Philosophy in Review/Comptes rendus philosophiques

Editor / Directeur

Jeffrey Foss
Department of Philosophy
University of Victoria
P.O. Box 3045 Stn. CSC
Victoria, BC
Canada V8W 3P4
Tel: 250-721-7512
Fax: 250-721-7511
E-Mail: pir@uvic.ca
Website: http://www.uvic.ca/philosophy/pir/index.html

Associate Editor / directeur adjoint

David J. F. Scott
Department of Philosophy
University of Victoria
P.O. Box 3045 Stn. CSC
Victoria, BC
Canada V8W 3P4
Tel: 250-721-7512
Fax: 250-721-7511
E-Mail: pir@uvic.ca

PIR publishes both invited reviews and unsolicited reviews of new and significant books in philosophy. We post on our website a list of books for which we seek reviewers, and welcome identification of books deserving review. Normally reviews are 1000 words.

CRP diffuse des comptes rendus dûment conviés, ainsi que d'autres leur étant soumis, à condition que les auteurs traitent de publications nouvelles et marquantes dans le domaine de la philosophie. Le liste des livres suggérés pour lesquels un compte rendu est requis est affichée sur notre site internet. Bien sûr, nous accueillons aussi favorablement toute autre suggestion de titres pour compte rendu. De façon générale, ces comptes rendus doivent se restreindre à 1000 mots.

Subscription prices for a volume of six issues

Institutions
$121 (Canada)
US$126 (U.S.A.)
Cdn$165/US$138/£79/€118 (World)

Individuals
$58 (Canada)
US$62 (U.S.A.)
Cdn$85/US$70/£40/€56 (World)

Prix de l'abonnement à un volume de six numéros

Institutions
$121 (Canada)
US$126 (E-U.)
Cdn$165/US$138/£79/€118 (World)

Individus
$58 (Canada)
US$62 (E-U.)
Cdn$85/US$70/£40/€56 (World)

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing and Publishing
9 - 3151 Lakeshore Road, Suite 403
Kelowna, BC, Canada V1W 3S9
Tel: 250-764-6427
Fax: 250-764-6428
E-mail: academicpublishing@shaw.ca
Website: http://www.academicprintingandpublishing.com

Publications Mail Registration No. 08491 – ISSN 1206-5269
Agreement number 40032920

Published six times a year

Volume XXVI, No. 2
April • avril 2006

Table of Contents • Table des matières

Mailed in April 2006.

Renaud Barbaras
The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty's Ontology.
Trans. Leonard Lawlor and Ted Toadvine.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2004.
Pp. vii + 333.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-34355-0);
US$24.95 (paperback: ISBN 0-253-21645-1).

The Being of the Phenomenon by Renaud Barbaras, originally published in French in 1991, is a work of singular merit which proposes to shed light into the depths of Merleau-Ponty's ontology, and which then proceeds to do so, with mastery. In its 'Introduction', the book's general approach is clarified in the following terms: to examine the texts of Merleau-Ponty with the same attentiveness and assiduity one would devote to those of a classic author (xxxi-xxxiii). As with any classic philosopher, Barbaras' appreciation of Merleau-Ponty's thought develops, at least in part, from a historical perspective, precisely as this work stands in an 'acknowledged continuity with the spirit of classical metaphysics', or, in other words, as it recognises the existence of Reason within the bounds of a world that lends itself uneasily to the grasp of intellectual knowledge (xxxii). It was not merely a matter of chance that Merleau-Ponty's last prepared lectures for the *Collège de France* were devoted to Descartes, Hegel, and Marx; and, taken in its entirety, Barbaras' work testifies to Merleau-Ponty's debt to this philosophical tradition. Indeed, it is suggested that Merleau-Ponty's ontology is more firmly rooted in the heritage of Descartes than in that of Husserl (xxxi; 81-6; 204ff), and a convincing chapter is devoted to the relation between this ontology and the work of Leibniz (229-34), whereas another section develops a searching analysis of an association with Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (181-6). In order to appreciate the full significance of the 'ontological turn' (xxxiii) in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, it is essential first to uncover the movement in his thought that necessitated such a profound shift in perspective. Barbaras contends that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, taken in its entirety, can be read as an introduction to ontology proper (xxxiii-xxxiv), and the book itself, which, for the most part, develops diachronically, serves as the very justification of this point.

Part 1, 'Toward Ontology', briefly traces the development of Merleau-Ponty's thought from *The Structure of Behaviour* to *Phenomenology of Perception*, and argues, contrary to certain other commentaries, that rather than going too far in its critique of intellectualism, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy initially retains a significant idealist tendency (14-18; 39-40). For Barbaras, it is most notably in the description of our experience of the other [*autrui*] as an embodied subject that the inadequacies or shortcomings [*insuffisances*] (18, 49) — or even the 'failure' (33) — of *Phenomenology of Perception* become most apparent (19-40). It is within this context that the book first addresses Merleau-Ponty's encounter with Husserl (26-33), who, as Merleau-Ponty

recognised, was one of the first to appreciate fully the profundity of the philosophical difficulties related to the status of the other in our experience (26-7). Formulating a satisfactory solution to these difficulties, which Husserl himself never managed to do, is one of the motivations which pushes Merleau-Ponty towards an ontological perspective (39-40; 239ff). A second significant motivation is Merleau-Ponty's attempt to deal with the problems surrounding a theory of expression, and notably linguistic expression, when such a theory rapidly becomes constrained within the bounds of a phenomenology of perception (41-8; 49ff). The resulting constrictions spur Merleau-Ponty to reconsider the questions pertaining to the genesis of meaning in experience, and thus the very place and status of truth and ideality. Barbaras argues that Merleau-Ponty's movement towards ontology, which is clearly visible in the progression of his courses at the *Collège de France*, beginning in 1952 (60), arises from the necessity to deepen our understanding of the concept of 'nature', in order to account for the manner in which this natural world harbours the sedimentation of meaning, truth, and ideality, precisely as a world of cultural significations (59-67).

In this first part, the reader might have wished to see more attention devoted to *The Structure of Behaviour*, and notably to the role of the concept of *Gestalt*, which becomes central again in Merleau-Ponty's later thought. In a 'Preface' written in 2000 especially for this English translation, Barbaras himself concedes this point (xxi). However, it should be mentioned that he has since addressed this very topic, again masterfully, in a paper published in 2001 in *Les études philosophiques* (*'Merleau-Ponty et la psychologie de la forme'*).

The difficulties surrounding linguistic expression are closely linked to the process of philosophical questioning or enquiry [*interrogation*], and this rapport is treated extensively in the book's second part, where the ontological issues come fully to the fore. Here Barbaras examines in detail an important aspect of Merleau-Ponty's relation to Husserl (87-110), whose philosophy retains profound affinities to that of Descartes (81-6), and who remains a constant reference throughout the work. Especially significant is the fact that, in the manuscript of *The Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty returns, at length, to Husserl's eidetic reduction (90ff) and to the association between fact and essence, an issue which is intricately bound to the central question concerning the manner of givenness [*donation*] of the phenomenon, and thus to the very status of its being. This evocation of the concept of being leads into an examination of the influence of Sartre — which, as in the case of Husserl, is shown to be considerable (see, for example, 126-7; 165-7; 248-50; 270-2) — and to a detailed analysis of Merleau-Ponty's critique of Sartre's dialectic of being and nothingness, demonstrating precisely how this critique gives rise to the fundamental concepts of Merleau-Ponty's ontology (111-39).

Although a model of rigour throughout, the book's *tour de force* is surely to be found in its second half (Parts 3 and 4, entitled 'The Visible' and 'The Invisible' respectively), which begins by shedding reasonable doubt on the accepted interpretation of the role of the final chapter of *The Visible and the*

Invisible ('The Intertwining — The Chiasm') (147-8). Barbaras proceeds to give a close reading of this evocative and highly important text, as well as to many of the most abstruse of its accompanying working notes, which he aptly describes as splendid examples of pure intuition, lucid in their freedom and conciseness (148). He examines comprehensively, and renders clearly, the fundamental notions of Merleau-Ponty's ontology, from the concept of 'flesh' [*chair*] — which directs the entirety of Merleau-Ponty's thinking at this stage (168) and, as Merleau-Ponty himself affirms, has no equivalent in traditional philosophy — to the concept of 'chiasm' in its multiple manifestations: from the intertwining between the visible and the invisible, to the chiasm between space and time (204-17; 227-8), past and present (217-26), thing and world (189ff), the world and ourselves (153-61; 199-203), the individual and the other (251ff), and, ultimately, to the final chiasm, between the sensible world, the intelligible world, and Being (306-7). Here Barbaras exhibits a singular attentiveness to explicating the intricacies of an ontology which seeks to think the unity of Being through the diversity of its appearances as phenomena within the sensible world, while strenuously denying any form of ontological monism (292-3), as well as any moments of pure presence or pure absence. The book's conclusion returns to the task of placing the scope of the analyses in a wider philosophical context, and, drawing in part from the work of Marc Richir, explains lucidly Merleau-Ponty's relation to Heidegger. The reader of the English translation benefits, in addition, from a helpful and extended index. A dense, and highly rewarding read.

Stephen A. Noble
Université de Paris I — Panthéon — Sorbonne

Tyler Burge
Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege.
Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2005.
Pp xii + 419.
Cdn$174.00: US$105.75
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-927853-9);
Cdn$54.00: US$24.95
(paper: ISBN 0-19-927854-7).

Our understanding of a work of great genius often passes through three stages. At first such work can seem so thoroughly wrong as not to repay further study. And yet we do not let it go; something in the work draws us back again and again. Eventually we learn to read it differently, as no less mistaken, at least in its conclusions, but nonetheless of considerable value

for the questions posed, the considerations raised, and the care and thoughtful seriousness with which the inquiry as a whole is pursued. Only at the third stage does it become clear that the confusions were almost wholly our own, that the 'mistaken' conclusions in fact express profound and deeply illuminating insights. Whether or not Frege's works are of such great genius, Burge's reading of them is well characterized by the second stage in our growing mastery of such work. Burge, one of our most careful, thoughtful, and philosophical readers of Frege, takes many of Frege's conclusions to be thoroughly wrong; but he is convinced, nevertheless, that working through Frege's writings, coming to understand his train of thought, will greatly enrich our own thinking about a wide range of issues in logic, semantics, the philosophy of mathematics, and the philosophy of language.

Truth, Thought, Reason collects together ten of Burge's previously published essays on Frege, four postscripts to individual essays, and a long introduction providing a reflective assessment both of Frege's historical significance and of his importance for current philosophical work. Most of the essays are very familiar, at least to those who work in this area, but it helps to have them all together, and to have them combined with Burge's further, often second, thoughts on key issues, and his overall assessment. Burge discusses at length some of the most intriguing and difficult themes in Frege: his notion of sense, his rationalistic conception of knowledge in logic and mathematics, and what Burge thinks of as Frege's formalist, structuralist understanding of language, thought, and inference. The motivation is almost always philosophical; the aim is to learn from Frege things that will help us in our own philosophical work. The method is historical; the task is to be faithful to Frege's own thought, undistorted by current understandings of the issues he addresses. The result is a very valuable discussion of central themes in Frege by an acute, largely sympathetic, and commendably careful reader.

Save for the first (a short overview of Frege's thought), the essays are organized into three parts — though, as Burge himself notes, the groupings are somewhat artificial given the way various themes are interwoven throughout the whole. The first sets things up with two (overlapping) essays on the centrality of the notion of truth in Frege's thinking, followed by a discussion of the role of sense in indirect discourse, in particular the need for a hierarchy of senses to explain variously complex embeddings of indirect discourse. To understand Frege, Burge thinks, one must begin with truth, as indeed Frege does, and with indirect discourse, which is much less central to Frege. The second part focuses on Frege's conception of sense, both as it contrasts with linguistic meaning and as it is, in particular cases, incompletely grasped in the course of ongoing scientific inquiry. This latter theme is then taken up again, developed and enriched, in the third part on Frege's rationalism. It is here, in Burge's thoughtful and illuminating characterization of Frege's rationalism as at once deeply historicist, resolutely pragmatic, and essentially holistic or inferentialist, that I think Burge makes

his most important and original contribution, one that at the same time clearly shows that Frege does indeed have much yet to teach us.

As Burge emphasizes, Frege's concern is with scientific language rather than natural language, with thought rather than communication: Frege's aim is to understand the pursuit of truth in logic and mathematics, where both are to be conceived as sciences yielding substantive knowledge of an objective domain. As Burge also recognizes, Frege's notion of sense is largely shaped by the explanatory role it is to play in an account of that pursuit. Frege has little theoretical interest in, for instance, ordinary proper names, indexicals, and demonstratives, or in vague predicates, precisely because they have no place in a properly scientific language. Burge nonetheless take the two sorts of language to be essentially similar, invoking, for example, context-dependent features of everyday thought about the world (e.g., a child's perceptual beliefs) as grounds for rejecting key features of Frege's notion. Of course Frege himself applies his technical notions of *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* to natural language expressions, and he often uses examples from natural language. It does not follow that he thinks that natural language is, in all crucial respects, like a scientific language, that he thinks that they are languages of essentially the same sort. Certainly Frege's own two-dimensional logical language, *Begriffsschrift*, looks on the face of it to be quite unlike a (written) natural language. If the two sorts of language *are* fundamentally different, then we should be wary of the sort of uncritical application Burge makes of lessons drawn from the one sort of language to the other.

Frege's logical language *Begriffssschrift* is self-consciously modeled on the formula language of arithmetic. Already in *Grundlagen*, written years before the introduction of Frege's technical notions of *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*, Frege achieves the essential insight of his mature conception. The problem that brings it to light is very simple: because there is only one number one, no amount of putting one together with itself can produce anything more than one, and yet the sentence, '1 + 1 + 1 = 3', expresses a truth of arithmetic. How, then, are we to read this sentence? One's first thought, that each tokening of the numeral '1' designates the number one, prior to and independent of the context of the sentence, so that the sentence itself expresses the fact that the number one and the number one and the number one together equal three, cannot be right. There is only one one. Frege provides an alternative. Instead of taking the primitive signs of the Arabic numeration system to designate numbers independent of any use — the numeral '1', for example, to designate the number one whatever the context — he suggests that we understand such signs as *only* expressing a sense prior to their use. The signs are then put together to form a sentence that expresses a thought, and that thought can then be analyzed into function and argument in various ways, none of which are privileged. The sentence, '1 + 1 + 1 = 3', can be taken to involve, for instance, the function, $\xi + 1 + 1 = 3$, with the number one as argument. Alternatively, we can take the object names, '1 + 1 + 1' and '3', both of which designate the number three (though they do so under different modes of presentation), to designate the arguments for the two-place relation, $\xi = \zeta$.

Clearly other analyses are possible as well. So read, a sentence of the language does not serve as a record of speech, as a sentence of natural language does, nor does it directly present truth conditions, as sentences of our standard logical languages do. Instead it expresses a sense that can be analyzed into function and argument in a wide variety of ways (for the purposes of judgment and inference), none of which are privileged. Only relative to such an analysis are truth conditions formulated in the formula language of arithmetic. Just the same is true of Frege's *Begriffsschrift*, his logical language modeled on the formula language of arithmetic. (See my *Frege's Logic* [Harvard University Press 2005].)

But if that is right, then Burge's understanding of Fregean sense in terms of truth conditions, and of Frege's conception of language more generally as a precursor to our model theoretical conception, cannot be right. For on that latter conception, primitives of the language do have *Bedeutung* prior to and independent of their occurrence in sentences. This is precisely what a model provides. Burge's account of Fregean sense makes just the mistake he seeks to avoid: it imports something foreign, namely, our own model theoretic conception of language, into Frege. Needless to say, this mistake ramifies in a variety of ways throughout Burge's reading of Frege (not least in his thought, noted above, that we need to understand indirect discourse to understand Frege).

Burge urges us to read Frege because, he thinks, even where Frege ultimately goes wrong, he has much to teach us along the way. One might say the same about Burge's writings on Frege. As I have indicated, there are problems with Burge's reading of Frege; but even so, *Truth, Thought, Reason* provides, for the beginner, an excellent introduction to key themes in Frege, and much food for thought even for those who have been grappling with Frege's writings for years. In the end, I think, we will finally come to see that Frege's works are indeed works of such great genius that the confusions are our own. Reading Burge on Frege can help to get us there.

Danielle Macbeth
Haverford College

Ranjit Chatterjee
Wittgenstein and Judaism:
A Triumph of Concealment.
New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. 2005.
Pp. ix + 207.
US$ 62.95. ISBN 0-8204-7256-5.

While Ludwig Wittgenstein's Jewish ancestry is a biographical fact, it is rarely noticed that W thought of himself as a Jewish thinker, and few scholars have explored the possible significance of these facts for a better understanding of his philosophy. Ranjit Chatterjee aims to remedy this neglect, and argues that W is best understood as a covert Jewish thinker in times of lethal anti-Semitism. Chatterjee begins with a sketch of the dimensions of W's thought, proceeds to proclaim its unity, argues that W's burden as a Jewish thinker is courageous clarification, considers W's relation to religion and postmodernism, then ends the book with an epilogue on reading and an appendix on W's Jewish descent.

Chatterjee rejects the distinction between early and later W, and contends that the difference between the *Tractatus (T)* and the *Philosophical Investigations (PI)* is a difference in style, not of substance (35). 'The *T* is best understood as a Jewish book performing a traditional role, its preface a cornerstone in the structure .... Take the *T* with its ending and the *PI* as is and you have the same book.' The question, 'What does "Jewish" mean here?' immediately arises. Is it employed as a racial or religious/cultural category? There is an absence of serious analysis here, but Chatterjee eventually makes a distinction between 'physical Jewishness' and 'intellectual Jewishness,' arguing that W 'confessed' to the former, but concealed the latter even though it is manifest in his notebooks and his philosophy.' The Jewish cultural tradition that W is said to belong to involves separateness, revelation, covenant, scripture, and commentary. 'The Book' is the patrimony of the Jewish writer, and anything he writes is but a reproductive response to it. The 'Jewish mind' focuses all its powers on commentary, clarification, and analysis. Hence W's writing is not really writing, but nonsense that draws attention to an age old mystical tradition which enables us to understand texts in that tradition without reading them.

Chatterjee goes on to relate W to the history of philosophy, seen rather narrowly as a dispute between Greeks and Jews. The Greeks are distracted from ethics due to their rationalistic spirit of inquiry, craving for the universal and univocal, and refusing to draw a limit to the possibilities of intellectual inquiry. In sharp contrast, the rabbinic tendency in W is toward differentiation, metaphorical multiplicity, and multiple meaning, with ethics as the true end of his work. The intention of the chapter on W's religion is to suggest a reading of W's religious attitudes that elucidates his philosophical work: 'the point of W's philosophy must be sought in his religion ... in his ethics.' This is glossed as, 'to be an honest religious thinker is to be an honest linguistic thinker, which means debunking all dishonest linguistic thinkers.'

The last chapter, 'W and the Clarification of Postmodernism', places W with Levinas and Derrida in a 'Jewish constellation,' and asserts that each uses difference to challenge the stranglehold of Greek-derived metaphysics: the motto, 'Don't look for the meaning, look for the use,' demands the investigation of linguistic difference. Here are a few family resemblances: while W and Levinas both emphasize physiognomy, W and Derrida are deconstructors, and all three demonstrate that 'the road to ethics goes through the philosophy of language.' The significance of silence about ethics is that 'one cannot speak directly about justice ... ; you cannot say, without talking nonsense "This is just" or even less "I am just" without immediately betraying justice.'

This is a valuable book. Among its achievements are the gathering and arrangement of textual evidence for the view that W was a Jewish thinker, the sustained attempt to elaborate implications of this for his philosophy, the demonstration that W read authors in the European Jewish tradition and that there are noteworthy affinities between him and such a tradition. Again, pointing to resemblances between W and such postmodernist figures as Derrida, Levinas, and Lyotard is interesting, even though the differences should merit equal attention. The set of contrasts drawn between 'Greeks and Jews' in philosophy is instructive, although the vocabulary is suspect, if only because it generates distortions: Can anyone seriously claim that Aristotle neglected ethics? The book's instructive powers are diminished by occasional selective textual bias, an apparent animus to Anglo-American interpreters of W, and a strange missionary tone.

Here are a few specific questions and difficulties. First, is the identification of W's *philosophy* with a religious/cultural group congruent with his conception of philosophy? Such claims are at odds with W's remarks to the effect that: 'The philosopher is not a citizen of a community of ideas. That is why he is a philosopher ... Philosophy is the patient weighing of linguistic facts.' These remarks do not privilege any particular religious or cultural tradition. Nor is it clear how W's utterance, 'I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view,' squares with the thesis of the book. Second, the suggestion that W would purge moral discourse and evaluation is incompatible with a central theme of the *PI*, namely, that in the end the job of philosophy is to describe the uses of language.

Chatterjee also insists that there was only *one* W, not two. Well, yes, but the division of W's philosophy into various periods and transitions makes good sense in light of the differences in W's thought as indicated by his texts. Chatterjee seems to forget this part of the preface to the *PI*: 'I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in [the *T*].' These 'mistakes' included the doctrines of the picture theory of meaning, and of the form of the proposition. Perhaps rather than looking for something in common to W's philosophy, early or late, it would be more fruitful to adopt an approach that explores similarities and differences among his various texts.

Chatterjee, however, sees a common essence to W's philosophy: 'W was one philosopher. He became this one philosopher very early, before the

writing of the *T*.' This over-simple view is pushed to bizarre lengths: The *PI* is seen as an assemblage of leftovers, rather than offering a fresh perspective on, and new methods for, doing philosophy. Chatterjee even sees the hard work that went into the *PI* as a mere rearrangement of rhetorical devices! It seems to me the idea that in philosophy you can arrive without taking the journey — without engaging in the struggle with language that sets everyone the same traps — is not only deeply un-Wian, but fails to capture the rough ground of philosophical activity.

Béla Szabados
University of Regina

Sinkwan Cheng, ed.
Law, Justice, and Power: Between Reason and Will.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2004.
Pp. xii + 278.
US$62.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4885- 3);
US$25.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4891-8).

Sinkwan Cheng has assembled an impressive list of contributors to this volume of fourteen mostly original essays. The contributors are Slavoj Žižek, Martti Koskenniemi, Maggie O'Neill, Peter Fenves, Sinkwan Cheng, Nancy Fraser, John Brigham, Ernesto Laclau, Robert Gibbs, Peter Fitzpatrick, Alain Badiou, J. Hillis Miller, Juliet Flower MacCannell, and Julia Kristeva. As one will gather from this list, the collection contains a considerable diversity of articles, which are of relatively even quality for a volume of this nature. What one will not find in the book is a strong organizing theme, as its title rather suggests, and as the titles of the volume's six parts, into which the articles are ostensibly organized, attest: 1. 'The "New World Order" Between State Sovereignty and Human Rights', 2. 'Colonialism and the Globalization of Western Law', 3. 'Legal Pluralism and Beyond', 4. 'New Ethical and Philosophical Turns in Legal Theory', 5. 'The "Inhuman" Dimension of Law: Poststructuralist Assessments', and 6. 'Psychoanalysis: Justice Outside the "Limits" of the Law' (incomprehensibly, Part 6 consists of only a single eight-page article). The editor's introduction, entitled 'Law, Justice, and Power in the Global Age', struggles valiantly to provide an organizing theme for the volume, but in a losing cause. Readers would be well advised to pass over Cheng's introduction; it is a textbook example of how not to write such a piece and how not to organize an edited collection. If this book is to be recommended — and it is, somewhat — it is on the strength of several of its

essays, not their contribution to a unified theme or set of themes. It is best approached as an unusually thick journal issue.

Among the highlights of the book are articles by Slavoj Žižek, Nancy Fraser, John Brigham, and Juliet Flower McCannell. Žižek's contribution, titled 'NATO as the Left Hand of God?', follows the editor's introduction and, unsurprisingly, is among the stronger essays in the volume. Žižek focuses on the NATO bombings carried out during the civil war in Yugoslavia and questions what this signifies regarding contemporary global politics. Does NATO's intervention in this war signify the triumph of human rights over state sovereignty, as many liberals proclaim, or is a more suspicious interpretation called for, one involving capital and the self-interest of the NATO powers? Asserting the latter, Žižek stops short of defending either pole of a dichotomy that he sees emerging at the present time, between 'global liberal capitalism' and ethnic nationalism. How, he asks, are we to understand NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia? Is it a case of 'the international community' acting in protection of human rights with no strategic purpose of its own, or is it an 'expression of the new moral tone that pervades contemporary political discourse more and more,' a tone of disingenuous moralizing of which political correctness is but one example (33)? If the reply most often heard is the former, we must ask why, 'in the NATO justification of the intervention, the reference to the violation of human rights is always accompanied by the vague but ominous reference to "strategic interests,"' a question that may so often be asked in cases of Western military intervention around the world (30). Without entirely rejecting the justification for NATO involvement, Žižek asserts the need somehow to combine this explanation with a more suspicious reading, one in which the New World Order is now regularly forced to combat a Slobodan Milosevic or a Saddam Hussein — less out of a disinterested concern for justice than to ensure that its 'protectorate' remains in a condition of dependency and subservience.

Nancy Fraser, in 'Recognition as Justice? A Proposal for Avoiding Philosophical Schizophrenia', addresses the question whether it is necessary to choose between two conceptions of justice that at the present time are frequently asserted to be incompatible, distributive justice and justice as recognition, and defends a negative reply. A 'schizophrenia' of justice(s) may be avoided, Fraser argues, if we regard both distribution and recognition as similarly premised on 'parity of participation,' a notion according to which 'justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers' (146). The conditions of such parity are principally two, one pertaining to economic distribution, 'the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants' independence and voice,' and the other to recognition, '[i]t requires that institutionalized patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem' (146). Neither condition alone is sufficient, Fraser maintains, nor can justice as recognition, or as distribution, be reduced to its respective other. In order for the claim of recognition to rise above the identity politics that Fraser

categorically rejects, it must abandon the category of identity entirely and replace it with a 'status model' of recognition based on the idea of participatory parity: 'what requires recognition is not group-specific identity but rather the status of group members as full partners in social interaction.' On the status model, the failure of recognition is not an affront to collective identity but '*social subordination* in the sense of being prevented from *participating as a peer* in social life' (142).

John Brigham's contribution to the volume, 'Rethinking the Quotidian: Legal and Other Regulations', analyzes the impact that Foucault's work has had in social scientific investigation into law and power, and argues that 'the constitutive perspective' that informs the work of many legal scholars and other social scientists depends upon insights developed by, or in response to, Foucault. While this may appear obvious, Brigham does a fair job of surveying the impact that Foucault's contribution has had on the study of legal power and on analyzing informal law and normative structures of the kind found outside the traditional concept of law. Brigham criticizes the habit of those influenced by Foucault of neglecting or minimizing the significance of state power in favor of practices of everyday life in which power 'circulates' or is 'deployed', preferring instead to 'understand law as regulation and regulation as embedded in the social fabric' and 'an aspect of the way we live' (171). He writes, 'bringing out the importance of little forms of power should not lead us to ignore the very real, the very big, forces that emanate from government. There is still considerable power left in the modern state. Clearly, both little and big forms of power must be incorporated in the description of modern mechanisms of regulation and social control' (164).

The volume contains some weaker contributions as well, surprisingly including those by Alain Badiou, who is not at his best in his six-page 'Justice and Truth', and Julia Kristeva, whose 'Beyond the Dialectic of Law and Transgression: Forgiveness and Promise' is a short (eight pages) and not terribly enlightening commentary on Hannah Arendt. Both papers are somewhat perfunctory, and were likely included in the volume on account of the reputations of their authors, rather than for the quality of the articles themselves. Similarly unimpressive is the contribution by the book's editor, Sinkwan Cheng, 'The Female Body as a Post- Colonial Site of Political Protest: The Hunger Strikers Versus the Labor Strikers in Forster's *A Passage to India*'.

Overall, *Law, Justice, and Power* is a collection of average quality, neither mandatory reading for political theorists of any school nor deserving of being ignored.

Paul Fairfield
Queen's University

John J. Cleary and
Gary M. Gurtler, S. J., eds.
Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Volume XX, 2004.
Boston: Brill 2005.
Pp. xxiii + 319.
US$154.00 (cloth: ISBN 90-04-14249-5);
US$89.00 (Paper: ISBN 90-04-14248-7).

This volume of the *BACAP Proceedings* is divided into seven colloquia, each of which includes a paper and a commentary originally presented during the 2003-04 academic year. With one exception, each of the colloquia is followed by a joint bibliography. There is a comprehensive *Index of Names*, but no index of contents. Co-editor Cleary's *Introduction*, which provides a detailed account of each contribution, nevertheless allows scholars to see the specific content of the papers. There is no *index locorum,* though enough of the papers are sufficiently detailed and of a common purpose to warrant one.

The pieces are a mix of the tightly argued and the more broadly presented, the close textual reads and the less textually dependent. Some are concisely written, others somewhat less so. (In the case of the latter, the commentator, as well as Cleary's superb introduction, are invaluable interpretive aids.) Some papers will undoubtedly be of considerable interest to almost all scholars in ancient philosophy as well as to some with other interests (e.g., political philosophy, philosophy of biology).

Fully three colloquia are devoted to Plato's account of justice in the *Republic*. In 'The Faces of Justice: Difference, Equality, and Integrity in Plato's *Republic*', Aryeh Kosman inveighs against a popular account of Plato which depicts him as an 'archetypal champion of *unity* and enemy of *difference*' (153). Kosman's paper shows that the *Republic* offers arguments about socio-political arrangements, as well as ontology, which run contrary to this popular account. According to Kosman, a central argument of the *Republic* (Bks. I-IV) treats justice as a 'normative principle of difference.' His discussion of ontology features a sustained discussion of the Divided Line which he contends sheds light upon puzzles about the one and the many in a way relevant to his thesis.

In her commentary, Mary-Hannah Jones focuses upon Kosman's principle, arguing that while the normative principle of difference is applicable to any functionally differentiated entity, justice is a *particular* kind of normative principle that can apply only to that polis which arises in the proper way and serves the right purposes. So not every polis that Socrates discusses in the *Republic* (the austere city, the luxurious, the ideal) will be equally just.

Susan Sauvé Meyer considers similar issues in 'Class Assignment and the Principle of Specialization in Plato's *Republic*'. Noting that the large artisan class fails to receive the city's education in virtue, Meyer objects to Plato on two fronts. First, 'Plato gives us no good reason to suppose that the artisans are excluded from political participation because of any natural

incapacity' (231). Second, 'the institutions of the ideal city show no evidence of having been designed with a concern to make sure that all those with the natural capacity to be guardians are given the opportunity to develop it' (231).

Tad Brennan's commentary is perhaps the most thorough in the volume, as well as the most consistently pertinent to its companion paper. He begins by distinguishing the following two questions, and by discussing what one may rightly infer about the Kallipolis on the basis of their answers: 1) Does Plato's Kallipolis satisfy a particular principle of fairness of class assignment? 2) Does Plato make the satisfaction of this principle a goal in the construction of the Kallipolis? Brennan then presents a thorough consideration of the textual evidence, both pro and con, concerning the particular issues raised by Meyer's position.

The third of the colloquia on the *Republic* is contributed by Daniel Devereux. In, 'The Relationship Between Justice and Happiness in Plato's *Republic*', Devereux's ambitious and surprising thesis is that Plato is not a eudaimonist in the *Republic*. One task to be undertaken in reaching this conclusion is, of course, navigating the textual possibilities for what Glaucon and Adimantus have in mind when they charge Socrates to praise justice 'for its own sake.' Devereux's conclusion is that justice's value is greater than and independent from the happiness it results in for the just person. His scholarship is painstaking (40 pp.), involving very close reads of the relevant passages (including some from Aristotle's *Ethics*).

Lee Franklin's interesting commentary focuses upon Devereux's evidence from Bk. I, from which the latter concludes that 'if Justice is valuable for itself, then its intrinsic value must be distinct from the value it has in virtue of the happiness it produces' (306). Franklin's discussion is inspired by his belief that, 'we cannot take for granted that an entity's intrinsic value will differ from the value it holds in virtue of its consequences' (306). He then provides a textually-based argument showing that, for Plato, justice is such an exceptional entity.

A fourth paper devoted to Plato is John Sallis' 'The Flow of Φύσις and the Beginning of Philosophy: On Plato's *Theaetetus*'. The argument here is a little difficult to track, but his thesis seems to be that the dialogue's various dramatic 'stagings' help to settle some questions of philosophical interpretation. By way of illustration, Sallis 'traces the contours of ... two extended scenes as they evolve and intersect in the first part of the dialogue ...' (178). These scenes are vaguely described as 'the scene into which is translated a certain thesis regarding φύσις,' and the other is that scene which involves 'the appearance of the philosopher' (178). The identity of these scenes is not made more explicit than this, except by way of their extensive discussion.

Nickolas Pappas seems to accept Sallis' claim about the philosophically suggestive power of the dramatic elements in the dialogue. In a critical vein, he asks, 'Is the inauguration of philosophy a historical event [the appearance of the philosopher], or is it a metaphysical possibility always ready to be

repeated?' (194). He then discusses relevant passages with an eye for their dramatic cues as a means to answer his question.

The topical 'Socrates, Aristotle, and the Stoics on the Apparent and Real Good', by Marcelo D. Boeri, tries to 'sketch an account of how the distinction "apparent-real good" is meant to be understood' (110) by Socrates, Aristotle and the Stoics. His primary thesis is that neither Aristotle, the Stoics (nor the mature Plato) were able to excise all Socratic elements in their respective accounts of how desire and thought combine to produce action. In his commentary, Iakovos Vasiliou suggests, in effect, that Boeri's topic exceeds his paper's limits. (Boeri himself acknowledges that that scope of his paper is too large to admit adequate discussion of all the pertinent details, 110.) In particular, Vasiliou notes, more attention must be paid to Socratic moral epistemology, as well as to some additional passages from Boeri's focal texts. Indeed, Boeri's study is both fruitful enough and, I expect, will be of sufficiently high interest to scholars, to warrant a book-length treatment.

There are two colloquia devoted to Aristotle. Alfred E. Miller and Maria G. Miller contribute 'Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as the Ontology of Being-Alive and its Relevance Today'. This paper alone takes up nearly one-third of the entire volume, and generates, in conjunction with its commentary, the most extensive bibliography. The Millers propose that the *Metaphysics* and the *De Anima* be interpreted so that their 'shared underlying ontology' is allowed to emerge, one that will account for organisms as well as 'stable entities on a dynamic causal basis' (1). Doing so brings Aristotle conceptually close to contemporary scientific understanding of organisms making 'illuminating comparisons possible' (1) between the two approaches.

The Millers' work represents a substantial reinterpretation of Aristotle. Commentator John J. Cleary is skeptical that the reinterpretation can succeed. Specifically, he raises objections about the Millers' readings of some of the passages; and he worries about the 'hermeneutical difficulty of remaining true' (97) to Aristotle's work when striving to make it comparable to modern points of view.

Finally, there is the tightly-argued 'Aristotle's Account of Agency in *Physics*, III.3', by Ursula Coope. Coope productively wonders: 'What does it add to our understanding of why a change occurred to know, not just that a certain agent was responsible, but also that that agent was *acting on something* to bring about the change?' (201). Her paper identifies key terms, presents a detailed account of her puzzle, and then carefully unfolds what Coope takes to be Aristotle's solution. Her conclusion is that to know why the bronze becomes a statue we must 'invoke the fact that the change in question is the incomplete actuality of the agent's potential for the patient to be F. It must, that is, refer to the agent's action' (220).

Daryl M. Tress explains that Coope's conclusion is ambiguous between two bold theses — one of which is very bold. First, Coope might have in mind that, 'The reciprocality of agent and patient is such that the motion or change *is* their mutual ... encounter' (222). Or, *very* boldly, Coope might have in mind that, 'Change is the actualization of the agent's potential that a patient be

otherwise, and the actualization of the agent's potential takes place in the patient' (223). Tress thoroughly discusses each thesis in turn, finding the bold thesis tenable and raising a number of brief, critical, discussions of the very bold thesis.

Patrick Mooney
John Carroll University

Janet Donohoe
Husserl on Ethics and Intersubjectivity: From Static to Genetic Phenomenology.
Amherst, NY: Humanity Books 2004.
Pp. 197.
US$60.00. ISBN 1-59102-210-X.

Donohoe's book investigates several of Edmund Husserl's unpublished manuscripts between the years 1913 and 1929, and argues that an important methodological shift took place within his thinking. Whereas his investigations prior to 1917 proceeded from a *static* account of the structure of a fully formed consciousness, these unpublished 'C-manuscripts' show Husserl turning his attention toward the *genetic* process by which consciousness came to be fully formed. As Donohoe notes, the discovery of this genetic dimension within Husserl's thought bears several historical and philosophical implications. Not only does it offer us a much richer view of Husserl's overall phenomenology; it also shows that to have interpreted or criticized Husserl solely according to his static account was to fail to consider both the breadth and development of his thinking. Within this latter group of (mis)interpreters and critics, Donohoe includes a veritable who's who of twentieth-century European philosophers: she names thinkers such as Habermas and Arendt, but she reserves critical space for the likes of Ricoeur (95-7), Derrida (106-9), and Levinas (160-1) for each failing to appreciate the scope of Husserl's thinking within their respective evaluations of his phenomenological investigations.

So what do these unpublished 'C-manuscripts' reveal? They demonstrate that Husserl was indeed pre-occupied by questions concerning the developmental origin of human consciousness. According to Donohoe's very clear and accessible organization of these documents, Husserl's genetic approach largely centered around his later reflections concerning the pure affectivity of the 'streaming living present'. Unlike the schematic and formal descriptions of time consciousness contained within his earlier works, these unpublished C-manuscripts show Husserl working out a conception of temporality

that *preceded* the constituting activity of a noetic consciousness. At this affective level of the 'streaming living present', Husserl observed that the I was with the Other in a radically immediate way: he described this level as one of 'coincidence with Others on an original level of constitution, my coincidence, so to speak, before there is constituted a world for myself and Others' (63). That is to say, Husserl's unpublished C-manuscripts spoke of the ego's fundamental openness and passive receptivity toward other human beings *prior to* the self-reflective awareness and constituting activity of an ego-logical consciousness.

As Donohoe highlights, such an account of human intersubjectivity is very different than the more familiar view of 'analogical constitution' traditionally associated with Husserl (62). She stresses, however, that Husserl's unpublished account is best interpreted as an important 'supplement' to this analogical view (179), because it shows Husserl working out a much deeper conception of the way in which consciousness is oriented within the givenness of an intersubjective relation.

In this way, Donohoe expertly shows how Husserl's genetic account allowed him to develop much richer views concerning the nature of intersubjectivity, ethics, and history. She begins this survey by pointing out that since the pre-reflective level of the 'streaming living present' displaced the absolute standing of a constituting consciousness (71), it allowed Husserl to investigate a horizon of meaning wherein pre-noetic consciousness could receive and inherit the sedimented meanings of prior generations from other human beings. Within the 'passive genesis' (88) of this horizon, Husserl's unpublished manuscripts subsequently discovered that we were all 'always already' immersed within the given prescriptions of a genealogical community (93). As a result, such an 'embeddedness of cross-generational intersubjectivity' (65) led Husserl to observe the way in which the habituation of shared attitudes and instincts functioned to sediment the basic nature of our ethical convictions (100). That is to say, on Husserl's account, we developed our normative guidance not from certain timeless or universal truths, but rather from the structure of communal inter-subjective living. What was most essential on Husserl's view, however, was that the ego was always in a position to reevaluate and reassess its inherited convictions and opinions (148). Although he stressed that the ego could only take up such a critical attitude within the context of a transmitted tradition, he nevertheless maintained that our 'rational vocation' demanded that we hold ourselves accountable for those values and ideals upheld within our given social community (156). That is, as rational beings who are dependent upon communal living, Husserl insisted that the basic character of our existence was inextricably linked to the social structure within which we lived. Therefore, according to Husserl's unpublished manuscripts, my self-responsibility extended not merely to and for myself, but was moreover connected to a deeper task of critically assessing those values and ideals upheld within my given social community.

Whereas the strength of Donohoe's book is this very clear and comprehensive overview of Husserl's unpublished genetic phenomenology, its weakness is a tendency to characterize uncharitably those philosophers who assessed Husserl solely according to the static dimension of his phenomenology (e.g., Derrida, Ricoeur, and Levinas). Not only does it seem strange to criticize these thinkers for merely interpreting Husserl according to his published works; it is moreover unfortunate that Donohoe did not attempt to set up a more respectful or interesting confrontation between their related insights. For instance, she devotes only two paragraphs to what she calls 'Levinas' own theory of a phenomenological ethics' in order to merely show that: (i) 'Levinas missed' a certain unpublished dimension of Husserl's thought, and (ii) to conclude that Husserl's own perspective was superior to Levinas', because it was not nearly as contrived at the level of human community (160-1). But surely Donohoe's very quick assessment is not suggesting that Levinas' phenomenology of human proximity is defenseless in the face of this retrieved Husserlian perspective? Moreover, surely the published works of phenomenologists such as Ricoeur and Levinas would have something important and/or compelling to say in response to these unpublished Husserl documents? Yet, on these seemingly inevitable kinds of question, Donohoe's book chooses to remain altogether silent.

Although it may be cheap to criticize a book for simply failing to ask questions that oneself happens to deem appropriate, I cannot help but think that her book would have been much strengthened by a more careful consideration of the relationship between these unpublished manuscripts and the original insights of other twentieth-century phenomenologists who have also worked out a conception of genetic phenomenology. In this way, instead of merely criticizing past assessments of Husserl's published works, such an approach would have better helped to frame the way in which the retrieval of these unpublished documents could reinvigorate and enrich debates within contemporary phenomenology.

Nevertheless, the outstanding strength of Donohoe's book consists precisely in its very clear and comprehensive account of how Husserl's unpublished genetic phenomenology allowed him to develop substantive views concerning the nature of intersubjectivity, ethics, and history. It is a valuable and much welcomed contribution to studies in contemporary phenomenology and Husserl scholarship.

Christopher McTavish
Loyola University of Chicago

Avigail Eisenberg and
Jeff Spinner-Halev, eds.
Minorities within Minorities:
Equality, Rights and Diversity.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. xii + 390.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0521843146);
US$31.95 (paper: ISBN 0521603943).

Since most discussions on multiculturalism and group rights have traditionally focused on the relations between majorities and assumedly homogeneous minority groups with easily defined boundaries, *Minorities within Minorities* is a most welcome, versatile addition to the existing literature about the value and meaning of individual autonomy, its potential conflicts with multiculturalism, and the different interpretations of the concept of identity. Are members of the majority entitled to interfere with minority practices and beliefs that seem to discriminate and even cause serious harm to individual, possibly non-consenting, minority members? Or should we remain impartial in the sense that the initial intention not only to tolerate but to recognize actively the value and meaning of multiculturalism requires that we refrain from all attempts to 'sabotage' minorities' traditional beliefs and ways of life? Or, are there special instances where our interference would not only be justifiable but be seen as a duty to protect the vulnerable?

No matter what anybody considers to be the right answer to these questions, since individual autonomy, freedom and self-determination are the core values in the Western world, it would be odd if philosophers and political theorists did not question the seeming incompatibility of at least certain group rights (or what some would like to call cultural rights) and the liberties and rights of *individual* minority members. Hence, as one would expect, the themes of these essays range from individual autonomy and self-determination to toleration, equality, and the nature and meaning of democracy, giving plenty to think about not only to philosophers and political scientists but to anybody interested in these very topical problems.

The title of the book gave me high hopes, and I felt optimistic that the volume would not only show many-sided scholarship in this field, but also seriously tackle some of the topics and questions that seem to have become somewhat sensitive issues. Many public debates about multicultural issues sound, at least to a Western, secular, philosophical ear, a bit lopsided — i.e., anti-liberalists may quite heavily and indiscriminately criticise Western values, most often individual autonomy and free speech, but at the same time they seem to be more than happy to demand that their own traditions and beliefs, unlike the Western ones, should not be subjected to criticism. In my opinion, this kind of nod towards real life might have nicely spiced up the book.

Although this collection of essays is erudite and well written, at least some essays lacked bite, in that they were mostly descriptive in nature.

But in all fairness, I should admit that the hope to see more provocative normative statements may be connected to my own background as a philosopher.

The first two essays deal with the often-debated concept of toleration, the importance and foundation of which, for Melissa S. Williams, lies in the importance of peace. I was left with the impression that Ms. Williams herself seems to be rather tolerant of illiberal practices since, in her own words, giving deliberative priority to peace-as-social-concord is likely to lead to a more creative liberalism. What this more creative liberalism would imply remained unfortunately vague. This same disturbing vagueness is present in some other essays as well, creating an impression that some of the authors wanted to express the opinion that harmful illiberal practices should not be accepted but, at the same time, tried to be careful not to insult illiberal people by giving examples of unacceptable behaviour.

There is no reason why anybody should deliberately insult others, but even academic writing has been affected by what I would call excessive political correctness. Lucas Swaine, for his part, concentrates on what he calls the four failures of liberalism in its efforts to argue that theocrats should embrace the principles of liberalism. Here again, when demanding that liberalists should give theocrats reasons they too can accept, we should additionally ask whether the only sound possibility is to accept Swaine's original position, namely, that theocentric arguments should be given room in the first place — given that most people trust scientific facts rather than religious beliefs in their daily actions. Also, at this point in my reading, I realised that minorities within minorities had so far been a minority issue. Luckily, later on they became more central.

The second part of the volume consists of four different approaches to equality. The first one, by the late Susan Moller Okin, goes back to her early writings and the critique her arguments engendered. The essay provides the reader with an interesting analysis of what has lately been said and written about women and their vulnerability as minority members. In addition, it illustrates well how misleading it is to talk about women as a group — academic women are equally capable of misinterpreting, even badmouthing, their colleagues as their male counterparts.

Gurpreet Mahajan poses one of the most vital questions, namely: Can intra-group equality co-exist with cultural diversity? Obviously it is impossible to give a straightforward answer to this question, even if one only concentrates on the co-existence of different cultures in one state — her description of the variety of kinds of internal minorities in India is proof enough of that. While I found the tone of the essay pleasantly optimistic, at some points it became exceedingly so. Towards the end of the essay, she mentions that although community members should be seen as primary agents, it is essential to create space for the organized group voice of women. This, unfortunately, would solve some of the major problems if, and only if, we had reason to believe that women do agree at least on certain core issues — which I most sincerely doubt.

Anne Phillips' essay on dilemmas of gender and culture, where she analyses different strategies adopted by political scientists who deal with the tensions between liberalism, multiculturalism and value conflicts, reminds us of the fact that value conflicts often depend on how thing are interpreted and how the problems are solved — not to mention who does the solving. Is the perspective of the problem-solver that of the political activist, the constitutional lawyer, or the deliberative democrat?

Parts Three and Four concern individual autonomy and self-determination, the key issues in recent discussions. Liberal norms try to protect individuals from unjustified interference, but what happens if and when some people voluntarily uphold illiberal views? Should the state interfere if they impose their views on their community members? Or is, as has been suggested, the 'right to exit' enough to safeguard minorities? Jeff Spinner-Halev shows in his writing that the mere right to exit becomes void if certain minimal standards are not fulfilled. Lack of education and inability to live among the majority may turn the right to exit into a privilege, attainable only for the fittest.

Unfortunately, this otherwise worthy essay does not cover those cases where the conflicts between different minorities are fiercest. As we can see in Jacob Levy's, Daniel Weinstock's, and Oonagh Reitman's essays, the major problem for any liberal democracy is where to draw the boundaries of illiberal views and behaviour. If toleration is the key word, freedom of association, and freedom to enter and exit, should be protected. On the other hand, the formal right to exit may only provide exit at such a high cost that the individual's happiness and well-being make potential followers sacrifice their freedom of opinion in order to be socially secure.

All these discussions remind me, at least, of the advantages of a secular society where, first, one's religious beliefs belong to a personal agenda; second, where people realize that we do have multiple cultural attachments which, in many cases may be partly incompatible; and, third, people understand that children are not to be seen as their parents' property, so that the state may interfere if there is reason to believe that children's interests and welfare are at risk. For these reasons, I found Rob Reich's and Daniel M. Weinstock's contributions to be of utmost importance. Reich reminds the reader that it is children who are most vulnerable to the intended, or unintended, consequences of multicultural politics. Also, both Reich and Weinstock focus their attention on, in my opinion, one of the core concepts, namely identity. Not only are the boundaries of cultures porous, so that cultural identities may be difficult to define, but the variety of our cultural and other attachments makes it next to impossible to define individual identity. And if the individual does not wish to define herself, why would anybody else be entitled to do so? Why, to use Weinstock's terminology, would birth-groups override choice-groups?

The last two parts of the book, on self-determination and democracy, deal with both identity issues and the argumentative basis of defenses for both multiculturalism and liberalist attempts to protect individual rights. Of

course the popular concept of deliberative democracy is obviously connected to minority-related decision-making, too. All in all, this many-faceted collection of essays makes good reading, and I hope that it will find its way to the bookshelves of all those people who even remotely have something to do with minority issues.

Heta Aleksandra Gylling
University of Helsinki

William A. Galston
The Practice of Liberal Pluralism.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp. vii + 205.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0 521 84034 1);
US$26.99 (paper: ISBN 0 521 54963 9);
US$22.00 (e-book: ISBN B0009W3KKQ).

William Galston explores many complex and interesting ideas in his new book *The Practice of Liberal Pluralism.* In Part 1, he attempts to justify what he contends is a 'balanced' approach (5, 191) to liberal democracy by appealing to value pluralism as the basis for broad rights to an expressive liberty of conscience. Galston's approach is contrasted with political democratic theories that treat public institutions as 'plenipotentiary' (3, 23). Among those criticized is the 'civic totalism' of Unger, Habermas, and Macedo (3, 25-33), and liberal egalitarian theories of Rawls, Dworkin, Barry, Gutman, and Thompson (Ch. 3). In Part 2, Galston gives an account of moral motivation and political behavior, in which morality is located on a continuum of moderate to altruistic forms of self-interest, and moral duties and criteria are largely derived from social context. Part 3 discusses the ill effects of individualism and the market on civil life (133-46), and Part 4 addresses criticisms from liberal egalitarians.

Of the varied and sometimes ambiguous analyses offered in this book, the most interesting and controversial claim is that value pluralism implies a primary right to what Galston calls 'expressive liberty'. Of particular interest is Galston's choice of examples to illustrate how the principle of expressive liberty protects associative and individual interests of citizens in the 'good of conscience.' Given that Galston holds that the right to expressive liberty of conscience is a right afforded to *individuals* (178), and includes the right to form associations on that basis, it is curious there is virtually no discussion of how individual expressions of conscience are to be balanced against group expressions of individual conscience.

According to Galston, the good of conscience refers to beliefs and associations that are authoritative and central to an individual's identity (67, 68). Historically, claims of conscience are overwhelmingly religious, but Galston includes as well some non-religious forms of human flourishing, pacificism for instance (49), which may also be understood as conscientiously authoritative.

Value pluralism justifies expressive liberty of conscience, Galston contends, because it recognizes that, above the threshold of objectively discernable human evils, there is a range of genuine human goods that are heterogeneous, incomparable, and often incompatible. Rational discussion cannot lead to the priority of any particular set of competing goods, and every option — even after rational deliberation — 'entails a sacrifice of genuine good' (14, 16, 18). It stands to reason that there are, therefore, a variety of equally valid forms of 'shared public purposes,' each of which protect mutually exclusive sets of genuine goods (166).

Galston contends that, in contrast with egalitarian liberalism, liberal pluralism supports a notion of political legitimacy that is truly 'inclusive' (34). Value pluralism supports two foundational duties of constitutional democratic government: 1) to protect citizens against recognizable evils (tyranny, oppression, genocide, cruelty, humiliation, mass epidemics, 3, 78), and, 2) to facilitate the mutual advantage of competing forms of shared public purposes (166). Satisfaction of basic human needs and protection of mutual advantage satisfy political legitimacy.

Through a series of well-chosen constitutional cases, Galston illustrates that 'neutral' policy in action accords 'near zero weight' to expressive religious conscience (Parts 1 and 2, 183). The Supreme Court's neutral interpretations of the constitution have resulted in intrusive directives to compel — Jehovah's Witnesses to pledge allegiance to the American flag (46), private schools to teach public curriculum 'to awake in the child's mind considerations ... contrary to those implanted by the parents' (54), and the government to tax the distribution of religious literature (Parts 1 and 2, 59).

Tellingly, though, the cases that Galston uses to illustrate his alternative thesis swing widely in the opposite direction, favouring the liberty of illiberal groups to enforce their values on individual dissenting members. Galston supports the decision in *Bob Jones University v. United States* to refuse tax benefits to the university because of its policy against interracial dating. But he claims that, had a decision been handed down to ban the interracial policy, it would have entailed an infringement of the free exercise of conscience (183). Likewise, in the case of *Dayton Christian Schools, Inc.*, Galston supports the Court's decision to uphold termination of the employment of a female kindergarten teacher on the basis of a patriarchal policy enforcing the view that mothers with children should not work outside the home (183).

If these examples prove worrisome for liberals concerned with substantive individual rights to equal freedoms from oppression, those anxieties will be reinforced by Galston's idea that claims of conscience enjoy a 'rebuttable

presumption to prevail in the face of public law' (68) and that this presumption properly protects 'illiberal institutions' as well as liberal (191).

Galston sees his view as decidedly liberal. But if he takes his commitment to liberalism seriously, one would expect a principled discussion of the value of individual equality and how that value defines limits to what groups may impose on their individual members in the name of liberty of conscience.

Galston's insistence on exit rights from illiberal associations to ensure '*genuine individual choice*' is a start toward this end (182). Indeed, Galston contends that political pluralists 'understand that group tyranny is possible, and therefore [the right to exit] protects individuals against some associational abuses ... ;' but that this also ' ... presumes that the enforcement of basic rights of citizenship and of exit rights, suitably understood, will usually suffice' (41). Unfortunately, there is no discussion of what constitutes 'suitably understood' exit rights or basic citizenship rights, and Galston offers no account of genuine individual choice that is distinguishable from manipulated choice. Without a substantive account of exit rights, it is difficult to see how individuals' right to dissent could be actualized. Consider the situation of some members of some indigenous groups, and also of some communal religious groups (e.g., fundamentalist Mormons, and Hutterites), who have no material chance for exit and are not assisted by any special effort to assist exit rights outside of their communities. (Consider the Jeff Warrens-led FLDS community, City of Colorado, in which it is the practice of polygamous husbands to refrain from insuring their wives' cars. If wives try to escape the FLDS, police may legitimately prevent them from leaving. All municipal judges and psychiatrists are FLDS members. See the Carolyn Jessop story.)

Galston's second foundational duty of the state, to secure basic human decency, is another promising place for a discussion of equal individual rights to equality. Galston states that the right to human decency resembles universal human rights such as those recognized by the United Nations Charter (3). In other places he acknowledges that human evils are objectively recognizable (15-6, 78). Again in other places, he concedes that the presumption in favour of rights to conscience may be overridden when they are mistaken (68). This presents an opportunity to discuss the objective and oppressive wrongs of arbitrary and undeserved discrimination in the name of associative conscience. Disappointingly, no such orienting discussion is forthcoming.

In the absence of such discussion, there is nothing to prevent the assumption that Galston defends only minimal rights of individuals to form their own private associations based on non-discriminatory and egalitarian values, but doesn't guarantee a place for those values anywhere else in the public arena. If this inference is correct, Galston's commitment to toleration has much in common with the millet system adopted by the Ottoman Empire (Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy,* 230-1), whereby a negative policy of non-interference was exercised in respect of group value systems, but any positive principle of rights for individuals within those groups is

accorded, to use Galston's words, 'near zero weight.' Wherein lies the so-called balance in this revisionist representation of 'liberal' theory?

Christie Sandford
Simon Fraser University

Shane Gunster
Capitalizing on Culture:
Critical Theory for Cultural Studies.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2004.
Pp. vii + 346.
Cdn$/US$50.00. ISBN 0-8020-3896-7.

If one browses the contemporary literature on cultural studies, one is bound to notice that the work of the early Frankfurt School, primarily that of Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin, is enjoying a resurgence. Gunster's work fits squarely in this trend. He states at the outset that his principle aim is to rethink 'the effects that commodified forms of culture have on the potential for different types of human experience' (8). He has three objectives: to develop an account of Adorno's critique of mass culture, to arrange Benjamin's work around the problematic of culture, commodity, and experience, and to read these thinkers together with the goal of producing a dialectical theory of mass culture that both explores its contradictions and attends to its transformative possibilities. In order to accomplish this task, Gunster not only offers an exegesis of the early Frankfurt school, but also the British empirical tradition represented by the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS). In so doing, Gunster is able to present clearly the history of cultural studies and locate Adorno and Benjamin in it. Throughout, Gunster maintains that the operative concept is 'commodification'.

Commodification, simply stated, is the transformation of an object into a commodity, that is, a product produced for the sole purpose of being exchanged. Borrowing from Marx, Adorno applies this not only to products of physical labor and material production, but also cultural products. It is in this respect that Adorno and Benjamin discuss culture as a commodity, as outlined in their culture industry thesis, the explication of which occupies the beginning of Gunster's work. Once culture is turned into a commodity it follows the logic of exchange. Culture no longer is the spontaneous creative expression of autonomous agents. Instead, culture takes on a life of its own with its own logic and rules. We no longer construct culture, but respond to

its demands. As Gunster explains: '[T]his dynamic ... helps transform cultural objects and processes ... into autonomous, independent entities and structures that cannot be controlled by human beings' (38). We lose control over culture. This loss of control adversely affects our capacity to function as autonomous, free beings. The concern over culture is rooted in a concern for human well-being.

The first three chapters of Gunster's book are primarily exegetical. Although some exegetical works can be repetitive or redundant to readers whom are familiar with the material, Gunster's presentation avoids these problems by placing Adorno and Benjamin in a dialogue that breathes new life into their work. He places Adorno's pessimism and condemnation of mass culture alongside Benjamin's optimism and belief in its liberatory possibilities. He is careful to present Adorno's rejection of mass culture not as an expression of elitism but as a concern for autonomy. Commodified culture, according to Adorno, perpetuates 'pseudo-individuation' or a false self. Benjamin, on the other hand, although lamenting the effects of mass culture as much as Adorno, sees the possibility of liberation in mass culture. Whereas Adorno saw mass culture primarily as the height of degraded experience, Benjamin found in it a means for the creation of 'flashes' that could break out beyond given categories of thought and thus create new, unique experiences of the world. Chapter 3 focuses on how Adorno and Benjamin can and ought to be read together. Both Adorno and Benjamin agree that true art is 'useless.' That is, it cannot be instrumentalized; it is purposive without being functional. The possibility of liberation or 'waking up' the masses lies in the creation of such a work that can highlight the contradictions of capitalism and arouse a desire for change. Although Adorno's work can be quite pessimistic, one can find this ideal in his work if he is read in fruitful tension with Benjamin. In Benjamin, there is the belief that through mass culture one can deliver the 'shock' that will wake up the masses and facilitate the change required. Mass culture can perform the same task as high art. It is at this point that Gunster begins to address the reception, or rather rejection, of Adorno and Benjamin by cultural studies generally.

Gunster begins with the British empirical tradition of cultural studies: the CCCS. He reads this tradition as a reaction to the early Frankfurt school's perceived elitism, pessimism, and thesis that culture is economically determined. Instead, through the appropriation of Louis Althusser's structuralism, the British tradition integrates semiotics into the study of culture, which is itself merely a system of signs. The problem of autonomy is thus reintroduced, but without the economic underpinnings. Gunster sees much value in this approach, although a major shortcoming of it is the dismissal of commodification as a cultural phenomenon.

In the final chapter, Gunster brings these two competing schools together. His desire is to bring commodification back into the discussion, while avoiding the naïve economism of classical Marxism. He believes he can do this through the use of Ernesto Laclau's concept of 'articulation'. As Gunster explains, articulation is 'the organization of seemingly unrelated elements

into a coherent formation by culture as well as by other social processes'(216). Gunster rephrases the Frankfurt School's culture industry thesis by adopting the semiotics of Louis Althusser and Roland Barthes. For Gunster, the culture industry thesis must not be understood as the simple equation: capitalism = mass culture = degraded life. Rather, it is a way of understanding the effects of commodification on all forms of social relationships. One must adopt a multiplicity of viewpoints since one is dealing with various forms of social relations, but at the core of all of them is commodification, that is, the effect of commodifying the inter-personal relationships that constitute the whole of culture.

Gunster has undertaken an ambitious project: to present commodification as the problem facing cultural studies, and do so by bringing together two divergent schools of thought on the matter. He is attempting to reframe the nature of the discussion. I am not sure if he is successful, but his attempt is laudable for both its insightfulness and clarity of presentation.

Jacob M. Held
Marquette University

David Couzens Hoy
Critical Resistance:
From Poststructuralism to Post-Critique.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2004.
Pp. ix + 274.
US$37.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-08330-2);
US$18.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-58263-5).

David Hoy's project in this book is ambitious. Through an analysis of several influential thinkers often grouped together under the rubric of 'poststructuralism', Hoy reframes their standing in the philosophical tradition, showing several nominally 'poststructuralist' philosophers (Foucault, Levinas, and Derrida) and one sociologist (Bourdieu) as offering a critique of the possibilities of resistance to social oppression and injustice. Their common project is interpreted as an attempt to account for the possibility of freedom without resort to the objective or normative foundationalism that these thinkers have found to be oppressive. Hoy largely succeeds in this task, displaying a broad command of the literature and addressing the problems in question in a writing style that is generally lucid and concise.

While distancing these philosophers from the approach of structuralism, Hoy tacitly realigns them with a kind of post-Kantian thought that insists on an immanent critique of reason while denying the self-transparency of

consciousness. The key figure in Hoy's recasting of these thinkers is Nietzsche, specifically Deleuze's Nietzsche from *Nietzsche and Philosophy*; and Hoy is clear that Deleuze's reading establishes the primary starting point for the contemporary changes in the methodology of articulating resistance. We are advised that these thinkers, rather than being 'post-moderns' or 'poststructuralists', are 'post-Nietzschean' in following Nietzsche's deepening of the Kantian critical project. Defending the Nietzschean critical turn to interpretation, Hoy writes: '[O]nly in the context of interpretation is meaningfulness at all possible' (34). Hoy presents four contributions to critical resistance by Nietzsche: 1) the body, not consciousness, makes intelligibility possible through interpretation; 2) this emphasis on the body is not reductionist; 3) Nietzsche's methodology, thus interpreted, is critical but not foundational; 4) the body is not unified and is not self-transparent (20-1). This sets the stage for the readings that follow of Foucault's and Bourdieu's social ontologies.

Importantly, early in the book, Hoy begins to address the question often asked of Nietzsche's philosophy as well as those texts that follow his emphasis on interpretation, namely: How can we distinguish between resistance that is potentially emancipatory and the illusion of such emancipation if there is not a unified or objective meaning available? Nietzsche's answer, for Hoy, is that 'interpretation is an ongoing process of balancing coherence and complexity' (55). Hoy argues that we finite beings have a need for coherence in our accounts of the world; and, therefore, although the Nietzschean position denies the possibility of a final, stable solution, it encourages active selection among interpretations (56). The abstract problem of illusion and emancipation can only be solved in a concrete situation by a practical judgment. Although perhaps Nietzsche would argue against attributing a stable *need* to humanity, Hoy's argument here is generally convincing in its emphasis on the concretely situated nature of interpretation. Roughly similar arguments will meet comparable charges made against the other thinkers represented.

The accounts that follow of Foucault's and Bourdieu's social ontologies are strongly written, particularly Hoy's disentangling of the often-conflated concepts of 'disciplinary power' and 'bio-power' in the Foucauldian *corpus*. Foucault is the major presence here, with Bourdieu's concepts of 'habitus' and 'field' serving generally to deepen 'Foucault's account of how subjectivity is constructed through power relations by providing a more detailed sociological theory of the process' (101). While finding Bourdieu's account mistaken in its reliance on the supposed objectivity of science, Hoy resists attempts to attribute an objective or naturalized body to Foucault's account of resistance. Instead, Hoy argues that Foucault only needs to demonstrate that other technologies of pleasure and the body have been actualized, and that the currently dominant form is not the only economy of pleasures possible (67). This gives Foucault a locus of resistance that is multiple and not grounded though a reductive naturalism or a transcendental realism. Although disciplinary power and bio-power shape the agency of the body and

of populations, respectively, they do not exhaust the body's possibilities or its historical actualities. Put in the Nietzschean terms that are ubiquitous in this text, Foucault's genealogy of power uncovers the *reactive* forces of bodily control to find the possibilities for resistance of *active* bodily forces.

Hoy proceeds to graft this Foucaudian account of social practice onto a Derridean description of ethical resistance to produce what Derrida calls 'deconstructive genealogy' and what Hoy will call 'post-critique' (226-7). Showing Derrida's debts to Levinas, as well as concerns about Levinas' phenomenology from Foucault's genealogical perspective, Hoy ultimately endorses Derrida's complementary project of showing critique to be an ethical duty, albeit one whose foundation is marked by undecidability. While a dynamic conception of the body is at the core of social engagement and resistance, ethical resistance is tied to death or the possibility of death of the body in particular social and historical arrangements (184). Here, Hoy provides a sketch of Derrida's complicated thinking concerning death and mourning; but the text perhaps tries to tackle too many other competing notions of death and dying. Although it is necessary to see Derrida's work on death as part of a tradition, the necessary background required here via Hegel's, Heidegger's, and Levinas' analyses of death — not to mention Freud's account of mourning — is presented in a manner that is hasty, particularly since Hoy has patiently elucidated his concept of the body through sections of three chapters.

The remaining chapters defend Hoy's 'post-critique' against the claims that deconstructive genealogy neglects ideology, thereby repeating its errors, and that it provides a disincentive to practice social transformation. Hoy is especially convincing in rebutting the post-Marxist charge, by showing how a genealogy of 'ideology' reveals the term's polysemy (196). Hoy also presents a strong case that 'post-critique' is 'not only critical but self-critical' in avoiding the trappings of ideology (191). Hoy's reply to the second objection lies in his claim that there is nothing essentially nihilist in genealogy. Nihilism is a possible practical outcome, but can be avoided only by practical judgment. 'Post-critique' cannot be *necessarily* effective in practice, but no position can, Hoy would argue.

In sum, Hoy shows that total critique is impossible and that we should, therefore, engage in as many regional critiques as possible, but without expecting ultimate closure. This book, despite the discordant term 'post-critique,' effectively demonstrates the philosophical place and importance of the 'poststructuralists' and replies to the major concerns put to them.

Darin S. McGinnis
Loyola University Chicago

Philip J. Kain
Hegel and the Other:
A Study Of The Phenomenology Of Spirit.
Albany: State University of New York
Press 2005. Pp. xi + 318.
US$89.95 (cloth: ISBN 0791464733);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0791464741).

In *Hegel and the Other* Philip J. Kain offers a unique interpretation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, thereby providing an interesting inquiry and explanation of both the workings of Hegel's text, and the underlying theory (or theories) that inform it. Given that Kain's text does stem from a rather original line of thought, the accuracy with which he understands and explains Hegelian theory is all the more remarkable.

The *Phenomenology of Spirit*, according to Kain, begins with the idea that the forms of consciousness cannot exist in separation from one another. Due to this he asserts that the *Phenomenology* should be read as consisting of three parts: Individual Consciousness (Chapters 1-5), Cultural Consciousness (Chapter 6), and Absolute Consciousness (Chapters 7 and 8). This arrangement, in a manner mirroring the *Philosophy of Right,* is more strategic than it is simply informative, as Kain is trying to show that Hegel is setting out ever more complex forms of experience in order to demonstrate how they fall short. Kain at one point even explains this as the demolishing of any explanation that is simpler than the absolute. And because the *Phenomenology*, according to his reasoning, lends a primacy and totality to the absolute, it is a mistake to read it simply as the 'last step'; it represents a presupposition that is absolute in its presence throughout the text, from the sections on individual consciousness, through cultural consciousness, and finally as it appears in the last section on absolute consciousness. The overall argument is that individual consciousness — that is, the simplest knowledge we have, and that which Hegel begins with — cannot be understood except as part of the development of a socio-cultural consciousness. Hegel, according to Kain, is purposefully creating an artificial separation between these modes of consciousness (as dealt with in the *Phenomenology*) in order to demonstrate that they cannot exist independently.

Because of the centrality of the absolute to Kain's reading, my explanation of his approach should provide helpful insight into the text: his method of reading the *Phenomenology* is directly linked to his understanding of the Hegelian absolute as something culturally constructed. And while this may be a stance that would seem to be subject to the same criticisms that are commonly brought against Left Hegelianism, Kain sidesteps these by arguing that because consciousness develops within a context that makes possible both a historical sense of identity and a dialectical course for history, this construction in no way precludes the possibility of 'truth'. He founds this on the correct assertion that Hegel's 'truth' is historical; that is, cultures have truth insofar as they grasp the reality of their time, and this provides them

with their connection to the absolute. This allows, as Kain reasons, for a sense of difference *within* the absolute; it also is subject to the qualification that any difference *from* the absolute means that the absolute is not in fact absolute, and is thus subverted. As culture operates on these absolute conceptions, it too will be subverted if anything shows up which has not been included within its absolute conception (275-6). This reading thus interprets Hegel's conception of philosophy as the history of one eternal Reason presenting itself in infinitely many forms, with each culture having the absolute before it — that absolute being the expression of a culture, and that culture the expression of the absolute. This means that as culture shapes and constructs its reality, reality shapes and constructs it. It also means, as Kain shows us, that as philosophy attempts to grasp and express its culture's absolute, it contributes to its construction (263).

The reason Kain gives for his reading is the *Phenomenology*'s Kantian heritage. According to Kain, Hegel uses transcendental deductions, similar to the type Kant uses to establish the legitimacy of the categories, to account for the different modes of consciousness. Thus the *Phenomenology* not only yields i) an explanation of how we have consciousness, ii) a search for the conditions that make it possible, and iii) a justification for consciousness, but also iv) the conclusion that none of it is possible outside of the totality of the absolute. For Kant, he reasons, is alluded to by Hegel on far more occasions than is normally realized. So much so in fact, that *Hegel and the Other* can also be read as an attempt by Kain to demonstrate that Kant is at the conceptual centre of the issues being treated in the *Phenomenology*. Thus, in good Kantian manner, the forms of consciousness are taken up to demonstrate that we cannot know them without a presupposition of an absolute.

However, the result of approaching the text from the presupposition of an absolute standpoint — cultural or otherwise — is that instead of reading the *Phenomenology* in its 'genetic', 'historical' terms, Hegel falls into the same 'trap' as any other dogmatic metaphysician who juxtaposes an abstract ideal of truth onto the actual life of consciousness. For Hegel cannot presuppose the absolute without somehow begging the question and illicitly invoking a circular view — after all, the ladder to the absolute standpoint is what the *Phenomenology* is supposed to provide.

I do not read the *Phenomenology* in the same manner as Kain; I do however believe that while he may err in his reading of the *Phenomenology* specifically, he most definitely succeeds in providing an accurate and helpful reading of Hegel generally. As I alluded to at the outset of this review, *Hegel and the Other* is a good text to turn to in order to understand the underlying rationality of Hegel's philosophy from an original point of view — that is to say, to understand Hegel in the 'big picture', and from a standpoint that is at times rather unique.

James M. Czank
(*Department of Political Science*)
University of Alberta

John Losee
Theories on the Scrap Heap: Scientists and Philosophers on the Falsification, Rejection and Replacement of Theories.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 2005.
Pp. viii + 206.
US$24.95. ISBN 0-822-95873-2.

Reasoning about evidence is a central branch of the philosophy of science. Losee's *Theories on the Scrap Heap* is a good introduction to the standard issues surrounding disconfirmation and theory change. Readers will be pleased to find that both the lucid style and the breadth of coverage (historical, philosophical and scientific) found in Losee's justly famous *Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* is present here as well.

Theories on the Scrap Heap aims to do two important things at once — doing them together is still relatively uncommon, so the fact that they are done together is a major strength of the book. The first aim is to describe and explain a significant cross-section of the philosophical difficulties that arise in the context of reasoning about evidence. The topics mentioned do not exhaust the range of possible topics related to evidential reasoning (there is no discussion of the problem of induction, there is little attention to positive evidence, and there is no treatment of Bayesianism or other contemporary accounts of evidence in science such as Achinstein's or Mayo's). Losee gives very full coverage nevertheless. Besides falsificationism, the ambiguity of falsification, and the rejection, replacement and ad hoc modification of theories in light of negative evidence, Losee discusses criteria of theory acceptance, scientific revolutions, non-rational factors in theory choice, and more. The second aim of the book is to illustrate evidential reasoning through excerpts taken from actual science and its history. This shows (at least in some measure) the complexity of actual scientific episodes. Attention to the complexities of actual science is an advantage of Losee's book over other more purely philosophical approaches to evidential reasoning that emphasize idealized or rationally reconstructed scientific cases. Examples are given from across the sciences, ranging from chemistry to particle physics, astronomy to aerodynamics, evolutionary biology to geology.

Neither of the two aims just mentioned is fully realized, but the book nevertheless makes an admirable contribution to the literature of history and philosophy of science. It will likely find its largest audience as a supplementary text in upper-level undergraduate courses on philosophy of science, or in beginning graduate courses on evidential reasoning. Historians of science may find the book to be a useful introduction to issues in the philosophy of science.

The book has four main sections: Theories and Falsification, The Rejection of Theories, The Replacement of Theories, and The Acceptability of Theories. Each section contains between two and four brief chapters. Roughly half the

book is devoted to excerpts from scientific literature (or historical commentary by actors who were involved in the episodes discussed); these excerpts are interleaved with Losee's commentary. Introductory materials are minimal, which sometimes means that the excerpts are less than fully contextualized. If used by undergraduates, this is definitely a book that needs a teacher to fill in background information and to explain certain aspects of the science discussed. A general shortcoming of the book is a lack of explanatory material. An opening chapter describing some of the issues and explaining why they are interesting and important would have been advantageous. Additional material describing the context and relevance of the scientific episodes discussed would have increased the usefulness of the book and expanded its audience.

Losee seems to have been aiming for an *in medias res* style of presentation. That is where things happen, after all. As a rhetorical strategy, however, this is less than entirely successful: the work is fully comprehensible only to readers who are already familiar with the history and philosophy of science. But readers who already have this familiarity will find the level of the philosophical analysis to be too low, while other readers may fail to see the forest for the trees. Losee's commentary merely summarizes the already well-known discussion of the philosophical issues in question, without going very deep, and without making any original contribution. Also, the book assumes some familiarity with various sciences, which is perhaps inappropriate for a book of this kind: various symbols and conventions remain unexplained (for example in the excerpts dealing with chemistry).

Despite these limitations, Losee gives good coverage of issues related to falsification and disconfirmation reasoning. The chapter on crucial experiments, for example, makes very good use of excerpts from across a range of sciences. It consists of a series of roughly one-page descriptions of different kinds of possible responses to apparently falsifying evidence, each of which is taken from an actual historical case. The only drawback is that there is no general unifying discussion of the episodes that puts them in philosophical perspective.

The strongest part of the book is the chapter on William Whewell's philosophy of science. It is the best brief introduction I know to that (quite difficult) subject. Another highlight is the analysis, and accompanying excerpt, in Chapter 13 about the early reception of Alvarez' meteoric impact hypothesis for explaining the Cretaceous extinctions. The descriptions of Newtonian method, in contrast, rely on rather old interpretations (Whewell, Mill) without referring to recent, and much more plausible accounts (including the excellent recent work by William Harper and by George Smith, among others).

There is no bibliography. Given the pressures on the publishing industry, this is an increasingly common feature, but it significantly diminishes the usefulness of the book for scholars. The endnotes to each chapter give references to the works mentioned in the text, but no additional sources are mentioned. A fuller presentation of secondary sources, organized themati-

cally, would have made the book a more useful tool for both students and scholars.

Overall, readers will find contact with real scientific episodes illuminating. A deeper level of understanding can be acquired through contact with the details of science than can be acquired through a focus purely on the philosophy. The issues are so important that they certainly deserve our attention, and Losee's book makes a good introduction.

William L. Vanderburgh
Wichita State University

Joseph Margolis
Moral Philosophy after 9/11.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 2004.
Pp. xviii + 150.
US$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-02447-X);
US$22.00 (paper: ISBN 0-271-02448-8).

Moral Philosophy after 9/11 is not the book some may think (or fear) it to be. Joseph Margolis presents us neither with another gruesome litany of the horrors of terrorism nor with another exercise in American apologetics, nor even a radicalized justification of *jihad*. Indeed, despite the title, the book has more of Margolis about it than of 9/11. There is no substantive examination of the Twin Towers attacks, which are used here rather as the pretext to launch an examination of issues in moral philosophy, and philosophy in general, which have concerned Margolis throughout his long career.

The pretext represented by 9/11 is the impotence of moral theory to address so plain a collision between entrenched, opposing moral visions. The justifications offered by either side in the conflict oppose each other in more than the incidental details of belief: the conflict between Islam and the West is deeply rooted in the home soil of each world, their historical practices and values. Moral theory that stakes its success on dismissing such conflict must presuppose the availability of a privileged position from which to prescribe universally binding norms. Margolis is skeptical of this possibility, yet he holds out hope for a valid resolution of moral conflict that does not involve any assumption of privilege. The question Margolis poses, then, is whether there is an ethical approach that can acknowledge the reality of conflict and still offer a reasonable way to make progress on resolving that conflict.

Several long-term themes in Margolis' work, namely his holism, historicism and constructivism, impose further constraints on the answer given

here. Margolis rejects universally binding norms out of the recognition of what could be termed the cultural reality of partisan conflict, viz. 9/11. Such conflict is partisan so far as any *ethos* is prudential on Margolis' account, fundamentally interested, though in a holist way — meaning that the practical stake is in maintaining a 'way of living' (*modus vivendi*), of which specific norms are an integral part. Values are not held *in abstracto*, but are deeply integrated into the practical concerns of a community. As different historical communities construct their moral visions on their own home soil, this means that there can be validly legitimated moral views in the absence of privilege, though not *uniquely* valid views. Hence, it would be a mistake to take this as a shallowly relativist claim: rather, this is a realist thesis, that values and norms exist as entrenched in the historical and cultural life of actual communities, and this implies the possibility of validly opposed moral visions.

Granting this initial holism, constructivism about moral theory implies that the salient distinctions of ethical discourse do not reflect a privileged grasp on matters, but are products of the interpretive aptitudes of encultured agents. Moral theory is holistically bound up with the trained perception of interests and goods in a culture. Taken together with the denial of a neutral perspective, this implies that moral theory can only call upon conceptual resources resident in the practices of actual historical communities. However, these resources consist in not only particular norms and values, but also the legitimative practices that have produced them. As a member of a culture, the moral theorist employs culturally-shaped interpretive powers in the task of constructing rationalizations of values and norms. Further, historicism means in this case that the interpretive aptitudes needed by members of a community are grounded in the tradition of the community, which contributes to shaping members into apt agents of their culture. On Margolis' view, moral agents are artifacts, constructs symbiotically connected to the practices of the culture of which they are a part, and enabled by their training to cope in a relevant way with moral reasoning. Although not legitimated from a privileged, neutral perspective, such reasoning is nevertheless not arbitrary or crudely relativist.

Take these three themes together and you have, in sum, roughly what Margolis means (following Hegel) by the *Sittlich*. Pictured as *sittlich,* morality is simply the consensual, customary values and norms embedded in some actual historical social world. Adverting to the *Sittlich* is perhaps the central move of Margolis' account, and might seem question-begging, as this appears to miss the critical question of legitimation. As *sittlich*, norms function legitimatively, since they are the effective values of a community, but only in a prima facie sense. This confers the advantage that such values are objectively confirmable by straightforward enquiry establishing the 'fact' of those values. However, critical legitimation of the valid prescriptiveness of such norms seems to require more than this, that legitimation be not merely prima facie. Given Margolis' insistence on constructivism, the resources available to critical legitimation cannot come from a different source than

those that service prima facie legitimation, or in other words, critical legitimation must be (at least) *sittlich*. At this point, Margolis claims that moral philosophy must proceed *dialectically*, that the opposition of prima facie and critical legitimation is internal to a cultural world. What this seems to mean is: moral philosophy must start from the validity of preserving the *sittlich* practices of one's society, for in any case no alternative set of values is available. It is thus inherently conserv*ing*. But as legitimative and aimed at the resolving of conflict, moral theory must defend the reasonableness of reshaping *sittlich* practices to bring about a resolution. So in confronting a conflict between, e.g., the demand for gay marriage and the insistence on preserving traditional marriage, the resolution is less the issuing of a verdict of moral truth on the matter, than a reasoned extension (or not) of present practice to a new case, the same-sex marriage. This extension need call upon nothing more than *sittlich* norms and values, but their use in this extension goes beyond the merely *sittlich*. Critical legitimation is simply the employment of *sittlich* morality to the reshaping of the *sittlich* world: as such, it is more than merely *sittlich*, though regarded after the fact, it reverts to the merely *sittlich*. Such resolutions will be 'objective' so far as they are 'liveable' (*modus vivendi*) in preserving the substance of the *sittlich* world and its prudential concerns. Margolis envisions a 'second best' morality proceeding in this way, without universal or privileged norms.

Margolis bolsters this picture with examples of principles that can be 'objective' and substantive without presupposing any privilege. These principles are indeed reasonable on the face of it, proposing such things as the alleviation of the worst evils and ensuring minimal conditions of existence. Less clear is how exactly they meet the requirements Margolis has set in his discussion of moral theory. The few details of his account reconstructed here are extracted from a rather more diffuse and free-ranging discussion, which alludes to the success of the argument more often than specifying it. This is perhaps a feature of Margolis' intention to preserve the freshness with which the argument initially came to him, as he remarks in his preface. Still, there is more genuine freshness here, philosophically speaking, than merely in the lack of labored explication, and for this, the book deserves a recommendation.

George Williamson
University of Saskatchewan

Peter J. Mehl
Thinking Through Kierkegaard: Existential Identity in a Pluralistic World.
Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press 2005.
Pp xii + 177.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-252-02987-9.

Peter Mehl attempts to 'think through' Kierkegaard in the sense that exegesis is 'thinking through', but also in the sense that one might think through another thinker by using him as a guide. Mehl wants to do the latter 'critically,' which means with critical reservations. The criticisms are generated in part by concerns about pluralism. The world is no more pluralistic now than it ever has been, and indeed is less so, but the *awareness* of multiple religious, ethical, and other forms of life seems to be a mark of postmodernity, and Mehl claims that Kierkegaard is insufficiently aware of, or fails to sufficiently credit, that multiplicity. One of Mehl's 'central points' is thus that Kierkegaard 'overstates his case for the normatively human' (122). In fact according to Mehl the important thing we have learned in our pluralistic world is that there is no such thing as *the* normatively human, so even an understated case would be misguided. Mehl also argues that Kierkegaard's ideal for human life is not only too exclusive but also too demanding. There are thus two logically independent parts of Mehl's critical reading.

Mehl focuses almost exclusively on three of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works, *Either/Or II* (by Judge William), *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (by Johannes Climacus), and *The Sickness Unto Death* (by Anti-Climacus). He believes that Kierkegaard's own voice is announcing a consistent theme or set of themes in these works. He sides with those interpreters who contend that Kierkegaard has definite views of his own that determine his variegated output. He thus effectively ignores post-modern readings of Kierkegaard's works, and many readers will find that all to the good. Of course no discussion of Kierkegaard can hope to take in the full range of his enormous output, but Mehl's particular selection tends to support his principal critical claims to a greater extent than a different selection might have.

The consistent theme is Kierkegaard's insistence upon the need for 'strong evaluation' in the quest for an adequate 'existential identity.' The notion of strong evaluation is borrowed from Owen Flanagan, and is one example of Mehl's use of 'extra-Kierkegaardian' philosophy and psychology. He draws upon the philosophers Alasdair MacIntyre, Thomas Nagel, and Charles Taylor, upon the psychologist Erik Ericson, as well as upon Evans, Rudd, Crites, and other Kierkegaard experts, in order to support a reading of Kierkegaard as an essentially Christian thinker, and to criticize some central features of Kierkegaard's thought. It is precisely Kierkegaard's explicitly orthodox Christian starting points that render him unfit to adequately credit 'pluralism', according to Mehl. 'Strong evaluation' amounts to an insistence that there is only one way to go in achieving a worthy existential identity,

and according to Kierkegaard that way must terminate in a life lived 'before God' and indeed before the God of Christianity.

The theme is already strongly operative in Judge William's second 'letter' in *Either/Or II*. William insists that the choice that produces an authentic, integrated self does so by placing the stamp of the 'eternal' upon the contingent givens of one's own psycho/social history and biological limits. Mehl stresses William's theological commitments and thus sketches an alternative to common readings of William as a mere moralist. Mehl argues that William's account of the role of despair in Christian morality is linked in significant ways to Anti-Climacus' account of despair in *The Sickness Unto Death*. The case for there being such links is convincingly presented.

In fact *The Sickness Unto Death* provides the clearest support for Mehl's contention that Kierkegaard's ideal for humans is too strenuous. According to Anti-Climacus, humans exists in a tension between a passive acceptance of an identity in terms of various 'immediacies', including those images of a social self unconsciously absorbed from the 'herd', and on the other hand a sense that one must attempt on one's own to bring one's actuality into line with a worthy ideal capable of integrating the self completely, so that nothing is left hanging, so to speak. In fact Anti-Climacus insists that people are so beset by various forms of despair that very few achieve such integration.

While Mehl is uncomfortable with Kierkegaard's strenuous and narrowly Christian views, he does find helpful guidance in what he calls Kierkegaard's 'pragmatic project,' his work as an 'edifying hermeneutical philosopher' (63) who 'discovers what a particular existential stance involves, how it feels in lived experience' (64).

The correct reading of Kierkegaard's own views is ever a controversial matter, and Mehl's book is no exception. For example, the familiar claim that Kierkegaard's thought is essentially asocial (96-104) has been widely criticized in the light of *Works of Love*. This aspect of Mehl's reading is internally connected to his critique, for it is precisely Kierkegaard's purported tendency to cut his thought loose from the social in favor of the eternal that ultimately enables the specifically *theological* ethic that Mehl finds objectionable. Mehl wants something more natural and open to ordinary life with others. But when he asks 'why can I not have a relationship to others that is existentially enriching and yet critical?' (102), some readers will instantly think of *Works of Love* as a stunning inquiry into exactly such a relationship. Those same readers may doubt, for textual reasons, Mehl's attempt to disconnect *Works of Love* from Kierkegaard's 'analysis of human selfhood' (160). Some readers will think that Mehl's selection of the hyper-Christian Anti-Climacus as a central focus has biased his construal of Kierkegaard.

This book was not carefully edited. There are missing letters, missing words, extra words, misspelled words, and misprints. Some mistakes occur within quotes from Kierkegaard and could create confusion in less experienced readers.

Nonetheless, this book should be quite useful to those who sympathize with Mehl's pragmatism and the not unprecedented claim that there is a

pragmatic strain in Kierkegaard himself, as well as to those who, in alliance with a Kierkegaard somewhat differently construed, might want to make a polemical target of some of the assumptions that guide Mehl's critique.

Norman Lillegard
University of Tennessee at Martin

Brian O'Connor
Adorno's Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the Possibility of Critical Rationality.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2004.
Pp. ix + 204.
US$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-15110-3);
US$18.00 (paper: 0-262-65108-4).

Brian O'Connor's treatment of Adorno squarely attempts to assess the philosophical value of Adorno's negative dialectic. Firmly focusing on the 'purely philosophical' aspect of Adorno's philosophy, rather than his concerns with the cultural application of critical theory, O'Connor ably negotiates the notorious density of Adorno's prose to establish the negative dialectic as a method by which philosophical speculation can achieve 'concretion'. This essentially means thinking an applied concrete critique of experience, grounded through a rational, self-reflexive interrelation between subject and world. The task at hand is to demonstrate, in a non-reductive manner, how subjectivity relates to the worldly and objective sphere through critical rationality.

The key to understanding O'Connor's line of thought lies in the emphasis he places on the subject-object relation in Adorno. What makes Adorno unique, in O'Connor's eyes, is that he contains valuable resources to overcome more traditional empirical and ideal approaches to understanding rationality. Experience, he argues, may only be understood as a coefficient mediation of both subject and object. It must be a necessary possibility of experience that a subject is affected and transformed by some element of objective reality, namely the object. This relation is of crucial importance in understanding the rationally reflexive, positive moments of the negative dialectic. The epistemic interest of this book rests in determining how knowledge of the object identifies within the subject an essentially reciprocal structure of experience. Such a concept of mediating rationality invites the question of its proximity to both post-Kantianism and Hegelianism. It is not surprising that O'Connor engages this legacy, discussing, among others, such diverse figures as Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Luckács, and Heidegger. In doing so, he

performs a valuable service in discerning the similarities and differences in Adorno's work with the canon of modern German philosophy, a service of obvious worth to any student of this period and discourse.

Not only, then, is this book a valuable contribution to the understanding of Adorno, it also provides an accessible insight into some of the central debates of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy. For instance, in perhaps the most interesting sections of this book over the course of the first two chapters, 'The Role of German Idealism in the Negative Dialectic' and 'The Structure of Adorno's Epistemology: The Priority of the Object', O'Connor demonstrates how Adorno appropriates Hegel to construct a viable theory of experience. Adorno, he asserts, does not find plausible the idea that the Hegelian articulation of conceptuality can necessarily be progressive or universal; instead, what Adorno finds valuable is the critical moment that opens the possibility of our experiencing the object in reality. Objects are not identical with concepts; any mediation that can take place in the negative dialectic may only be particular. For O'Connor, the crux of the epistemological sphere in Adorno's work hence lies in asserting that 'objects are irreducible to concepts,' although they are not identical with consciousness. Negative dialectics provides a moment of non-identity, as the experience of the object creates by necessity a moment of transformation in the understanding, where the subject is affected and changed and 'confronted' with a facet of objective reality, namely the object.

Far from being a sceptical argument, this entails an essential epistemic postulation, i.e., a conceptualisation of the possibility of critical rationality whereby subjectivity is affected by an objective moment of non-identity within reality. This in turn allows us to think how conscious rationality may realize and judge the experience of difference or non-identity that directs us beyond any forms of reified consciousness. This brings us within the compass of Adorno's primary aim: the theorization of experience as integrally structured by subject-object reciprocity and transformation.

In Chapters 3 and 4, 'The Structure of Adorno's Epistemology: The Role of the Subject' and 'The Critique of Kant', we gain a refreshing, although sometimes lengthy, critique of the possibilities of transcendental idealism. Highlighting the material role in the objective and subjective relation, O'Connor argues that, for Adorno, consciousness is not a 'passive receptacle', but the precise point where thought actively engages with non-identity *qua* object. This means that subjectivity becomes 'mediational', rather than understood in terms of the standard Kantian separation of the faculties that accents the irreducibility of material objectivity for consciousness. The subject is not other to the existents of the objective sphere: ' ... in so far as it is subject to empirical conditions it is non-constitutive — but if it is constitutive it then has a status outside of the limits of justification' (124). While this thesis is not revolutionary, giving expression to a non-identical 'mediational' theory of meaning already found in hermeneutical, phenomenological, and post-structural theories, it is, however, delivered in the guise of a critical rationality that may discern the material conditions of experience. Hence it

provides an attractive and refreshing alternative to some currents trends of research that heavily stress the extreme otherness of non-identity.

This is perhaps why the final chapter, 'Adorno on Husserl and Heidegger', is somewhat disappointing, rehearsing some of the standard refutations of phenomenology and its apparent failure to address rational and critical subjectivity. O'Connor asserts that Husserl privileges an individualist logical objectivity instead of an experiential mediational process, and likewise that Heidegger relies on an abandonment of the subject-object relation, resulting in an undifferentiated *Dasein*, which in turn is unable to distinguish itself from its environment, with the concomitant consequence that the immediacy of the world negates rational reflection. Unfortunately, O'Connor never overtly discusses Husserl's middle period, particularly *Ideas I* and *II*. For example, a classical phenomenologist would argue that the subject-object distinction is bracketed from consideration, with the goal of critically reasserting the conditions of experience from within the phenomenological attitude. In terms of Heidegger, O'Connor does acknowledge the lack, and need for, an Adornian analysis of readiness-to-hand in Heidegger. The overall force of this chapter thus seems to need more development of precisely this point, and consequently seems somewhat of a lost opportunity for a sustained Adornian engagement with Husserlian and Heideggerean scholarship.

Overall, *Adorno's Negative Dialectic* is rigorous, well researched, and theoretically interesting. It offers an impressive and attractive account of the inevitability of the epistemological relation of subjectivity and objectivity and a novel theorization of where we can think rationally within differentiated and transformative contexts. It is thus recommended to specialist, non-specialist, and student alike, and provides a much needed and accessible presentation of the riches that Adornian theory holds for philosophy in general.

Patrick O'Connor
National University of Ireland, Galway.

David S. Oderberg, ed.
The Old New Logic:
Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2005.
Pp. xii + 242.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-15113-8);
US$30.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-65106-8).

Logic — in the central sense of the term according to which it denotes the science of valid inference — was first cultivated by Aristotle. Classical Aristotelian logic was extensively studied by the Stoics, formed the core of the Medieval scholastic canon, and was the bedrock of much seminal Modern philosophy, including for example important work by Leibniz and Kant.

In the late nineteenth century, logic was set on a different course. There are several points of departure between classical Aristotelian logic and its modern descendents; one in particular is crucial to the present review. It can be traced to Frege's (1879) ground-breaking work *Begriffsshrift*, or *Concept Script*. Here Frege argues that natural languages are not ideally suited for the study of logic, due to the presence of obstacles to transparent, unassailable demonstrations (such as vagueness, ambiguity, and context-sensitivity). Frege designs an artificial language for the study of logic, and virtually all subsequent work in logic has followed suit. Given the staggering progress made in logic in the interim, the overwhelming majority of experts count Frege's innovation as a monumental leap forward.

For decades, Fred Sommers has been a dissenting voice attacking this orthodox picture. Sommers' old new logic is an attempt to develop a logical calculus that is decidedly un-Fregean, and which fashions itself in the older, Aristotelian tradition. The aim of this collection is to critically evaluate Sommers' efforts toward that end.

The volume begins with a three-page editor's preface, which gives the general orientation of the project. This is followed by a brief, gracious foreward by P.F. Strawson. The first chapter is Sommers' twenty-five-page intellectual autobiography, which expounds three major stages in his career: 1) the development of a tree theory which, first, revamps the Aristotelian doctrine that 'it is *terms* that are the linguistic entity that are subject to negation in the basic sense' (26), and, second, forms the basis of a thorough, systematic account of what Ryle calls a 'category mistake'; 2) the ensuing development of the calculus of term functor logic (henceforth 'TFL'), which is the old new logic on which this volume is focused; and 3) Sommers' most recent work on the concepts of existence and truth. The final chapter is twenty-two pages of his replies to the critical essays, followed by a four-page bibliography of his work.

The body of the text consists of nine critical papers; six are by philosophers, the other three from a computer scientist, an engineer, and a psychologist. Chapter 2, by Sommers' ally and collaborator George Englebretson, is an encyclopedia entry for 'Fred Sommers', entirely exegetical and salutary. In

Chapter 3, E.J. Lowe discusses some relations between syntax and ontology, and compares how these relations play out in standard modern logic vs. TFL vs. what Lowe calls 'sortal logic' (62). In Chapter 4, Frank Keil discusses some implications of Sommers' work for the philosophy of psychology, including a survey of some data (pertaining to language and knowledge) that seem to support some of Sommers' hypotheses in the philosophy of logic. In Chapter 5, Alan Berger investigates how TFL handles certain puzzles about general terms that have been the subject of recent debates within the theory of reference. Chapter 6, Patrick Suppes' contribution, is a brief discussion of the syntax and semantics of prepositional phrases. Chapters 7 and 8 are the densest and hardest going: William C. Purdy gives a thorough formal investigation of the phenomenon of anaphora in TFL; and Steven Lindell investigates some of the physical constraints that restrict the capacities of formal information-processors, and argues that, in this respect, TFL is 'just as expressive as ordinary first-order logic' (167). In Chapter 9, Aris Noah compares TFL with some more standard modern logics on the method of resolution. Finally, in Chapter 10, editor David Oderberg attempts to make the case that standard Fregean logic is inherently tied up with the dubious metaphysical notion of a bare particular, because of the central role played by the concept of the variable.

Unfortunately, on the whole this volume puts me in the role of reactionary. I find that many of the tenets and assumptions which motivate Sommers' TFL to be ill-motivated and off-base. This volume has further convinced me of the merits of the new new logic. So, I will just briefly develop one particular objection to the old new logic, and then turn to assessing how well this volume measures up to its own goals.

The motivation for Sommers' TFL is that what Aristotelian logic did poorly is accidental, rather than essential, to the system; and what Aristotelian logic does well it does much better than modern Fregean logic. Fregean logic superseded Aristotelian primarily because Frege developed a more efficient and comprehensive calculus; but Frege's logic was a great step backward from Aristotle's because it lacks 'cognitive adequacy' — i.e., it 'radically departs from the syntax of the natural languages in which people do their everyday deductive reasoning' (215). Hence the motivation for TFL: a calculus as sleek and potent as Frege's, but fashioned entirely out of humble, folksy, Aristotelian components.

This particular conception of cognitive adequacy lies at the heart of the old new logic. Sommers begins his autobiography (1) with it, and comes back to it at several points during his replies (e.g., 215, 218); and virtually every one of the critical essays also stresses the point. However, there are a variety of deep problems with this crucial notion. For example, it presupposes that thought takes place within the confines of a natural language. This presupposition is, first, controversial when considered on its own, and, second, fraught with troubling consequences in the philosophy of logic.

It is controversial because mundane counterexamples abound, such as the common phenomenon of not being able to find the right expression for what

one has in mind, or the consideration that a rich mental life is obviously necessary in order to acquire a natural language in the first place. Even further, this presupposition is rather out of keeping with some of the most successful research programs in the cognitive sciences (see, e.g., Steven Pinker's *The Language Instinct* [W. Morrow and Co. Press 1994], especially pp. 57-67). As for problematic consequences for the philosophy of logic: Is it Sommers' view that we need a distinct logic for every natural language? There are reasons why he has to steer clear of either answer to this question. If he says 'No', his claim to cognitive adequacy is undermined, for what fits with the syntax of English will have to depart from the syntax of Algonquin, Finnish, Swahili, and Mandarin. If he says 'Yes', then this is a serious departure from Aristotle's grand goal of a systematic, comprehensive science of inference. Logic is a normative enterprise, not a piecemeal descriptive one. It is concerned with the grounds on which good inferences rest, not with how this or that agent happens to arrive at this or that conclusion.

On the whole, though, this volume should attain the aim of increasing the clarity and quantity of discussion of Sommers' work. The essays are wide-ranging and interesting; and for the most part thoroughly competent. To date, there is not a great deal of literature on TFL; so this collection is a significant contribution on that front. However, since all of the essays involve explications and applications of TFL (to varying degrees — the most notable exceptions are the essays by Lowe, Suppes, and Lindell), the enduring interest of this collection is contingent upon the enduring interest of TFL.

So, this volume will prove valuable to anyone interested in TFL, as Oderberg has done a solid job of soliciting and collecting together a wide range of pertinent secondary literature. For more mainstream philosophers and logicians, it is always a good thing to have orthodox views subject to critical scrutiny. In this respect, at the very least, Sommers has played a worthwhile, important role in recent philosophy of logic, and Oderberg's volume is a fitting testament to this.

Arthur Sullivan
Memorial University of Newfoundland

Max Pensky, ed.
Globalizing Critical Theory.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005.
Pp. vi + 254.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7425-3449-9);
US$27.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7425-3450-2).

Does Critical Theory have a future, or is it an artifact of twentieth-century intellectual history? Contributors to this book affirm the former, provided that Critical Theory adopts a global (rather than Eurocentric) perspective and provided that Critical Theory addresses the phenomenon of globalization. The deliberate ambiguity of the book's title conceals a lingering opacity about what 'globalization' means.

The book places its authors within a third generation of Critical Theory, following the convention of identifying Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse as the first generation and Jürgen Habermas as the second.

Two opening essays by Habermas (technically the second is 'cosigned' by Derrida, but it was written by Habermas) voice a 'European intellectual' protest against American hegemony manifested by the illegal war against Iraq. 'Interpreting the Fall of a Monument' opens by recounting the scene of American troops pulling down a monumental statue of Saddam Hussein with a noose around the neck of the dictator. But the title also conveys the fall of another monument as Habermas condemns 'a war in violation of international law.' 'Let us have no illusions: the normative authority of the United States of America lies in ruins' (21).

The second essay calls upon European intellectuals and countries to assume political responsibilities beyond any Eurocentrism, and even more pointedly criticizes the United States under the Bush regime: 'At the international level and in the framework of the United Nations, Europe has to throw its weight on the scale to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States' (29). 'Second generation' Critical Theory hereby thus urges Europe to adopt a global perspective in opposition to current U.S. unilateral foreign policies. One must add that a 'post-hegemonic' outlaw superpower can be even more dangerous.

What about 'globalization' and Critical Theory in a putatively post-Habermas generation? The editor embraces 'the messy pluralism of current theories of globalization,' and offers these essays as an opportunity to those influenced by preceding generations of Critical Theory 'to show how globalization theory is critical theory and, conversely, how critical theory is a theory of globalization' (4). It is troubling that little effort has been made to specify what globalization is supposed to be, though it is the object of critical analysis by people who take themselves to be third-generation critical theorists. The 'flat-world', neo-liberal view of globalization is hardly a critical theory of globalization.

A reader of the essays that follow Habermas' two initial essays experiences an unsettling dualism. The very articulation of what is needed at the theoretical level to bring about cosmopolitan democracy or global emancipation sounds utopian. But without such theoretical initiatives, hegemonic unilateralism triumphs by muting universalistic ideals and demands. Articulating the utopian is necessary and may have practical effect. Still, the forceful perspective of Habermas overshadows subsequent essays.

Thus Nancy Fraser opts to rethink her earlier position on public sphere theory, deeming it too oriented to the national level. In 'Transnationalizing the Public Sphere', she calls for 'institutional renovation' in order to 'globalize' citizenship that is, at best, merely national at present. What is required is 'institutionalizing elements of transnational/quasi-global citizenship; generating concomitantly broad solidarities that cross divisions of language, ethnicity, religion, and nationality; and constructing broadly inclusive public spheres in which common interests can be created and/or discovered through open democratic communication' (46).

In 'Toward a Critical Theory of Globalization', James Bohman urges that the 'public sphere' become international rather than national: 'For a nation-state to be democratic, it requires a certain sort of public sphere sufficient to create a strong public via its connections to parliamentary debate. For a transnational and thus polycentric and pluralist community, such as the European Union, requires a different sort of public sphere in order to promote sufficient democratic deliberation' (67).

María Pía Lara stresses that globalization must be viewed within a 'normative framework' in the spirit of Kant's ideal of cosmopolitan order. In 'Democratic Institutions and Cosmopolitan Solidarity', she claims that justice and democracy must be goals of any responsible concern with globalization: '"The only way to link internal democratic demands and external procedures that can foster the building up of democratic institutions to an agreed coordination with other countries that would be supported by an institutional space of global politics and governance is to create global democratic institutions and collective agreements that support the new global era' (75). Both global institutions and global citizens are needed: 'Citizens of the world today must understand that when they perceive themselves as global subjects, they become members of a global community that leaves them no choice but to cooperate and compromise' (80-1).

But if these post-Habermas critical theorists are in agreement with his introductory essays, there is a major obstacle to such theoretical proposals and initiatives, and that is an outlaw superpower. And yet, if the superpower is lawless — ignoring, rebuffing, and defying international law — it is nonetheless imperative that the demands of and for international law and tribunals be made despite their utopian-sounding character. Such is in the tradition of 'classical' critical theory. To fault these theorists for articulating ideals is inappropriate, but 'actually existing globalization', and its ruinous results for some nations, must be taken into account to avoid pure utopian theorizing and illusory ideals.

Quite concrete essays balance the collection. Clay Steinman criticizes the critical theory of the Frankfurt School as white and Eurocentric in 'Beyond Eurocentrism: The Frankfurt School and Whiteness Theory', offering some insights about Adorno's writings on jazz. Thomas McCarthy, well known translator of and commentator on Habermas, provides an excellent and powerful indictment of the failure of the United States to come to terms with its national past of racial injustice in '*Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in the United States: On the Politics of the Memory of Slavery'. McCarthy notes that although Germany has wrestled, not without pain and controversy, with its Nazi past, the United States has largely 'repressed the memory' of slavery that was integral to its founding. Racism persists today in ways that will continue to inhibit global democratization. 'Until legal, institutional normal, everyday racism is publicly and widely understood to have been integral to U.S. history and identity as a nation, it will, I am suggesting, continue to encounter major obstacles to developing the degree of transracial political solidarity required for democratic solutions to the forms of racial injustice that are its continuing legacy' (150).

In provocative contrast, Andreas Huyssen identifies two concrete situations in which a 'politics of forgetting' 'proved to be constitutive of a politically desirable memory discourse' in 'Resistance to Memory: The Uses and Abuses of Public Forgetting'. His two examples are the memory of the state terror in Argentina and the memory of the *Luftkrieg* in Germany. His is no call for revisionist history or outright repression of a public past, but rather an observation that preoccupation with certain pasts 'may block our imagination of the future and create a new blindness in the present. At that stage, we may want to bracket the future of memory in order to remember the future' (182-3).

The last section of the book concludes with essays on 'Globalizing Critical Theory of Science', an essay on the global implications of television in the spirit of Walter Benjamin's reflections on culture, a discussion on Adorno and aesthetic theory, and a look at Adorno's aesthetic theory in Brazil.

A reader sympathetic to a contemporary critical theory project misses, however, any attempt in this collection to come to terms with Marx and globalization. Has globalization of the sort envisioned by Marx come to pass? Given the Marxist inclinations of many (but not all) of the early Critical Theorists, this issue is urgent. After all, the Communist Manifesto of 1848 represents the *locus classicus* of globalization: 'The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country ... It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.' Globalization for Marx and Engels signified the global expansion of the capitalist market prompted by increasing technological development that would in time sweep away nations and national economies, politics, and cultures. That nations and nationalism would persist alongside and within

globalizing tendencies and that nationalism itself might be a potent engine of technological development lay beyond their conception.

The essays display the typical diversity of a volume assembled in an era of globalization discourse as a product of a 'summer seminar' on 'Critical Theory Revisited'. The endnotes at the end of each contribution are substantial and valuable. A strange omission is a section, customary for such collections of essays, with descriptions of the contributors.

Although this book presumes prior acquaintance with Frankfurt School Critical Theorists (for this, *The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory* [Cambridge University Press 2004] is especially to be recommended), it represents an engaged and critical discussion of some various aspects of the much-discussed phenomenon of globalization, without exhausting the resourcefulness of the perspectives afforded by Critical Theory.

John P. Burke
Seattle, Washington

Rush Rhees
Wittgenstein's On Certainty*:*
There Like Our Life.
Ed. D.Z. Phillips. Malden, MA: Blackwell 2005.
Pp. ix + 195.
US$76.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-405-10579-8);
US$29.95 (paper: ISBN 1-405-13424-0).

This volume of seminar notes from 1970 (plus sundry related items) is a frustrating read. Rush Rhees is not the best of writers, and it is often difficult to make out his argument, never mind how he came to his conclusions in the first place. (I wasn't at all surprised to learn [134] that the 13 pages of 'Wittgenstein's Builders', his best-known paper, was distilled from a draft of 170 pages.) Nor does it help that Rhees strings together incongruous ideas without explanation, and quotes Wittgenstein as though he were crystal clear. Still there is much that is valuable, even indispensable, in the book, and nobody curious about *On Certainty* — or Rhees or Phillips — should give it a pass.

Working through Rhees' discussion armed with Phillips' Afterword, the bulk of which is given over to explaining how Rhees interprets *On Certainty*, where he goes beyond Wittgenstein and what sets him apart from other commentators, one can see why Rhees is regarded so highly in some quarters and why Phillips is so keen to promote his cause. (Incidentally, Phillips' title is, as Rhees says of Wittgenstein's, 'not altogether a happy one' (3). Like *On*

Certainty, *Wittgenstein's* On Certainty deals with much more than advertised.)

Central to Rhees' interpretation of *On Certainty* is his conviction that Wittgenstein is not branching out in a new direction and his discussion is not different from 'the sort of discussion [he] had had before' (4). This is hardly a new point (the editors of *On Certainty*, possibly prompted by Rhees, say something similar). But it is important and bears repeating. As Phillips observes (135), a comparison of *On Certainty* with earlier works 'brings out the *kind* of questions' with which Wittgenstein was grappling. Rhees has a sharp eye for 'the continuity in the *problems* that Wittgenstein addressed' (vii) and is a fine guide to 'the constant connections between [the remarks of *On Certainty*] and [Wittgenstein's] earlier discussions ... going back at least to 1930.' Lest there be any residual doubt on this score, Phillips supplements Rhees' account of 'the philosophical background to [*On Certainty*]' (1) with a handy six-page appendix of 'comparisons' extracted from Rhees' personal papers. In any event Rhees is surely right that 'Wittgenstein's work is [not] devoted to a polemic against Moore's writings' (3; also 104, 134) and Phillips right that ' [w]e cannot appreciate Wittgenstein's concerns ... if we remain within the parameters of Moore's interests' (150).

Rhees takes *On Certainty* to be 'a work in logic' — indeed conjectures that Wittgenstein 'would have said that the whole set of remarks (the whole book) is a discussion of logic' (48). In this connection he underscores Wittgenstein's observations about the logical character of the language-games of knowing, believing, and the rest (see Chapter 9 and 171-4), in particular his observations about the logical dependence of linguistic practice on empirical regularities (Chapters 12 and 14), the 'peculiar role' of Moore's propositions (ix, 10, 104), and 'the *sureness* involved in the various ways in which we *do* judge and act' (124, also 150). All this is, I think, to the good though, like the point about the continuity of Wittgenstein's thought, much less fresh than when Rhees was writing. Had Wittgenstein not been troubled by logical questions of the sort Rhees singles out, I very much doubt he would have embarked on the investigations detailed in the book (and in *Remarks on Colour* and other works from the same period), still less pursued them to the last days of his life. I am less sure that the question of how language-games are 'conditioned by' facts was 'for Wittgenstein the most important of the whole discussion' (91); my impression is that that he had many irons in the fire, all equally important.

For the most part Rhees portrays Wittgenstein as engaged in an explanatory enterprise, and promotes what Phillips refers to as 'Wittgenstein's conclusions' (170, 171). He holds that 'Wittgenstein's earliest and last concern was: what does it mean to say something?' (6; also 34, 135, 177) and takes him to have accorded considerable theoretical weight to the phrase '[i]t is there — like our life' (83; also 140). Moreover, Phillips tells us, Rhees deprecated interpretations of Wittgenstein as some sort of therapist, his view being that he wished to 'restor[e] a contemplative relation between philosophy and the world,' a task that required spelling out the relation itself (179,

182). Phillips writes (153): 'While recognizing the importance of clarifying conceptual confusions, [Rhees] always emphasized that, for Wittgenstein, this was in the service of the big questions of philosophy.' Yet Rhees also speaks of Wittgenstein in ways that suggest he sees him as involved in a fundamentally critical endeavour and, in Phillips' words, as 'not trying to *establish* anything' (170). It was Rhees' practice in his seminars to return — presumably in the exploratory spirit Wittgenstein favoured — to 'the same points again and again from different angles' (ix). And he was of the opinion, apparently, that Wittgenstein believed we get into trouble when philosophising about our knowledge because 'we are looking in the wrong direction altogether' (150). Perhaps Rhees can have it both ways, but I was unable to figure out how he thought he could pull off the trick.

I could cavil some more. The treatment of Russell, Quine and the logical positivists struck me as overly harsh and dismissive, even — dare I say it? — unWittgensteinian (29, 44, 108; also 136, 173). And not unexpectedly (nobody seems to agree with anyone else about Wittgenstein), I was brought up short by some of the interpretations offered for individual passages of *On Certainty* (and the *Philosophical Investigations*). Mostly, however, I found myself wanting to see how Rhees and Phillips read Wittgenstein and to learn from them. A great deal of labour has gone into producing the book, and I only regret that — for all Phillips has done to elucidate Rhees' thinking — we are still getting just the tip of the iceberg.

Andrew Lugg
Montreal, Quebec

Avital Ronell
The Test Drive.
Urbana-Champaign:
University of Illinois Press 2005.
Pp. vii + 371.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-252-02950-X.

If one cannot touch the spirit of modernism without discussing the innovations of form and the ideas behind them, one cannot introduce Avital Ronell's works without mentioning the persistent drive to test new forms, new expressions, for a new philosophy. Such a claim to 'make it new' has provoked interesting reactions, as noted by Jonathan Culler, the editor of a special section of *Diacritic* devoted to the works of Avital Ronell (vol. 4, no. 4, Winter 1994). Idiosyncratic, with the cunning audacity to present herself to Jacques

Derrida as 'Metaphysics' (Derrida, *Postcard*, p. 197), Ronell in *The Test Drive* is as daring, original, excitable, as she can be unsettling, irritating, and controversial. *The Test Drive* is itself an experimental treatise on the interlocking relationship between *techne* and *episteme*, science and knowledge, and ultimately, art and philosophy. Parts of the book mime a lab report, with subheadings like 'Testing 1', 'Testing 1.2', 'Prototype .01', 'Prototype .02', interlaced with prints, different fonts, cute iconic designs, and photography by Suzanne Doppelt. As Ronell writes, in the guise of Husserl confessing to 'Front Weatherman' (she even has the master comment on her previous sections), that 'the vain succession of philosophical systems constitutes a distressing spectacle, entirely unworthy of a philosopher,' the 'true and real *Philosophie* does not spring from the head of a single thinker,' but is, 'like science, the work of teams and generations of philosophers' (259), the new philosophy to which the book aspires only comes into being by meshing rhizomatic lines from the Bible, Kafka, Popper, Freud, Nietzsche, Alan Turing, Robert Boyle, Zen, and 'the test on democracy' of 9/11.

The gayness and fun-poking-ness of experimentation notwithstanding, *The Test Drive* is dense and dead serious in its vigorous testing of potentialities of the test. In Part 1, 'Proving Grounds', Ronell begins by questioning the structure of testing, which, like Meno's Paradox, already implies 'a frame, a trace, a disclosive moment to which [the test] refers' (5). Infolding the test and temptation of Nietzsche's *rescindability*, Derrida's *différance* in being-with-itself, Plato's *hypotheton*, Popper's equation of 'falsifiability' with 'refutability' or testability,' Kafka's testimony to the Law, and the famous Allan Turing Test, among many other things, Ronell's trial targets two things: objectivity in positivism and the Protestant ethic which flourishes on the ground of various testings, from HIV or polygraph testing to warfare, urban planning, military strategy and national security. We are paying dear prices for science, Ronell observes (16), but the space of testing can be reopened if we turn to a destructive philosophy of implosion and dislocation, modeled after the iconoclastic Nietzsche, the major protagonist of the book. Part 1 and Part 2 of the book set up different frameworks of testing in science and philosophy. In Part 2, 'Trial Runs', eleven prototypes of testing are presented, from Levinas' distinction of *épreuve* and *expérience*, the psychoanalytic concept of 'reality-testing,' Kafka's fable 'The Test', Robert Boyle's experiments and his ethics of modesty (99), Lyotard's notion of *differend*, to Zen philosophies.

The central question that groups these impressive models together is the limit of science and its promise of knowledge. Ronell is not only concerned with the breaks as well as recognizable traits of continuity, but she also wants to show the ethical dimension embedded in the different models of epistemology. Increasingly, the figure of submission emerges in the models of testing, such as the tortured slave of testimony, Kafka's ignorant test-passer, and Freudian ego under the sway of reality-testing. The space beyond testability and certainty of modern science which Ronell strives to open up

brings back a familiar postmodern — or should we say posthuman — figure/trope: 'the figure of submission — an allegory of testing' (70).

Interestingly, while Ronell's ethical/political/philosophical stance is strikingly similar to that of Gilles Deleuze, she often unnames Deleuze and instead stages Nietzsche as the major protagonist of the book. From 'Part 3: On Passing the Test' on, the book is part exegesis of Nietzsche's 'experimental disposition,' part self-reflexive meta-philosophy of how a 'new species of philosophers' that 'tests the limits of intelligibility' (137) can be possible. 'The genuine philosopher is powered by the self-threatening wheelworks of performativity' (137), but he 'scores failure time and again' (138); he desists, with aggressive passivity and ignorance. He is, to push Ronell to her unnamed ally, the very creature of 'becoming-(Flaubertian)-*bétise*' (138) and 'becoming-*übermensch*/transfeminist' (147; Ronell performatively translates *über* into 'over' or 'on top of').

There is a sense of futurity, or self-ironizing that links futurity to language, in Nietzsche's *la gaya scienza*, so that the prophetic philosopher occupies the position of *S.s.S.* (*sujet supposé savoir*) that used to be taken by Socrates in Plato. Maybe it is Nietzsche's powerful rendering of destructiveness into openness and creativity that Ronell finds most useful to 'desist' both the claim for rationality in the embrace of testability and the flip side of apocalyptic, 'nihilist slide of values' (163): 'The question that Nietzsche presses us on is therefore never merely one of affirming homelessness after metaphysics, but of rendering spaces habitable, multiplying trajectories for life and the living, refiguring the site of experimentation in such a way as to ensure that it is not already the ensepulchered reserve of the living dead' (172). Ronell reads Nietzsche as the ultimate site for test and taste (175), personality and politics, suffering and playfulness to transfer to each other, and break up, thereby joyously remaking philosophers 'human without test.' In this way, philosophy also becomes the test drive itself — a test, or rather, a *force* without the human, a gay science.

Unavoidably, with a provocative book like this, one is faced with the impossible test of taste. Ronell seems to challenge her readers to the core of the test: Do you follow the reading my style dictates? Can you stomach my experiments and newness? Yet with the tests and challenges, one lingering question emerges. The call for a new philosophy already appears with a middle-aged face: in our time, don't we already have Derrida's deconstructionism, Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*, and Lyotard's postmodern turn? Perhaps what Ronell is really getting at by the test is the question that haunts the spirit of modernity: what has philosophy not been *yet*? In an interview, Ronell confesses that '[a] good part of me wants to venture elsewhere, though. I want to do theater or performance.' Maybe it is in the space of 'elsewhere' — in art, theater and performance — that one gets closest to Ronell's argument in *The Test Drive*: that modernity — its aesthetic productivity as well as political catastrophes — has never been divorced from the relentless drive to test. It is at the cross-roads of testing that Ronell inserts her intervention: we can follow the priestly hermeneutics of truth to

the war on terrorism, or, we may follow Nietzsche and turn unwaveringly to experimenting a monstrous futurity of newness.

Lili Hsieh
University of Pennsylvania

Ronald Sandler and **Philip Cafaro, eds.**
Environmental Virtue Ethics.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2005.
Pp. 240.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7425-3389-1);
US$28.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7425-3390-5).

Environmental Virtue Ethics (EVE) is a new approach in environmental ethics that connects human flourishing to environmental protection. In recent years, work on EVE has become increasingly visible in moral philosophy, but it still remains a relatively neglected aspect of practical ethics. For instance, the 'Environmental Ethics' entry for *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2002) devotes only a paragraph to virtue ethics, after a much lengthier discussion about how consequentialist and deontological ethical theories deal with the environment. *Environmental Virtue Ethics* is the first anthology to be published in this area. Featuring ten original contributions plus four previously published key essays, it provides a wide spectrum of views on EVE, and advances current research on this topic.

While most previous writers in environmental ethics have argued for a more altruistic treatment of nature, environmental virtue ethicists tend to argue that it is in our enlightened self-interest to protect nature. In the above-mentioned *Encyclopedia* entry, Andrew Brennan and Yeuk-Sze Lo suggest that virtue ethics is unavoidably anthropocentric and unable to support a genuine moral concern for the nonhuman environment. However, as they also recall, a flourishing human life requires friendship and 'one can have genuine friendships only if one genuinely values, loves, respects, and cares for one's friends for their own sake, not merely for the benefits that they may bring to oneself.' An environmental-friendly ethics thus might require the virtues of love, respect, and care for the nonhuman natural world as an end in itself. As Louke van Wensveen notes in an essay in the volume under review, a review of environmental literature shows that care, respect, and love are the most frequent virtue terms used in this kind of discourse (175).

What is distinctive about EVE? Put simply, EVE is focused on character rather than on action. As co-editor Ron Sandler says in his cogent introductory essay, environmental virtue ethics has meant different things to different philosophers, but they are nearly united in their belief that attention to human character is key to providing a proper environmental ethics. In one of the most theoretical contributions to this anthology, David Schmitz and Matt Zwolinsky argue that virtue ethics offers resources for addressing one of Derek Parfit's 'repugnant conclusions': that for any number of persons, all with lives well worth living, there is some much larger human population whose existence would be better, even though the lives of its members are only barely worth living. These repugnant conclusions have typically been thought to arise only from certain forms of utilitarianism, but Schmidtz and Zwolinski argue that they are more insidious and 'suggest problems for the whole idea that moral theorizing should culminate in a simple formula for right action' (107). An appropriate response to the repugnant conclusions will therefore not be found by merely reformulating traditional principles of right action but, instead, must involve considerations of character and human excellence or virtue.

What is the role of the virtues in environmental discourse? In 'The Emergence of Ecological Virtue Language', an excerpt from her earlier book *Dirty Virtues* (2000), Louke van Wensveen reviews the language that environmental theorists and activists have used to argue for environmentalism. She finds virtue language ubiquitous in these articulations. Indeed, she says she has 'yet to come across a piece of ecologically sensitive philosophy, theology, or ethics that does not in some way incorporate virtue language' (16). By means of a more focused search in 'Thoreau, Leopold, and Carson: Toward an Environmental Virtue Ethics' (2001), co-editor Philip Cafaro finds plenty of 'virtue talk' in the lives and works of these widely influential and respected environmental figures. Henry David Thoreau, Aldo Leopold, and Rachel Carson are models of environmental excellence who lived very different lives and expressed their virtue in diverse ways, but Cafaro finds among them certain commonalities — putting economic life in its proper place, cultivating scientific knowledge, extending moral considerability beyond human beings, promoting wilderness protection, and a bedrock belief in the goodness of life (both human and nonhuman).

What is the role for EVE within environmental ethics? In his seminal article, 'Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments' (1983), reprinted in the anthology, Thomas Hill Jr. argues that there are cases of environmental behavior that are intuitively improper, and that this impropriety is best understood in the context of an account of human excellence and the dispositions that we ought to express in our environmental interactions. Hill suggests that the answer to the question, 'What is wrong with treating the environment that way?' is intelligible only against the background of an answer to the question, 'What is wrong with the kind of person who would do that?' However, in 'Environmental Virtue Ethics: Half the Truth but Dangerous as a Whole', Holmes Rolston III claims that

environmental virtue is only intelligible as a responsiveness to the independent value of nature, not the other way around. Rolston thus finds EVE dangerous to the extent that its focus on *human* flourishing distracts us from the intrinsic value of natural entities that, according to him, makes environmental virtue possible. He finds this danger exemplified in Thoreau's confession in *Walden* that he went to the woods 'to suck out the marrow of life' — but this depiction of Thoreau as a selfish quasi-anthropocentrist is quite controversial (75). Laura Westra, like Rolston, believes that natural value is not derived from human value, but in 'Virtue Ethics as Foundational for a Global Ethic' she argues that virtue ethics has a foundational role nonetheless. It provides an account of individual flourishing which it is the goal of a global ethic to promote, thus justifying the need for both ecological integrity and environmental or ecological rights. For in both Aristotelian and in Kantian accounts, all individuals (human and nonhuman) depend on ecosystems for their survival, health, and optimum functioning.

And what virtues are those? In another contribution (originally published in 1997), Bill Shaw examines Leopold's land ethic from an EVE perspective. He argues that Leopold's ethic requires cultivating certain virtues, which he calls 'land virtues' — respect, prudence, and practical wisdom — that not only dispose individuals to act in ways that promote the integrity, stability, and beauty of natural systems, but also mitigate some of the difficulties that arise when the land ethic is treated strictly as an account of right action. The anthology continues by discussing the substantive content of other environmental virtues and vices. In 'Benevolence as an Environmental Virtue', Geoffrey Frasz considers benevolence to be a genus under which fall specific other-regarding environmental virtues such as compassion, friendship, kindness, and gratitude. If, as Frasz argues, environmental virtue benefits both its possessor and the natural environment, then perhaps the concept of environmental vice is best understood in terms of the frustration of human and environmental flourishing. In 'Gluttony, Arrogance, Greed, and Apathy: An Exploration of Environmental Vice', Cafaro develops such an account. In 'Vices and Virtues in Religious Environmental Ethics', Charles Taliaferro discusses virtues and vices in both theistic and Buddhist environmental ethics. In her second contribution to this book, 'Cardinal Environmental Virtues: A Neurobiological Perspective', Wensveen argues that we should revamp the traditional cardinal virtues — practical wisdom, justice, temperance, and courage — in light of our improved biological, ecological, and neurological knowledge. Using a somewhat confusing imagery (a painting called *The Blessed Brain* is described, but one feels that the old cliché, 'a picture is worth a thousand words', is in order), she argues that we should consider a particular virtue cardinal 'if its cultivation involves the conditioning of a particular type of neurobiological system that plays a pivotal role in any other process of virtue cultivation,' or 'emotional fine-tuning by which agents are enabled to flourish and let flourish under changing circumstances' (179, 180).

How can EVE be applied in practical reasoning? In the final section of the collection, Peter Wenz and Sandler apply EVE to some pressing environmental problems. Wenz argues that for people in industrialized nations, the traditional virtues foster both human and environmental flourishing, whereas the traditional vices diminish both. Anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric accounts of virtue and flourishing are thus synergistic, and the key to this synergism is a shared repugnance to industrial consumerism, which is harmful to both humans and nature. In 'A Virtue Ethics Perspective on Genetically Modified Crops', Sandler proposes an EVE approach for assessing the acceptability of the use of genetically modified crops in agriculture. Such an assessment involves determining whether this technology will compromise the capacity of the environment to produce goods essential to the development and maintenance of human virtue, as well as determining if the technology is contrary to any of the virtues applicable to human interactions with the natural environment. Using these criteria he defends a limited endorsement position regarding genetically modified crops. This section leaves the reader hungry for more, as it works as sort of 'proof of the pudding' for the whole enterprise of EVE, and one would like to see more than two essays there.

Is intrinsic value necessary for EVE? This valuable book thus begins by recognizing EVE and its unique language, and then tries to understand the theory behind it at local and global levels. After an analysis of selected environmental virtues and vices, it attempts to apply them to a few controversial contemporary issues. The essays are scholarly, imaginative, clearly written, and will be of interest to all readers with an interest in environmental philosophy. Still, the question raised by Brennan and Lo remains: to what extent must EVE conceive of the nonhuman natural world as an end in itself? Authors often appeal to the 'last man argument' (112) in the following way: Suppose you are the last human being on earth, and you shall soon die; what would then be wrong with destroying the last remaining redwood? EVE typically answers that there must be something wrong with the character of someone who destroys the redwood, but this does not necessarily entail that the redwood has some sort of 'intrinsic value', an hypothesis that many philosophers find implausible. The question is still open. After all, as Sandler states in his introduction, there is no getting away from nature.

Antonio Casado da Rocha
University of the Basque Country

Anthony Savile
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: An Orientation to the Central Theme.
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2005.
Pp. 148.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-4051-2040-1);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 1-4051-2041-X).

This slim volume aims to provide the reader a guidebook to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and from the tone in which it is written, it seems to be directed mainly at students who have not yet been initiated into the mysteries of Kant's *magnum opus*.

Despite the title, this book only discusses the aesthetic and the analytic, and the latter only up to the refutation of idealism. Moreover, Savile focuses on a single and by no means central theme of these chapters, namely, the possibility of fashioning objective *empirical* knowledge from the chaotic manifold of intuition that goes beyond what is given immediately in such intuition. This material is broken up into six chapters according to the expected divisions (sensibility, metaphysical deduction, etc.), and is prefaced with a short 'Historical Prelude' in which Kant is portrayed as last in the line Descartes-Locke-Berkeley-Hume to take up the problem of empirical knowledge. As the rest of the book makes clear, Savile takes this as more than a device for introducing the problem; he really thinks that the critical philosophy emerged as an attempt to develop a consistent epistemology within the limits of a Lockean theory of concept formation. He also outlines three major ways in which Kant was, in his view, *actually* influenced by Berkeley in constructing the *Critique* (113-14). Both of these claims are made without supporting evidence, and both contradict all extant studies of Kant's intellectual development.

The subsequent chapters consist of descriptions of the strategy that Savile sees Kant as pursuing in each part, and how these together form a coherent epistemology. Savile conducts his argument at a significant distance from the actual text throughout, only citing passages occasionally to reassure the reader that his argument has some basis in the *Critique*. The emphasis is on results, rather than on arguments (49), and consequently the chapter on the transcendental deduction is by far the shortest and sketchiest, while the chapter on the principles is the longest and focuses almost exclusively on the second analogy of experience (causality). In relation to the latter, Savile makes several weighty claims about Kant's relation to the physical sciences that are highly dubious, if not straightforwardly false. He says, for instance, that in the Third Analogy Kant aims ultimately to provide a 'metaphysical underpinning for Newton's law of universal gravitation' (81). However, Kant explicitly connects it with Newton's third law of motion, and not with universal gravitation. He also claims that Kant believes gravity to require 'a medium to be effective' (99), while Kant actually defends the idea of gravitation as 'an immediate action of matter on other matter through empty space'

(*Metaphysical Foundations,* Second Chapter, Proposition 7). These errors seem to flow from Savile's blanket assumption that Kant enjoys a basically Cartesian mechanistic view of nature, when in fact nearly a century and a half of scientific advance separates them.

As regards the deduction, Savile relies on a psychological reading: 'Kant's principle teaching is that the world experience reveals to us, and about which we can attain reputable empirical knowledge, is in large part constituted by ourselves and our own ways of thought' (2). Thus Savile speaks of space and time, as well as the categories, as coloring our experience, and as objectively valid simply because we *must* use them, 'just because there is no other material possibility for beings with our sort of mental endowment' (111). The only difference between this and problematic idealism, so he claims, is that Kant identifies the product of the mind *immediately* with experience of objects (111).

Unfortunately, such a psychological reading necessarily fails to justify a strong intersubjective claim to objectivity. And since Savile mistakenly reads Kant in a psychological fashion, it is not surprising that he takes this as the major reason why we must reject Kant's theory. Thus Savile claims there is an 'inevitable mismatch' between the sort of objectivity Kant wanted to justify (intersubjective), and the sort that he does justify (122). As an illustration he says that while Kant has proven that 'what is common to us all is the structure of both inner and outer intuition,' he does not prove 'that all our various manifolds, yours and mine and the Queen of Sheba's, are synthesized ... as belonging to one common space' (124). So Kant's reputed deduction of objectivity collapses back into subjective idealism.

On this psychological interpretation also depends Savile's further claims that Kant's a priori concepts can and should be rendered empirical (116), and that the acquisition of fundamental concepts like space and time is an object of 'developmental psychology rather than philosophy' (120). Perhaps it is also the reason why Savile foists upon Kant the odd idea that noumena affect our senses and are the real things behind the appearances (108). Savile's only support for this claim, however, is the Kemp-Smith *mis*translation: 'Now we must bear in mind that the concept of appearances ... already of itself establishes the objective reality of noumena ...' (A249). Checking a more recent translation (Cambridge or Pluhar), or perhaps just the German original, one will find that the passage quoted actually begins: 'Now one might have thought that ... .'

Savile's final chapter closes with the claim that Kant was so blinded by his Lockean presuppositions that he was unable to recognize that the solution to all of his problems was already to hand in Thomas Reid's *Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (1764). Writes Savile: 'Curiously, it was a work that Kant knew about and which, in his doctoral dissertation of 1770, he had dismissed as philosophically worthless' (128). Curious indeed. Kant does not refer to Reid in the dissertation, and Reid's book was not published in German until 1769, meaning that it most certainly did not reach far East Prussia until well after the dissertation was published.

To conclude, I personally found this book seriously *dis*orienting, and I really had to stretch the limits of charity in order to keep with it, especially since Savile rarely provides citations or textual evidence for his claims, and refuses to dialogue with any of the secondary literature. Ultimately, this is a book that tells us that the central theme of the *Critique* is neither the possibility of metaphysics nor the *transcendental* analysis of the possibility of a priori knowledge.

Courtney David Fugate
Catholic University of Leuven

Kenneth Seeskin
Maimonides on the Origin of the World.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.
Pp.viii + 215.
US$55.00. ISBN 0-521-84553-X.

Kenneth Seeskin brings his considerable skills as a philosopher in the classical and medieval periods to bear in this, his latest book on Maimonides. He concentrates on a central question in Maimonides' *Guide of the Perplexed*, whether the world is created or eternal. This question impacts directly on the question whether the world has a creator, and what sort of creator. For Seeskin, Maimonides' response is that the world is created from nothing, all at once, by a free and benevolent divine will.

While he finds religious inspiration in this view, Seeskin argues Maimonides' position on philosophical grounds, contrasting the arguments for creation *ex nihilo* that Maimonides brings, with arguments found in Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus for an eternal generation of being. Seeskin brings out nicely the different conceptions each Greek philosopher has of the ultimate cause of an eternal world. Plato's Demiurge willfully imparts forms upon inchoate eternal matter; Aristotle's God is bound by the unchanging necessity of form and matter; and Plotinus' One is totally other than that world which emanates from it.

Seeskin follows Maimonides' explicit critique of the views of Plato and Aristotle with an assumed critique of Plotinus' position. All three are found to posit an eternal matter without providing demonstrative arguments to prove it. Moreover, Aristotle's God and Plotinus' One act out of necessity, while Maimonides rejects as spurious the will ascribed to them.

The divine will that Maimonides embraces, according to Seeskin, is totally free, with no internal or external impediments. God's creation of the world

is for Maimonides the result of a free choice that does not entail change in God. Adopting Maimonides' statement in *Guide* 2.18, Seeskin says (118) that the true reality of the will is the ability 'to will or not will;' opposed expressions of the will do not represent change in the will.

As Seeskin goes on to explain, God's creation of the world 'follows' His non-creation of it, without employing any causal or temporal factor. Time is created together with the motion and matter of the world, all at once, *de novo* as well as *ex nihilo*.

Seeskin is aware of the problems Maimonides faces in his thesis: that creation introduces a proscribed causal relation between the Creator and His creation, a relation opposed as well to Maimonides' negative theology; and that the very notion of creation from nothing is usually considered meaningless: *ex nihilo nihil fit*.

Seeskin appears to approve of Maimonides' challenge to this basic philosophical tenet, which for Maimonides is based on physical observation, not logic (75). Maimonides candidly admits, however, that he does not have demonstrative proof for his position either. Indeed he cannot, as he is talking about something and someone totally beyond our experience. All Maimonides wishes to do is establish, on philosophical grounds, the possibility of creation, and Seeskin thinks he does so.

The argument centers on the notion of possibility itself, whether it is limited to our experience of what has been actual in the world and thus is part of an intelligible universe understood by our intellect, or whether whatever may be imagined is possible, short of self-contradictory assertions.

Maimonides joins this issue initially with the Occasionalists of Islamic theology, *Kalâm*, at *Guide* I: 73. Their tenth premise assumes whatever is admissible to the imagination is possible, since everything is contingent upon God's will, and could be otherwise than it appears to us.

The denial of a natural world and of causal efficacy in the created world goes against Maimonides' Aristotelian grain. Yet, in his later confrontation in the *Guide* with philosophers who accept an eternal universe, Maimonides adopts this *kalâm* tenet, in relation to the creation of the world.

Creatio ex nihilo is a possibility that seemingly cannot be denied, for it makes a claim that is empirically irrefutable, since no circumstances obtain by which to evaluate it. Seeskin finds this claim logically tenable, and moves on to buttress Maimonides' position by highlighting his view on particularization (another *kalâm* premise) and purpose.

The teleological order of the world is the standard view of philosophers and scientists through the medieval period, though in Maimonides' day the heavens were in considerable scientific disarray. Seeskin is very good at summarizing the problems Maimonides found with astronomy (131-3), problems that led him to opt for a supernatural explanation for the composition of the celestial sphere.

The particular, apparently arbitrary design of the heavens is for Maimonides an argument for a Creator who chose it thus, who had no necessary reason for acting the way He did. Particularization and purpose of this sort

are thought to require a will that freely expresses itself. For Maimonides, this was possible before God created the world, before the laws of physics, which God ordained, took hold. Thus the world is not eternal *a parte ante*, but is eternal *a parte post*, Maimonides asserts. As Seeskin states, even this everlasting form of eternity is contingent on God's will, which always has the possibility of ending this world, though Scripture assures us it won't (158).

It is the Bible, as Maimonides reads it in the opening verses of Genesis, that motivates him to prefer creation *de novo* and *ex nihilo* over any other theory of origin, though he acknowledges rabbinic statements that lean towards a Platonic view of creation. Thus, for Maimonides, the freedom that creation from nothing offers is not only a condition for genuine divine volition, but is also critical for establishing the legitimacy of miracles, particularly the revelation of the Torah on Mount Sinai.

Creation thus bears upon revelation and prophecy. Maimonides finds the diverse opinions people have about creation analogous to those they hold in regard to prophecy; analogies that have led many scholars to deduce that Maimonides is being disingenuous in advocating creation *ex nihilo*. Seeskin rejects this claim, arguing his case in an uncharacteristically abbreviated manner (174-9).

The arguments that favor a Platonic or Aristotelian reading of Maimonides' doctrine, flying as they do in the face of his apparently explicit position, are motivated by the problematic nature of the doctrine, both in itself and in relation to the rest of Maimonides' philosophic posture in the *Guide*; and by the conviction that the *Guide* requires an esoteric reading.

Seeskin is adamant that Maimonides did not have an esoteric agenda in this matter (180). His understanding of Maimonides' position is plausible and well reasoned, though inconclusive. He pays insufficient attention to the political sub-text of Maimonides' discourse, to the immediate sources through which Greek thought reached Maimonides, and to the philosophical problems (concerning emanation, the relation of will and wisdom, providence, matter and evil) that Seeskin's God would encounter, were Seeskin to extend his inquiry beyond creation. Still, this is a forceful, learned and articulate presentation of the issue.

There are a small number of stylistic errors and typos that should be noted, on pages 86, 107, 125, 164, 177, 190, and 193, note 27. Questionable too, is Seeskin's consistent translation of Maimonides' term for choice, *ikhtiyâr*, as 'free choice', though Seeskin's thesis hinges on this debatable, and certainly equivocal, word.

Alfred L. Ivry
(*Skirball Department of Hebrew and Judaic Studies*)
New York University

Margrit Shildrick and
Roxanne Mykitiuk, eds.
Ethics of the Body:
Postconventional Challenges.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2005.
Pp. vi + 288.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-19523-2);
US$27.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-69320-8).

In *Ethics of the Body* thirteen authors from diverse disciplinary backgrounds explore the themes of embodiment, identity, and difference with a view to demonstrating the usefulness of postconventional approaches to bioethics. According to co-editor Shildrick, bioethics is out of touch with bodies (as they are implicated in self-identity), with postmodern theories' contribution to the reduction of binary thinking, and with postmodern culture in general, which views with a skeptical eye claims of certainty about universal, abstract goods. Despite employing what, in my opinion, is a rather ungenerous picture of 'conventional' bioethics, the volume is rich in suggestions for furthering critical bioethical inquiry — shifting the emphasis from ' ... the parameters of right and wrong behaviour' to ' ... the dynamic becoming of the embodied self' (17). To the extent that biomedicine is a major player (culprit!) in binary identity construction — ill/well; abled/disabled; female/male; sane/insane; addicted/non-addicted; gay/straight — and that identity is a major determinant of health and human flourishing, the deconstructive turn can readily be seen as significant for bioethics.

The substantive issues which provide the context for the deconstructive project range across the physician-patient relationship, genetic reductionism, addiction, psychiatric counseling, viral load testing for HIV, reproductive technology, clinical responses to intersex phenomena, the legal construction of selves, and the moral agency of scientists in a post-academic society.

Three essays dealing with genetics illustrate well the usefulness of questioning 'given' identities and the surprising potential of the (otherwise sinister) dominance of genetics discourses. Scully argues for the subversive potential of embracing molecular biology (albeit a cultural meta-narrative) on the grounds that it offers multiple interpretive models (hence one's choice must be justified ethically and politically), that its genetics history is the investigation of phenotypic variation for its own sake (not to pathologise), and that current theory favours a 'process' account, which foregrounds multiple causal factors (including the environmental) in genetic variation. Molecular genetics might then provide a discourse to destabilise the ideal of normality and empower disability theory. This essay nicely accomplishes all three goals of the collection — exploring normative embodiment, reducing the binary of abled/disabled, and celebrating difference — while offering a provisional interpretive model with a self-critical discussion of 'strong' postmodernism and social theories of disability. Karpin and O'Connell also

nuance the common critique of genetics discourse by showing how it blurs the boundaries of the self. Because of the kinship implications of genetic information, current attempts to draft privacy laws, they claim, are flawed (because of the impossibility of containing genetic information) and undesirable (because a revised — transgressive — concept of selves is preferable). In light of the 'leaky' boundaries of selves, legal attention instead should focus on noting asymmetries of power in negotiating disclosure (Karpin) and shoring up anti-discrimination law (O'Connell).

The subtle interaction between the conceptual and the material in producing subjective embodiment is provocatively explored in an essay by Rosengarten on HIV. Through a critical discussion of viral load testing, Rosengarten aims to show how HIV medicine materialises its *conceptual* (not natural) objects — viruses, bodies, infectivity — with questionable ethical results. Viral load testing not only creates new serodivisions (based on measures of viral presence), but generates distinct '... responsibilized socially embodied subject[s]' (81), only some of whom, as differential risk carriers, must display 'adherence' to drug regimens that may be difficult to maintain and may painfully reshape the body. Theories about the concentration of the virus in parts of the body (notably, the male genital tract) invite localized medical interventions, increased surveillance, the reification and compartmentalisation of infectivity, with social consequences as yet unknown. Thus risk (taken to be biological) and responsibility (taken to be individual) are embodied (but indeed interactive) in particular persons, while questions of broader responsibility (How acceptable is the scientific theorizing, in light of its material consequences? How culpable are drug companies when 'adherence' is so problematic?) are sidelined.

Although it is impossible to comment on every essay in this fascinating collection, I do want, finally, to draw particular attention to Nagl's mapping of the current cultural context of scientific research and her proposal for moral agency in science. The current reality of post-academic science — science in harness with industry — forces to the surface the ethical issues which the former ideal of disinterest concealed. Science is now largely geared to product development; but, in the science-industry collaboration who is ethically responsible? Nagl proposes a code of moral agency for scientists based on Helen Longino's epistemic virtues of (the traditional) empirical adequacy, novelty, and (the revisionist) ontological heterogeneity, mutuality of interaction, applicability to human needs, and diffusion or decentralisation of power. Such a moral code would contribute to a theoretical and social contextualisation of science, a valuing of 'rogue' knowledges (via novelty and sensitivity to power), subversion of value hierarchies (via ontological heterogeneity), and favouring of relational complexity over single-cause models (such as the traditional active-male, passive-female model of fertilisation). Extending the moral code, Nagl recommends interdisciplinary alliances, and in particular, a link between science and art as a way of generating and criticising forms of representation and their social consequences.

Reflecting on Nagl's proposal in the context of this collection's challenge to bioethics, I wondered whether the code for science might be adapted to bioethics, and might offer more guidance than the rather vague suggestions for a deconstructed bioethics that appear in the collection: Derrida's ethic of personal responsibility (exhorting us to 'think outside the boundaries' (12) — but, to what end?); the call for a 'new [ethical] conceptual platform' (275), 'a more fluid and open model,' or to 'resist authority' (9). Bioethics, like science, is increasingly harnessed both to industry and biomedical institutions, and also operates in a postacademic environment. The modified code of virtues offered by Nagl, however, could provide a meeting place for the insights of 'conventional' — which is not (just) one — and post-conventional bioethics. In particular, the profound understanding of how power operates to construct and maintain bodily identities in a matrix of privilege can only enrich the more conventional bioethical concern for the vulnerable.

Nagl introduces the Maori concept of *Whakapapa*, a nonessentialist, relational, historical understanding of identity, as a corrective against genetic reductionism. *Whakapapa* means setting layer upon layer, and I read the essays in *Ethics of the Body* less as a 'thoroughgoing deconstruction' (16) of bioethics than as another, and very valuable, layer in its complex discourse.

Elisabeth Gedge
McMaster University

Scott Soames
Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century. Volume 2: The Age of Meaning.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2003.
Pp. xxii + 479.
US$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0691115745);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0691123128).

Although billed by the publishers as a 'major, wide-ranging history of analytic philosophy', it is charitable not to read Soames' two volumes in this light: historical scholarship is slight to non-existent, large parts of the history are ignored, and little attempt is made to trace actual historical connections. Soames rarely takes much exegetic care with the philosophers he discusses, but he does take considerable care to associate with them a clear and precise position (whether or not it was one they actually held), and then to subject

it to clear and detailed criticism. For this reason the book has pedagogic value, for undergraduates using it will learn how to dissect philosophical positions even if they are misinformed about how those positions originated.

As Soames explained in his first volume — an explanation repeated in this one — he is especially concerned to show how, over the course of the last century, analytic philosophers improved their understanding of concepts such as analyticity, meaning, logical truth, necessity, apriority (and their contrasts). This theme comes into its own in the second volume, which, although somewhat longer than the first, covers only twenty years, in comparison to the fifty years covered by the first. Very few of the philosophers covered in the first volume saw themselves as contributing to these issues with the same clarity that Soames did, whereas several of those dealt with in the second tackled at least some of them explicitly. In Volume 2 there are two chapters on the later Wittgenstein; two on Ryle; one each on Strawson's theory of truth, Hare's theory of goodness, Malcolm's paradigm case argument, and Austin's *Sense and Sensibilia*; one on Grice; two on Quine; two on Davidson; and four on Kripke. The coverage is eccentric, not so much because of the choice of philosophers, but because of the allocation of space to those chosen. Does Ryle really warrant as much space as the later Wittgenstein? Does Kripke really warrant as much as both of them put together?

Soames' emphasis on Kripke is the more remarkable because he deals exclusively with *Naming and Necessity* (and two related, shorter papers); Kripke's contributions to modal logic (clearly relevant to Soames' main theme) and his 'Outline of a Theory of Truth' are ignored. Yet, although there is a clear sense throughout that the book, and thus by implication the history of analytic philosophy so far, is going to culminate in Kripke, the ultimate conclusion is by no means triumphal. Soames' discussion of the necessary a posteriori (Ch. 15), for example, ends with the following familiar dilemma: On the assumption that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are rigid designators without descriptive content, we can 'either ... take it for granted that the sentences "Hesperus is Hesperus" and "Hesperus is Phosphorus" semantically express different propositions, and try to explain what this difference consists in; or ... treat the two sentences as semantically expressing the same proposition, and try to explain how speakers use them to assert and convey different information, and to express and report different beliefs' (395). This is indeed a difficult dilemma, difficult enough to make one reconsider the Kripkean assumption on which it is based, and Soames, who builds towards it through his chapter with admirable clarity and attention to detail, does nothing to make it seem more tractable.

In other respects there is a tension between the theme Soames wants to emphasize and the topics he chooses to discuss. His two chapters on Wittgenstein, for example, deal with Wittgenstein's attacks on the referential theory of meaning and the Tractarian notion of analysis, and with the private language argument and notion of rule following. One gets the sense that Soames pulled these themes from a few passages early in the *Philosophical Investigations* without much concern for what was said elsewhere in the book.

Nonetheless, he does a good job making them clear enough to be intelligible to undergraduates and in pointing out their weaknesses — it is good to see the hagiographical tradition in Wittgenstein scholarship finally coming to an end, though students coming to the later Wittgenstein for the first time through Soames will be hard pressed to understand what all the fuss was about. It is in deference to Soames' main theme, however, rather than to his actual discussion of Wittgenstein, that he concludes Chapter 1 by ascribing some of the failures of the *Philosophical Investigations* to the twin theses that, since philosophical claims are not empirical they must be necessary and a priori, and that the necessary, the a priori, and the analytic are one and the same (p. 29). It is surely a stretch to attribute either of these theses to Wittgenstein (whose hostility to anything so clear as a thesis was legendary), least of all to attribute them to the *Investigations* where the relevant concepts are barely discussed. Wittgenstein gets closer to Soames' main theme in the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, but for pedagogical purposes a detailed discussion of that book would have been far less useful.

In the first of his two chapters on Ryle, Soames discusses Ryle's repudiation of the semantic argument for fatalism in *Dilemmas*. The argument (*Dilemmas* [Cambridge UP 1954],15) goes something like this: Suppose that this morning I sneezed, then it was true yesterday (and indeed at the dawn of time) that this morning I would sneeze. But if it was true at the dawn of time that I would sneeze this morning, then it would be impossible for me not to sneeze this morning. And so my sneezing was pre-determined. As Soames points out (76), the argument fails to distinguish between 'Necessarily, if it is true that I will sneeze then I will sneeze' (which is true, but doesn't support fatalism) and 'If it is true that I will sneeze then necessarily I will sneeze' (which is fatalism itself, and thus can't be assumed in an argument for fatalism). Ryle misses anything so clear cut and obvious, and instead makes a number of more or less inconsequential remarks, producing what Soames aptly calls 'a fog of analysis' (79). (In fairness to Ryle, Michael Kremer, reviewing Soames in *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* [19 September 2005], suggests a different argument for fatalism that Ryle may have had in mind and that fits his text somewhat better. Nonetheless, I think the fog of analysis charge still stands, for Ryle explains neither the argument, nor what is wrong with it, anywhere near as clearly as Kremer does.)

The same point seems to me to apply to a great deal of ordinary language philosophical analysis. The ordinary language philosophers were far too interested in particular features of language, and far too little interested in developing a general framework within which they could be studied. What theorizing they did was confined to simple examples and broke down rapidly when more complex cases were considered (as, e.g., with Strawson's performative theory of truth). Soames, too, decries their reluctance to theorize, and links it to a further failing. By concentrating on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of simple, individual sentences used in particular speech acts, the ordinary language philosophers failed to distinguish features of the

speech act which arose from the meaning of the sentence used from features which arose from other factors (90, 142, 198). On Soames' account, it was Grice who brought the second failing to prominence and, in doing so, brought ordinary language philosophy to an end.

The ordinary language philosophers' hostility to a theory of meaning was shared, from a quite different point of view, by Quine. While the ordinary language philosophers thought that meaning was best approached by cataloguing the uses of expressions, Quine was suspicious of the notion of meaning itself. Soames devotes Chapters 10 and 11 to a detailed and, I think, successful critique of Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference. After that, he turns to Davidson in hopes of finding the missing theory of meaning, though Davidson, also, is found wanting. To this point, Soames' entire story has a very attractive unity: the ordinary language philosophers and Quine hoped to do without a theory of meaning; Davidson hoped to provide one; all three failed. All this suggests that the next big step in analytic philosophy will be the development of a plausible theory of meaning. But this is not a story which leads up to *Naming and Necessity*, which offers no help with a theory of meaning.

It is easy to think of philosophers who will continue the story that Soames has spent three-quarters of the book outlining: Dummett, who is second to none as an advocate of the importance of meaning theory in philosophy; the developers of model-theoretic semantics, including the Kripke Soames ignores; or those philosophers who have espoused naturalistic theories of meaning anchored in the philosophy of mind. The different story which properly culminates in Kripke, on the other hand, could begin with the positivists' treatment of analyticity, Quine's 'Two Dogmas' (which Soames covers in volume 1), and Quine's 'Truth by Convention', continue with the debate on reference which began with Strawson's 'On Referring', and lead through Carnap's *Naming and Necessity* to possible worlds semantics. Carnap, indeed, is seriously neglected by Soames (with only one significant paragraph devoted to him in the entire two volumes, and then only as a foil to Quine). He would have been a much better philosopher to represent the positivists than Soames' choice, Ayer.

Reviewers, however, should try to resist the temptation to tell authors about the book they should have written. Soames treats the philosophers covered in his second volume rather better than those in his first. With the exception of the later Wittgenstein, whom he treats very sketchily, he gives more evidence of having come seriously to grips with them than he did with the philosophers in Volume 1. This, of course, is especially true of his treatment of Kripke, with whose work he is deeply engaged. (He cites as many secondary sources on Kripke as he does on all the other philosophers in volume 2 combined.)

This book is neither a reliable history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy, nor a coherent rational reconstruction of a single strand of that history. Nonetheless, despite its flaws as history, there is a great deal in

Soames' discussion of particular positions that makes his book well worth reading.

Nicholas Griffin
McMaster University

Paul Virilio
Negative Horizon: An Essay in Dromoscopy.
Trans. Michael Degener. New York:
Continuum 2005.
Pp. viii + 227.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-8264-75248.

Speed kills. The popular aphorism sums up the driving concern pursued in Paul Virilio's *Negative Horizon*. The book provides perhaps the most developed statement of Virilio's theory of dromoscopy, his study of speed and its increasingly significant place in the current global era. Drawing on the political and military histories of the West, Virilio examines the impulses to move further and faster and the destructive impacts of speed. The West's compulsion to accelerate, evident throughout its history, has broken down both the barriers of nature and socially rooted resistance to speed. Presently the force of speed has given rise to a politics of time that, in the global era, supercedes the territorial politics of space. Speed, for Virilio, perpetuates the hunt and, by so doing, also perpetuates extermination. What makes Virilio's work so interesting is his focus on this 'violence of speed,' the unsuspected violence produced by the vehicle, and the way in which we are, despite our intentions, swept up in this violence.

For Virilio, the first freedom is the freedom of movement. Far from being an aspect of leisure, the potential for movement is identified with a potential for war, which is distinguished from the hunt. Virilio begins this history of movement with reflections on transportation throughout the course of human histories. Along the way he illustrates the further development, institutionalization, and perfection of transportation. This is fundamentally expressed as an acceleration, as the compulsion of speed. He also makes clear that transportation is rooted in, and gives rise to violence. Indeed, for Virilio, the search for, and capture of, means of transportation mark the emergence of specific economies of violence beginning well before the rise of pastoralism.

The history, development, and the speeding up of transportation is also, however, fundamentally the speeding up of war, which has always been the often unspoken accompaniment to transportation. 'The progress of speed is

nothing other than the unleashing of violence; we saw that breeding and training were economic forms of violence, or, if you like, the means to sustain violence, indeed render it unlimited' (45).

For Virilio, patriarchy and transportation go hand-in-hand, and his analysis suggests that the domestication of women occupies an important place in the processes of speed. Patriarchy arose with the capture of women and was extended through the husbandry of livestock. Women were 'the first means of transportation for the species' before the domestication of pack animals and saddled horses (39). Women as the sole means of transport, during migrations or during episodes of conflict, freed up male hunters to specialize in the duel, to become warriors. The domestication of women provides the first necessary logistical support. All auto-mobility stems from this early infrastructure of women's backs. This logistical support allows for the extension of conflicts, previously limited by group mobility, as food and weapons no longer have to be gained 'on site.' They can be delivered. For Virilio this is the first form of economy preceding the raised and bred animal, slavery, and husbandry. It, like the others to follow, is an economy of violence. In Virilio's words, 'domestication is the fulfillment and perfecting of predation' (40). This begins the movement to pastoral societies and beyond as societies are organized for war, movement that supercedes the hunt. While the primordial animal hunt is a hunt for subsistence, a slaughter, or execution, the hunts for women and men that follow are about capture. With agricultural societies this capture becomes institutionalized in slavery.

Speaking of the defeat of the Maya, Virilio signals the warning that still haunts the present: 'It is the differential in time, the speed of the conquerors that enabled the extermination of a civilization by a few dozen horsemen' (41). As Virilio argues, it is 'this "dromocratic" superiority that always compensates for any inferiority in numbers' (41). The key point for Virilio, and one that underpins the rest of the book, is that 'just as war arose from conflicts between members of the same species and not from a confrontation with animal kind, so also did its sophistication further develop in connection with internecine struggles as opposed to conflicts against outsiders' (40).

Overall the book maintains the provocative and unique style readers have come to expect from Virilio. A writer of difficult and often frustrating prose, Virilio nevertheless is to be commended for his willingness to push ideas and stand up to challenges.

The most disappointing aspect of Virilio's book is the abstract presentation of speed as an all-pervading character detached from specific social and economic relations, specifically, in the current context, the social relations of class within capitalism, and the under-developed discussion of class and speed. There are important implications for thinking about class relations from the perspective of Virilio's focus on speed — but the book offers only hints. 'The society of the course, society of the hunt, the dromocracy is merely a clandestine organization of a social and political hunt where speed extends the advantage of violence, a society where the affluent class conceals the class of speed' (45). At certain points Virilio touches upon the importance of this

connection, as when he suggests: '"the transportation revolution", in producing in the nineteenth century the factory of speed, industrializes terror: *the motor manufactures fear*' (46). Elsewhere, Virilio tantalizes the reader by raising a provocative thesis on the priority of speed for the emergence of capital, both echoing and extending Marx's own comments on the importance of the mobility of capital. 'The accumulation of energy and of speed in the vectors of transport (horse-drawn or seagoing) is indispensable for the capitalization of goods and riches, the occult character of this dromocratic "society of the course" reveals the strategic dimension of the vectorial politics carried down through the ages' (49).

In place of analysis of this crucial symbiosis of speed and capital, however, Virilio settles for the occasional suggestive phrase. Thus, Virilio acknowledges the significance of an 'elite of movement' and suggests this elite 'represents a misunderstood and underestimated order without which accumulation would not have been possible' but offers only this bare statement (49).

It is curious, and rather disappointing, that Virilio's analysis says nothing about one of the key motors of speed driving capitalist economies, the pursuit of surplus value and the speeding up of the working day — and the struggles engaged over that speed up. From the prototypical case of the Taylorist assembly line with its time-motion studies to the instantaneous flexibility of just in time niche production, capitalist production institutes an ongoing speed-up that spills from the workplace to structure most aspects of everyday life from rush hour to fast food. Unfortunately, Virilio's free-floating speed theory, in arguing that speed drives society, avoids engaging the question of what might be driving speed.

Jeff Shantz
York University

William J. Wainwright
Religion and Morality.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2005.
Pp. xii + 252.
US$99.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7546-1631-2);
US$34.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7546-1632-0)

This book offers an up-to-date survey of what philosophers have had to say about the relationship between religion and morality. Wainwright divides his subject-matter under three headings, to each of which he devotes a part of the book: 'Moral Arguments for the Existence of God', 'Divine Command Theory and Its Critics', and finally, 'Human Morality and Religious Requirements', which deals with the apparent contradictions between ethics and the practices of various religious traditions. The book is almost exclusively concerned with the work of analytically-oriented philosophers and theologians who write in the English language. It makes no mention of postmodern thought; Kant and Kierkegaard are the only continental thinkers seriously discussed. Within those limits, its compass is quite comprehensive.

Part One begins with a lucid and charitable description of Kantian ethics, leading up to Kant's famous claim that God's existence must be postulated in order to make ethics fully comprehensible. Wainwright does not simply set out a single possible reading of Kant; he contrasts the views of different interpreters (e.g., Peter Byrne and Allen Wood), creating a kind of exegetical dialectic.

Next for consideration is John Henry Newman's argument that the phenomenon of moral conscience points to the existence of God. Wainwright describes the criticisms of Newman proffered by John Mackie and S.A. Grave, subjecting each to subtle critique. However, he is troubled by the apparent fact that many people simply do not possess the kind of moral conscience described by Newman, and that Newman disposes of this problem in ways that render his doctrine unfalsifiable.

The final chapter of this section deals with attempts to prove God's existence from the assumed premise that moral values are objective. First, Wainwright presents and rejects W. R. Surley's contention that if values are objective they must exist in God's mind. He is more favorably disposed towards Richard Adams' theory that values gain their objectivity from their resemblance to Divine attributes. Wainwright concludes by allowing that in as much as such arguments offer good explanations for the objectivity of values, they offer some basis for belief in God's existence.

Part 2 opens with a chapter describing the historical background of the controversy surrounding the so-called 'Euthyphro Problem,' i.e., does God command us to do certain things because they are moral obligations, or are those things moral obligations because God commanded them? Pierre d'Ailley (1350-1420), Martin Luther and René Descartes are cited as champions of the Divine Command theory of ethics, which takes the latter view. Ralph Cudworth's *A Treatise Concerning True and Immutable Morality*

(1731) is examined in some detail in order to explain the traditional criticisms of Divine Command theory. Chapter 6 continues the exposition with thorough accounts of the two leading modern versions of the theory. These are Robert Adam's 'Modified Divine Command Theory', which is based upon the premise that the fact that an imperative is commanded by God is constitutive of its status as an *ethical* obligation, and Phillip Quinn's 'Causal Divine Command Theory', which is notable for allowing the possibility that some moral truths may be *necessary* truths.

While Chapter 6 does describe some of the controversies surrounding the ideas of Adams and Quinn, Chapter 7 is devoted wholly to criticism of Divine Command theory. Wainwright wisely avoids critiques based upon atheistic arguments (if you can prove there is no God, then Divine Command theory has little to offer) that would lead him astray into metaphysical issues that are not really the book's concern. Instead, he concentrates on arguments that can also appeal to some theists. These attacks on Divine Command theory invoke a broad range of issues: whether non-believers would be able to become cognizant of divinely commanded ethical obligations; whether the 'ought' of ethical obligations may be derived from the 'is' of 'It is commanded by God'; whether God can command us to do evil; what are we to make of the claim that God is good if He Himself invents the criteria of goodness as He wishes; and finally, whether Divine Command theory contradicts Kant's notion of human moral autonomy. All of this is followed by yet another well-argued chapter making Wainwright's own 'Case for Divine Command Theory'. His tentative conclusion views the glass as half-full: 'At this point in time, it is not unreasonable to prefer theological voluntarism [i.e., Divine Command theory - B.D.L.] to other forms of theistic ethical theory' (144).

The final section of the book considers whether the ideas of actual religious traditions may contradict rational moral norms. Consequently, it devotes a good deal of space to describing relevant aspects of those traditions. It begins with Chapter 8, which offers a well-informed discussion of Christian and Buddhist endorsements of pacifism, and considers whether unwillingness to fight may sometimes interfere with the performance of moral obligations. Building upon Reinhold Neibuhr's critique of Christian pacifism, Wainwright takes this problem very seriously, and concludes that, 'we have uncovered a real clash between certain religious requirements and the requirements of rational morality' (174).

Chapter 10 deals with the theologically challenging story of 'The Binding of Isaac' from the Book of Genesis. Unsurprisingly, much of the discussion revolves around Kierkegaard's classic study, *Fear and Trembling*, and its recent interpretations. Once again, the views of Quinn and Adams are also discussed in detail. Although Wainwright devotes about two pages to Jerome Gellman's views on Kierkegaard, *Religion and Morality*'s lack of any references to Jewish thought becomes especially glaring in this chapter. After all, Gellman's discussion of Kierkegaard appears in his (2003) *Abraham! Abraham! Kierkegaard and the Hasidim on the Binding of Isaac*. It is a shame

that Wainwright does not seem to be acquainted with Michael J. Harris' (2003) *Divine Command Ethics: Jewish and Christian Perspectives*.

The final chapter asks whether mysticism, as represented by figures and movements in the Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions, is a help or a hindrance to morality. Wainwright classifies some of these as forms of ethical egoism; the mystic is really only interested in his or her own enlightenment. He claims that more theistically-oriented forms of mysticism tend to be more concerned with morality; they often take the shape of 'mixed forms' of religious life, which balance contemplation with ethically-grounded action.

All-in-all, Wainwright is to be commended for producing such a lucid, comprehensive, and philosophically sophisticated book. It should be on the 'must-read' list of anyone with a serious interest in the philosophy of religion. However, lay readers and teachers of undergraduates should take note: despite the clarity of his presentation, Wainwright's technical subtlety makes parts of his book heavy going for the philosophical novice.

Berel Dov Lerner
Western Galilee College, Israel

David Wills
Matchbook: Essays in Deconstruction.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2005.
Pp. xi + 221.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN: 0-8047-4135-2);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN: 0-8047-4136-0).

The essays collected as *Matchbook* were written in the two decades before Derrida's death in October 2004. So instead of retrospective appraisal we get a very personal, highly stylized look at some key Derrida works and ideas, especially those published after 1980. In fact, Wills makes an unusual claim in this regard, arguing straight-off that 'Envois' of *The Post Card: From Plato to Freud and Beyond* (1980 [1987]) is 'for me the determinant text of the Derridean corpus' (ix).

This frankly eccentric claim will not sit well with most philosophers, for whom the later works are generally less rigorous and original than the early works of 'grammatology' (the 1960s) and informed literary experiment (early 1970s). Of course, philosophers have been painfully slow to recognize the importance of even these works. So maybe Wills — a knowledgeable, well-published Derrida translator and professor of French and English — is really a decade or two ahead of us. Or maybe Wills is wrong about the importance

of Derrida's late work in general, and about the seminal status of 'Envois' in particular.

Judging this issue is not easy. *Matchbook* routinely makes significant demands on its reader, and not just because of the complexity of its subject matter. Consider Wills' literary style. He likes 'run-on' sentences, and speed readers could be forgiven for mistaking them for parodies of Derrida's own style. Six of nine chapters end with very long run-ons, including a doozy that runs the length of three pages — the better, presumably, to demonstrate what is interminable, excessive, and resistant to closure (129-32). Other flourishes include a discussion Wills begins twice, repeating for a few paragraphs the very 'same' words that form his opening remarks — the better to perform for readers Derrida's idea that iteration incurs difference (127-8). Wills even taunts readers that he has nothing, or nothing more, to say about a chosen subject. For example, in 'JD-ROM' he very quickly runs up against the limits of what he (thinks he) has to say, and then opens a new paragraph with the words: 'But I won't stop there' (91). Some readers will wish he did stop, especially analytic philosophers who will be confirmed in their prejudice that all this sound and fury signifies nothing save, perhaps, intellectual bankruptcy. Yet it behooves readers to judge whether or not this performance is finally worth the effort.

Sometimes it is. Chapter 2, 'Lemming', goes beyond mere spectacle to provide a useful, teacherly lesson about the meaning of Derrida's *The Truth in Painting*. Similarly, 'Forked Tongue' has some bright spots, especially when Wills thinks more critically about Derrida's late recourse to autobiography. And 'Supreme Court' and 'Bookend: Fiber Allergics' provide useful discussions of speed and reading, feminism, and such staples of deconstruction as 'aporetic undecidability' (167) and the 'chiasmus' (195).

Too often, however, Wills offers Derrida warmed-over and rationalized through the transformative promise of iteration. Take 'Jaded in America', which serves as a general introduction to the book but doesn't live up to its promise. Instead Wills serves up knowing samples of technical terms and neologisms found in the literature on deconstruction, such as 'virgule' and 'invagination', and engages in a discussion of the supposedly aporetic coupling of 'is/in' (as in *Deconstruction Is/In America*) that never justifies the eyestrain.

Wills' rhetoric here and elsewhere invites the question: Why bother reading Wills-doing-Derrida when we can just read Derrida-doing-Derrida? It is an important question with implications for the entire field, and it turns on a debate about the relative worth of the early and late Derrida, which is to say, on the relative importance of Derrida's philosophical and literary pretensions. Autobiography is at the heart of it.

Arguably, Derrida's own recourse to autobiography doesn't always serve deconstruction. It can be indulgent and off-putting. That Wills imitates precisely these worst aspects of Derrida's corpus is, therefore, I think, a mistake. In Derrida's case, it's the mistake of narcissism or excessive self-love. In Wills' case, it's the mistake of what Freud called transference love —

the love of Derrida. And, indeed, Wills is often a willing slave to Derrida: ' ... I hereby send this word to the attention, intention, and address of Jacques Derrida ... ' (89). And although he wrestles with this affection-affliction, it doesn't really change the diagnosis (186-7). It's not that it's indecent and voyeuristic for readers to share these overtures; or, at least, it is not just that. It's rather that the stakes of deconstruction are thereby squandered. Why? Because the vaunted idea of an ethical 'response-ability' in deconstruction, and of 'hospitality' to the other, is made perfectly laughable. For nothing is more irresponsible and inhospitable than a deconstruction that makes such excessive demands — first of all on that other called the reader. Of course Wills and Derrida are quite right to insist on slow, careful reading. But they are wrong if they think anyone owes them anything when they squander our good will. On the contrary, the onus falls first upon them.

As for careful reading, not once does Wills recognize that Derrida's 'Envois', a collection of delirious post cards sent to his wife (herself a psychoanalyst), was among other things a reflection on Freud's famous correspondence with his friend and colleague Wilhelm Fliess. Freud had wanted the surviving side of the correspondence — his own — burned. After all, these letters comprised a veritable matchbook, one that has indeed fuelled the utter demystification of the origins of psychoanalysis. (The complete letters were published in 1985, but an abridged edition has been available since 1954.) Wills ignores it all, just as he more or less ignores psychoanalysis — which is very peculiar given that 'Envois' appears in a book with major essays on Freud and Lacan.

In principle Wills' interests, like every deconstructionist's, lie in that space between style and content, literature and philosophy, etc. But in practice Wills, like Derrida sometimes did, actually betrays that space and takes his stand with style and autobiographical whimsy. The result is one-sided and, too often, empty.

For those who care, *Matchbook* is a fresh case study in the family romance called deconstruction. For those who don't, it's fodder for finger-wagging. As for those critical yet sympathetic to deconstruction, those loyal parricides, it registers as a lost opportunity to learn more from someone deeply familiar with Derrida's work. In any case, *Matchbook* is a burn.

Todd Dufresne
Lakehead University

Jason Wirth, ed.
Schelling Now.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2005.
Pp. vii + 257.
US$44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-34438-7);
US$24.95 (Paper: ISBN 0-253-21700-8).

Is Schelling still relevant today? Jason Wirth's collection sets itself the task of demonstrating the value of Schelling to contemporary philosophy. Thus, the success of *Schelling Now* must be determined in reference to this task.

Together with Wirth's introduction, *Schelling Now* contains fourteen new essays as well as a reprint of Slavoj Žižek's 'Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Schelling'. Included in this edition is a convenient bibliography of Schelling's writings in German and English. Unfortunately, there is no index of secondary reading, though this text attempts to rectify the notable lack of contemporary scholarship on Schelling. While the various authors offer a number of different approaches to the philosophy of Schelling, the book as a whole is directed toward a select audience. To whatever extent the analytic/continental distinction is valid within philosophy, Wirth's collection is clearly intended for those who identify with the latter side. None of the essays attempt to engage analytic philosophy in any significant way. Nevertheless, this is to be expected, given the analytical view of philosophical history and Schelling's obscurity. The abstract nature of Schelling's philosophy makes it difficult to gain entry into his thought, and most of the essays simply take for granted an ample amount of familiarity with Schelling. Thus, it would be difficult to recommend the collection as an introduction to this figure. However, those who are acquainted with his work, and of a continental ilk, will find Wirth's compilation to be of immense interest.

As Wirth's introduction points out, Schelling's place within the Western philosophical tradition is a dubious one. A contemporary, and for a time roommate of Hegel, Schelling came onto the scene as something of a philosophical wunderkind. At a very young age he had already advanced beyond the thought of his teacher, Fichte, and prior to turning twenty-five, published numerous books, received a professorship at the University of Jena, and earned a relative fame. By this time Schelling had already begun to question concerning nature and freedom, questions that haunted him his entire life. As fast as Schelling's rise was, his fall was just as sudden. The legend of Schelling's fall into obscurity attributes Hegel's famous criticism in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* regarding 'the night in which all cows are black' as the sole cause of Schelling's demise. However, Wirth's introduction, and in a sense the collection as a whole, dispenses with this myth. As Wirth astutely points out, there were many other factors that contributed to Schelling's fall, including, but not limited to, his tumultuous friendship with Hegel, his love for his wife, Caroline, and his difficult relationship with Fichte. However, the main source of Schelling's seeming irrelevance may have been the untimeli-

ness of his thought. So the question remains, has Schelling's time finally come?

The answer to this question can be found in various forms throughout the text. Joseph Lawrence explores Schelling's philosophy of religion and its inquiry into creation as a potential response to totalitarianism and the tyranny of reason. The creation of the state as a supplement to nature puts the project of authenticity in danger. Against this nothingness of the self, Schelling turns to the possibility of beginning anew through opening oneself to the 'ineradicable strangeness of both self and other' (14). Here we are introduced to Schelling's key theme of the 'dark ground', which is treated in a number of the other essays. Žižek's essay invokes this difficult notion, which he elsewhere referred to as the 'indivisible remainder'. Through the films of Alfred Hitchcock, Žižek attempts to clarify Schelling's distinction between existence and the origin of Being. Also, he attempts to grant us access to this spectral, pre-ontological excess, and the way this 'proto-Real' is fictionalized in order for us to regain a solid ground in 'real reality'. Stephen Ross takes up this fictionalizing of the real through the imagistic character of the world. Schelling's appeal to the madness of images found in their necessary proliferation reveals nature's necessity and contingency, the excessive nature of nature. In Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback's essay, we are presented with the way Schelling moves beyond the dualism of image and concept, by introducing a 'non-thinking thinking'. For Schuback, Schelling does not substitute images and metaphors for conceptual thinking, but rather attempts to philosophize from experience itself as a form of knowing.

Schelling saw thought as an event that initiates us into an imaginative vision of a unity, not as delimited, but as the very life of what is. Thus, Schelling not only calls into question the primacy of the concept, but also makes visible the work of experience; he thinks the between — the cision — in Being. It is a thought that recognizes the 'unprethinkability of being'. It is this problem of expressivity, the problem of an expression of life, which Wirth addresses in his essay 'Animalization'. How is it nature itself can be expressive if the site of its expression is the human? How can we express that which always exceeds us? What is required is a movement back to art, to poetry as the source of philosophy. What is needed is a form of expression that exceeds delimitation and also bespeaks its own origin, imitating the very production of nature. Schelling moved beyond the confines of conceptual thinking in negative philosophy by re-thinking the beginning as indeterminate yet expressed, and consequently by re-thinking expression. Through Schelling, nature expresses itself as life, unfolding from the expression and gathering itself into the expression, thus maintaining itself in the expression. Therein, philosophy for Schelling takes on the character of 'the search for life within life itself' (94).

The next section of the text provides four essays that examine the origins of Schelling's thought. David Krell begins this portion by examining Schelling's unsettling reference to 'God's footstool'. From this nebulous position, Krell is able to gain admittance to Schelling's enigmatic notions of

sexual difference and mortality. Martin Wallen examines another shadowy aspect of Schelling, namely the 'orgasm of forces.' This idea is an attempt to recover the primordial, but in order to do so, as Wallen points out, we must first learn how to read Schelling. His texts pose a task rather than offer a doctrine, and it is only in taking up this task that Schelling's writings can become revelatory. Such a task requires that we take seriously the role of poetry in Schelling's philosophy. Theodore George examines this poetic turn as a response to the crisis of philosophy. Schelling saw this crisis most starkly through Kant, who claimed that reason poses questions it cannot answer. Reason strives to know the absolute, yet this is something reason can never accomplish. Rather than obviate or exclude this impossible end of reason as post-Kantian philosophy had done, Schelling turns to poetry, specifically Greek tragedy, to fulfill the purpose of philosophy. In Greek tragedy we are given a representation of the absolute that is true to the tragic character of reason. In the final chapter of this section, F. Scott Scribner examines Schelling's own imaginative writing within the *Ages of the World*. Through the notion of 'speed', Scribner attempts to use Schelling's dialogue to situate the imagination within the age of technology.

In the final section we are presented with the intersection of Schelling's thought with prominent twentieth century philosophers. Peter Warnek demonstrates the necessity of Heidegger's reading of Schelling. It is Heidegger who opens up the possibility of a genuine reading of Schelling. Such a reading means precisely moving beyond Schelling, being open to the possibility for the future of his work. It is a thinking that exceeds thinking, directing itself to the ground of thought. This dark ground as that which sustains and precedes thought, is beyond Schelling. As Warnek — by way of Heidegger — states, 'what matters in Schelling's philosophy is not Schelling's philosophy' (176). Patrick Burke examines the influence of Schelling on Merleau-Ponty's later philosophy. Schelling's 'barbaric principle', the principle of life, the dark ground of Being, pervades Merleau-Ponty's ontology. As such, Merleau-Ponty's attempt at ontology is at the same time a confrontation with the 'unprethinkability' of Schelling. Thus, once again we encounter the question of priority, but only in Fiona Steinkamp's essay on Levinas and Schelling does the problem of time become a central theme. Steinkamp plays the two thinkers off of one another in order to enrich their respective notions of eternity, time, and consciousness. In the following essay Benjamin Pryor examines the relationship between Schelling and Jean-Luc Nancy. This is more than a mere intersection of thinkers, however, for Nancy's confrontation with Schelling was fundamental not only to his own work, but also to all those who have encountered Schelling since. Finally, Eiko Hanaoka elaborates on Schelling's influence on Nishitani and the Kyoto school. Schelling laid the seeds for Nishitani's philosophy with his questions concerning evil and difference, questions that Nishitani attempt to solve through the wisdom of Buddhism.

Thus, the collection as a whole offers a number of doorways into Schelling, each as compelling and provocative as the next. So has Schelling's time

arrived? This edition is a fundamental step toward the possibility of Schelling's future.

Alain Beauclair
University of Oregon