries of political philosophy and practice, but that can take a critical perspective on boundaries.

The collection is divided into two parts. Part I, 'Philosophical Bounds of Justice', examines the theoretical bases and limitations of justice, and Part II, 'Political Bounds of Justice', explores the relationship between the reach of political institutions and the scope of justice. Although Part II develops and illustrates the more abstract and theoretical arguments of Part I, the two parts, and indeed the individual chapters, could be read independently of each other. Readers more inclined towards questions of institutional design and public policy will be drawn more to Part II, but those with a special interest in Kant's moral philosophy, and moral reasoning in general, will find the discussions in Part I indispensable.

Part I includes chapters on practical reason, agency and autonomy, practical judgment, Kantian justice, the nature of coercion, and women's rights. In the chapter 'Four Models of Practical Reasoning', O'Neill defends what she calls a 'critical conception of practice reason' that is both action-based yet critical with respect to existing social norms and individual commitments. This conception of practical reasoning meets the two necessary conditions of practical reason that O'Neill identifies (12), namely, that of 'non-arbitrariness' (i.e., norms are not endorsed uncritically) and 'accessible authority' (i.e., nonteleological).

In 'Kant's Justice and Kantian Justice', O'Neill examines the prospects for preserving Kantian conclusions about justice, which she takes to be superior to end-base conceptions like those of utilitarianism, without Kant's metaphysically controversial idealisation of the individual (74). O'Neill discusses Rawls's attempts to preserve Kantian justice in a manner that is consistent with 'the canons of a reasonable empiricism' (66). Rawls thinks that our existing political culture can provide us with the 'socially determinate starting points' from which to get to Kantian justice without the idealism of Kant (73). Yet, O'Neill argues, Rawls succeeds only by confining his Kantian justice to a bounded democratic society, and so instead of getting a political philosophy critical of boundaries, we get a political philosophy that is limited by existing boundaries.

O'Neill recommends that we 'look back to Kant' and try to see if there are alternative, nonidealised, ways of reading Kant's conception of self, freedom, and reason and action (74-5). O'Neill believes that by taking a 'two-aspect' rather than, as is commonly done, a 'two-world' reading of the noumenal-phenomenal distinction, we may read Kant not to be saying dogmatically that reason 'exists whole and complete in each of us,' but that the articulation and adoption of principles of reason is a 'task rather than a discovery' (75-6). One important condition for going about this task, in fact the 'only available restraint on the standards we adopt,' is that we forward only those principles that others could themselves reasonably adopt (76). That a principle 'be one that *at least could be adopted by all*' is consistent with a 'stripped-down version' of Kant's Categorical Imperative (76-7).

The important question of coercion is discussed in Chapter 5, and O'Neill usefully defines coercion in terms of relative vulnerability. This way of understanding coercion has the virtue of allowing us to understand the current North-South relationship as a coercive one even though neither legal nor physical coercion are always obvious in this context. The final chapter of Part I discusses women's rights, and here O'Neill argues that what is fundamentally lacking is not the failure to respect women's rights as such, but the failure to take obligations, and their proper allocation, seriously. Taking rights seriously means that we have to take their corresponding obligations even more seriously; obligations, not rights, ought to be the core of Kantian justice, O'Neill argues (110).

Part II addresses the problem of transnational justice, the relationship between state boundaries and gender justice, community and identity, and the moral standing of non-citizens. An important thesis here is that boundaries that favor members are permissible only if these boundaries create no injustice for nonmembers. It is sometimes alleged that such boundaries are justifiable in spite of their implications for outsiders because people 'can legitimately aim to establish states, which are divided from other states, and hence from other nations and communities by boundaries' (172). This argument is 'typically strengthened by pointing out that a feeling of affiliation to nations or communities is not a mere matter of preference, but the basis of the very sense of self and identity of the persons so linked' (173). But, O'Neill replies, the argument is question-begging: 'if the social and cultural concepts of nation, tribe, community or peoples are to do the work of *justifying* states, hence the territorial boundaries between political units, they must not be redefined in terms that presuppose the boundaries' (178).

In addition to challenging the assumptions about justice and boundaries, this rich collection of essays also points to several new avenues of research. For instance, what are the prospects for democratic cosmopolitan 'networking institutions' that O'Neill speaks about in Chapters 9 and 10? This question raises not just practical challenges but conceptual ones too, for on one common view, a shared nationality is a prerequisite for a functioning democracy. Old debates are revisited as well, a familiar one being O'Neill's stress on obligations over rights. One might agree with O'Neill here that taking rights seriously is also, crucially, a matter of taking obligations, their counterpart, very seriously. But why should this make obligations the core of justice? Could a rights theorist not say that the problem of obligation-assignment raises not so much a conceptual but a methodological issue that need not argue against taking rights to be fundamental to justice?

In sum, this is a sophisticated, carefully argued, and thought-provoking book that ought to be required reading for scholars and students troubled by the new challenges of globalisation for the theory and practice of justice.

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Nicholas Rescher
Process Philosophy: A Survey of Basic Issues.
Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press 2000.
Pp. 144.
US$27.50. ISBN 0-8229-4142-2.

Nicholas Rescher's book serves to clarify the important notion of 'process', pointing to its various usages in the natural sciences and in the humanities, as well as to its historical precedents, in Hegel and Leibniz, and to its critics. Coinciding with his earlier book entitled *Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy*, Rescher's view of 'process philosophy' is that it is not exclusively to be associated with the general paradigm stemming from the thought of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. As such, the present text does not focus directly on the 'basic concerns' of these thinkers nor on those embedded in their theories, a fact that may disappoint some readers. Rather, Rescher holds that there is still a need for a fully worked-out 'process philosophy', for which some of the groundwork is allegedly provided here. Largely undervaluing the systematic detail and scope of Whitehead's theory of prehensions in *Process and Reality*, Rescher unfortunately assumes that 'the work of actually developing the process doctrine to the point where it can be compared with other major philosophical projects like materialism or absolute idealism still remains to be done. Many writers have hinted at a process philosophy, but nobody has yet fully developed one — not even Whitehead, though he has perhaps ventured further in this direction than anyone else' (19). As a result, more 'puritan' readers will feel that Rescher does not give Whitehead's cosmological scheme its fair due, and that it can be contrasted with other major views. However, Rescher is right to suggest that 'the unity of process philosophy is not doctrinal but thematic' and that 'true to itself, process philosophy is not a finished product but an ongoing project of inquiry,' in its anti-dogmatic insistence on novelty (45, 21).

The focus and strength of the text is Rescher's vivid meditations on, and legitimization of, the two-tiered concept of 'process'. In his synopsis, 'a process is an actual or possible occurrence that consists of an integrated series of connected developments unfolding in programmatic coordination: an orchestrated series of occurrences that are systematically linked to one another either causally or functionally ... a natural process by its very nature passes on to the future a construction made from the materials of the past ... the inherent futurition of process is an exfoliation of the real by successively actualizing possibilities that are subsequently left behind as the process unfolds' (22). Armed with a slough of these lucid definitions, Rescher on the one hand defends the notion of 'process' in the investigation of the nature of actualities. In his view, 'the core idea of process philosophy is a dynamism that prioritizes processes for things' (46). As such, Rescher associates the 'process' perspective with a monadological metaphysics, which is able to describe things both as inter-functional units of space-time 'process' and as individual substances, as in traditional metaphysics. In this way, a 'process'

approach is shown to be useful across various disciplines such as the philosophy of nature, psychology, theology, as well as the natural sciences. Correspondingly, he demonstrates how the concept of 'process' is vital to discussions of human agency, cognition, history, and scientific and technological progress. On the other hand, Rescher is concerned with ontological 'process', namely, 'the mental process (of separation) to extract "things" from the blooming buzzing confusion of the world's physical processes' (7). That is to say, 'process' philosophers hold that 'Nature's processes stand connected with one another as integrated wholes — it is we who, for our own convenience, separate them into physical, chemical, biological, and psychological aspects' (23). In this light, for Rescher, 'process philosophy' essentially holds to a '(metaphysical) realism that is founded, initially at least, on a fundamentally idealistic basis — a realism whose ultimate *justificatory basis* is ideal' (106). He further reveals that in the 'process' approach, while reality 'is the causal source and basis of ... the phenomena of our cognitively relevant experience' and is the 'ontological *source* of cognitive endeavours', the very existence of the objects of this realism ultimately depend on the subject's ideas, purposes, beliefs, and desires (100, 101). This standpoint is parallel to Whitehead's own standpoint of 'provisional realism', although here, Rescher does not discuss the centrality of the notions of 'feeling' and 'negative prehensions' to it, as is the case in *Process and Reality*.

On the whole, this book may be construed as a much-needed effort to bring some of the basic thought-patterns of 'process philosophy' into the currency of contemporary analytic philosophy. While this task is achieved in a well-articulated manner, many of Rescher's conclusions are overshadowed by Whitehead's speculative philosophy, which needs to be more adequately addressed. The fact remains that with all the existing introductions, companions, and keys to 'process philosophy' currently in print, there still remains the challenge to write a detailed, clear, and intelligible one for the novice reader, which focuses directly on Whitehead's work. One will not find this focus in Rescher's two books on 'process philosophy', although these writings may prove effectively to precede such an introduction.

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Nancy Rosenblum, ed.
Obligations of Citizenship and Demands of Faith: Religious Accommodation in Pluralist Democracies.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
2000. Pp. vi + 438.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-00707-1);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-00708-X).

The papers collected here were originally presented at a US conference on Religion and Law in 1998 and, not surprisingly, much of the discussion is focused on US constitutional law: the 'Free Exercise' and 'Establishment' clauses of the constitution together with controversial judgements in cases concerning the right of Mormons to sack a non-Mormon janitor from one of their enterprises; the right of Hopi Indians to use proscribed drugs in religious ceremonies; and the claims of the Amish to exemptions from educational and traffic provisions. Some papers discuss questions of religious accommodation in India and Israel, however, and it is fair to say that there is much here of interest to those of us situated outside the US.

Rosenblum, in her introduction, argues that a reassessment of traditional ways of conceiving the boundaries between religion and politics is overdue given: the 'explosion' of religious pluralism, posing difficult questions about the definition of religious faith and activity; the diversification of governmental and religious activities, creating new sites for potential conflict; and the growth of what she terms 'integralism', rather than 'fundamentalism', i.e., the concern of increasing numbers of religious people with diminishing the tensions between their civic and religious identities. To this we may add a fourth factor: the formulation of a pluralist, 'political' liberalism eschewing comforting assumptions about secularisation and modernity. Three key themes emerge from the papers: the contrast between secular and pluralist versions of liberalism; the problematic nature of the public/private divide; and the place of religious argument within public deliberation.

The oddest contribution is that of Graham Walker who argues that the strict exclusion of religious teaching from US public schools amounts to the covert 'establishment' of secularism. Oblivious to the fact that this has clearly been no obstacle to a US religious revival (see Alan Wolfe's opening sociological survey), Walker goes on to argue that this 'establishment' should be replaced with the explicit establishment of one of the major faiths. He points approvingly to Poland and Israel as beacons of religious tolerance which have, or are on the point of having, established religions. Ignoring the obvious difficulties of this view (Nussbaum points out that the establishment of Orthodoxy in Israel disadvantages even religious, but non-Orthodox, Jews to say nothing of those of other faiths or no faith), Walker's claim is that an established religion would be more acceptable than secularism to a member of a minority faith because 'I would rather possess my religious identity in the fact of a majority religious order overtly at odds with me — so long as my

subordinate existence is constitutionally ensured — than to stand in the midst of a scheme whose mask of neutrality will strip my identity from me — or my children — without our even realising it' (121). Strong stuff, but history suggests that establishment is an unattractive regime for most minority faiths.

A more thoughtful response to public secularism is provided by McConnell, who argues that the state should promote not one but a plurality of religions as a fair way to diminish the problem of 'ambiguous citizenship' created by the dual loyalties of the religious to faith and state. Amy Gutmann challenges the overhasty assumption that such ambiguity is experienced solely by the religious, a point also picked up by Nussbaum, who suggests that it is not plausible to sustain a clear distinction between religious beliefs and other non-religious but nonetheless 'comprehensive' beliefs. Gutmann argues that McConnell is wrong to read the constitution as providing chiefly for the protection of the state from religion, as, in her view, it also serves to preserve religious autonomy from the sort of pressures to which religions would become subject if they were to become entangled with public policy.

Ronald Thiemann is also concerned with the problem of integrity but suggests that citizenship and religion need not be viewed as necessarily antagonistic. Religious associations in fact provide support for active citizenship in an increasingly privatised world through providing opportunities for community activism. He is overly optimistic in supposing that 'absolutist' claims are 'neither essential to most religious traditions nor the best interpretations of those religions' claims to truth' (84), but he must be right to suppose that there should be a place for religion-inspired social criticism within a democratic public sphere, a point underlined by other contributors (Gutmann, Nussbaum).

Martha Nussbaum takes the 'political' liberal view that secular liberalism is insufficiently pluralist and fails to recognise that religion is one legitimate expression of the central human capacity to search for a meaning to one's life and, as such, is worthy of respect. She is also concerned with threats to gender equality posed by traditionalist interpretations of religious faith, and argues that respect for religion must be tempered by a 'principle of moral constraint' under which a state may be viewed as having a 'compelling interest' to intervene where the central capacities of its citizens are concerned. What is of interest for our understanding of public deliberation is the way in which she distinguishes 'political' and 'social' versions of this principle. Under the former, judges should seek to defer to the self-interpretations of the religions concerned, but the latter allows for extensive public criticism and reinterpretation of religious beliefs themselves. Thus, in relation to the Indian examples her discussion centres on, Nussbaum argues that liberals cannot afford to eschew the support of those readings of the Quran which provide religious support for gender equality.

Finally, Greenawalt, in a fine-grained discussion of the problem of separating religious from legal questions, argues that judges must inevitably address questions about: sincerity of belief; the definition of 'religion'; and

the centrality of certain practices to a given faith in the course of deciding many cases concerning fraud, conscientious objection etc. In relation to the problem of definition he suggests that judges have been hampered by adopting a definition by 'necessary and sufficient conditions' approach, and should instead opt for a 'flexible analogical' approach resting on the treatment of religion as a family-resemblance concept.

The concentration on US constitutional law may not be to everyone's taste, but overall this volume contains a stimulating combination of concrete cases and theoretical reflection on a problem which must be seen as central to contemporary political theory.

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John Russon and **John Sallis, eds.**
Retracing the Platonic Text.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press
2000. Pp. xix + 190.
US$69.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8101-1702-0);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8101-1703-7).

There are almost as many genres of Platonic scholarship as there are readers of Plato and, given the spirit and richness of the text, this is perhaps as it should be. The pity is that not all of them talk to each other or even want to talk to each other. Those, for instance, who find apparently incidental details in the dialogues to be only incidental cannot stomach the views of those who find deeper nuances everywhere. Those who profess a dogmatic Plato have no time for those who want to read him in a freer, more open-ended fashion. For some, then, this book will offend the sober tastes of more traditional scholarships, since this conference collection of essays, by a pleasantly balanced array of contributors from major scholars (like John Sallis) to a tutor currently on leave for the study of viticulture, sets out to address from a Continental philosophy perspective dimensions not addressed by 'traditional philosophy', and, in particular, to focus upon the dialogues as literary and as whole texts. In short, the volume is built 'around the ideal of reading: the ideal of careful attention to Plato as a text to which we must be responsible' (81). 'The just reading receives the text — the tradition — as a question' (xi). What this means in practice is that all the contributors are committed to reading Plato in an open-ended way (and expressly in the light

of the last two hundred years of European philosophy, from Hegel and Schelling to Heidegger, Derrida, and Gadamer), not in terms of dogmas, solutions or simple arguments, or as if the truth were enshrined there once and for all, but as if the text provokes us to read it in different ways — forwards, backwards, and sideways — in order to follow out the traces of what always remains unsaid in it (see, e.g., xi, xvii etc.).

If this sounds just too obscure for the more cautious reader, it is mitigated from the outset by a provocative and lucid introduction to the volume (by John Russon), followed by ten papers which do not always agree but which develop a kindred sensibility in relation to many dialogues. These papers are divided into three groups which focus respectively: a) in part 1, upon the character of Platonic textuality and writing [essay 1) on the question of *mimesis* and the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy in the *Republic* (C. Barrachi), 2-3) on the inclusiveness of different genres within philosophical discourse and on the nature of images in the *Phaedrus* (G. Nicholson and W. Brogan), and 4) on writing as involving a metaphysics of non-being which undermines presence, in relation to the *Sophist* (A. Schoener)]; b) in part 2, upon a rereading of the metaphysics of form and imitation in terms of otherness [essay 5) on the relation between the receptacle and the elements in the *Timaeus* (J. Sallis), 6) on the dynamic, Heraclitean form-matter relation in the *Phaedo's* recollection argument, the harmony objection by Simmias, and the final argument's view of *nous* (J. Russon) and 7) on the inseparability of the idea of the good and a metaphysics of human freedom (G. Figal)]; and c) in part 3, on the character of Socrates as essentially dialogical [essay 8) on the simultaneous opposition and kinship between poetry and philosophy, the comic and the serious (B. Freyberg), 9) a convincing interpretation of the *Protagoras* in terms of Socrates radical openness to conversation with Protagoras (F.J. Gonzalez), and 10) on the theme of the soul's conversion in *Republic* 7 as the structure of the writing of the *Phaedo* (J. Crooks)]. Appropriately, the volume concludes with a down-to-earth essay on the practical problems of translating Plato (e.g., collaboration, readership, particles, apparatus etc.) which rejects any straightforward positivistic approach in favour of a belief 'in the semantic plenitude of the Platonic texts' and with the aim of producing 'an English version that, like the Greek, says more than the translators know' (188).

There is no index or bibliography (possibly on purpose); and for the analytic or philological reader the phenomenological-sounding language will at times perhaps look like mumbo-jumbo. Nonetheless, this is a valuable and provocative volume, and many of its theses are essentially correct, even if they run counter to commonly received opinion (e.g., a radically open-ended 'Plato', *mimesis* as a character of *all* discourse, poetry or philosophy, etc.). In particular, Figal's argument that *praxis* and *theoria* are inseparable in Plato's idea of the good is a thesis that deserves more attention, even if it is short on textual support here (and despite the fact that it has been more comprehensively argued by F.J. Gonzalez elsewhere — F.J. Gonzalez, *Dialectic and Dialogue. Plato's Practice of Philosophical Enquiry* [Evanston, IL:

Northwestern University Press 1998]). Gonzalez's interpretation of the *Protagoras* in terms of dialogical *synousia* is outstanding and effectively puts an end to the view that Socrates seriously proposes a hedonistic calculus in that dialogue. Above all, however, this is a volume that doesn't simply talk its own language, but engages the other major forms of contemporary Platonic scholarship in a way that also serves to illuminate and be illuminated by the essentially dialogical concerns of earlier modern thinkers like Hegel and Schelling (see esp. G. Nicholson, 28-31).

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Chris Mathew Sciabarra
Total Freedom:
Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism.
University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press 2000. Pp. xi + 467.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-02048-2);
US$24.50 (paper: ISBN 0-271-02049-0).

With *Total Freedom*, Chris Sciabarra extends the dialectical libertarian project begun with *Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical* and *Marx, Hayek, and Utopia*. While those works focused for the most part on particular thinkers, here Sciabarra's programmatic focus is prominent. Sciabarra unabashedly seeks to bring together two traditions that are typically thought of as opposed as well as both suffering from some lack of philosophical popularity. Like Marx, Sciabarra recognizes that any radical project that fails to be dialectical is likely to fall into naive utopianism. The only future that can be of political significance is one grounded in the present. The point of the Hayek book was to point out the similarity between Marx and Hayek on this point. In his work on Rand, Sciabarra, largely relying upon the Marxist Bertell Ollman's work on dialectics, sought to show how Rand's thought was dialectical insofar as it was sensitive to context and sought to overcome a variety of dualisms such as reason/emotion, mind/body, egoism/altruism, and individual/society.

The title of Sciabarra's new book, while hinting at his larger vision, also delineates the work's two dimensions. 'Total' represents the dialectical domain and its concern for the totality of systematic dimensions involved in analyzing social problems, while 'freedom' references Sciabarra's libertarian project. Consequently, *Total Freedom* consists of two parts. In the first Sciabarra seeks to lay out the history and meaning of dialectics so as to make

this tradition available to libertarian social theory. In the second he engages in a kind of libertarian case study, focusing on the work of economist Murray Rothbard.

Sciabarra's history of dialectical thinking contains both standard and non-standard elements. Beginning with Plato's dialogues, Sciabarra moves to a lengthy and interesting discussion of Aristotle, then focuses on Hegel, before turning his attention to post-Hegelian dialectical thinkers such as Marx and libertarians such as Ludwig von Mises, F.A. Hayek, and Ayn Rand. The stage is then set for his engagement with Rothbard. The discussion of dialectical libertarianism is the most controversial part of Sciabarra's history and largely recapitulates his earlier work.

While willing to recognize undialectical dimensions in his pantheon of libertarian thinkers, Sciabarra is unsurprisingly more critical of Marx. How is it that Sciabarra sees dialectical methodology succeeding in a libertarian context, while failing in a Marxist one? Sciabarra's discussion of Marx is rather surprising in that he presents a fairly nuanced view of Marx and his concern for social context. However, this discussion seems wholly unconnected to Sciabarra's criticisms of Marx. Sciabarra claims that Marx is undialectical insofar as 1) Marx sees 'social production, cooperation, and so forth' as separable from the context of the market (91); and 2) Marx presupposes that humanity is capable of a kind of total omniscience which is needed for socialist planning.

There are several problems here. With regard to the first objection, it is arbitrary to take the market as the one foundational, invariant element in a social context. The only reason Sciabarra offers for this claim is connected to the second objection. The market is the one social institution that provides a context for the 'trial and error' decision making that is the only alternative to omniscience. It isn't clear, though, why democratic decision making in a socialist society cannot also be a 'trial and error' process. A further problem with the second objection is that Sciabarra offers no evidence that Marx either explicitly or implicitly holds this view. There is one quotation from Engels which Sciabarra admits doesn't quite make his case, quotations from a variety of libertarian thinkers *claiming* that this is Marx's view, and a discussion of the failed Biosphere 2 experiment in the Arizona desert where the attempt to totally control a hermetically sealed experiment was a dismal failure. This last bit seems quite a stretch given that even proponents of the market are likely to agree that examples of *its* failures can be found much closer to hand than the Arizona desert.

With his discussion of Rothbard, Sciabarra continues to wield his dialectical method to analyze libertarian thinkers. Rothbard is an anarchist libertarian, who like Nozick begins with a quasi-Lockian conception of natural rights. Unlike Nozick, Rothbard rejects even the minimal state. For Rothbard, the state is fundamentally coercive. This leads him to object to taxation, but also to a significant involvement in anti-war activism. Unlike a variety of other radicals, Rothbard even rejects the idea that the state can be used as a means to advancing his ideals. Sciabarra tells us that Rothbard was

against 'forced integration for the same reasons that he was against forced segregation' (204).

For Sciabarra, Rothbard's critique of the state is dialectical insofar as he shows that 'the state itself engenders a host of dualisms in social life, in which law is severed from market, production from distribution, effort from reward, and so on' (248). Furthermore, and more importantly, Rothbard's thought includes a theory of structural crisis. Specifically, state intervention in the economy creates a class division between those that benefit and those that are harmed by this intervention. Taxation necessarily creates social conflict. Furthermore, given the inefficiencies of the state, 'the greater the state's control, the more effectively is social production thwarted' (303). So, the statist system contains the seeds of its own destruction. While celebrating this dimension of Rothbard's thought, Sciabarra also criticizes him from a dialectical perspective. Sciabarra sees Rothbard's radical bifurcation of state and economy, which results in Rothbard's ideologically pure anti-statism, as an undialectical dualism. Sciabarra also recognizes that Rothbard's theory of rights may be ahistorical. He sympathetically quotes Gregory Johnson's remark regarding this theory that it is 'hermetically sealed off from history, social science, common sense, and moral institutions' (356). Rothbard himself seems to have recognized this late in his life moving closer to cultural conservatism. Sciabarra is critical of this conservative move; but does agree that freedom may well need a more cultural or communitarian grounding. He does not, however, give us any reason to think such a grounding will be compatible with libertarianism.

To be fair, Sciabarra does not see himself as proposing a full-blown libertarian theory. Instead, he argues for the use of a method sensitive to context and history. He seeks, in this regard, to show the strengths and weakness of the libertarian tradition. His book is most successful when seen as part of a dialogue internal to this tradition. It engages less well with modes of thought external to it.

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Jon Stewart
The Unity of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: *A Systematic Interpretation.*
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 2000. Pp. xv + 556.
US$69.95. ISBN 0-8101-1693-6.

This is an ambitious book that has two stated objectives: ' ... 1) to provide a detailed analysis of the *Phenomenology* that would be accessible to most intermediate students and nonspecialists; and 2) to make plausible Hegel's own conception of the *Phenomenology* as part of a systematic philosophy' (Stewart, 1). After providing some background on Hegel's life and works and a brief description of Kantian philosophy, Stewart proceeds to give a detailed account of each chapter in Hegel's book, presenting the case that Hegel's argument is a classical 'transcendental argument' (i.e., a deduction of the necessary conditions of consciousness from which we obtain objective knowledge). Hegel's argument thus should be seen as an emendation of Kant's cognitive metaphysics. The argument Stewart gives is not original. One can find a similar account in Labarrière's *Structures et Mouvement Dialectique* ... (1968). What Stewart provides, however, is a complete and readable commentary in English, and he does an admirable job in defending the idea that Hegel is a systematic philosopher who actually knows how to construct conceptual relations. His analysis challenges work by those such as Charles Taylor and Robert Solomon, who believe that Hegel's logical project is either incoherent (Taylor) or just romantic fancy (Solomon). Stewart's work shows why these other interpreters have misunderstood the development of the philosophical concept.

There are, however, two points that the careful reader should consider when approaching Stewart's work. First, Stewart does not defend his approach from those who claim that Hegel is actually opposed to the strategy of 'transcendental arguments'. H.S. Harris, for instance, in his *Hegel's Ladder* (1997) notes that a transcendental argument presumes something determinate about the nature of objects (e.g., that they are given in experience and the inherent character of them is perceptible); since Hegel's Introduction and initial two chapters explicitly reject such suppositions, it is not feasible to claim that Hegel is employing this strategy. Hegel's argument is more of a philosophical epic than any 'deduction'. Since Stewart refers to Harris, one might have thought that this part of his thesis should be better defended in respect to Harris's interpretation than it actually is.

Secondly, Stewart seems to assume that by 'systematic philosophy' Hegel has a single idea in mind, one that is explicitly Kantian and opposed to 'Schelling's mysticism.' The system that Stewart identifies is the idea of philosophy that Hegel presents and defends in the *Science of Logic* (1812/1816) and the Berlin *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830). Is the assumption true? It is not defended in the book, and on its face it does not seem true. For example, in 1810 Hegel writes Isaac Sinclair that he has

changed his mind about the role of the *Phenomenology* in the system, and that he is setting the system on a new foundation. (See Clark Butler, *Hegel: The Letters* [1984], 288; letter no. 167.) This implies that Hegel has changed his mind about the idea of the system. The critical editors of Hegel's *Werke* have also provided enough source analysis to show that Hegel's idea of the system from 1805-07, when the *Phenomenology* was written, was still influenced by the attempt to reconcile rationalism with critical idealism. This notion is explicitly Schellingian, and Hegel could still be seen to follow, albeit critically, Schelling's program. Further, the system projections of the Jena period (1801-06) appear as something distinct from either the program announced at the beginning of either the *Science of Logic* or the *Encyclopedia*. From these projections it looks as if Hegel's idea of the system was still in flux even as the *Phenomenology* was coming to completion. Stewart's presentation of the chapters is based on Hegel's 1831 revisions, not on the original 1807 publication; since Hegel died before completing even the revisions to the Preface it is presumptuous to argue that *Phenomenology*'s argument is arranged according to the 1831 plan. How would Stewart know what plan Hegel actually had in mind?

I should like to focus just on his treatment of chapter six, 'Spirit', because therein he shows ingenuity in the analysis of Hegel's philosophical concept. Chapter six is one of the historical chapters. It presents a Universal History of European Culture from ancient Greece to German Romanticism as defining the concept of the self's evolving identity with its world but also the disruption of self-identity within each epoch. Stewart, although noting the historical character of the presentation, emphasizes the repetition of the earlier patterns of the concept. He contends that the three divisions of the chapter — A. True Spirit; B. Self-Alienated Spirit; and C. Spirit that is Certain of Itself — are 'repetitions' of previous sections of the book; A. repeats Consciousness, B. repeats Self-Consciousness, and C. repeats the final three moments of Reason. By 'repeats' Stewart simply means 'contains': 'These same universal forms are all contained in "Spirit" in their historical manifestations ... ' (294). Although this is certainly true, and it demonstrates the point that the concept of the *Phenomenology* is unified, it does not really demonstrate Hegel's objective in the chapter. When Stewart addresses the question of why does Hegel use a Universal History to explicate the universal patterns of thought, his only answer is that he is presenting the 'dynamic dialectical movement of subjective and objective freedom' (295). There are problems with this interpretation. As Stewart himself admits chapter six does not follow the plan of history that Hegel sets out in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. Stewart relies on this later plan but shows that both the first and final sections of chapter six are 'problematic' in light of it. Perhaps the reason why they are problematic is that Hegel in 1806 had a different program in mind. If Stewart had considered (a) the relationship between this chapter and the *Philosophy of Spirit* (1806) and (b) the criticisms made against the Schelling-Hegel critical project in 1803-05 that it lacked historical evidence for Spirit's manifestation in the world, then he

might have found right sort of issues that motivated Hegel to write this chapter. The main reason that compels Stewart to adopt the Berlin program as the 'one idea' of the *Phenomenology* may simply have to do with Stewart's focus on making every section fit neatly both with the earlier sections of the *Phenomenology* and with the Berlin lectures. Such fastidiousness is admirable but not informative on the nature of Hegel's argument.

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Otto Weininger
On Last Things.
A translation of *Über die letzten Dinge* (1904/07). Studies in German Language and Literature, v. 28. Translated and with an Introduction by Steven Burns.
Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press 2001.
Pp. xlii + 200.
US$89.95. ISBN 0-773-47400-5.

Since he is not mentioned in any of the encyclopedias of philosophy that have appeared in English in the past half a century, perhaps the first thing to say is that Otto Weininger was the intellectual comet of fin de siècle Vienna. His influence has been extraordinary despite the fact that during his short life (1880-1903) he published only one book, *Geschlecht und Charakter*, which tries to develop the idea of characterology and provide the fullest statement of a theory of the male and female soul. Wittgenstein thought this to be the work of a remarkable genius, and said that Weininger at the age of twenty-one had recognized, before anyone else had taken much notice, the importance of the idea of projection. Another book, brief and more accessible, entitled *Über die letzten Dinge*, was posthumously published. While *Geschlecht und Charakter* was translated into English as *Sex and Character* in 1906, there has been no translation of *Über die letzten Dinge* until now that Steven Burns offers us *On Last Things*.

Wittgenstein listed Weininger as a seminal influence on his own work, 'a seed out of which his plant grew.' Weininger's influence also fell on other leading cultural figures such as Karl Kraus, Kafka, James Joyce, Rilke, D.H. Lawrence, Canetti, Svevo in literature, as well as on feminist scholars, even if only as a foil. However, the exploration of the nature and extent of this influence has been seriously hampered by the fact that *Über die letzten Dinge* was unavailable in English, and the text of *Sex and Character* was difficult

to appreciate in what Wittgenstein referred to as 'that beastly translation.' Moreover, its apparent anti-feminism and anti-Semitism tend to evoke in us moral horror as we read through post-holocaust eyes.

In sharp contrast to *Sex and Character*, Steven Burns's translation of *Über die letzten Dinge* is clear, lively and elegant — anything but 'beastly' — even though there is an interesting albeit amusing section on the character of animals. The essay on Ibsen focuses on his play *Peer Gynt* and concerns itself with truth, lies and self-deception as the central problems of ethics. For Weininger, Ibsen's poetry is Kant's moral philosophy, as the individual's categorical imperatives are to seek the highest value and strive for autonomy. As Ibsen explores Peer Gynt's hypocritical and self-deceptive character, so does he also the essence of immorality. Weininger also discusses Ibsen's treatment of male-female relations, in particular the theme of man's redemption through woman's love understood as projection.

The three essays on Seekers and Priests, Wagner and Schiller are unified by their concern for character as the central feature which gives a person whatever worth he has. Character for Weininger is not something seated behind a person's thoughts and feelings, but reveals itself in every thought, feeling or deed, including artistic creations. Seekers and Priests, like male and female types, are for him theoretical paradigms which constitute in various mixtures the character of each person. Despite the relentless essentializing and dichotomizing — are these what Wittgenstein sees as Weininger's instructive ground floor mistakes? — the essays are valuable for putting to use the theory of characterology, and sketching a language and criteria of cultural and aesthetic criticism. The Seeker feels inadequate and searches for fulfillment, while the Priest is content and radiates this to others. The former is the artist, the latter the teacher, even though as we know from experience, many who begin as seekers end up as priests.

Next is a sharply critical account of Schiller's failure of character manifest in his literary works: he lacks depth, originality and fails to 'compose out of his own experience.' By contrast, the fragment on Wagner's *Parsifal* is more positive about its thought-content: 'the problems that Wagner has chosen are the most enormous that any artist has chosen.' These are innocence, as symbolized by the Rhinemaidens at one with their world, the rupture which creates dualism, the tension between fate and freedom, the possibility of redemption. What we have here is an insistence on the aesthetic principle that a necessary condition of great art is the tackling of significant human problems.

The fragment on metaphysics is not a traditional contribution to the subject, but attempts to reconceive it as 'universal symbolism'. Weininger aims 'to uncover what the sea, what iron, what ants, what the Chinese mean, the ideas which they represent.' On this view, metaphysics is discourse about human characteristics we project on nature. The dog receives a kick as the symbol of criminality — loss of ego, self-worth and freedom. The horse, whether racer or worker, fares no better, being considered as the symbol of insanity because of its nodding head.

The central question of the piece on 'Science and Culture' is the place of scientific knowledge in the purposes of culture. The essay has epistemological and cultural resonance in its notable claims that 'knowledge rests on belief, and has firm foundations only through the application of logic, but logic itself can only be believed.' Furthermore, the 'economic conception of science as a big industrial establishment' is said to be ethically problematic and alien to true culture. Such a picture of science not only 'homogenizes human experience', but results in a loss of problems and reduces even wisdom and clarity to the status of mere instrumental value.

Finally, the book offers two sets of occasionally inspired aphorisms. Here is one: 'The highest expression of all morality is: Be! A person must act in such a way that the whole of his individuality lies in each moment.' Another: 'Idiocy is the intellectual equivalent of crudeness.' Alas, this committed Kantian author is in want of a sense of humour, and certainly does not write philosophy as a series of jokes — an idea provocatively envisaged by a later Austrian philosopher!

On Last Things is a welcome gift to philosophers interested in retrieving a major source for Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy, enabling us to sketch a portrait of Wittgenstein as a kind Weiningerian. Especially noteworthy are their respective discussions of animal psychology — scenes, as it were, from the Viennese zoo. While Weininger speaks of involuntary canine hypocrisy, Wittgenstein deflates this as nonsense, since 'a dog cannot be a hypocrite, but neither can it be honest.' The book is a treasure-house to students of modern literature concerned with gauging Weininger's impact on such cultural icons as Kafka, Joyce, Rilke, D.H. Lawrence, to feminist scholars examining the roots of feminism/anti-feminism, as well as to historians of *fin de siècle* Vienna. Feminist scholars might take note of Germaine Greer's observation about Weininger's first book as containing 'one of the fullest statements of the theory of the female soul, set out in a remarkably rigorous and committed book by a mere boy, Otto Weininger.' *On Last Things* provides applications of this theory to topics of particular cultural importance. The essays on science and its relationship to culture is of special relevance to historians of science and to culture-studies, while the reflections on Ibsen, Wagner and Schiller appeal to theorists of theatre and music.

Last thing: we are grateful to Steven Burns for a penetrating translation, for a comprehensive and insightful introduction to Weininger's philosophical perspective, and for a useful bibliography of available works on Weininger.

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Kevin Wm. Wildes
Moral Acquaintances: Methodology in Bioethics.
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 2000. Pp. x + 183.
US$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-268-03450-8);
US$20.00 (paper: ISBN 0-268-03452-4).

Kevin Wildes book is a worthwhile attempt to refocus bioethics on praxis rather than theory. Of course, Wildes is well aware that theory and praxis are not separable, so his methodological turn lays bare its theoretical commitments by analyzing a variety of previous bioethical approaches in order to separate wheat from chaff. Wildes's survey of bioethics is understandable without 'dumbing down' complex positions from utilitarianism to casuistry, natural law to principlism. This survey then leads Wildes to reject much previous bioethical theory replacing it with a 'proceduralism' of 'moral acquaintanceship' that takes pluralism and practical matters seriously. With much of his account I readily concur; however, where problems arise for me is in what I take to be Wildes's acceptance and further extension of H.T. Engelhardt's (1986 & 1996) own proceduralism and moral categories, rather than, like Erich Loewy (*Moral Strangers, Moral Acquaintances, and Moral Friends* — 1997) before him, recognizing that the category of moral acquaintances seriously undermines Engelhardt's 'foundations of bioethics'.

The book is organized along conventional lines. After an introductory chapter that sets the problem to be pursued — viz., in a morally pluralistic world, what, if any, common morality exists? — the next three chapters sketch and critique existing 'methods' of bioethics in order to expose both the insightful and detrimental features of each. Lumping a number of theories — e.g., utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, and so forth — under the title of 'foundational methods', Wildes concludes that each theory offers important insights about such concepts as 'consequences', 'obligations', and 'character'; however, by relying on one or another foundational concept on which to ground these insights, they beg questions concerning the problem of a lack of a 'view from nowhere'.

Turning, then, to what 'methods' try to avoid the problems of grounding bioethics in a moral theory, Wildes discusses both the 'ecumenical' approach of principlism and the paradigmatic approach of casuistry, devoting a chapter to each. Bringing back the theme of the problem of 'common morality', he critiques the bioethical theory of Beauchamp and Childress, arguing that 'middle level' principles need a context in order to ground them, a context lacking in Beauchamp and Childress's account. Wondering if the more particularistic approach of Jonsen and Toulmin's casuistry fares any better, Wildes concludes that because of the secularization of the Western world and the corresponding lack of moral authority that came along with it, sufficient historical changes also make their account of casuistry untenable.

Having surveyed several major theories of bioethics, Wildes is ready to establish his own position. However, before we go on, I wish to point out one

concern with Wildes's survey. As the subtitle denotes, Wildes's looks at what he calls 'methodologies' in bioethics. Here his definition of the term 'methodology' is a bit confusing, however. Though I would agree that his own procedural ethics is methodological in nature, his survey of other bioethical approaches under the name of 'methodologies' does not always ring true. I find it difficult, for example, to designate utilitarian, deontological, and virtue ethics as methodologies rather than theories. Surely when put to the test of bioethical concerns, these theories may get some practical fleshing out, but I am not clear how Wildes own discussion of these positions is, itself, a discussion of method rather than theory. That is, I do not see that he discusses so much what we *do* rather than what are the concepts we use to justify and motivate what we do. It seems to me that his critique of others would be all the more forceful if we read Wildes as noting that the lack of methodological considerations in other approaches is, in fact, to the detriment of the entire bioethics enterprise. It is not so much that he is surveying foundational, principlist, or casuistic 'methods' as he is pointing out that many of these common bioethical theories lack a serious method which would make them effective bioethical instruments. Wildes correctly points out that bioethics demands method more than mere theory, and yet too many bioethicists focus on establishing a moral theory, principles, or paradigms rather than ethical 'procedures'. His own proceduralism then can be read as a methodological corrective.

'Part Two: Moral Acquaintances and Methodologies' (the last three chapters — last third — of the book) begins with an account of 'communitarian bioethics' in order to setup the category of 'moral acquaintanceship'. Briefly, beginning from the premises that autonomous people do not live in isolation from each other and that morality is a part of life (not something to be added to it), Wildes states, 'bioethical considerations are not simply isolated principles or propositions but part of the actual life of real communities' (132). Reading Engelhardt as a communitarian, Wildes determines that, though on the right track, Engelhardt's own categories of 'moral friends' and 'moral strangers' do not go far enough to capture the rich plurality of human associations. Thus Wildes offers up his concept of 'moral acquaintances' which is intended to straddle the chasm left by Engelhardt's account between moral friends and moral strangers.

To develop his new category, Wildes turns to a discussion of consensus and agreement in bioethics to show that between the deep agreement of moral friends and the minimal permission left to moral strangers, there is significant space, space not successfully delimited by such concepts as Rawls's 'overlapping consensus' which itself attempts to bridge the gaps among autonomous individuals and interests. 'Consensus' for Wildes is too strong covering over important differences in relationships often based on tenuous and highly specific agreements.

Wildes concludes with his concept of proceduralism which tries to give meat to the skeletal account of Engelhardt. According to Wildes, his proceduralism takes content seriously while attempting to avoid the discrepancies

of diverse interests that cause the political rancor now so much a part of bioethical debate. Stating correctly that '[t]here are no "pure," contentless procedures' (167) Wildes recognizes that we must 'acknowledg[e] the moral assumptions of proceduralism' in order to identify 'common ground' (167). However, though he takes himself to be extending Engelhardt's argument and categories, surprisingly he finds that, like Engelhardt before him, such procedures as 'informed consent' and 'prior notification' are 'part of our common morality' (8 and 166), and thus his procedural 'paradigms' have, for me at least, practically the same force and insight for bioethics as Engelhardt's.

Though I admire and accept much of this book, I find myself deeply troubled when his discussion betrays certain beliefs with which I cannot agree. For example, Wildes's communitarianism as expressed in Chapter 5 dangerously loses sight of individuality. Rather than speaking of individual moral commitments, Wildes speaks *only* of the commitments of groups, communities, and society. Analogously, his discussion of 'moral acquaintances' notes only when groups of people agree or disagree. Because of this, Wildes is hard pressed to discuss not just differences between groups but differences within them. Even the 'strongest' moral communities are not uniform, so that when Wildes talks about communitarianism bringing particularity into bioethics (127-8), how can this be true given that 'moral friends', 'moral strangers', and 'moral acquaintances' are only ever discussed from a group, not individual, perspective?

Furthermore, while Wildes's proceduralism does do Engelhardt one better by explicitly recognizing that content and method come together, Wildes's view still settles for simply expanding Engelhardt rather than undoing him. Like Loewy, I read Engelhardt as a libertarian, not a communitarian. Loewy's account of 'moral acquaintanceship' shows that Engelhardt's project provides a poor 'foundation' for bioethics. But whether libertarian or communitarian, it is the fundamental account of the relationship between individuality and community that is problematic. There is not the social order on the one hand and individuals on the other. Instead, we need a different account that recognizes socially situated selves, or as I have called it elsewhere, a functional concept of the narrative self (*Community As Healing*, 2001).

Here is not the place to give such an account. What I will say is that rather than choosing one side over another, we might be better served by embracing the idea that shared experiences, realities, and purposes as well as pluralistic individuality are both 'facts' about community. That is, these concepts are not in fundamental conflict, as they might seem. It is quite possible, to have unique expressions of purpose that can, as a matter of accident or design, work together as shared purposes. Cannot the communitarian and the liberal both win, at least a part of, the day? Community, then, does not mean mere 'sameness'. 'The condition of community,' as Beth Singer has put it, 'is one of sameness-in-difference, of partial commonality of perspective among persons whose perspectives as individuals also include other perspectives, some unique to themselves and some shared with members of multiple communi-

ties to which they also belong' (*Pragmatism, Rights and Democracy* [1999], 85).

This is what I take to be 'moral acquaintanceship,' and to be honest, I believe this is where Wildes is heading. However, by carrying Engelhardt's baggage, I do not think he gets there. Moral acquaintanceship in my sense of it is based on a wholly different model of the self than Engelhardt's libertarian formalism allows. This leads to deep flaws, clearly illustrated by Loewy, flaws I fear that Wildes inherits.

However, these may be petty philosophical disputes that threaten to overshadow what is otherwise a useful addition to the literature. Wildes's desire to rethink the direction of bioethics for a new century by moving away from theory to praxis is to be commended and should be studied by all serious scholars and practitioners in this field.

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Eric R. Wolf
Envisioning Power:
Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1999. Pp. xi + 339.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-520-21536-2);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-520-21582-6).

Envisioning Power constitutes an anthropologist's attempt, in the light of the horrors of the twentieth century, to rethink the anthropological task and to redress the definitions that configure that task. In this work, Wolf seeks to explore the connections between ideas and power, and to link those connections to the politico-economic circumstances of the cultural group.

Wolf begins by recounting traditional ways in which power and ideas came to be conceptualized within the discipline of anthropology. Wolf demonstrates that traditional approaches are inadequate to the tasks of understanding the power of ideas to configure human action, as well as to the task of understanding how power configurations emerge *within* social groups and structure their relational interconnections. Wolf then turns to the individual within the social group to demonstrate how a life space is always already constrained by socio-politico-economic imperatives peculiar to the social context. The individual opens to opportunities for action, and indeed recognizes these openings *as such*, in ways already predetermined by the parame-

ters of the life space. These parameters, horizons of 'truth' that configure possibilities for action, are partially prefigured as proneness of disposition into the biological composition of the group, partially prescribed by the historical power formations — the institutions — and the accompanying 'rituals' whereby the social configuration manifests itself, and partially determined by the imperatives that define the present circumstances of the social space.

Wolf rethinks how ideas are employed as the connecting tissues that underwrite power relations within life spaces, even as they compose and bind the social space to configure it as 'world'. Mental constructions are not flights of fancy extraneous to the lifeworld, explains Wolf, but, rather, ideas have specific content configured within conceptual traditions and they serve distinct functions, delimiting the features of an individual's world and sorting the chaotic data of the empirical environment into comprehensible categories for understanding. The ways in which ideas serve these functions are peculiar to the social space. Thus, ideas are the parameters of the life space, according to Wolf. They are the emblems and instruments that delineate and delimit how objects, events, and other beings will be seen. Ideas involve and invoke the modes of interaction practiced within the group, configuring the plays of power within which human relationships evolve within the ever-shifting and ever-contested interdependencies that make for social spaces in the world. It is primarily ideas and their linguistic/conceptual 'rituals' that bind a social body and afford it its distinctness in relation to other social bodies. Ideational systems are self-enclosed and self-referential and they act conservatively to underwrite the particular monopolies of power that configure the social space. Through the power of ideas, people are propelled into specific orbits of existence, unequally distributed over the social terrain into networks of exchange and commerce. Some are even, by virtue of the very same ideational forces, marginalized, ignored, or obliterated from the social scene altogether. Clearly, Wolf's project is deeply Marxist in that it seeks to indicate how relevant ideas are embedded in material processes that involve and invoke certain ideologically patterned 'rituals' with respect to ecology, economics, social organization and political formations.

Wolf's deep awareness of the power of ideas to configure a social space, to underwrite and manifest power relations within the social structure, is the great strength of this work. Wolf offers three very careful applications of his theory in analyses of the Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island, British Columbia, the Aztecs of fifteenth/sixteenth-century Central Mexico, and the German people of the Third Reich. Wolf chooses these three social configurations because he considers them to best serve the analytical interests of his project, since each is characterized by uncommonly evocative and elaborate repertoires of ideas and each demonstrates a rich array of 'ritual' practices grounded upon these ideational foundations. Wolf considers these three groups to comprise 'extreme expressions' of the activities and qualities that characterize human cultures *as such*. The rather flamboyant ideologies and 'ritual' systems of these three social groups might, hopes Wolf, point us

toward the connections between ideational systems and the workings of power within social structures that characterize human beings as a species, even where power forces and ideational systems remain more veiled and muted, in the case of people less assertive and aggressive in their cultural ways.

Wolf's profound appreciation for the subtle power of idea systems to shape and underwrite power relations responds to the contemporary demand of philosophers and social scientists for a fresh understanding of power beyond its traditional definition as a unitary and independent force, itself free from external constraints. Wolf effectively demonstrates that ideologies arise in specific social configurations as an aspect of those configurations. *Envisioning Power* is an anthropological work that is highly ethical in its motivations, because, in Wolf's insistence that all human cultures share common connections binding their power systems and their ideas, he forces the reader to confront the possibility that her own, and her culture's, 'rituals' might be altogether ideologically consistent with his exemplary cultures. Our ways, too, may be genocidal, fascistic, and totalitarian.

Envisioning Power comprises a must-read for philosopher and social scientist, but it also constitutes valuable reading for any educated person seeking a deeper understanding of how power relations enable 'envisioning' of self and world. Its sole weakness resides within its foundational claim of a distinction between idea-systems that coalesce into unified schemas ('ideologies') that underwrite or manifest power forces, and ideation that does not form 'ideological' forces. Wolf's failure to make clear this distinction, to explain how some ideas have ideological power while others do not, leaves his project caught up in the debate still separating followers of Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault: Is it possible to arrive at some *innocent* rational space outside of given power relations, in order to confront and assess those relations as such? Or is *every* rational space always already bound up in the power relations of which it forms an integral part?

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