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David F. Austin, ed.
Philosophical Analysis:
A Defense by Example.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
1988. Pp. xv+363.
US $79.00 ISBN 90-277-2674-4.

Does the practice of philosophical analysis actually need defense? Well, certainly it does not need *this* defense – a collection of twenty papers, mostly in epistemology or philosophical logic, mostly fairly technical and presupposing a close acquaintance with the recent concerns of analytical philosophy. No one who is not already an enthusiast will see the point, let alone be persuaded of the merits of the analytical approach.

But no matter. For the title, which promises one kind of book, in fact thinly disguises something quite different, a Festschrift for our best known reluctant publisher, Edmund Gettier. As such collections go, this one is not bad, though it suffers from the usual faults of variable quality and a lack of cohesion. The editor tries to impose a measure of order on what is really an unordered heap of papers; but when he has to resort to using catch-all section titles like 'Analyses of Belief, Knowledge and Sensation: Ancient, Modern and Contemporary', you know that he is fighting a losing battle.

Among the papers on epistemology, only one directly addresses the Gettier problem (surprisingly, given the occasion) – a compact but forceful piece on 'The Fourth Condition' by Carl Ginet. Ginet offers an intricate, disjunctive, fourth condition that does seem to cope with a number of standard problem cases (the fake barns, etc.); we are just left with the question about *why* we should possess a concept of knowledge with such a complex structure.

Roderick Chisholm offers a characteristic piece of late chisholmiana, 'An Analysis of Thirteen Epistemic Categories'. The definitional mechanisms whirr away in the familiar style; but are any epistemological gears still being turned? Sceptics about his enterprise might usefully turn to 'Chisholmian Internalism', where Alvin Plantinga provides a very lucid critical overview of Chisholm's theory of knowledge. Keith Lehrer's contribution is a (too) short note arguing that Reid has long since sabotaged the idea that we are justified in believing in material objects because that is the simplest explanation of our experience. The remaining epistemological papers are a thin piece by Earl Conee, 'Why solve the Gettier Problem?', and a

paper on what counts as 'Having Evidence' in which Richard Feldman claims that 'S has *p* available as evidence at *t* iff S is currently thinking of *p*' (95) – which seems to imply that by the time I get to the end of an argument and am thinking only of the conclusion, the premisses are no longer available to me as evidence (so why ever bother to argue?).

Among the philosophical logic papers, Robert Stalnaker writes on 'Vague Identity'; he focuses on the Evans/Salmon argument which has been much discussed recently (e.g., in the pages of *Analysis*), but he does not make any really new moves. Michael Jubien shows that there are 'Problems with Possible Worlds', whether construed realistically in Lewis style or taken as sets of propositions (for in the latter case there are cardinality problems when we start wondering about sets of *all* truths): again the arguments are not entirely novel, but they are well put together. Mark Richard, in 'Taking the Fregean Seriously', very nicely explores a tension in Frege's official position between saying that in 'that'-clauses expressions refer to their customary sense, and allowing that different people may associate different senses with the same expression. When I report your belief that Alice believes that Hesperus is a star, whose sense of 'Hesperus' is relevant to fixing the truth value of the whole report – mine, yours or Alice's? Thomas Ryckman offers a weak note on 'The Millian Theory of Names and the Problems of Negative Existentials and Nonreferring Names', G.W. Fitch offers a formal theory of 'The Nature of Singular Propositions' (which intriguingly allows that it can be necessary that *p*, while not necessary that *p* is true – which some might think is a problem), while Terence Parsons writes helpfully on 'Russell's Early Views on Denoting'.

In the remaining papers, Bas van Fraassen gives an excellent discussion of 'The Problem of Old Evidence' for Bayesians, and Thomas McKay argues very convincingly, in '*De Re* and *De Se* Belief', against the Lewis/Chisholm tactic of accounting for *De Re* belief in terms of *De Se* belief (these two papers I found the most rewarding). Del Ratzsch takes too long in 'Quantified Subjunctives, Modality and Law' to reach the conclusion that there is a circularity problem about analysing laws by subjunctives, subjunctives by what happens in near worlds, and nearness by the degree to which laws are preserved. Fred Feldman discusses 'Two Questions about Pleasure', arguing that the concept of sensory pleasure is to be analysed in terms of the concept of propositional pleasure (i.e., *being pleased that ...*): to experience sensory pleasure is for there to be some sensation such that you take

intrinsic *De Se* propositional pleasure in having that sensation (76). Which implies that either Baby gets no sensory pleasure or that she has *De Se* propositional attitudes to her own sensations; neither limb looks attractive. Edward Wierenga discusses 'Omniscience and Knowledge *De Se et De Praesenti*' (can God know the propositions that we must express in the first person and/or the present tense?) And in the longest paper, 'Negations, Imperatives, Colors, Indexical Properties, Non-Existence, and Russell's Paradox', H-N. Casteñada indeed discusses all those, but without producing illumination.

Finally, two papers that rather stand apart: a nice piece by Gareth Matthews on 'A Puzzle in Plato: *Theaetetus* 189b-190e', and a formal paper on 'The Impossibility of Certain Higher-Order Non-Classical Logics with Extensionality' by J. Michael Dunn.

The colleagues, friends and one-time students who have contributed to this volume attest to Gettier's influence, to his philosophical vitality and inventiveness. Non-publishers of his kind, who enliven their colleagues and students, are a sadly endangered species.

Peter Smith
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Anita Avramides
Meaning and Mind: An Examination of a Gricean Account of Language.
Cambridge: MIT Press 1989. Pp. 216.
US $25.00. ISBN 0-262-01108-5.

Avramides argues that Griceans must hold that public language meaning isn't reducible to any psychological property of speakers. Her thesis conflicts with that defended by some influential Griceans, most notably Brian Loar and (early) Stephen Schiffer, who aim for a physicalistic account of semantics. Thus, Avramides' argument merits serious attention.

Avramides presents her anti-reductionist argument in the last two chapters of her book. It can be formulated thus:

(1) Any reductionistic interpretation of a Gricean meaning-analysis must presuppose that psychological properties are more epistemically basic

than semantic properties: the former are essentially knowable independently of one's having any semantic knowledge of any public language (93-8, 104-11).

(2) That kind of asymmetry implies that linguistic behavior is only contingently related to the communicative Gricean intentions it expresses (127-37).

(3) The relationship between linguistic behavior and the expressed Gricean intention is non-contingent (138-47).

(4) Thus, any reductionistic interpretation of Gricean meaning-analyses is objectionable.

Avramides' argument for premise (1), which appears in Chapter Three, is as follows. Gricean Reductionists hold that Gricean meaning-analyses determine the nature of public meaning rather than the nature of linguistic understanding; the former isn't epistemically dependent on the latter (98, 106-11). Thus, grasping a correct Gricean meaning-analysis would suffice in knowing the meaning of an utterance in the absence of any semantic knowledge of the language in which it is produced. The meaning of an utterance token is said to be constituted by the speaker's Gricean communicative intention for producing it. Therefore, a person's Gricean intentions could be known independently of one's having any semantic knowledge. Hence, Gricean Reductionism assumes a 'deep epistemological asymmetry' between semantics and psychology.

Chapter Four is a defense of premises (2) and (3). The argument for (2) is this (136-7). Assume that thoughts are essentially knowable independently of language. In that case, it's possible for one to grasp a speaker's thoughts even if the speaker's utterances, which count as evidence for their occurrence, might not have expressed them if the semantics of the speaker's language had been otherwise. That suggests that verbal behavior is as best contingently related to thoughts.

To establish premise (3), Avramides uses a Dummettian argument (141-7). Suppose that mental states are only contingently related to behavior. To understand another as having a certain thought, one must appeal to that person's behavior as evidence for the thought entertained. But if behavior is contingently related to thoughts, then there ought to be an explanation of why *this* kind of behavior should be evidence for *that* type of thought. The only possible explanation

is that evidential behavior necessarily manifests intentional content. In which case, certain forms of behavior, such as meaningful verbal behavior, must be non-contingently related to the mind.

One minor criticism of the argument should be mentioned: if premise (3) is true, then premise (2) is dubious. Suppose that, by uttering the English sentence, 'Please pass the salt', I mean that you should pass me the salt-shaker. The Gricean Reductionist says that my meaning consists in my having a certain complex, self-reflexive, Gricean intention. Suppose that that intention could in principle be known independently of one's having any semantic knowledge. Still, if (3) is true, then my utterance of 'Please pass the salt' won't be contingently related with my meaning. For, that is nothing more than my having the intention that you pass me the salt-shaker by virtue of your recognizing my *utterance as expressing* that same intention. A correct description of the content of my intention must specify, then, the content of my utterance. If that behavioral act isn't conceptually linked with the intention that constitutes my meaning, then my intention isn't a *communicative* intention. However, that is compatible with holding that you, the audience, needn't know what 'Please pass the salt' means in English in order to recognize my intention. The reason for the compatibility is that the content of a Gricean intention isn't determined by what the audience in fact semantically knows about the speaker's language. Nevertheless, the contentful utterance of a sentence must be conceptually related with the corresponding Gricean intention if a speaker is to mean something by it, assuming that Gricean Reductionism is true.

Much can be learned from a careful study of Avramides' book. Chapter One discusses the historical significance of Grice's work, argues for the legitimacy of conceptual analyses of meaning, and tries to reconcile the Gricean approach with a truth-theoretic approach to semantics. Chapter Two, which in some ways is the best chapter of the book, provides an in-depth review of past and current work in Gricean semantics. Finally, the central argument of her book is both engaging and important. *Mind and Meaning* breaks new ground in a neglected area of Grice's philosophy. For that reason, it deserves to be read and discussed.

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Max Black
Perplexities: Rational Choice, The Prisoner's Dilemma, Metaphor, Poetic Ambiguity, and Other Puzzles.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1990.
Pp. ix+201. US $25.95. ISBN 0-8014-2230-2.

Max Black had nearly completed this collection of his essays, lacking only a preface, when he died in 1988. His literary executor, Jack Kaminsky, and Cornell University Press saw it into posthumous publication.

The book consists of 10 previously published essays, plus an introductory chapter written for this volume. Five of the essays have publication dates in the 1970s while the other five derive from the 1980s. As they originally appeared in a variety of anthologies and journals which are largely outside the main reading channels of most philosophers today, it is valuable to have them gathered together. That is especially so in the case of someone such as Black whose preferred genre is the essay and not the book. (We are not told whether there are further essays of Black's which might form some future volume.)

The majority of the essays are on topics which Black has considered before and the views expressed on those topics are developments of what he has previously held and argued. There are 2 papers on metaphor ('More about Metaphor' and 'How Metaphors Work: A Reply to Donald Davidson') and 4 on rationality ('Ambiguities of Rationality', 'The "Prisoner's Dilemma" and the Limits of Rationality', 'Making Intelligent Choices: How Useful is Decision Theory?' and 'Some Questions about Bayesian Decision Theory'.) Then there are 3 essays focused upon meaning ('Some Puzzles about Meaning', 'Verificationism Revisited: A Conversation' and 'The Radical Ambiguity of a Poem'.) Last and least is 'Demystifying Space'.

None of them are major contributions. I think the most substantial is the essay on verificationism, although the piece on ambiguity in poems has some potential. On the whole, the relevant essays should be read by philosophers interested in those topics and conversant with Black's previous work on them.

It is, however, the introductory chapter, 'The Articulation of Concepts', which forms the chief general reason for attending to the collection. In it Black attempts to set out his view of philosophy and its procedures, in the course of which he tells us something of his

intellectual background and his philosophical production. Black conceives of himself in the tradition of Thomas Reid and G.E. Moore, as starting from 'common sense', and allows that he is in some ways also following upon Austin and the later Wittgenstein. Actually Aristotle would be an equally close ancestor: starting as he usually did from *endoxa* and making no distinction between what the community generally believes ('common sense') and what can intelligibly be said ('ordinary language'). And as with Aristotle, the point of the enterprise for Black is not simply getting clear about the ladder upon which we must stand in doing philosophy, but also in the possibility of making modest improvements on our platform (rather than throwing it away).

That chapter is not, unfortunately, a powerful defense of that way of seeing and doing philosophy, but there is one thing especially notable about it and about his thought as a whole. Black was most unusual in that he had an equally strong grasp of, for example, Wordsworth's poetry and Bayesian Decision Theory. There was no Two Cultures divide in his mind and work. He was one who could criticize the current philosophical fascination with science, the treatment of philosophy as a special branch of science, without thereby seeming a rank outsider. For that reason, at the very least, the philosophical community will miss him.

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Martin Blais
L'autre Thomas d'Aquin.
Montréal: Boréal 1990. Pp. 316.
Cdn $24.95. ISBN 2-89052-301-2.

Ecrire et publier un livre sur saint Thomas d'Aquin, au Québec, et à l'aube des années 90, exige du courage ou de l'inconscience. Heureusement pour les lecteurs et les lectrices, il ne s'agit pas ici d'inconscience. Au contraire, l'ouvrage de Martin Blais se veut férocement conscient des acoquinements politico-religieux dont a souffert la pensée de Thomas d'Aquin aux mains d'un clergé qui ne s'est pas

toujours montré très respectueux des idées de ce docteur de l'Eglise. Manipulée par l'intelligentsia catholique, la souplesse du thomisme est trop souvent devenue une rigidité douteuse et redoutable (10-12). Au point où cette philosophie se retrouve maintenant synonyme d'un conservatisme étriqué et réducteur, d'un dogmatisme indécrottable, d'un moralisme restrictif, bref, d'un systémisme calcifié dans l'eau bénite. Les apparatchiks de l'Eglise catholique ont fait de Thomas d'Aquin un saint. L'eussent-ils expédié au goulag des philosophes, il eût pu en revenir en héros; canonisé, il nous est revenu en lambeaux. 'L'auréole en philosophie, c'est pire que la couronne d'épines' (74).

Le but que s'est proposé l'auteur de cet ouvrage sur Thomas d'Aquin est explicite: montrer des facettes de la pensée de ce philosophe médiéval trop souvent escamotées, présenter le Thomas d'Aquin quelquefois 'ignoré de ceux-là mêmes dont il est le docteur officiel' (12).

Ceux qui ont déformé le thomisme original, par action ou par omission, peuvent avoir pour excuse l'ampleur, la profondeur et la diversité d'une oeuvre qui compte quelque 20,000 pages. Martin Blais, quant à lui, peut se vanter d'avoir suffisamment épluché les textes pour mériter le droit à la dissidence. Médiéviste de formation, sa lecture de Thomas d'Aquin est presque exhaustive: texte original, traductions, commentaires, biographies, etc. On sent que ce livre n'est pas le fruit d'un survol, mais bien le travail acharné d'un chercheur attentif et minutieux. Résumé de tant d'efforts, l'ouvrage aurait pu être lourd et ardu à déchiffrer. Par bonheur, il n'en est rien. Le style dégagé, mais sérieux, fait de cette lecture un agrément certain, même pour les non-initiés aux subtilités du thomisme et à son hermétisme occasionnel.

Qui est donc l'autre Thomas d'Aquin? Martin Blais nous présente trois thèmes révélateurs de cette pensée méconnue: l'anthropologie, la morale et le pouvoir. Le trio forme un ensemble percutant, car chaque thème est utilisé de manière à mettre en relief des aspects parfois inattendus de cette philosophie du XIIIe siècle.

Considérant l'anthropologie thomiste, l'auteur nous fera d'abord remarquer que Thomas d'Aquin a résolument combattu le mépris du corps humain issu en droite ligne du platonisme et récupéré ensuite par la religion. L'Aquinate 'va soutenir que le corps contribue au mieux-être de l'âme' (118) et qu'il 'constitue un merveilleux instrument pour la vie qui fait toute notre dignité, la vie intellectuelle' (123). Cette réhabilitation du corps, tout indirecte qu'elle soit, n'en constitue pas moins une tendance révolutionnaire pour l'époque. De même, sa conception de la femme ne semble pas aussi teintée de misogynie que

beaucoup de ses adversaires ont voulu le faire croire (mentionnons, entre autres, Benoîte Groult). Bien sûr, Thomas d'Aquin n'était pas féministe, mais il n'était pas non plus un adepte de la domination mâle à la manière de saint Augustin ou de saint Paul. Et cet écart par rapport à l'augustinisme, par exemple, se fait encore plus visible lorsqu'il est question de sexualité ou du plaisir considéré sous un angle plus général. 'Thomas d'Aquin ne peut sûrement pas être taxé de pessimisme quand il dit que la vie humaine est soumise à de multiples et inévitables maux. [...] Le remède qui peut sinon guérir du moins soulager l'humanité aux prises avec tous ces problèmes, c'est le plaisir', affirme-t-il (160, renvoi à la *Somme théologique*, I-II, q 5 a 3 et q 31 a 5 s 1). Même si le plaisir prôné par le thomisme sera maintenu dans les limites de la tolérance religieuse, il n'en demeure pas moins présent, ce qui distingue nettement Thomas d'Aquin de ses prédécesseurs un peu trop obsédés par l'ascétisme et la mortification. 'En anthropologie', écrit Martin Blais, 'Thomas d'Aquin mérite d'être présenté comme un ancêtre en ligne directe de l'illustre Rabelais' (301).

En ce qui concerne la morale thomiste, on découvre qu'elle a peut-être été l'aspect le plus occulté de la pensée de l'Aquinate, non sans raison, car elle est explosive. Il ne s'agit pas d'une morale du devoir, mais bien plutôt d'une morale de l'intérieur dont la conscience est la seule règle, au point même où 'la conscience fausse oblige toujours' (224, renvoi à la *Somme théologigue*, I-II q 19 a 5). Certains exemples de solutions apportées à des dilemmes moraux par saint Thomas sont absolument étonnants. Entre autres, cette réponse au problème posé par quelqu'un qui jugerait mauvais d'avoir la foi: 'la volonté qui ne suit pas le jugement de la raison, que ce jugement soit droit ou faux, est toujours mauvaise', dira Thomas d'Aquin (225). En clair (et tel que commenté par le père Deman dans *La Prudence*, 2e éd. [Editions de la Revue des Jeunes 1949], 500): 'Qu'un homme juge mauvais de croire au Christ et qu'il y croie néanmoins, il pèche: car dans la conscience où il est, il consent au mal' (225-6). C'est toute la souplesse du thomisme qui transparaît dans cet exemple. Une souplesse que le dogmatisme institutionnel a souvent transformée en sclérose. 'En morale, la primauté de la conscience constitue une couleuvre que les gens de droite sont incapables d'avaler' (302).

Pourquoi la véritable morale thomiste a-t-elle été si soigneusement travestie? Peut-être à cause de ses liens avec une certaine démocratisation du pouvoir prônée également par saint Thomas et également dissimulée par la tradition. Replacer la décision morale dans le giron

de la conscience individuelle devait avoir pour corollaire une individualisation du pouvoir. Du pouvoir de décider soi-même de la moralité de ses propres actes devait découler la capacité de décider de la moralité du pouvoir qui demande de poser des actes. Rien n'est moins thomiste que l'idée de l'obéissance absolue et aveugle aux autorités en place. 'La philosophie thomiste de l'obéissance ne facilite pas l'exercice de l'autorité. Elle ne facilite pas la soumission non plus ... l'être humain est inaliénablement responsable, responsable même dans l'obéissance' (264). Ne croirait-on pas entendre Sartre?

Ce qui précède peut sembler paradoxal quand on sait que Thomas d'Aquin était en faveur d'une forme de gouvernement exercé par un seul individu. Dans son traité intitulé *Du gouvernement royal*, il a expliqué cette prise de position. Le système du chef unique constituerait, selon lui, la meilleure forme de gouvernement dans la mesure où le peuple aurait son mot à dire concernant le choix de ce chef et de ses associés subalternes: 'La part du peuple vient du fait que les chefs sont choisis parmi tous les citoyens: *ex omnibus eligi possunt*, et qu'ils sont élus par tous les citoyens: *ab omnibus eliguntur*' (257, renvoi à la *Somme théologique*, I-II q 105 a 1). en tant que philosohie politique médiévale, le thomisme faisait certainement preuve d'un esprit d'avant-garde.

Tout ceci suffit amplement à convaincre le lecteur ou la lectrice que la partie la plus révolutionnaire, et à notre avis la plus intéressante, de l'oeuvre de Thomas d'Aquin a été soigneusement dissimulée ou travestie en raison de son caractère subversif. Le plaidoyer est convaincant et habilement mené. Bref, cet ouvrage est rafraîchissant dans tous les sens du terme, au point même où il fera l'effet d'une douche froide sur le dos de certains dinosaures englués dans un thomisme nettement plus réactionnaire que ne l'avait voulu saint Thomas d'Aquin lui-même.

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Marjorie Clay and **Keith Lehrer, eds.**
Knowledge and Skepticism.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1989.
Pp. xviii+186.
US $38.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-0778-3);
US $15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-0777-5).

Knowledge and Skepticism is a collection of nine essays by William Alston, Barry Stroud, Ernest Sosa, Alvin Goldman, Fred Dretske, Henry Kyburg, Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, and Jaakko Hintikka. No specific theme unites the essays.

Only two of the essays deal squarely with skepticism: Stroud's and Sosa's. In 'Understanding Human Knowledge in General', Stroud argues that skepticism is philosophically important given its demand that we explain how we know *in general*, without assuming some of the knowledge in need of explanation. Stroud contends that this demand has not been met in two familiar contemporary approaches to epistemology: the 'rational reconstruction' approach of Russell and Chisholm, and the 'externalist' approach of Dretske and Goldman. We can grant Stroud's contention here, but add that those two general approaches were not designed as explicit replies to knowledge-skepticism. Those approaches assume that we can distinguish, at least conceptually, (a) an *explanation* of the substantive conditions for knowledge from (b) a *justification* of those conditions that challenges the skeptic. Further, Stroud's case for the importance of skepticism assumes that we have a coherent notion of *explaining knowledge in general*; but this assumption needs considerable argument not provided by Stroud.

In 'The Skeptic's Appeal', Sosa opposes knowledge skepticism of various sorts. He presents a 'vital incoherence' argument against 'radical skepticism', the view that restricts true knowledge to what presents itself as intrinsically obvious *per se* or what is established by logical deduction from the intrinsically obvious. The argument uses this idea of vital incoherence: If you believe that acting (or existing) a certain way is not reasonable, but you still act (or exist) that way, you fall into vital incoherence. Sosa claims that radical skeptics fall into such incoherence, on the ground that they retain many beliefs all of which are judged unreasonable by their own skepticism. This challenge is provocative, but it needs to handle the skeptic's appeal to a distinction between what is merely pragmatically reasonable and what is epistemically reasonable. The typical knowledge-skeptic

allows for maintaining beliefs on pragmatic grounds; and it is not clear that Sosa's very brief comment on this point will sustain his anti-skeptical argument. The skeptic, in reply, can regard his beliefs about implication relations as having the same sort of pragmatic basis as any other pragmatically rational belief. It isn't obvious that the skeptic must rely on a nonpragmatic notion here.

In 'A "Doxastic Practice" Approach to Epistemology', Alston sketches a new approach to the problem of 'epistemic circularity' he has treated elsewhere. His problem here is that if we are entitled to use beliefs from a certain source (e.g., perception) in showing that source to be reliable, then any source, even crystal-ball gazing, can be validated; but that, of course, is unacceptable. Alston's proposed solution to this problem is complex. In short, it is that we must make do with indirect arguments for the reliability of a belief-forming practice, i.e., arguments implying that we can rationally affirm that a certain doxastic practice is reliable. As for evaluating the rationality of a practice, Alston contends that an epistemologist can avoid circularity by using her 'doxastic skills and tendencies' in a 'relatively free' way that does not follow the fixed rules of a certain practice. But here's the urgent question: Why should we think that the free use of such skills is an effective means to *epistemically* rational assessment linked in some way to reliability? Alston, unfortunately, does not pursue this issue; so reliability-skeptics, especially, will be unsatisfied. But Alston's essay does pursue a number of important meta-epistemological issues.

The essays by Goldman ('Précis and Update of *Epistemology and Cognition*') and Lehrer ('Knowledge Reconsidered') refine views already familiar from earlier writings by Goldman and Lehrer. Goldman now countenances two distinct concepts of justification. *Strongly* justified belief is belief formed by a proper, reliable belief-forming process, whereas *weakly* justified belief is blameless, or nonculpable, belief. Strong justification, according to Goldman, is the sort of justification appropriate to knowledge. But it is not clear how weak justification is *epistemic* in any straightforward sense. Lehrer's revised view implies that undefeated justification is a function of whether one's accepting something is a reliable or 'trustworthy' guide to truth. It is not altogether clear what Lehrer means by 'trustworthy', but it is clear that, unlike Goldman, he does not make justification a function of a belief's causal origin or sustenance.

In 'The Need to Know', Dretske pursues the question of why we need knowledge rather than simply true belief. He argues that his

reliabilist understanding of knowledge gives a good answer: roughly, if you want true beliefs when the time for action comes, you will need a *reliable* means of generating those true beliefs; you thus need a means that produces knowledge, not just true belief. Perhaps this is so, given certain contingent facts about ourselves and our environment. But wouldn't it be just as valuable for us to have a fortuitous environment that gives us the true beliefs without the familiar counterfactually reliable means? Given such an environment, we apparently would need only true belief. It thus seems that knowledge is contingently valuable.

Kyburg's essay, 'Convention, Confirmation, and Credibility', is a somewhat formal treatment of the thesis that we need some convention to decide how to attribute error to observation beliefs. Chisholm's essay, 'Probability in the Theory of Knowledge', is a brief statement of some definitions intended to clarify an epistemic sense of 'probability'. And Hintikka's 'Knowledge Representation and the Interrogative Model of Inquiry' aims to use a question-asking methodology to explain the nature of tacit knowledge and its activation.

Overall, then, this collection is wide-ranging in scope. But its contributors have chosen topics that should be of interest to most students and teachers of epistemology.

Paul K. Moser
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Christopher Hookway
Quine: Language, Experience and Reality.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1988. Pp. xii+227.
US $35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-1386-3);
US $11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-1475-4).

Hookway's book tries to provide a clear and comprehensive introduction to Q's work. Q's philosophical development would run from his early essays supporting holism and leaning towards pragmatism to his later writings where (nonrealistic) pragmatism seems to be more or less – if perhaps hesitatingly – waived while empiricism and

holism are kept and physicalism becomes more and more emphasized. The book attempts a comparative study of Q's thought as against nowadays widely accepted Davidsonian doctrines and finally a short, cautious critical assessment.

Another backdrop Hookway repeatedly refers to as offering an alternative philosophical path to Q's is Goodman's 'worldmaking' approach. Hookway brings his book to a close (220) by suggesting that Goodman's account is more promising whereas 'it is easy to conclude that it is only a physicalist or empiricist prejudice that justifies restricting our conception of the real in the way that Quine desires.' Hookway praises Q (219) for having 'worked through what is involved in a physicalist empiricism more thoroughly and rigorously than any other positivist philosopher,' suggesting that by so doing 'he has helped us to see why it is unsatisfactory.'

The first part is claimed to be devoted to Q's early thought (in *From a Logical Point of View*), while parts two and three are of a more systematic purpose dealing with Q's philosophy as put forward in his later works; finally part four is given over to a mild criticism of Q's conclusions. However, that plan's effective implementation is not that clear or straightforward. The leading thread is, from start, the 1975 paper 'Five Milestones of Empiricism'. Now, construing Q's early thought through the hermeneutic keys provided by so late a paper is a daring exegetical enterprise which would call for some warranting argument.

As I view it, Q's thought has remained fairly stable through the years, oscillations and all. In fact the essays collected into Q's *Theories and Things* – one of which is 'Five Milestones' – evince that oscillation, especially when the 2nd printing of the book is compared with the 1st one, with chapter 2, 'Empirical Content', having undergone an important modification. While the former version – which is the one Hookway quotes on p. 200 – claimed that two empirically equivalent theories are equally true, or false, the recast version only says that they are equally warranted. However even in the last printings, *Theories and Things* is full of remarks which clearly tally with the nonrealistic view espoused in the former version. In that connection it is worth mentioning how Q strove, in 'On empirically equivalent systems of the world' (1975) to reconcile his nonrealistic leanings with his thesis of underdetermination of theory by experience. Another claim which is in that connection quite telling is that treating simplicity as a presumption of truth is not Q's line (see 'Reply to Gibson', in L.E. Hahn & P.A. Schilpp, eds., *The Philosophy of W.V. Quine*, 155). If simplicity

affords no presumption of truth, nothing does, since all scientific criteria – as those proposed in *The Web of Belief* – can be taken to be as many standards of simplicity in a broad sense.

Hookway is not even very clear on what realism amounts to. The already mentioned claim about how two observationally equivalent theories are equally true, or false, is alleged on p. 210 to be what allows Q 'to avoid being forced to acknowledge anti-realism or relativism explicitly' despite underdetermination of theory choice by evidence. Isn't it the other way round? Underdetermination does not compel us to espouse anti-realism unless we reject the idea of unwarranted truth, or, better, of a theory being truer than another even when it is not more warranted than the latter. Yes, saying that they are equally true enables one to keep short of confessing to anti-realism in the sense of the thesis that a scientific theory needn't be true, but paying the price of a strongly nonrealistic conception of truth, one according to which we couldn't be wrong and yet heed the evidence (a view Thomas Nagel has challenged: he is one of those who are not mentioned in the book).

Not that Hookway is not aware of persisting nonrealistic leanings in Q's writings (on p. 57 he says that 'the [pragmatist] claims from *From a Logical Point of View* seem not to have been left behind,' and again on p. 200 he rightly says that a number of statements to be found in Q's later writings 'suggest a view closer to anti-realism than to the scientific realism which Quine proclaims'). Yet I suspect that he has not fully realized how deep the tension is in Q's thought between realism and nonrealism. (His book seems to have been written before the above-mentioned collective volume on Q appeared.)

In fact Hookway seems to be much more concerned over Q's physicalism than over his empiricism. As regards the latter, he claims (7) that '[w]e do not require a precise definition of [empiricism]: it is enough that empiricists take seriously the claims of the sciences to provide our best knowledge of reality, and hold that this knowledge is grounded in sensory experience.' A very vague claim. Hookway later (15) maintains that '[a]n empiricist who thinks that our grasp of our language involves linking it to experience need claim only that we understand an expression when we know how to test the sentences in which it occurs against experience.' Only? What then emerges as empiricism is a strongly verificationist theory of meaning. That trend is doubtless present in Q's motivations, and one of the essential premises of his most cherished argument for indeterminacy of translation, IT. But as we have seen such a line of thought issues in

abandoning or anyway warping the underdetermination thesis and more generally realism. There is an alternative argument for IT, that put forward in 'On the Reasons for the Indeterminacy of Translation' (*Journal of Philosophy* 67 [1970] 178-83), a paper which Hookway does not mention in his discussion of the IT thesis (in ch. 8, on pp. 127 ff.), a discussion which nevertheless contains a lot of insightful remarks.

Despite such defects the book is a rather good introduction into the study of Q's philosophy.

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Michael Mitias, ed.
Aesthetic Quality and Aesthetic Experience.
(Elementa, Bd. 50.)
Atlanta, GA: Rodopi Editions 1989.
Pp. viii+177. US $50.00. ISBN 90-6203-710-0.

This collection includes the nine papers discussed below and a long essay in German with which I cannot deal, 'Der Mensch als Welt-Beispiel' by Rudolph Berlinger.

John Fisher, in 'Experience and Qualities', outlines Monroe Beardsley's conceptions of aesthetic quality and aesthetic experience. He then suggests that given these conceptions, the aesthetic qualities of a work and a perceiver's aesthetic experience would turn out to be closely yet contingently linked.

Göran Hermerén, in 'The Variety of Aesthetic Qualities', suggests that there are diverse types of aesthetic qualities, and that we may get into trouble by failing to recognize that. He picks out for attention six types (examples in parentheses): emotion qualities (sad, cheerful), behavior qualities (vigorous, gentle), gestalt qualities (disorganized, coherent), taste qualities (beautiful, garish), reaction qualities (shocking, stirring), and nature qualities (cool, rugged). His discussions of these types are often illuminating, although some of his accounts and analyses, and even some of his classifications of

examples, seem to me in various ways puzzling, questionable or doubtful.

Mitias' own contribution, 'Locus of Aesthetic Quality', is somewhat difficult to sort out. He seems to hold that aesthetic qualities are potentialities whose actualizations depend not only on the non-aesthetic qualities of a work (which determine a *range* of possible actualizations), but also on 'creative imagination' or 'a creative effort by the percipient', which actualizes some potentiality within that range. (Would this be true of perceiving the 'balance' of a bilaterally symmetrical design?) From his claim about the creative contribution of the perceiver, Mitias infers that, as *actual*, an aesthetic quality is a 'mental event'. Turning to perplexities about what we can mean when we call a piece of music sad, Mitias suggests, for one thing, that hearing sadness in the music is akin to 'empathetic intuition' of another person's sadness. This suggestion might prove fruitful, but could do with fuller and clearer development.

Richard Lind's notably interesting 'Aesthetic "Sympathy" and Expressive Qualities' also addresses the question how music can be sad. He proposes that if listening to a piece of music induces a set of bodily sensations – tension, etc. – that in other circumstances would be a sign of a certain emotion in us, and if also we are listening to the music with a 'romantic attitude,' an attitude that treats it (rightly or wrongly) as an 'expressive vehicle' for the composer, then we place the emotion not in ourselves, but in the music as an expression of the composer – an expression comparable to tone of voice, facial expression, or gesture. While such bodily sensations are, for Lind, the primary determinant of the expressive character of the piece, he also suggests that its expressive character can be enhanced or more narrowly specified by the 'behavioral demeanor' of the music (cf. Bouwsma).

Catherine Lord, in 'Intentionality and Realization in Aesthetic Experience', tries to mediate disputes between Monroe Beardsley and George Dickie about whether or how a work of art can be 'in' aesthetic experience and about whether unity can be attributed not only to a work of art, but also to someone's experience of it. On the latter issue, she concludes that we cannot find unity in the experience that 'matches' unity in the work, but that there can be unity in the experience 'answering to' unity in the work. For example, where the balance of a painting fosters a 'sense of the integration of the self' in the perceiver, the latter sort of unity 'answers to' the former, but is different in kind and so does not 'match' it. She goes on to suggest

a second sort of 'answering' relation, where 'the intensity of aesthetic experience ... varies concomitantly with,' and answers to, 'the degree of unity a work has and the intensity of its expressive properties or its elements such as color.'

Maria Golaszewska's 'Quality, Experience, and Values' looks for common elements in various accounts of aesthetic qualities. She emphasizes, for one thing, how aesthetic qualities depend on and are influenced by interaction and context. She then proposes that the, or a, function of aesthetic qualities is to reveal aesthetic values (the beautiful, tragic, comic, etc.). Such values, in turn, embody or express visions of the world that 'cannot be rationally or fully explained or accounted for.'

In 'The Quality of Aesthetic Convention', Steven G. Smith sketches an account of aesthetic merit. He locates aesthetic value in the possibility of a beholder 'inhabiting' a work, and explains differences of merit in terms of 'how full the beholder's life' can be in different works. One measure of such fullness is how far many persons can 'cohabit,' share, meet in, the work. He discusses also such things as 'greatness' and its conditions, the role of social convention in aesthetic experience, and 'the universality of aesthetic subjectivity.'

Alicja Kuczynska, in 'Qualities of Things as Aesthetic Qualities', tackles the status of aesthetic qualities. Are they in the work, in the perceiver, or what? Her remarks are sometimes hard to understand and sometimes hard to square with one another. However, she seems to accept a view she attributes to Dewey – that an aesthetic quality is in the physical object as a potentiality (a disposition to affect experience?), and is actualized in our experience.

Robert Ginsberg's 'Aesthetic Qualities in the Experience of the Ruin' is, for good or ill, highly rhetorical and full of word-play. It proposes that a ruin exhibits new unities, free 'from the past as well as from the dictates of form, function, purpose, or culture,' that it invites free exploration, and that it can be exhilarating. A ruin can, somewhat like art, afford an experience of wholeness and heal 'the brokenness of daily life.' These and others of his suggestions are striking, though I hesitate over how far some of them hold true.

The papers vary considerably in clarity and interest, but all in all there is a good deal that is of value in the book. Brief identifications of the contributors would have been worthwhile.

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Jan Narveson
The Libertarian Idea.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press
1989. Pp. xiv+367.
US $34.95. ISBN 0-87722-569-9.

The resurgence of interest in libertarianism as a political outlook dates for many philosophers from the appearance of Nozick's *Anarchy, State and Utopia* in 1974. That ingenious work set out a case for individual liberty as the central political datum, and for a minimalist conception of the state and its use of coercive power with respect to that liberty, that reverberates among philosophers still. Of this plea for individual liberty, what caught, and still catches, the eye of many are two things. First, Nozick's case, cast or recast in the language of negative, natural rights, weighs rather heavily against end-state distributive schemes that, imposed by government on individuals, all too easily violate one's liberty to live one's life as one sees fit and to dispose of one's labor, earnings, and property as one wishes. Such schemes, found throughout modern welfare states, are coercive when they impose views, values, and conceptions of the good life upon one against one's wishes, and no argument from benefit makes good the wrong done. For to benefit one person by violating another person's liberty, say, to dispose of their property as they wish does not undo the wrong done the person whose liberty is violated. Second, Nozick nowhere provides foundations for the negative, natural rights around which, from the first sentence of his book onwards, his libertarianism turns. As a result, they seem mere intuitions on his part, and intuitions about rights, no matter how widely shared, do not have *per se*, certainly in the absence of argument, any probative force in moral/political theory. Nor does the attempt to order one's intuitions do any better, in the absence of some argument as to why we should believe that such ordering confers probative force upon intuitions. Libertarianism, then, at least in Nozick's hands, seems to lack foundations.

When we look for help elsewhere in the libertarian literature, prospects do not appear more inviting. Appeals to religion and natural law seem increasingly not to have the bite, foundationally, that they may once have exercised. If one examines the writings of those who came to libertarianism through the work of Ayn Rand, one typically finds either that negative, natural rights and libertarianism are enmeshed in and flow out of a kind of ethical egoism, a theory

with few adherents today, or that they are enmeshed in and flow out of a teleological world-view, Aristotelian or otherwise, that may or, increasingly, may not take one's fancy. Of course, there can be movement on these fronts; for example, I take Eric Mack's recent work on agent-relative value to be an attempt to move away from ethical egoism while trying to retain the agent-centered focus that libertarianism, with its emphasis upon individual liberty, requires. All in all, though, doubts about libertarianism, whatever one's subsequent view of the comparative harshness of its results when applied in society, have a strong foundational air about them.

It is here that Narveson's new, bold, and highly readable book enters the picture; for he aims, quite simply, to provide the secure foundations that libertarianism apparently lacks. What is important about Narveson's attempt, and the reason it deserves careful consideration, is that it shifts the foundational focus of libertarianism away from Locke and historical entitlement theory to Hobbes, a view of the Hobbesian state of nature as a case of prisoner's dilemma, and a cooperative solution to the dilemma. That is, Narveson has read Gauthier and tries to adapt his contractarianism to present purposes: escape from a Hobbesian state of nature (there is no presumption of antecedently existing natural rights) does not require the setting up of the Hobbesian coercive state that, through the sovereign, rules its subjects with an iron hand; escape is possible through mutual agreement to engage in cooperative behavior, that is, 'behavior that it is advantageous from the point of view of each one of us to have everyone, including ourselves, engaging in' (145).

Narveson's book is divided into three parts. The first sets out what Narveson takes the libertarian idea to be, and it offers discussions on the nature of liberty, the nature of rights, positive and negative rights, property, and so on. This part contains, I think, the clearest, most direct statement of libertarianism available (though I know some libertarians will query Narveson's analysis of rights). Interestingly, if there is a fundamental right to liberty, as Narveson believes, it is only later in the book, in the discussion of contractarianism, that one sees exactly what the ground of this right is and in what sense it may be said to be fundamental. Part two contains Narveson's attempt to ground libertarianism in contractarianism, and the early pages of part three help to fill out this attempt. The bulk of part three, however, is devoted to consideration of some of the applications of the libertarian/contractarian view that emerges in part two, and here all manner of issues are discussed, from markets, government, and

democracy to insurance and charity, children's rights, education, pornography, zoning laws, and international relations. This material is especially striking and, to some degree, makes up for the relative absence of considered applications of contractarianism in Gauthier's *Morals by Agreement.*

However interesting all this material may be, the success of Narveson's book stands or falls on the detailed arguments of part two (especially pp. 131-84) and the attempt to use a Gauthier-like contractarianism to ground libertarianism. In a short review, I cannot even begin to state and assess these arguments. Of course, some issues are obvious. Is it right to think of a Hobbesian state of nature in terms of prisoner's dilemma? Is Gauthier's cooperative solution to prisoner's dilemma correct? If so, how far can Narveson extend that solution to show that the trappings of a libertarian state are those things to which rational cooperators would mutually agree in order to escape the dilemma? And to what extent must the agreements on these trappings satisfy Pareto demands? These are obvious issues, precisely because they form the central planks of Narveson's case.

I am far from sure that a cooperative solution to prisoner's dilemma can be extended to show that the libertarian state *is* that to which rational cooperators would agree in order to escape the dilemma. Plainly, this is a very complicated matter, but at least one source of doubt is readily apparent. It is now a commonplace, as Russell Hardin has suggested, that what emerges from a Hobbesian state-of-nature argument is mutual agreement on some sort of authoritative structure that effectively prevents relapse into the state of nature; but exactly what that structure will look like is, as Hardin has noted, yet to be decided. Now this authoritative structure may take the form of a Hobbesian sovereign ruling with an iron hand, but, as Gauthier has shown, it need not. What we must take from Narveson is that the structure will take the form of the voluntary behavior and practices of the libertarian state, where these are understood to include private property rights, no compulsory transfers of property, and so on. Presumably, then, to escape the state of nature, rational cooperators will agree to cooperate in precisely those ways typically identified with libertarianism. But why should they do this? If we are to agree with Hobbes, any form of authoritative structure would be preferable to remaining in the state of nature, including the Hobbesian coercive state; so why, of the different structures available to us, should rational cooperators favor a libertarian one? Any form of authoritative structure would make all those who agree to cooperate

better off. The temptation is to say that a libertarian structure would make rational cooperators, not merely better off, but best off, that such a structure is Pareto-optimal, in that all cooperators are made the best off that they can be and no cooperator is made worse off? But why would rational cooperators believe this to be so, of practices, such as an entrenched, extensive domain of private property rights, that specifically exclude other cooperators from the domains over which such rights are exercised? The claim of mutual advantage, that I, too, would be able to exclude others over domains over which I exercise private property rights, does not provide an answer; for if exclusion from certain domains is what is being aimed at, then there are other ways of bringing this about short of mutual agreement on an entrenched, extensive system of private property rights. In this sense, mutual advantage does not *show* such an entrenched system of rights Pareto-optimal. In short, Pareto-optimality might provide rational cooperators with a reason to agree upon a libertarian structure, but it at least remains to be shown that, of the alternative forms of structure available to us, a libertarian one is Pareto-optimal. And I think Hardin is right to observe that, if any structure is preferable to a state of nature, then mutual advantage arguments do not as such show which particular structure is the preferred one, one that is, we may add, Pareto-optimal.

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Jay Newman
The Journalist in Plato's Cave.
Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press 1989. Pp. 208.
US $32.50. ISBN 0-8386-3349-8.

A consistent theme throughout Newman's book is a criticism of the dearth of philosophical attention paid to journalism. Unfortunately this work does little to effectively fill that gap.

This is not to say there is not much in the book worth reading. Chapters Four and Five in particular offer interesting and insightful

analyses of the educational role of journalism and of the nature and limits of a free press. However, the book's failings, especially since the worst occur in the early chapters, are so serious as to dissuade any but the most determined of readers.

The book is organized in a sandwich structure. The first and last chapters are devoted to a discussion of the relationship that does, has, and should exist between philosophy and journalism, while the middle chapters address the nature, purpose, and values of journalistic practice. Importantly, the book is about *journalism* – indeed, as we will see, about an artificially restricted category of journalism – not about mass media generally. Thus even without its other weaknesses, the book would not be an appropriate selection for the growing number of ethics courses which try to address a broad range of issues in the media.

The problems are of two sorts. First, Newman's program suffers from a kind of schizophrenic approach to metaphysics and epistemology. While he claims to be doing 'ordinary language' philosophy (31), his analyses are ultimately driven by a form of Platonic essentialism. This schizophrenia, present in all his major arguments, tends to undermine even his best ideas.

Second, although Newman purports to be doing applied, 'relevant' philosophy (16) (indeed, he is condescending toward what he calls 'armchair philosophy' [174]), the work is done from within an empirical vacuum. This lack of empirical grounding produces sweeping generalities and implausible explanations. It also results in an overall lack of appreciation for the values and goals that define and motivate contemporary journalistic practice.

Newman's metaphysical and epistemological confusion is most apparent in Chapter Two in which he attempts to describe 'The Essential Nature of Journalism'. He starts with the ordinary language approach, quoting the *Oxford English Dictionary*: Journalism is 'the occupation or profession of a journalist; journalistic writing; the public journals collectively' (31). However he quickly abandons the key tenet of ordinary language philosophy – that a lexigraphical definition is a *reflection* of a culture's current understanding of a concept – and uses the definition as an icon to which all legitimate forms of the practice must correspond. The definition acquires, for Newman, something of the status of a Platonic essence, an essence which many commonly held forms of journalism can at best only approximate.

Thus, despite that persons clearly view them as such (including most print journalists), and despite that Newman admits 'in recent

years it has become quite acceptable to speak about, for example, broadcast journalism' (38), such television reporters as Mike Wallace, Ted Koppel, and Eric Sevareid are not, by definition, 'journalists'. They are not, Newman claims, because the *true* essence of journalism is captured in the second clause of the *O.E.D.* definition – 'journalistic *writing*' (31, my emphasis).

Newman does provide a weak defense of this restrictive definition (permanence, 'the mighty power of the *logos*,' enhanced freedom, and greater reader competence) (39-40). Although each of these arguments is quite weak, my principal apprehension here is not about whether broadcast journalists should 'count'; rather, I am concerned with the confused and confusing manner by which Newman concludes they should not. If there truly is a Platonic essence of journalism then there is no logical relation between it and a dictionary definition (and vice versa). In using the latter to serve as a legitimation of the former, he has undercut the philosophical power of both the essentialist and the ordinary language positions while also managing to confound and frustrate his reader.

Let me give one more example here before moving on to the second major problem. In his discussion of the famous analogy from which the book derives its title, Newman admits that Plato's appeal to transcendent forms 'are difficult for even some of Plato's greatest admirers to swallow whole' (74). Yet Newman clearly endorses that version of truth and reality in his central criticism of journalists: he equates them with the cave's puppeteers who deceive the masses with mere temporal 'images' rather than showing them the 'higher truths' of authentic reality (88), 'the realities that pure thought alone can apprehend' (14). Again, an at best schizophrenic and at worst self-contradictory position emerges.

The need for a better empirical grounding is present throughout the book, but is most evident in Chapter One. In discussing why philosophers have tended to neglect journalism, Newman unflinchingly generalizes about philosophers' 'disdain for journalism' (17) and yet provides not a single supporting reference. (Interestingly, Virginia Held makes similar sweeping claims in her article, 'Philosophy and the Media', *Journal of Social Philosophy* 20 [1989] 115-6. She at least makes reference to one philosopher's complaints.) He then attempts to explain this disdain on psychological grounds (again without reference): it seems that philosophers are jealous of the social power held by journalists and thus have too much '*ressentiment*' to give the occupation serious study' (18). These sweeping empirical claims and

frankly silly psychological explanations not only simplify a complex relationship, they also ignore the recent and very significant work in this area by philosophers and by philosophically trained persons from other disciplines (e.g., Deni Elliot, Louis Hodges, Howard Ziff, Clifford Christians, Robert Steele, Erling Skorpen, and Edmund Lambeth).

It also seems apparent that Newman has never stepped inside a newsroom, either print or electronic. Thus despite his criticism of 'armchair philosophy' (174), Newman's work is ultimately reduced to just that. He relies upon academic writings, rather than upon the thoughts and concerns of working journalists, to discover what they do, what values motivate their actions and serve to define their profession. He might be surprised that, though understandably guarded, many journalists are anxious to engage philosophers, to argue about ethical issues, to (re)consider the nature and purpose of their work. He might also be surprised to discover that he has a tremendous amount to learn from them, even about such seemingly philosophically pure topics as Truth and Beauty.

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Carole Pateman
The Sexual Contract.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1988. Pp. xi+264.
US $39.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-1476-2);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-1477-0).

The social contract, as found in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, applied solely to relationships between men, relationships outside of the family. The family, and women's confinement to it, was seen as having a pre-contractual basis. What was this basis, and what are its implications for contemporary contractarianism? In this book, which offers the most comprehensive discussion to date of these issues, Pateman argues that prior to the social contract there was a 'sexual contract' which defined the terms of men's control over women, and that a version of this sexual contract remains intrinsic to all contemporary contract theories.

Pateman begins by addressing some conceptual confusions that have blinded people to the existence of the sexual contract – the false dichotomy between 'status' and 'contract' (9-10), or between 'public' and 'private' (12-13), and the false equation of 'patriarchalism' (the rule of men over women) with 'paternalism' (the rule of fathers over sons) (32-3). The next two chapters discuss how classical contract theorists, despite their 'revolutionary' commitment to the idea that everyone is born free and equal, came to defend the subjection of women. Contract theorists saw themselves as attacking the principle of paternal power, as found in theorists such as Filmer. However, Pateman argues, there are two facets to paternal power: 'father-right', or the power of fathers over their sons; and 'sex-right', or the power of husbands over their wives. While contract theorists rejected the first, and supported the right of sons to rebel for their political freedom, they 'eagerly embraced' the second (86).

In order to defend male sex-right, contract theorists claimed there was a natural basis for women's subordination. Women lacked the mental or physical capacities to share power inside or outside the family, and so the husband's rule does not require the wife's consent. However, contract theorists were ambivalent about this line of defense, since it contradicted their claims that people are born free and equal, and that women's marital role is rendered consensual through the marriage contract (93-4). According to Pateman, this suggests that a deeper story about women's subordination is being hidden. In order to expose this story, Pateman turns to Freud, who recognized that while sons resented their father's paternal power, they also desired his conjugal power. Indeed, Freud says, the reason why sons desire political liberty, and so rebel against their father, is to acquire sexual access to the women he was monopolizing (103). In order to prevent further conflict over sexual access, the sons then sign a contract – the sexual contract – 'which confirms masculine sex-right and ensures that there is an orderly access by each man to a woman' (109). While the existence of this contract is not made explicit by contract theorists, Pateman argues that it is presupposed by their claim that monogamous marriage is a natural condition, found in the state of nature. The sexual contract is therefore 'displaced' onto the marriage contract (110), in which each man respects the right of other men to rule over a woman. The fact that married women are still expected to perform domestic labour without pay, and to give up their protection against marital rape, shows that the sexual contract 'is replicated every day' in the marriage contract (115).

As Pateman notes, some feminists argue that the problem with the marriage contract is that it is not a true contract – the partners must accept a pre-established and unequal status, rather than negotiate their own terms of association (163-7). Hence, it is argued, what women need is more freedom of contract – each woman should be free to choose what rules of sexual access, domestic labour, and reproductive services she wishes to bind herself to (184-7). In the final three chapters, Pateman argues that this would change the form of the sexual contract, but not the substance. It would lead to a 'universal market in bodies and services' (184), in which men's right of sexual access would now be ensured through a wide range of prostitution, pornography, and surrogacy contracts, rather than through traditional marriage.

Pateman argues that any contractualization of reproductive or sexual labour harms women, for 'contracts about property in the person inevitably create subordination' (153). We cannot separate our labour from ourselves (202). Hence any contract to perform sexual, reproductive or domestic labour for another, be it in the form of a short-term prostitution or surrogacy contract, or a long-term marriage contract, involves subordinating oneself to another. The subordination is greatest when the labour involved is least separable from the self, and, Pateman argues, the sexual and reproductive labour involved in surrogacy and prostitution are more intimately tied to our sense of self than any other form of labour (204). Hence sexual relations based on contract can only be 'maintained through mastery and obedience' (232).

There are a number of questions raised by Pateman's account. First, Pateman conflates a number of diverse theorists under her label the 'standpoint of contract' (15), including Hobbes, Rawls, and Nozick. Not all of these theorists endorse the idea that social life is based on contract 'all the way down' (59), or that 'no limits can be placed on contract and contractual relations', not even on slave contracts (15). Nozick's idea of self-ownership conflicts with Rawls's idea of the moral arbitrariness of our talents, which conflicts with Hobbes's idea of mutual advantage, and these yield conflicting accounts of the role of contractual relations in society. Hence Pateman's arguments apply, at best, to one subset of contract doctrines.

Second, it is unclear why a universal market in bodies and services would reinforce male sex-right. Women would be free to sell their sexual or reproductive labour in such a universal market, but men would not have the legal power to force them to do so. Of course,

women may be forced by economic necessity into prostitution or surrogacy. But Pateman insists that her objection to sexual contracts is not women's economic vulnerability (58, 201, 212). Even when 'truly voluntary' (8), such contracts subordinate women, for 'when women's bodies are on sale as commodities in the capitalist market ... the law of male sex-right is publicly affirmed, and men gain public acknowledgement as women's sexual masters' (208). However, if women have both the legal right and material resources to refuse men's demands for sex, why wouldn't such contracts affirm the opposite of male sex-right – i.e., that men's sexual access to women is dependent on their free consent?

Third, it is unclear why Pateman thinks that male sex-right underlies women's subjection in our society (38). Some feminists (e.g., Susan Okin) argue that the main basis of women's subjection is not the fact that men in some jurisdictions can legally rape their wives, and/or buy the services of prostitutes, but the fact that women perform the majority of unpaid housework and child care, which disadvantages them in the labour market, which in turn makes them dependent on, and vulnerable to, their male partners. On this view, if women were not economically vulnerable, they would not be dependent on abusive husbands or prostitution for access to resources. Hence women's economic vulnerability within marriage gives men the power to demand or buy sexual access, not vice versa. Pateman argues that 'to focus on parents and children suggests that patriarchy is familial and that father-right is the problem' (85), when in fact men can only become fathers if women become mothers, and so 'sex-right or conjugal right must necessarily precede the right of fatherhood' (87, 183). However, Pateman doesn't consider the possibility that the unequal distribution of child care could lead to the subordination of women, even without the law of male sex-right.

Finally, Pateman offers no alternative to contractualism. She says that there are 'other forms of free agreement through which women and men can constitute political relations' (232). But she doesn't explain what these other forms are, or how they avoid the problem of subordination. Despite these unanswered questions, Pateman's book is sure to generate much debate. Anyone who is concerned with understanding and rectifying the failure of political theory to include the interests and voices of women will find it an important and challenging work.

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Thomas W. Pogge
Realizing Rawls.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1989.
Pp. 320.
US $36.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2124-1);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-9685-3).

It is a peculiar feature of late twentieth-century political philosophy in the English-speaking world that despite the enormous influence of the work of John Rawls there are almost no Rawlsians. So far Rawls's elaborate theory has proved easier to criticise than to defend. Thomas Pogge's aptly titled book is a brave and important step toward redressing this critical imbalance. Pogge is a Rawlsian in the very best sense: the way, say, J.S. Mill was a Benthamite. He can be as harsh and, thanks to his mastery of Rawls's texts, as damaging a critic as Rawls has ever known. (Some critics are merely harsh. Had Sandel understood Rawls as well as Pogge does he could not, as Pogge himself demonstrates in Chapter 2, have written *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.*) At the same time Pogge is willing to defend creatively, and at times passionately, what he sees as the two most important core ideas in Rawls's theory of justice: 'first, the focus on the basic structure ... ; second, the maximin idea that a scheme of social institutions is to be assessed by the worst position it generates, that its justice depends on how well it does by its least advantaged participants (1).' If this along with frequent appeals to the original position is sufficient for being a Rawlsian, then sometimes Pogge is willing to be more Rawlsian than Rawls himself. His revisionism sharply curtails what is surely another core Rawlsian commitment – the priority of liberty – and diverges radically over the importance and content of a theory of international justice. Along the way he responds intelligently to problems Rawls himself has yet to address at length: such as a defence against Nozick (chapter 1), and a theory of just medical care (181-96).

Were there enough Rawlsians to classify, Pogge could be described alternately as: a *left* Rawlsian (one whose primary concern is with the plight of the worst-off, and who consequently believes that the USA is far from being a just society); a *middle*-Rawlsian (identifying most with the 'radical' Rawls of *A Theory of Justice*, and seeing in his recent developments an increasing conservatism and retreat to abstraction); a *political* Rawlsian (eager to retrieve and defend the moral and political content of the principles of justice, but relatively unconcerned with 'issues in moral psychology, metaethics and moral epistemology',

that is, with 'debates that are metaphysical in style if not in substance' [4]); or a *globalized* Rawlsian (believing that a theory of justice must be developed in the first instance for a global rather than national basic structure, and that familiar injustices in our societies, grave as they are, 'pale in comparison' to those involved in the prevailing international institutional scheme [215]).

Of course each one of these positions points to where Pogge can expect criticism, but in most cases his critics will find his defenses a challenge to overcome. This is especially true of his highly critical but constructive analysis of the two principles of justice in Part 2. These two densely argued chapters result notably in new versions of both principles which remain lexically ordered, but with a 'social minimum' of socioeconomic goods incorporated into the first, and real teeth put into the principle of opportunity in the second. His argument throughout, while original, is fundamentally Rawlsian: focussing on worst-case scenarios from the perspective of the original position; and taking seriously Rawls's own remark that the rationale for the two principles taken together is 'to maximize the worth to the least advantaged of the complete scheme of equal liberty shared by all' (*Theory of Justice*, 205, quoted 38 and 128).

Pogge is certainly much more vulnerable to attack for his almost undefended refusal to address methodological issues. He claims that he could explicate and develop Rawls's 'two most powerful and important ideas, together with their practical political implications ... without even mentioning the ... original position ...' (2). Perhaps he could, but he certainly doesn't. And even if he only uses it to 'dramatize the priority concern for the least advantaged' (2) he ought still to respond to criticism such as Ronald Dworkin's against the legitimacy of contractarian arguments in general, and especially of those that guage the justice of a society almost exclusively by the situation of the worst off. Still, one has to welcome Pogge's predominantly normative discussion given a contemporary debate – encouraged by Rawls's recent writings – truly obsessed with abstract foundational problems. (Surely the idea of modern liberalism or social democracy is based *at least* as firmly on a concern for the poor and disadvantaged as it is on a commitment to, say, neutrality or anti-perfectionism.)

The first two parts of the book could well stand apart from the last, 'Globalizing the Rawlsian Conception of Justice'. Indeed, the topics covered in the latter really require a book-length treatment (something they very rarely receive from Anglo-Saxon philosophers). While this is Pogge's most original discussion – Rawls after all has but a few lines

on justice between states – it is also less thoroughly argued; often reading like a pamphlet. Two Rawlsian themes dominate Pogge's theory of global justice: the first obviously is a concern for the most disadvantaged of the world; and the second, somewhat surprisingly since it comes from the recent Rawls, is the idea that a moral order based on an overlapping consensus can arise out of a *modus vivendi*. Pogge blames the great shortcomings of the international institutional scheme – from the threat of a third world war to the reality of third world poverty – on the current *modus vivendi* in international relations. His alternative solution to the fairy-tale idea of world government is the need to develop an overlapping consensus based on shared values between democratic societies. Of course international justice will require that not only values, but also resources and technology be shared. And that will require that democratic voters be willing to sacrifice for distant strangers in a way that they so far are reluctant to do for fellow citizens literally shivering on their doorsteps. Pogge is undeterred by such a prospect. Our inability to realize global justice would be 'an indictment not of that conception [of justice] but of ourselves' (260). He believes that those advantaged by an unjust institutional scheme share responsibility for it, and have a negative duty toward those disadvantaged by the scheme to work to change it (260, also 32, 34). There is no doubt that Pogge has taken this duty seriously while writing his book.

To my mind, however, Pogge's analysis of international injustice and his prescriptions for alleviating it suffer from his explicit preference for 'macroexplanations' involving vague references to the international *modus vivendi* over 'microexplanations' of why this or that country succeeded or failed (e.g., 236ff). Surely both are essential parts of any useful explanation. If we are going to commence massive transfers of resources to the developing world it would certainly be worth understanding how, say, Nigeria managed to squander its own oil wealth, or why South Korea 'took-off' and North Korea didn't. An apparent indifference between capitalism and one-party 'democratic' socialism (154, 203, 232), and the complete lack of an environmental or population dimension make Pogge's discussion of the problems of development seem rather dated. It is unclear to what extent his *philosophical* contribution to international ethics in general does or does not really depend on macroexplanations which he does 'not pretend to have' adequately provided (274).

It must be emphasized that Pogge has not set out to write 'Rawls Made Simple'. *Realizing Rawls*, especially its first two parts, is tough-

going and presupposes a high-level understanding of both Rawls's theory and the major controversies it has provoked over the past two decades. The result is a significant contribution not only to scholarship but to contemporary political philosophy.

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Friederich Rapp and **Reiner Wiehl, eds.**
Whitehead's Metaphysics of Creativity.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1990. Pp. x+223.
US $49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0202-9);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0203-7).

This book reflects the growing interest in Whitehead in the German-speaking world. It contains twelve papers originally read at the International Whitehead Symposium held in Bad-Homburg in 1983. Two of the papers were originally presented in English; the rest have been translated. By and large the translations are felicitious, though the style occasionally bogs down so that the author's meaning is not always clear. Whether this is the fault of the translator, the original author, or the topic in hand I leave to the reader's own judgment – though the mind boggles at what would be the German equivalent of the final line on page 107 which appears as one continuous word: 'theclaimtoovercomethedichotomybetweenempricismandrationalism' [*sic*]!

The book is divided into four parts. Part I attempts to locate Whitehead's thought within the Western philosophical tradition. Ivor Leclerc argues that it is important to recognize that Whitehead rejects in its entirety the modern form of the neoplatonic tradition introduced in the seventeenth century and that his doctrine of 'dipolar' (physical and mental) actual entities is Aristotelian in origin. Ernest Wolf-Gazo describes Whitehead's approach as 'onto-epistemology' whereby 'metaphysics precedes epistemology and determines it' (26). He contends that the influence of Berkeley was decisive for Whitehead's development of a 'metaphysics of nature' and that Whitehead translated Berkeley's principles of human knowledge into principles of natural

knowledge. Similarly, in *Process and Reality*, Locke's fundamental positions are transformed into a theory of the constitution of actual entities.

Part II looks at the Whiteheadian notion of 'creativity' as it relates to his sense of the passage of nature. Friederich Rapp asserts that modern science systematically excludes the sorts of phenomena (e.g., novelty and creative production) that form the basis for Whitehead's speculative cosmology. 'Science endeavors to reduce novelty to what is already known,' says Rapp (83), to subsume it under established lawful patterns. For this reason, 'Whitehead's speculative cosmology cannot, by its very nature, provide the same degree of conceptual precision and empirical verifiability as modern science' (89). Hans Poser responds to this challenge by characterizing Whitehead's cosmology as a 'revisable metaphysics'. Such a cosmology must adequately explain and be applicable to experience, as well as be coherent, and logically consistent (107). Its task is not to render a final, certain account of reality, but 'to assist our intellectual orientation by creating a formal unity of the fundamental convictions that dominate at a given time without ever claiming to reveal the truth' (105).

Part III examines Whitehead's cosmology of feeling and its relevance to what we think and which experiences teach us to understand the world. The articles here are more technical and expository, and are on the whole less interesting. Part IV concentrates on creativity and creation. Wolfhart Pannenberg chides 'the school of process theology' in California for treating Whitehead as 'an entirely self-sufficient systematic thinker and, as such, authoritative, like Aristotle in the high scholasticism of the thirteenth century' (167). He criticizes this approach on two counts. First, there are other thinkers, such as Bergson and Alexander, who provide different versions of a process philosophical perspective. *Process and Reality* is neither the first, nor the last word on the subject. Second, Whitehead's idea of the radical self-creation of each occasion 'cannot be reconciled with the biblical ideas of creation nor, therefore, with the biblical idea of God' (175). In defense of the California process theologians, it should be noted that this article appears in translated form as a reprint from the journal, *Process Studies* (cf. x), an indication that those affiliated with the the Center for Process Studies, at least, do not shun such controversy.

Pannenberg's charges are responded to in different ways by the remaining two authors in this section. Jan Van der Veken counters the objection that Whitehead is a typical practitioner of an 'onto-theology' which assigns highest reality to God. Drawing on works other than

Process and Reality, he tries to show that Whitehead's God is not a real entity but rather '*the first qualification of being* [his italics], or the firm and foremost limitation of substantial activity' (184). Creativity is a universal activity which is efficacious in all events and God 'as the primordial limitation of this process coordinates all events from within' (185). As such, God is not a determinate reality over against other realities, but is the religious qualification of reality, a religious name that enables believers to interpret the all-encompassing process. 'In this sense God is a "category of meaning" and not just a category of being' (185).

Reto Luzius Fetz concludes the volume by suggesting that creativity functions in Whitehead's system as a new transcendental, in the scholastic sense of a property or characteristic that pertains to all existents and explains what every existent is (189). Counter to Pannenberg's admonitions, Fetz claims that the medieval Christian metaphysics of creation, particularly that of Thomas Aquinas, forms the indispensable background for Whitehead's notion of creativity. For Fetz, 'there is indeed an internal connection between the classical concept of *creatio ex nihilo* and the Whiteheadian concept of creativity understood as the principle of novelty' (199-200).

So where does this leave Whitehead? Is he to remain the darling of the theologians, or does he have something important to say to the scientist as well? What of his own claim that speculative philosophy should frame 'a coherent, logical, necessary system of ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted' (*Process and Reality*, 3)? This brings us back to a problem raised in the article by Ivor Leclerc, that of the testing of metaphysical theories. Whitehead's position, says Leclerc, entails that this testing be not only in respect of the internal consistency or overall coherence of the theory, but that the more important and more difficult testing will be to demonstrate the extent to which all of experience can be successfully understood in terms of its basic categories. In the case of Whitehead's metaphysics, the task for generations of scholars to come will be to display the scheme as 'effectively and adequately providing a metaphysical basis for the understanding of the highly important scientific advances of recent decades ... ' (17). For all the differences of interpretation and criticisms of Whitehead found herein, I find this book itself a good step in that direction.

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C.D.C. Reeve
Socrates in the Apology.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. 1989.
Pp. 200. US $24.50. ISBN 0-87220-089-2.

In *Socrates in the Apology*, C.D.C. Reeve gives us a short but useful book which has much in common with the recent *Socrates on Trial* by Brickhouse and Smith. Both books seek to show that Socrates was sincere in making his defence, and was not trying through boastful speaking (*megalēgoria*) to antagonize the jury and thereby to bring about his own death. Reeve's book is not, I believe, either as scholarly or groundbreaking as the Brickhouse and Smith work, but it has definite merits. The book is divided into three chapters corresponding to a broad tripartite structure in the *Apology* which Reeve thinks needs emphasizing. The first chapter deals with the false Socrates pictured by the first accusers. The second chapter deals with the Socratic defence against Meletus in which Socrates displays philosophy and the *elenchus* in action in refuting Meletus. The third chapter deals with the true Socrates, and the portion of the dialogue from 28b3 to the end.

Reeve has a framework of six problems in terms of which he analyzes the dialogue. He holds that various accounts can be categorized and individuated by reference to these problems and their putative solutions. One problem is that of Socratic ignorance (or Socratic knowledge). What is it that Socrates does not know and what does he know? The second problem is that of Socratic virtue. If knowledge is virtue and Socrates lacks knowledge of virtue, then Socrates must not be virtuous. Yet he seems to be virtuous and to present himself as such. Third, how can Socrates get people to care for their souls by using his method of *elenctic* refutation? The last three problems are the problem of Socratic teaching and politics and the problem of determining the proper role of irony in the *Apology*.

I find Reeve especially good when he argues against people who take various portions of the dialogue as ironical and fallacious. The second chapter, in which he argues against those who claim that Socrates' arguments against Meletus are not to the point is a particularly good example. He shows that Meletus was the final authority on the interpretation of the charges against Socrates, and that Socrates does not entrap Meletus. Rather he gives him a fair set of alternatives to choose from, heterodoxy or atheism. Meletus chooses the atheism interpretation and is shown to contradict himself. Thus, Socrates' arguments against Meletus are to the point and his strategy of undermining

the credibility of Meletus is intelligible. Reeve also argues that the arguments which Socrates gives are better than commentators have usually taken them to be.

Reeve's solution to the problem of Socratic ignorance is that when Socrates disclaims knowledge he is disclaiming expert craft-knowledge of virtue. Craft-knowledge is supposed to be explanatory, teachable, luck-independent, elenchus proof, and certain. Socrates' human wisdom consists in his recognition that he does not possess expert craft-knowledge of virtue. On the other hand, when Socrates asserts that he knows, his assertions should be treated as non-expert knowledge.

Reeve's solution to the problem of Socrates' disclaimers of knowledge is disturbing for a variety of reasons. In explaining why Socrates does not have a craft of virtue, Reeve seems to me to characterize craft-knowledge in such a way that no one but a god could have a craft of any kind. Surely doctors, to take one of Socrates' favorite crafts, do not have certain knowledge. Nor does the knowledge they have prevent them from making mistakes. They are hardly infallible. Reeve's citation from the *Euthydemus* (39) may show that craft-knowledge is luck-independent, but it does not show that non-craft-knowledge is not. If Socrates is a paradigm of someone with non-craft-knowledge, one could make a good case from the *Apology* itself that non-craft-knowledge is also luck-independent. Socrates, after all, asserts that being the kind of man he is, he cannot be harmed by his accusers. I find the evidence which Reeve quotes to support his list of standards for craft-knowledge largely unconvincing. I find it equally implausible that Socrates would have higher standards for craft-knowledge than Plato.

Reeve claims that one characteristic of non-craft knowledge is that it is universal, in that everyone has it even though they might deny the truth of the propositions they know in this sense. The proposition that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it is an example of such universal, non-craft knowledge. But surely there are many examples of non-craft knowledge which are not universal; and it is equally likely that there are cases of craft-knowledge which are universal. If the definitions of the virtues were known, for example, this knowledge would seem to be both craft-knowledge and universal even on Reeve's account. Reeve's characterization of non-craft knowledge as universal, also seems a very weak reason for denying the status of a craft to an activity which can bring people to recognize the truth of such propositions as that it is never right to do wrong

and that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it. These propositions represent, after all, a noble and revolutionary break with the ordinary ethical values of the Greeks. Thus, I think even those who would agree with Reeve that Socrates' disclaims craft-knowledge when he disclaims knowledge, and claims non-craft knowledge when he claims knowledge, will find his account of that distinction disappointing.

On occasion Reeve does a poor job in dealing with texts which do not support his view and with secondary literature. Reeve quotes *Gorgias* (521D, at 159) where Socrates claims to be a practitioner of the true craft of politics, but fails to note or discuss the tension between this passage and Socrates' claim in the *Apology* not to have a craft of virtue. As for the secondary literature, in presenting Vlastos' reasons for holding that Socrates has a craft (177), for example, Reeve fails to note that Vlastos has a quite different conception of craft-knowledge than the one Reeve advocates. This may not create problems for the scholar versed in the literature, but it is going to be confusing for those readers who are not.

Though I find Reeve's solutions to many of the six problems he poses unconvincing, and I think there are some serious problems in the way he deals with secondary literature, I would still recommend the book. It provides an interesting and fruitful counter-point to the Brickhouse and Smith book.

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Wilfrid Sellars
The metaphysics of epistemology: Lectures by Wilfrid Sellars. Ed. Pedro V. Amaral. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company 1988. Pp. xi+353.
US $35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-917930-94-0);
US $15.00 (paper: ISBN 0-917930-54-1).

This book is a reconstruction of five lectures that Sellars gave to a class in metaphysics and epistemology in 1975. The editor attended the class and based his reconstruction on lecture notes that he took

at the time. His text is accompanied by a felicitous artistic rendering of Sellars's blackboard drawings and diagrams. The whole presents a lively sense of Sellars as a witty, stimulating lecturer, and it provides an illuminating text on basic issues in the metaphysics of epistemology – a text reminding me of a book Sellars used to prescribe for his beginning graduate students: Moore's *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*.

In his preface, Amaral traces his title to a comment Sellars once made about Kant's *Prolegomena*, but the intended referent of 'the metaphysics of epistemology' is best grasped by reference to the contents of Sellars's five lectures. His first lecture is concerned with objects of knowledge. The most general question he asks is 'what is an object?', but he moves on to discuss standard views concerning the nature of facts, meanings, and perception, as well as types, divisions, primary and secondary qualities, and form and content. His second lecture is devoted to perception and reality. Here he discusses such subjects as phenomenalism, the theory of appearing, epistemic privacy, and the notion of recognizing a thing, *a*, as *F*. His third lecture is titled 'Facts and Representation', the focus of his concern being occurrent beliefs, facts, attributes, necessity, *a priori* knowledge, and the analytic/synthetic distinction. In his fourth lecture he concentrates on the debate between rationalists and empiricists, discussing in the process such topics as causality, entailment, probability, and induction. He devotes his fifth lecture to linguistic meaning. Instead of presenting a variety of alternative views here, he develops his own conception of meaning as 'functional classification' – a conception illustrated by the equivalence (as he sees it) of ' "nicht" (in German) means *not*' and ' "*nicht*"s (in German) are .not.s', the dot-quotes around 'not' creating, in his terminology, a special 'illustrating common noun' rather than the designator of some abstract object. He devotes his sixth lecture, finally, to a critical examination of what he calls R.M. Chisholm's 'classical Platonistic-Cartesian stance' in epistemology, a stance that survives as a vigorous alternative to the one he accepts. He concludes his lecture with some final remarks about his alternative.

As my summary indicates, Sellars presents his subject dialectically, discussing the pros and cons of rival positions. His basis for this approach is indicated by a remark he makes in lecture two: 'Philosophy exists in dialogue and you have to take the other part of that seriously; do not fix on a position and then run like a bull into the streets, knocking other people down; you have to put yourself in the

other parties' shoes' (61). Although philosophers constantly complain that their rivals do not really understand them, I think Sellars was very successful in putting himself in his rival's shoes. As a result, his book will give the attentive student a very good sense of the lay of the land in basic epistemology. Such a sense is what Sellars intended to convey in his lectures, for in the last one he remarked that 'this is not an occasion on which we are supposed to solve all the problems that are related to the theory of knowledge; we are out to get ourselves familiar with the space of the theory of knowledge' (323). It seems to me that Sellars accomplished this very well in these lectures.

All things considered, *Metaphysics and epistemology* will make a very useful text for middle-level courses in the theory of knowledge, and Amaral is to be commended for his generally excellent reconstruction of Sellars's lectures from his lecture notes. He made some occasional slips, as in speaking of 'Brookner's symphonies' (72) and in referring to 'Hardy' (150) as the one who coined the word 'normalcy' (he should have said 'Bruckner' and 'Harding'); but he did a fine job rendering the style and spirit of Sellars' lectures. A naturally shy man, Sellars was lively, outgoing, and often dramatic in speaking to a familiar class, and his former students (I was one of them) will not forget his wonderful ability to make abstract philosophical discussions seem as interesting and exciting as they were serious and important. Sellars was a very special teacher, as instructive as he was inspiring; and Amaral's text (helped, as he said, by his editor, Jeffrey Sicha) provides a valuable record of Sellars in this memorable role.

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Alan Sidelle
Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1989.
Pp. xv+216. US $26.50. ISBN 0-8014-2166-7

Some people judge that synthetic and *a posteriori* necessary truths show that we should reject the view that all necessity is analytic and so reject empiricist semantics. Since analytic propositions are *a priori*, we are committed to the view that all necessity is *a priori* if we hold that necessity derives from analyticity. But as Kripke and Putnam and others have argued, some necessary truths are not *a priori*. Thus it seems we should reject empiricist semantics. This way of looking at the matter is contested by Sidelle, whose purpose is to defend empiricist semantics and to attack 'real' necessity without denying in the process that there are *a posteriori* necessary truths. The book is cleanly written, forcefully argued, and a genuine challenge to those of us who believe in real necessity. The author contends that attention to modal epistemology reveals that even *a posteriori* necessity rests, in a qualified way, upon conventions. Sidelle is among those for whom the mere mention of Aristotelian essentialism sends 'shivers down the spines of ... ontological sensibilities' (86). But there are things here that may give us pause. There is a sense in which it is a corollary of Sidelle's empiricism that the world is, apart from our conventions and intentions, a poor, impoverished place containing only 'stuff' but no individuals and no kinds. One wonders where the conventions themselves come from. Sidelle might have addressed the question of how can there be conventions and intentions in a world bereft of individuals (entities, objects). If individuals are the product of conventions and intentions, does that mean that in the beginning the process of creating individuals and kinds (by way of conventions and intentions) is carried out by 'pre-objectual' (55n) nonobjects? And one wonders how, exactly, *that* works. How does mere stuff engage in the business of conceptual creation?

At the heart of Sidelle's semantic empiricism is the denial that necessity is 'a real feature of the world.' Inasmuch as we have knowledge of necessity and possibility, this is explained in terms of conventional 'general principles of individuation' and not real, mind-independent necessity. What do such principles look like? The 'formal mode' schema is:

> If '*x*' denotes something of kind K, then if *p* is the P-property of the thing so denoted, then '*x*' applies to something in a possible situation only if it has property *p*. (43-4)

The idea is that such principles are in a sense definitive of individuals and kinds. (Sidelle is explicit in extending the argument from kinds to individuals. See p. 57.) Kind boundaries and individuative (modal) boundaries are established by such principles. Since we decide on the operative principles, 'we make the boundaries' and in the process 'make the sorts' (45-6). The value for 'the P-property' is definitive of the kind K (48). Let the value for 'K' be 'biological organism' and the P-property involve biological origins:

> 1. If 'Margaret Truman' denotes a biological organism, then if *p* is the biological origin of the thing so denoted, then 'Margaret Truman' applies to something in a possible situation only if it has property *p*. (34 and 43-4)

The alleged conventionality of (1) no doubt will raise eyebrows. Someone might adopt in place of (1):

> 2. If 'Margaret Truman' denotes a biological organism, then if *p* is the culinary disposition of the thing so denoted, then 'Margaret Truman' applies to something in a possible situation only if it has property *p*.

Both (1) and (2) have claim to generating *a posteriori* necessary truths. Suppose an essence is constructed for an individual by adopting (1). We learn empirically that Margaret is the daughter of Bess, and so discover a necessary truth about Margaret. But if we start with (2) instead and tell a similar story we get the 'result' that it is a synthetic necessary truth that Margaret is fond of bouillabaisse. Should we then conclude that what is, and isn't, essential to a given individual depends upon which conventions we adopt? This proposal is very much at odds with what I take to be Sidelle's position. Sidelle would say not that there is an individual who is essentially born of Bess relative to (1) and essentially fond of bouillabaisse relative to (2) but that there are two individuals – Margaret_1 and Margaret_2, say – in the works, one of whom is essentially born of Bess and the other essentially fond of bouillabaisse. In the course of making essences, conventionally drawing modal boundaries, we make not only kinds but also individuals. One potential worry here is that individuals are too easy to come by. As conventions multiply, we are left with any number

of individuals – many Margarets, so to speak, presently located in the same armchair. I do not myself find this a plausible position. I wish Sidelle had said more about this.

In the concluding part of the book, Sidelle argues for the truth of the basic empiricist semantic claim, which is that there must be 'conventional individuative features in language', and discusses the implications of this for the causal theory of reference. Since there is no real necessity, reference to 'modally extended entities' requires individuative conventions. The causal theory requires both essentialism and *a posteriori* necessity. Since the only acceptable essence is nominal essence, the causal theory requires nominal essence, which is to say an empiricist semantics.

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Alan Soble
The Structure of Love.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
1990. Pp. xiv+320.
US $32.50. ISBN 0-300-04566-2.

This is, I expect, the most technical if not cold-blooded text ever written on this very personal and perennially popular topic. Roger Scruton's controversial *Sexual Desire* a few years ago was, in comparison, downright cuddly. A doctrinaire psychoanalytic treatise would be, by contrast, caring. Occasional expressions of sensitivity appear throughout the pages like bits of fruit in a high fibre cereal, but these are virtually always by way of quotations from some other author or poet, who is then criticized for his (less often her) lack of precision.

Intended as an objection, however, I doubt that a charge of tediousness and insensitivity would bother Soble, who begins by dismissing the worry that his method might seem 'anal-compulsive,' similarly dismissing 'love as a feeling' ('I will let the poets describe the inner phenomenology of love'). (All quotations in this paragraph are from pp. xii-xiii.) He has no desire to 'inspire happy faces to smile into the void' but rather announces his intention to provide only 'detailed

scrutiny of various claims,' the 'logical relations between them' and 'the arguments that are or could be used to defend them.' Soble provides 'a sustained logical probing' which, he admits, may seem 'terribly dry on first reading' but 'when reread, these dry sentences reveal breathing truths about love.' He also dismisses the idea that a work on love inevitably betrays something of the history or personality of the author. ('Some tiny details of my life, I admit, do infect the text, but I'll bet a dollar to a donut that no one will recognize them.') Of course, this is not an original conceit. The late great French semiotician Roland Barthes began his *Lover's Discourse* by insisting 'there is no question here of a history' and 'no author, no subject, just discourse produced.' For Soble, there are 'just arguments produced.' But the comparison between Soble and Barthes ends right there. Despite his disclaimer Barthes goes on to provide a series of very personal, sometimes agonizing expressions of love and its varied experiences.

For Soble, the arguments produced are preferably paradoxes, readily reducible to symbolic form without any of the messiness of 'feelings' or, much worse, actual relationships. He centers much of the book around a particularly silly paradox produced off-handedly some years ago by the distinguished and usually insightful Ernest Gellner. (If x has an emotion toward y in virtue of property S and then meets z who also has property S, then either x has the same emotion toward z and this cannot be love (exclusivity is presupposed as a logical feature of love) or x does not have the same emotion toward z, 'equally constitut[ing] conclusive evidence' that S was 'accidental, arbitrary, and without any of the significance which one normally attrubtes to [love].' [34]) Now such paradoxes have been charmingly toyed with in arguing for or against one or another theory of love (e.g., by Ronald de Sousa in Chapter 5 of his *Rationality of Emotion*) and there is, as Soble demonstrates at great length, a great deal that one can do by way of tinkering with them. I have no doubt that a few readers and reviewers will share his delight in talking at length about love by way of what Margaret Atwood once called 'the biologist's white gloves' ('You asked for love/ I gave you only descriptions.' [*Power Politics*]) Others, I suspect, will share my sense that this shows with embarrassing clarity what has gone so terribly wrong with 'the philosophy of love' and more generally at least some applications of this excruciatingly professionalized version of 'analytic' philosophy. There is the proper and welcome use of analysis to understand and to clarify, and then there is its use to eviscerate.

In the spirit of the enterprise, however, let me point out what seem to me to be two considerable mistakes in the very conception of 'the structure of love'. The first is its underlying essentialism, the uncritical assumption that there *is* something called love, some singular proper analysis of the relationship between love and its 'objects'. There is much to doubt here, and Soble himself rejects the idea of a definition of 'love' as such. But why then should love have a singular 'structure'? 'Love' is very much a *political* term and though Soble (like Scruton) attempts to defend some rather controversial political positions in the name of conceptual analysis, it would seem that, given his project, essentialism should itself be one of his targets rather than one of his presuppositions. And returning to the solid ground of real human relationships, one would think that the first task of any philosopher of love would be to undo the damage that the belief in a 'true' form of love (albeit not in first-order predicate calculus) has inflicted on many people.

Second, the status of the 'object' of love is by no means so obvious as Soble seems to assume. He contrasts the conceptions of 'erosic' and 'agapic' love (two archaic and long-standing polemical designations that have provided volumes of tedium and self-righteousness in the literature on the subject), defined in terms of the ontological status of the properties in virtue of which one loves. Basically, 'erosic' love is 'property-based' or 'reason-dependent'; that is, *x* loves *y* because of some property (or set of properties). (Horrid neologism, 'erosic', and etymologically more closely related to 'erosion' than to 'eros'.) Agapic love denies this (for example, in the name of the woolly claim that one only loves 'the whole person'). I must say that there is no attempt whatever to make these eccentric uses of these archaic terms clear or interesting to the ordinary philosophical reader. (Perhaps one can expect to find illumination in Soble's suggested further readings.) But isn't it possible that the very notion of 'intentionality' is in some important way inappropriate here, that the 'object' of love has only minimally to do with properties or reasons as such and much more to do with the conception, dynamics and history of a relationship. (This would include unrequited and other eccentric relationships.) Soble repeatedly claims to be 'bewildered' by such claims (e.g., 304).

Soble takes pride in the fact that the technical and detailed complexity of his analysis betrays nothing personal, but between the lines of his often prickly barbed-wire prose there is indeed a personal confession (and not just 'tiny details'). But I'll keep my dollar donut and my mouth shut and not look for the structure of love in all the wrong places.

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Editor's Note

The anglophone editor of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews
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is pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

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R.A. Shiner