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Editorial Announcement

New Editorship

This issue marks a transition for *Philosophy in Review*, as it is the first under our editorship of the journal, which passes to us from Roger Shiner and Robert Burch. It is our goal and commitment to carry on in their tradition of dedication to philosophy and to the profession of philosophy. Our readers and reviewers should expect to see the identity of this journal maintained, not changed.

Over the twenty-five years of its existence, *PIR* has grown from its Canadian roots into an international journal, reviewing philosophical books no matter what their country of publication, with reviewers and readers hailing from every continent except Antarctica. Though *PIR*'s roots will always be in Canada, we will continue to serve this enormous and enormously widespread community. We take this opportunity to express our gratitude to the outgoing editors, and indeed all the previous editors of this journal. We appreciate your work and dedication in bringing *PIR* to its current robust health. In particular we would like to express our thanks to Roger Shiner, who brought this journal into existence two and a half decades ago and has nurtured and guided it to this day. We also take this opportunity to thank the many publishers who generously provide *PIR* with books for review, our freelance army of dedicated reviewers who create the content of *PIR*, and most crucially our legions of readers. To all of you, without whom *PIR* would not exist, we owe a debt of gratitude.

Jeffrey Foss
David Scott
University of Victoria

Ron Amundson
The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary Thought.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp xiii + 280.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-80699-2);
US$60.00 (e-book: ISBN B0009V6CCV).

History is used by scientists in part to affirm the rightness of their cause, and nowhere more than in the history of evolutionary theory. Ron Amundson, of the University of Hawai'i at Hilo, presents a historical revision of the standard story told by adherents of the Modern Synthesis — in particular by Ernst Mayr — regarding essentialism, morphology, and adaptation. In so doing, he reintroduces development into that story, and distinguishes morphological traditions from idealism and the argument from design, which played so great a part in natural theology, and to which Darwin responded. Amundson's work is the latest in a series of similar revisions undertaken by several researchers, among them Robert J. Richards, Polly Winsor, Lynn Nyhart and Gordon McOuat, finding gaps and misrepresentations of the history of biology by what Winsor calls the 'received view' and Amundson calls 'Synthesis Historiography': the historical account proffered by the architects of the modern synthesis, particularly Mayr. There is something of a revolution occurring in the history of evolutionary theory, morphology, and systematics that seeks to overturn the accounts put forward, often by scientists themselves, to support the synthesis, and this book may very well serve to crystallize it into a coherent school of thought. Amundson addresses several crucial areas: species fixism, essentialism, and typology, in the first part of the book; heredity, and the disconnect between developmental biology and genetics in the post-Mendelian era, in the second.

It has long been known that the standard view, whatever it is called, is a rhetorical device used by scientists and philosophers to affirm the novelty of the new science. Scientists do this in every science — from astronomy to geology, science is a Whig historian, finding precursors to the present everywhere, and chronicling the triumph of the 'right' view. Mayr and other evolutionists did this too. The difficulty, for a historian of science, is to figure out what interests this served, and to work out what of the past is really like it is portrayed in the textbook views. Amundson shows some things that may surprise readers who only know the textbook accounts. For a start, the idea that species were fixed is a mid-17th century invention. Amundson fingers Linnaeus, but I think it's John Ray or a bit earlier. Older accounts of species had them able to change through hybridism or in ways that had to do with the nature of generation.

Moreover, essentialism, one of Mayr's *bêtes noirs*, doesn't make an appearance in biological systematics until Hugh Strickland, in the 1830s. And oddly, Darwin is an enabler here — the Strickland Rules were something he was

crucial in getting adopted. Amundson points out that these were not essentialist in the way Mayr wrongly thought, that species were composed of their causal essence, but only in a formal, nomenclatural, and diagnostic sense — species had better have a name and a definition or else we couldn't tell what we were referring to when we used a species name. That is pretty harmless.

Worse, the Mayrian claim that ideal morphology was a creationist view, or an example of the 'idealist version of the argument from design', is historically false. The ideal morphologists associated with Goethe and Oken, and present in Britain in the person of Richard Owen, were neither statists (that is, opposed to temporal change of form) nor creationists. Instead, they expected that form could change over time, and were more interested in developmental sequences than evolution in the broader sense (for 'evolution' originally meant development).

Amundson presents in detail Owen's ideas and influence on the subsequent debate, as well as those of Cuvier, Martin Barry, and others on Darwin himself. Then, in Part II, he addresses the invention of heredity in science, and the neo-Darwinian accounts of evolution, in a new and fresh way. In particular he deals with the 'eclipse' of Darwin, so named by Huxley and dealt with by historian Peter Bowler in a book by that name, following Jean Gayon, who argued that the reason Darwin was eclipsed from 1890 to 1930 was reasonably simple: natural selection hadn't yet run up the scientific credentials. By 1930, it had.

He notes that for the early evolutionary thinkers who followed the introduction of Mendelism, development was a 'black box' that was not tractable with the tools of the new genetics. There is an extensive discussion of Thomas Hunt Morgan's ideas, and how they developed, so to speak, in reaction to the 'unit character' notion of genes in Hugo De Vries and William Bateson's thought. He discusses the influence of the Morgan (or Mendelian) Chromosomal Theory of Heredity on explanation in biology, noting that Morgan himself treated genetic 'cause' as a single difference between genetic material that led to a different form. Much of the later framing of the genetic debate relied on Morgan's sidelining of development and use of Weismann as the geneticist *par excellence*, which he was not, of course, being an experimental embryologist.

Among the many interesting discussions, Amundson points out that a much-attacked developmental biologist, Conrad Waddington, in fact had a substantial impact upon the ideas of Ernst Mayr, especially his views on Mayr's views on epigenesis. Mayr's four dichotomies, still influential, are listed, and the ways in which they changed over time are discussed in ample detail: genotype versus phenotype, germ line versus soma, proximate versus ultimate explanations, and typological thinking versus populations thinking. They are all shown to be very far from simple and clear.

I won't go into detail with Amundson's telling of the story — it is worth reading itself, and I urge those interested to do so. One thing that Amundson does is retrieve the 'hidden' history of twentieth-century biology, that of developmental biology, which has been itself eclipsed until quite recently.

Now, with the new field known as 'evo-devo', the evolution of developmental cycles has become the hot new field as it integrates into genetics and the ecological aspects of biology.

I have few criticisms of the book. Its worst sin is pretty much a peccadillo: the naming of positions as '-isms', such as structuralism, essentialism, adaptationism, and so on. I recommend it to those worried that the neo-Darwinian view is all-conquering. I recommend it also to those who think this is a good thing.

John Wilkins
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Marc Augé
Oblivion.
Trans. Marjolijn de Jager.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2004.
Pp.xii + 92.
US$56.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-3566-8);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-3567-6).

In *Oblivion*, Marc Augé challenges the common tendency to value memory over oblivion by arguing that forgetting is essential to memory, and 'our relationship with time passes essentially through oblivion' (25). The book is composed of three chapters and a short 'afterword' which briefly puts together the main points made along the way.

In the first chapter, Augé starts discussing the relation between remembering and forgetting, following Borges, by stating that if we remembered everything we experienced, we would not only run out of space for new information, but also would be unable to live in the present — a perfect memory of each moment of the past would replace our actual time and leave us unable to experience the present. Forgetting is, Augé argues, inherent to memory, rather than being its contrary: we recollect not the facts themselves, but our perception of these facts as we interpret and recollect them. Hence, what is left to us is already eroded and shaped by oblivion, and, naturally, our memory is always full of holes and gaps — the traces of oblivion.

Augé thinks that memory and oblivion are entwined just like life and death — making it impossible to fully grasp one without the other. Besides the obvious similarity (of life to memory and oblivion to death), the parallel, between memory and oblivion on one hand and life and death on the other, can be conceived at least in two ways: first, one has to live today and

remember that one will die one day; second, death belongs to the past and one has to live with the memory of this past. Augé suggests that Christian thinking is closer to the first way, whereas the second way is inherent to the reincarnative view and the belief in the return of ancestors (or materialization of gods in the present) in various appearances, as can be found in some African societies. A more acute awareness of, and concern for, the subsistence of the past in the present follow from this second case. This, according to Augé, indicates that our conception of the relation between memory and oblivion, and the way we experience time, are tightly knitted.

An awareness of different ways of remembering, Augé thinks, can help us better understand ourselves — both on the personal and the social level. On the personal level, most of our recollections from the past are incorporated in a story. We do not simply remember images, but put them in a meaningful story, which is, especially in the case of childhood memories, shaped by the tales of our parents, friends, etc. Since we repress not the remembrances themselves but the connections that we found between them, freeing the images from these connections can liberate us from repression. What one should do, following Pontalis, is 'remember less but rather make associations, free associations, as the Surrealists tried to do' (23), unraveling the already established links and letting new associations appear.

On the social level, Augé suggests that encountering different societies, their languages, and their thought patterns, is an effective way of discovering various ways of relating to ourselves. Seeing that other people make sense of physical facts through different conceptions of time and patterns of remembering and oblivion, encourages us to reflect on the ways we understand these concepts. In this respect, ethnology helps us better understand time, and the ways we and other people conceive time — for not only is the way we relate to time closely connected to oblivion, but also various conceptions of time gathered through ethnography have narrative virtue, and 'on these, grounds, they are configurations of time, in the words of Paul Ricouer' (25).

The second chapter focuses on Augé's explication of the narrative aspect of life, with many references to ethnography. He suggests that, while studying another society, an ethnologist may incline to take the lives of others as a 'fiction' (which is less 'real' than the observer's life) that she watches as a distanced, objective witness. But, Augé suggests, the rules and the system of symbols of a society become visible in lived experiences and narratives; thus if we attempt to understand them from outside as distanced onlookers, what we get will not be an 'actual text' but rather a dictionary or 'directory' in Ricoeur's terms (32). That is, one can get some definition for each element, yet a proper understanding of the connections between them would be missing. We experience real life as a complex network of stories in which we take part, and about which we tell other people; a solely symbolic analysis cannot capture the richness of this intricate network. If an ethnographer locates herself outside of the narratives of others, she situates herself in a different time than others — as though she is in real time and the 'subjects'

of her study are living in a mythical, magical time. Once this distance is removed, her closer involvement with others' narratives will enable her to understand that she also lives in a narrative.

According to Augé, we live in multiple narratives at the same time and play different roles in each of them. These stories are produced through oblivion and remembrance, which carry in themselves the present, our anxious future expectations, and our rereadings of the past. Not always are we the makers of the stories — our individual stories are parts of larger, collective narratives, and sometimes we are only an actor in someone else's story.

Augé devotes the third chapter to an analysis of the three figures of oblivion, drawing illustrations from some African and American rites in which these figures are materialized. They are, first, *return*, i.e., discovering a lost past by forgetting the present moment and near past (exemplified by the ritual of possession); second, *suspense*, which, as realized in the rites of interregnum, focuses on the present by isolating it from the past and the future; third, *beginning*, or re-beginning, the aim of which is forgetting the past, with the hope of finding a new, unknown future through forming new conditions — just like a new birth opens up a new future.

These figures of oblivion, Augé suggests, operate on both collective and individual levels. As can be seen in the rituals illustrating them, they are not only social events in which many people take part, but also personal experiences that put individuals to the test and help build individual identity in society. What they mean to the individual and to the crowd may not be the same, yet rituals bring people close and open a new future for them. There are many ways these figures find expression; Augé draws a number of examples from various literary works by authors such as Dumas, Stendhal and Proust to illustrate some of these ways.

In his analysis, Augé makes good use of his background in ethnography and his knowledge in diverse areas, including literature, psychology, and philosophy. He does not attempt to offer a systematic theory of oblivion; sometimes he digresses from the main argument to make separate points or to tell the reader about his personal experiences as an ethnographer and an avid reader of literature. This can be construed as both a strength and weakness of Augé's style: at times it makes it hard for the reader to keep track of the his line of thought, but it also allows the author to relate to the reader on a more intimate level by preserving the link between theory and lived experience.

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Ian Bell
Metaphysics as an Aristotelian Science.
Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2004.
Pp. 261.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 3-89665-292-3).

In the early books of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle explicitly refers to several concepts central to his *Posterior Analytics*, and asks whether the science, later identified as the science of being *qua* being, should be demonstrative. This alone might suggest a possible influence of the *Posterior Analytics* on the *Metaphysics* (the latter generally accepted as a later work). In light of the central place that each treatise takes in the Aristotelian corpus, the question of the nature of such an influence, if one is to be found, should turn out to be of considerable importance. Bell's book aims to answer this very question.

On Bell's interpretation, we find the core of the influence of the *Posterior Analytics* on the *Metaphysics* in what he calls the methodological chapters: 1.1-2, 3.2, 4.1-3, and 6.1. His interpretation is based in major part on the conceptual affinity of the meaning of '*qua*' (*hêi*) in the phrase '*qua* itself' (*hêi auto*) in *Posterior Analytics* 1.4 and 'being *qua* being' (*to on hêi on*) in the *Metaphysics* (23-6, 40-3). The *qua* locution, according to Bell, specifies the level of generality at which the science of being *qua* being studies its objects, that is, insofar as its objects belong to all things *qua* beings or substances. It is this adverbial use of *qua* that enables Aristotle to distinguish the science of being *qua* being from the other sciences and to unify the inquiries of its three distinct objects: principles and causes of being *qua* being, its essential attributes, and common axioms. The book investigates Aristotle's methodologies in his treatment of each object, respectively, and finds a close resemblance between the *Metaphysics'* inquiry into the essential attributes of being and the *Posterior Analytics'* inquiry into demonstrative science.

In addition to the general thesis of the influence of the *Posterior Analytics* on the *Metaphysics*, the book makes a contribution with regard to several related and unrelated issues. It shows Aristotle's motivation behind the otherwise unexpected introduction of the science of being *qua* being in 4.1, and, more generally, it shows how the adverbial use of *qua* enables Aristotle to solve some of the *aporiae* of 3.1. Whether or not Bell gets it right, identifying the essential attributes of being *qua* being with sameness, otherness and the like in the fifth *aporia*, his overall discussion of this *aporia* (99-113) is impressive. Engaging in particular is Bell's line of thought that shows how Aristotle's conception of the science of being is a refinement of the conception of 'wisdom' introduced in the first book of the *Metaphysics*. Bell also offers an interesting perspective regarding the development of Aristotle's thought (a subject which has recently regained scholarly attention), not to mention a possible solution to the potential problem of the identification of first philosophy with the science of being *qua* being in *Metaphysics* 6.1.

This is a stimulating and very useful book. It is written in a clear, economical, and well-structured manner. Bell's choice to leave key terms and expressions in Greek, and in Greek script, is a sound one, for it enables the reader to focus on what Aristotle himself said, avoiding any possible indoctrination. This excludes the book from the scope of the general public, yet it seems appropriate, for the book is based in major part on a textual exegesis.

In light of the highly controversial nature of the relevant parts of both the *Posterior Analytics* and *Metaphysics*, perhaps it should not be surprising that some major points in Bell's interpretation are vulnerable to criticism. I will mention two such points. According to the traditional understanding, the second 'being' in the phrase 'being *qua* being' refers to what Aristotle calls the 'primary substance', be it 'god' or sensible substance (*a this*). While securing for 'being *qua* being' the most general meaning (being *qua* all kinds of beings and substances), Bell criticizes those who reduce its meaning to 'being *qua* primary substance'. It is not clear, however, why we cannot take the primary substance as the source of being of all kinds of being insofar as they are such. In other words, Bell should convincingly show why the reading '*qua* primary substance' cannot allow the science of being *qua* being ' ... to study *all* beings (or at least all substances) at a certain level of generality, namely, insofar as they are beings and substances' (191).

I suspect that a major criticism of Bell's claim for the influence of the *Posterior Analytics* on the *Metaphysics* will rely on the lack of clear textual evidence of such an influence in the latter, a lack that Bell fully acknowledges, even if sometimes in an apologetic tone. Bell rightly points out that, despite Aristotle's emphasis on the demonstrative proof-structure as the ideal scientific model, he hardly uses it throughout his writings; and the *Metaphysics* is not an exception. I agree with Bell that the claimed influence does not require explicit demonstrative examples. However, in light of the nature of his project, Bell might wish to say more about the troublesome lack of practical application of Aristotle's demonstrative theory.

By the end of the book Bell modestly presents his project as an attempt to integrate pieces of existing scholarship in one coherent picture (226). However, his own contribution goes over and above a mere compilation. He offers a well balanced exposition of his original line of thought with thorough discussion of secondary literature. Whether or not one agrees with some of his conclusions, Bell provides a coherent and plausible picture of the possible influence of the *Posterior Analytics* on the *Metaphysics*. Among other things, he argues that the scientific interests of the *Posterior Analytics* evolved rather than disappeared, and were not necessarily diminished by the time Aristotle wrote his *Metaphysics*. Bell's book will be of much interest for Aristotelians, especially students of the *Metaphysics*.

Zeev Perelmuter
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John D. Caputo and
Michael J. Scanlon, eds.
Augustine and Postmodernism: Confessions and Circumfession.
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Pp. viii + 264.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-34507-3);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21731-8).

In *Augustine and Postmodernism: Confessions and Circumfession,* Jacques Derrida and an international group of postmodern, or deconstructionist, philosophers offer their thoughts on philosophy of religion, specifically on the theology of Saint Augustine.

To review *Augustine and Postmodernism: Confessions and Circumfession* is an exceedingly challenging task, and I will have to start off with a confession of my own: I am incompetent to read the vast majority of the essays included in the volume. Really. Derrida and Bennington suggest disengaging confession from truth and seeing it rather as an event. Stronger still, they suggest that confession has nothing to do with the truth. But I am truthful here. I have always thought of myself as a pretty good reader, but the essays in *Augustine and Postmodernism* taught me otherwise. They exceeded and frustrated my professed competency. Many essays in the volume lack the philosophical clarity and linear style familiar to me and from the very get-go I felt entirely lost in them. But since they are coming from deconstructionists, I am guessing that my confusion would have been intended and welcomed by the authors. After all, deconstructionists deliberately aim to defeat and confuse our neatly prearranged concepts. Yet this very effort to continuously disturb and defeat 'understanding' or 'knowing' makes speaking to the work of Derrida and the other authors in the volume quite a challenge. I will surely end up pigeonholing, shriveling, or reducing the ideas expressed in *Augustine and Postmodernism* to their bare bones. Avoiding that, I chance to offer merely a reiteration of the words and gestures of the authors. Either way, describing, naming, says the postmodernist, inevitably does harm. Perhaps the harm is already done even before the describing. But Derrida gestures at a possibility. He maintains that in speaking, one can *make* truth; one can *do* truth, something, which has nothing to do with what we generally associate with truth. It is, says Derrida, 'not enough to *bring to knowledge*, to *make known what is* , for example *to inform* you ... .' Making or doing truth has rather to do with asking for pardon. So, I will ask for your pardon right off the bat, remain a little longer where *Augustine and Postmodernism* has brought me — on a threshold of bewilderment and ambiguity — and try to speak to the volume. After all, if we cannot name things, or consider things under conceptual umbrellas, then we cannot speak. In that case, we might as well give up on philosophy altogether.

Augustine and Postmodernism is separated in two parts. The first part, titled 'After the Event', is short, and contains an essay by Derrida as well as

the transcripts of a round-table discussion with him. The second part, titled 'Confessions and Circumfession', contains eleven essays by new as well as established philosophers.

One of these, an essay by Hent de Vries, titled 'Instances', raises, contrary to the suggestion that 'one simple question' will be explored, numerous questions regarding temporal modes in the work of Augustine, Derrida and Lyotard. Of particular interest is de Vries' exploration of these questions through the looking glass of the tradition of spiritual exercises. Using questions, which are raised by the work of Pierre Hadot, de Vries explores Derrida's meditations on Augustine.

Another essay in Part II, 'Shedding Tears Beyond Being' by John D. Caputo, reminds one of the words of Augustine himself: 'the divine equilibrium between beauty and use should also be found in man ... .upon whom is bestowed the gift of making beautiful things'. Caputo has the gift of making an essay into a beautiful thing. His poetic writing embodies an intellectual sensibility befitting the topic of the exploration: faith, prayer, and uncertainty.

Among the many other gems in the collection are the already mentioned essay by Geoffrey Bennington titled 'Time — for the Truth', and the essay by Richard Kearney titled 'Time, Evil and Narrative'.

Some of the essays in Part II include responses by Derrida. Noteworthy are the essays by Philippe Capelle titled 'Heidegger: Reader of Augustine' and by Mark Vessey titled 'Reading like Angels'. Both essays include very eloquent and elegant responses by Derrida.

The volume comes to a close with an essay by Jean Bethke Elshtain titled 'Why Augustine? Why Now?' Quoting Peter Brown as saying that Augustine has 'come as near to us ... .as the vast gulf that separates a modern man from the culture and religion of the later empire can allow,' she concludes the volume with her exploration of this contemporary appeal of Augustine.

Saint Augustine counseled that patience is the companion of wisdom. And this post-modern contribution to the growing field of philosophy of religion requires patience. *Augustine and Postmodernism* is a challenging read. It breaks and strikes, as Geoffrey Bennington says in *Time — for the Truth*, one's competency as a reader. At times, the text, filled as it is with lengthy quotes, dismembered words and phrases, brackets, dashes and slashes, is at times bewildering and inhospitable. This is surprising given the amount of attention given to the theme of hospitality by Derrida himself. In the essay composing *'Circumfession'* which is included in Part I of the volume, Derrida distinguishes between hospitality of invitation and that of visitation. The latter implies that the visitor may come and be received without conditions while the former implies that the visitor is welcomed under some conditions. Those reading *Augustine and Postmodernism* are invited to read in that very sense Derrida delineates: under the condition of at times obscure, irksome and wearing writing.

Yet as George Bennington suggests in 'Time — for the Truth', the very experience of not knowing how to read the text affirms one's reading, and

there might indeed be something like a truth in the unpleasant infringement of ambiguity and confusion. In responding to the lovely essay titled 'The Form of an "I" ' by Catherine Malabou, Derrida admits that even after having read her work twice, a third reading seemed like a first, revealing many things to which he had been blind before. This, to him, was a strange experience, which made the essay all the more enjoyable. I am guessing that many readers might experience, as I did, reading *Augustine and Postmodernism* in the same way — as a strange and enjoyable read.

Gerda Wever-Rabehl

John W. Carroll, ed.
Readings on Laws of Nature.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 2004.
Pp. viii + 284.
US$26.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8229-5852-X).

The rise of modern science has brought the attention of scientists and philosophers alike to laws of nature as regularities which persist and turn out to be projectible. The original religious connotation of 'laws of nature' has long since withered away, but the basic problems remain: What makes them different from accidental regularities? Are they metaphysically grounded? Do they support inductive inference? What sorts are there in science?' Answers to these questions mark the divides between alternative accounts.

The dominant viewpoint on these questions — framed by John Stuart Mill, revived in the twentieth century by Frank Ramsey, and most recently professed by David Lewis — used to be the regularity view, according to which laws form the class of basic (the simplest and most informative) regularities from which the remaining ones could be derived. The publications of David Armstrong, Fred Dretske, and Michael Tooley in the late 1970's and the early 1980's brought out a pre-modern topic, i.e. the issue of metaphysical grounds for laws. On the necessitarian account they propounded, laws manifest necessary links between universals, while other regularities do not.

The anthology collected by John Carroll assumes familiarity of the reader with many of the contributions mentioned that have shaped the recent form of the divide between regularity and necessitarian accounts. Ramsey's, Armstrong's, and Lewis' texts are intentionally omitted.

The book opens with an introduction by Carroll, which is a thoroughly revised version of a paper (2000) and an encyclopedia entry (2003). It is very

useful, for it outlines the recent state of the discussion (since the 1940's), as well as marks where the twelve contributions appearing in the anthology belong in the chronological order.

Carroll identifies four central problems in debates on laws, which to a large extent organize the content of the book. And these are: the distinction between laws and accidental regularities (lawhood), the relation between laws and inductive inference (induction), the necessity of laws (necessity), and the existence of strictly exceptionless laws as opposed to conditional laws (provisos).

As Carroll makes very clear in his introduction, the current state of the debate on how to characterize laws and distinguish them from accidental generalizations is far from a final resolution: 'Make no mistakes, the divisions are serious ones' (6). To account for the nature of laws remains the major challenge for many philosophers. This is also reflected in the book, as five out of twelve of Carroll's selections come to terms with this challenge.

The two classic papers, Dretske's 'Laws of Nature' (selection 1) and Tooley's 'The Nature of Laws' (selection 2), propound the familiar view that laws manifest an underlying metaphysical necessitation relation between universals. Barry Loewer's 'Humean Supervenience' (selection 10) is a much more recent exposition of the alternative viewpoint on laws. He defends a version of the regularity account of laws. On his view, a law is a theorem of an axiom system of knowledge that is the best combination of simplicity and informativeness. Loewer's version of the best systems account of laws is significantly different from Lewis' original, as it assumes omnipotence, and attributes informativeness to theorems rather than to axioms. He identifies an epistemological superiority of the regularity view of laws in its being able to account for the same evidence as do the necessitarian accounts of Dretske, Tooley, and most prominently, Armstrong, without 'positing non-Humean properties' (199).

Beebee's 'The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature' (selection 12) represents an original line of criticism of the necessitarian view. She identifies a motivation for the felt need of metaphysical grounds for laws in the intuition that laws 'govern' rather than 'describe' as proponents of the regularity view have it. She finds the intuition misguided on conceptual grounds, a false metaphor based on an analogy with other kinds of laws.

Both accounts of laws have been severely criticized by skeptics, most prominently by Bas van Fraassen in his *Laws and Symmetry*. Carroll's decision to include 'Armstrong on Laws and Probabilities' (selection 6) may seem somewhat unfortunate, as Armstrong's views are not represented in the book. *Laws and Symmetry*, however, contains sections with extensive discussion of Drestke's, Tooley's, and Lewis' accounts, which would more coherently fit with the remaining selections in *Readings*. Besides, van Fraassen comes up with general problems that any account of laws has to address, namely the well known duet: identification and inference. I cannot imagine a serious discussion of laws not mentioning these problems, and therefore I am uneasy about Carroll's omitting it in the anthology.

Carroll's second central problem for accounts of laws is induction. Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter in 'Confirmation and the Nomological' (selection 4) challenge Nelson Goodman's claim that only law-like statements are capable of being confirmed by their instances. As the condition for a sample to confer confirmation on a generalization (law-like or not) that all *F*s are *G*s, they propose a nomological condition which is supposed to assure that *F*s and *G*s are nomologically bounded both in the sample and beyond it. Elliott Sober in 'Confirmation and Law-likeness' (selection 7) compellingly argues that the nomological condition may well be one among other sufficient conditions, but it surely is not a necessary condition for an instance to confirm a generalization. Even if we assume that the mechanism of composing an urn is known, a generalization that is accidental on this mechanism could still be confirmed by its instances if the posterior probability goes up as it does in Sober's example. Sober words it characteristically: 'Observations have confirmatory significance only within the context of a set of background assumptions' (139-40).

John Foster's 'Induction, Explanation, and Natural Necessity' (selection 5) adopts Dretske's and Armstrong's model of inductive inference. An observed law-like regularity is best explained as a manifestation of a natural necessity (law), which in turn sustains its projectibility on its unexamined instances. Further, it is claimed that on the regularity accounts laws cannot explain their instances, and the inductive inference is therefore crippled. To challenge Foster's account, Carroll in his 'Introduction' points to Sober's conclusion that 'the confirmation of a hypothesis or its unexamined instances will always be sensitive to what background beliefs are in place' (8). More, however, would need to be said to make it apparent how Sober's criticism of the essay of Jackson and Pargetter bears on Foster.

The problem of necessity, and more generally, the issue of such properties of laws as being universal, exceptionless, explanatory, having stability, or having unifying power, is much underrepresented in *Readings,* with only one selection addressing the third of Carroll's central problems. John Bigelow, Brian Ellis, and Caroline Lierse in 'The World as One of a Kind' (selection 8) focus on natural kinds as the metaphysical ground for laws. This is an early exposition of the view that in more recent publications of Ellis and Lierse has evolved into dispositional essentialism. However, none of the recent accounts of laws in terms of causal powers, capacities, mechanisms, or stability and invariance find their place in the anthology. In particular, James Woodward's classic 'Realism about Laws' would fit nicely in the book as it builds on the criticism of Tooley's standpoint.

Recently revived, Hempel's problem of provisos is represented by three selections. In '*Ceteris Paribus*, There Is No Problem of Provisos' John Earman and John Roberts (selection 11) respond to points addressed by Nancy Cartwright, represented here in 'Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?' (selection 3), and to Marc Lange's argument in 'Natural Laws and the Problem of Provisos' (selection 9).

Carroll's anthology is an excellent introduction to recent debates on laws which focus mostly on the problem of *ceteris paribus* conditions. For anyone familiar with the early exposition of necessitarian and regularity views in the 1970s and 1980s, this collection is most valuable as it brings together some of the most important recent contributions. Nonetheless, including papers discussing laws in the context of invariance, reliability, and Bayesianism would have made the anthology a more comprehensive guide.

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Andrea Clausen
How Can Conceptual Content Be Social and Normative, and, at the Same Time, Be Objective?
Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2004.
Pp. 267.
US$79.95. ISBN 3-937202-57-9.

Clausen's study focuses on the claim that social practices are constitutive of conceptual content, a claim endorsed by thinkers from Kripke and Wittgenstein to Brandom. Yet, the attempt to reduce semantics to pragmatics seems problematic, since if conceptual content is constituted by social practices then it is hard to see how that content could in any way be objective. The result seems to be a lack of attitude-transcendence, i.e., objectivity simply reduces to consensus and thus appears to be objectivity in name only. Clausen's project is to argue that this need not be the case, viz., that, as her title indicates, conceptual content can be social, normative, *and* objective. Clausen reviews non-normative, naturalistic, and pragmatist answers to her guiding question, and her text is thus a useful survey of the literature. Clausen also defends her own position, which is a variant of the kind of conceptual-role semantics Brandom defends in *Making It Explicit*. But Clausen's position is hardly old wine in a new skin; while endorsing Brandom's general approach she attempts to emend and extend the same.

Drawing on the distinction between what is correct and what is taken to be correct, Clausen construes objectivity in terms of 'attitude-transcendence', i.e., the claim that the structure of social practices presupposes the possibility that an entire community can be wrong. On this account, error concerns the appropriateness of the conditions under which an assertion is evaluated as correct. Clausen's main thesis is that the very practices that confer concep-

tual content implicitly contain norms concerning the correct use of expressions, and her success in saving objectivity hinges upon her ability to defend this thesis. Clausen begins her defense by considering Kripke's reflections on rule-following. By addressing Kripke's response to skeptical problems regarding rule-following Clausen begins to sketch the notion of attitude-transcendence that is central to her overall argument. Kripke's focus on the mutual assessment of language users leads, she claims, to a privileging of the community's perspective and, thus, to an inability to account for objectivity. Yet, Clausen argues that the vast literature on Kripke and rule-following has failed to diagnose the reason that his account fails. In the end, Clausen argues for an interpretation of content in terms of inferential role semantics such that content is *intrinsically* normative (Kripke's mistake was in not realizing this): as Brandom famously puts it, it's 'norms all the way down'. Her defense of this position in Part I of the text, especially in the context of the Kripke-discussion, is quite informative and does a fine job of surveying and critically appraising the literature.

Part II of Clausen's text is devoted to analyses of naturalistic (Esfeld, Pettit, and Haugeland), pragmatist-existentialist (Heidegger), and 'primitivist' (Brandom and McDowell) answers to her guiding question. While Part II often lacks the analytic rigor displayed in Part I, it is the portion of her text that will garner the most attention. Unfortunately, at times Clausen's language confuses rather than clarifies, and, given the complexity of the positions she addresses, this is unacceptable. This may be a result of Clausen's translation from the original German (the book is based on her dissertation) into English. Nevertheless, these occasional lapses in clarity hardly outweigh the benefits of Clausen's argument.

Taking Esfeld's work as representative of a naturalistic approach, Clausen argues that he conceives of constitutive practices in purely intersubjective terms, and thus fails to account for the objectivity of conceptual content. The core problem, according to Clausen, is that naturalistic approaches are committed to a pre-inferential and pre-conceptual notion of constitutive practice. As such, a version of the naturalistic fallacy is committed, since norms are held to be antecedent to, and in some way dependent upon, factual matters. If Clausen is correct that attitude-transcendence is an essential feature of objectivity, then the approaches of Esfeld et al. fail precisely since they do not make room for attitude-transcendent normativity. Dependence upon a process for determining which natural dispositions are reliable is, presumably, the problem with naturalistic approaches. Heidegger seems to offer a way around this problem, since his focus on pre-conceptual practice (our everyday ' coping') avoids naturalistic assumptions. However, Clausen avers that a Heideggerian focus on *pre-assertional* practices cannot make room for objectivity. This critique of Heidegger focuses on the dependence of inferential relations upon conceptual capacities, which Heidegger's position denies. Here, we reach the bedrock of Clausen's question, viz., the possibility of construing referential relations in terms of inferential relations.

Clausen devotes the last chapter to a consideration of a 'primitivist' answer to her guiding question. She claims that assertions and inferences are the proper focus rather than pre-linguistic performances and, especially, that determining 'correctness' is a matter of navigating between perspectives of language-users. Clausen argues that it is precisely such navigation (in combination with social-inferential 'triangulation') that makes room for the attitude-transcendence that she identifies as the necessary and sufficient condition of objectivity. In this regard, Clausen makes good use of Brandom's method of 'making explicit', which she claims permits her to remain within a wholly pragmatist framework (i.e., no naturalistic or non-normative assumptions are presumed). However, Clausen also focuses on problems with Brandom's 'objectivity proofs' in *Making It Explicit*, rejecting his claim that 'S asserts that *p*' does not entail '*p*'. Brandom's error, she argues, results from not fully appreciating that content as well as assertions must be the focus of scorekeeping practices. This leads Clausen to articulate a form of conceptual realism, i.e., the notion that conceptual content and worldly entities are both made and found (i.e., the notion of a world that is resistant to some interpretations). Although her defense of this thesis is problematic (frequent conceptual confusions, glossing over potential inconsistencies, etc.), she does present the raw materials for future work.

Clausen effectively responds to the guiding question of her text and does a fine job of navigating her way through the literature. This last aspect is particularly helpful for those looking for an overview of work in the field. But her own position also merits attention. Despite occasional lapses in clarity, her argument is at once thoughtful and thought-provoking.

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Finn Collin and **Finn Guldmann**
Meaning, Use and Truth:
Introducing the Philosophy of Language.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing 2005.
Pp. ix + 301.
US$84.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7546-0785-5);
US$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7546-0759-3).

Collin and Guldmann have produced a solid introduction to the philosophy of language. Taking the truth-conditions of an assertion as the central notion, they discuss the issues involved in generating a specification of the truth-conditions of an arbitrary utterance of a sentence of a language, including the proper construal of basic notions deployed in such a theory, e.g., truth

and reference, and the difficulties presented by non-extensional contexts of various sorts. They cover the extension of the basic theory to non-assertoric speech and discuss the overall role of a semantic theory in an account of what people do with language. They also consider challenges to this overall approach from Wittgensteinians, cognitive semantics, Dummettian verificationists and those on the 'pragmatic' side of what have lately been called 'the semantics-pragmatics wars'. The book includes discussion of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Tarski, Quine, Putnam, Dummett, Grice, Davidson, Kripke and Lewis, among others, and it ultimately ties its stated topic into broader philosophical issues.

In judging an introductory text it is important to be clear what the standards are. Criticisms of detail are not necessarily germane; what must be asked is whether a diligent student could, through study of the text, come to a proper grasp of the outlines of the topic without undue trouble. To this end unclarity and apparent inconsistencies are to be avoided, as are errors about uncontroversial features of language. Interpretations of major figures, when unorthodox, are to be explicitly flagged as such. Technical vocabulary is to be clearly explained upon first use. Viewed in this light, *Meaning, Use and Truth* is only a partial success.

As for clarity, to take one important example readers are told early on that a 'theory of meaning' generates, from a finite base, statements of the conditions of appropriate use of every sentence of a language (34). However, in subsequent pages criticisms of various views do not turn on their unsuitability for this task. For instance, the 'direct reference' view that the meaning of a name is its referent, (the 'label theory' of 43) is criticized for giving rise to Frege's puzzle. However, the puzzle isn't a puzzle about the conditions of appropriate use of identity statements themselves: if *a* is identical to *b*, then '*a* = *b*' shares its truth conditions with '*a* = *a*'. The criticism is especially odd given the emphasis (41) on the basic conception of a 'theory of meaning' to the effect that the meanings of singular terms 'consist in their contribution to the determination of the success conditions (truth conditions) of the sentence': if that were really the view, the implications of the label theory for the semantics of identity statements would be acceptable.

The real problem with the 'label theory' is supposed to be that it doesn't appropriately account for aspects of the speaker' s understanding of sentences (49), a problem that impinges on the theory of meaning officially construed (34) only when it comes to the treatment of attitude contexts, a topic discussed much later in the book (131ff). That it is criticized when attitude contexts aren't in view indicates that there is sometimes more to a 'theory of meaning' than a simple determination of truth conditions: a 'theory of meaning' is sometimes an account of what speakers understand that explains patterns of knowledge and ignorance, or of what constitutes meaning something in particular. That the term is simply ambiguous in this way is, however, not explicitly stated until well into the book (118).

Similar problems can be noted elsewhere. Readers are told both that Quine's reflections on translation are part of a radical skeptical project aimed

at 'the foundations and nature of our knowledge' (228) and that his conclusions about meaning are unwarranted since he fails to produce compelling evidence of semantic indeterminacy in actual cases (255). However Quine admits as much, and Collin and Guldmann make no serious attempt to explain what is wrong with the 'in principle' questions. The discussion of Fregean sense assumes that senses are descriptive (52) but also suggests that they need not be (55). Definite error is also at times evident. The assignment of a set to a predicate as its semantic value is in places treated as equivalent to an enumerative definition and on this basis the view that the semantic value of a predicate is its extension is criticized as making all true predications analytic (69). It is assumed that the relation between an anaphoric dependent and its antecedent is metalinguistic (137). The above problems are mostly minor, but instructors assigning the book will need to be careful to note where it is unclear or mistaken.

When it comes to readings of major figures interpretations that are controversial at best are sometimes on offer. It is claimed that a Kripkean reference chain is on Kripke's view part of the meaning of a name (58) and this leads to heavy weather over how the account is compatible with meaning being what speakers grasp. On a standard reading of Kripke, by contrast, the appeal to such chains merely explains how names have the meanings they do. (This is another instance of trouble about what a 'theory of meaning' is.) Likewise, the principle of charity is presented as though on Davidson's view it has a status akin to that of the demand for simplicity in scientific theory (232, 239) with the result that it looks like an epistemic heuristic for choosing interpretations that are likely to be correct, one backed by a hopeful metaphysical assumption. On Davidson's view properly construed, the principle of charity is, rather, a necessary condition of the assignment of determinate content in any interpretation.

The book's easy way with terminology is also problematic. Examples of terms that are used without explanation or even indexing include 'supervene' (95), 'model theory' (141) and 'equivalence relation' (155). Prospective instructors should be aware of this presupposition of significant philosophical and logical background. Not all is lost, however. Collin and Guldmann often write well and do possess a flair for introductory presentation and, as noted, the plan of the book is basically solid. The book would be usable for an instructor wanting a general introduction to the philosophy of language who was willing to compensate for its weaknesses in class.

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Jacques Derrida and
Elisabeth Roudinesco
For What Tomorrow ... : A Dialogue.
Trans. Jeff Fort.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2004.
Pp. xviii + 238.
US$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4607-9);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4627-3).

Jacques Derrida, notorious for producing intensely difficult works on aspects of the history of philosophy, here shows himself in another light dealing concretely and practically with some of the pressing social and political issues of our day. As the text unfolds, a deep concern for justice emerges, impelled by a call to take responsibility for relevantly inheriting a past history in the light of the singular problems of the present, in order to best determine that history for a future-to-come.

The text takes the form of a dialogue between Derrida and the historian and psychoanalyst Elisabeth Roudinesco. As longtime friends, they share a common history and an intellectual heritage. Taking, as point of departure, Victor Hugo's unsettling reflection 'For what tomorrow will be, no one knows' (ix), Roudinesco and Derrida reveal their own answers to the question of the relation between past, present, and future. 'Everything today,' writes Hugo, 'whether in ideas or in things, in society or in the individual, is in a twilight-state. What is the nature of this twilight? What will come after it?' (ix). The present epoch with its own particular problems is thus the subject of a reflection which immediately presents it as the twilight-state, on one hand, of a past history and, on the other hand, of a future-to-come. Discussion turns around nine topics: the significance of cultural heritage, the multiple uses of the politics of difference, the future of the Western family, the nature of human freedom, the duties that bind humans in relation to animals, the haunting specter of 'revolution,' the past, present, and future forms of anti-Semitism, arguments against the death penalty, and finally, the pertinence of psychoanalysis for the modern world. The nature of today's 'twilight' thus opens up a dialogue which emerges, says Roudinesco, as a text written in 'two hands'.

Up for discussion in Chapter 1, 'Choosing One's Heritage', is the nature of our responsibilities in relation to our 'heritage'. Themselves heirs to a certain history, Derrida and Roudinesco each reflect on their responsibilities in relation to their own past, present, and future. For Derrida, heritage has, as its condition, 'choice'. Inheriting, the process of accepting without accepting everything, is both faithful and unfaithful to its past. In fact, deconstruction takes place as the attempt to responsibly inherit, the attempt to uncover the 'dogmatic moment' grounding the movement of differentiation via which a particular 'heritage' is determined, in order to redeploy this moment in a more pertinent way, making it 'live' differently. The present thus has the

capacity to operate a new dogmatic moment, thus opening its past onto a different future.

Chapter 2, 'Politics of Difference', presents difference as a process of differentiation beyond every kind of limit, whether cultural, national, linguistic, or even human. Both thinkers are wary of the communitarian and the identitarian whose logic tends toward the narcissism of minorities. While Derrida agrees that it may be strategically advisable to join in solidarity under the banner of a certain minoritized identity, he nonetheless mistrusts the identitarian or communitarian logic as such, and, for that matter, every discourse that rests on absolute distinctions. Which is why, moreover, he takes a strong stance against the censorship of material deemed to be apparently 'incorrect' with regard to minorities. Via discussions of the parity movement, the 'politically correct,' censorship, and the sexual harassment 'problem' in American universities, Derrida suggests that absolute distinctions of 'correctness' or 'incorrectness' inevitably browbeat people with stock formulas and wooden language, preventing critical thought, sometimes creating a microclimate of terror and of paranoia, sometimes creating a climate of unperturbed conviction. What is needed is continual vigilance.

Chapter 3, 'Disordered Families', asks whether homosexual parenting, via adoption, same-sex parenting, surrogate motherhood, or artificial insemination, threatens the existence of the traditional family. These new forms of parenting are, for Derrida and Roudinesco alike, transformations rather than abnormalities. Via discussions of the hastily drawn distinction between 'unnatural' reproductions such as surrogacy, adoption and techno-genetic transformations, versus 'natural' reproductions within traditional confines, Derrida reminds us that both 'nature' and 'culture' are reproduced via generalized cloning: the production of something new via the reproduction of the identical. Both thinkers insist that, come what may, there will be *something of* a family: the persistence of an order that produces no determinable familial model.

In 'Unforeseeable Freedom', Derrida reveals his wariness of the term 'freedom', the use of which risks reconstituting a philosophical discourse about freedom in terms of the sovereign independence of the conscious self. Consequently, he remains wary of Roudinesco's desire to 'restore a space of freedom to the subject' (50). Avoiding recourse to sovereignty, Derrida's account of freedom is intrinsically tied up with the 'responsibility' to pertinently choose to redeploy the unavoidable dogmatic moment involved in all determination. 'Freedom' reveals itself simply as 'what happens': the event, the unforeseeable, an excess of complexity in relation to the mechanistic, physicalistic determinism of scientism.

While nonetheless opposing 'Violence against Animals', the subject of Chapter 5, Derrida refuses to attribute rights to animals via a humanistic 'rights of man'. Animals will forever come off second best if their treatment is subject to an ostensibly essential human-animal difference via which animals are granted rights only on the basis of having 'human' qualities. At

stake, rather, is the task of thinking about animal needs via a co-implication in differential relations beyond any human-animal divide.

'The Spirit of the Revolution' suggests that to save the value of revolution we need to transform its very idea. For Derrida, responsibility itself is revolutionary: it requires continually revolutionizing today's global order so as to resolve contemporary problems of unemployment, social marginality, economic war, traffic of arms, terrorism etc.

Derrida and Roudinesco turn, in 'Of the Anti-Semitism to Come', from Derrida's own experience growing up in the Jewish community in Algeria, to the problem of anti-Semitism more generally. Once again opposing the implementation of censorship laws to outlaw transmission of anti-Semitic sentiment, both favor critique 'without respite and without weakness' (117). Derrida reproves, on one hand, the anti-Semitism that often goes hand-in-hand with the condemnation of Israeli politics, while, on the other hand, insisting on the right to criticize all government politics before and ever since the foundation of Israel. Vigilance, again, is the key.

In 'Death Penalties', after recalling that political philosophy from Plato to Hegel, and from Rousseau to Kant, expressly supports the death penalty, Derrida argues rather for the principled and unconditional abolition of the death-penalty. Generally speaking, the political should not require, as its condition, the death of what appears to be contrary to its proper ends.

The dialogue terminates with the question of the significance of psychoanalysis for Derrida, and for the modern world. While he approves of the discipline so dear to Roudinesco, the discipline that provides the common reference throughout the dialogue, Derrida underlines that psychoanalysis must itself be 'critically inherited' in the light of new realities.

For those familiar with Derrida's work, these exchanges offer an insight into the concrete relevance of deconstruction for today's particular problems. To newcomers, this book provides a grounded entry point to a philosopher notorious for his complexity.

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Hent De Vries
Minimal Theologies: Critiques of Secular Reason in Adorno and Levinas.
Trans. Geoffrey Hale.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 2005.
Pp. xxxiv + 720.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8018-8016-5);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8018-8017-3).

Minimal Theologies is the first of Hent de Vries' trilogy of books on the twentieth-century debates around the co-implications of philosophy and religion, a trilogy that also includes *Philosophy and the Turn to Religion* (1999) and *Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida* (2001). Nevertheless, it was the last to be translated into English (from the German: *Theologie im pianissimo: Zur Actualität der Denkfiguren Adorno und Levinas* [Kampen, Neth.: J. H. Kok 1989]).

Not at all a text for beginners, De Vries presupposes in his reader a significant familiarity with Critical Theory, with Adorno and Habermas in particular, with the post/phenomenological tradition, and with Levinas and Derrida. Erudite, rigorous, and extensive, this work makes its way painstakingly through patient analyses of Adorno and Levinas — tracing out the development of the thought of each of these main protagonists with respect to De Vries' own central concern, and in constant dialogue and argument with other interpreters (above all with Habermas and Derrida as interpreters of Adorno and Levinas respectively) — toward the thesis that Adorno and Levinas, each in their own way, recognise and develop the possibilities, and even the 'necessity,' for a 'minimal theology' (*Theologie im pianissimo*) in contemporary (post-Enlightenment) thought: Adorno by way of a critique of dialectics, or negative dialectics, that places itself 'in solidarity with metaphysics at the moment of its downfall,' and Levinas through his phenomenological critique of phenomenology that clears the way for an 'experience' of 'the trace of the other' (of reason).

The thesis of the work — that the structurally 'parallel' critiques of secular (philosophical, but especially Enlightenment) reason in Adorno and Levinas opens a narrow glimpse of 'an Other' already implicated in reason itself, and thus upon 'a minimal theology whose modus operandi lies in the diminishing yet still remaining dimension of the almost invisible, the nearly untouchable, the scarcely audible, *in pianissimo*' (351) — is indeed subtle, and threatens to get to lost in the sometimes labyrinthine studies whereby it is presented to us by De Vries. Or, further, and perhaps more precisely, subtle because De Vries follows Adorno and Levinas in their respective attempts to seek a mode, from somewhere within philosophy, to honour that which exceeds philosophy (the incommensurable, nature, *Autrui*, God). Indeed, part of the thesis is that such does get lost in being systematically excluded by 'secular reason,' particularly in its Enlightenment form. De Vries presents both

Adorno and Levinas as sensitive seekers of 'the other (of reason),' critics of a 'reason' that would attempt to exclude it, but 'reasonable' enough to know that dogmatic assertions of the theological in light of Enlightenment critiques of theology and metaphysics, and of theology as metaphysics, are no longer intellectually viable. Adorno and Levinas, under De Vries' reading, offer two attempts to discover a way of thinking the 'theological' in the age of 'the paradox of the progressively reduced yet increasingly poignant notion of "God" ' (52).

The text unfolds across four major sections, preceded by an introduction and followed by an appendix. In the 'Introduction: Tertium Datur', De Vries lays out the broad terrain across which this 'third' that is neither something that is nor is not is to be discerned. In 'Part One: Antiprolegomena', De Vries, via a study of Habermas' theory of rationality and formal pragmatics, 'analyses the modern critique of, and remaining possibilities for, theology' (44), arguing that such 'must always already, however provisionally and unwittingly, have taken into account theological motifs and their consequences' (17). 'Part Two: Dialectica' follows, in four chapters, the historical development of the thought of Adorno through an analysis of some of his central texts, from the period of the emergence of his early (and enduring) intuitions in his habilitation on Kierkegaard, through his 'middle period' of collaborations with Horkheimer, to the mature works *Negative Dialectics* and *Aesthetic Theory*. 'Part Three, Phaenomenologica' offers a parallel four chapters on Levinas' development from his early analyses of experience through studies in Husserl and Heidegger, his early (underdeveloped but important) work on 'aesthetics,' towards a mature formulation of his 'ethical metaphysics of the other' in terms of the development of new notions of subjectivity coupled with a critique of logocentrism. Each of these two central, expository sections explores — though critically, by means of what De Vries refers to as a *'lectio difficilior'* ('a method according to which the scattered, dissonant, and least articulated motifs and layers of a text express what is plausible within it' [210]) — the conceptual innovations that Adorno and Levinas respectively wrestled through in an attempt to live, and think, 'after Auschwitz', i.e., after the death of the 'God' of theology, but without succumbing, on the other hand, to a 'rigid nihilism'. The study reaches its apogee in 'Part Four: Hermeneutica Sacra sive Profana', in which De Vries offers, in 'Chapter 11: From Unhappy Consciousness to Bad Conscience', his most explicit and concise comparison of and confrontation between Adorno and Levinas on the question of a 'minimal theology,' attempting a kind of 'cross-pollination' and mutual co-illumination between dialectics and phenomenology that allows them to 'express together what neither could express alone' (559). 'Chapter 12: "The Other Theology": Conceptual, Historical, and Political Idolatry' has as its focus the relationship between negative theology and the phenomenon of idolatry as opened up by certain aspects of Adorno's thought. The appendix — presaging one of the major trajectories that De Vries' subsequent works will follow — focuses on the issues surrounding apophatics in Derrida's decontruction.

Minimal Theologies, as a text, is thoroughly 'Germanic' in its style, and one can readily imagine its main thesis (the structural correlations between Adorno and Levinas and their respective contributions toward the recognition and construction of a *Theologie im pianissimo*) being made in a much shorter work, and one that might consequently be, moreover, both more lively and more striking. This thesis, both plausible and potentially helpful, is nevertheless made more so by the breadth of the analyses, even if one wonders whether the breadth of the bridge De Vries constructs here is really necessary to the distance it spans. The main merit of the book may be less in the case that it makes — as insightful and provocative as that is — as the opportunity it affords, to the patient reader, to traverse this arena of thought under the direction of a learned and thoughtful guide capable of helping one to lengthen and sharpen one's contemplative gaze. And for those, like myself, who are more conversant in one of the two main discourses here explored and compared than the other, new vistas for understanding the less well known domain are also opened up. There is much in this work to which I, at least, will no doubt feel inspired to return, and to draw from, again.

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Daniel A. Dombrowski
A Platonic Philosophy of Religion: A Process Perspective.
Albany: State University of New York Press 2005.
Pp. iii + 152.
US$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-6283-8).

The most interesting questions raised by this book relate to the way in which the writings and views of philosophers can or should be interpreted. This hermeneutical issue is central to Dombrowski's text, not least because it is made so explicit by the author himself. He repeatedly draws attention throughout his work to the kind of interpretative lenses that he employs to analyse Plato's philosophy of religion and indeed Plato's philosophical approach generally. By making his interpretative approach so explicit (described as 'a process perspective' in the title), the author is to be thanked for providing the reader with a clear understanding of the hermeneutical direction taken. This might prove an obstacle, however, to those unsympathetic to this kind of interpretation, and could easily result in an over-critical reading by them of this text. Certainly, the constant emphasis on Hartshorne's views on Plato and Platonism seems too intrusive at times, so that

the reader may be drawn to wonder just what is so compelling about Hartshorne's Platonic interpretation that it should be so central to the appraisal in this book of Plato's religious views. What is described as 'Process Theology' or a 'Process Perspective' in the philosophy of religion represents a view of God that rejects divine immutability and absolute transcendence in favour of a God who is partly evolving with and in relation to, and therefore is affected by, the created world, however understood. The dominant emphasis on divine immanence, not surprisingly, often contains strong hints of pantheism, and clearly suggests a strongly anthropomorphic view of God. Many Christians and those of other faiths, including Judaism and Islam, would find such an approach extremely problematic, though some Christians have espoused a 'process perspective'. The question as to whether Plato interprets divinity through a 'process perspective' would be contested by many Platonic scholars.

To be fair to Dombrowski, he does provide quite detailed evidence in support of his own 'process perspective', but there remains the nagging feeling that the position he adopts is too narrow and exclusive, and that what we are getting is a much too reductive account that cannot do adequate justice to the complexity of Plato's religious project. That being said, there is much in this book to recommend it, and it certainly contributes substantially to Platonic scholarship. It is so written that each chapter leads easily on to the next, which makes it easy for the reader to follow the author's general direction.

The introduction sets out the approach to be taken, and Chapter 1 on the World Soul immediately begins a discussion as to whether God can be said to have a body, and if so, what this might mean. What is interesting here is that while the only recorded reference to Jesus is on page 45 of this chapter, nothing is said about the Christian belief in the divine Word made incarnate in Jesus Christ, the God-man who is necessarily humanly embodied. This belief is nowhere adverted to, though it would not have been out of place in a book of this kind, and this absence is all the more surprising given the considerable number of references in Dombrowski's text to the body of God (see page 15 *et seq.*), a concept that he considers to be of such importance to his investigation. It should also be noted that there is a growing interest among some prominent Christian theologians, especially those with environmental concerns, in the concept of a cosmic Christ with global physical and spiritual significance for our world, a feature found much earlier in the twentieth century writings of the Jesuit, Teilhard de Chardin.

There is heavy reliance too on Hartshorne in this chapter, as indeed throughout the book, as well as intriguing hints about Plotinus' famous declaration that the world is 'boiling with life', in the context of his interest in the World Soul and its relationship with the One. The question of God's capacity for change is also raised, an issue which is theologically contentious, certainly from a Christian point of view, and one that Dombrowski will continue to develop in subsequent chapters while simultaneously criticising the notion of an 'Abrahamic' (and Aristotelian) understanding of an unchanging God.

Chapter 2 deals with the identification of being as power, and refers to Whitehead quite extensively, which again raises the question as to how helpful it is to interpret Plato's thinking through the views of Hartshorne and Whitehead. In this chapter, the author claims that Plato believes in God as the World Soul, and suggests hints of this in the Christian writings of Origen and St. Paul, an assertion that would need much greater supportive evidence than that provided here.

Dombrowski's growing confidence in his own approach becomes more evident in Chapter 3, which begins by stating that God's omnipresence is the soul for the body of the world, and later as the 'mind for the natural body of the world' (56); and despite his subsequent protestations, these views and their explanations read as being rather similar in many respects to the pantheism of Spinoza. Dombrowski, indeed, seems to have serious intellectual and perhaps personal difficulties with understanding God as the ultimate unchanging, omniscient, and omnipresent absolute being who nevertheless has entered into a creative relationship with the cosmos while being essentially unaffected by it at the divine level of being. Dombrowski seems to assume indeed that it is possible to get behind the mystery of God by anthropomorphic methods, a very contentious assumption, which many sacred texts in the Christian, Jewish and Islamic traditions, to name but three, constantly warn the believer against; and to be fair to Plato, his writings invariably seem to respect the mystery of divinity as ineffably transcendent. In Chapter 4, on dipolar theism, the author appears to insist that God can have contradictory attributes, and as a result there are some views expressed in this chapter which seem quite incoherent.

Chapters 5 and 6, however, represent the main focus and best parts of the book. They deal with the Platonic arguments for the existence of God (Ch. 5) and becoming like God (Ch. 6). They could indeed be read first, together with the Introduction, followed by the earlier chapters in sequence. Chapters 1 through 4 are at times very detailed in argument and references, and, despite what was said earlier, one can easily lose one's sense of where the whole project is going — whereas these last two chapters represent the kernel of Dombrowski's understanding and assessment of Plato's views on religion. Last but not least, attention must be drawn to the many references throughout the book to St. Anselm's ontological argument and its implications for Anselm's views on God, which are interpreted through Hartshorne as implying that Anselm implicitly supported a 'process perspective' on God, a claim that would be strongly contested by many scholars.

The book's bibliographical and reference sections are impressive, and though this is not a text for the philosophical beginner, it will be read with great interest by those philosophers who explore and teach courses in the philosophy of religion, especially Platonic scholars.

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Shadia B. Drury
Terror and Civilization:
Christianity, Politics, and the Western Psyche.
New York: Palgrave 2004.
Pp. ix +211.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 1-4039-6404-1);
US$24.95 (paper: 1-4039-7294-X).

Shadia Drury, in her preface, clearly sets forth the issue she wishes to pursue in her five-part study: the relationship between terror and civilization. Two integral elements of her study are corrective. First is her examination of two contradictory theories that attempt their own respective explanations of this relationship, labeled 'the naïve' and 'the cynical' views. The other corrective element is her demonstration that contrary to what religious people believe, particularly those who are Christians, terror is not merely a matter of practising Christians misinterpreting the message of Christ and scripture. Read critically and honestly, the very source of terror finds its origins in the Jewish and Christian scriptures, and even in the actions and teachings of Christ himself.

The first corrective element of Drury's study, which addresses the naïve and cynical views of the relationship between terror and civilization, begins with the naïve view. For its part, the naïve view has terror and civilization standing in opposition to each other. It is a pessimistic vision of human nature whereby evil forces are seen as coursing just slightly below the surface of social decency. The role of political authority is to eradicate any attempt by the forces of evil to usurp civilization. This 'profoundly singular understanding of the good,' (or perhaps, better, reductionist understanding), is dualistic as well. It has the world and human nature divided and conflicted between 'good and evil, God and Satan, formed consciousness and deformed consciousness, the defenders of civilization and the enemies of civilization' (131).

The other theory most often held in contrast to the naïve view is the more sophisticated and complex. Similar to the naïve view, which also draws on Bible scripture, the cynical view likewise sees human nature pessimistically. But unlike the naïve view whereby terror must be excised from civilization at every opportunity, the cynical view sees terror as a necessary part of the 'civilizing process'. As Drury goes on to say, 'Terror is the silent force behind the apparent geniality of social life. It makes it possible for us to live with one another; it makes it possible to live at all' (132). On the cynical view, terror is a necessary tool for keeping human nature in check, chastised, and under control. Even once controlled, the powers of the state must, perforce, match and supersede any threat of terror from its members, whether presented individually or collectively. As a result , the state forever remains dependent on terror as the necessary mechanism for controlling any citizens who are themselves seduced by its (viz., terror's) power. In the five part division to her book, Drury sets out to argue her general thesis — that the

real source and inspiration of terror is buttressed in Jewish and Christian scripture, the actions and words of Christ, and, most certainly, the actions of the Church throughout the centuries.

Part I, 'Metaphysics of Terror', can be read as a response to the Christian apologists who try to separate the history of Christianity (and the actions of Christians) from the genuine character of Christianity. Drury shows, through multiple examples, that the teaching of Jesus, the writers of the New Testament, and the history of the Church largely indicate intolerance, arrogance, and overall, monstrous behaviour. Drury's strength in this book is showing that despite how some may think the history of Christianity, with all its main characters, is pristine, transparent, and bursting with loving-kindness, nothing is more contrary to the case. Again, this has importance today for those who think that what is needed is a re-empowering of the Church in order for society to be re-habilitated. Instead, 'If the Church were to be empowered once again, the results are certain to be just as disastrous as they were in Rome, in the Middle Ages, in Calvin's reign of terror in Geneva, in the Puritan rule of England and dominance of New England' (3).

Part II, 'Politics of Terror', looks at the history of Christian thought, from some of the early Church Fathers, including Augustine, through Church councils (Nicea, Carthage, Milevis), to Calvin and Luther. Again, the value of Drury's study is to remind us how brutal Christian thinking can be.

Part III, 'Ethic of Love', isn't really what the title suggests. Drury shows that while the Christian ethic is often understood as one of 'love', read honestly, the scriptures are far from such an ethic. Again, in the morality of Jesus, in the method of Christians in battling sinful thoughts, and in the extremism of asceticism, practise instead indicates a brutal and violent relationship, not only with oneself, but with others. This study naturally extends to Part IV, 'Psychology of Terror', where, instead of seeing notables like Freud releasing people from deep feelings of guilt and shame, they actually share 'the Christian emphasis on human depravity' (99).

Lastly, Part V, 'Terror, Ideals, and Civilization', is a natural addition to the previous parts, with another look at how the Bible portrays its ethic. Of interest is Drury's discussion of the story of Samson, and how it parallels modern acts of mass killings, particularly that of Mohamed Atta, one of the hijackers of September 11, 2001.

The value of Drury's study is to provide, sometimes in rapid succession, lists and examples of brutish, horrid behaviour of biblical characters and figures from Church history. It merits a close reading by admirers of the 'Christian ethic,' not only because of what Drury points out in her favour, but what might merit further consideration on her part. *The Beatitudes* and *I Corinthians* 13 might be good places to begin the response.

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James Duerlinger
Plato's Sophist: A Translation with a Detailed Account of Its Theses and Arguments.
New York: Peter Lang 2005.
Pp. xiii + 154.
US$55.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8204-7417-7).

Despite A.E. Taylor's remark that 'the analysis of the actual argument of the dialogue presents few difficulties' (*The Sophist and Statesman,* trans. A.E. Taylor [New York: T. Nelson 1961],18), Plato's *Sophist* remains a challenging and shadowy philosophical text. It begins with the so-called Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus attempting by means of something involving collection and division to define what it is to be a sophist. The discussion quickly shifts to the pernicious problem of falsehood and subsequently to the even more pernicious problem of not being, and along the way there is talk about metaphysics, dialectic, and semantics, among other things. When the Stranger and Theaetetus emerge, something has changed, and they are able to complete the definition of the sophist. For these and other reasons, the *Sophist* remains a fascinating and important Platonic dialogue, and so it is not surprising that those interested in Plato continually return to it.

Scholars and students of the *Sophist* will be pleased then to find James Duerlinger's new English translation and commentary that sets out in a very different direction from more recent translations and interpretations of the text. Duerlinger says in the preface that his translation is intended primarily 'for use by students in courses in ancient philosophy, Plato and/or the history of metaphysics' (vii), and in this respect he has done a fine job. The translation is smooth and generally free from the awkwardness that translators often face when attempting to make subtleties in the Greek transparent, but this is not to say that Duerlinger has sacrificed the complexity of the text. He includes a number of endnotes to the translation that contain points of clarification and explanations of important ambiguities in the Greek, and the extensive bibliography will be of use to students who wish to delve more deeply.

Duerlinger also remarks in the preface that his translation and commentary are for those who wish to 'study Plato's metaphysics as he himself is likely to have understood it' (vii), so he has made a Herculean effort to avoid using language that biases the text toward particular contemporary philosophical traditions. Nevertheless, such a grand gesture toward faithfulness means of course that the translation emerges from 'what the translator believes to be Plato's own perspective' (vii), and so his commentary becomes an integral part of the book.

The commentary is divided into two parts. The first explains the use of dialectic by the Stranger ('The Philosopher' in Duerlinger's translation) to define the nature of a sophist; the second explains the use of dialectic to answer a sophist's potential objection to the final definition. Important interpretational points he makes here include: a) the use of dialectic in the

Sophist is to be understood not only from the few remarks Plato himself makes about it in other dialogues, but also from how Aristotle and the later Platonists perceived the point of dialectic in Plato; and b) the resolution to the problem of falsehood that consumes the central part of the dialogue should be understood in terms of how Plato actually conceived the problem of not being he inherited from Parmenides — indeed, a conception that is radically different from that of recent scholars (25).

Duerlinger delineates three purposes of dialectic: first, to 'facilitate the attainment of the highest human good,' which is the 'divine life' that involves 'the contemplation of the good from which the world of mind and its ideas arises' (12); second, to secure justification of the hypotheses upon which the special forms of knowledge are based; and third, to provide a refutation of false views concerning the distinctive natures of things. In the section that follows, he explains the various 'methods' of dialectic: the methods of collection and division, hypothesis, and derivation involving the demonstration of truths about the world of mind and its ideas by the one who has 'acquired intuitive knowledge of the one or the good' (15).

Many scholars are sympathetic to searching Aristotle for clues about Plato's intentions, but some may have reservations about looking to the later Platonists, who in this case, turn out to be Plotinus himself, whose Platonism is at best *neo* and at worst *non*. (Of course this need not mean that Plotinus does *not* understand Plato's original philosophical intentions, but some of Plotinus' own interpretations of Plato suggest reason for doubt, including his understanding of the infamous *Republic* 509b9-10.)

Duerlinger's interpretation of the problem of not being, which informs his translation of the section devoted to the lengthy resolution of the problem of falsehood, will be of particular interest to scholars, less so perhaps to undergraduates. Duerlinger claims that the 'standard interpretation,' which he rejects, fails to account for the fact that in Greek 'there is an ambiguity in the use of *to mê on* and the verbal construction, *ouk estin*, of which *to mê on* is a nominalization' (ix). The ambiguity of course lies with statements involving negation and the verb *to be*. He says the Greeks assume statements such as 'X *estin*' mean 'X *on estin*' ('X is a being'), and so statements of the form 'X *estin*' ought to be translated as such. This then has implications for negative statements involving 'to be', so that statements like 'X *ouk estin*' become ambiguous between 'X *on ouk estin*' and 'X *ouk on estin*'. He says that because translators and commentators have missed this ambiguity, 'present translations of the *Sophist* into English usually render *ouk estin* as "is not" rather than "is a non-being" and *to mê on* as "what is not" rather than "non-being" or "a non-being" ' (xi). So, on his view Plato is only interested in statements of the form 'X *ouk on estin*', which is different from ordinary Greek usage.

Why would Plato make such a move? Duerlinger says the simple answer is that this is how *Plato thinks* Parmenides conceived the problem: that non-being is contrary to being in the sense of being the complete absence of being (x). Duerlinger's point is not that *Parmenides* says a non-being cannot

be because it possesses a nature contrary to being, but that *Plato* sees it that way since 'in the *Sophist* the way in which he argues that Parmenides' dictum, that a non-being cannot be, is false, is by conducting a dialectical examination of the forms that he believes establishes not only that a non-being is a being, but also that being and non-being are not contraries' (x). Duerlinger turns to Aristotle, *Physics* A 8-9 and *Metaphysics* N 4, for evidence.

Duerlinger admits the contentiousness of his view, and recognizes the need for more detailed study beyond the scope of an introductory essay for a translation primarily aimed at students. Nevertheless, his interpretation of the problem of not being guides the translation, including some rather pivotal passages. For example, the first two lines of Parmenides' fragment 7, quoted at *Sophist* 237a6-9 and later at 258d2-3, become: 'Never let it prevail that non-beings are beings. In pursuit of the truth keep your thought from this path' (102). And the account of truth and falsehood at 263b4-9 reads: 'Among these the true one reports beings concerning you as beings. / ... / The false one [reports] other beings [as beings concerning you]. / ... / Therefore, it reports non-beings as beings' (134-5).

Those knowledgeable of contemporary interpretations of the core argument of the *Sophist* are likely to chafe at this way of reading the text, but Duerlinger's translation and commentary offer a new, unique perspective on the vexing issues explored in the *Sophist* that will no doubt contribute to rewarding discussion of this important Platonic dialogue.

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Samuel Fleischacker
On Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations*: A Philosophical Companion.*
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2004.
Pp. xvii + 329.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-11502-8);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-12390-X).

This book is a self-described 'philosophical companion' to *The Wealth of Nations* (*WN*); both terms of that description require comment. First, 'philosophical': Fleischacker says his interests are a philosopher's interests in assessing, clarifying and where necessary reconstructing Smith's arguments. His discussions are strong on all of these. Much of the value of this book lies in Fleischacker's close reading of passages in Smith's texts, and his useful

reconstruction of Smith's arguments by placing them in the larger context of the chapter or book in which they occur, and even in Smith's overall corpus. This close attention to context allows Fleischacker to spot errors in other Smith commentators, not to mention his destruction of many Smith myths — such as the oft held belief that Smith thought people were entirely motivated by self-interest. Fleischacker is also strong on placing Smith's ideas within the context of his time; he has interesting comments on Smith's relationship to Hobbes, Mandeville, Hutcheson, Hume and even Reid. Fleischacker's biggest weakness, which he admits, is his avoidance of some issues in economics and social science. On this, more later.

The second self-descriptor we must consider is 'companion'. In the introduction Fleischacker explains: 'The book is indeed meant to be readable in separate sections, such that someone interested in Smith's views of justice, for instance, could read that section without the rest' (xv). Fleischacker's commentary is not organised by passages of *WN*, but by topics that Smith discusses throughout his writings. A person reading *WN* cannot follow along with Fleischacker for help with difficult passages or chapters, although the book does have an Index Locorum of passages from Smith that Fleischacker discusses. Nor is this book a collection of separate articles on different topics. Although each topic can be read separately with profit, the book has more coherence than that implies, and there is much to be gained from reading the book straight through. Why then does Fleischacker describe his book as a companion? The reason says something very important about Adam Smith's thought and accomplishment.

As Fleischacker discusses, Smith's life plan was to write three major treatises, the first on human nature and morality, the second on justice and politics, and the third on economics. He completed the first, *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (*TMS*), and the third, *WN*. What he wrote about the second he burned. Our knowledge of and speculation about Smith's ideas on justice come from lecture notes from his Glasgow University courses. The seminal reconstruction of Smith's views on justice is Haakonssen's; Fleischacker disagrees with Haakonssen on significant points, but the discussion remains pretty much in the terms set by Haakonssen. Fleischacker's problem, then, is an inability to pull Smith's thinking together into one large coherent 'system' in which Smith's views on human nature, morality, justice and economics become a coherent whole. It may be Fleischacker's frustration with this which leads him to consider his book a 'companion' even though he has a great deal to say about the interconnections of Smith's ideas. Let us look at Fleischacker on the three main areas of Smith's thought.

Fleischacker argues (correctly, I am sure) that Smith's view of human nature did not change significantly between *TMS* and *WN*. 'Das Adam Smith Problem', in which there is a need to explain why human nature in *TMS* is dominated by sympathy for our fellow humans, while in *WN* we are driven only by self-interest, is not a problem when attention is paid to the context of each discussion. In *TMS*, Smith is explaining that morality emerges because we have imaginative (not contagious) sympathy for other people's

resentment of injustice done to them. Our imaginations create an impartial spectator's perspective that we then are able to apply to our own actions, allowing us to pass moral judgement on ourselves.

Smith's concerns are different in *WN*, as is clear from famous passages such as the one about our relying on the self-interest of the butcher and baker for our supper. Fleischacker makes the enlightening point here that Smith is not showing that we are motivated only by self-interest, but rather that we rely on the self-interest of others to get them to do what we want. This is not because they have no benevolent feelings; Smith concludes the passage by pointing out that some people (beggars) do rely on people's benevolence. It is just that when dealing with strangers, or anyone who is not a close friend or relative, we are more likely to benefit if we appeal to their self-interest. Smith's purpose in *WN* is to explain how large economies, in which most business is done between strangers, can function. Our social dealings with those close to us are dominated by benevolence, and it is here that sympathy can function well enough for us to develop the impartial spectator and morality. The economy is dominated by appeals to self-interest. What connects the two is our sense of justice, which being impartial, can develop though our social nature, but apply to strangers as well.

Which brings us to Smith's theory of justice, which can be best analysed in terms of proper form and content. Fleischacker summarises his view of Smith as follows:

'1. Justice requires certain formal conditions of the positive laws in all societies; that they be clear, precise, and apply equally to everyone. 2. Justice also ought to have a certain content ... by which states should enforce only those laws that protect individuals against harm and maximise their liberty. This condition, however, cannot be spelled out in a clear and universally acceptable way' (168).

The form of just laws can be specified, their content cannot. Smith failed to develop a satisfactory theory of the content of natural justice. In *WN*, Fleischacker argues, Smith is reluctant to call any social institution 'unjust', and only does so when there is a clear violation of the proper form of just laws, or when the content violates principles of justice Smith is sure his readers will accept. The oppression of colonial peoples is unjust (because of form); the Statute of Apprenticeship is unjust because it violates the labour foundations of property, a principle of justice Smith's intended readers would have accepted. Though he condemns primogeniture, entails, and slavery, Smith does not call them unjust. I disagree, by the way, with Fleischacker's comments on slavery; slavery clearly violates the necessary form of equality before the law. Why did Smith hesitate to call slavery unjust? Perhaps Fleischacker is reading too much into whether or not Smith refers to justice when condemning social practices.

Fleischacker does have a section on 'The Foundations of Economics', but it is only twenty-two pages long. He pleads lack of expertise in modern economic concepts, but there is a serious issue of omission here. One of Smith's greatest achievements was to show how the actions of individuals

have unintended social consequences which *sometimes* are beneficial to society. Only sometimes; Fleischacker explains well that the invisible hand for Smith works only in certain circumstances, such as investment when capital is not internationally mobile. Smith's economic system is designed to show how human societies display what are now called emergent qualities, and Smith is keen to explain their emergence in terms of human nature. To choose an example Fleischacker mentions but does not discuss, Smith 'explains' why the interests of labourers and landlords are the same as society's, but the interests of business people ('merchants and manufactures') always conflict with society's interests. There are immense philosophical issues with this project; it would have been nice to hear much more of Fleischacker's views, especially given his sophisticated interpretation of Smith's theory of human nature.

There is much more in this book, including whole chapters on vanity, property rights, distributive justice, and politics. There is a very interesting section (three chapters) on Smith's methodology, in which Fleischacker argues that Smith had an epistemology similar to the common sense philosophers. There are also interesting themes scattered throughout various chapters; I found helpful, for example, Fleischacker's discussion of Smith's changing views on Stoicism.

Overall, this is a very useful book whether treated as a companion or, better, read straight through.

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Bruce V. Folts and **Robert Frodeman, eds.**
Rethinking Nature:
Essays in Environmental Philosophy.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.
Pp. 357.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-34440-9);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21702-4).

Rethinking Nature: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, is an anthology designed to bring attention to areas of environmental thought that range beyond the normal confines of environmental ethics. According to Foltz and Frodeman, to rethink nature in this way means stepping outside the dominant 'circuit of English-speaking (or "Anglo-American") philosophy,' where philosophical reflection upon nature is relegated to 'a special branch of ethics, as an investigation of our moral obligations toward that region of the world

about which positive knowledge has been provided by the natural sciences'(3). The book's central purpose is to open up new ways of rethinking nature by first bringing 'the voices of leading contemporary Continental philosophers to a discourse that has so far been largely dominated by the assumptions of analytic philosophy and modernist epistemology,' and secondly, by redirecting philosophical reflection away from scientific understandings and definitions of the environment and toward a more thoughtful retrieval of the traditional metaphysical notion of *physis* or 'nature' (6).

The anthology is divided along five themes or parts, the themes of which draw heavily upon a Heideggerean reading of philosophy and the idea of nature. Part One, 'The Phenomenology of Nature', and Part Two, 'Nature and the Philosophical Tradition', are explicit responses to the Heideggerean demand that any attempt to rethink nature should be 'both phenomenological in relation to the subject matter of "*die Sache selbst*," and deconstruction in its relation to the philosophical tradition' (7). The five essays in Part One revolve generally around the issues of place and the boundary conditions between humanity and nature. Most of the essays here are largely introductory and exploratory, offering new or alternative ways of approaching, perceiving, or thinking about nature and our relation to it. In 'The Uncanny Goodness of Being Edible to Bears', for example, James Hately attempts to negotiate the 'boundary between the natural and the human' through a phenomenological examination of our being edible to predators. He attempts to undermine 'the Kantian's insistence on making an absolute distinction between means and ends' (20), moving us away from the highly rigid, Kantian analysis of ethical distinctions, and towards a greater appreciation of blurred boundaries that mark the '*sympathy* of shared organic origins' between ourselves and the rest of the natural world (26f).

The three essays in Part Two, 'Nature and the Philosophical Tradition', are loosely historical in character. Trish Glazebrook's 'Ecologic: An Erotic of Nature' is somewhat provocative, and her proposal for an 'ecological erotic of nature' is, at times, broadly suggestive. But her historical analysis is highly caricatured (with the usual intellectual villains, e.g., Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Christian Theologians as a whole, etc.) and her analysis of love (as *Eros*) is surprisingly narrow and very coarsely grained. Elaine P. Miller's 'Vegetable Genius: Plant Metamorphosis as a Figure for Thinking and Relating to the Natural World in Post-Kantian German Thought', is, by contrast, strongly historical and is certainly the most scholarly of the group (and perhaps the most instructive as well). John Sallis' 'The Elemental Earth', on the other hand, is more phenomenological in approach and might be said to be the more 'Continental' of the three. Sallis' essay focuses upon what he claims is a philosophically and scientifically overlooked feature of the world, namely, its 'elemental' character. According to Sallis, our present relation to 'earth' is dominated by a historically inherited division between the intelligible or universal character of the world on the one hand, and its population by particular, sensible things on the other. The elemental stands as a third dimension or kind 'that stakes out an ontological region that is

irreducible to the sensible, to the intelligible, and even to the unity of these as universal individual' (144). To think earth in this elemental region demands that we depart from the overly simplified and dangerous reduction of earth to its intelligible and sensible dimensions (which both underlies and has enabled the scheme of production that is so characteristic of our present relation to earth) and move towards a view of earth that is more open to its elemental character.

Part Three, 'Nature and Natural Science', provides 'a critical reappraisal of the role of science in defining the environment.' While each of the three essays in this section is interesting in its own right, the essay by Robert Frodeman, 'Philosophy in the Field', seemed to be most in keeping with the section's stated theme. Frodeman explores the terrain of field geology as a way of reevaluating the traditional image of science (which has been built upon the highly artificial and unrealistic model of the laboratory) and the related epistemological identification of knowledge with what is 'regular, immutable, and certain' (150). This results in 'a closeted image of the nature of science that turns away from our lived experience ... encourages disillusionment with science ... [and] sponsors the devaluation of other types of knowledge.' We can counter this by developing a field-based (rather than a lab-based) philosophy of science (as modeled on geology), one that 'offers us a more socially engaged and epistemologically realistic image of science' (154) that will give rise to an improved (non-productive) relation to nature and a healthier understanding of our own capacities and expectations.

Part Four, 'Approaches to Nature', builds upon the previous critical appraisal of science by addressing the question of 'which approaches to nature would helpfully supplement or even at points displace scientific understanding.' Michael E. Zimmerman's 'What Can Continental Philosophy Contribute to Environmentalism' and Diane Michelfelder's 'Contemporary Continental Philosophy and Environmental Ethics: A Difficult Relationship' attempt to assess and evaluate whether, how, and in what capacity Continental philosophy can help to supplement or displace our historically developed scientific understanding of nature. On the other hand, the article by Stephen David Ross, 'Biodiversity, Exuberance, and Abundance: Cherishing the Body of the Earth', and that of Edward S. Casey, 'Mapping the Earth in Works of Art', outline new ways of viewing nature opened up by Continental philosophy; Ross through his discussion of the 'abundance' of nature, and Casey through his analysis of maps, mapping, and the centrality of 'land' as a third factor that goes beyond Heidegger's dyadic distinction between 'earth' and 'world' (269).

The fifth and final part of the book, 'On the Nature of Nature', offers examples of the kinds of 'new understandings of nature' that might result from rethinking nature by attempting to 'elaborate environmental philosophy in new modalities, and thus to enlarge the range of possibilities for environmental philosophy in the future' (7f). Some of the essays in part five are highly suggestive, leaving the reader feeling pregnant with the many possibilities that may follow from rethinking nature in this way. Alfonso

Lingis' 'The Music of Space' stands out here as a beautiful and deeply insightful phenomenological analysis of the rhythmical character of the various kinds of spatial relations that constitute our place in the world, while 'Nature's Other Side: The Demise of Nature and the Phenomenology of Givenness' by Bruce V. Foltz presents us with an intriguing and spiritually rich overture to nature as a 'bestowal' or 'radical givenness' that echoes some of the important work of Jean Luc Marion and others. These are fertile, well written pieces that deserve to be read.

Oddly enough, the diverse range of philosophical perspectives and approaches presented in *Rethinking Nature* stands both as its strength and its weakness. On the positive side, most of the essays are interesting, stimulating and serve as fine examples of the different, potentially enriching ways in which we can rethink nature; they should appeal to a wide variety of philosophical tastes and interests. On the negative side, however, the anthology as a whole seems to have a rather weak unifying theme and feels, as a result, more like a collection of conference papers or proceedings than a carefully devised body of thought. Many of the papers seem very loosely connected to the anthology's stated themes, giving one the impression that the book was put together to fit the papers rather then the papers having been chosen to serve the book's stated purpose. The emphasis on Continental philosophy is a fresh and much needed addition to the general literature on environmental thought and the philosophy of nature. It is somewhat odd, however, that an anthology dedicated to rethinking nature should completely omit all of the equally important work being done within the very active field of process philosophy (an omission that only further supports the 'conference proceedings' feel of the book). The work being done in this area is equally critical of the same 'Anglo-American' approach to nature as is Continental philosophy, and should be included in any serious anthology dedicated to the general (and not merely Continental) task of rethinking nature.

Readers who are not familiar with Contintental Philosophy, and in particular the philosophy of Heidegger (and to a lesser extent, Husserl and Deleuze), may find some of the articles in *Rethinking Nature* a little challenging. A more detailed Introduction summarizing the key elements of Heidegger's thought as they relate to the articles (including the book's overall structure) would have been helpful. Overall, however, this is a good collection, and many of the articles presented here are of very high quality. I would recommend it to anyone interested in the general field of environmental thought and the philosophy of nature as a whole.

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Paul Hegarty
Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory.
New York: Continuum 2004.
Pp.180.
US$89.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8264-6282-0);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8264-6283-9).

Moss has begun to gather on what was once a rolling stone of Baudrillard criticism. In the 1980s the question was whether or not Baudrillard was a postmodernist; in the 90s, many mistakenly thought that he claimed major events never happened; and after 9/11, it seemed for some that Baudrillard believed that America willed the event. What now? Quiescence and a little respect in the form of an online specialist journal, *The International Journal of Baudrillard Studies*.

Do we need another overview of Baudrillard's expanding oeuvre? Perhaps surprisingly, yes. Not any overview, but this one by French professor Paul Hegarty. Why? Hegarty tackles head-on, and with a lively and generous critical probity, the difficult questions: the relation and evolution of simulation and symbolic exchange, Baudrillard's two key concepts; the problems internal to these concepts and what replaced them, the virtual and singular, respectively. Hegarty coaxes some fascinating responses on these and related matters from a typically reticent Baudrillard in the interview that is included in this volume, in keeping with the principle of 'live theory' that defines this series. Will this book get the stone rolling again? No. Not even a good book can do that when the scene has gone flat. It does make one wonder about how to it get going again and what the new stakes might be.

Admittedly, one can't be too adventurous in what is billed as an 'introduction', but Hegarty makes the best of it with a tightly argued and richly documented presentation of Baudrillard's most challenging concept of symbolic exchange. There are some nice aperçus here. Early on, Baudrillard's quick abandonment of psychoanalysis and the unconscious is explained in terms of the distance it puts between its own avatars and an unrepresentable symbolic principle. The link is also made to anthropological evidence of so-called 'primitive societies' inhabiting the symbolic. Hegarty deftly swerves around the problem of a pure symbolic exchange found only in history, with the observation that it is 'formulated with its loss' (33) in societies of simulation (fixed economies and regimes of signs). It is neither the lost origin nor the outside, but, and here it is worth reading Hegarty carefully, symbolic exchange 'is *in* the divide, *in* the relation, a non-place that is not "outside" as part of a binary distinction, and therefore capable of disruption' (33). There is just one 'symbolic' in Baudrillard (36), and it 'forms gradually' in his writing around 1972, then was used as a 'privileged Other' (37), an anti-Law.

Yet the concept's formation is, as Hegarty suggests, murky, letting Baudrillard off the hook by passing lightly over the borrowed anthropological material (i.e., Robert Jaulin). Still, Hegarty is right to underline the radical shift from subjects joined by difference in a obligatory circuit of exchange,

and the 'institution of total signification' (37) in which subjects are defined by differentiation based on negative criteria. Symbolic exchange is closed off by capital, semiosis and consumerism. Importantly, it is also closed off by death's expulsion from our contemporary systems of value. Baudrillard is not, Hegarty tell us, a thinker of the gift, but a theorist of the counter-gift of death in which the living would still be intimately involved with their dead (think Mexico, or even Sicily), primarily through initiation rites, but also everyday familiarity (45). If the real is just a simulation of the symbolic, and the symbolic for Baudrillard is a counter-gift that resolves the real, why so much attention to simulation? For surely it is swept away, too.

Not so fast, Hegarty advises. It is as hard to get out of simulation as it is to shake off castration anxiety. So, writes Hegarty, the real is 'the product of simulation, and nothing more' (49), and this makes it always mediated and representable. But Baudrillard also harbours a model for 'genuine reality,' and it is symbolic exchange, the spectre haunting 'simulation as a term free from mediation' (51), and thus not representable. Symbolic exchange cannot be real-ized in an image, unlike simulation. Technological improvements on re-presenting the real seem to know no boundaries, even if this ensures that we remain in full simulation, and Baudrillard is trapped in a version of technological determinism (60). The real simply persists as simulation in media, in science, and philosophy, even in war. It would make no sense for only symbolic exchange to remain, for simulation to be resolved. The lack of tension between the two concepts would be unbearable.

Hegarty does two noteworthy things at this point in his explication. First, he points out that it isn't only symbolic exchange that threatens simulation, but 'the possibility of its [simulation's] own limit' (68). That is, the implication that the real and simulation could be totally resolved is never resolved by Baudrillard, because he switches tactics by turning to a series of figures of the symbolic (seduction, symbolic violence, fatality, evil, illusion) that keep us from slipping into a totally simulated universe (and into a totally symbolic universe). By the same token, it is into the virtual that simulation flees in escaping from its own limit (88), with the real close behind. As simulation perfected, but with 'a willed, perfect copy' (105), the virtual retains a kind of prophylactic power in the sense that 'virtual events protect us from actual ones' (105). Thus, the loss of the virtual could be disastrous. Second, he points forward to his final remarks on Baudrillard's latest figure of the symbolic — singularity. The route he follows is through Baudrillard's introduction of 'impossible exchange,' which announces the end of an outside against which values may be positively exchanged (85). Impossible exchange is simulation's quasi-completion, whereas singularity is self-defined, resolved in itself, and for this reason absorbing, and in this way resistant (somewhat) to simulation. Objects and events may become singular if they become at all beyond their capture and undoing by media.

This book's greatest strength is in how it traces the parallel developments of Baudrillard's key intertwined concepts of simulation and symbolic ex-

change on the levels of intellectual biography and philosophical elaboration, with none of the warts and bristles smoothed over.

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Graeme Hunter
Radical Protestantism in Spinoza's Thought.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2005.
Pp. 196.
US$89.95. ISBN 0-7546-0375-X.

In this book Graeme Hunter attempts to address what he perceives as an atheistic bias in contemporary Spinoza scholarship. The monograph is divided into three parts, each demonstrating Spinoza's Protestant influences from a different perspective — beginning with a display of the concrete historical and material conditions in which Spinoza might be said to have developed his thought, moving on to an analysis of the *Theologico-Political Treatise* (*TTP*), and finally a re-evaluation of the relationship between the *TTP* and the *Ethics*. Of course, the greatest test of the validity of Hunter's position will come with Part III, as any reinterpretation of Spinoza that falls foul of the *Ethics* must be deemed a failure. Unfortunately however, the consideration of the *Ethics* represents the book's weakest moment. Whereas the historical material of Part I is well-researched, well-condensed, and admirably written, Part III appears more a strategic attack on atheistic interpretation than a subtle work of philosophical edification.

In his introduction Hunter outlines his hermeneutical approach: one ought to take Spinoza at his word - he was not writing in code. Whilst this appears plausible to begin with, it becomes evident in Part II that such a method might also serve as an excuse to entirely bypass much of the subtlety of Spinoza's work. For example, one need no longer consider the difficulties inherent in the interpretation of a work of immanent critique (which the *TTP* arguably is) if one's hermeneutical approach allows for the simple apprehension of the text without consideration of the limits within which it is constructed, i.e., its 'code'.

The first two chapters cover the historical and cultural elements that shaped Spinoza's early life, beginning with an outline of the more general culture into which Spinoza was born and of the nature of his education and early economic life. Other than the focus on religion, there is nothing new here, but it may prove useful to a Spinoza novice to find this historical

material collected in one place. Covered of course are such things as Spinoza's relationship with religious radicals such as Juan de Prado, and Spinoza's flaunting of the ban on contact with Prado after his excommunication. This leads into an outline of the basic patterns of devotion and dissent that formed part of the context of Spinoza's thinking. Some may find Hunter's argumentative tools a little blunt. In Chapter 2, for instance, Hunter suggests that one of the possible reasons for Spinoza's eventual excommunication was that he may have translated Quaker propaganda into Hebrew — that he may have had a hand in attempting to convert his Jewish community to Christianity. This possibility is suggested, but no argument is made for its validity (though there is a vague reference to the opinion of another author). To be fair, it must be said that Hunter avoids committing to this explanation, but the suggestion is nonetheless rather leading. He employs this rhetorical manoeuvre with alarming regularity — making a suggestion favourable to his thesis without committing to its truth. Finally, in Chapter 2 we are introduced to the Collegiant Protestants, where Hunter demonstrates that Spinoza had much in common with them intellectually and ethically. There is some interesting material here, particularly as so few authors carefully consider this aspect of Spinoza's factual life.

Part II includes chapters 3-6, and is devoted to analysis of the *TTP*. Chapter 3 lists the various biblical figures in both the New and Old Testament on which Spinoza has made comment, demonstrating Spinoza's preference for the New Testament and Jesus Christ. In chapters 4 and 5 Hunter attempts to demonstrate that the *TTP* is primarily a religious, rather than a political, work. Whilst not obviously wrong, Hunter's demonstration is hardly conclusive. In Chapter 6, for example, which deals with Spinoza's solution to the problem of Christian unity, Hunter's own arguments and examples suggest that Spinoza's primary interest in the *TTP* lay in thinking through the disunity of sectarian *politics*.

Hunter utterly rejects the notion that the Ethics and the *TTP* might be considered in isolation — that they might be incommensurable yet not contradictory. Thus Part III consists of an evaluation of the apparent inconsistency between the Ethics and the *TTP*, which finally amounts to an attempt to re-evaluate the Ethics such that it might cohere with the content of the *TTP*. I would imagine that most people familiar with Spinoza's writing would find such an attempt quite bizarre, to say the least. To be fair, Hunter's attempt is admirable for its rigor, but, unfortunately, perhaps fundamentally misguided. From a Spinozan perspective at least, the most philosophical argument in Part III is actually a quote from Henry Allison. Hunter misinterprets Allison's position as being one that allows for inconsistency between the ethics and the *TTP*, when in fact the very quote in question suggests quite the opposite. In failing to consider at all the differences between Spinoza's three kinds of knowledge as relevant to a discussion of the relationship between the Ethics and the *TTP*, Hunter effectively removes himself from the dialogue that constitutes serious Spinoza scholarship.

That a radical Protestant community formed part of the material context in which Spinoza produced his work is well demonstrated, but Hunter fails to show the necessity of such for the Ethics, though this would quite clearly represent the basic measure of success for a project such as this. The tone of the writing can at times become rather shrill, as Hunter's 'atheistic' straw persons are cast off with the barest suggestion of an argument, and indeed on occasion it seems mockery will suffice when an argument is not forthcoming. *Radical Protestantism in Spinoza's Thought* seems a strategic rather than philosophical work, and as such I imagine that its appeal will be limited to those who share its resolutely anti-atheistic predisposition.

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Sarah Hutton
Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. viii + 271.
US$75.00. ISBN 0-521-83547-X.

Henry More no doubt was looking to make a compliment when he told his pupil Anne Conway, 'you write like a man'. A compliment it was, at least to the extent that it was no easy thing for a woman to penetrate into the intellectual elite of the 17th century, to absorb all its concerns, master its style, and finally to contribute lastingly to its legacy. Sarah Hutton's excellent new study of Conway's life and thought does a fine job of showing how she managed to do just this, both by lucidly explaining what Conway's theoretical contributions were, as well as how these were forged in the course of her intriguing life.

Conway could of course not receive a proper education, barred as she was from university study. Her half-brother, John Finch, had been a student of the great Cambridge Platonist, Henry More, and it was through this connection that Conway had the good fortune to begin a correspondence with More that would in time make her an unofficial member of the Cambridge circle. Conway shares with More a distaste for the Cartesian disjunction between ensouledness and materiality. Her preferred alternative is a vitalistic monism, according to which the entire material world is coursing with a vital principle, and indeed according to which materiality is not something radically different from spirituality, but rather is simply a mode of substances that are at bottom incorporeal. For her, matter is congealed or sluggish spirit;

it constitutes a state of substance in the same way that ice amounts to a state of water. Substances can move up and down along the continuum of degrees of spirituality, and rarefaction is more than just a chemical analogy for moral improvement. To become better is literally to move from a more sluggish and bodily state to a rarer or more spiritual one.

Conway would more appropriately be described as a 'trialist' than a monist, for she believes that there are in fact three kinds of substance: God, which is unchanging; Christ, which can change, but only for the better; and finally all the created substances, which can change either for the better or the worse. This and other aspects of Conway's metaphysics, particularly as spelled out in her one great treatise, the posthumously published *Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy* of 1690, are rooted in traditions and figures that by contemporary philosophy's standards are both obscure and unphilosophical. Hutton ably brings these sources to light and explains their significance for Conway. Her chapter on Conway's engagement with Kabbalist sources, in particular, is among her richest.

Many of Conway's friends, and notably among them Francis Mercury van Helmont and Henry More himself, were busy promoting a Christianized variety of Jewish mysticism that incorporated elements of the Pythagorean-Platonic esoteric tradition and that emphasized the impending end of the world with the coming of the Messiah, as well as the hidden connections between all true expressions of philosophical wisdom throughout history. As Hutton shows us, Conway was no dogmatist; for her, Kabbalah was but one source of the *philosophia perennis*, and she had no trouble departing from it when it proved to be at odds 'with sound reason and the order of things' (168). Her tripartite hierarchy of being, in particular, would seem to be more firmly rooted in the Platonized theology of Church Fathers such as Origen, while the doctrine of immaterial substance seems traceable back to Plotinus' concept of incorporeal matter. One of the convenient things about belief in a *philosophia perennis* is that sundry elements can be thrown together from different traditions, and one can insist that they all, to use today's banal expression, 'say the same thing'. In the seventeenth century, this conviction was far from banal, for it represented an effort on the part of some brilliant thinkers, Conway and, more signficantly, Leibniz among them, to absorb learning from whatsoever source it may come, rather than resting content with inherited commonplaces.

Conway is one of those sympathetic figures in history who seem to have been driven in their intellectual and spiritual endeavors by the motor of suffering. For her, the fuel came in the form of debilitating headaches. As her husband Lord Conway wrote in moving desperation, 'her sighs, and grones come so deep from her, that I am terrifyed to come neere her' (31). Some of the most captivating sections of Hutton's book concern the seventeenth-century cultural practices surrounding the health of the body, as well as the beliefs underlying these practices, of which we gain a picture in Conway's relations with the great medical men of her day, men she hoped in vain might be able to relieve her. Particularly memorable is the story of

Conway's submission to the treatment offered by one Valentine Greatrakes, a colorfully suspicious Irish healer, whose hand-laying technique was backed up by a theory of spirituous effluence that he may or may not have believed himself. Conway also consented to prescriptions from the unlicensed Boyle's pharmocopeia, and as we learn from Thomas Willis, 'she tried Baths, and Spaw-waters almost every kind and nature, she admitted of frequent Blood-letting, and also once the opining of an Artery' (120). None of this did any good, of course, but Hutton sharply observes that '[t]he failure in efficacy of their treatments did not mean there was a failure in theory' (130). Conway was at the center of an important period of experimental medical philosophy; indeed, she was both a test subject and a theorist at once, and the fact that she was never cured does not diminish the importance of the figures she interacted with for our understanding of the history of medicine.

Hutton contends that Conway's 'personal experience of unrelievable pain certainly impinged directly on her philosophy' (116). Conway herself asks, 'Why does the spirit or soul suffer so with bodily pain?' For her, the answer seems to require a rejection of Cartesian dualism, and Hutton does not doubt the connection for Conway between the headaches and the untenability of a radical split between soul and body. Here, even in light of Conway's own comments, the effort to tie together life events with theoretical convictions grows dangerously speculative. Descartes himself, after all, was hardly the image of health for periods of his life. But in his case the bodily *soucis* only seem to have strengthened the conviction that his true self must lie elsewhere than in that unstable vessel. For every thinker who takes an affliction straddling the boundary between the psychic and the physical — headaches, epilepsy, panic attacks, etc. — as evidence that there is in fact no such boundary, there is another who takes the same maladies as evidence for the view that embodiment itself is a temporary affliction suffered by a soul 'intimately bound up with' but not belonging to, let alone identical with, its host. Conway may have interpreted her headaches as evidence for her favored metaphysics, but the headaches do not really explain why she preferred the one theory rather than its opposite.

Hutton is perhaps a bit too concerned to excuse Conway for having been interested in dead-end research programs. But this is less a flaw in her book than a regrettably necessary preemptive response to those critics who still consider 'greatness' a criterion for warranting a study of this depth. Certainly, the Cartesian view that the insufficiencies of mechanism could be worked out over time, and that we do not need to take hasty recourse to vital principles in nature, let alone to unscientific mystical speculation, would prove to be the more lasting legacy of the seventeenth century, compared with, e.g., Platonism and Kabbalism. But the prognosis for what will turn out to be a cul-de-sac is not nearly so clear in the present as it is in hindsight, and the only way to thoroughly understand someone else's present is to bear this in mind.

Anne Conway was not a great philosopher, in the sense often demanded. But she was a sharp and perceptive thinker, and she occupies a node in the

intellectual culture of the seventeenth century that, if given due attention, will reveal to us quite a bit about what was at stake in the great debates of the time, and what the range of possible positions was. Hutton shows this succinctly and well. In sum, her book constitutes in itself an argument for the importance of the so-called minor figures in early modern philosophy for anyone wishing to come to a profound understanding of the period.

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Mi-Kyoung Lee
Epistemology After Protagoras.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Pp. viii + 291.
ISBN 0-19-926222-5.

In *Epistemology After Protagoras*, Lee contrasts her approach to certain familiar issues in Plato and Aristotle with the approach of those who simply try to provide an 'isolated study' of the positive epistemological views of one of the great Greek thinkers (252). Lee's approach takes a certain kind of relativism associated with Protagoras as an important part of the background for Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus. As she puts it, 'By studying [these figures] in the context of the intellectual and philosophical milieu of their time, we gain a better understanding of what they were reacting to and what they took their principal challenges to be' (251).

As methodological principles go, it's pretty hard to quibble with that one, although it won't be possible to decide whether some part of a figure's philosophical milieu had significant impact on his positive views unless we're given a convincing account of the relevant details of those views and a story about how those details emerged from reflection on that aspect of the milieu. Thus, when we're interested in understanding Greek epistemology, discussion of the milieu isn't really a substitute for detailed positive accounts, but it's perhaps a kind of prolegomenon to them.

At any rate, I say 'a certain kind of relativism associated with Protagoras' because as Lee tells us, we don't know much about what Protagoras' views really were, and it's likely that Protagoras would have resisted attempts to refine his views into stationary targets (22).

Nevertheless, in Chapters 2 and 3, Lee describes what she takes the core of Protagorean relativism to be: it is a relativism about facts or states of affairs. Facts such as the wind's being hot obtain or are real only relative to

perceivers. Since the facts are relativized, it is misleading to see Protagoras as primarily a relativist about truth, since any doctrine about truth is conceptually posterior to the relativism about truthmakers (46).

Because of the plasticity of Protagoras' statements, their precise philosophical import is largely in the eye of the critic. In Chapters 4 and 5, Lee presents an account of the way Plato shapes and tries to undermine Protagorean relativism, especially in some much-discussed passages in the *Theaetetus*. The chapters on Plato are rich and interesting, and I shall only try here to indicate their general line of thought and to highlight a couple of contentious points.

On Lee's view, the formulation of Protagorean relativism operative in the *Theaetetus* is 'Whatever appears to be the case to one is the case for one' (77). This is offered by Socrates as a friendly clarification of Theaetetus' definition of knowledge as perception. The first major question at this point is how we get from the Protagorean construal of Theaetetus' definition to the so-called 'Secret Doctrine' — the mixture of Heraclitean doctrine and Socratic invention put forward as support or context for the definition thus construed.

Lee argues that the elements of the Secret Doctrine, including especially the doctrine of flux, are not implications of the Protagorean position, and thus are not views to which the Protagorean needs to be committed. Rather, the Secret Doctrine is a cluster of vague metaphysical views which might be used to support relativism, but whose real purpose in the dialogue is to be examined and demolished in its own right, not as means to the demolition of Theaetetus' position (88-92).

A further controversial aspect of Lee's treatment of the Secret Doctrine is her claim that what's really important for the infallibility of knowledge is not flux, but rather the fact that objects lack intrinsic perceptual properties (100). Such properties only arise in relation to perceivers, when the object and organ 'give birth' to a quality and a matching awareness.

We learn later, however, that Lee thinks this relational account of perception only secures infallibility by the 'ad hoc stipulation' that the awareness 'matches' the quality (152-3). Thus, on Lee's view, the Secret Doctrine is not only a merely optional way of defending Protagoras; it turns out, for all its bells and whistles, to establish the infallibility of perception by fiat.

Chapters 6 and 7 focus on Aristotle's discussions of a collection of extreme doctrines in *Metaphysics* 4.5, and especially on a theory of mental content which, according to Lee, is identified by Aristotle as the true source of the mistaken epistemology defended by Protagoras and some others. On Lee's view, the errors Aristotle identifies are (1) explaining thinking on the wrong kind of analogy to perceiving (136-40), and (2) using qualitative similarity between content and object to explain our thinking about external objects (144). These views make it impossible to explain erroneous thinking, and explaining this is a *sine qua non* for the theory of content.

What is particularly dicey about moving beyond this very general account of Aristotle's milieu, however, is that Aristotle himself arguably explains thinking on close analogy to perception, and arguably explains how we think

about a given object by reference to the mind's becoming the same in form as the object. Thus, we aren't really going to learn anything about Aristotle's response to the broadly Protagorean milieu until we know how Aristotle employs the strategies in (1) and (2) without falling prey to his own criticisms of them. Unfortunately, Lee's book is virtually silent on these difficult questions. She gestures in the direction of Victor Caston's view (180), according to which *phantasia* is what allows Aristotle to explain error and answer Brentano's question, but this view is controversial, and it's in any case unclear how much of his view Lee wants to endorse.

Chapters 8 and 9 are devoted to informative discussions of early and late sources for Democritus' views. Lee discerns three interpretations of Democritus in the ancient sources. Some see him as a negative dogmatist, others as a rationalist, and a third camp has him affirming perception as a measure of truth. She tentatively defends the view that there may be a single, coherent epistemology provoking these disparate interpretations: the senses provide data about appearances which are subjective but nevertheless necessary material for the rational ability to discover explanations (246-7).

Working to understand what precisely Plato and Aristotle are responding to in developing their positive epistemologies is an important project, and Lee's book is an admirable contribution to it. As I've tried to indicate, however, I think it can be fairly asked how much the book teaches us about Platonic and Aristotelian responses to Protagorean relativism. While it would be churlish to insist upon detail beyond the book's argumentative needs, it's simply impossible to evaluate the claim that Protagorean relativism deserves special attention without knowing which features of later epistemology are supposed to have emerged from reflection on it.

If we don't know, for example, why Plato rejects perception as knowledge, and what he means by the infallibility of knowledge, or how Aristotle preserves the possibility of error within a likening model of perception and thought, then we cannot say whether Plato and Aristotle really saw Protagoras as an important part of the philosophical milieu, or just a famous guy with a cool slogan. Still, for those interested in a fascinating aspect of Greek epistemology, *Epistemology After Protagoras* is easy to recommend.

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Joan McGregor
Is It Rape? On Acquaintance Rape and Taking Women's Consent Seriously.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2005.
Pp. x + 267.
US$99.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7546-5065-0);
US$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7546-5066-9).

Despite reforms, US criminal law and legal practice continue to require some kind of 'forcible compulsion' for the crime of rape. They exclude from criminal prohibition forms of nonconsensual, non-violent sex, even where there is clear verbal resistance and refusal. In so doing, they fail to articulate clearly the importance of women's being able to give full consent, and fail to acknowledge that nonconsensual sex constitutes a serious harm to and violation of women.

This is Joan McGregor's assessment of contemporary US rape law. Current rape law, in conjoining the requirements of non-consent and force for rape, does not adequately protect women's interests or adequately empower them to protect themselves. In response, McGregor argues that we should expand our conception of rape to embrace all forms of nonconsensual sex, so that it will include cases involving acquaintances and cases where no physical force or threat of force is used.

To develop her position, she shows how consent must be conceived if it is to function centrally in the protection of autonomy and security for women. She argues that consenting is a performative act with normative power, in that it is able to change or transform existing rights and obligations. McGregor rightly rejects the attitudinal account of consent, which treats consenting as consisting in certain subjective states of mind of the consenter, because a mental state such as wanting or desiring is neither necessary nor sufficient for consent, and these cannot explain how consent can function as a public, normatively transformative act. At the same time, consent must be voluntary, and this implies that the consenter must be able to form intentions and be at liberty to act according to them, as well as that certain contextual circumstances must obtain.

She also distinguishes and defends her position from opposition from several different quarters. Among competing positions, McGregor considers some lines of feminist objection to efforts to make the law respect a robust form of women's autonomy. These include the criticisms that (MacKinnon) consent is of no value where a social ideology of sexual domination predominates, and that (Paglia) measures to protect consent paternalise women by regarding them as incompetent to control their own sexual interactions. McGregor thinks the former position distorts women's experience and denies women what is a legitimate model for developing their sexuality, while the latter underestimates the amount of sexual coercion in society, and denies protection from rape to contemporary women who may be insufficiently

assertive in the interests of some long term goal of promoting women's sexual autonomy.

The book contains a discussion of how consent can be affected by both internal and external constraints. External constraints involve circumstances of coercion or deception that serve to vitiate consent. On coercion, McGregor has an interesting discussion of ways of differentiating threats from offers. The standard account holds that threats would make the victim worse off than they would be in the normal course of events, while offers would make the victim better off. McGregor thinks the central issue is how to interpret 'the normal course of events' which is to serve as the baseline for such discriminations. She evaluates the respective merits of three interpretations of this — a descriptive analysis, a normative analysis, and an 'epistemic rights' account (her preferred account) which emphasizes expectations that are grounded in common norms of acceptable behaviour. 'Judgments about coercion, then, turn partly on our normative ideas about what conditions it is appropriate or expected to put on another person' (175).

She also examines deception in the form of fraud in the inducement, showing that the law's treatment of cases often turns on disapproval of the motives that a woman had for having sex, for example, sex with someone falsely believed to be rich or famous. McGregor points out that even if the motives for having sex were dubious or unworthy, this does not show that the court should not protect important interests in being able to choose with whom to be intimate. Being deceived into having sex can be harmful; it can frighten and humiliate, and can undermine a person's ability to enjoy future relationships. This chapter develops a clear-headed and sensible line of argument that improves on Feinberg's 1986 discussion in *The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Self*, while also making original contributions to current debates.

McGregor also tackles controversies about the *mens rea* requirement for rape. One issue concerns whether or when mistakes should or should not exculpate, while another concerns whether it is ever reasonable to believe that when a woman says 'no' she means ' yes'. On the first of these, she asks: can a standard of reasonableness be required for mistakes, so that an 'honest belief' that is nevertheless unreasonable will not serve as a defence to rape? McGregor is sympathetic to the position that unreasonable mistakes often arise as a result of indifference to consent or caring too little about it to attend to it. Such carelessness should be sufficient for liability. On the second issue, it has been claimed that evidence of nonverbal behaviour showing 'incomplete rejection/resistance', together with women's reports of their desires during a sexual encounter, supports the position that it is reasonable to believe that women sometimes mean 'yes' when they say 'no'. McGregor rejects this claim because it confuses desire with consent and confuses empirical evidence with normative conclusions that require a different kind of supportive argument. It is reasonable for the law to require positive signs of consent to sex on the part of the parties. In this way the law will respect autonomy equally in men and women.

The concluding chapter has an illuminating and valuable discussion of what the harm, and wrong, of rape consists in. Rape certainly denies a person's ability to control a central and vital part of their domain, and makes its victim into a mere object for the gratification of another. It curtails women's liberty in many ways, direct and indirect. It has profoundly damaging emotional and psychological consequences for its victims. But more than this, McGregor thinks that rape is a moral injury to a person, because it is an act that expresses disrespect for the value of the victim. It is an injury to a person's status as an equal. This follows an idea of Jean Hampton's ('Defining the Wrong and Defining Rape' in *A Most Detestable Crime*, 1999), and makes even better sense of it by targeting it specifically to the offence of rape.

This is an intelligent and insightful book. It reflects a contemporary perspective on sexuality. It is directly and engagingly written, and will inform a wide audience with interests in legal reform, sexual offences, and greater equality for women.

A minor irritation is that the book suffers from careless typesetting. 'Consensual' and 'nonconsensual' are misspelt throughout.

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Richard L. Mendelsohn
The Philosophy of Gottlob Frege.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. xx + 226.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-83669-7);
US$60.00 (e-book: ISBN B0009F1YLK).

Frege wrote next to nothing on most topics in philosophy, applying himself largely to foundational questions in logic and mathematics. Frege was led by concurrent reflection on this work to formulate powerful and widely influential philosophical theses concerning the nature of linguistic expression and communication in general, but even these were meant to subserve the aim of constructing a formal language which precisely codified the logically significant aspects of thinking, asserting, and inferring, especially those relevant to arithmetical demonstration.

Because of this, we can only expect any survey or exposition of Frege's 'philosophy' to inherit the fairly narrow focus of its subject-matter — though to be sure, the depth and richness of Frege's treatment of even this small

swath of philosophical inquiry has provided more than enough material to fill many pages of fruitful, rigorous reflection. (Michael Dummett's mammoth tomes are monuments to just this point.) And yet, even by these special standards, for something entitled '*The* Philosophy of ... ', Richard Mendelsohn's book is highly selective in its narrative. Mendelsohn is quite upfront about this: 'we do no pretend that this book is a comprehensive treatment of Frege's philosophy ... . Our goal here is, quite modestly, to illuminate Frege's central insight' — which, in Mendelsohn's view, is Frege's 'function/argument analysis' of linguistic expression, 'at the level of [its] reference' [*Bedeutung*] (xvii).

Mendelsohn's treatment of this tightly-circumscribed domain is quite careful, fairly thorough, and well-organized — and above all very clearly written — but those looking for engagement with Frege's philosophy as a whole are advised to look elsewhere. Nor will the reader get much by way of historical context, save through a running comparison with Russell — who, though he represents one of the more significant contemporaries, is surely not the only one whose views were either influenced by, or might provide a useful foil for, Frege's own position. (*Tractatus*-vintage Wittgenstein springs to mind; he is nearly absent from the work.) Similarly little is said about Frege's predecessors, and the only somewhat sustained, historically-oriented discussion — of Kant's views concerning existence and the 'ontological argument' — is hasty and misleading on many points, and simply wrong on others. (E.g., 'it is incredible that [Kant] said nothing about the Cartesian clear and distinct perception *I exist*' [124].)

Even those interested by such specialized subject-matter might be suspicious of how Mendelsohn can hope to 'illuminate' Frege's views on reference, when the book suffers from an 'omission [of] any in-depth analysis of Frege's notion of sense' (xvii) — especially since, as Mendelsohn himself notes, Frege 'clearly believes that sense *determines* reference' (35; my italics). One might also be surprised to learn that, in a work devoted almost solely to Frege's philosophy of language, Frege's (in)famous Context Principle — a principle that Frege calls (in his 1884 *Grundlagen*) one of his 'Grundsätze' — gets only a few, always passing, mentions. Indeed, no attempt is made to incorporate this principle into, or show it to be compatible with, the theory about *compositionality* of reference that Mendelsohn ascribes to Frege.

This last point must be kept in mind when passing through the middle chapters of Mendelsohn's book. For instance, Mendelsohn finds Russell's theory of definite descriptions 'a good deal more intriguing than Frege's, largely because of [Russell's] introduction of the *scope distinction*' (my italics) concerning definite descriptions, a distinction which represents, in Mendelsohn's view, 'the critical difference between Russell and Frege' (98). Mendelsohn introduces a notation for 'predicate abstracts' (modeled on lambda-abstraction) in which '$<\lambda x.Fx>(a)$' says that 'the object a has the property of *being* F'(89), in order to represent the distinction between a description's having 'large' or 'small' scope — for example, the distinction between 'denying the claim that a has the property of *being* F' and 'saying *of*

a that it has the property of *being not-F*". In symbols: '$\sim<\lambda x.Fx>(a)$' vs. '$<\lambda x.\sim Fx>(a)$' (ibid.). As Mendelsohn points out later, this is on par with the difference between a *de dicto* and a *de re* reading of negation.

Mendelsohn suggests that this Russellian 'machinery' allows us both to do better than Frege on the 'Paradox of Nonbeing' (101), but also to grant (against Russell himself) that it is perfectly safe to view existence as a property, since we can read negative existential statements *de dicto* (as denying a whole statement) rather than *de re* (as affirming of an object that it has a negative property of non-existence). This succeeds so long as 'denials of existence are only permitted the small-scope reading' (107). But notice that this interpretation of the *de dicto* reading of negation requires that we be able to 'identify something as a predicate without its being predicated in that context' (107); for '*x* exists' is literally not being predicated of anything. Here, of course, Frege would protest, since, as Mendelsohn rightly points out, Frege 'just does not have any way of specifying a predicate without its actually acting predicatively in that context'; rather, 'referring to a concept' is achieved only by 'the performing of a certain function' (149-50; cf., 82).

Note that this is not an oversight on Frege's part, but something which derives fairly straightforwardly from the Context Principle: expressions are not assigned references (or even reference-types) independently of their context of use. But note also this opens up the possibility that the same expression can be assigned different references, depending on the context. In fact, Mendelsohn argues that Frege intentionally exploits just this possibility, not only in his response to Benno Kerry (over the notorious example: 'The concept *horse* is not a concept'), but also in his treatment of otherwise apparently disparate issues. For instance, in *Begriffsschrift* Frege proposes a theory in which expressions that 'stood for the objects they customarily denoted everywhere save when they occurred at either end of the symbol for identity ... where they stood for themselves,' such that the identity-sign represented 'a relation that holds between expressions instead of their contents' (namely, that they both have the same contents) (42). And even after the advent of the sense/reference distinction, Frege pursues a similar route in his treatment of contexts in which substitution of co-referring expressions fails to preserve truth-value (such as 'that' clauses): these too are treated as contexts in which expressions no longer have their 'customary reference,' but rather refer to either themselves or their senses (40).

Similar proposals are adopted for indirect speech and quotation-marks (127f; cf. 163f), as well as for cases we examined earlier: negative existential statements (117). In each context, Frege's strategy is to 'take claims to be about the names, not the things named' (117); yet as Mendelsohn notes, this policy renders every expression 'systematically ambiguous' (42), a consequence most unwelcome to Frege's intention to create a 'formula-language for pure thought' in which each sign uniquely denotes, no matter what its context. In fact, one of the commendable achievements of Mendelsohn's book is to recognize that Frege responds to such a wide set of issues with this single policy; yet (to repeat) one of the challenges left unaddressed is whether these

two commitments — to context-sensitivity and to the possibility of rule-governed compositionality — are compatible, either in Frege or in principle.

Readers should be warned that Mendelsohn makes free (though not excessive) use of logical symbolism throughout, and even ends the final chapter by constructing his own formalism for the representation of his preferred semantic interpretation of single-quote construction, all of which suggests that Mendelsohn's target-audience consists of those already familiar with first-order logic and basic model-theory (such as is prominent in contemporary writings in analytic philosophy of language). A larger audience might be interested to know that, as an appendix, Mendelsohn provides a rendering of the first two parts of *Begriffsschrift* in contemporary logical notation, thus complementing George Boolos' 1985 rendering of Part III.

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Ronney Mourad
Transcendental Arguments and Justified Christian Belief.
Lanham, MD: University Press of America 2005. Pp. x + 159.
US$57.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7618-3031-6);
US$27.00 (paper: ISBN 0-7618-3032-4).

According to Mourad, many contemporary theologians hold that the Christian tradition has its own distinctive standards of epistemic justification. Accordingly, if Christians wish to reflect critically on and justify their religious claims, they must do so 'with reference to the normative standards internal to their own tradition' (vii). Christians who evaluate their religious claims with reference to some set of *alien* epistemological standards (whatever those standards may be) are said to commit a kind of category mistake (x). Given this, a discussion of the implications of transcendental argument for the justification of Christian belief will likely be met with suspicion. According to Mourad, a transcendental argument is, roughly, a 'demonstration of the necessary conditions for the possibility of making assertions' (x). Transcendental arguments are dialectically interesting because, as Mourad notes, not only do they 'identify regulative standards of justified belief' (x), but their conclusions cannot be denied without self-contradiction. And since, says Mourad, these standards are truly *universal* in the sense that they are implied by *any* act of assertion whatsoever, then, by extension, 'they must be implied by the assertions made or implied in the Christian tradition,' too.

Accordingly, *these* standards cannot be properly called alien to Christianity. A full-blown defense of transcendental arguments, therefore, (apparently) provides a response to the charge that Christian standards of epistemic justification are in 'all respects distinctive' (vii).

With the foregoing in mind, Mourad's book appears to be aimed at establishing at least the following three claims: Mourad wants (i) to show that transcendental arguments can serve to justify theistic belief (or, to use Mourad's terminology, 'theologically relevant conclusions'), (ii) to show that transcendental arguments have an important role to play in the overall theological enterprise, and (iii) to provide a comprehensive response to the charge that Christian standards of epistemic justification are in some important sense unique.

Here in bald fashion is the overall structure of Mourad's book. In the first three chapters Mourad develops what he calls 'an epistemology of transcendental arguments' (vii). In Chapter 1, Mourad seeks to define a type of transcendental argument that meets the following criteria: it should be relevant to theology; it should not be obviously vulnerable to existing criticisms of transcendental arguments; it should be at least formally compatible with Alvin Plantinga's proper function theory of epistemic warrant; and it should account for any 'formally and functionally distinctive characteristics of transcendental arguments' (1). In the process of refining his general definition, Mourad also notes some important features of transcendental arguments including the 'self-referentiality and universality' (vii) of their conclusions. In Chapter 2, Mourad presents an in-depth explication of Plantinga's theory of epistemic warrant and argues that the practice of justifying conclusions by 'arguing transcendentally' (65) can serve to ground a conception of epistemic justification that is formally compatible with Plantinga's theory of warrant. In this chapter Mourad also compares and contrasts Plantinga's theory with those of Karl-Otto Apel and Franklin Gamwell. In Chapter 3, Mourad considers a wide range of 'formal and dialectical' (71) objections to transcendental arguments. The objections of Stephan Körner, Richard Rorty, and Barry Stroud all figure prominently in Mourad's discussion. Mourad here also replies to a set of objections that purport to discredit 'theologically relevant' transcendental arguments, relying in part on Franklin Gamwell's defense of those arguments. The last two chapters explore the theological use of transcendental arguments. In Chapter 4, Mourad examines Schubert Ogden's theology in light of the earlier discussion of Plantinga's theory of warrant, and concludes that the epistemological views of these two thinkers are 'essentially compatible' (109). In this chapter Mourad also attempts to show that an 'epistemological synthesis' of Plantinga and Ogden will 'contribute constructively to ongoing debates about the proper method of theology and the role of philosophy and transcendental argumentation in the theological enterprise' (109). And lastly, in Chapter 5, Mourad argues that, although some theologians reject transcendental arguments wholesale while others make them the 'exclusively privileged arbiters of religious truth' (ix), it is possible to develop a distinctive but

limited role for the use of transcendental arguments in theology that incorporates the insights of both Plantinga and Ogden (131). As Mourad puts it, by appreciating certain features of Plantinga's theory of warrant and Ogden's theological method, one can 'illuminate the limits and possibilities of transcendental arguments in theology' (131).

This is a disappointing book. The reason for this is quite simple: the sheer amount of conceptual territory that Mourad attempts to cover in this book not only makes for very difficult and often frustrating reading, but, more importantly, ends up very badly obscuring the central claim of the book, viz., the claim that transcendental arguments can somehow serve to justify or ground theistic belief. Among its other downfalls are a generally cumbersome writing style, lack of careful argumentation in key areas, and awkwardly structured chapters. Overall, upon reading Mourad's book, one gets the distinct impression that Mourad simply attempts to do too much in too little space (the book is a scant 145 pages). Unless one is *very* well acquainted with theological method, the works of Apel, Ogden, Gamwell, and Plantinga, and the literature surrounding transcendental arguments, I cannot recommend this book.

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L. Nathan Oaklander
The Ontology of Time.
New York: Prometheus Books 2004.
Pp. 366.
US$30.00 (paper: ISBN 1-59102-197-9).

Although *The Ontology of Time* comprises a collection of Oaklander's previously published essays (save for two), it exhibits a surprising degree of coherence and unity. Oaklander's brief is, in his own words, to 'put forth and defend a B-theory of time'. I think he does a fair job of it too, though I do have some reservations, and ultimately disagree with his basic position (but a review is not the place to discuss the latter).

The B-theory Oaklander ultimately defends belongs to the category of 'New B-theories of time,' based both on aspects of A- and B-language, and the truth-conditions of their respective sentences. However, he argues that it is distinct in various ways from other more 'standard' new B-theory accounts (of, e.g., Smart, Mellor, and MacBeath). The two principal differ-

ences are as follows: (1) Other new B-theorists think that the A-theory is false because its tensed sentences (viewed as occupying a tensed object-language) can be stated in a tenseless meta-language. Oaklander, on the other hand, believes that the A-theory is false because of McTaggart's paradox. (2) Other new B-theorists think that the B-theory is true because it is able to provide the *full* meaning of A-sentences through B-sentences. However, Oaklander argues that it is not possible that one can state all of the truth-conditions of a tensed sentence by means of a tenseless sentence. But it is possible, according to Oaklander, that a tenseless sentences state just those conditions of tensed sentences that make them so useful.

In order to achieve his goal of constructing and defending such a view, Oaklander covers an awful lot of ground, much of it topically very diverse, making for a really worthwhile read. The book is split into four parts. The first part is devoted to setting up the debate that will concern him for the remainder of the book, namely that between A-theorists and B-theorists, as outlined in McTaggart's Paradox. Oaklander sides with McTaggart, defending the conclusion that the paradox is fatal to A-theorists — however, he is also very charitable in how much he cedes to the A-theorists, as can be gathered from (2), above. In the second part, he strengthens the case against the A-theorists, considering and debunking a variety of distinct flavours of the basic position broadly divided into two classes: 'presentism' and 'open-future' theories. This part does have the slight disadvantage of being composed mainly of book reviews, resulting, in places, in a lack of generality. The third part constitutes the defensive part, and in it he provides reasons for believing in the 'new tenseless theory of time'. He amplifies this viewpoint by incorporating a more generous account of the A-theorists position (again, as per (2), above). Part four is a mixture of short essays in which Oaklander discusses some of the myriad connections between the ontology of time and other perennial philosophical topics (free will, personal identity, and responsibility).

The background against which the drama in the book unfolds is McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time. Contrary to many other recent works on philosophy of time (though certainly not all), Oaklander treats McTaggart's paradox very seriously and devotes the whole of Chapter 3 to defending its power. Recall that McTaggart's argument involves the distinction between *intrinsic* A-determinations ('Past', 'Present', and 'Future') and *relational* B-determinations ('earlier than', 'simultaneous with', and 'later then'). A-theorists have events changing over time by taking on the properties 'past', 'present', and 'future'; B-theorists have things changing by having incompatible properties at different times. McTaggart argued that our ordinary conception of time requires both an A-series and a B-series, but that the B-series was dependent upon the A-series, so that the latter is ontologically fundamental. He then argued that the A-series was contradictory, so anything dependent on it must be rejected. Time is, therefore, unreal.

The modern debate hinges more on what is needed to account for our everyday experience of time and change, and on how we actually use lan-

guage in temporal discourse. The question is: does this require an A-series, a B-series, both, or neither? Detensers believe that the B-series is sufficient; tensers believe that it is not. As I mentioned above, Oaklander argues that tenseless truth conditions cannot fully account for tensed discourse. Like Smart, in his recent review of Oaklander's book for the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (Vol. 83, No.3, 2005: pp. 437-40), I find it an odd claim that providing the truth conditions for a sentence is considered as not sufficient to give its meaning. This surely grants too much to the A-theorist?

Aside from this point, my only substantive criticism of the book is that there is very little mention of the physics of time (and spacetime). Many philosophers of time — mainly, it has to be said, those who are also philosophers of physics — like to 'read' their ontology off the best theories of physics. Indeed, it is from special relativity that the B-theory gets much of its support since (1) it appears to be underwritten by a four-dimensionalist view (the representation in Minkowski spacetime), and (2) it rules out an invariant notion of 'presentness'. Clearly, given this, an engagement with the physics of time is absolutely vital since many distinctions, such as that between 'presentism' and 'eternalism', are to a large extent dependent on which theory of (space-) time is being assumed — Newtonian, with its invariant present, *versus* Minkowskian, for example. Considerations of general relativity (classical and quantum) mess up matters even more, but are surely no less relevant; likewise quantum mechanics, or at least its measurement problem. To my mind, no book on the ontology of time is complete without at least some serious engagement with such, often hard, physics. This omission certainly left the book feeling a little dated and restricted.

However, the book is so overflowing with interesting topics, and novel approaches to old topics, that this criticism can perhaps be put aside. No doubt, too, many philosophers will view my objection as a plus-point of the book! Overall Oaklander's book is an impressive argument for the tenseless theory of time, and all philosophers of time should add it to their bookshelves. It is an excellent legacy demonstrating an uncommon degree of focus.

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Rush Rhees
In Dialogue with the Greeks Volume I: The Presocratics and Reality.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2004.
Pp. xxv+117.
US$89.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7546-3988-6).

Rush Rhees
In Dialogue with the Greeks Volume II: Plato and Dialectic.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2004.
Pp. xxviii + 272.
US$99.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7546-3989-4).

Volume I

D.Z. Phillips compiled this monograph from Rush Rhees' notes on the pre-Socratics and notes taken by Donald M. Evans. Phillips presents these notes in a coherent and systematic fashion as he presents Rhees' ideas in chapters dedicated to particular philosophers, e.g., Heraclitus, Parmenides, Protagoras, etc. Throughout the treatment of the pre-Socratics, Rhees' general point is that these philosophers were concerned with the relationship between language and reality. Rhees suggests that the main focus of pre-Socratic thought was metaontology, i.e., working out a schema for how to talk about what exists, as opposed to the traditional ontological reading of these texts, i.e., attempting to give an account of what exists. Rhees' supports his interpretive strategy with appeals to charity and to the text.

Rhees suggests that Thales et al. were providing a framework for discussion about the things that are, 'But Thales' view is more akin to a kind of geometry than it is to physics. It is saying, here is a phraseology in terms of which you can talk about things, compare them, and, in an important sense, understand them'(2). Similarly, 'The Pythagoreans seem to have held that whatever can be spoken about must be expressible in some way in terms of number'(11). In a similar vein, Parmenides provides limits on what can be said about reality (15), in particular, that being or 'is' must be univocal (20). Rhees extends this to Anaxagoras (66): 'So the function of *nous* in this account seems to be this act of considering "all things together". (It is, in this respect, similar to "the boundless" of Anaximander.)' Rhees emphasizes this point when summarizing the pre-Socratics, ' ... earlier philosophers had tried to give a common measure of discourse. Each suggested a different way of describing things - a way in which we must speak of things if we are to say what they really are' (95).

Rhees objects that the ontological reading of the pre-Socratics is unintelligible. He states concerning Heraclitus, '"What is common to all things" or "what is common to all processes" is empty talk' (42). The idea behind this objection is expressed in Rhees' discussion of Empedocles. 'Take the phrase "that out of which all things are, and of which they consist". Well, what does

a table consist of? We may reply, "Wood", and so on. But "all things" cannot be explained by going outside of "all things" and saying, in terms of something else, what they consist of' (52).

Thus, the earliest philosophers were attempting to do two things, provide a language for describing reality, and describe reality. The latter of these projects was a miserable failure bordering on unintelligibility. The former, however, is an interesting problem that remains a topic of discussion. Our contemporary philosophical endeavors can be carried on in dialogue with the pre-Socratics, since they were dealing with the same things. The thumbprint of the time in which Rhees was writing (mid-twentieth century) deeply marks this view, as does the Wittgensteinian influence under which Rhees worked. This can be seen in Rhees' preference for linguistic as opposed to metaphysical issues, and in his positivistic leanings. Rhees repeatedly complains that the pre-Socratic claims about reality are not empirically verifiable. Concerning atomism as a physical theory, Rhees objects, ' "Things are constructed of atoms" does sound like a physical theory. But if it were one, it should be developed by means of observations and measurement, be capable of refinement, and so on. But none of this makes sense in relation to Democritus' theory' (74). Similarly, 'Compare, "All things are made of air differing according to density". But when you talk about reality, there is nothing you can check by observation, as with "all material things are derivable from hydrogen" ' (23).

When considering Rhees' work on this subject, one should not look to be convinced by the reasoning behind his main idea (because there is not any), nor should one look for an adequate treatment of the historical texts (especially since Phillips failed to adequately note the sources for Rhees' allusions and attributions to the pre-Socratics, Socrates and Plato). This second point deserves some emphasis as Rhees clearly misinterprets many of the ancient philosophers. One particularly egregious example is when he claims the following, 'When Pythagoras said, "All things are number", he wanted to provide the same kind of account of "all things" as Thales did when he said, "All things are water" ' (10). Pythagoreans were interested in explaining the ratio, balance, and proportion that obtained within things or between elements, whereas Thales sought to provide a material explanation. We would be justified in saying that Pythagoreans were interested in formal causes while the Ionians were interested in material causes. They are not answering the same question or attempting to give the same kind of account. Rhees manages to mischaracterize the entire Platonic corpus, 'The question of what sort of unity the world has is one that occupied most of Plato's philosophy' (18). Outside of the *Timaeus* and sections of the *Republic* one would be hard pressed to find this issue addressed directly. Similarly, without argument, Rhees asserts concerning Zeno, 'He is not advancing or refuting any hypothesis about motion.' Similar misapprehensions occur throughout the work.

In short, Rhees provides an interesting suggestion for a different way of interpreting the pre-Socratics. There is something to his suggestion, as Parmenides had a clear concern for what we can say, and think, about what

there is. But an interesting suggestion is all that this work contains. Given the departure from standard readings of these texts, these ideas need to be worked out with much greater rigor and support before they deserve serious attention.

Volume II

Rhees' work in the second volume focuses on middle and late Platonic dialogues including the *Gorgias*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Timaeus*. In discussing these dialogues, Rhees addresses many of the enormous number of issues raised in them with varying degrees of attention to the text and varying degrees of philosophical rigor. The first three parts, corresponding to the first three dialogues listed above, barely rise above the level of a stream of consciousness. The thoughts are disjointed; the text is full of sentence fragments (both grammatically and intellectually incomplete thoughts); there is little that genuinely engages any recognizable philosophical issue. The next four parts (corresponding to the next four dialogues) form a continuation of the themes from Volume I, i.e., language, truth, and reality. These parts are loosely based on the text, and deal more with the philosophical issues in a Wittgensteinian manner. The part on the *Republic* contains Rhees' best treatment of the text and the most interesting engagement with Platonic philosophical issues.

Rhees critically discusses Plato's notions of education and its relationship to both community life and fitness for ruling. Plato's theory of education and rule in the *Republic* identifies the educated elite with the appropriate rulers. To have political authority is to be someone who has completed the educational program in Kallipolis. This education begins in early childhood with the stories told by nurses, continues through early childhood with gymnastics and musical training, involves military training for late adolescents, followed by mathematical training, years of practical service to the state and a final education in dialectic, which, presumably, leads one to knowledge of the forms, including the form of goodness. Having completed this ascent, a citizen is fit to rule in the state.

About this educational program, Rhees raises a number of criticisms. 1) It is a general weakness in Plato that he does not consider under what conditions good activities develop (113). 2) Plato neglects spontaneity in the child to be educated (113). 3) Plato seems to have no satisfactory answer to the question of how a single or coherent way of life is to be achieved (114). 4) About Plato's Book II account of the motivation to organize in society Rhees objects, 'This whole account is confused and unhistorical. Men do not go on living together because they think it is in their interests to do so. They go on living together because their occupations bring them together' (127). 5) Concerning the rulers of the ideal state Rhees complains, 'It is the way men work together that determines the character of the community in which they live; it is not the loyalty with which they observe the laws' (101-2). 6) 'Fitness to rule' is said to be a requirement of 'knowledge'. How would this help to decide between one policy and another? (105).

Most of these objections can be quickly dismissed by pointing to the relevant texts, something neither Rhees nor Phillips bother to do. 1) is undermined by the latter half of Book II, Book III, Book VI, and Book VII, which are devoted almost exclusively to explaining the educational program of the ideal state and how it will lead to the best activities, i.e. those which are just. 2) ignores 538a-c where Plato claims that children must be observed while playing in order to discover their character traits and aptitudes. Regarding 3), it is not clear that Plato attempts or needs to attempt to explain how a coherent way of life can be achieved. In the absence of an ideal state, Plato claims, 'Thus, like someone who takes refuge under a little wall from a storm of dust or hail driven by the wind, the philosopher — seeing others filled with lawlessness — is satisfied if he can somehow lead his present life free from injustice and impious acts and depart from it with good hope, blameless and content' (496d5-9). 4) misses the mark as Plato is not attempting to give a historical account. Additionally, the idea that occupations precede society is patently absurd. Plato at least has the order right - first people enter into society, and then they specialize. The statement in 5) is exactly what Plato claims. If Rhees meant it as an objection (which the context suggests), he simply misunderstood Plato, especially when Plato claims that laws are ineffective for controlling behavior as the good do not need them and the wicked ignore them (425c-427b). 6) confuses contemporary government functions with Plato's notion of guardian rule. Plato's guardians guard the city through education. The policies they set are primarily concerned with the polis' educational system. For such policies, knowledge and honesty are tremendously important. Though, offhand, I cannot think of an area of policy making where knowledge would not be vitally important.

As Rhees' objections can be dispensed with so quickly, it is clear that the book has little philosophical merit. For a devotee of Rush Rhees wondering how Rhees approached Plato's work this book is of some use. For the rest of us, there is no impetus to read this book.

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Margaret A. Simons, ed.
Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings.
Champaign, IL: University of Illinois
Press 2005.
Pp. ix + 351.
US$40.00. ISBN 0-252-02982-8.

Whether read in its entirety or encountered in the works of other feminist writers, Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* is a staple of any Women's Studies course. Simone de Beauvoir the philosopher, however, has not fared as well. Indeed, aside from Hannah Arendt, the canons of Western Philosophy are comprised primarily of writings by men. Margaret A. Simons and an international team of scholars heading the Beauvoir Series project hope to change this by compiling much of de Beauvoir's philosophical writings into one text that may easily be introduced into any philosophical curriculum.

The first of seven volumes chronicling the entire corpus of de Beauvoir's writings, *Philosophical Writings* contains twelve, newly translated, essays by de Beauvoir drawn from a variety of sources dating from 1924-1947. Each essay is accompanied by a scholarly introduction contextualizing and explaining its philosophical significance, and a wealth of references useful to furthering de Beauvoir scholarship. Most strident in arguing for de Beauvoir's place in the annals of philosophy are Margaret A. Simons and Edward Fullbrook. In her introduction to the volume, Simons attributes the failure to recognize de Beauvoir as a philosopher to a lack of translated materials, poor translations, de Beauvoir's rejection of philosophical system building and the 'sexist assumption that she was merely Sartre's philosophical disciple' (2). Compounding the problem is de Beauvoir's own disavowal of herself as a philosopher, interpreted by Simons as her refusal to face the painful fact of Sartre's failure to acknowledge his philosophical debt to her, and her fear of appearing bitter, especially in light of the reception of *The Second Sex* as a work of feminine resentment.

In his introduction to 'Two unpublished chapters,' Fullbrook argues that these chapters, initially intended as the first two chapters of de Beauvoir's novel *She Came to Stay*, significantly influenced Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, a project he embarked upon while reading de Beauvoir's drafts. To preserve Sartre's status within the development of French Existential thought, Fullbrook states, *She Came to Stay* had to be excluded from the phenomenological-existentialist canon. The reader will indeed find the chords of many Sartrean themes in these chapters — bad faith, the tension between the self and other, the struggle to create oneself — and acknowledge *She Came to Stay*'s rightful place within the body of existentialist literature. However, while the project of establishing de Beauvoir's influence on Sartre's philosophical progress is important to the history of the development of twentieth century philosophy, it is not necessary for securing de Beauvoir's status as a philosopher in her own right. The essays in this volume show that de Beauvoir's writings clearly belong to the earliest development of existen-

tialist thought, and even surpass Sartre's thinking on the problem of the relation to the Other and an existentialist ethics.

After reluctantly accepting the term existentialism to describe his philosophical ideas, Sartre became a leading spokesperson of a doctrine that took hold of the public's imagination. In his creedal article 'Existentialism', Sartre defends existentialism against the charge that it is a nihilistic philosophy, dwelling on human suffering and degradation. He argues, to the contrary, that existentialism is the most 'optimistic' doctrine as its first principle is that: 'Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself'(*Basic Writings of Existentialism*, ed., Gordon Marino, p. 345). But with this freedom that comes with the loss of all transcendent foundations, is the 'anguish' that accompanies the realization that one is entirely responsible for one's existence. It is this responsibility and anguish that lie behind Sartre's statement that 'man is condemned to be free' (350).

Sartre, however, had no real interest in responding to the public's demand for quick and easy explanations, a task that often fell to de Beauvoir. While de Beauvoir would later recognize that one's social circumstances considerably circumscribe one's choices, in her essays 'Existentialism and Popular Wisdom' and 'What is Existentialism', she defends the Sartrean doctrines of absolute freedom and responsibility. Nonetheless, it is clear that her explication of these themes go beyond a mere understanding. De Beauvoir was herself an existentialist, and, together with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, founded the journal *Les Temps Modernes*, then the leading venue for French existential phenomenology. She does not therefore reiterate Sartrean themes, which, as Fullbrook and others in this volume suggest, are likely to have developed in his encounter with de Beauvoir, but elucidates themes that are central to her own philosophical perspective.

But it is in her article 'Pyrrhus and Cineaes', published in 1944 and translated into English for the first time in this edition, where we see de Beauvoir-the-philosopher's unique formulation of the relation of the individual to the other and an account of community. Because it was even more pressing than defending existentialism against the charge of nihilism, Sartre's 'Existentialism' set out to counter the charge that it is a philosophy of pure subjectivism. But aside from the assertion that individual choices 'involve all mankind,' and that 'In choosing myself, I choose man' (347), it is unclear how exactly human solidarity coheres with his thoughts about human freedom and radical responsibility. De Beauvoir is able to provide a clear account of the relation of one's existential choices to the choices of others.

In 'Pyrrhus and Cineaes' de Beauvoir asks the question: Why act at all? She answers it with an ethics of action and the fundamental inter-subjectivity of human reality. For Sartre, action arises out of nothingness, which is the being of man. At any moment one is free to create oneself, as the limits to one's being rest entirely in the self. For de Beauvoir, on the other hand, freedom and responsibility are integral to the being of the other because the choices that one makes create limits that are internal, not to the being of the

individual per se, but to the world and to oneself in the world with others at large. 'I am situated in a world that my presence defines' (140). 'I never create anything for the other except points of departure' (121). The terminus of the act is not the individual being but the horizon of possibilities that one creates for oneself and for others, and equally, that others create for me through their existential choices. By extending the bounds of nothingness to the world wherein possibilities are found, de Beauvoir explains the interrelation between one's choices and the choices of others, a relation Sartre was never able to adequately explain. Indeed, for Sartre, 'hell is other people'. To the contrary, for de Beauvoir, nothingness is not empty. It belongs to a proper understanding of 'maternal love' as a 'desire *for nothing*' in wishing for the greatness and happiness of one's children (123).

Philosophical Writings contains nine other essays ranging from de Beauvoir's reflections on Sartre and American society to the relation of literature and philosophy and a preliminary introduction to her *Ethics of Ambiguity*. Missing from this collection are more complete passages from *Ethics of Ambiguity* and *The Second Sex*, the latter of which Simons informs us is translated and edited by Parshley, a zoologist who deleted more than ten percent of the French text, particularly those passages with philosophical content. These omissions may partly be a result of the stress placed on proving de Beauvoir's philosophical inclinations. But the time-consuming effort of arguing for the independence of a female philosopher's thought from that of her lover's is perhaps unavoidable. Arendt also faced the accusation that her thinking was, at least partly, derivative of Heidegger's, her lover and teacher. While the fate of de Beauvoir the philosopher remains to be seen, this collection of *Philosophical Writings* and the attendant introductions contribute greatly to freeing de Beauvoir from the shadow of Sartre and to securing her status as a philosopher in her own right.

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Gary Steiner
Descartes as a Moral Thinker: Christianity, Technology, Nihilism.
Amherst, NY: Humanity Books 2004.
Pp. 352.
US$60.00. ISBN 1-59102-212-6.

Western Civilization has used certain positions associated with Descartes to create a split within the union of reason and faith that had characterized the pre-Modern period. Steiner argues that Descartes did not advocate such a split, and that the sense of morality that he supported did not require this kind of interpretation. Yet, Steiner does recognize an 'uneasy tension' which 'reflects a fundamental ambivalence in Descartes' thought between Christian piety and autonomous rationality' (12). The same tension is seen to characterize our own age, and this serves as a basis for analyzing Descartes' influence on current discussions about 'secularization, the problem of nihilism, and the power of reason to ground morality' (13). Does dualism necessarily lead to nihilism? Does rational autonomy of the individual eliminate the need for faith? Does self-assertion and the mastery of nature force us to reduce non-human reality to mere categories of use? These are major issues, and not easily evaluated in a brief review. But some elements can be.

Because readers may very well know more about Descartes than they do about Martin Heidegger, Karl Lowith, Hans Jonas, Hans Blumenberg and others, the work will prove useful in opening up their thought through the prism of what we tend to see as Cartesian problems. But because each of these figures makes use of Descartes from his own perspective in order to grapple with the problems as he understands them, Descartes is not really clarified, but simply becomes a victim of collateral damage. In most of these writers, Descartes is found to have been the point of departure for a gradual erosion of moral stability. However, the concern of Steiner is to demonstrate that Descartes was essentially embedded in faith, and therefore could not have seen a conflict between the clear rational grasp of scientific reality, and the moral framework within which such insights are to be applied. This point is entirely sound, but the argument by which Steiner supports it is strained.

In support of his position, Steiner points out that Jacques Maritain finds Descartes to be 'sincerely Catholic' (57), as does Karl Jaspers (132). Nonetheless, Steiner joins Maritain in maintaining that Descartes' 'fundamental principles will develop into a sheer enmity of reason against faith,' and that this will occur 'through the confluence of Descartes' program for the mastery of nature with the Baconian spirit of the age' (57). Despite the understanding of Steiner that this would have been against Descartes' intentions, he fails to show why this interpretation of conflict within Descartes' thought is necessary. Could it not arise through faulty scholarship? That is, have scholars misunderstood what Descartes said? Instead, Steiner permits Descartes' 'fundamental ambivalence' to assume responsibility. This kind of criticism might be leveled against other discussions, e.g., that of dualism

(*passim*), or of Descartes' apparent conflation of error and sin (29, 49, 110); but perhaps the faith-reason conflict provides the clearest example.

The framework is clear. Descartes was indebted to Augustine and to Aquinas, who both agreed that there can be no essential conflict between reason and faith. (Aquinas: *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, Ch. 7, par. 1 and 7). However, Steiner shows Descartes to accept the primacy of faith over reason. He quotes *Regulae* III: revealed truths are 'more certain than any knowledge'; and *Principles of Philosophy*, I, 76: 'whatever God has revealed to us must be accepted as more certain than anything else' (56-7). This evidence seems sound, until we recall that he has just previously provided Descartes' ultimate position on the faith-reason relationship (54-5). What Descartes clearly states is that the matters dealt with through faith are obscure. Of course, they must be, since if they could be clarified they would be understood through rational analysis. But the reasons for embracing faith are not obscure. 'We must distinguish between the subject-matter, or the thing itself which we assent to, and the formal reason which induces the will to give its assent: it is only in respect of the reason that transparent clarity is required' (*Meditations*, Reply to Objections, II). Now this is quite another matter. We see that, while faith and reason can conflict if we are confused, when their proper roles are carefully distinguished, a complementary relationship becomes entirely clear. Thus it is not casuistry, but common sense that requires the position outlined, and the earlier quotations now take on a different significance. Descartes can say with entire candor that revelation and faith are supreme, as flowing from the authority of God. But whether anything is revelation or the object of faith is by no means established. Moreover, this is a *necessary* human position, since we are human (rational) before we are committed to a position through faith. Descartes can therefore legitimately maintain a very strong position, emphasizing the full employment of reason, while retaining a solid role for faith in areas where reason cannot function. A less rigid stance would leave the faithful subject to the role of docile sheep: i.e., mere adherents to any doctrine claiming to be authoritative.

This is a delicate matter, and it is not difficult to see why Descartes might be distorted or misunderstood. But surely, even if one chose to see this as an 'uneasy tension' in Descartes' thought, it would be difficult to call it a 'fundamental ambivalence'. Perhaps Steiner would prefer that Descartes be more docile. Nonetheless, the conclusions drawn are correct: Descartes *does* adhere to traditional values. But he does this by confronting the Church with the full force of its own doctrine, since his position was based on Thomistic principles. Naturally, some clergy supported him, while others wanted him condemned; and some opponents saw him as a covert rebel, or simply a hypocrite. The truth is less dramatic. Unfortunately, the position offered by Steiner often acknowledges that Descartes did not explicitly express the convictions attributed to him, or that these convictions are only implicit in, or to be inferred from, what is expressed. These reservations unnecessarily weaken his argument. It could be given a much stronger formulation.

Agood deal more could be said about this work, of course. It will certainly serve a good purpose in promoting discussion and raising interesting issues. It must also be mentioned that the publisher has produced a quality product, with very few errors or omissions.

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Charles Taylor
Modern Social Imaginaries.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2004.
Pp. xi + 215.
US$64.95 (cloth: ISBN: 0-822-33255-8);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN: 0-822-33293-0).

Charles Taylor's *Modern Social Imaginaries* — an abbreviated *Sources of the Self* for social theory — gives an account of what it means to be distinctly modern (at least in the West) by tracing the historical development of three modes of imagining our social world — as an economic system, as a public sphere, and as a pre-politically constituted sovereign people (69). Taylor's history is largely culled from secondary sources; for example, his account of the public sphere is, as he acknowledges, deeply indebted to Jürgen Habermas and Michael Warner. Accordingly, many readers will find it familiar and uncontroversial.

What makes this book so provocative is that it is more than a work of history; it is a work of social theory in its own right. The guiding insight of this book is that it takes imagination for us to conceive of ourselves as constituting a society. The world view that enables us to understand how we relate to others is what he calls here a 'social imaginary,' or what he has elsewhere called a 'shared background understanding.' The language of imagination — borrowed from Benedict Anderson — adds to Taylor's earlier writings by drawing particular attention to the work we ordinarily do when we conceptually organize the world in terms of social groups.

From within a social imaginary, it is difficult to be aware of the work one's imagination is doing to make sense of the world; from the perspective of the present, we take our world view to be natural and self-evident. For example, we moderns widely accept that all humans are to be treated equally (although of course we disagree about how that should come out in practice). Yet from the perspective of history, we can see that social imaginaries are contingent and change over time. This is the theoretical contribution of Taylor's histori-

cal tale: it reveals a general account of how such change occurs. He stresses that ideas, while important to explaining social change, cannot alone account for it. In order to flourish, a novel idea — such as the modern notion of a sovereign people — must be able to gain a foothold in already-existing practices — such as the Anglo-Saxon tradition of electoral assembly. Furthermore, these ideas-embedded-in-practice must be widely shared to have any claim to legitimacy (115).

This concern with how members of a community imagine their shared social world is a familiar theme in Taylor's political writings, and this book should also be read as a contribution to that work. He presents here two important ways that Western moderns conceive of themselves as constituting a collective agency. On the one hand, modernity brings with it the concept of the public: an imagined community of people who need never meet. This public is distinctly secular, according to Taylor — by which he means to indicate not the absence of religion, but the absence of transcendent foundations. The public is a collective agent that we found and re-found as we act within its sphere; it is 'an association that is constituted by nothing outside of the common action we carry out in it' (94).

On the other hand, our modern social imaginary still retains a kind of foundationalism in the guise of the sovereign people. Unlike the public, the sovereign people is imagined to be constituted outside of and prior to political community; indeed, it is the agent ('we, the people') that founds the polis. Via nationalist myths, religious stories, and so forth, we imagine ourselves to be members of a collective agency that we did not create.

These two kinds of collective agency reflect the dual conception of identity present in Taylor's other works. As some of his commentators have noted, at times he describes identity as something that we create through dialogical interactions with others, and at other times he describes it as something which pre-exists these interactions, such that it can be authentically recognized or misrecognized by our interlocutors. It would be easy to attribute this apparent inconsistency to a kind of conceptual confusion. However, *Modern Social Imaginaries* suggests a different explanation. The two conceptions of agency — as constituted through and prior to dialogical action — are both ways that modern Westerners *imagine* collective agency. His accounts of identity and agency, then, may be best understood in phenomenological, rather than empirical, terms: as claims about how we experience the world. We experience identity both as constituted in and as prior to dialogical action.

While this is a compelling explanation of the duality in his work, it raises more questions than it answers — questions that Taylor regrettably does not consider in this book. How is it that we are able to imagine simultaneously such different conceptions of collective agency? Are these two views of collective agency in tension with one another? Does our imagined pre-political identity inhibit us from seeing the political as the site of collective self-creation and re-creation? Does our capacity to reinvent the public anew undermine our appreciation for (perhaps necessary) foundations?

The disjuncture between these two understandings of collective agency is only heightened by Taylor's observation that both are the product of our imagination — both are the product of secular, human action. The pre-political community is just as much our creation as the public sphere, yet it only succeeds as an imaginary by denying its secular origins. In arguing that collective agency is a product of the human mind, Taylor shows affinities with anti-foundationalist theories — from Judith Butler's performativity to James Tully's agonic freedom — that emphasize how we daily create and recreate ourselves through action with others. While such thinkers demonstrate in theory the incoherence of pre-political claims to collective identity, Taylor reminds us that anti-foundationalism as an idea may have no real effect on the world unless it can translate into practice. This is especially problematic in the case of the concept of the sovereign people since, as Taylor has repeatedly asserted here and elsewhere, our modern practice of democracy relies upon it (189-91). To make good on Taylor's insight that modern forms of collective agency are a product of the human imagination, we would somehow have to reimagine democracy itself as the continual secular invention of a self-creating demos.

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Dennis F. Thompson
Restoring Responsibility: Ethics in Government, Business, and Healthcare.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Pp. viii + 349.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-83830-4);
US$25.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-54722-9).

For over twenty years Dennis Thompson has written about the morality of public life as a union of personal and institutional responsibility, whether in governments, corporations, professional associations, or international agencies. The sixteen papers republished in this widely ranging volume display a consistent focus on institutional rather than individual vices, and on public deeds rather than private lives. Marital infidelity does not necessarily translate into failures of public duty, but loyalty to family can lead to corrupt conflicts of interest in organizations. Thus, traits praised in individual relations can have negligible or evil consequences in corporate entities. We should not be surprised that when ethical principles are translated into

standards suitable for public institutions they may recommend conduct that is distinct from, or even contrary to, the responsibilities of private life.

If there is a clear distinction between individual and institutional ethics, it may be best marked by 'The Problem of Many Hands' that provides the title of the lead essay of this collection. In any complex organization there are leaders, officials, representatives, advisers and a host of others who contribute to policies and decisions. Since responsibility is distributed, good institutions require good norms and principles that may not map onto those appropriate for private agents. Institutions should also develop structures for encouraging good behaviour in the possible absence of good character and trusting relationships. As maintained in 'Restoring Distrust', which addresses 'the problem of many overseers' (261) whose deference to others enabled the Enron scandal to occur, sound institutions need means of identifying problematic behaviour and calling effective attention to it. Similarly, in 'Mediated Corruption', 'the problem of too many representatives' (151) shows the need for structures that discourage politicians from providing questionable services to persons who are only tenuously their constituents, as when the Keating Five in the American Senate considered giving a wealthy contributor political favours in return for substantial financial support.

The second of these examples of institutional scandal is especially edifying for showing how institutions have requirements that create opportunities for abuse. Competitive political systems depend on politicians seeking political advantage, leading them sometimes to exploit the blurry distinction between campaign contributions and bribes. Electorally-based representative systems permit or require politicians to act from many motives: the benefit of particular constituents, the good of the district and larger nation, and political ambitions. Under the circumstances, individuals cannot be expected to determine the right balance of motives unaided. That requires standards for assessing actions in the context of the system as a whole, including standards for acceptable appearances that make certain behaviour wrong even if an apparent wrong has not occurred.

Restoring Responsibility is not a series of exercises in designing sound institutions but a search for principles that constrain the designs. Thompson's favoured principles link personal responsibility in institutional settings to democratic accountability. The principle of publicity, for example, constrains secrecy in large institutions that affect public life. Secrets may sometimes be necessary in order for an institution to achieve its purposes, but they are justified only when the decision to impose them can pass the bar of public opinion, and only when they are temporary. Principles, though, are rarely exceptionless and rarely supreme over others. Publicity interferes with accountability when cheap talk about politicians' personal lives drives out effective deliberation about public policy. In the same way, when institutional oversight consists of constant checking for adherence to a set of rules, it may interfere with trusting officials to use appropriate discretion. A consequence of such tensions, illustrated in case after case, is that the

interaction of many judgmental factors will frustrate a crisp theory of institutional responsibility. Being responsible to responsibility requires weighing various considerations in particular circumstances, which is to say, the methods of casuistry. Since these methods do not lend themselves to the formulation of sharply defined general rules and regulations, one must be guided by a topical balance of the broader principles that underlie specific codes of behaviour.

Although Thompson insists that 'What we do not need are more rules and regulations' (262), it is not clear whether anti-regulation should be a theme of institutional ethics, or how the principled impulse can successfully moderate the tendency to 'more forms and reports'. A concluding set of articles on 'Extensions of Institutional Responsibility' may suggest that the institutionalization of professional ethics inevitably leads to very particular codes of conduct. In several papers on hospital ethics, Thompson stresses the need for explicit policies on admissions and discharge, abortion, and physician-assisted suicide. Institutional coherence requires clear rules concerning controversial procedures lest there be insistent public pressures to bring medicine and other professions under external control. This may be good practical advice, but it may also imply that conflicts of value should lead to the regulation of medicine within its many particular locales, where each hospital has 'its own ethics' (287) and attracts like-minded practitioners. Clarification of the relationship between rules and principles might provide useful commentary on the seemingly inexorable bureaucratization of public services. An interesting subsidiary element of this further work would include clarification of the concept of institutions themselves. As John Searle essentially asks in the lead article of the inaugural issue of the new *Journal of Institutional Economics*, is every hospital an institution, or is medicine an institution, or both?

The impetus to codify good ethical practices reflects difficulties of fair provision in a society whose ethical pluralism is expressed in normative antagonisms rather than respect for different practices. The nature of ethical disagreement is a deep undercurrent in this book. In contrast to the problem of many hands, Thompson speaks of 'the problem of many minds' (72) and 'the problem of many majorities' (319) as results of conflicting patterns of ethical judgment. It is assumed that reasonable people can differ about fundamental values and the assignment of rights and authority among many groups, none of which should demonstrably prevail over others. Thompson has (with Amy Gutmann) wrestled with this issue in *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), but the problem has resisted resolution. It is made more difficult because it is never clear whether deliberative democracy is conceived as integral to institutional responsibility or as a parallel stream of argument illustrating one conception of such responsibility.

An engaging essay on 'Election Time' stresses the virtues of concentrating campaigns in periods that conclude in the expression of a single collective decision made by independent citizens who cast their votes simultaneously.

The discussion is an effective critique of campaigns that go on indefinitely, blurring the difference between electoral and 'ordinary' politics. Yet one might think that ongoing debate is the strength of deliberative democracy, and that focusing on what happens between elections can lead to conclusions that elections then formalize. Of course, campaigns that go on indefinitely, like invasions of personal privacy, tend to consist mainly of 'cheap talk'. Sound institutions arguably require a gold standard of communications. A striking absence from *Restoring Responsibility* is any sustained consideration of the information media and their critical role in any broadly deliberative democracy. Like other liberties, freedoms of thought and expression can be badly used, making it desirable to examine the area of intersection between considerable freedom of the press from political accountability and the professional responsibilities of journalists in a democratic society. Such a study would make it clearer whether it is possible to develop a general account of institutional responsibility that reconciles the particular and possibly conflicting responsibilities of participants in separate institutions.

The concluding essay, 'Democratic Theory and Global Society', begins to develop one dimension of a broader account of political agreement, raising issues of cross-national responsibility and deliberation. The discussion refreshingly helps to balance the fact that almost all of the cases discussed by Thompson derive from the United States. In spite of scattered references to Canada and other countries, it is usually American institutions that are in question, leaving aside useful contrasts and relevant issues of broader regional impact and international law. Since globalization poses unavoidable problems for liberalism and democracy, interesting challenges to institutional political and ethical theory arise. At first glance, institutional ethics has little purchase on questions that different states may answer differently. 'Given limited resources, should a state spend more on preventative healthcare or on lifesaving therapies?' (322). The apparent answer is that just as different hospitals may have different policies about particular procedures, different nations, if they are democratically accountable, may have different views about medical priorities. However, this is an expression of deliberative democracy rather than a judgment derived from the basics of institutional ethics. There is more to say about these fundamentals, especially where cross-national deliberation has not resulted in cross-national institutions. Readers therefore have good reason to hope for Thompson's further thoughts on these matters.

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Robert M. Wallace
Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. xxxiii + 346.
US$75.00. ISBN 0-521-84484-3.

No longer treated like a dead dog, a growing number of contemporary scholars argue that Hegel's system as a whole should be considered 'not merely as a major historical influence on all sorts of other thinkers, but as a major candidate for truth' (xxix). While defending this system, such scholars are also at pains to demonstrate its current relevance, and thus are focusing a good deal of attention on Hegel's ethical theory and concept of freedom. Wallace's work, while clearly part of this trend, pushes it in an important new direction, arguing that the *Logic*, though usually not discussed in that context, is the very foundation for a proper understanding of Hegel's ethics and concept of freedom.

Wallace sets the stage for his analysis and defense of Hegel by considering a number of dualisms and their interrelations, including freedom and necessity, God and humanity, and realism and idealism. The first two chapters outline various philosophical responses to the problem of reconciling these dualisms, drawing on such thinkers as Hobbes, Gauthier, Kant, and Plato. While Wallace is concerned in a general way with outlining the weaknesses of these various attempts at reconciliation, the main point of these chapters is to show how none of these thinkers, including and indeed especially Kant, are able to refute what Wallace calls 'rational egoism', the claim that one can be a fully autonomous, rational individual, and yet also entirely self-interested and immoral.

The remainder of this work is dedicated to showing how Hegel's system overcomes the dualisms mentioned above, defends itself against the challenge of rational egoism, and demonstrates 'that full freedom and individuality require ethics — that a truly free agent cannot be unconcerned with others' (xxxi). The *Logic* is central to this argument insofar as Wallace attempts to 'interpret the *Logic* as a whole as [Hegel's] systematic response' (257) to and refutation of rational egoism.

Although his approach to Hegel's *Logic* is unique, Wallace is certainly not guilty of a perpetrating a violent or selective reading of the text. Rather, he devotes more than two hundred pages of his book to a careful and detailed reading of the entire *Logic*, excepting his admittedly brief and summary account of 'Judgement' and 'Syllogism'. Throughout, Wallace's particular concerns are carefully woven into his account of the argument of the *Logic* and his engagement with the critical literature, so that the various comments on rational egoism and dualisms serve not as asides, but rather as further illustration and development of the exposition. For example, during his analysis of Hegel's concept of the 'true infinite', Wallace argues that this is a key concept for grasping Hegel's reconciliations of freedom, necessity, hu-

manity, and God. In order to demonstrate the importance of this concept, Wallace attempts to show that Charles Taylor's reading of Hegel's concept of God can be traced to a misreading of Hegel's concept of the 'true infinite'. Yet despite the importance he places on this concept, Wallace is careful to emphasize the inadequacy of this concept when taken on its own and abstracted from the later developments of the *Logic*. He illustrates this point in the context of his own peculiar reading by pointing out that 'true infinity' is clearly incapable of refuting rational egoism insofar as, taken on its own, it is still atomistic, and that the resolution of this issue will only be found later in the *Logic*, because 'the logical relationship between free agents is established ... in the Doctrine of Essence and the Doctrine of Concept' (127).

In the final chapter, Wallace turns to a brief account of the final sections of Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* and a summary of the *Philosophy of Spirit*, drawing extensively on his previous analysis of the *Logic*. Although an able summary, due to its brevity Wallace is unable to deal with this material in any depth, much less delve into the lectures that substantially augment Hegel's account. This considerably weakens Wallace's case in that, as he admits, he is only able to consider the concept of God, and one might add freedom and the state, in the most general form. For this reason, Wallace's contribution to an understanding of Hegel's ethics and concept of freedom remains questionable. He still needs to demonstrate in detail that his account of the *Logic* is truly consistent with the rest of Hegel's system, and with the manner in which the latter depends on the former. Furthermore, he needs to show that the problematic dualisms mentioned previously are not merely logically resolved, and how, but are actually realized as resolved within the specific concrete ethical, political, and religious existence of a community. While sufficient to refute some of the more simplistic 'left' and 'right' readings of Hegel's system, the dubious character of which are generally recognized today, Wallace's work only demonstrates that Hegel is logically required to reconcile these dualisms in his system, not that he has actually done so. For these reasons, Wallace's final chapter does little to actually advance his main argument.

The problem with Wallace's work is that it is overly ambitious and tries to force too much material into a single book, to the detriment of the main argument and the coherence and unity of the work as a whole. This should not, however, blind one to its virtues. Parts of this book, particularly the sections on Hegel's *Logic*, will, as Wallace warns, 'be challenging for non-specialist readers' (xxxii). The fact is, however, that Hegel's work is difficult and complex, so that any account that does it justice will be fairly challenging. A reader struggling to come to grips with either the *Philosophy of Spirit* or the *Logic* will thus likely benefit from and appreciate Wallace's work precisely because he does not oversimplify matters, leaving the reader lost precisely when they require the most help. Hegel scholars, on the other hand, will appreciate Wallace's detailed and provocative reading of Hegel's *Logic*, the way his summary of the *Philosophy of Spirit* draws upon and brings into account the arguments and categories of the *Logic*, and, above all, that

Wallace has initiated a new line of research into Hegel's ethics and concept of freedom.

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Sylvia Walsh
Living Christianly:
Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Christian Existence.
University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press 2005.
Pp. xii + 199.
US$49.50. ISBN: 0-271-02687-1.

Walsh's book is not intended to be a critical response to Kierkegaard's thought. Rather, it is a clear and concise explanation of Kierkegaard's understanding of the qualifications of Christian existence. Indeed, scholars wanting to respond to Kierkegaard ought to read this book first in order to ensure a correct understanding of Kierkegaard's views. For, as Walsh correctly points out, most treatments of Kierkegaard emphasize only the early pseudonymous works, which thereby 'have tended to obscure the importance of his later religious and specifically Christian writings' (1). Walsh demonstrates that Kierkegaard's main aim throughout his *entire* authorship is to explain how an individual can become a Christian and to describe the qualifications for such a Christian existence. However, she restricts her primary focus to the works and journals of Kierkegaard between 1847 and 1851, since it is only during this 'second period' that we see 'the most developed and most balanced statement of Kierkegaard's understanding of Christian existence' (2). Further, Walsh focuses neither on the works or journals in which Kierkegaard gives explanations for how and why he created his authorship nor on his account of his own personal relation to his works. Therefore, Walsh does not enter the debate about whether Kierkegaard is right in his *Point of View*, but she does point the interested reader to articles that do (3, 166).

The main lens through which Walsh reads Kierkegaard's later works is that of the 'inverse dialectic', or the 'dialectic of inversion'. In short, the inverse dialectic that informs Christian existence holds both negative and positive characteristics together, so that the positive is indirectly known or inversely expressed through the negative. Further, the Christian conception of what qualifies as negative or positive will always be opposed to the worldly or pagan understanding of such terms. Both the negative and the positive

are essential to Christianity, and emphasis on only one or the other in Kierkegaard's works will misrepresent and distort his conception of Christian existence.

The bulk of the book is composed of four chapters, each of which gives detailed explanations and analyses of the four major dialectical relationships between negative and positive characteristics of Christian existence. The first is what Walsh takes to be the central dialectical relationship in all of Kierkegaard's thought: the relation of the consciousness of sin with faith and forgiveness of sins. Second, faith is also related inversely to the possibility of offense. The third dialectical relationship examined involves dying to the world and self-denial as opposed to (yet necessary for) new life, love, and hope. (In this third chapter Walsh also provides an insightful analysis of the differences and similarities between ethical-religious existence and specifically Christian existence. This discussion leads Walsh to take issue with both Thulstrup and Westphal's characterization of Kierkegaard's later view of Christianity as 'religiousness C' (109-10, cf. 140, 188 n.22).) In each of these chapters, Walsh emphasizes that Kierkegaard's vision is ultimately positive, but that such positive aspects are only possible and must be known and expressed in and through the negative.

The fourth chapter, in which the fourth dialectical relationship is examined, may be the best in its composition and arguments. Here Walsh shows the relationship between Christian suffering and Christian joy and consolation. She begins by examining *Postscript*'s conception of religious suffering and then shows that only Kierkegaard's subsequent works spell out the full definition of specifically Christian suffering (and its dialectical relation to joy and consolation). She moves through *Postscript* and 'An Occasional Discourse' to 'The Gospel of Sufferings', *Christian Discourses, Practice in Christianity, For Self-Examination,* and *Judge For Yourself!* Walsh presents detailed accounts of the precise nature of Christian suffering and also relates it to the previous dialectical relationships that constitute the qualifications of Christian existence, thereby showing their interrelatedness.

In the final chapter, Walsh looks at the broader dialectic of Christianity itself insofar as it 'incorporates both gospel and law, grace and works, mildness and rigor, and presents Jesus Christ as the Christian striver's redeemer and prototype for living Christianly' (152). Here she makes her final argument that Kierkegaard holds both the positive and the negative together, and that focusing only on one of the two (or what is the same thing, focusing solely on the early pseudonymous works) distorts Kierkegaard's view of Christianity. Thus, recognizing the inverse dialectic at work in Kierkegaard's thought is crucial to understanding his views correctly.

It is only in the last few pages that Walsh offers any kind of critical response to Kierkegaard. Her overall assessment is that Kierkegaard, in making use of the inverse dialectic, succeeds brilliantly in describing the qualifications of Christian existence (162-3). However, inasmuch as Kierkegaard's intent is to show that Christianity is *qualitatively* different from any other form of existence (religious or otherwise), Walsh cautions that

it 'is questionable' whether he is successful here (161). She mentions Judaism and the concept of paganism as two areas that warrant further investigation to determine if they have qualifications that correspond to Christianity.

One could criticize Walsh for not engaging Kierkegaard more critically, but this criticism is not justified, given that her stated goal is simply to look at Kierkegaard's own description of Christianity and let it speak for itself. An additional criticism could be that Walsh treats an unsystematic thinker in a systematic manner. However, she explicitly recognizes this shortcoming and acknowledges that her classifications are 'to a degree arbitrary and a departure from Kierkegaard's own practice' (15). Still, she argues - and rightfully so - that for academic purposes, such a departure is not grounds for dismissal, especially if Kierkegaard's own reminders are heeded, namely, that one must actualize these qualifications (and not simply know them) to become a Christian. Finally, it should be acknowledged that Walsh's notes and bibliography serve as a great help in pointing the interested reader to the various debates and positions in Kierkegaard scholarship. Whether or not one will accept Kierkegaard's description of living Christianly is beside the point here, since Walsh succeeds in her task of drawing from Kierkegaard's journals and all the major works from the second period in order to give us a balanced, focused, and honest portrayal of Kierkegaard's thought and task.

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