Philosophy in Review/Comptes rendus philosophiques

As a rule, P.I.R. publishes only invited reviews. However, we will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English.

En général, C.R.P. ne publie que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, nous prendrions en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais.

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T.R.S. Allan
Constitutional Justice.
A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford
University Press 2001. Pp. x + 331.
Cdn$106.00: US$60.00. ISBN 0-19-829830-7.

Allan's book offers a normative defence of modern constitutional law, understood as the chief mode of regulating the exercise of public authority. Its most basic premise is that the rule of law is the cardinal principle of any constitutional regime.

The conception of the rule of law developed in this book is, without a doubt, intriguing. At the outset, Allan tries to make clear that, owing to its emphasis on procedural fairness, and, hence, its in-built focus on 'form', the rule of law has decisive substantive implications. 'Due process', that is, procedural fairness, which may commend itself as the most straightforward epitome of the rule of law, can only keep its promise of protecting persons against the arbitrary use of government action if it is complemented by the 'companion principle' of equality (17). Allan contends that, as a principle appealing to the voluntary recognition of legal obligation, equality has to have substantive implications, too. Mere formal equality, that is, the precept to apply general laws to any situation regardless of the individual person affected, has no controlling influence over whether the respective laws themselves are based upon arbitrary discrimination against groups of persons. Only substantive equality that protects against such discrimination supplies a defensible ideal of constitutional justice (39).

Among the many insightful interpretations developed in this book, this conception of the equality principle stands out. Scarcely in the literature is it more accurately reflected that the point of the equality principle consists in constraining the government's pursuit of what it submits to be the common good. Overstating his point a bit, Allan claims that equality is 'simply the opposite of arbitrariness: it means that all governmental acts and decisions that affect the fortunes of particular persons should be capable of justification ... ' (22). With this central perspective in mind, the rule of law is recast as a manifestation of what Allan calls, drawing on Dyzenhaus, a 'culture of justification'. Ideally, this culture addresses itself to the principle requiring that all government be supported by the consent of the governed, who are understood to be equally free. It is not factual agreement what Allan has in mind here but rather the idea that from an impartial perspective all legal rules ought to merit the voluntary endorsement by its addressees. In the final result, thus, the equal dignity of citizens constitutes 'the basic premise of liberal constitutionalism' and 'the ultimate meaning of the rule of law' (2).

For the greater part of the book, however, the rule of law is viewed as derivative of the two complementary ideals of procedural due process (Allan: 'natural justice') and the equality principle. In several chapters dealing with institutional characteristics of a constitutional regime, Allan tries to estab-

lish how those two principles are generative of structural features of constitutional democracy, such as the separation of powers or the split of sovereignty between the legislature on the one hand and the judicial branch on the other. As to this ambitious reductive task of the book, however, one is left in a quandary whether Allan claims that there is a conceptual, that is, necessary, connection between the foundational principles and the basic layout of constitutional law or whether there are empirical links that allow for some interpretative clarification or elaboration. If Allan were to claim the former, the analysis would have merited greater analytical rigor; if he is content with the latter, it is to be regretted that the book lacks a broader historical dimension.

This lack of such a historical dimension is all the more surprising given that one cannot but agree with Allan that, from a jurisprudential point of view, the world of modern constitutional law is becoming increasingly one. Contrary to former times, the matter of whether a constitution is a written document, which has been, in some solemn declaration, formally entrenched, has become of tangential significance to the normativity of constitutional law. Modern constitutional law is an international discourse whose elementary grammar can be reconstructed by condensing elements that reappear at the most general level of justification.

Even though the book claims to apply, in this vein, a more universal perspective on constitutional law, much of the discussion is evidently addressed to a British audience. It is one of the major thrusts of the book to show that parliamentary sovereignty, a principle peculiar to the seminal but insular development on the British Isle, can be tamed without compromising the foundations of liberal democracy. Therefore, from the perspective of both American constitutional law and the constitutional traditions in mainland Europe, the book appears to put together some 'old truths' for the special purpose of aiding the English tradition in catching up with the universal expanse of constitutional principles.

Nevertheless, among the many virtues of the book stands out the diligence with which Allan illustrates how the general principles explained in the book are expounded in judicial practice. He draws on examples from many jurisdictions. This underscores the fact that constitutional law has become an international affair, and I agree with Allan that legal positivism cannot account for the 'source-less' floatation of ideas and strings of reasoning from one jurisdiction to the other.

The most interesting problem in respect of this discourse, which is of concern for scholars currently working in the field of comparative constitutional law, affects the question of whether the normative discipline of constitutional law has had its day. Unfortunately, the phenomena that threaten to subvert or supersede constitutional discipline, such as supranational regimes, transnational markets, the privatisation of governance structures etc., are widely ignored in this book. This springs from Allan's basic methodological orientation. The book represents normative political philosophy, Anglo-American style. Its hallmark is the invocation of time-less rea-

sons. Therefore, the bulk of the book is restricted to a restatement and reconstruction of well-known and widely cherished ideas. This detracts, a bit, from the relevance that the book might have for legal circles. Again, the lack of a historical dimension makes itself felt here. Indeed, I surmise that a philosophy of history approach to constitutionalism would be more rewarding than a normative review, however elegant, of well-known first principles.

These few critical remarks are not meant to deny the great value that the book will have for philosophers who wish to make themselves familiar with the legal mentality from which constitutional principles emerge and with their application by courts working in the Common Law tradition.

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David Landis Barnhill and
Roger S. Gottlieb, eds.
Deep Ecology and World Religions:
New Essays on Sacred Ground.
Albany: State University of New York Press
2001. Pp. xiii + 291.
US$65.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4883-5);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4884-3).

Deep ecology as developed by Arne Naess and the team of Bill Devall and George Sessions invites exploration of and comparison with various religious traditions. Although deep ecologists have typically focused more on their call to action than on the metaphysical basis of their claim that non-human beings have intrinsic value, what they say about this value is often suggestive of the notion of sacred. This well-ordered anthology considers the compatibility of deep ecology and the major world religions, while issuing the necessary cautions regarding the places where deep ecology and the religions diverge. Roger Gottlieb's 'Spiritually Deep Ecology and World Religions: A Shared Fate, a Shared Task' takes the connection between deep ecology and religion so far as to advance the view that deep ecology *is* a religion and nature *is* the sacred. However, because most religions maintain a distinction between nature and the divine, most authors in the anthology are less willing to erase the distinction between religion and deep ecology. Consequently, the articles tend to highlight the ways in which deep ecology and a particular religion are compatible. They explain how religion could be supportive of aspects of the world view of deep ecology and/or its action agenda.

Taking an interdisciplinary approach, which is appropriate to the book's subject matter, authors come from departments of religion (4 authors), theology (3), philosophy (3), justice studies (1) and environmental conservation (1). Barnhill and Gottlieb, like most contributors to the volume, believe that there is much to be gained from forging an alliance between deep ecology and world religions. A religion's adherents can be called to heal the earth and religion provides a useful framework for rethinking deep ecology. The twelve invited articles examine deep ecology from the primary religious perspectives. Beginning with Indigenous perspectives (John A. Grim 'Indigenous Traditions and Deep Ecology') the volume examines deep ecology from the point of view of Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism (Christopher Key Chapple, 'Hinduism and Deep Ecology'; David Landis Barnhill, 'Relational Holism: Huayan Buddhism and Deep Ecology'; Jordan Paper 'Chinese Religion, "Daoism," and Deep Ecology'; Mary Evelyn Tucker, 'Confucianism and Deep Ecology'). Western religions are covered by an article on Judaism (Eric Katz, 'Judaism and Deep Ecology'), two articles on Christianity (John E. Carroll, 'Catholicism and Deep Ecology' and John B. Cobb Jr., 'Protestant Theology and Deep Ecology'), and one article on Islam (Nawal Ammar, 'Islam and Deep Ecology').

The editors' 'Introduction' and Roger Gottlieb's article provide a useful introduction to deep ecology and to the linkages between this environmental ethic and the sacred. The articles on Eastern religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam compare and contrast the tenets of deep ecology and the particular religion. So, for example, Chapple's discussion of Hinduism shows that Hinduism conforms to deep ecology in viewing human beings as inseparable from nature and united with the natural world through meditation. Chapple uses the Indian State of Kerala to illustrate in a concrete way the extent to which Hinduism's sense of human's place in nature, notion of sacred place, and its ancient rituals produce an Indian form of deep ecology.

Unsurprisingly to proponents of deep ecology, the tenets of deep ecology generally seem to be a better fit with Eastern than Western religions. The articles on Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism expose the harmony between the religion and deep ecology's world view. However, the article on Judaism laments the metaphysical and normative gulf which separate religion and the ethic while the two articles on Christianity struggle to establish that despite appearances to the contrary Christianity and deep ecology really *are* consistent. Nawal Ammar's discussion of Islam, which explains that only Allah is sacred, most clearly articulates the basis for the inherent incompatibility between deep ecology and the religion's of the West. In each case, nature possesses a derived value, not an intrinsic value. However, as in the case of the articles on Christianity, Ammar argues that Islam requires the protection of the environment demanded by deep ecology.

Given the complexity of any religious system, it is reasonable to expect that the articles will be unable to contain all that is relevant to establishing the connections between religion and deep ecology. However, with the exception of Jordan Paper's article on Daoism, the contributions examine signifi-

cant components of the religion's metaphysical and normative views. Paper's discussion differs because he is focused on critiquing deep ecology's understanding and use of Daoism. This article serves as a caution about how not to connect deep ecology to a religion.

The last two articles in the anthology, 'Deep Ecology, Ecofeminism, and the Bible' by Rosemary Radford Ruether and Michael Zimmerman's 'Ken Wilber's Critique of Ecological Spirituality', contribute new dimensions to the discussion. Zimmerman provides the most sustained critique of deep ecology in the book and Ruether's article is more about ecofeminism than deep ecology. She argues that both the Old and the New Testament (hence, Judaism and Christianity) have components which do not contradict deep ecology's commitment to nature. Importantly, she employs ecofeminism to critique deep ecology's account of humankind's domination of nature. While sympathetic with the deep ecologist's call to end our domination of nature, rather than base this call on the intrinsic value or sacredness of nature, Ruether's argues that the destruction of nature can be directly linked to the impoverishment of women.

Undoubtedly, while reading the article discussing the religion which one knows best one is reminded that there are various perspectives on a particular religion. Since the authors tend to present their understanding of a religion as authoritative, the reminder is useful. Although the editors are to be commended for their article selection as well as the scope of the anthology, the anthology can only provide an introduction to this immense topic. This said, the book is a valuable resource for those exploring the linkages between deep ecology and religion. Its excellent bibliography provides the resources needed by someone eager to dig deeper.

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John L. Bell, David DeVidi and
Graham Solomon
Logical Options: An Introduction to
Classical and Alternative Logics.
Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press 2001.
Pp. xi + 300.
Cdn$36.95. ISBN 1-55111-297-3.

Graham Priest
An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.
Pp. xxi + 242.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-79098-0);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-79434-X).

Over the past fifty years, the most exciting developments in logic have concerned extensions or revisions of classical logic: modal logic, deontic logic, intuitionistic logic, many-valued logic, fuzzy logic, free logic, relevant logic, and various conditional logics. My own book, *Deduction* (Palo Alto: Mayfield 1987; second edition, Oxford: Blackwell 2002), was perhaps the first book to present these developments to introductory undergraduate logic students. In the past year, two excellent books have appeared that present non-classical logics at a somewhat more advanced level. Both are appropriate for undergraduate and graduate students with some previous acquaintance with logic. Both are sophisticated enough to be useful and informative to philosophers, mathematicians, computer scientists, and linguists who want to learn more about non-classical logic. The books share many features, including many strengths. (Both, notably, concentrate primarily on the Gentzen/Beth/Hintikka/Smullyan/Jeffrey truth tree method of assessing validity.) But they differ significantly in style and focus.

John L. Bell, David DeVidi, and Graham Solomon's *Logical Options: An Introduction to Classical and Alternative Logics* begins with an introduction to classical propositional and predicate logic that occupies one-third of the book. It is clear, to the point, and often cleverly original. It puts the concept of a counterexample to an argument in central position, which ties in nicely to the subsequent emphasis on tree methods. It presents formal semantics and metatheorems clearly. And it acquaints the reader with axiomatic, natural deduction, and sequent calculus approaches as well as trees. The relatively few exercises are helpful and well-chosen, though those involving English arguments tend to be even more contrived than is usual for logic texts. I have some minor quibbles — '⊥' represents both falsehood and a contradictory formula, for example, and 'implication' sometimes refers to the conditional — but overall the introduction to classical logic succeeds admirably.

Bell, DeVidi, and Solomon then extend predicate logic in a chapter covering postulate systems for arithmetic, many-sorted logic, and second-or-

der logic, showing that first-order arithmetic is not categorical and that, while many-sorted logic does not genuinely extend the power of first-order predicate logic, second-order logic does. Their thirty pages devoted to these topics incisively discuss key concepts and results.

Modal logic receives a more detailed treatment. Bell, DeVidi, and Solomon introduce contextual operators as, in effect, quantifiers over places of relevance. The familiar modal operators emerge as a special case. They define frames and conditions on them that correspond to various modal principles and systems, prove soundness and completeness, and develop tree systems. They then use modal logic to develop a provability logic (again, with frames, axioms, and trees), and link the earlier discussion of arithmetic to an illuminating discussion of Löb's theorem and Gödel's first and second incompleteness theorems. They discuss multi-modal logic (in which, for example, one might have both alethic and deontic operators). The chapter closes with an excellent discussion of logical and philosophical issues in quantified modal logic.

Bell, DeVidi, and Solomon move on to many-valued and intuitionistic logic. They define attractive properties for many-valued systems and present Bochvar, Kleene, and Lukasiewicz logics, including trees for the latter two. The discussion is clear but brief. They spend more time on intuitionistic logic, showing that it is not an n-valued logic for any value of n, developing tree rules nicely tied to the philosophical motivation for the system, introducing Kripke semantics, and proving the adequacy and correctness of the tree method. Their discussion of the relation of intuitionistic logic to classical logic and S4 and their development of intuitionistic predicate logic with identity exhibit logical elegance and philosophical sensitivity.

The book ends with a 'sampling' of several further topics: fuzzy logic, algebraic logic, term-forming operators, and free logic. The first is briefest, generalizing the earlier treatment of many-valued logics. The last three, however, not only offer intriguing glimpses of further issues but illumine further the relation between classical and intuitionistic logic. Bell, DeVidi, and Solomon define Boolean and Heyting algebras. They show that Boolean valued logic is classical logic (which need not, thereby, commit one to bivalence) and that Heyting valued logic is intuitionistic logic. They present Hilbert's epsilon and tau operators, showing that term-forming operators are inert classically but not intuitionistically. Finally, they develop trees for free predicate logic in both classical and intuitionistic settings.

Graham Priest's *An Introduction to Non-Classical Logics* also concentrates on tree systems. It too treats modal, many-valued, intuitionistic, and fuzzy logics. But Priest restricts himself to propositional logic, so discussions of predicate logic, postulate systems, many-sorted logic, higher-order logic, free logic, and term-forming operators are out of bounds. That narrower focus, however, allows him to develop modal, relevant, and various conditional logics in considerable depth.

Priest begins by reviewing classical propositional logic, and, specifically, the material conditional. He presents trees, shows how to read counter-

models from branches, and proves soundness and completeness. He notes several apparent counterexamples to understanding English conditionals as material conditionals (e.g., the validity of $[A \to B]$ & $[C \to D]$; therefore, $[A \to D] \lor [C \to B]$). He reviews arguments in favor of the material conditional, which turn on the validity of disjunctive syllogism — something that emerges as important in later chapters on relevant logic. In this as in other chapters, he has short sections on history, further readings, and exercises. All this takes place — concisely and elegantly — in fewer than twenty pages. The exercises here and throughout the book deserve special commendation. They are exceptionally well crafted. Some are straightforward; some are quite demanding; some are philosophical. Together they constitute terrific training for any budding philosophical logician.

Priest devotes three chapters (about a quarter of the book) to modal logic. He first develops a very general possible-worlds semantics with a matching tableau method, probing philosophical issues surrounding possible worlds. He then considers normal modal logics as a special case and develops semantics and tableaux for T, B, S4, and S5. Non-normal worlds, systems employing them (especially S2, S3, and S3.5), and associated analyses of the conditional form the subject matter of an especially illuminating chapter. The discussion of whether contradictions imply everything is both unusual and helpful. Exercises introduce S6 and S7.

Priest next turns to conditional logics. He develops the general conditional logic C with semantics and associated tableaux, discusses sphere semantics in detail, and presents systems corresponding to Lewis and Stalnaker analyses of conditionals, all the while summarizing arguments for and against these systems. Priest's treatment of intuitionistic logic in the following chapter is both less extensive and less sympathetic than the treatment in Bell, DeVidi, and Solomon, but it contains a fine presentation and critique of Dummett's arguments for intuitionism. Priest's intuitionistic trees are more cumbersome than those in Bell, DeVidi, and Solomon, but also bring out the parallel to modal trees more clearly. The chapter on many-valued logic not only presents the essentials of Kleene and Lukasiewicz systems but also points out the limitations of many-valued conditionals. It discusses truth-value gluts as well as gaps from various sources.

The most distinctive features of the book emerge in the next three chapters, which concern relevant logics. Priest develops FDE (first degree entailment), in which interpretations are relations rather than functions. He presents a tableau system, compares it helpfully to many-valued logics, introduces Routley star semantics, and reflects on paraconsistent logics and the validity of disjunctive syllogism. He then, adding the conditional to FDE, introduces basic relevant systems that he himself has developed, with tableaux, relational, and star semantics. Finally, he introduces ternary interpretations and mainstream relevant logics such as R, applying them to the analysis of *ceteris paribus* enthymemes. The book ends with an illuminating chapter on fuzzy logic, including fuzzy relevant logic. Priest does a remarkable job of making relevant, paraconsistent logics seem intelligible, attrac-

tive, and even natural. He nevertheless is frank about the apparently unintuitive character of star semantics and ternary interpretations.

The two books just discussed share a number of strengths: (1) They offer excellent introductions to topics of central logical and philosophical importance in classical and especially nonclassical logic: modal logic, intuitionistic logic, many-valued logic, and fuzzy logic. (2) They are well-written, clear, well-organized, and carefully proofread. (I counted four minor errors in Bell, DeVidi, and Solomon — a missing negation on page 50, a missing 'S-' on 120, a switch of 'weak' and 'strong' in describing Kleene systems on 186, and a missing parenthesis on 222. I found no errors at all in Priest's book.) (3) Exercises, though not numerous, are exceptionally well-designed.

There are three major differences. The first is a matter of content. Bell, DeVidi, and Solomon discuss predicate logic as well as propositional logic. They treat many topics — quantified modal logic, free logic, identity and quantification in intuitionistic logic, many-sorted logic, second-order logic, algebraic logic, and provability logic — that lie outside the scope of Priest's book. Conversely, paraconsistency, conditional logic, and relevant logic are central for Priest, but do not appear at all in Bell, DeVidi, and Solomon.

The second difference is a matter of focus. Bell, DeVidi, and Solomon offer a comprehensive introduction to various areas of nonclassical logic. Their interests frequently lead them back to the relation between classical and intuitionistic logic, but the book is nonetheless a survey. Priest's book, in contrast, has a definite theme. Priest offers a concentrated series of introductions to nonclassical logics viewed as attempts to offer adequate theories of the conditional. He displays a set of difficulties for the material conditional and uses them to motivate and test later theories. Discussions of disjunctive syllogism and non-normal worlds in early chapters prepare the way for paraconsistent, relevant logics in later chapters.

Finally, the books differ in style. Bell, DeVidi, and Solomon are conversational: they talk one through truth definitions, tree methods, and proofs. They allude to philosophical issues but spend little time discussing them. Priest is a stylistic minimalist, expecting the reader to be more readily conversant with mathematical formalisms but also presenting arguments in greater detail. He also, in capsule form, outlines philosophical issues in some depth.

To glimpse the difference in formal presentations, consider (the interesting half of) the argument that taking the accessibility relation as an equivalence relation and taking it as a universal relation yield the same logic: S5. In Bell, DeVidi, and Solomon, we find: ' ... suppose that $\not\models_{S5} P$. Then there is an appropriate model in which P fails to hold in some world, w, say. We can turn this model into one in which R is universal by deleting all the worlds not accessible to w. Since the truth value of P in any world depends only on the truth values in that world and in worlds R-related to w, P remains false in w. Accordingly, there is an M with R a universal relation such that $M \not\models P$' (145).

In Priest, part of the argument appears as: ' ... suppose that $\Sigma \nvDash_{K\rho\sigma\tau} A$. Let $I = <W, R, v>$, be a $\rho\sigma\tau$-interpretation, such that for some $w \varepsilon W$, all members of Σ are true at w, but A is not. Let $W' = \{w': wRw'\}$. (R is an equivalence relation, and W' is just the equivalence class of W.) Let $I' = <W', R', v'>$ where R' and v' are the restrictions of R and v, respectively, to W'. Then I' is an v-interpretation. For if $x, y \varepsilon W'$, wR'x and $wR'y$. Thus $xR'w$, by symmetry, and $xR'y$, by transitivity. A further crucial fact is that if $x \varepsilon W'$ and xRy then $y \varepsilon W'$. For wRx and xRy entail wRy. Hence, if $x \varepsilon W'$, R and R' relate to exactly the same worlds (*). Now, if it can be established that for all $x \varepsilon W'$, and for all A, the truth values of A in I and I' are the same, we will have what we want. This fact is established by induction over the construction of A ... ' (53-4).

Priest's summaries of philosophical issues are often incisive. Consider, for example, his critique of epistemicism about vagueness: 'Whatever one makes of this argument itself, it cannot really serve to explain why we find the existence of a semantic discontinuity counterintuitive. For it is not just the fact that we do not *know* where the cut-off point is that is odd; it is the very possibility of a cut-off point at all: the changes involved in one second of a person's life just do not seem to be of the kind that could ground a difference between childhood and adulthood' (213). Or this criticism of the KK thesis: 'The principles for Kσ [$p \rightarrow K \neg K \neg p$] and K$\tau$ [K$p \rightarrow$ KKp] are almost certainly false, however (though they are frequently assumed in the literature). For example, you can know something without believing that you know it. ("I didn't believe that I had really absorbed all that information, but when it came to the exam, I found that I had.") *A fortiori*, you can know something without knowing that you know it (assuming, as is standardly done, that knowledge entails belief)' (50-1).

Both books are outstanding introductions to nonclassical logic. Bell, DeVidi, and Solomon provide a wonderful survey of many key areas; Priest provides a brilliantly crafted tour of a narrower but critically important realm.

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Michael Clifford
Political Genealogy After Foucault:
Savage Identities.
New York: Routledge 2001. Pp. xiii + 225.
Cdn$128.00: US$85.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-92915-6);
Cdn$37.95: US$24.95
(paper: ISBN 0-415-92916-4).

The precise place of 'genealogy' accounts in theories of liberation remains a subject of intense debate. In his broad-ranging study *Political Genealogy After Foucault*, Michael Clifford claims to bring together themes from Foucault's thought on discourse, power relations, and ethics to 'trace out' the emergence of the autonomous individual both as an ethical concept and a cultural icon. In a play on Rousseau's 'Noble Savage', Clifford dubs this autonomous individual with its rights, freedoms, powers, and obligations, the 'Savage Noble'. In carrying out his genealogical critique, Clifford also aims to develop and defend political genealogy as a theoretical model for liberation movements. The book is divided into two parts, Part One addressing Foucault's discussions of discourse, power, and self-formation, and Part Two bringing these to bear on freedom, political power, and the purpose of political theory.

Clifford begins Part One employing a Foucauldian theory of discourse to explain how the political subject of the Enlightenment emerged in the 'discursive space' of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (31). Using Hobbes as his primary example, he claims that *Leviathan*, with its focus on the threatened condition of the human subject in a hostile state of nature, 'puts into play and concretizes a discursive practice to which virtually all later Western political thought must conform' (33). This fearful Hobbesian political subject is not merely discursive, however. Clifford goes on to link Foucault's earlier theory of discourse with the genealogy of power in works such as *Discipline and Punish*, arguing that the discourse of threat finds embodiment in the 'enunciative modalities' of modernity: the sites that discipline the bodies of modern political subjects (56). According to Clifford, the most important site of the discourse of threat lies not with the institutions to which Foucault called attention (schools, armies, factories, prisons, hospitals), but rather with the 'imagined political unity' of the nation state (58). In the final chapter of Part One, Clifford describes the ethical processes of self-formation or 'subjectivation', through which mechanisms of external control become ethical virtues of self-government. Using Mill's *On Liberty* as his primary source, Clifford claims that an ethics of toleration informs both the liberal and conservative variants of Western political identity.

Clifford extends his discussion of the modern political subject in Part Two, where he develops a Foucauldian conception of freedom and defends political genealogy against some important criticisms leveled against it. He begins with a dense description of how the 'modern experience of subjectivity'

emerges in a matrix of three interrelated axes of discourse, power, and subjectivation (102). The supposedly autonomous individual that emerges from this interplay of disciplinary forces is thoroughly shaped by the social opportunities, gestures, movements, and temporality that these axes determine: 'There is no free space of autonomy or noninterference that individuals may enjoy' (106). Although such an observation might appear to vindicate those who have charged Foucault with developing a thoroughgoing social determinism, Clifford contends that political genealogy engages two kinds of freedom. 'Strategic freedom' consists of the development of strategies for resisting and disrupting power based upon a genealogical understanding of its techniques and disciplines. This freedom is possible, however, only to the extent that it is informed by the freedom of 'counter-memory', an effect of genealogical description that consists in actively forgetting socially determined identities (masks) and thereby asserting a freedom from the governance of all identities, most notably that of autonomous individualism. To the extent that the autonomous subject can comply with disciplinary directives, it is also free to act otherwise: 'Power is exercised only over free subjects and only insofar as they are free' (138). Clifford likens this ever-present ability to recognize and resist domination to the existentialist freedom of Sartre and de Beauvoir (143-4).

The book concludes with a brief defense of Foucault against the charge that he falls into what Clifford dubs the 'Foucault conundrum'. Critics including Nancy Fraser, Jürgen Habermas, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer, have variously charged that because genealogy reveals that power is 'everywhere', and because the freedom that issues from this understanding is an ungrounded resistance to identity per se, political genealogy lacks the basis for a coherent politics of resistance. First of all, it allegedly lacks the 'normative yardsticks' needed to ground a moral or political condemnation of the status quo (154). Moreover, MacIntyre charges that Foucault's method is ultimately self-defeating in that genealogical critique requires the very standards and identifications that it seeks to disrupt. To the first charge, Clifford offers a strikingly Sartrean reply, observing that moral 'oughts' issue from factual situations that have no normative value apart from arbitrary choice. To the second, he does not deny that genealogy may be self-subverting, but claims that genealogy is a 'self-consuming concept' that is itself always in question (159). According to Clifford, both such criticisms derive from the misguided attempt to cast political genealogy as a traditional political theory. As a radical critique of identity itself, genealogy cannot issue in a conventional politics of the left or the right, but only in an 'abiding suspicion' that defies 'the dilemma of being either for or against' (157, 163).

Although Clifford acknowledges that the scope of his project is broad, some of his controversial claims would have benefited from a more rigorous and sustained defense. His treatment of the ideological American nation-state as a 'site' for Foucauldian genealogical study, for example, seems at odds with Foucault's emphasis on concrete spaces of bodily discipline such as schools,

hospitals, and factories. More importantly, Clifford's well-documented case that Foucault consistently identified political freedom with the identity-subverting force of 'counter-memory', raises a number of difficult questions. Can a political theory that lacks the normative content to 'take sides' effectively inform liberatory movements? Can a theory that treats all identities (aside from those assumed in a spirit of parody) as antithetical to freedom explain why some identities seem clearly to be more oppressive than others are? Finally, by locating the site of resistance to power in the subject's capacity to choose against it, is Clifford reinstating an existentialist version of the autonomy that he seeks to criticize? Although Clifford does not fully answer these questions, his study suggests that they will be important ones for future defenders of Foucauldian political theory.

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Debates about cultural pluralism have dominated democratic theory in the last decades. While John Rawls has made 'the fact of pluralism' the central constraint on any liberal conception of political justice, much of the discussion has concerned the failures of liberalism to appreciate the consequences of diversity. Monique Deveaux offers us a comprehensive assessment of these debates, considering proponents of liberal toleration, liberal perfectionists such as Kymlicka and Raz, deliberative democrats such as Young and Benhabib, as well as offering her own deliberative brand of liberalism. Her discussion of these arguments is judicious and subtle. Deveaux avoids the overly strong dichotomies that have characterized the debate so far, rejecting strong claims to liberal neutrality while accepting a weaker form of impartiality, accepting cultural rights and the need for positive measures to promote and support diversity while rejecting any undifferentiated conception of group identity. Her argument is guided throughout by clear normative standards with which to evaluate discussion of diversity in liberal democratic societies (35). In particular, she claims that cultural minorities make justified claims to justice that can be supported by liberal norms of respect and

consent, but which cannot be elaborated and developed without the free and open actual deliberation of all those affected. In this way, Deveaux balances the demands of democracy and pluralism, in which pluralism enriches democracy and provides the framework in which it can flourish.

Deveaux puts these standards to work in evaluating liberal and deliberative attempts to accommodate diversity. Toleration is the first object of criticism. First, toleration is merely a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the full recognition of the value of cultural pluralism. By taking religious diversity as the guiding model, liberal toleration cannot justify either group rights or positive policies that promote the flourishing of cultural communities or the protection of language. Second, Deveaux argues that toleration presupposes asymmetrical relations of power between the group tolerated and the ones doing the tolerating. Beyond even positive toleration, the stronger norm of respect must then replace mere toleration, because respect 'demands much more: it demands that institutions and individuals take into account the content of different cultural groups' as the appropriate way to recognize, following Kant, ' "the humanity in every other person" ' (58). Respect in this Kantian sense also provides the limits of toleration for illiberal as opposed to nonliberal groups: 'In cases where cultural minorities seek to undermine the agency, dignity or humanity of their own members or that of other members of society, they forfeit the special recognition and forms of community autonomy granted to them' (39). While toleration is 'thin', respect is a normatively thicker attitude of mutual engagement.

This step beyond toleration to respect involves several important issues. First, it is not so clear just how different respect and positive toleration actually are in cases of conflict to the extent that both reject noninterference. Toleration and respect are species of the same attitude that we take toward others with whom we disagree when we engage in joint deliberation with them. If we regard the persons whom we tolerate as citizens, then we regard them as entitled to put forth reasons that are valuable from their perspective. In order to engage in deliberation with those with whom we disagree as *citizens*, we require not simply attitudes of respect or toleration, but a 'regime of toleration' in Walzer's sense, that is, a framework of social arrangements whose purpose is to incorporate difference and allow it a share of social space. A deliberative regime of toleration has the reflexive feature of permitting citizens to challenge the limits and discriminations that inevitably become a source of conflict within such arrangements, including the interpretation of the norms of respect and consent within them. The exact limit of toleration is itself a subject of deliberation, where the norm of respect is part of the broader regime. Second, toleration and respect differ with respect to their objects. While respect has as its objects persons as agents or citizens, communication itself is 'the proper object of toleration' in a democracy (as Onora O'Neill has argued). In deliberative settings, citizens manifest their equality with each other not only by refraining from interference with their acts of expression; they also do so by sustaining the conditions for potential communication. A deliberative regime of toleration is illegitimate if it denies

such as entitlement by falsely generalizing the perspective of the tolerating group so that they can reject the claims and reasons of the tolerated group. Toleration does not always involve power asymmetries, as deliberative toleration shows.

This issue emerges again in the next step of Deveaux's argument. In rejecting Kymlicka and Raz's perfectionist liberalism, Deveaux argues that diversity cannot be defended in light of liberal norms such as autonomy or the role of culture in opening up meaningful options. Many cultures embrace their culture precisely because it limits options; moreover, they would reject any such norm of autonomy. Neutrality poses similar problems for the liberal embrace of diversity, precisely because it imposes limits on the sort of reasons that various groups may offer in deliberating about policies and rights. Here Deveaux introduces the fascinating example of the Hindmarsh affair in Australia in order to exhibit the exclusionary character of such a restriction on the sort of reason offered in deliberation (95). In this dispute, aboriginal women protested against building a bridge to an island on the grounds that parts of the island were sacred to them for reasons that had to remain secret. Deveaux considers the case to show that the requirement of openness and transparency imposed liberal neutrality in an inappropriate way. Like autonomy, liberal neutrality fails to pass a reflexive challenge especially among such traditional communities (136). But would Kantian respect fare any better? As in the case of autonomy, members of a traditional minority culture might claim that any particular violation of liberal respect for persons should be tolerated (say in family law or marriage practices). It would seem then that there is no substantive or thick liberal norm that would not be open to such a reflexive challenge, not as a special right but as the object of toleration. Impartiality, as Deveaux reconstructs it, has the advantage of being a stance or perspective that members of different groups can adopt when deliberating with each other. Nonetheless, if traditional religious communities are to be included there are no non-contestable norms that guide deliberation across liberal and non-liberal communities. The Hindmarsh dispute is not just about offering public reasons, but about the need to offer reasons at all.

The next step of Deveaux's argument reveals a possible answer to this difficulty. It is because neutrality would make democratic deliberation about cultural differences impossible that it ought to be rejected. The main issue of the last chapters of the book is then to develop a conception of deliberative democracy that is inclusive enough to be appropriate in the situation of cultural pluralism, to form the 'micro-level' of democratic pluralism missing in liberalism's 'macro-level politics'. She rightly argues against appeals to ideal rationality or to ideal or actual consensus or to any thin conceptions. At the same time, Deveaux rejects the claim that deliberative democracy can make good on the promise of doing without any contestable, presupposed moral and political norms. Instead, she argues, 'a plausible account of deliberative democracy, far from suspending all presupposed norms depends on several determinate norms and institutions ... these norms and features must already be in place for deliberative democracy to offer a coherent

alternative to majoritarian democracy' (163). The issue then is to see which of these norms can be amended so as to provide the basis for deliberation in culturally pluralistic democracies. These norms include principles of respect, consent, reciprocity, equality and a certain ideal of impartiality, all of which are necessary conditions for open and democratic dialogue (164-5). Although these principles are similar to the ones offered in Gutmann and Thompson's *Democracy and Disagreement*, Deveaux is much clearer that the interpretation of these principles must be rethought so as to be more accommodating of wide pluralism. She is also well aware that all of them stand under various provisos, as when she insists that it might be correct to use impartiality to criticize some group's claim to justice 'under various circumstances'.

With her overall argument and detailed assessment of various positions, Deveaux argues forcefully against the dominant 'thin' form of political liberalism. While agreeing with perfectionist liberalism in this regard, her thicker conceptions derive from a commitment to resolving cultural conflicts only through actual deliberation among all the parties concerned. Perhaps most contentious to deliberative democrats is her argument that the norms of deliberation 'must already be in place'. While the various norms that she elucidates appear to be necessary conditions for deliberation at all, deliberative democrats reject seeing them as general philosophical principles rather than the norms of a specific constitutional framework. Committing such a framework to a thicker and more specific philosophical interpretation has the danger not only of making deliberation irrelevant, but also of intolerance, as can be seen in the common liberal charge that religious reasons are 'nonpublic' and 'nonreciprocal'. Any reflexive challenge to the normative framework for deliberation asks citizens to rethink the very nature of the polity in which they live, and for that reason multiculturalism often has led to constitutional debates and reform. One of the merits of Deveaux's reconstruction of the debates about cultural pluralism is to show that a tolerant, respectful and multiperspectival polity needs to develop institutions that express robust normative commitments to respect and equality. Here the deliberative interpretation of democratic norms needs to be given priority over the liberal interpretation of norms as constraints and presuppositions. Rather, as the membership of the polity grows more diverse, an important feature of public deliberation will be the internal critique of those very norms that made deliberation possible in the first place. If this is not possible, then deliberative democracy loses its capacity to accommodate pluralism and collapses into a comprehensive or a political liberalism.

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Diane Moira Duncan
The Pre-Text of Ethics: On Derrida and Levinas.
New York: Peter Lang Publishing 2001.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-8203-5123-1.

The result of a revised thesis dissertation, Duncan's *The Pre-Text of Ethics* presents an engaging critical comparison of two of France's leading contemporary thinkers: Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. The background to the book's analyses is Duncan's main contention that both Levinas and Derrida imbue their respective writings with a profound sense of ethical commitment. To the reader familiar with Levinas this characterization comes as no surprise; it is Duncan's controversial contention that Derridean deconstruction, far from being an apolitical nihilism as commonly supposed, in fact expresses a dynamic concern for ethics and justice as well.

Duncan supports this thesis by way of various avenues of literary and philosophical interest. In her noteworthy analysis of Kafka, for example, she finds innumerable characters portraying an interminable waiting for justice within systems of *constructed* laws and bureaucracies. In surveying Derridean deconstruction, she finds a deep and abiding ethical commitment within some of his key hermeneutical concepts (e.g., *différance*), by demonstrating their smooth convergence into an ethical framework similar to that of Levinas's concern for (pre)original alterity. These varying surveys and analyses eventually lead Duncan to situate both Levinas and Derrida in a radically grounded ethical responsibility, which precedes and transcends the collective / totalizing text (the 'Pre-Text') of all human interactions, discourses, and institutions.

Based on this analysis, Duncan also hopes to create a space for dialogue within postmodern ethics. She believes that these above-mentioned emphases upon ethical responsibility and the secrecy of interiority are a direct challenge to the bleak humanistic monotony and simulated *hyper-reality* of contemporary postmodern ethics. She contends that Levinas's phenomenology of the face not only exemplifies Lyotard's imperative to be 'witnesses to the unpresentable', but that Levinas's account also reveals a sense of duty and responsibility *within* the indeterminate anonymity of the postmodern vision. In her concluding chapter, Duncan extends this suggestion by considering the relationship between deconstruction and the *gift*. She discovers several paradoxical aspects within this interconnection: for example, every finite act of justice towards an other carries within it an act of injustice towards an other's other. Ultimately, however, despite these paradoxes and misreadings of deconstruction, she believes that by placing justice in the immediacy of the 'right now', both Levinas and Derrida have as their concerted focus the impossibility of the human being's non-deferral.

Most noteworthy in this text is Duncan's 'organic overview' of the development of Levinas's thought. While displaying an evident admiration for the subtle profundity of his ideas, Duncan does not hesitate to call into question certain aspects of his phenomenological analysis. She questions, for instance,

the seeming ethical privilege Levinas accords to 'visual' immediacy. Her scrutiny leads one to wonder whether or not the moral sphere of Levinas' thought can properly extend to those with visual impairments, or to those with distinctive sensory priorities. Additionally, in her most incisive criticisms she also considers the discomforting masculinist tone in Levinas' account of the *feminine*. Drawing upon recent work in this area, Duncan addresses the diverse standpoints ranging from Levinas's more sympathetic readers (e.g., Cohen and Peperzaak) to his more discerning critics (e.g., de Beauvoir and Irigaray). Her careful discussion assesses Levinas's view of the feminine by charting the development of his early account in *Time and the Other* through to his later 'interpretive corrections' in *Ethics and Infinity*. Duncan finds many troubling inconsistencies in Levinas's attempt to categorize and thematize the feminine: 'on the subject of woman, Levinas is exceedingly hypocritical' (88). Nevertheless, she still maintains an interest in 'preserving the sublimity of his ethical vision' (21). While non-apologetic in her analysis, Duncan does ultimately believe that despite Levinas's male-narcissism, salvage measures can and should be taken. Duncan's re-visionary suggestion, more easily stated than put into practice, is to disassociate the term 'feminine' from its misogynistic connotations, and to displace the implied gendered subordination of the feminine by employing the term 'beloved'.

Stylistically speaking, while Duncan's elliptical writing can certainly be engaging, it can also leave the reader somewhat frustrated. Through all three of the chapters, several intriguing strands of argument are left open for the reader's own personal reflection. Although this element of passivity on Duncan's part can be helpful to the introductory reader, more informed readers may wish for a more developed conviction. Nevertheless, the intrigue of these analyses and their elusive presentations do constitute an appealing discussion of both the interconnection between Levinas and Derrida, and their respective concerns for such topics as ethics and justice. As an informative and thoughtful introduction to these issues, Duncan's book is specifically noteworthy for its insights into the role of the feminine in Levinas, and for its attempt at a critical opening within postmodern ethics.

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This book is a collection of recent papers examining the Greek notion of *logos* as it features from Homer and Hesiod through to the Stoics (the paper on stoic philosophy is the only one not previously published). The account concerning presocratic philosophy focuses primarily on Heraclitus and Parmenides; in the case of Plato, the dialogues under direct consideration are the *Phaedrus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Statesman*; while the *De Anima* forms the basis for the examination of relevant Aristotelian views. Fattal has also offered recent publications on Plotinus (e.g., *'Logos' et image chez Plotin*, L'Harmattan, 1998), but, regrettably, this book does not cover late antiquity and Neoplatonism.

Fattal employs a meticulous criticism of ancient Greek sources (pre-classical, classical, and Hellenistic), as well as later Latin and (in the case of commentaries on Aristotle) Arabic texts. But his work is not merely a learned and at times fascinating exploration of the philological and philosophical origins of *logos*. Furthermore, he has in effect ventured to specify (explicitly, for instance, on p. 90) a distinct link between Modern Western rationality (as exemplified in science) and Plato's particular reinvention, as it were, of ancient Greek *logos*.

In order to substantiate this theoretical approach, Fattal begins from the ambiguity of *logos* as denoting both (a) declarative language (*parole*), and (b) rational thought (reason, *raison*) — an ambiguity already present in Homer (albeit embryonically, 30-2). Linguistic evidence (cf. the root **leg-*, alterable into **log-*) indicates that *logos* initially designated the act of assembling or collecting: this sense of the word is for Fattal best reflected and reinforced in the Heraclitean and the Parmenidean conceptions of *logos*, whereby the emphasis lies on the unity of language and world, or on the interdependence of thinking and being.

With Plato, the second sense of *logos* acquires prominence, according to Fattal: this sense is concerned with the ensuing need for the enumeration, in a way, of what has been amassed — whereby diction becomes a means for segregation. Thus, Plato's diaeretic-dialectic method of ideas and words transformed *logos* into a measure of separation rather than unification; *logos* became distributive, discursive thought (47-8, 90-1, 176-7). It was left to Aristotle and the Stoics to further elaborate the characteristics of this transposition; *logos* was thenceforth to be primarily identified with the study of the modes in which words and their meanings are correlated — and, ultimately the new science of *logic* became possible (48, 257-8).

This theoretical journey from ancient *logos* — what Cicero translated into *ratio* (28n) — through to logic and scientific rationality (positing Plato as the crucial point of reference), seems to assume, in the first place, that the

different senses of *logos* are really distinguishable. To claim that one sense acquires pre-eminence over another is a dubious assertion. Saying and showing, relating and distinguishing can be interpreted as two facets of the same act. Moreover, the history of Greek *logos* does not end in antiquity, and no account of its meaning can omit later developments in Christian, mediaeval, modern and contemporary Greek theory and usage. (If these are 'un-philosophical', then so are Homer and Hesiod.) In other words, there may be even more senses of what *logos* is.

We can of course concede that this could be easily accommodated by modifying the title of Fattal's book simply into *'Logos', pensée et vérité dans la philosophie grecque <ancienne>*. I am afraid that this time the unexamined assumptions would be even greater. For, even if we can isolate and objectify some section of (ancient) theory as more rightfully amenable to examination, then our translation of its terms can only be devised in our favour, related to terms of a more familiar theoretical context. The only way of reducing the probabilities of self-deception is in this case the more comprehensive, broadly historical approach that I have just implied.

But let us yet again concede that all this is too exacting, and that a more philological, or systemic approach (of mere consistence within a given frame of reference) is all that we need. Still, I think that Fattal relies rather heavily on the Heideggerian critique of Plato's ontology. How are we to interpret the alleged Platonic *logos* of dissecting discursiveness on the face of images, myths, and unwritten doctrines — all of which so unmistakably characterize Plato's thought?

These latter considerations notwithstanding, finding our way through the 'continuities and ruptures' (22) in the history of philosophical thought is too complicated a task to be uncontroversial, conclusive, or all-inclusive. Fattal's book constitutes an important new contribution to the study of Greek *logos*, providing further evidence for the polysemy — or, in other words, the semantic fertility — of a persisting philological and philosophical riddle.

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Matthew Festenstein and
Simon Thompson, eds.
Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues.
Cambridge, MA: Polity Press 2001.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7456-2165-1);
US$14.99 (paper: ISBN 0-7456-2166-X).

In a review of Habermas's *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Richard Rorty suggests that first-rate critics of an original philosopher object to the philosopher's work only after reading it charitably and appreciating its ingenuity. By these lights, Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson's *Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues* is an example of first-rate criticism. This collection includes ten essays that explicate and criticize Rorty's views on issues in social and political philosophy, a response by Rorty to each, and a reprint of Rorty's 'Justice as larger loyalty'. This collection serves as a very good introduction to Rorty's work in these areas of philosophy. Further, the dialogical character of this collection makes it valuable for those who seek a refined understanding of Rorty's views.

The collection begins with an excellent introductory essay in which Festenstein presents a clear overview of Rorty's work. Simon Thompson offers careful criticisms of Rorty's accounts of truth, justification, and justice; Thompson's challenge provides an occasion for Rorty to explain his notorious views on these subjects. David Owen attempts to show that Rorty ought not accept Rawls' high valuation of public justifiability. His account of 'joshing' as a rhetorical strategy is part of what Rorty calls a 'very accurate and sympathetic account of my motives and strategies' (111). Owens further claims that Rorty's views on liberalism would benefit from further appreciation of Judith Shklar's work on cruelty, a claim that Rorty wholeheartedly accepts. In his essay, Festenstein claims that Rorty ought to follow Dewey in offering a theory of the self which would support his social hopes; he rightly contends that Rorty must take into account the extent to which social arrangements construct, rather than simply serve, individuals.

In his 'Justice as larger loyalty', Rorty argues that Rawls should reject Habermas's claim of the necessity of transcultural arguments in favor of liberalism. In doing so, he rejects the claim of Richard Shusterman's essay that the dispute between him and Habermas concerns whether reason or aesthetics is primary. As Rorty sees it, the issue between them is whether one should attempt to 'peel apart Enlightenment liberalism from Enlightenment rationalism' (235). Rorty endorses this task as 'necessary', and it provides a compelling perspective on his responses here. Time and again Rorty treats the challenges posed to him as animated by resistance to his tearing asunder liberalism and rationalism. Many of the essays here claim that Rorty's moral vision sits badly with his views concerning justification of that vision, i.e., his antifoundationalism and his ironism.

Norman Geras, for instance, claims that without an account of 'moral foundations' Rorty cannot consistently make use of the notion of 'moral

progress'. Now, Rorty's antifoundationalism amounts to the claim that moral beliefs need be grounded not in any non-natural entities, but simply in our beliefs and desires. In his response to Geras, he states that 'nothing in the nature of Humanity ... tells us that a socialist utopia is better than a vicious oligarchy. But it is. We know that it is as well as we know anything' (172). Rorty's response here is suggestive, but not as clear as it might be. Such a response, it seems, could be developed along the following lines: Objections like Geras's depend on a moral phenomenology in which we have certain values and are looking for a reason to take them seriously. But this phenomenology is a bad one; the values associated with liberalism are our values precisely because we do take them seriously. The lack of a foundational justification for these values does not, by itself, constitute a reason to doubt these values; Rorty rightly states in response to Thompson that only a 'concrete contribution to an argument' — only a real option — can do that (52).

Insofar as Rorty's defense of *antifoundationalism* is successful, however, his attempt to defend *ironism* is imperiled. Ironism is characterized by the worry that one has been given 'the wrong language' and so 'turned into the wrong kind of human being' (quoted on p. 19). John Horton commends Rorty for these concerns about 'grounding' our commitments, but wonders whether there Rorty's ironism makes such grounding impossible. But are these concerns in fact to his credit? According to what criteria could the ironist be wrong? Given Rorty's antifoundationalism, the criteria must be those supplied *by our values*. Now, Rorty's position is that only the challenge of a real option gives reason to doubt our values. However, it seems that an option is real only if it accommodates at least some of our values. Thus, it seems that while Rorty's antifoundationalism may not be inconsistent with his liberalism, it is inconsistent with the globally skeptical worries that characterize his ironism.

Finally, the challenges and responses collected here illustrate what may well be the primary reason for philosophers' frustration with Rorty: his tendency to reject everyday, hum-drum views as though they are calls for robust, foundationalist theory. For instance, after situating his position vis-à-vis humanism, Kate Soper argues that Rorty can and should avail himself of realism about human nature. In the course of rejecting this claim, Rorty rejects the philosophically innocent claim that 'certain sentences are true in virtue of the way the world is' (130-1). If antifoundationalism *does* imply rejection of such common-sense notions, so much the worse for antifoundationalism, or so it would seem.

Rorty's responses here show that he acknowledges that no such implication holds. For he provides *reasons* for the rejection of this apparently common-sense claim. He argues that to accept it is to embark on the slippery slope toward metaphysics, the fruitless 'inquiry into how the world independently is, as opposed to how it might be usefully described' (131). More importantly, he argues that to accept that 'certain sentences are true in virtue of the way the world is' is to do more than simply and reasonably to acknowledge their *power* in allowing us to achieve our ends. It is rather to

confer upon them *authority*, a status independent of their relationship to us (131). Because Rorty holds that attribution of such a status — as well as the common-sense that leads us to it — is at odds with his naturalist vision, he thinks he must reject it.

Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues provides an excellent forum for further discussion of these and other claims concerning Rorty's often compelling and always provocative views. If *Richard Rorty* finds the readership it deserves, the number of Rorty's first-rate critics is sure to increase.

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Lou Goble, ed.
The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic.
Malden, MA: Blackwell 2001. Pp. 520.
US$69.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-20692-2);
US$34.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-20693-0).

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Philosophical logic is formal logic motivated by philosophical, as opposed to strictly mathematical, concerns. Standard philosophical logics and their motivating concerns are well-represented in Goble's collection. In what follows I briefly indicate the target areas and authors of each chapter. I then offer a few remarks by way of criticism, followed by a brief overall evaluation of the book, and in particular its target audience.

Goble begins the volume with a useful introduction which orients the reader with respect to the subsequent surveys. The introduction also points to the perennial issue concerning logical monism (there is 'one true logic') and logical pluralism; Goble nicely points towards a version of pluralism, though he does not pursue the topic in any detail (for good reason, given the scope of the volume).

The surveys run as follows. As will be clear, the first six chapters may be categorized under 'classical logic', the next four under 'extensions of classical logic', the next six under 'alternatives to classical logic', and the final four as 'miscellaneous' (or, perhaps, 'a deeper look'). Each chapter contains an up-to-date — though, for obvious reasons, not exhaustive — bibliography.

1 CLASSICAL LOGIC I — FIRST-ORDER LOGIC: *Wilfred Hodges*. This chapter surveys classical first-order logic, including salient metatheoretical results. In addition to its chief aim the chapter also presents foundational distinctions that are presupposed in subsequent chapters (e.g., different senses of 'logic', object- vs meta-language, the notion of a *theory*, and so on).

<center>*411*</center>

2 CLASSICAL LOGIC II — SECOND-ORDER LOGIC: *Stewart Shapiro*. This chapter sets out standard (classical) second-order logic, clearly distinguishing it from its first-order counterpart. In addition to discussing the important meta-theoretical differences between the two logics Shapiro does a nice job summarizing the chief philosophical issues confronting second-order logic.

3 SET THEORY: *John P. Burgess*. Contemporary philosophical logic relies heavily on set theory, but set theory itself is a subject of philosophical concern. This chapter not only presents basic set-theoretic notions but also highlights some central philosophical issues confronting standard set theories, including especially the reduction of mathematics to set theory.

4 GÖDEL'S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS: *Raymond Smullyan*. This chapter presents Gödel's famous incompleteness theorems (and also Rosser's). Smullyan presents the results in a variety of ways, including (wrt the first theorem) the proof via Tarski's theorem concerning truth. In addition to the details of the various theorems Smullyan also pauses to discuss philosophical interpretations of such theorems (including, for example, their epistemological consequences).

5 TRUTH: *Anil Gupta*. A central concern in philosophical logic is truth and the notorious liar paradox. This chapter nicely summarizes leading contemporary responses to the liar, dividing such solutions into three natural categories: fixed point theories, contextualist theories, and revision theories. In addition to giving the basic details of such theories Gupta also briefly discusses the ongoing question of *semantic universality* (the idea that natural languages can express their own semantics).

6 LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE: *Patricia A. Blanchette*. The chief concern of philosophical logic is logical consequence — what follows from what. This perspective is now dominant, replacing the previous (Quinean) idea that logic's chief aim is *logical truth*. Of course, depending on the logic in question, these two aims sometimes coincide perfectly; but sometimes they don't. Blanchette provides an overview of contemporary issues surrounding various analyses of logical consequence, and also touches on the history of the topic.

7 MODAL LOGIC: *M.J. Cresswell*. This chapter presents standard normal modal systems (both propositional and first-order), concentrating on alethic modalities (necessity, possibility). In addition to presenting the basic object languages and salient metatheoretical results, Cresswell discusses some of the important philosophical applications of such logics and also some of the standard philosophical issues confronting them.

8 DEONTIC LOGIC: *Risto Hilpinen*. Deontic logic is motivated by deontic notions — moral obligation, permissibility, and so on. Hilpinen presents standard deontic logics, concentrating almost exclusively at the object-language level, and also discusses some of the important paradoxes in the area.

9 EPISTEMIC LOGIC: *J.J. Ch. Meyer*. Epistemic logic is motivated by epistemic notions — knowledge, belief, and so on. Meyer presents standard approaches to epistemic logic, with particular attention to problems confronting (or motivating) the various approaches. While Meyer's chief concern are

(naturally) the formal details, an elementary but useful discussion of various philosophical motivations is provided.

10 TEMPORAL LOGIC: *Yde Venema*. Temporal logic is motivated by *time* and, in particular, reasoning about time. While covering the standard systems in temporal logic Venema also highlights some of the important metatheoretical results. In addition, Venema provides a nice discussion of the extra-philosophical applications of temporal logic.

11 INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC: *Dirk van Dalen*. This chapter presents a succinct historical overview of intuitionism and the motivation behind constructive logic. Different semantical approaches to constructive logic are discussed, in addition to intuitionistic modifications of standard (ZF) set theory.

12 FREE LOGICS: *Karel Lambert*. Free logic arises from a dissatisfaction with the 'existence assumptions' of standard classical logic. In addition to discussing a variety of philosophical issues behind (and around) free logic, Lambert summarizes standard approaches to proof theory and model theory, and also mentions a number of extra-philosophical applications of free logics.

13 RELEVANT LOGICS: *Ed Mares and Bob Meyer*. Relevant (or, in America, relevance) logic arises from a dissatisfaction with classical accounts of *implication* or *entailment*. In addition to covering the basic philosophical issues motivating relevant logics, Mares and Meyer give a nice survey of basic object languages and metatheoretical results, concluding with a brief indication of open problems.

14 MANY-VALUED LOGICS: *Grzegorz Malinowski*. This chapter presents a general discussion of standard many-valued logics. After touching on philosophical motivations and issues, Malinowski covers the basic languages and salient metatheoretical results of the corresponding logics, in addition to indicating various extra-philosophical applications.

15 NON-MONOTONIC LOGIC: *John F. Horty*. Non-monotonic logics are such that adding premises to a valid argument may produce an invalid argument. Many familiar logics (familiar to most philosophers) are monotonic. In addition to discussing standard motivations for non-monotonic logics Horty provides various semantic approaches to standard systems (covering both propositional and predicate).

16 PROBABILITY, LOGIC, AND PROBABILITY LOGIC: *Alan Hájek*. While most philosophers are competent with respect to basic (classical) probability theory, few are familiar with so-called probability logics. This chapter covers the basic philosophical motivations behind such logics, as well as the formal details of basic systems.

17 CONDITIONALS: *Dorothy Edgington*. Unlike the previous chapters this chapter is concerned not so much with a particular family of logical systems but, rather, with one of the central motivations behind many logical systems — the notion of *conditionals*. Edgington covers the basic issues in the area, including basic arguments for and against standard approaches.

18 NEGATION: *Heinrich Wansing*. Negation is another of the key notions in philosophical logic. Indeed, what one makes of negation often dictates one's approach to other issues, not least of which are the paradoxes. Wansing

covers a handful of philosophical issues surrounding negation and a few formal approaches to modeling the notion.

19 QUANTIFIERS: *Dag Westerståhl*. Quantifiers, like truth, negation, and so on, continue to call for philosophical examination. Westerståhl gives a succinct survey of various recognized quantifiers, their semantics, and their salient metatheoretical features, and also touches briefly on some of the philosophical motivation behind each type of quantifier.

20 LOGIC AND NATURAL LANGUAGE: *Alice ter Meulen*. This chapter concludes the volume with an ongoing problem: the connection between formal logics and natural language. The chapter focuses mainly on standard approaches in contemporary semantics of natural languages, with discussion of both the motivation for and problems confronting each given approach.

This collection is by my lights the best of its kind, serving as an excellent resource for those approaching philosophical logic for the first time (or, at least, after a first course in contemporary formal logic). Each author has done an extraordinarily good job of making his/her respective chapter accessible to the non-expert (or uninitiated, in general). Given the importance of philosophical logic in contemporary (analytic) philosophy, I should think — indeed, hope — that this book finds itself on the shelves of every professional philosopher, not to mention graduate students.

In an effort to come up with a criticism I can point to only one point: paraconsistency. Paraconsistent logics are logics for which explosion (traditionally, *ex falso quodlibet*) fails; that is, a paraconsistent logic is one such that arbitrary B does not follow from arbitrary A and its negation. To be sure, standard relevant logics, which are covered in the book, are paraconsistent, so understood; however, paraconsistent logics are often motivated by issues independent of 'relevance', issues at the heart of philosophical logic. Perhaps the chief motivation for paraconsistent logics are the paradoxes, both semantic and set-theoretic (which, perhaps, may be the same kind of paradox). Other examples arise from historical examples of (negation-) inconsistent but non-trivial theories, including naive truth theory, naive set theory, and (arguably) early atomic theories. Even aside from such applications of paraconsistent logics, the 'spirit' of paraconsistency raises fundamental issues in philosophical logic — not the least of which is whether some sentences may in fact be true and false.

Given the rising interest in paraconsistent logic (and paraconsistency, generally) Goble's volume would have benefited from a chapter devoted to the topic. Unfortunately, aside from the chapter on relevance and various remarks in the chapter on truth, the topic is entirely neglected. That said, the volume is such a good overall collection that, in the end, the noted sin of omission is certainly forgivable.

As indicated above, I think very highly of this volume. Not only do I recommend it to budding philosophical logicians but I recommend it to all analytic philosophers, irrespective of specialty. After all, competence with respect to the basics of philosophical logic can only serve to open new vistas of exploration, if not help clarify (via formal models) vistas formerly explored.

As for the classroom, I strongly recommend the book as a supplement to advanced undergraduate logic courses and similarly for courses in (formal) philosophy of language. With some care the book might also be used as the central book in a second course in logic; in this case, the bibliographies of each chapter would point to supplemental readings.

J.C. Beall
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This collection includes fourteen essays, five of which were previously unpublished. The book addresses many of the questions that are discussed in informal logic circles these days. The main themes are rationality, the evaluation of arguments and the contexts of argumentation, particularly the place the audience should play in a theory of argumentation.

Govier analyzes recent feminist criticism of the practice of argumentation, alleging it to be adversarial in nature and to be somewhat condemned as such, rational persuasion being essentially coercive. She rebuts those arguments by criticizing their starting point: while there are adversarial aspects of argumentative practice (militaristic metaphors are often used to describe argumentative practice, for instance, and they are often appropriate), there are also important cooperative aspects. For one thing, argumentative practice is very closely linked to respect for persons and other minds because when we argue with someone, we address the other person 'as a rational being, as a person with beliefs and values of his own, as one who thinks and is capable of changing his beliefs on the basis of reasons and evidence'. She also rebuts those arguments by pointing out that even if adversariality were so pervasive in argumentation, it would not be sufficient to condemn the practice, since a minimal adversariality is a component of controversy, is a source of its intellectual power and is linked to open-mindedness, to non-dogmatism and to the creative aspects of thought itself.

A number of essays tackle the question of what makes an argument a good one. On first analysis, a good argument is an argument whose premises are acceptable and in which the link between the premises and the conclusion is sufficient. But problems arise as soon as one tries to sharpen those two criteria, as anyone who has taught informal logic soon learns. For instance, in the case of premises, there is the problem of the epistemic versus the

rhetorical acceptability: one could use a premise that one considers false and that, in fact, is false, with an audience that considers it true. Is the premise acceptable? While this problem could be dissolved by distinguishing epistemic from rhetorical acceptability, another, more intractable problem concerning the criteria of acceptability of premises is the problem of the duties one has towards one's own beliefs: what should one do before accepting a premise (a testimony, an appeal to expertise, etc.)?

In regards to the second criteria, the sufficiency of the link between the premises and the conclusion, do we mean by sufficiency logical validity in the strong sense? Surely not, but then what is the best way to construe the notion of a link the strength of which is rationally warranted? On these questions, the author summarizes clearly different positions and shows the strength and weaknesses of each, leaving the question open-ended, which is not surprising, these being the most problematic questions in informal logic, at the crossroad of naturalized epistemology, theoretical reason, practical reason and ethics of belief.

In addition to these more fundamental questions on the evaluation of argumentations, Govier examines a few particular types of argumentations: testimonial claims, *a priori* analogies, the *tu quoque* and the slippery slope fallacies. In regards to testimonial claims, she distinguishes three levels of sub-argumentation in a typical appeal to testimony: a sub-argument to asserted belief (concluding in 'A believes that P'), a sub-argument to transmissible good reasons (concluding in 'There is good reason to believe that P'), and a sub-argument for acceptance (concluding in 'Therefore probably p'). She then shows how prejudice and stereotypes can affect the judgments one has to make at each of these three levels, in the context of the allegations of sexual harassment made by Anita Hill against U.S. Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas in 1991. In her analysis of the *tu quoque* and the slippery slope fallacies, she presents the contexts in which they arise and distinguishes those in which such arguments are really fallacious from those in which they are not.

In three articles, she considers the suggestion made by Ralph Johnson, somewhat in the spirit of the Amsterdam school, that an argument, to be a good one, should respect additional criteria, criteria that would reflect the importance of the audience in argumentation, Johnson adopting the position according to which the purpose of argumentation is rational persuasion. Those criteria would be a) how well does the argument address itself to objections and alternative positions and objections?, b) how well does the argument handle consequences? Govier, after pointing out the importance of such considerations, examines various ways in which they could be construed as criteria of good argumentation supplementing the usual ones of acceptability of premises and sufficiency of the link between premises and conclusions. Her overall conclusion is that though addressing objections, alternative positions and considering consequences may well be necessary for a good 'exhaustive case' in support of a position, there are crucial

objections to including these elements within the list of criteria for determining the soundness of an argument.

In sum: a very interesting collection of papers, reflecting the current debates in informal logic, written very clearly with a willingness to point out the strengths of the position she rejects and the weaknesses of some of her own.

Pierre Blackburn
Cégep de Sherbrooke

Martin Heidegger
Zollikon Seminars:
Protocols — Conversations — Letters
Medard Boss, ed.
Trans. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press
2001. Pp. xxxiii + 360.
US$89.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8101-1832-7);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8101-1833-5).

Originally published in German in 1987, *Zollikon Seminars* records the exchange between Heidegger and the Swiss psychoanalyst, Medard Boss. Boss initially wrote to Heidegger in 1947, after reading *Being and Time* by chance during the occasional boredom of working as battalion doctor for a Swiss Army mountain troop. Devastated by his initial discovery of Heidegger's wartime political allegiances, Boss nonetheless remained entranced by his articulation of 'fundamentally new, unheard of insights into the human being's way of existing in his world' (xvi). They first met in 1949, and in 1959 began a series of seminars lasting ten years, in which approximately sixty of Boss' colleagues and students met two or three times a semester at Boss' home. By 1963, Boss was dictating a protocol into a tape recorder following each seminar. *Zollikon Seminars* is divided into three parts which present those protocols, Boss' record of conversations with Heidegger from 1961 to 1972, and letters received between 1947 and 1971.

Two things are incredibly exciting about this book, both of which are found in the seminars and conversations, and are prescient of contemporary debate. The first is what drew Boss: Heidegger's analysis of human being in the lifeworld. Heidegger rejects Cartesian mind/body separation by interpreting being-in-the-world as bodying forth (*Leiben*) (86 et passim). Human being is in the world not as mind, but as embodied self, and Heidegger and the doctors search for a way to help the sick through a novel understanding of integrated, bodily existence. Hence the discussion covers such experiential moments as

space and time, the meaning of the 'psychosomatic', and Heidegger's rejection of Freud's notion of the unconscious. Since the exchange is not with philosophers, Heidegger is breath-takingly and uncharacteristically clear and straight-forward in explaining his intensely complex and deep conception of human being, and thus he counters in practice the prejudice that only initiated specialists can understand him. Furthermore, he anticipates contemporary philosophies of embodiment, and offers precise disagreement with Sartre's phenomenology of the body (157).

Secondly, much literature has developed in recent years concerning Heidegger's critique of science. He is herein engaged with scientists, so much discussion explains his criticisms of technoscientific, representational and calculative thinking, objectivity, and the mathematization of nature, while making clear that he is not much hostile towards science but resisting 'the prevailing lack of reflection on itself by science' (95). A shortcoming is that the science at hand is medicine, while Heidegger discusses such figures as Heisenberg, Galileo and Newton, since his paradigmatic science is physics. The question remains whether Heidegger is right that contemporary science is driven ideologically, methodologically and praxically by physics, or whether the sciences cannot be so reductively homogenized. Nonetheless, if you are after a concise and lucid diagnosis of what's wrong with modernity in Heidegger's view, then this is the text to gain access to the embeddedness of nihilism in scientism, and to gather hints of an alternative meditative practice of thinking.

Editorially, the book has some superficial weaknesses. Presumably it was Boss who chose to separate the protocols from the discussions, rather than integrating them chronologically. The translators provide many references to Heidegger's other texts, but appear to have limited themselves to English translations. For example, *Die Frage nach dem Ding* is regularly an obvious text to point to, yet only the small section translated in *Basic Writings* is referenced. Such editorial choices warrant explanation, and the translators substantial editorial work cross-referencing could be helpfully indexed. There are names spelt wrong, missing index entries, and little explanation of the notes. Every footnote says 'TRANSLATORS', but are the difficult-to-find endnotes supplied by Heidegger, Boss, or the translators? Against these weaknesses, the book has real strengths. Boss' synopsis of contents is extremely helpful in its thoroughness and detail, especially in a world of generally unindexed Heidegger texts. Also, the translators' afterwords are excellent pieces of scholarship. Askay situates Heidegger's analysis against psychoanalytic theory, and Mayr's treatment of translation issues is beautifully insightful concerning the differences between German and English, Heidegger's philosophy of language, and particular complications with Heidegger's German. These pieces might be more helpful as forewords, however, and excellent as they are, they say little about the actual translation. With the exception of translating *vernehmen* as 'to receive-perceive' (4n), the translators have done a good job of remaining as literal as possible and

reproducing Heidegger's uncharacteristic 'down-to-earthness' in these discussions.

As a radical departure from Heidegger's usual writing style (presumably because he is talking with non-philosophers and because the discussions are recorded by Boss), this text is both significant and dangerous. Its strength and weakness is flagged on the book jacket, where it is called 'the best and clearest introduction to Heidegger's philosophy available.' It certainly offers the beginner an overview of Heidegger's thinking from the analytic of Dasein to the question of science and technology. Yet the fact that it is remarkably free of Heideggerian jargon means that its intelligibility may be at the sacrifice of Heidegger's depth of reflection. The reader is not stymied by untranslated and untranslatable German words, yet may thus be enticed to digest the book too quickly, simply to assimilate it to the representational-calculative thinking which Heidegger argues holds the modern mind in thrall. The mistake of understanding this book all too quickly is aggravated by the inclusion of the letters, which, though they offer occasional insights into the effects of calculative thinking, reading the Greeks as self-critique (278), the overlooking of the lifeworld by the sciences (281), and the possibility of resisting calculative thinking (283), nonetheless generally are expressions of friendship, gratitude, and what a good time was had by all on vacation. Thus the book is strongly recommended, with the provisos that one remember these are not just Heidegger's words but very much under Boss' hand, and that one expect to get more philosophically out of some parts of the book than others. *Zollikon Seminars* is an important text not just because of Heidegger's influence on psychoanalytic theory, but because it unfolds a lifetime of philosophical reflection in a novel and praxical context.

Trish Glazebrook
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Political liberalism is under attack. It has been criticised by many as failing to deliver the kind of impartiality or neutrality it promises. In recent years this criticism has been strenuously voiced by those who defend what can be broadly termed 'identity politics'. Authors as diverse as Charles Taylor, Iris Marion Young, and even Will Kymlicka have expressed the view that the

model of political liberalism articulated by John Rawls cannot accommodate the kinds of identity-based political demands that they believe are often justified in deeply divided societies. Anthony Laden's new book is a sophisticated and ingenious attempt to show that political liberalism is in fact the best way to achieve political legitimacy in deeply divided societies, and that it is far more hospitable to identity claims than its critics realise.

Laden is centrally concerned with the following apparently impossible dilemma. If political legitimacy requires the uncoerced consent of citizens, how can this be achieved in the face of social, ethical, and cultural diversity so deep that it goes all the way down? If citizens are so diverse that they effectively don't share anything of significance, how can they ever agree on a set of political principles to govern their behaviour? The problem only gets worse if we stipulate, as Laden does, that it would be illegitimate to wish away this deep diversity either by arbitrarily excluding those who disagree with us, or by forcibly assimilating them so that 'they' become 'us'. Laden's answer to this enduring puzzle of political philosophy is to construct an ideal of reasonable political deliberation, through which citizens come to genuinely share a common will. The idea of a shared will is, of course, nothing new in political philosophy, and so the book opens with two chapters on Rousseau and Hegel. Laden argues that the theories of Rousseau, and especially Hegel, share several important features with the project of political liberalism, most importantly, the idea that the process of public reason can serve as a device of reconciliation for individual citizens. Rather than seeing our own aims and interests as competing with the demands of citizenship, the commitment to reasonable political deliberation is meant (in Rousseau, Hegel and Rawls) to constitute a shared civic identity which makes our own goals and objectives congruent with the requirements of citizenship. In other words, our civic commitment to public reason becomes part of our practical identity, thus ensuring that there is no 'schizophrenic' divide between our public and non-public identities in political liberalism, as Rawls's critics have often argued.

Much obviously hangs on what we mean by reasonable political deliberation, and the central chapters of the book are devoted to explicating a conception of public reason that treats citizens as free and equal in the face of serious differences. Laden (and here he departs significantly from Rawls's view) argues that reasons are authoritative, that is reasonable, when they are located in the relationships that obtain between people. If you and I are friends, then it's reasonable of me to make the sorts of claims that I think are supported by our shared understanding of the concept of friendship. Citizens, however, are not usually friends, and so reasonable political deliberation must be grounded in a shared conception of citizenship. This conclusion might seem to lead to a dead end, since our starting assumption was that citizens didn't share anything important. The solution, according to Laden, is that they must share only in the commitment to be reasonable with one another. Inevitably there will be different conceptions of what this entails, and so Laden concedes that the content of public reason must be

plural, and cannot be fixed (as Rawls argues) in advance by a political conception of justice.

In the later chapters of the book, Laden shows how a conception of reasonable political deliberation will, in practice, require that many of the substantive demands of identity politics be met. This is true, he argues, because the reciprocity inherent in reasonable deliberation will be undermined if certain citizens are socially or economically excluded, if their nonpolitical identities are imposed on them, or if the demands of citizenship prove unduly burdensome for their nonpolitical identities.

Although Laden presents a subtle and compelling case for political liberalism (or deliberative liberalism as he calls it), there are several troubling moves made in the general argument. First, the idea that what makes deliberation reasonable is its appeal to a shared conception of a relationship is dubious. Grounding reasonableness in relationships or shared identities is apparently meant to lend support to the idea that public reason is hospitable to identity politics, but this link is never firmly established. Why not simply say, with Rawls, that respect for someone requires that I offer them reasons I think they have reason to accept? On this view, there's no need for me to share anything with someone in order to treat them with respect in public deliberations — surely a better way to deal with the challenge of deep diversity? Second, Laden's arguments regarding the place of identity politics in political liberalism tend to be either too obvious to need stating, or so complex as to require much further argumentation. In the chapter on exclusion, for example, Laden moves quickly through a long list of practices which are illegitimately exclusionary, which range from obviously illegitimate forms of legal exclusion to much more controversial notions of social exclusion. The discussion of these topics and their possible solutions are far too brief. There are philosophically interesting problems for political liberals surrounding the legitimacy of say, affirmative action and the censorship of pornography as means to combat social exclusion, but they are merely hinted at here.

Finally, there is an unresolved tension in the book regarding how democratic or deliberative political liberalism can be. Laden differentiates himself slightly from Rawls by branding his theory 'deliberative liberalism' and implying that it rests on a more plural and democratic conception of public reason than Rawls's political liberalism. Yet Laden also defends Rawls's restriction of public reason to constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. This restriction, however, seems deeply incompatible with Laden's demand that the state ought to be concerned with how its policies affect our nonpolitical identities. This problem of normative stability (can political liberalism generate support for the right reasons?) seems to go well beyond the domain of constitutional essentials, and a theory which restricts public reason to such essentials won't have the resources to argue in favour of many of Laden's more radical prescriptions on identity politics.

Jonathan Quong
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Philosophy and the neurosciences have recently begun a sustained interaction. From the bottom up, this interaction has given rise to the philosophical movement known as *neurophilosophy* (a term coined by Patricia Churchland in her 1986 book), which attempts to use concepts, models and experimental results from the neurosciences to help solve traditional philosophical problems, mostly in the philosophy of mind, but also in ethics, epistemology, etc. And from the top down, the interaction between philosophy and the neurosciences has given rise to a systematic philosophical reflection on the nature of the neurosciences: their explanatory methods, the structure of their theories, the nature and reliability of the evidence they use, etc.; in short, a *philosophy of the neurosciences*. Of course, philosophers of science have reflected on the neurosciences before, but they have never done it so systematically and never in a context where the neurosciences, mainly through the use of new methods and instruments, have gained a status such that neuroscientists feel they can now make bold claims about traditional philosophical themes such as cognition, consciousness, knowledge, and so forth. *Theory and Method in the Neurosciences* is one of the first books in this new philosophy of the neurosciences. The book derives from a conference held at Konstanz University in Germany, and as it is often the case with such books, Machamer et al.'s is somewhat uneven: some papers are chapter length, others are conference length; some are accompanied by a commentary, others are not; some address the subject directly, others have little relevance to the topic; and, inevitably, some are good and some are, well, not so good.

Most of the papers address various issues surrounding the nature and structure of explanation in the neurosciences. (One important paper, by Grush, deals with the nature of one of the neurosciences, viz. computational cognitive neuroscience; another paper, by Schoenle, is pure neurophilosophy of consciousness; another, mainly historical and not particularly illuminating, by Breibach, deals with the 'timing mismatch' between neurological concepts and experimental techniques in the neurosciences. For reasons of space and unity of theme, we will not consider them here.) So, what is so special about explanation in the neurosciences that we need a new philosophical subdiscipline to deal with it? For one, as Revonsuo notes (46-7), explanations in neuroscientific disciplines are explicitly non-nomological. Since most philosophical models of explanation were developed to account for explanation in physics and other typically nomological sciences, most will not work in the neurosciences. Accordingly, there has been a recent effort on the part of philosophers to distill the essence of explanation in the neurosciences and fully half of the papers in Machamer et al. address this

very issue (Hardcastle and Stewart, Revonsuo, Hartmann, Bechtel, Craver and Darden). They all defend one version or another of a kind of explanation that finds its source in Cummins' model of mechanistic functional explanation (this, in opposition to the philosophy of biology, where *etiological-teleological* functional explanations abound). In its contemporary form, Cummins' model is best represented by the work of Craver and Darden and their paper in the reviewed volume both presents and illustrates their model by constructing an explanation-sketch of spatial memory. As some authors remark (Bechtel, for instance), this type of functional explanation does not fit particularly well with either autonomous or reductive views of the mind, which were the traditional opponents in the philosophy of psychology. Most of the authors who address the issue of explanation also note problems and limitations with this kind of explanation, when applied to the neurosciences. Revonsuo, for instance, observes that functional mechanistic explanation proceeds through the heuristics of decomposition and localization but that those presuppose that neurological systems are modular and decomposable, an assumption that might not be valid. For their part, Hardcastle and Stewart argue that the neurosciences are epistemically peculiar in that the general mechanisms they posit in their explanations can often only be validated by experiments on animal models — and often, because of species differences, animal models that apply only to one species.

This brings us to the second major issue addressed in the volume. Although the brains and behaviors of all animals are scientifically interesting for their own sake, the crown jewels of the neurosciences are human behavior and the human brain. However, for practical and ethical reasons, neuroscientists rarely get to study human brains (but see below). Most of our knowledge about the brain, our brain, was acquired by studying the brains of so-called model animals, some of which are very distant cousins of ours: worms (nematodes), snails (*Aplysia*), flies (*Drosophilia*), squids, etc. For instance, we have a good molecular understanding of the mechanisms that generate and propagate action potentials ... in squids. Are action potentials similarly generated and propagated in the human brain? Everyone *assumes* they are and uses this assumption in their explanation of human brain functions. But what is the value of this assumption? The papers by Schaffner and by Weber address such issues. As they show, some studies of the simple nervous systems of animals like worms, which, at first, promised to be a 'reductionist's delight', may turn out to be more nightmarish as even their behavior does not correlate very well with neuroanatomy. They also provide reasons to doubt the relevance of certain genetically modified animal models (mutants and transgenics) in explanations of human brain functioning and behavior (e.g., human sexual behavior — Yes! Inferences concerning human sexual behaviors derived from the sexual behaviors of mutant flies!).

We have all seen, in popular science media, pictures or films of brains lighting up as they perform various cognitive tasks. Functional imaging, mostly positron tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance (fMRI), has caught the imagination of scientists and the public alike because

it allows the study of the human brain in action. Never before in the history of humankind have we had the opportunity to 'see' the mind in action. With the help of functional imaging, neuroscientists can now generate and evaluate mechanistic explanations of human cognitive functions through direct observation. But this may be overly optimistic, as Bogen convincingly argues. In fact, both PET and fMRI measure the brain's hemodynamics (blood flow). There is, of course, a functional relationship between blood flow and the electrical activity of the brain (oxygen being necessary for the ATP cycle that generates the energy required to drive the various pumps that help maintain and restore the action potential) but most neuroscientists seem to assume that the relation is a simple linear function (more blood flow, more neuron firing, bigger implication in cognitive functioning). In fact, as James Bogen shows in his paper, the relationship is much more complex, and a host of assumptions and computations must be performed in order to transform raw blood-flow data into the impressive pictures that fire the neuroscientist's imagination. To take but one of the problems noted by Bogen, functional imaging cannot distinguish between excitation and inhibition. Is a given brain region lighting up because it is actively processing information or because it is actively preventing some other area from processing information (or regulating processing in that other area)?

All in all, Machamer et al.'s volume shows that philosophy of the neurosciences is a lively and important sub-discipline in the philosophy of science, one that promises a better understanding of the neurosciences and perhaps, as the editors note in their introduction, of Science itself.

Pierre Poirier and **Luc Faucher**
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John McCumber
Time in the Ditch:
American Philosophy in the McCarthy Era.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press
2001. Pp. xiii + 213.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-8101-1809-2.

Analytic philosophy came to dominate American philosophy departments in the early 1950s, roughly the same time that the McCarthyite witch hunt was in full force terrorizing American cultural life and American universities. In the first three chapters of his thought-provoking book, John McCumber argues that this was no mere coincidence. Liberal tolerance meant that McCarthyites couldn't dismiss left-wing academics just because they had opposing views. However, as part of a clandestine movement, communists

weren't engaged in the open, scientific, objective pursuit of truth, the only legitimate goal of the academy according to leading McCarthyites such as Reginald Allen, President of the University of Washington, and thus were subject to dismissal. Analytic philosophy's overriding concern with true propositions allowed philosophy departments to accommodate these political constraints. The emphasis on the pursuit of true propositions distinguishes McCumber's political critique of analytic philosophy from Herbert Marcuse's earlier critique of it in *One Dimensional Man* (1964) as essentially descriptive and incapable of providing any critical, transcending, perspective on the *status quo*. Historically and socially minded philosophies like pragmatism and Hegelian idealism suffered, as well as speculative metaphysics and the history of philosophy, with existential phenomenology barely tolerated. McCarthyism was thus responsible for two dysfunctional characteristics of contemporary American philosophy: the general absence of historically informed critical reflection on the discipline by its own practitioners, and its self-imposed isolation from other fields. What contributed to the continued domination of analytic philosophy was the highly centralized character of the discipline and its main institutions that allowed a philosophical establishment based in the few major graduate schools to dominate departments, the APA and its programme, and major journals. McCumber relays in some depressing detail philosophy's petty academic politics, as well as the pusillinamity and buckpassing of the APA and the AUPP in the face of McCarthyite threats to its members.

However, his story isn't entirely convincing. After all, the three philosophers whom he identifies as McCarthy's henchmen, Sydney Hook, William Barrett, and Arthur Lovejoy weren't analytic philosophers, but rather a pragmatist, an existentialist, and a metaphysician and historian of ideas respectively. Accommodators outside analytic philosophy weren't in short supply, and analytic philosophers, as McCumber notes, also stood up to McCarthyite demands and suffered, e.g., Marcus Singer and Rudolf Carnap for refusing to name names or swear the requisite oaths. Moreover, analytic ethics in the 1950s was hardly an ideal tool for McCarthyite defenders of Americanism. McCumber argues that America tended to discourage philosophical reflection on its own philosophical foundations lest it subvert them. The 1950s emphasis on meta-ethics as opposed to normative may have meant, as McCumber claims, that philosophy was no longer in the business of taking potentially dangerous moral stands that might bring the wrath of the state down on philosophy. However, even meta-ethics can be subversive. Virtually no analytic moral philosophers in the 1950s would hold these truths to be self evident — that men were entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Any student of the era would have realized that. Unsurprisingly, positivism in particular had often been viewed in the 1930s in Austria and Britain as dangerous to the moral and social order. Conservative philosophers were more likely to be Catholic or of Hegelian bent, e.g., Collingwood, or Oakeshott.

The dominance of analytic philosophy in Britain seems especially damaging to McCumber's thesis, suggesting instead that it may likewise have become dominant in America without benefit of McCarthy. He lamely responds that Britain had already undergone its version of a zenophobic and paranoiac McCarthyite terror thirty years earlier, quoting an obscure MP railing against 'urnings', sodomite German agents — I kid you not — infiltrating Britain. Doubtless, this explains the academic career in Britain of Wittgenstein, an alien homosexual sympathetic to Soviet communism who had visited, considered living in, and even been offered jobs in the Soviet Union (cf. Ray Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* [New York: Macmillan 1990], Chp. 17). What would old Joe McCarthy have thought? Worse, his view hardly fits British foreign policy in the inter-war period from the Washington conference of 1921 right up to Munich and even the beginning of the German invasion of Poland, one of moralistic internationalism, multilateralism, and appeasement (see Corelli Barnett, *The Collapse of British Power* [Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1986, reprinted from 1972]).

Moreover, the direction of American philosophy immediately before McCarthy seems clearly suggested by the titles of the works of its most influential thinker, C.I. Lewis — *Mind and the World Order* in 1929 to *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* in 1946. Oddly, Lewis, whose deep respect for the history of philosophy influenced many prominent students, is never mentioned by McCumber, despite heading American philosophy's dominant graduate school, Harvard. (McCumber's respect for the history of philosophy doesn't always yield sound understanding, as when he overlooks Hume's distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact to argue that since for Hume mathematical necessity is not mind independent, mathematical necessity like causal necessity is just a matter of custom!) The post-war prestige of British academic culture in American humanities departments also affected philosophy departments and reinforced its directions. McCumber responds that ordinary language philosophy didn't really hold in America, and so the best explanation of analytic philosophy's dominance there is his McCarthyite one. He underestimates, however, just how strong a grip it had in many quarters until the late '60s, and ignores the causes of its demise. They may have been partly political, a Vietnam era desire for revisionary philosophy, and partly philosophical, Quine's attack on analyticity as well as the quite non-Quinean Kripke-inspired revival of real necessity, real essences, and scientific realism. However, there was also the increasing influence of and interaction with linguistics, cognitive psychology, and computer science.

Indeed, apart from literature departments, McCumber's charge of dysfunctional disciplinary isolation is overstated. Arguably, American philosophy's most distinctive contribution over the last twenty years is its naturalism and scientism which has led to interdisciplinarity unparalleled since the eighteenth century. (Mohan Matthen has reminded me that this itself may partly be the result of the Cold War, but not McCarthyism as such,

thanks to the post-Sputnik availability of defence department monies for various formal and cognitive studies.) Of course, American philosophers haven't been public intellectuals as French philosophers have. Yet British philosophers have also been more in the public eye, and received significant public honours like knighthoods. The problem thus may be more American society than analytic philosophy.

In the last two chapters, McCumber turns to identifying America's *philosophical* loss. In Chp. 4 he argues that greater familiarity with Hegel and Heidegger might have hastened the recognition in post-positivist philosophy of science of the social dimension of science and Fine's natural ontological attitude in the practice of science. Perhaps, but this would be more convincing had continentally inspired philosophy of social science, e.g., Charles Taylor's 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', as well as Heideggerian philosophy of technology, not been a chief refuge of positivist views of *natural science* in the last thirty years. In his last and best chapter, McCumber astutely identifies a grave weakness in much analytic philosophy: the search for true propositions concerning the analysis or explication of key philosophical concepts led analytical philosophers to overlook the history of these concepts, the solutions to theoretical and moral problems their development involved, the options they left open, and the problems that ensued. Much more contentiously, he argues that the present should be read as *resolving* problems of the past while leaving the future open. Analytical philosophy has recently been more sensitive to the history of concepts and words, e.g., Plantinga's historical archaeology of the concept of epistemic justification. Still, McCumber is probably correct in thinking that a more pluralistic philosophical community wouldn't have allowed philosophy to ignore the need for a critical philosophical history of itself. For many readers, his insights here may make up for his rhetorical flourishes and sometimes gappy argumentation, both historical and philosophical.

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Martin Morris
Rethinking the Communicative Turn:
Adorno, Habermas and the Problem of
Communicative Freedom.
Albany: State University of New York Press
2001. Pp. x + 245.
US$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4797-9);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4798-7).

Of those philosophers associated with the Frankfurt School, only Habermas's light still seems to be shining brightly. Though there is substantial interest in the other main figures of the Frankfurt School, in the last ten years they have begun that descent from relevance to objects of mere historical interest. Habermas, still breathing, has an obvious advantage. But one might well wonder exactly how he has come to overshadow so greatly the other major figures of the Frankfurt School, particularly Adorno, whose work — until fairly recently at least — seemed to be just as vital as Habermas's.

In this timely book, Martin Morris argues that in placing Adorno in Habermas's shadow we have missed much of what critical theory has to offer. Morris's interest is in critical theory's relevance to social and political philosophy, specifically the notion of communicative freedom. Given this, it may seem odd that he champions Adorno, whose vision of critical theory is fundamentally aesthetic, and for this reason would at first glance appear much less suited for a discussion of communicative freedom than Habermas's linguistic approach. What is unique about Morris's book is that he makes a case for seeing a certain limitation to the linguistic approach to communicative freedom, and he urges Adorno's so-called 'aestheticized philosophy of the subject' as a corrective. This is an undeniably novel and interesting move, for it amounts to a dismissal of what is arguably one of the most important moments in twentieth-century philosophy: Habermas's 'communicative turn' and the mass of current theory which grows out of this.

The crux of Morris's argument is that Habermas's notion of communicative action, placing as it does ultimate emphasis on the attainment of *shared* rational principles, is unable to embrace genuine otherness. Though Habermas's theory of communicative freedom is grounded on the imperatives of inclusiveness, 'his sacrifices for the sake of reaching agreement and expanding consensus marginalize or silence the cognitive importance of much of what Adorno valued most highly,' (194) namely the ineliminable and ultimately emancipatory presence of contradictory and ironic speech in social and political communication. The idea of somehow doing away with this by attaining Habermasian consensus, even as a utopian ideal of communicative freedom, amounts to no less than a pernicious lie, a lie which effectively denies that which really causes the problem in the first place: the existence of radical difference. What Morris locates in Adorno's philosophy is a way of embracing the presence of irresolvable paradox and contradiction in communication, a presence which functions to disrupt and destabilize entrenched

notions of identity and community. Though Morris never explains in fully satisfying terms precisely what is so 'aesthetic' about this — and it is supposed to be an aesthetic theory of communicative freedom — he offers a spirited case for seeing that this dimension of communication is 'crucial not only in order to shake free and preserve the diversity of communication so necessary to democracy, but also to allow and foster alternative modes of relating to each other ... ' (195).

Though Morris makes a strong case for offering Adorno a more central role in discussions of communicative freedom, the strength of his book lies not so much in its thesis as in its execution. It is one of those rare books in which one can disagree with virtually every conclusion and still find considerable value. Regardless of whether Morris will succeed in convincing one to speak like Adorno instead of Habermas, his is a fascinating and engagingly written history of one of the most important philosophical movements of the past century. The book functions as an excellent advanced introduction to the Frankfurt School and critical theory, and specialists as well as those who just happen to be curious will find much to enjoy in it.

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Terry Nardin
The Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott.
University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press 2001. Pp. xi + 241.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-271-02156-X.

In several ways, Nardin's study of Oakeshott might seem unappetizing to analytic philosophers. Oakeshott was not a philosopher by profession but a political theorist or historian of political thought, and the same is true of Nardin. Nardin spends very little time engaging with the secondary literature on Oakeshott, despite the fact that his philosophical-not-political reading of Oakeshott is controversial; and he is apparently not very interested in evaluating Oakeshott's philosophy. Instead he aims to offer the best possible reading of Oakeshott's philosophy, which he does mostly by sticking to what Oakeshott says, or most often says, but which occasionally involves inquiring into what Oakeshott should have said. Those philosophers other than Oakeshott who are mentioned are most often continental types (Hegel, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Rorty, for instance) although there are also generic references to positivists, empiricists, and analytic philosophers. Nardin locates

Oakeshott in the hermeneutic tradition, which identifies the contents of the world with what has meaning, and is hence concerned above all with questions of interpretation of various meanings.

These are qualities likely to put off many analytic philosophers, but they are not necessarily flaws in the book. Although Oakeshott was employed to teach political theory he did take a very serious interest in philosophy more generally, especially in his books *Experience and its Modes*, *On History and Other Essays*, and *On Human Conduct*. Before we can judge whether this philosophy was any good we need to get clear on what it is, and it is just this that Nardin sets out to do here. Despite the nods in the direction of continental philosophy Nardin's prose is straightforward and free of trendy or obscure jargon. Although seemingly more interested in continental philosophy than analytic, he argues against the existentialism of Heidegger and the pragmatism of Rorty (on the grounds that neither respects the autonomy of theory and practice). So we should not be deterred by the rather superficial considerations outlined above from looking more closely at Oakeshott's philosophy as Nardin sets it out for us.

A clue to the contents of the book is given by the titles of the five long chapters that make it up: Understanding, Understanding and Doing, Understanding in the Human Sciences, Historical Understanding, and Understanding the Civil Condition. Oakeshott is concerned with understanding. More specifically, the philosophy of Oakeshott, as it emerges in this book, is remarkably close to that of the later Wittgenstein, whom indeed Nardin mentions from time to time, but not as often as one might expect given the similarities between the two thinkers. Both see philosophy as an activity without practical goals beyond the gaining of clarity of understanding. Both oppose scientism. Both emphasize the importance for meaning of context and practice. Both believe that philosophy's main work is to clear up the confusion that arises when people mix up what Wittgenstein would call language-games and what Oakeshott calls modes. There are differences between these thinkers too, of course. Oakeshott recognizes far fewer modes than Wittgenstein recognizes language-games and these modes are all ways of understanding the world, which cannot be said of all language-games. Wittgenstein is also less obviously hermeneutic than Oakeshott. But the similarities are striking and raise the question of whether any method in philosophy can succeed in being politically neutral. Certainly Oakeshott's work has generally been taken to have a clear political bias, albeit with some disagreement as to whether this bias is conservative or liberal.

Addressing this question in Oakeshott's case would amount to judging the success or failure of his philosophical project, which Nardin wants to avoid doing. Instead he sets out the main ideas in Oakeshott's philosophical theory. As Nardin sees it these are the ideas of modes, of contingency, of civility, and of difference. Nardin starts with modes.

The main modes with which Oakeshott is concerned are modes of understanding, especially science and history. The difference between these two is, to put it simply, that scientific understanding has fundamentally to do

with generalizations about causes whereas historical understanding is necessarily more contingent, having to do with agents' reasons for actions in specific cultural and historical contexts. Thus the hard sciences, defined not by their subject matter but by the kind of interest they take in it, are quite distinct from the 'historical' social sciences properly understood. Politics, in Oakeshott's view, is almost too diverse an area of study to qualify as a social science at all.

The civility Oakeshott talks about is not, according to Nardin, a bourgeois ideal but the morally and politically neutral concept of a means for dealing with individual differences in a political society. As for difference, this is not the Derridean term of art but more an emphasis on variety or pluralism, and a refusal to engage in reductionism. Hence, for instance, Oakeshott's distinction between science and history as modes of understanding, and his rejection of Heidegger's over-emphasis, as Nardin sees it, on the practical. The way we understand the world when hammering, say, is just one more mode of understanding and not in any way logically prior, even if it is biographically prior, to other such modes. Most of the book consists of an explication of this kind of distinction (between modes and other things) and a limited defense of the pluralism (or anti-reductionism) that goes along with it.

This is hardly likely to be the last word on Oakeshott, but it was never meant to be. Instead it is a starting point for a new kind of philosophical debate about Oakeshott, one that concerns not his political ideas but his ideas about politics, about human life, about epistemology, and about philosophy itself.

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Carlo Natali
The Wisdom of Aristotle
Trans. Gerald Parks.
Albany: State University of New York
Press 2001. Pp. xii + 259.
US$62.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4895-9);
US$20.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4896-7).

The publisher's blurb on the jacket describes this book as 'the definitive scholarly treatment on the role of practical reasoning in ethics.' That praise is too high, and also misrepresents Natali's more humble aim: a comprehensive statement of Aristotle's (A's) mature theory of moral reasoning with *some* attention to its continuing modern relevance. In some ways the book succeeds admirably, which certainly justifies its translation into English from Italian

(after ten years). However, Natali's promotion of a controversial thesis in a disputed area (A's 'ethical pragmatism'), though fashionable, is anything but definitive. The book is aimed at a specialist readership and makes heavy use of Greek without translating every word, but Natali's treatment of A's corpus is skillful and wide-ranging; the reader will appreciate the indices of Greek terms and of passages cited. Unfortunately, the publisher has done Natali no favours by using fine type that makes for very dense pages, and by allowing quite a number of typographical errors including a persistent missing period in sentences ending with Greek letters. In these cases the following word is also not capitalized, creating confusing run-on sentences.

The book has four chapters but has no introduction, so the reader must wait almost until the end to see exactly where Natali is leading her. This is unfortunate because the best chapters are the last two, and some readers might give up before they get there. The first chapters deal at length with *phronēsis*, which Natali/Parks prefer to translate as 'practical knowledge' (in a puzzling contrast to the book's title). *Phronēsis* is first distinguished from *epistēmē* in a way that supposedly demonstrates A's great originality in ethics, with the second chapter then turning to the requisite investigation of ends and means in moral reasoning. The third chapter is perhaps the best part of the book, and ought to be consulted by any serious student (or teacher) of A's ethics. It provides a masterful reconstruction of A's 'practical syllogism' that not only brings his account of *phronēsis* from the first two chapters directly into play but also brings A's ethics emphatically 'down to earth'. In short, *phronēsis* supplies only the minor premise of a practical syllogism, which contributes the *means* linking the more general *end* (major premise) to the *action* (conclusion). Finally, in a lengthy fourth chapter, Natali turns to happiness and the apparent conflict between the life of action and the life of contemplation. His rather surprising result is that these two lives (*bioi*), both of which are self-sufficiently happy, are nonetheless mutually exclusive — thereby freeing the philosopher from any responsibility to participate actively in politics (even in the best conceivable city).

The orthodoxy that Natali is attempting to unsettle here is that, for A, *phronēsis* is still much as it was for Plato: it involves contemplative knowledge of a timeless truth (the good for humanity), while additionally allowing one to grasp and act upon particulars in whatever way leads most fruitfully towards that end. It is thus both active and contemplative, and its highest cultivation must therefore bring action and contemplation together to their most human completion. Natali's resolution of the tension implicit in this theory (especially considering A's praise of a life of contemplation at the expense of action in *EN* X) proceeds by way of separating contemplation from *phronēsis*, thereby rendering *phronēsis* entirely active. The cost of this strategy is that *phronēsis* must be understood as taking its ends from elsewhere than contemplation (specifically, from socially inculcated *doxa* in every case). That, in turn, ultimately implies that, for A, there can be no such thing as 'knowledge of good and evil' in any timeless or universal sense, and contemplation is restricted to non-practical timeless truths. This is a consequence that will please modern-

day pragmatists, but it is questionable whether this leaves A with any meaningful sense of 'the good for humanity' as a basis for ethical reasoning. Natali is not the first to read Aristotle as an ethical pragmatist, but his argument is perhaps technically the most sophisticated.

However, a potential weakness is revealed in Natali's evident hostility to previous 'Academic' approaches to ethics. For instance, his first chapter works hard to separate *phronēsis* from *epistēmē* on the grounds that A recognizes *epistēmē* as morally neutral, while *phronēsis* is intrinsically practical — and good. This is repeatedly called an explicit challenge to 'the Platonic position'. But all Natali shows us here is that A takes Plato's own arguments against '*technē*-as-virtue' from *Lesser Hippias* and deploys them instead against '*epistēmē*-as-virtue'. When Plato suggests that, instead of *technē*, virtue must be 'some kind' of *epistēmē* (viz., knowledge of good and evil: *Laches*) he clearly is thinking of *epistēmē* as intrinsically practical — and good (Natali quotes neither *LHip* nor *Laches*). So in fact, A's originality here lies only in restricting the application of the word *epistēmē* to value-neutral instances of knowledge (as Plato had done for *technē*), which still leaves him in the same boat as Plato: trying to define the type of knowledge that is specifically ethical — knowledge (not *doxa*) of ends. To take this as a criticism of Platonic ethics is fair neither to Plato nor to A. Thus, though A is indeed helping to develop the technical apparatus for ethical philosophy, it is hardly news to insist that virtue must, after all, be practical. Likewise, in chapter two, Natali's emphasis on A's connection of *phronēsis* with desire is said to contrast sharply with Plato's 'purely theoretical' conception; one wonders then what to make of Plato's extensive concern with *erōs* in the closest proximity to the 'life of contemplation'. If these hints are suggestive of anything, it is that Plato and A are much closer on ethics than Natali will allow.

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Harold W. Noonan
Frege: A Critical Introduction.
Malden, MA: Polity/Blackwell 2001.
Pp. viii + 244.
US$22.95. ISBN 0-7456-1673-9.

This is an excellent introduction to Frege for intermediate (upper division) students, and nicely complements J. Salerno's introduction for beginning (lower division) students (*On Frege* [Wadsworth 2000]). Unlike A. Kenny's book (*Frege* [Blackwell 1995/2000]), which focuses chronologically on the sequence of Frege's works, Noonan's organization, like J. Weiner's short introduction (*Frege* [Oxford 1999]), is topical (though it is interesting how parallel the two distinctive approaches actually are). There is much to admire and agree with in this book, and some to disagree with.

Chapter 1. Life and Works Introduces the reader to Frege's life and puts his contributions to philosophy — as grouped under four categories: logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophical logic, and theory of meaning — into historical perspective. Importantly, he puts Frege's logicism in the context of the previous 'arithmetization of analysis' and Kant's synthetic a priori conception of mathematics (arithmetic and geometry). This allows Noonan to relate Frege's project of a 'gapless' formalization of mathematical reasoning not just to gaps filled with intuitive logical inferences, but to gaps filled with (Kantian) mathematical intuitions. He also relates Frege's use of 'Hume's Principle' to current attempts (Hale, Wright) to revive logicism without the troublesome Basic Law V. This could stand as a chapter-length introduction to main points in Frege's philosophy.

Chapter 2. Logic Reminds us of what logic was like before Frege's (1879) *Concept Notation* (CN), basically the algebraic logic of Boole which allowed an interpretation in the Aristotelian logic of terms or the Stoic logic of propositions (but not both), and which had serious inadequacies, the most famous of which was dealing with sentences containing multiple generality. Noonan then surveys the main contributions of CN to logic, locating 'the fundamental innovation' in Frege's replacement of subject-predicate analysis with function-argument analysis, clearing the way for his celebrated theory of quantification and its application to multiple generality. Other important features of CN include: distinguishing judgment from content (Geach's 'Frege Point'), conceptual content, and the metalinguistic analysis of identity. He ends by noting four doctrines that will change in Frege's mature logicism after the introduction of the sense-reference distinction in 1891.

Chapter 3. Number Takes the reader through Frege's 'masterpiece' *The Foundations of Arithmetic* (FA), first assessing Frege's aims in FA (Introduction), then rehearsing Frege's discussion of earlier writers, such as Mill, Kant and Leibniz on the nature of mathematical propositions (Part I), and the concept of number (Part II). Then Frege's analysis of unity and one, and his own conception of number (Parts III, IV) are laid out. The chapter ends with the collapse of the FA program in Russell's paradox; there is no separate

discussion of *Basic Laws of Arithmetic*. This is the second longest and in some ways most substantial chapter in the book, and makes an excellent companion to FA.

Chapter 4. Philosophical Logic First reviews the foundational ideas in Frege's important but somewhat neglected paper 'Function and Concept' (1891), concentrating on Frege's functional theory of predication: predicates ('concept words') refer to concepts which are functions from objects to truth values, and how Frege got there by extending the mathematical notion in its domain, range, and field of operations. The standard apparatus of logic can then be stated uniformly in terms of the application of functions to arguments. Two topics would require more discussion: (i) the idea of a function name as the common 'unquotable' pattern of structured value names (138-52). Current linguistic theory takes most of the wind out of his argument for this. (ii) The diagnosis of Frege's 'implausible conclusion that sentences containing empty singular terms must be truth-valueless' (159). Second, it reviews 'On Concept and Object' (1892), where Frege defends the notorious position that concepts can never be objects, referred to by singular terms. In the phrase 'the concept: *horse*' the definite article indicates reference to an object standing proxy for the concept of being a horse. Noonan suggests that this object is the extension of the concept, and returns to the idea (see above) that reference is connected to substitution salva veritatae by 'quotable expression' which names of concepts (functions) are not. Noonan (following Dummett and Geach) imagines this problem to be illuminated by appeal to Wittgenstein's doctrine of saying vs. showing.

Chapter 5. Theory of Meaning Noonan begins by reconstructing (three times!) Frege's celebrated 'informativeness of identity' argument for sense from the beginning of 'On Sense and Reference' (1892), and goes on to explicate sense as 'thinking of an object as the unique one satisfying a certain condition' (178-9). Although Noonan takes sense as 'a cognitive notion' (178), it is arguable that only grasping a sense is cognitive, and that the sense grasped qua condition on reference is mind independent (see below). Noonan insists that these conditions can be non-descriptive (though he does not elaborate) and he returns to Frege's 'untenable position on empty names' (182) viz. that they contribute sense but not reference to their containing sentences, depriving those sentences of a truth value. Again, he does not say what is untenable about it. Frege's doctrine of indirect reference, that in certain 'indirect' linguistic contexts expressions have their customary sense as their ('indirect') reference, is developed off of an 'equivalent formulation' of the first argument for sense (above) in terms of substitution into opaque contexts, yet there is an important difference; the problem of the informativeness of identities arises with purely extensional languages. Next, Frege is said to 'explicitly commit himself' to an 'infinite hierarchy of indirect references' (190), though no citation is given, and even so, it is not clear why such indirect (sense and) reference cannot be computed only in context as compositionality requires, rather than ascribed to expressions simpliciter. However, Noonan prefers to block the hierarchy at the second step — no

distinct doubly indirect references. Frege's doctrine of the objectivity of sense (vs. the subjectivity of 'ideas') and the doctrine that grasping a sense is psychological ('The thought', 1918), are both found wanting: 'thoughts as mind-independent ... explains nothing' (197). But it would help to explain something Frege insists on, that 'mankind has a common store of thoughts which can be transmitted from one generation to another' (193). Also 'Frege provides no account of what grasping a thought is' (197), which is true, though Noonan does not point the reader in the direction Frege went with his analogy between grasping a thought and visual perception ('The Thought'). Noonan ends this topic with the well known problem of indexical thoughts, especially I-thoughts, for Frege's theory. He favors the view (from Dummett) that I-thoughts are private in the sense that 'only their subject can think them; but other people can know precisely what she is thinking when she does so ... ' (202). In effect this locates the problem more in the grasping relation than in the thought grasped. The final topic consists of the (failed, in Noonan's opinion) challenges posed to sense by Russell and Kripke. Although Russell's theory of descriptions introduces the needed notion of scope, it offers an account of the informativeness of identities by 'smuggling in (under the title of "propositional functions") a notion in crucial respects akin to Fregean sense' (213). And although Kripke 'teaches us the importance of the social dimension of language and the crucial role of deferential intentions in determining reference' (230), his criticisms also fail. Assessment of these points would take another review.

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The striking cover of *Latin American Thought* features Diego Rivera's well-known 1931 painting, 'Flower Festival: Feast of Santa Anita', which contains a surfeit of calla lilies that, in this context, could well represent the abundance, variety, and richness of ideas in Latin America. Although Nuccetelli usually uses the terms 'thought' and 'philosophy' interchangeably, *Latin American Thought* is a well-chosen primary title because the book delves into

Latin American intellectual history from the Mayan cosmologies to present-day debates about cultural identity.

Designed to be used as a textbook for a Latin American philosophy course Nuccetelli prepared, the book is written in a lively style likely to engage students. However, the text is rife with references to philosophy of language and epistemology which are not likely to be accessible to beginning students of philosophy. The ideas presented seem often polemical and, at times, very controversial.

Numerous discussion questions follow each chapter. Many of the open-ended questions are quite provocative. Nuccetelli intends the first two chapters on the Mayans to be read in tandem, but each of the remaining six chapters could be read individually to supplement courses dealing with more traditional Latin American philosophy as well as history and anthropology. The book provides much analysis of Latin American thought (often in comparison to the eras of Western philosophy). Primary texts would need to accompany the chapters assigned for class purposes. A strength of this book that sometimes is absent from assessments of Latin American thought is the inclusion of Brazil and contrasts between the influences of Spain and Portugal.

At the outset, Nuccetelli convincingly argues that indigenous thought has often been neglected in studies of Latin American thought. Throughout the opening two chapters, however, she is perplexed by her finding that the Mayans lacked 'cognitive doxastic rationality' (42) and thus have little to contribute to contemporary philosophy. There appears ambiguity, then, about why it is so important to study Mayan thought. Her views of what philosophy is help reveal why she finds indigenous thought so inadequate: 'for a theory to be philosophical, it must raise questions that are cognitively relevant at the time and that have some plausibility (i.e., some likelihood of being true)' (60). Further: 'The philosopher's activity leads to wisdom because it is based on a special kind of reflection aimed at two goals: 1) formulating puzzles that make sense to investigate; and 2) solving them by theories or systems of beliefs that get closer to the way things are' (60).

The third chapter subjects native cosmologies to some famous tests of Western philosophy and science. Nuccetelli argues that since parts of the Mayan *Popol Vuh* and the Aztec explanation of the origins of the universe 'were clearly not based on hypothesis and observation, they fail to count as empirical theories, testable in principle and able to describe the actual origins of the universe' (64). For Nuccetelli, by contrast, the pre-Socratics at least 'made some use of the method of rational argumentation' (64). Overall, the first three chapters will raise objections from some scholars of indigenous cultures who may find her analyses anachronistic in several senses.

Chapters four and five deal with the clash of cultures beginning in 1492, cultural relativism, pluralism, and human rights. Moral issues stemming from the Conquest and Thomistic philosophy are explored, drawing especially on the thought of George Santayana, Francisco Romero, Bartolomé de

Las Casas, Francisco Vitoria, Bernardino de Sahagún, José Vasconcelos, Samuel Ramos, and Miguel León-Portilla.

Chapter six may be the most valuable: Nuccetelli outlines scholasticism very tellingly and explains why it endured for so long in Latin America. She covers key intellectual debates and then synopsizes the thought of several major thinkers in very clear and accessible ways. She demonstrates how the modernizing thought of José de Acosta, a Jesuit missionary in Perú, postulated that geographical explorations by Spain and Portugal revealed deficiencies in Scholastic science. Acosta's thought helped to discard ancient and medieval conceptions of the planet in favor of a modern view.

The Mexican nun Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz was another significant figure. Her autobiographical essay, 'Reply to Sor Filotea,' is a profound defense of a woman's right to learn and maintain an intellectual life. Nuccetelli nicely analyzes Sor Juana's feminist thought in historical context and includes much of her unusual life story. Nuccetelli says of Sor Juana, 'In spite of her success at court, at the age of sixteen she renounced that life to enter a convent, probably because of her intellectual leanings and the realization that, since she was an illegitimate daughter with no dowry, she had no status in the eyes of colonial society and thus could not qualify for a marriage of the kind that might allow her to pursue her interests' (150-1). While it is true that Sor Juana lacked social standing for the reasons Nuccetelli mentions, Sor Juana's writings reveal no interest in marriage, and she famously wrote in 'Reply to Sor Filotea' of her total disinclination toward that institution. Chapter 6 also includes an interesting discussion of the defining political thought of Simón Bolívar and Domingo F. Sarmiento.

Critical intellectual cycles of positivism and anti-positivism are explored in Chapter 7. The essential scholarship on these topics by Brazilian João Cruz, Costa, Uruguayan Arturo Ardao, Argentine Risieri Frondizi, and Mexican Leopoldo Zea are showcased. This chapter also presents seminal ideas of the Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó on Latin American identity, the Cuban José Martí on social justice in the Americas, and the Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui on issues of land and race.

In the last chapter, Nuccetelli discusses a variety of contemporary topics in Latin American thought: What should people who live in or come from Latin America call themselves, Hispanic, Latino, Ibero-American? Nuccetelli briefly lists some connotations of those terms before exploring other identity issues.

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Joseph Raz
Engaging Reason.
On the Theory of Value and Action.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford
University Press 1999. Pp. 336.
Cdn$79.50: US$60.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-823829-0);
Cdn$39.95: US$19.95
(paper: ISBN 0-19-924800-1).

Engaging Reason brings together papers that Joseph Raz has over the course
of the past decade devoted to the areas of value theory, metaethics and the
philosophy of action. Raz is principally known as a philosopher of law and of
politics. This book therefore represents something of a departure for him.
But readers will be happy to know that all of the intellectual virtues that
have characterized earlier works such as *The Concept of a Legal System* and
The Morality of Freedom are in evidence here. Raz is a careful, painstaking
philosopher who has always displayed an overriding commitment to follow-
ing arguments wherever they might lead, rather than to defending flashy or
controversial positions. His book is a tough read, and is not to be recom-
mended to the philosophically squeamish. Each page is rife with complex
argument and fine-grained analytic distinctions. Raz is not the most reader-
friendly of philosophers. His arguments are often not as clearly signposted
as one might like, and the search for philosophical precision rather than
elegance often lends his prose a superficially forbidding air. But readers
patient enough to stay the course with Raz will be rewarded with some of the
most thought-provoking and philosophically compelling work on value theory
and the philosophy of action to have been produced in quite some time.

I cannot possibly, within the confines of a short review, hope to do justice
to the full range of views developed by Raz in this book. I hope to be able to
present its main themes, and to raise a couple of questions suggested by
them. Raz begins with a general construal of what it means to be an agent.
Agency is, for Raz, responsiveness to reasons rather than mere license or
spontaneity. We display the active side of our character not when we act
outside of all normative constraint, but rather when our actions are governed
by reasons. And the reasons that we recognize betoken our awareness of the
good-making properties of actions. Our behaviour only manifests our active
personhood when it is grounded in an understanding of those aspects of the
world that instantiate value.

Normative governance does not however for Raz imply normative deter-
mination. Our understanding of the reasons that apply to us does not
necessitate action. Rather, it identifies certain actions as eligible. Reason
underdetermines choice. The will on Raz's view must step in and choose
between incommensurable values.

Human action is therefore both explained and justified by the values that
there are, to which our reason makes us responsive. But what is the status

of our value-talk? Are values 'objective', or do they merely reflect individual idiosyncrasy or social custom? Central to Raz's project is the vindication of the objectivity of our evaluative thought. For Raz, there is no easy way to determine whether a domain of human thought is objective or not. Rather, there is a (revisable and expandable) variety of tests, epistemic, semantic and metaphysical that seem jointly to characterize what we mean by 'objective'. For example, it must admit of the possibility of error; thoughts within the domain must be answerable to available evidence; they must pertain to a reality that is construed of as independent of them, and the like. Various truisms, rather than a simply statable theory, make up our best understanding of objectivity. And so though we cannot say that evaluative discourse is unchallengeably objective, we can say that it meets the challenges set by the various truisms that constitute our unsystematic and provisional understanding of objectivity.

Raz is at pains to meet the challenge to the objectivity of evaluative discourse posed by various rival theories to do with the sources of value, most notably theories that link value to social practices. Raz's objection to social relativists is complex and subtle. He claims that certain goods emerge as worthwhile objects of human pursuit because of contingent human practices. Values are plural, and there are many imaginable ways of combining them into complex goods. The ways of mixing values that do in fact end up emerging in human history are a function of the practices that emerge in different societies. Such practices *explain* the emergence of such and such a complex good, and *sustain* the good in question by making it into an identifiable object of human pursuit. But the values that are combined are values independently of social contingency and practice, and they alone *justify* the excellences at the heart of a practice as worthy of human pursuit. (Readers of *The Morality of Freedom* will recognize a link here with the themes developed in that book. The view developed by Raz allows us to see more clearly why a liberal perfectionist might end up defending the importance of culture and social context. In Raz's view, though values exist independently of practice, their concatenation into standards of excellence only occurs within contingent social practices.)

So we have a picture of what agency consists in, one that links it closely to the domain of objective values and to the social practices that embody them in complex ways. But we should in Raz's view be wary of jumping too quickly from this view of agency to the view of practical reason that might at first glance seem to flow from it. For it does not follow from the fact that action is governance by reasons that it must always be accompanied by an explicit awareness of or deliberation on the basis of these reasons. Reasons inform the way we see the world and the values that inhere in it, but when we act, it is most often directly on the basis of this awareness, rather than mediated by an explicit reckoning of values or principles at play.

The book ends with a set of essays that jointly question the view, which has become something of a truism among moral philosophers, that there exist distinct and identifiable provinces of moral and of prudential reasons. The

realm of value present itself to us in a much more seamless manner, Raz contends. We choose certain actions because they appear to us as instantiating certain goods, not because of the further thought that these goods are distinctly moral, nor because they conduce to our well-being. Conceiving the realm of value as in this way seamless among other things dissolves the challenge that the amoralist has been seen as posing to the legitimacy of moral talk. The amoralist thinks that she can for example accept all of the prudential reasons that her fellows also accept, but simply opt out of the distinctly moral ones. The seamlessness of value makes this a much harder position to sustain. But it also puts paid to the traditional moralist response, which has been to attempt to argue the amoralist back into morality on the basis of the rational commitments she affirms elsewhere.

The foregoing sketch can only hint at the subtlety and complexity of the arguments presented in *Engaging Reason*. Though the book is (it seems to me) broadly Aristotelian in its spirit (through the link it establishes between the will and perception, through the argument for a practice-based view of complex goods, and arguably also through its unified picture of practical reasoning), Raz is in no way motivated by an *esprit de clocher*. Though his views are sometimes developed by confrontation with those of others (Williams, Nagel, Dancy, etc.), he has no philosophical axe to grind. It would be well-nigh impossible to subsume Raz's view under the banner of any currently extant philosophical 'ism'.

A few of the claims developed in the book seemed to me to raise questions. I would like very briefly to spell out two. First, I worry that Raz has not done justice to what one might term 'hard-nosed' realists for whom the objectivity of morality depends upon the properties to which it refers being integratable to what as a misleading shorthand we might refer to as a scientific world view. Many, including David Brink, have come to believe that upholding the objectivist *bona fides* of the properties to which moral discourse refers is through the thesis of the supervenience of the moral upon the non-moral. Raz's response, if I understand him aright, is that the intelligibility of the moral depends upon much more than supervenience. We need to know a lot about evaluative discourse before we can start matching up evaluative and non-evaluative properties in a supervenience relation. And supervenience cannot help us effect the correct groupings.

But this seems to me to confuse two issues. No holder of the supervenience thesis has to my knowledge ever claimed that unless one can match up evaluative and non-evaluative properties in the correct way, one does not understand the evaluative terms one uses. Part of the supervenience theorist's concern is precisely, through the thesis of the irreducibility of moral terms, to immunize the every day user of moral terms from such a challenge. But the possibility of intelligibility does not settle the metaphysical question. We can accept that speakers use evaluative terms aright without any idea of their non-evaluative underpinnings, and still wonder whether these terms refer to anything that could be integrated into a respectable scientific world-view. Much of Raz's characterization of values have not only an

objectivist, but also a realist tone. Values are for Raz aspects of the world. He therefore takes on a metaphysical burden of proof that the hard-nosed realist might with some justification view as not having been fully discharged.

Second, it seems to me that there is something of an incompatibility between what Raz says about the practice-basedness of goods and standards of excellence on the one hand, and his dismissal of the possibility that there might be an independent province of distinctly moral reasons on the other. The question is this: could it not be the case that, while there are no distinctly moral values when we consider the issue from a practice-independent point of view, it just happens to be the case that a practice has emerged that cordons off certain values as distinctly moral, and that combines a set of values together into the standards of excellence that we tend to identify with the morally admirable person? In other words, does Raz's metaethical view on this question not stem to some degree from his adoption of a socially aloof point of view, whereas surely one of the messages we are to take away from *Engaging Reason* is that we cannot fully understand complex goods unless we attend carefully to the social practices that explain their emergence and sustain them over time? And if this is the case, does it not give new legs to the amoralist, who can simply be taken to be claiming that she does not go in for the way of 'mixing values' that has come to be identified with the practice of morality?

Engaging Reason is destined to become a classic in value theory, just as Raz's other works have become canonical in their respective fields. It is a difficult book, but one which more than repays the effort that grappling with its many stimulating arguments involves.

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Jill Robbins, ed.
Is It Righteous To Be?
Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas.
California: Stanford University Press 2001.
Pp. 1 + 307.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4308-8);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4309-6).

Comprising twenty interviews spanning a decade of Emmanuel Levinas's prolific career, *Is It Righteous To Be?* provides one of the best initial routes of access into Levinas' distinct philosophical œuvre and a valuable resource for those more familiar with his thinking. This collection offers insights, not

only into common Levinasian themes (such as the 'face' [48-9, 135, 204, 208, 215], 'separation' [131-2, 173], 'holiness' [56, 90, 111, 170, 183-4, 207, 218, 220], 'asymmetry' [54, 56, 133, 143, 213], 'pre-philosophical experience' [159-60], the 'miracle' and 'madness' of generosity [54, 59, 106, 111, 113, 216-18, 250], 'legitimate violence' [167, 221], and the 'third party' [50-1, 67-8, 100, 115-16, 133, 143, 165-9, 183, 193-4, 205-6, 214, 230, 246]), but also into less familiar — though highly relevant — aspects of Levinas's life and work.

Levinas's intellectual generosity becomes apparent in a number of the interviews. Thus, although Levinas' is not an 'optimistic philosophy' (175) promising a theological or political 'happy end' (134), he praises both 'Christian charity' (70) and Marxism's 'devotion to the other man' (88). Likewise, Levinas's pacific (if not potentially 'masochistic' [46]) vision of sociality does not prevent him from expressing his 'great admiration' (42) for Jean-Paul Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*.

On a more biographical note Levinas recalls the esoteric M. Shoshani (assuming 'that was his real name' [74]) whose remarkable knowledge of the Scriptures and Talmudic tradition so inspired him. Surviving on other's hospitality, Shoshani stayed with Levinas 'once or twice a week' for around three years, until one day he suddenly left 'without saying goodbye' (75). (A striking parallel emerges here between Levinas's general characterisation of the other and Shoshani's own 'visitation' [87] and appeal for non-reciprocal hospitality.)

But Levinas' generosity is not unbounded. His high regard for *Being and Time* is, after all, severely compromised by Martin Heidegger's political deviations. Levinas thus warns: 'Heideggerian being-with-one-another ... appears to me always like a marching together' (137), and similarly: '[t]here is in Heidegger the dream of a nobility of the blood and the sword' (186). Although *Being and Time* presents 'no formulation specifically traceable to the theses of National Socialism,' there is in the concept of 'authenticity' something in which Nazism can 'find accommodation' (202). (More caustically, Levinas confesses that 'Hitler did always sound a bit like Heidegger to me' [141].)

What troubles Levinas here is Heidegger's rhetoric, which 'sounded, resounded, theological as well. You know, "guilt." It looked as if it were a secularization of theology' (ibid.). There is doubtless something in this charge, but Levinas seems oblivious to his own preoccupation with guilt. For although Levinas characterises ethics as a 'responsibility without guilt' (52) (as 'preceding a notion of a guilty initiative' [ibid.]); as 'a debt that precedes all borrowing' [192]), he nevertheless refers to the 'uneasiness at having taken the place of another. This putting into question of my place — of my site — in being ... A reversal of a being content with its own good conscience of existing' (98), and 'the death of the other man ... for whom one may already feel ... like a guilty survivor' (126).

Is It Righteous To Be? is therefore pertinently titled, for the ethical question posed simply by 'the Da of my Dasein' being 'already a usurpation, already a violence in respect to the other' (225) whom 'I [have] deprived ... of

his vital space' (128) is arguably Levinas's overriding concern (55, 62, 92, 97, 194). (It is in this context that he recalls Franz Kafka, who 'describes a culpability without crime, a world in which man never gets to know the accusations charged against him. We see there the genesis of the problem of meaning. It is not only the question "Is my life righteous?" but rather, "Is it righteous to be?"' [163].)

Indeed, Levinas's further identification of 'a whole geopolitics in Heidegger' (178) is similarly haunted by self-obliviousness. For his account of the relation between Biblical and Greek thought (133-4) is unwittingly exclusivistic: 'I always say — but under my breath — that the Bible and the Greeks present the only serious issues in human life; everything else is dancing. I think these texts are open to the whole world. There is no racism intended' (149). Whatever his intentions, Levinas's dual insistence that, on the one hand, 'the Bible is essential to thinking' (63) ('The Bible means something for all authentically human thought, for civilization tout court' [243]; 'all literature ... is perhaps only a premonition or recollection of the Bible' [170]), and, on the other hand, 'everything must be able to be "translated" into Greek' (224), constitutes a troubling ethnocentrism. Levinas thus maintains, not only that 'Europe is the Bible and the Greeks' (64), but also that 'European man is central' (ibid.): 'it is in the Old Testament that everything, in my opinion, is borne ... man is Europe and the Bible, and all the rest can be translated from there' (ibid.). Likewise, we are told that 'Europe ... is the Bible and the Greeks' and as such 'takes in everything else in the world ... One can express everything in Greek. One can, for example, say Buddhism in Greek. Speaking Greek will always remain European' (137). (In a not dissimilar vein Levinas suggests that '[e]veryone is a little bit Jewish' [164].)

In addition to its treatment of key Levinasian motifs, *Is It Righteous To Be?* offers a comprehensive — albeit at times surprising and uncomfortable — picture of Levinas, his philosophy and cultural presumptions. But then, as Levinas himself wonders, '[p]erhaps ... I invent new words for old ideas' (112).

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In a recent tribute to David Riesman in the *New York Times* (May 19th, 2002), Orlando Patterson noted the tendency within modern sociology to embrace narrow topics lending themselves to empirical measurement and stringent standards of verifiability. The casualty of this approach, as noted by Patterson, is no less than the discipline of sociology itself which has been progressively losing its ability to speak to the deep interests of Americans in coming to understand what is distinctive about their patterns of behaviour, beliefs and values. This tension between both the underlying appeal, if not need, for broad generalizations about political and social community and their weaknesses as scientific claims is also what informs this book by Romani. It is timely insofar as there is implicit recourse to such broad characterizations in various debates over the progress of democratization and political development, be it in Africa, the Middle East or in aboriginal communities across the world, as well as in attempts within the developed world to reconceptualise political community. However, while Patterson clearly mourns the loss of a more humanist strand of sociology, Romani takes the scientific imperative more seriously. The charting of the rise and variations of a discourse concerning national character linked to changing social and political circumstances fuels scepticism over its viability as a factor of social analysis.

By claiming to show the history of the concept of national character in its various manifestations from 1750 to 1914 in both Britain and France (with some Italian thinkers thrown into the mix), Romani sets up for himself a Herculean task. His main objective in this broad survey is to show the variability of the concept of national character both in different cultures and different time periods. The task appears even larger when it becomes evident that he is seeking to do more than just a survey of what we might call national stereotypes. In fact, he is drawing on traditions of literature, from Montesquieu on, which seek to argue for the relevance of social factors (*mœurs*) for politics, be it in the form of cultural generalizations about certain national groups or merely a concern for the habits and attitudes which best support political liberty.

Romani focuses on five major variants on the theme(s) throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: that of eighteenth-century France, where authors tended to share the idea of national character as an elite phenomenon and where *philosophes* stressed the classical notion of character being the effect of institutions so as to criticize despotic tendencies within the old regime; post-revolutionary France, where there was increased emphasis on the primacy of morals (*mœurs*) over institutions culminating in the work of Tocqueville; Continental political economy (including Italy)

in the first half of the nineteenth century, where the notion of national character began to encompass the need for the virtues of hard work and enterprise in the wake of the rise of industrial society; late eighteenth-century Britain, where Whiggish pride in the virtues of Englishness prevailed, seen as synonymous with the universal qualities of a free people; and finally later nineteenth-century thought and the development of the social sciences which led to an emphasis away from the narrowly political implications of national character as a means to sustain modern republican institutions towards the idea of civism, or the amalgam of qualities essential for the proper functioning of a complex modern society requiring solidarity and cooperation among individuals. As is evident by this very general overview of the variants covered, each one in itself could merit a separate monograph and so it is to Romani's credit that he is able to cover such a vast territory in just under 350 pages. Furthermore, Romani is careful in examining each chosen author to provide a detailed appreciation of their arguments as relevant to his theme so as to support his understanding of the broad shifts in thought without injustice to the particulars. The work shows a good understanding of the work of a vast number of modern theorists and an impressive array of scholarship.

However, it is the display of scholarship in the particulars which in the end may detract from the general force of argument in the book as a whole. In the course of depicting the views of one thinker after another there are times when the book may lose its thread and when the broader argument is lost.

Romani is certainly right to emphasize the elusive and problematic nature of a notion of national character. He does note that such generalizations, though scientifically dubious in the absence of solid empirical grounding or mode of proof, also do contain a grain of truth. So why embark on a study of such a difficult concept? Romani argues in his Introduction that a history of the idea of national character will help to clarify its meanings 'in order to be dealt with more consciously by those who care about intellectual discipline' (2). In the current context one could clearly find more powerful reasons for exploring the history of these notions. Still, what the reader finds at the end of the road is an extremely broad range of theoretical approaches which in some way argue for the relevance of social factors for political life with no real attempt to adjudicate among them or to draw lessons from their evolution. It is also curious why Romani limits his study to the British and French traditions with little discussion of their interrelated influences (for example Tocqueville's influence on Mill) and no discussion of some of the German thinkers whose ideas have been considered seminal for nineteenth-century nationalism. Even within the traditions he chose to examine he makes clear that he has avoided study of any issues 'stemming from encounters with extra-European peoples ...' (6). The lacuna is not only disappointing but may very well be distorting given that he seeks to show the varying meanings of the idea of national character based on the very uses they were put to in their context. It is hard to imagine how these encounters could not have had an

impact on how national community and their relative virtues or lack thereof came to be perceived.

In conclusion, while the work does show an impressive amount of scholarship and moments of extraordinary insight, Romani's failure to dwell more thoroughly on the broader justification and significance of his study was a disappointment, particularly in light of current debates concerning how to reconceptualize social and political community.

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Maria Michela Sassi
The Science of Man in Ancient Greece
Trans. Paul Tucker.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2001.
Pp. xxx + 224.
US$34.00. ISBN 0-226-73530-3.

This book, originally published in Italian in 1988 but now revised with a forward by G.E.R. Lloyd, provides an extensive analysis of the development of anthropological thinking in the ancient world. Sassi attempts, by philological investigation, to trace the development and systematisation of ancient thought on the nature of humankind. Beginning with an examination of the use of skin colour to distinguish male and female in Greek writings from the archaic to classical periods Sassi identifies a Greek preoccupation with the physical signs of difference. Moreover, the contrast between the white-skinned female and the dark-skinned male is further explained by reference to an indoor/outdoor contrast, reflecting the distinct social spheres of influence. This patterning of physical attribute with social role is then further investigated in the case of other marginal figures such as the slave, boy, craftsman, peasant, philosopher and foreigner. The function of these descriptive systems is to identify and contrast a dominant centre group with the periphery and thereby reinforce the social dominance of the former.

This system is not perceived along a sharp contrastive binary opposition, but allows for a spectrum of deviation dependant on the proportion of shared positive or negative physical characteristics. It is this quality that preserves a greater degree of social marginalization of the female over lesser deviants such as the peasant and foreigner. Interestingly, Sassi observes that this rudimentary prelude to anthropological thinking is founded not on consid-

eration and definition of the norm, but on a fascination with that which is different from that norm. This belief that physical characteristics somehow correspond to innate nature is said by Sassi to be the birth of anthropological thinking in the ancient world.

Sassi then proceeds to trace the influence of this basic assumption on the development of a number of theoretical spheres in the ancient world such as physiognomics, ethnography, geography, medicine and astrology. Drawing on an impressively wide range of evidence, Sassi makes use of not only literary texts, but also evidence from papyrology, epigraphy, archaeology, art history and numismatics. From these Sassi develops a coherent conception of development of anthropological thought in the ancient world, acknowledging the simultaneous and interrelated influences of social ideology, artistic representation, political pragmatics and academic speculation. This multivalent expression of a developing theoretical system is particularly well suited to represent the nature of intellectual culture in antiquity, where the notion of distinct and exclusive disciplines was not yet a practical reality.

Sassi facilitates a clear synthesis of this material by the use of (predominantly literary) case studies integrated and supported by examples taken from other types of evidence across a broad period. This method will be of particular benefit to philosophers and scholars of the ancient world, especially in the extended consideration and translated citation of specialised texts, such as the pseudo-Aristotelian *Physiognomics*. Her philological emphasis is determined by an appreciation of the performative function of these texts and is made accessible by the inclusion of transliterated Greek terms where pertinent.

This method allows Sassi to access and represent the development of anthropological reasoning in the ancient world at a terminological level. In particular, she identifies analogy and abduction as the standard form of reasoning in early physiognomical theory and recognises the commonality between physiognomical and rhetorical modes of argument and presentation. The use of analogy as a complex symbolic ordering is shown to be a persistent element in anthropological thinking. The classification of reality by the use of symbolical forms of logic is said to add cohesion to collective patterns of thought.

Both medical and ethnographic texts reveal an attempt to graft explanatory reasoning onto this system of signs and associations. Herodotos, for example, prefers similarity in custom over physical similarity as a means of identifying the ethnic origins of the people of Colchis (103). Later writers seeking to affirm the right to rule of various peoples associate the physical environment not only with the immediate physicality of the people but with their moral, and hence political, character. This is affirmed in the Hippocratic treatise *Airs, Waters, Places*, which relates climate and terrain to physical and psychical characteristics (108-9).

The articulation of an ordered and organized system of classification begins, according to Sassi (112ff.), with Aristotle. It is with him that a teleological structure of inferences from physical and climatic to moral and

political is presented. Aristotle postulates that the ideal is a balance of these contrasting physical and thus moral characteristics. The temperate climate of Greece is assumed to produce, by this reasoning, people with courage, freedom, intelligence and the ability to rule.

With Posidonius and the relocation of the political centre of the Mediterranean world to Rome, Sassi sees the final development of a 'genuine anthropological theory' designed to extrapolate and explain reality on the basis of physical signs (131). The competition between medicine and divination for the authoritative 'science' of prediction was then founded on the claim to a comprehensive set of established data said to provide the network of association enabling prediction. This move is said to have been primarily facilitated by the works of Galen and Ptolemy. Identification of the illness or phenomenon was not the focus of theoretical attention. Rather, it was the prognostic capabilities which proved the authority of each method. The efficacy of such vast data collection was not realised until the system of the humors was established.

The final culmination of anthropological thinking identified by Sassi is astrology (ch. 5). It is the cosmic theory of sympathy contributed by the Stoics, that formulates the relationship between astral bodies and signs with the human world in a manner which could cope with the needs to describe individual situations and collective. Culminating with the Zodiac, it is this system which most rigidly and lastingly systematised ancient anthropological thinking.

Sassi offers a convincing and illuminating presentation of the development of anthropological thinking in the ancient world. The ambitious chronological and evidential scope of her analysis lends itself to a synchronic and synthetic conception of the development described. Often this method elides the substantial differences in register and context of her source material — creating a rather deceptive concordance. For instance, papyrological evidence, and indeed epigraphic evidence, shows that there were a number of identificatory techniques used besides simple reference to physical characteristics, although Sassi is right in noting some prevalence of this type (67). The interest in presenting a continuous development frequently leads Sassi to overlook the more immediate motivations behind ancient thought. It is with closer, more specialised, diachronic investigation that the true merits of Sassi's remarkable thesis needs to be tested. This is all the more reason for scholars from various disciplines to consider Sassi's work, especially as the potential benefits for political, social, philosophical and scientific history are so numerous.

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Avital Simhony and **David Weinstein, eds.**
The New Liberalism:
Reconciling Liberty and Community.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.
Pp. ix + 246.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-79083-2);
US$23.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-79404-8).

The 'new liberalism' of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is the subject of this thought-provoking volume. One ambition of the collection is the recovery and revivification of this member of the liberal family. The editors lament that most current dialogues jump from nineteenth-century J.S. Mill to twentieth-century John Rawls, forgetting notable historic figures of new liberalism such as T.H. Green, Bosanquet, Hobhouse, and Hobson. One aftereffect is the narrowness of contemporary depictions of liberalism, a multifarious tradition. A second goal is to alleviate the deleterious effects of this neglect on the 'liberalism-communitarianism debate'. This current debate relies upon misleadingly dualistic depictions of liberalism and communitarianism as antagonists, and overlooks that this dialogue is a replay of an historical debate to which the new liberals contributed.

In the contemporary liberal-communitarian debate, liberalism is portrayed as individualistic, 'featuring solitary abstract individuals who find fulfillment in separation from each other' (2). The new liberalism pre-empted this criticism, creating a place for community and common good as well as rights. New liberals supported rights 'as enabling powers which guaranteed all citizens the opportunity to flourish and thereby contribute to the common good' (5). The response to initial communitarian objections was that liberalism has always valued common good and community and not valorized unencumbered selves.

The collection is carefully organized and readers are rewarded with a rich array. Michael Freeden argues that Hobhouse rejects the view of society as founded on a voluntary contract. Hobhouse's community 'led inevitably to a carving out of that element of harmony as the common good ... the organic relation was one of mutual service, constituting a harmony in which each part assisted the fulfillment of the others' (35). The community is a bearer of rights and has its own identity, and so individual liberty is constrained by community rights. Freeden claims that these constraints are not repressive, but mark out horizons of permissible ranges of political values and conduct. Hobhouse's conception of the common good is 'a harmonious, individual-developing sociability' (39). Hobhouse notes that personal development comes to fruition through contributing to the common good. He 'dissociates himself from a conception of autonomy as self-regarding action' (41) and rejects the present-day focus on individual autonomy. Although these arguments raise a knotty set of issues, Freeden does not pursue them in depth.

According to Rex Martin, T.H. Green's theory of rights is organized around '(i) the requirement of social recognition and (ii) the idea of a common good'

(50). The discussion concentrates on the first aspect, which is acknowledged as controversial, particularly Green's claim that 'recognition is necessary to any right properly understood' (50). The worrying implications are palpable: the politics of recognition dialogue has brought attention to the harm done to oppressed groups whose rights are *not* socially recognized. Martin's careful elaboration does not sufficiently address this core problem. A further problem arises from Green's views on the common good, for rights are justified according to the mutually perceived benefit that each and every citizen has in being treated in 'ways that are identically the same for all' (59). This goes against the grain of the politics of difference, which claims that identical treatment, when some are oppressed, does not promote justice. Finally, that Green's theory depends at its heart upon a conception of self-realization which relies upon having 'identical traits of character' (60) is at odds with liberal pluralism and diversity.

Avital Simhony's contribution further articulates Green's theory of the common good. Green's theory features 'his deliberate effort to rid liberalism of its association with self-centered individualism', instead requiring joint self-realization (70-1). Since self-realization is a mutual good, 'no one can achieve self-realization in separation from and independently of others; one's development is dependent on and is reciprocal with others' (72). The ideal is distributive, applying to 'each and every member of society individually, though jointly and not separately' (73). Self-realization focuses on the form of realizing one's capacities by following 'dominant interests' of varied sorts. Free choice of pursuits is not advocated, for only valuable pursuits are candidates. Simhony recognizes that 'liberal anxieties about Green's liberalism' do not go away, though she contends, without substantial argument, that they are groundless. The anxiety is that 'the commonness of the (common) good is exclusionary and suppressive of difference' (89). The response, that although there are restrictions on self-realization, it is not a single path, is unlikely to appease liberal anxieties.

Some essays take up more specific topics. John Morrow looks at new liberal theorists' views on private property. James Meadowcroft counters the currently dominant view that liberalism is identified with state neutrality by arguing that state perfectionist policies can promote the common good. Gerald Gaus's treatment of Bosanquet interestingly explores the combination of 'a thorough-going, organic (communitarian) social metaphysics with a strong defense of economic individualism' (23). David Weinstein argues effectively that the new liberalism and nineteenth-century utilitarianism were 'estranged conceptual cousins but they were conceptual cousins nonetheless' (159); Green, Hobhouse, and Ritchie are indebted to utilitarianism, and their liberalisms are 'fundamentally consequentialist' and even 'fundamentally utilitarian' (159). Andrew Vincent argues that new liberals pursued an 'active' conception of citizenship, which has since been turned into a 'passive' conception. The 'Achilles' heel' (224) is that 'in a situation of increasing pluralism and recognition of difference, it is difficult any longer to get a purchase on metaphysical or moral consensus' (225). Vincent's

argument faces the substantive issues sidestepped by some other contributors.

The collection succeeds admirably in its first goal of exploring the richness of the new liberal tradition. It is less successful in the second goal. Underlying the caricatures of the contemporary liberalism-communitarianism debate are knotty problems and dilemmas. 'Liberal anxieties' about tensions between the common good and individual, personal autonomy, about rights and justice and the politics of difference, and about pluralism and diversity are not fully addressed. The collection would have benefited from a more concerted engagement with liberal anxieties as well as with communitarian concerns.

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Ming Singer
Unbounded Consciousness:
Qualia, Mind and Self.
London: Free Association Books 2001.
Pp. x + 254.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 1-85343-542-2);
US$25.00 (paper: ISBN 1-85343-541-4).

The Second World War had an extraordinary impact on science. The majority of science's practitioners were otherwise occupied, of course, and when directly involved in hostilities, their attention had to be focussed on the immediate job of survival. But even the military situation permits occasional opportunities for thought. Scientists forced to spend years away from the laboratory were able to take stock and frequently revise their research ideas and priorities. The upshot was an extraordinary blossoming in the immediate post-war period, as scientists acted upon their well-considered plans.

Research on the brain has witnessed a massive surge in recent years, and books on consciousness are being published in their hundreds every year. But any sort of consensus still seems a remote prospect, and one cannot help wondering whether the field needs a few-year pause for contemplation and evaluation. Perish the thought that this would require another conflagration, but perhaps a universally supported moratorium on publication would have a salutary effect. It would be healthy for the field to have a time-out for stock-taking.

During such a breather, those interested in consciousness could do worse than spend some time reading the thoughtful little book by Ming Singer. The

name is not well known among neuroscientists, and this slim volume has the feel of a doctoral thesis. If anything, it is a prolonged evaluation of numerous other works on the subject, and quotations abound. And because Singer clearly puts a premium on exactitude, the desire for thoroughness occasionally makes for heaviness. One must perforce consume the book in relatively small doses. If that is done, however, one gets the feeling of gradually progressing to a state of deeper understanding.

Not surprisingly, the work of David Chalmers has had a very large impact on Singer's thinking, and the book can in a sense be regarded as a prolonged debate about the issues famously delineated in Chalmers's seminal work. This is not to denigrate the related efforts of such figures as Block, McGinn, Nagel and Searle, whose work is skilfully taken into account. But in the court-room drama that this book seems to provide a script for, it is Chalmers who is in the dock. His information-state model is People's Exhibit A, and Singer does a fine imitation of Perry Mason in periodically drawing it to our attention.

When someone gets around to writing a history of consciousness studies — which Singer wisely acknowledges was not part of the remit — it is going to be interesting to see how the subject has been handled by the various academic disciplines. The subject was virtually taboo among the psychologists of the Twentieth Century, and the majority of tenured university staff in that subject shrank from the idea of suggesting it as a research topic. Indeed, even the mere mention of the word *consciousness* in undergraduate lectures was frowned upon. The behaviourist philosophy ruled the roost, and it was left to members of other fraternities to take up the challenge, dust it off, and look for new avenues of investigation. There are those who attribute the surge of interest in the subject during the last decade of the century to what one could call the famous man impetus. And it cannot be denied that the participation in the hunt of such figures as Francis Crick, Gerald Edelman, the late John Eccles and, to a lesser extent, Leon Cooper — Nobel Prize winners all — has lent weight to that conclusion. But there are others who feel that the more important factor has been the emergence of brain-imaging techniques. And it has to be admitted that being able to see which brain regions are active under a given set of circumstances has an almost seductive appeal.

The famous man factor has perhaps been seen most prominently in the emergence of what many are now calling quantum consciousness — as if a role for quantum effects in consciousness was already part of the scientific canon. The luminous person in that case is Roger Penrose, of course, and Singer devotes many pages to discussions of the quantum idea. Sceptics have heaped scorn on this theory, saying that it sprang from logic which linked quantum mechanics to consciousness merely because they are both mysterious — ergo, they must be connected at some deep level. One cannot help wondering whether Penrose's Pied-Piper influence on many young physicists stems from the respect he obviously deserves by dint of his superb accomplishments in more traditional areas of physics, mathematics and cosmology.

Singer also devotes space to another physics-inspired concept, namely chaos, and he carefully documents the evidence for that phenomenon playing a role in consciousness. In this case, the argument hinges on the brain having to chose from between a variety of possible responses to a given stimulus, and Singer does an excellent job of tying such choice to a process of self-organisation. Whether such a process has to be of the type usually discussed in connection with chaos is, however, another matter, and Singer wisely leaves that question in abeyance.

Singer's incorporation of the word *unbounded* in the book's title seems to smack of a second agenda. That feeling is reinforced by the three-page epilogue, in which Singer sums up the overall case. Oddly enough, the prose becomes heavier here, as if the gravity of the subject matter were finally making itself felt. We read of 'the vastly daunting task of synergistic syntheses' (225) and later that 'once the agency-sentience divide is closed, a higher level of synthesis is reached in the synthesis-antithesis dialectic' (227). The final tone is almost evangelical, and the book ends with a flourish, as it states that 'consciousness … is the greatest and most glorious gift of nature. And it has no bounds' (227). The book would have benefited from a lighter finish, but let that not detract from the generally positive impression; it's a rewarding read.

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