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Annette Barnes
Seeing Through Self-Deception.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. 182.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-521-62014-7.

The traditional picture depicts self-deception (SD) as deeply irrational, as Reason's *tout autre*, where passion or desire undercuts the sovereignty of reason, and a person knowingly believes contradictory propositions. This picture's moral implications are: SD is the worst thing, since the deceiver's always being with us results in a constant fear of error and a paralyzing self-doubt; it is essentially vicious and immoral, because it corrupts conscience which is the guide of life. Furthermore, it erodes the basis of both Kantian and consequentialist ethics, insofar as the application of the categorical imperative depends on consistency, and consequentialism relies on reasonable, informed calculations.

While Kant acknowledges the reality and moral dangers of SD, he conceptually complicates things by saying: 'It is easy to show that man is in fact guilty of many inner lies, but to explain the possibility of an inner lie seems more difficult. For a lie requires a second person whom one intends to deceive, and intentionally to deceive oneself seems to contain a contradiction, namely, knowingly believing a proposition and its negation at the same time.' The first fifty years of analytical writing on SD is usefully seen as a series of illuminating footnotes to the Kantian challenge to provide a coherent account. Much has been done to dispel grammatical confusions, to demythologize or naturalize SD, and to a lesser extent, to trace its quantum of reason in the desires and passions that motivate it.

Annette Barnes' positions and arguments unfold with this analytical literature as backdrop. She aims to see through conceptual anomalies, to develop her own distinctive theory, as well as explore SD's irrationality and moral status. Here is the theory in a nutshell: A person B self-deceives himself into believing that p, if and only if: 1) B has an anxious desire that q, which causes B to be biased in favour of beliefs that reduce his anxiety that *not-q*. This bias, operative in B's behaviour, thinking, judging or perceiving, causes B to believe that p. 2) The purpose of B's believing that p is to reduce his anxiety that *not-q*. 3) B is not intentionally biased. 4) B fails to make a high enough estimate of the causal role that his anxious desire that q plays in his acquiring the belief that p. B wrongly believes that his belief that p is justified.

How does Barnes' theory differ from and go beyond its predecessors? The literature on SD is divided between those who, like Kant and Davidson, see it as intentional, and those who, like Mele, see it as non-intentional. Barnes distinguishes between typical cases where 'one self-deceives oneself into believing', and atypical cases where 'one intentionally deceives oneself into believing'. The latter have a Kantian resonance, but pose no paradox for Barnes who sees these cases as believing that p and that *not-p* at different

times. Barnes moves beyond the Kantian challenge by making typical SD her primary theoretical interest. Such cases do not involve any essentially intentional activity such as lying or pretending, but are cases of bias where anxious desire guides and filters belief formation and retention.

Unlike intentional accounts which hyper-rationalize mental processes, Barnes sees SD as non-intentional, but motivated and purposive. By assigning a pivotal role to anxious desire, Barnes provides sufficient content to specify SD's distinctive motivation as well as its final goal to produce an anxiety producing belief. This moves us beyond some overly abstract previous theories which viewed SD in terms of a lonely pair of beliefs, and even flirted with the idea of motiveless SD. However, the question remains, how does Barnes' theory differ from other non-intentionalist accounts, such as Mele's which also propose that SD is a species of desire-influenced irrational belief formation? Barnes claims that her theory, unlike others, resists the tendency to assimilate SD to wishful belief and hence, preserves SD's distinctive character.

Is irrationality a feature of this distinctive character, and if so, how? The typical bad rap is that SD is deeply epistemically irrational, in the sense that it includes a person's flouting his own standards of rationality, even the law of non-contradiction. Barnes softens this response when she claims that SD-ers 'do not recognize that the totality of their evidence favours *not-p*, when they come to believe that *p*.' They are irrational only insofar as 'they ought to have known better, but they do not know better.' Nor is SD necessarily a failure in prudential rationality, since 'the SD-er always gets something he wants as a result of his deception' — namely, his anxiety reduced. Moreover, sometimes epistemic irrationality is compatible with prudential rationality, and therefore SD may have 'survival value'.

Now to the question, what is morally amiss with SD? 'If SD were always prima facie morally bad, it would be so either intrinsically or because of its consequences.' However, Barnes holds a non-intentional theory, and hence cannot locate SD's badness in its intentions. Besides, SD may occasionally have good overall consequences. This leaves motives as Barnes' resource for a general moral assessment. 'The most revealing and always appropriate charge to level at SD is epistemic cowardice': they lack the courage to face up to painful, apparently unbearable beliefs.

Annette Barnes' book is a valuable addition to the modern classics on SD. It is uncommonly lucid and perceptive, rigorous and resolutely analytical, bristling with necessary and sufficient conditions. While attentive to details, it does not lose sight of central issues. Barnes' fresh and diverse examples, from life and literature, nourish our thinking. One major achievement is the elegant organization of the complex scholarly literature of the past twenty-five years in a way that provides a clear critical perspective. The treatment of this literature is remarkable for its fairness, and Barnes' assessments of it are balanced and judicious, even if the useful bibliography surprisingly excludes M.R. Haight's ground-breaking *A Study in Self-Deception*, and occasionally the elaborator of a view is credited with originating it.

Another significant achievement is Barnes' compelling, carefully crafted, richly textured theory, which brings an entire line of thinking about SD — namely, that it is a motivated and goal-oriented form of irrationality — to a natural closure. This achievement, while instructive and decisive, contains its own seeds of criticism. Perhaps to alleviate the sense of a loss of problems, more could have been done to open up the topic by placing some question marks deeper. For example, the assumption that all SD is ascribable to the cause of anxious desire seems suspect, since there are cases of SD where the goal is to promote joy, rather than avoid anxiety or pain.

A few nagging after-thoughts about Barnes' implied emphasis on filtering and blocking mechanisms, involved in SD. While a woman's anxious desire for her husband's fidelity, together with her bias toward stress-reducing beliefs, guide the filtering and blocking in the processing of information, SD does not have to occur that way. Mechanisms which behave the opposite way can play equally crucial roles. For example, pathological jealousy of the sort displayed by Proust's narrator seems to be supported by processes which are extra-vigilant in seeking out confirming information when he is in a stress-engendering situation. Rather than suppressing mild evidence of his girl-friend's infidelity in order to relieve his stress, the narrator works himself into a frenzy seeking out further information. He can be said to know that his girlfriend is not unfaithful, yet believe that she is. Stress is apparently caused in him by appearances of her fidelity, relieved momentarily by the discovery of counter-evidence. The upshot is that in SD the details of the case may become so important that information-filtering, as well as information-generation, are aspects of the situation. To ascribe SD then to a particular causal mechanism, saying in effect, it has to happen that way, becomes implausible.

Concerning the issue of irrationality: Barnes' theory erases, or says little about, the role of the evidence in the teeth of which the anxiety-relieving belief is held. However, it is the glimmering awareness or thought of this evidence that underlies the woman's fear that her husband is not faithful, and distinguishes her case from free-floating anxiety or groundless fear. Her reactions to this evidence, the attempts to ignore it, explain it away, or soft-pedal it, constitute part of the basis for our criticism. To say that in SD a person 'ought to, but does not know better', or that 'he does not recognize that the totality of his evidence favours *not-p*', is to relegate SD to a minor form of epistemic negligence, and make it sound as if it is a brute bias produced as the epiphenomenon of processes taking place, of which we are even unconscious.

To strike a moral note: if SD is a vice, because it is a form of epistemic cowardice, how come that it is often required by acts of courage and bravery? Without the 'anxious desire and subsequent bias' to succeed in an anti-terrorist operation, few of the soldiers in the squad would have the right stuff. If SD is what Barnes says it is, then she could have done more to liberate us from the bad rap that the moral tradition foisted on us.

It is natural to expect the adoption of a personal voice and style when an author writes about SD. We might even expect a reflexive turn: how might SD intrude upon the very project of theorizing about SD? Barnes resists this expectation, except in her quietly moving closing passage, with which I conclude: 'Philip Larkin is said to have chosen his title *The Less Deceived*, for its sad-eyed realism. If what has been said in this book about SD is correct — if epistemic bravery in the face of anxiety is required to avoid it — then being among the less deceived may well be the best that most of us are able to achieve.' We are grateful to Annette Barnes for courageously shedding light on a difficult and important problem.

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Sue Campbell
Interpreting the Personal: Expression and the Formation of Feelings.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1997.
Pp. x + 204.
US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-3374-6);
US$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8408-1).

After an evocative introduction which uses autobiographical examples to introduce the personal nature of emotional expression, Campbell begins with the recent history of the concept of emotion in the work of Darwin, James, Gilbert Ryle, and William Alston, and traces how emotion has come to be neglected in recent philosophy of mind. She argues that terms denoting emotions and feelings are applied on the evidence of behaviour, but are also treated as causal with respect to that behaviour: they thus cannot have any independent role in the explanation of behaviour. This circularity in theoretical discussion requires the rejection of any purely internalist account of feelings.

C uses the word *feeling* broadly 'to refer to all experiences people might classify as emotions. ... The category is ... inclusive of the standard emotions but much broader' (10). Those members of the class of feelings that are not standard emotions are later referred to as 'freestyle' feelings, that are 'not grouped under emotion concepts' (67). Expressionist theories of art are the only philosophical theories that have an explicit place for 'nuanced and nameless feelings that are neither reducible to sensations nor the sorts of states that are adequately captured by the categories of the classic emotions' (71).

C's own view is developed by contrast with two other perspectives, essentialist individualist (internalist), and social constructionist theories of the meaning and ontological implications of expressions of feeling. Each of these represents a theoretical way of viewing the language used of and in those human activities that constitute the expression of emotion and of personal feelings. If C is right, the classification that our everyday concepts of emotions impose upon us are too inflexible to reveal what is crucial to our experience of feelings, their irreducibly individual and personal nature. Such feelings form an important part of her critical approach to the use of social constructivism as a means of analyzing emotions, so providing her with a basis from which to set out the final version of her own theory.

This is neither internalism nor constructivism, but involves the joint interaction of (at least) two persons and some external object, applied not to the construction of *kinds* of emotions, but to the interpretation of individual episodes of expressive behaviour. She uses Davidson's concept of 'triangulation' as standing at the core of meaning, but applies it at an anthropological rather than a logical level. The expression of the speaker and the interpretation of the listener both play a role in the determination of the actual feeling expressed. 'Intent' and 'uptake', together with non-verbal and environmental cues, and an understanding of background social conventions, all play roles in the individuation of what feeling is expressed. Which emotions are expressed on a given occasion is neither wholly private, nor a matter of social convention; in this way, C makes room for a richness of interpretation and misinterpretation that escapes more restricted accounts of the individuation of feelings.

The use of the notion of triangulation serves a central role in giving a theoretical framework within which expressions of emotion can be located semantically. It plays this role in a way that is not part of a formal semantic theory, but as indicating the necessary minimum context within which to think about the description and communication of those human states C calls feelings. I feel that the link to contemporary semantic theory is overstressed: the formal aspect is less suggestive than the use C makes of it.

Recent writers, philosophical, anthropological, and psychological, have looked in their thinking and in their writing to wider contexts of study, to a consideration of the expression of emotion in poetry, literature and fiction as well as the roles of cognitive and social factors in the description of emotional response. C's work fits well within this broad shift of interest. She has extended this research by noticing the way in which the interpretation of the behaviour of others is a matter not of applying pre-existing categories but of continuing interpretation; the responsive interlocutor does not identify states that are themselves the product of social conventions, but rather engages in imaginative (and often political) understanding of the autobiographical background that an individual brings to her expression of feelings.

Current theories of semantics are designed for scientific discourse narrowly conceived, and ignore the need for extended and interpretive understanding of the kind found in art and especially poetry. I welcome this more

flexible attempt to do philosophy with a sensitivity to the actual conditions of the lives we lead, and I highly recommend its original and insightful treatment of a complex topic.

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Martin Carrier and **Peter K. Machamer, eds.**
Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press
1997. Pp. 372.
US$75.00. ISBN 0-8229-3986-X.

The Pittsburgh-Konstanz Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science are a series of biennial international conferences brought about by the joint efforts of the Center for the Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh and the *Zeatrum Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie* at the Universität Konstanz. The Colloquium are guided by the mandate to 'further the integration of philosophy and the sciences' with particular emphasis on the 'philosophical analysis of science as it is actually done' (i). This volume contains the proceedings of the 1995 conference, 'Philosophy and the Sciences of the Mind', held in Konstanz, Germany. The collection includes twenty papers on an impressive range of topics central to contemporary philosophy of mind and concludes with an overview of the status and prospects of Psychoanalytic Theory by Adolf Grünbaum. Positions on folk psychology, qualia, mental content and mental representation, consciousness, and the mind-body problem are presented and discussed by leading philosophers in these fields from both sides of the Atlantic — including, among others, William Lycan, John Haugeland, Peter Gärdenfors, C.L. Hardin, Ruth Garrett Millikan, Jaegwon Kim and Ansgar Beckerman. What these prominent thinkers have to say may not be new to those already familiar with their work, but with few exceptions the papers have been written for this volume and they provide succinct introductions for those looking to survey current work in science-based approaches to the philosophy of mind.

A laudable strength of the volume are the commentaries that succeed very well at complementing the main contributions. Especially notable is Bradley E. Wilson's response to Millikan's account of the relevance of concepts from evolutionary biology for thinking about cognition. Wilson succeeds in providing both an insightful interpretation of Millikan's views and a provocative

critique. These values — telling insights and provocative responses — are characteristic of the volume as a whole. Moreover, the reader who works through its entirety will easily find herself engaged as a participant in the debates since concepts and frameworks presented under one topic are often relevant to others. This leaves the reader well prepared to continue the inquiry well beyond what is written on the page.

The volume stays true to the colloquium's mandate to present an approach to philosophy that is oriented toward scientific frameworks. This objective requires a ready understanding of the theoretical frameworks assumed in the research programmes of the mind-sciences. For example, Tim van Gelder presents a beautifully clear account of the basics of dynamical systems theory as a theoretical framework for cognitive science and places it within the logical solution space that includes the better known computational frameworks. Barbara Von Eckardt elucidates the underlying theoretical structure of empirical work in social psychology.

Each of these authors go on to make clear the relevance of these scientific frameworks for philosophical issues. Van Gelder argues that approaching the study of cognition via dynamical systems theory overturns several prominent assumptions of both traditional and contemporary work on the mind-body problem. From this alternative perspective the 'inner/outer' dichotomy of the domain of the mental versus the domain of an external world is undone, as is the dichotomy of mental versus physical phenomena. Mind is conceived as an interrelated set of features rather than a discrete, single entity and there is no place for the concept of representation so essential to computational characterisations of cognitive function. A dynamical systems approach reveals a way to naturalize the mind without the need to show that mentality is somehow 'grounded' in the physical. Rather, cognition is shown to be an 'inherently natural phenomena that is fundamentally continuous with our understanding of so many other natural phenomena' (266).

Von Eckardt argues that philosophical conceptions of folk psychology, which focus almost exclusively on the propositional attitudes, are too narrow. They neglect what Haugeland, in responding to her paper, calls 'trait-trigger psychology'; the tendency to explain and predict how people will behave on the basis of behaviours believed to be associated with psychological dispositions, such as conscientiousness and extroversion, that persist through time.

Continuing in this vein, Wolfgang Prinz considers the implications of scientific models of perceptual knowledge and well-known empirical studies on action initiation (Libet, 1985) for the issues of free will and mental causation and Rav Lahav argues for the relevance of neuropsychological data for understanding what consciousness is, why it exists and why we are often not conscious of the causes of our behaviour.

Towards the end of the volume Kim and Beckerman lead the discussion into deep issues in the philosophy of science. Empirical considerations are left behind and more purely philosophical issues are intensely debated. What is the possible metaphysical status of properties related by supervenience? If one property type is realized by another property type is the latter reducible

to the former? How can emergent properties be related to physical properties and are these properties consistent with a physicalistic metaphysics? Kim argues that realization relations are conducive to reductions, but Beckerman contests this point on the grounds that Kim's conception of realization is unjustifiably restricted to a traditional understanding of what it is for two properties to be identical.

It can only be expected that a volume with such broad-ranging ambitions cannot fail to leave any number of pressing questions unaddressed — for example: How do we make sense of the practice of attributing contents to thought given that dynamical systems theory eliminates the notion altogether? Granted that philosophical conceptions of folk psychology need to be informed by empirical research, what special relevance does trait-trigger psychology have for the philosophical issues that revolve around questions about the content and status of folk psychology that the more restrictive belief-desire conception fails to raise? These are questions that hang conspicuously in the air — however, the richness and high quality of the volume as a whole is such that these questions prove a value, not a weakness. They speak to the volume's capacity to stimulate interest and motivate deeper inquiry. Those contributions not mentioned, for lack of space, are no less worthy in this respect than those described here.

The book is an impressively cohesive collection that would serve especially well as a study volume for graduate students or professional philosophers with some background in the philosophy of mind. It is an excellent introduction to contemporary approaches to this area of philosophy via the sciences, demonstrating the extent to which contemporary philosophy of mind has become a branch of the philosophy of science.

Ruth Michaels
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Stephen Crites
Dialectic and Gospel in the Development of Hegel's Thinking.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 1998. Pp. xvii + 572.
US$65.00. ISBN 0-271-01759-7.

The purpose of this book is to present the 'details' (xvii) of the development of Hegel's philosophy of religion and relation to Christianity from his boyhood in Stuttgart through his Jena period. It does not seek to pronounce any 'grand thesis' (xvii) upon these aspects of Hegel's thought, but only to provide a genetic account or intellectual chronology of Hegel's religious awareness as it eventually appeared in his 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*. As philosophical biographer of the religious side of the young Hegel, Crites succeeds admirably.

The first of four parts describes the Swabian environment of Hegel's earliest religious, emotional, and intellectual influences. We see the obedient schoolboy in Stuttgart, the theology student in Tübingen, the friend of Schelling and Hölderlin, the partisan of the French Revolution, and the examiner of the influence of Kant's critical philosophy upon the Lutheran tradition. Crites enhances his narrative of this familiar story with humorous vignettes, e.g., his portrayal of a typical day in the life of a Tübingen seminarian during Hegel's time (17-19).

Part II shows Hegel in Bern (1793-96) and Frankfurt (1797-1800) as a full-fledged Kantian, concerned primarily with the religious implications of Kant's thought. In this generally unhappy period, Hegel saw religious issues as various dualities and wrestled with their philosophical implications. Dualities such as living/dead, popular/theological, subjective/objective, communal/private, historical/rational, and positive/revealed all found their way into the young Hegel's mostly fragmentary philosophies of religion, writings which were not published until 1907 (*Hegels theologische Jugendschriften*, edited by Herman Nohl). Some of these essays were quite harsh toward Christianity, and essentially left the dualities unresolved. But Hegel, always a 'both/and' rather than an 'either/or' thinker, sought *Versöhnung* (reconciliation) of these dualities, and thus pushed himself toward his particular brand of dialectic which was to emerge in Jena a few years later.

Part III finds Hegel in Jena from 1800 to 1806, first as Schelling's protégé then breaking with him, consigning 'the Schellingian intellectual intuition as the ineffable *Indifferenzpunkt* ... to the nocturnal cows' (351). At Jena Hegel's effort to produce a unified account of the interrelationships among all phenomena began to bear fruit. Crites traces the Christian elements in Hegel's writings of this period.

Part IV (comprising nearly half the book) is Crites's exegesis of Hegel's *Phenomenology* as a Christian treatise, an *itinerarium mentis in Deum*, or rather, *in spiritum absolutum*. He amplifies themes he introduced in his 1972 book, *In the Twilight of Christendom*, and his 1978 paper, 'The Golgotha of

Absolute Spirit'. The dialectic of *Erinnerung* (interiorization) and *Entäusserung* (externalization) culminates at the stage of absolute spirit, where all the dialectically prior configurations of logic and history are present, concrete, and fully mediated for self-consciousness, not relegated to the undifferentiation of the Schellingian/Böhmean abyss (538). But this final stage is still more a 'speculative Good Friday' than an Easter, for there remains the pain of recognizing the crucified Christ. The dead shapes of history must meet for self-consciousness, not in a beatific vision, but at Golgotha, where speculative truth at its absolute standpoint, like the Christian God, suffers and dies, perhaps to rise again in some form yet unknown and unknowable to us.

Crites's work is meticulous, but not up to date. He shows little familiarity with the vast body of new interpretations of Hegel's philosophy of religion done in the 1980s and 1990s, especially in the wake of the authoritative Jaeschke/Hodgson critical editions of Hegel's lectures on that topic, by such scholars as John Burbidge, Martin de Nys, Louis Dupré, Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, Jeffrey Hoover, Quentin Lauer, Eric Luft, Philip Merklinger, Dale Schlitt, Falk Wagner, Merold Westphal, Raymond Keith Williamson, and James Yerkes. He seems to have ignored almost completely the contributions to the world's two leading Hegel journals, *Hegel-Studien* and *The Owl of Minerva*, as well as the proceedings of the 1990 meeting of the Hegel Society of America, published as *New Perspectives on Hegel's Philosophy of Religion*, edited by David Kolb. Nevertheless, Crites makes excellent use of earlier scholars, such as Kenley Dove, Theodor Haering, Dieter Henrich, Jean Hyppolite, George Armstrong Kelly, Heinz Kimmerle, Alexandre Kojève, Otto Pöggeler, Karl Rosenkranz, Mark C. Taylor, and Jean Wahl, plus a few current scholars, such as Daniel P. Jamros, Cyril O'Regan, and Robert R. Williams.

Crites seems particularly indebted to H.S. Harris, whose monumental studies of Hegel began in the 1960s and continue today. Yet in many important respects Crites opposes Harris, primarily because the young Hegel is, for Harris, purposeful, single-minded, and serious, but for Crites, more spontaneous, unsure, and unsettled (52-3). Hegel's *Entdeckungsreise* ends earlier for Harris than for Crites. That difference alone makes Crites's book worthwhile for anyone interested in the young Hegel.

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Stephen T. Davis
God, Reason and Theistic Proofs.
Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans 1997.
Pp. xiv + 204.
US$26.00. ISBN 0-8028-4450-2.

Philosophers of religion face a dilemma. Their work must make a difference for or against some actual religion, or it will be dismissed as an academic exercise, yet they risk an elitist absurdity if they claim that a knowledge of philosophy is necessary for justified acceptance or rejection of religion. Davis's way out is to claim that the theistic proofs are relevant to the practice of religion, but are not needed as a *foundation* for belief. Furthermore, the proofs need not be understood by all believers as long as *somebody* in the community of believers is conversant with the proofs and can respond to objections.

Davis is clearly such a *somebody*, and anyone seeking a comprehensive and critical guide to recent work on the theistic proofs will probably find here all that is needed before taking on the literature itself. Davis cites the *locus classicus* for the various proofs, but does not engage in exegetical or historical scholarship.

This book is good news for students and the 'educated general readers' for whom it is intended. Non-specialists who find themselves having to teach theistic proofs should find it useful, and the theologians, historians, and philosophers who show 'so much hostility to the theistic proofs' will find their complacency rattled. Davis insists that whether the God of the proofs is the God of the classical theistic religions is a genuine question, and he argues persuasively that if one or more of the philosophical proofs is successful, then 'we have arrived at the existence of a being that is remarkably similar to the God of theism.'

The ontological, cosmological and design arguments receive a chapter each, as does the argument from religious experience. The moral argument, and Pascal's and James' alternatives to theistic proof are treated more briefly. Over one third of the book is devoted to the nature and value of theistic proofs in general. This discussion begins in the first chapter and concludes in the final chapter, providing a satisfying sense of unity. Strategically placed middle chapters take up the continuing debates between realists and nonrealists and between foundationalists and anti-foundationalists. These two chapters are models of intellectual honesty and lucidity of mind. Davis, like most philosophers, is constantly making distinctions (six kinds of religious realism, three of religious nonrealism, five theistic responses to the evidentialist objection, ten candidates for what we should require regarding the truth of premises in a successful argument), but he has the knack for making those and only those distinctions that are helpful. Even for beginners, oversimplification can turn a difficult subject into an impossible one.

In a few cases Davis moves too quickly. In his defense of religious realism, Davis claims that ordinary believers are the most authoritative interpreters of religious language, and he defends their authority by pointing out that the best way to discover what people mean by the religious language they use is to ask them, 'What do you mean when you say things like...'? No doubt ordinary believers are the final arbiters of what statements they take to be equivalent, but any answer they might give will itself be subject to a nonrealist analysis since nonrealist theories do not involve predictions about what people will say but about the ontological, linguistic and epistemological status of such language.

Davis considers a successful theistic proof a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the rationality of theism. After stating that appeals to religious experience cannot by themselves constitute a successful proof that God exists, Davis concludes with a clear statement of his own considered verdict: 'I enjoy discussing theistic proofs [this is obvious throughout the book], consider the enterprise valuable, and even consider that there do exist successful theistic proofs. Nevertheless, the reason I am a theist has almost nothing to do with theistic proofs. It has a great deal to do with experiences I have had that I interpret in terms of the presence of God ...' The reader is left wondering why those experiences which constitute the reason he is a theist cannot be considered a version of the theistic proof from religious experience. Perhaps Davis meant to explain that, like Alston, he considers the argument from religious experience an argument for the rationality of theism rather than a theistic proof. Furthermore, although Davis mentions the cumulative case for theism, and makes some telling points about its potential significance regarding the design argument and the argument from religious experience, he never attempts to evaluate the whole tendency of points for and against God's existence. Considering the perspicuity of Davis's exposition on a number of foggy issues, a section or chapter on the cumulative case would be a welcome addition.

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Judith DeCew
In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1998.
Pp. xiv + 199.
US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-3380-0);
US$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8411-1).

In Pursuit of Privacy is a sustained defense of a broad conception of privacy, in law and in life. Working primarily from a close analysis of American legal cases, Judith DeCew argues the coherence, legal plausibility, and value of the privacy protections developed in American law over the past hundred years. DeCew's writing is clear and concise: where it does not advance our understanding of privacy issues, it refrains from muddying it. *In Pursuit of Privacy* thus can serve as an excellent introduction to privacy issues in American jurisprudence, carefully laying out the history of privacy in tort and constitutional law, and presenting important contemporary issues.

The first half of the book works towards sustaining a broad legal conception of privacy. As DeCew notes, American law has seen the development of two sorts of privacy cases. The first, stretching back one hundred years into tort law and Fourth Amendment interpretation, focuses on what she latter terms 'informational' privacy — limiting access to confidential or sensitive information — and 'accessibility' privacy — limiting others' physical proximity or ability to observe one (75-6). The second sort of case, beginning in 1965 and continuing with Supreme Court decisions concerning contraception, abortion and other matters, recognizes a right to privacy independent of the Fourth Amendment. These cases focus on what DeCew terms 'expressive' privacy — protection of 'a realm for expressing one's self-identity or personhood through speech or activity,' free of external control (77). Critics have charged that expressive privacy has little or nothing in common with the first two sorts of privacy, and hence does not cohere into a single defensible conception of privacy. Combined with 'strict' views on constitutional interpretation, this supports the position that expressive privacy is not protected under common law or the U.S. Constitution.

DeCew demurs. In the first place, she argues, the distinction between the two sorts of cases can be overdrawn: pre-1965 cases in fact did provide some protections for expressive privacy. Furthermore, they did so in language which suggests a connection between these various 'privacies', centered on what privacy provides: a realm of self-creation, in which people can make autonomous decisions free from overt control or public humiliation. She thus grounds privacy protections on a basic respect for persons and on the practical need for such a private realm, if our lives are to be enjoyable and free. The ridicule which I may feel if my sexual secrets or bank balance are publicized (informational privacy); the sense of invasion when my government or my neighbors spy on me (accessibility privacy); my powerlessness to decide for myself whom to marry or whether or not to have children (expres-

sive privacy): all diminish my personhood. Such violations often occur when I am weak and vulnerable; and they often leave me weaker and more vulnerable. This is not a good thing. DeCew appeals here both to sociological studies and to our common intuitions concerning the value of privacy. Thus she shows the coherence of such a conception of privacy and the interest we share in sustaining it.

DeCew does not defend a particular position on strict or wide judicial interpretation (although she does present the options clearly). Nor does she mount a full utilitarian or rights-based defense of privacy. Rather, she asserts a general presumption in favor of privacy. Some readers will doubtless insist that part of what DeCew wants to preserve as 'privacy' is better understood as autonomy or self-expression. At some point, however, this criticism loses force, because any detailed defense of either privacy, autonomy, or self-expression, will refer to the one's role in preserving the other two, and assert the value of all three.

The second half of the book looks at current privacy issues, devoting a chapter each to the feminist critique of privacy, abortion, sexual self-expression, drug testing, and challenges to privacy presented by new information technologies. These chapters vary in quality.

The chapter on the feminist critique of privacy is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, DeCew uncritically repeats assertions that women as a class are 'oppressed' (83) and 'dominated' by men (92), and herself alleges the 'continued subordination of women' in the United States (94). These false assertions trivialize the suffering of actual victims of oppression. Second, while the feminist critique turns out to mean quite different things to different critics, it often involves arguments to limit privacy, based on the realization that privacy protections can cloak unjust or immoral behavior towards women. This is true and can support privacy restrictions, but not without some discussion of the extent to which we want to legislate morality, which is not forthcoming here. Third, DeCew argues that feminist critiques support 'rejection of the [public/private] dichotomy as it has been understood' (93), without backing up this assertion or suggesting how we might draw the distinction differently. In fact, her discussion suggests that hoary aspects of the traditional public/private distinction provide crucial support for feminist political positions. The simplest argument that spousal abuse is not private behavior protected from outside interference, involves appeal to Mill's harm principle.

In contrast, DeCew's chapter justifying privacy protections for consensual sex is strong. Here she focuses largely on *Bowers v. Hardwick*, the 1986 case in which the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's anti-sodomy laws. DeCew dissects the tortured logic by which the Court retreated from earlier decisions upholding expressive privacy in the realm of sexual relations. In the end, she agrees with Justice Stevens, who writes in dissent that the Court seems to exclude homosexuals from constitutional privacy protections because the justices dislike homosexuals. Beyond staking out a strong position in favor of sexual privacy, this chapter advances DeCew's general positions that

privacy includes an expressive dimension and that it has a strong presumption in its favor, which should not be overridden absent compelling reasons. Subsequent chapters carry these themes forward, shepherding privacy interests past further moralistic and technological threats.

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Gilles Deleuze
Negotiations. Trans. Martin Joughin.
New York: Columbia University Press 1997.
Pp. 221.
US$16.50. ISBN 0-231-07581-2.

Deleuze is the most recent thinker to have gained the kind of simultaneously enthusiastic and skeptical acceptance into the Anglophone academy that is characteristically reserved for contemporary French philosophers. All his major works (bar one, ironically on a British figure, the painter Francis Bacon) are now available in English, and *Negotiations* represents the continuation of this project into the translation of his minor and occasional pieces. It consists of a series of interviews with Deleuze, and sometimes also with his collaborator Félix Guattari, originally published between 1972 and 1990, when the collection was first assembled in France. The interviews concern mostly other books by Deleuze, ranging across the mammoth two-volume *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1972-1980), the two volumes on cinema (1983-5), the small eulogistic text on Foucault (1984) as well as his scholarly monographs on Leibniz (1988) and, to a lesser extent, Spinoza (1968, 1970).

The interview format is obviously not one which fosters major conceptual advances: most of the ideas Deleuze tables are recalled straight from the books he is talking about, and readers would be unwise to think that they could learn about them best from these interviews. The book is not, as billed in the blurbs, a good 'introduction' to Deleuze; indeed it might serve to put skeptical first-time readers off Deleuze, since points are mostly asserted rather than argued for. But it does serve several other functions rather well. The summaries of the cinema books are very concise, and give a wide-lens view of what can otherwise appear to be an intimidatingly dense conceptual network. The time-bound nature of interviews encourages Deleuze to give explicit analyses of contemporary events. Particularly compelling is his rather backhanded complement suggesting that Foucault's account of disci-

plinary society is already obsolete, being replaced by a society of control modeled on cybernetic rather than thermodynamic technology.

Most significantly, the necessity to respond in real, conversational time also forces Deleuze to address his large-scale motivations, which are often a little difficult to discern in his more extended projects, and which are certainly often misunderstood both in France and elsewhere. Of special interest to an Anglophone readership is his claim that — unlike many other popular French thinkers — he is an empiricist (88-9). This raises the possibility of lines of communication between Deleuze and Anglophone thought other than the traditional and familiar ones stretching between French philosophy and university humanities departments in Britain and the U.S. Such lines would not be unproblematic. Aside from stylistic concerns, Deleuze's empiricism is resolutely anti-individualist. But even here, there are some quite unexpected convergences: Deleuze's emphasis on distributed networks (what he calls rhizomes) rather than tree-like structures exactly parallels, and pre-dates, recent developments in cognitive science (connectionism, dynamic approaches to cognition). Indeed, around this issue, the often rather gallocentric concerns of Deleuze's interviewers elide quite substantially with those of a post-Sokal (hoax) Anglophone audience: what is the relation of philosophical to scientific concepts? Deleuze's responses to this frequently posed question (made of course prior to the current brouhaha) are measured, interesting and relevant.

Martin Joughin's translation is fluent, readerly and generates, by persistent colloquialism and contraction, an intimacy that, whilst not a strict rendering of Deleuze's French, nevertheless usually gives the welcome impression of being the way that Deleuze might have conducted informal conversations in English (a language whose flexibility he always loved). It is — considerations of tone apart — not particularly accurate, making elementary errors of tense, number and vocabulary. But the worst effect of this is an occasional clumsiness in the English: in only one case is any serious theoretical violence done to Deleuze (*l'agent, l'opération* and *le thèse* are all inexcusably translated as 'principle' in the space of a page, hiding the active nature of Deleuze's comments under a transcendental shell). In the context of the increasingly pedantic nature of academic translations, especially of French philosophers, a sacrifice of some term-for-term precision is certainly worth tolerating for the sake of a warm and legible English text.

Joughin also adds a large critical apparatus to the bare French edition, comprising about one fifth of the volume of the book. The index is certainly a helpful addition, but the footnotes, whilst occasionally noting technical elements in Deleuze translation, and filling in some perhaps unfamiliar French intellectual background, are mostly hectoring, pretentious and often tendentious attempts at exegesis. Such attempts are particularly out of place in a Deleuze book, since Deleuze inveighs constantly against the indignity of speaking for others and against the very notion of interpretation (there is a long and apparently entirely humorless note explaining what Deleuze means by saying that he is only interested in how things work, not in what they

mean). One suspects that the notes are a sublimated and fragmented translator's introduction, and would probably have been better left unsublimated.

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Daniel C. Dennett
Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1998.
Pp. xi + 418.
US$42.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-04166-9);
US$20.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-54090-8).

Dennett's most recent publication, *Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds*, is the logical successor to his earlier books, *Brainstorms* and *The Intentional Stance*, in so far as it collects together previously published essays (1984 - 1997) on such topics as philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence and the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. In this case, though, the essays are collected from a variety of relatively inaccessible sources and, thus, at least some of them have escaped the notice even of Dennett's legions of fans and attentive critics. The one exception here is the essay *Real Patterns* which, although widely available, is, as Dennett puts it, 'utterly central to my thinking' (95).

The essays are collected thematically into four sections: Philosophy of Mind; Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Life; Ethology, Animal Mind; and Standing Back. Of the many fine essays in the first section, 'Speaking for Ourselves', co-authored with Nicholas Humphrey, is particularly interesting. The authors sketch a theory of the phenomenon of Multiple Personality Disorder (hereafter: MPD) that shows MPD to be theoretically possible. That is, it is shown to be neither logically nor scientifically contradictory and, thus, potentially more than merely an artifact of diagnosis. Only in this way, argue the authors, is it possible to discuss the phenomenon in a way that is not *a priori* dismissive (38). However, the real value for those concerned to understand the complexities of Dennett's thought is the insight it provides on his *Multiple Drafts Model* of consciousness. Essentially the authors argue that whereas, in the ordinary case an illusion of unity results from the fact that the various narrative drafts (i.e., fictive selves) coalesce around some dominant narrative that is elected to be the Head of Mind, in cases of MPD, 'the competing fictive selves are so equally balanced, or different constituencies

within are so unwilling to accept the result of the election, that constitutional chaos reigns — and there are snap elections (or *coup d'état*) all the time' (42).

Particularly noteworthy in the second section is 'Cognitive Wheels', in which Dennett discusses the philosophical puzzles associated with the infamous frame problem of AI. In the introduction to the essay, Dennett informs us that his treatment of the problem here is idiosyncratic and that some have claimed that he is not even talking about the *real* frame problem. No matter: the essay is a philosophical investigation of *some* persistent epistemological puzzle about how we do in fact problem-solve that is fascinating and often humorous — Dennett at his best.

The essays in the third section are a mix of the philosophical and the informal. There is some moralizing about the value for philosophers of getting out of the armchair and doing some empirical research. In 'Out of the Armchair and into the Field', Dennett regales us with the fascinating story of his own time spent in the field with researchers studying the Vervet monkeys of Africa. The essay 'Animal Consciousness: What Matters and Why' is a hard-nosed philosophical inquiry into the issue of animal consciousness that strives to find a philosophically defensible middle ground between the excesses of romanticism (which would attribute consciousness of a human variety to animals based on nothing more than anthropomorphic interpretations of their behaviour) and scepticism (which would deny consciousness to animals regardless of the evidence).

The last section contains two essays that do not share any obvious thematic unity but simply do not fit comfortably into any of the other sections. The first of these, 'Self-Portrait', is reprinted from the collection of critical essays *Dennett and His Critics*. In this essay, Dennett outlines the motives and assumptions that have directed his inquiries and shaped his thoughts. The essay does a masterful job of setting the broader context in which to understand Dennett's work with respect to both how it relates to the views of others working in the same domain and how the various pieces of Dennett's view relate to each other. The second essay of this section, 'Information, Technology, and the Virtues of Ignorance', concerns the ethical implications of the computer revolution and its attendant explosion of information. It has no obvious relation to the other essays and seems out of place, as though an afterthought.

While these do not exhaust the excellent essays to be found here, the book is not without problems, some related to the fact that the essays collected here are from a variety of sources, including some that are non-academic. Thus, the essays do not have as much unity as Dennett's previous collections. Second, the essays are not of uniform quality. Some of the essays fall well below the level of the best, at least by academic standards. Other essays are problematic for a different reason: a pronounced tendency to respond to critics in a way that is often digressive and distracting rather than illuminating. For example, consider 'The Logical Geography of Computational Approaches: A View From the East Pole', which purports to be a description of the state of the art in cognitive science circa 1984. Although dated, as

Dennett admits, the real problem is that the discussion frequently digresses into subtle points of dispute at the periphery of these debates. In fact, the essay is likely to be impenetrable to anyone not already familiar with the methodologies and names referred to here. In fairness, this is not always the case. In 'Real Patterns', Dennett uses the views of his ideological opponents as a foil to expound and clarify his own views. Here the task is accomplished with *élan*: the treatment of his opponents is even-handed and it is made clear how Dennett's view places on the scale of views (in order of decreasing intentional realism) that includes Fodor, Davidson and Churchland.

In sum, the book for the most part reflects the qualities we have come to admire in Dennett: clarity, insight, good humour and a thoroughly engaging style. As such, it constitutes essential reading for Dennett's critics and fans. However, for the curious lay person, or even the academic philosopher with only a passing interest in Dennett or the topics covered by these essays, one would be well-advised to look for a book that is both more accessible and better balanced.

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Daniel Clement Dennett
La diversité des esprits: une approche de la conscience.
Traduit de l'anglas par Alexandre Abensour.
Paris: Hachette Littérature 1998.
Pp. 240.
120FF. ISBN 2-01-235289-8.

La diversité des esprits est la traduction d'un livre de Dennett paru dans la collection *Sciences Masters Series*. Comme tous les ouvrages de cette collection, il offre un survol accessible des problématiques qui ont occupé leur auteur, habituellement un scientifique de renom, au cours des dernières années. Dans le cas de Dennett, on retrouve bien entendu les questions concernant l'intentionnalité, la conscience et l'évolution. Il choisit, pour aborder ces problèmes, de traiter de la notion d'esprit en tâchant d'isoler les conditions auxquelles doit répondre une créature pour être dite posséder un esprit.

Le premier chapitre met en évidence l'état chaotique de nos intuitions concernant l'existence d'esprits non-humains ainsi que les conflits entre les principes moraux et la méthode scientifique concernant cette question. Dennett suggère, pour remédier à la situation, l'adoption d'une stratégie

évolutionniste qui consiste à décrire les étapes qui mènent d'un monde sans esprit à un monde peuplé d'esprits comme les nôtres en passant par les précurseurs de l'esprit et les esprits simples.

Au début était donc la molécule réplicative qui rompit la monotonie du monde des effets et des causes en y introduisit l'action. Comme il le montre au second chapitre, on peut caractériser ces molécules comme des systèmes intentionnels quoiqu'ils ne se représentent pas les raisons de leurs actions (Dennett parle dans ce cas de «rationalité flottante»). C'est à Mère Nature qu'ils doivent de pouvoir être interprété ainsi. Comme celle-ci ne s'embarrasse pas des détails, il est vain de rechercher pour ces systèmes la «précision propositionnelle» dans l'interprétation des états que nous leur attribuons comme certains philosophes ont cherché à le faire. Le chapitre suivant décrit les conséquences du fait que notre cerveau repose sur un système de régulation biochimique, qui fut le premier type de système exhibant une «sensibilité» (lente et réactive) à l'information. La résultante est un système complexe dans lequel notre système nerveux n'a pas nécessairement le dernier mot. Comme il l'écrit: 'On peut donc affirmer qu'il y a bien une sagesse renfermée dans tout notre corps, sagesse qui porte surtout sur des préférences. En utilisant les vieux systèmes somatiques comme une caisse de résonance, ou de public dont il guette les réactions, ou de critique, le système nerveux central peut être guidé — ou doucement incité, ou violemment poussé — à faire des bons choix. La décision doit être effectivement soumise au vote du corps' (109). Le chapitre qui suit présente une histoire spéculative de l'évolution des créatures dotées de cerveau. Dennett reprend ici la hiérarchie qu'il avait déjà présentée dans *Consciousness Explained* et dans *Darwin Dangerous Ideas* qui va des créatures darwiniennes aux créatures grégoriennes en passant par les créatures popperiennes (qui laissent leurs idées mourir à leur place). Une autre partie de son scénario imaginaire consiste à concevoir une tendance à la complexification du pistage de l'information chez les organismes. La prolifération et la surimposition des nombreux systèmes de pistage expliqueraient l'«intelligence» de certains animaux non humains, mais également leurs limites (les chiens, aussi intelligents qu'ils soient, trouvent toujours le moyen d'enrouler leur laisse autour des poteaux et trouvent rarement le moyen de s'en déprendre).

La partie la plus intéressante du livre est celle où l'auteur offre sa version de la théorie de l'«esprit étendu» (*extended mind*) pour expliquer le passage des systèmes possédant uniquement un savoir-faire aux systèmes plus complexes. Cette position, à mon avis une des avenues les plus prometteuses des sciences cognitives actuellement, s'oppose au courant individualiste qui a dominé jusqu'à maintenant les sciences cognitives. Par «individualisme», il faut entendre ici la tendance a considérer que les limites de l'esprit coïncident avec les limites de la peau et donc que l'environnement physique ou culturel ne fait pas partie de l'esprit. Dennett considère d'abord le rôle du langage dans la transformation de l'esprit. Suivant ici Clark et Karmiloff-Smith, Dennett montre comment le langage permet de transformer l'information implicitement stockée dans un système en information explicite

facilement manipulable. Mais le langage n'est qu'un des outils que nous utilisons pour étendre les capacités de notre cerveau dénudé: les marques que faisaient les bergers sur des os pour se souvenir du nombre de moutons qu'ils possédaient, les photographies que l'on prend de nos vacances, les schémas que nous dessinons pour nous y retrouver, l'esprit des autres, tout est outil pour le cerveau. Comme l'écrit Dennett: 'Nos cerveaux sont légèrement plus grands que ceux de nos cousins les plus proches (mais pas plus grands que les cerveaux de certains dauphins et de certaines baleines), mais là n'est probablement pas la source de notre plus grande intelligence. Il me semble que la source première de celle-ci réside dans notre habitude de nous décharger autant que possible de nos tâches cognitives en les projetant dans l'environnement lui-même — nous projetons nos esprits (par là il faut entendre nos projets et nos activités mentaux) dans le monde extérieur, où nous avons construit toute une série de dispositifs périphériques pour stocker, traiter et re-représenter nos significations, dispositifs qui rationalisent, améliorent et protègent ces processus de transformation qui sont notre pensée même. Cette pratique si répendue nous permet de dépasser les limitations de nos cerveaux animaux' (176). Une carte géographique, pour prendre un exemple de re-representation, est utile parce qu'elle présente une représentation de notre savoir sur une région dans un format dont peut s'emparer une compétence perceptive spécialisée, dans ce cas la mémoire spatiale. De la même façon, les mots ne sont que des outils internes dans lequel l'esprit entrepose et transpose certaines représentations afin de les rendre plus facilement manipulables. Le livre se termine sur la considération de l'impact de ces mêmes mots sur la conscience et sur le fossé qu'ils creusent entre notre esprit et les autres. Il traite également de l'effet de ce fossé sur les questions morales concernant la souffrance chez les animaux.

Disons, pour conclure, que *La diversité des esprits* constitue une excellente entrée en matière à l'oeuvre de Dennett. Le livre conviendra particulièrement aux étudiants de philosophie qui recherchent une introduction en douceur aux problématiques contemporaines en philosophie de l'esprit. Il réserve également quelques surprises agréables pour les philosophes aguerris en leur offrant des perspectives qu'ils ne sauraient négliger plus longtemps.

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François Duchesneau
Philosophie de la biologie.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1997.
Pp. xiv + 437.
FF 148. ISBN 2-13-048304-6.

Philosophie de la biologie de François Duchesneau est un livre à plusieurs égards remarquable, par la quantité d'informations qu'il contient, ainsi que par la finesse de certaines des analyses qu'on y trouve. Cinq problèmes essentiels en philosophie de la biologie y sont abordés: la notion d'espèce, la téléologie, le rapport entre la génétique mendélienne et la génétique moléculaire, la structure des théories biologiques et le profil épistémologique des explications darwiniennes. Dans chacun d'eux il présente les positions des principaux acteurs de l'épistémologie de la biologie (par exemple Michael Ruse, David Hull, Elliott Sober, Alexander Rosenberg, Elizabeth Lloyd, pour n'en nommer que quelques uns) et il s'efforce de mettre en lumière les diverses interrogations épistémologiques que suscite l'étude de la biologie par opposition à celle des autres sciences. Puis l'auteur procède à une analyse critique des solutions proposées par les philosophes ou les biologistes les plus importants qui se sont penchés sur elles. Un des avantages de cette façon de procéder est qu'elle procure au lecteur une image à la fois succincte et complète des débats les plus importants en philosophie de la biologie à l'heure actuelle. Il s'agit donc d'un livre extrêmement utile qui permet à celui qui est prêt à faire l'effort nécessaire d'entrer de plein pied dans plusieurs questions centrales de philosophie de la biologie. Le livre de François Duchesneau en effet ne sacrifie en rien à la facilité et s'il renferme une grande quantité d'information, traite de nombreux auteurs et aborde plusieurs problèmes, il ne se satisfait jamais d'effleurer une question. Toujours nous avons droit à une analyse sérieuse et complète du sujet. En conséquence, une des vertus de ce livre est d'épargner à son lecteur de nombreuses lectures, le situant d'emblée au coeur d'une problématique et lui donnant de ce fait la possibilité d'orienter rapidement ses recherches vers des ouvrages plus spécialisés. *Philosophie de la biologie* ne constitue cependant pas pour autant une entrée en matière ou un ouvrage introductif. C'est, selon moi, un livre trop difficile pour les véritables débutants. Les analyses qu'il contient sont trop fines pour être vraiment compréhensibles à ceux qui n'ont pas déjà fait leur premières armes dans la discipline. Pour ceux qui sont plus avancés ce peut, parfois, être un outil de travail hors pair. D'une part, en raison de la quantité d'informations qu'il rassemble, d'autre part parce que François Duchesneau maîtrise parfaitement les problématiques les plus difficiles et les plus spécialisées en philosophie de la biologie. Je dis 'parfois' car on peut reprocher à François Duchesneau de n'avoir pas su bien trouver quel public il vise. Trop difficile pour constituer une simple introduction, *Philosophie de la biologie* se limite néanmoins à reprendre des opinions connues, spécialisées certes, mais connues. A aucun moment il n'avance d'interprétations nouvelles ou de prises de position inédites. En conséquence, il s'expose à ce que son public

potentiel se révèle 'de courte durée' ou extrêmement réduit. En effet, ceux qui, comme les étudiants avancés, peuvent véritablement tirer profit de cet ouvrage, risquent de s'en détourner rapidement pour aller lire dans l'original les explications qu'ils ne trouvent ici que de 'seconde main'.

Quoi qu'il en soit. Il convient d'insister sur le fait qu'à l'heure actuelle, il n'existe probablement aucun livre comparable sur ce sujet en langue française. *Philosophie de la biologie* est, à ma connaissance, le premier livre à présenter en français une vue d'ensemble des problématiques formant le noyau de la philosophie de la biologie telle qu'elle est pratiquée aujourd'hui, non seulement dans les pays de langue anglaise, mais partout où elle s'est constituée comme une discipline autonome. Il comble donc un vide important et de ce seul fait il constitue une contribution attendue.

Mais l'intérêt de ce livre ne se limite pas là. Il vient aussi du fait que François Duchesneau met la philosophie de la biologie en rapport avec l'évolution de l'épistémologie en général. Il rappelle en effet que le développement de la philosophie de la biologie est allé de pair avec deux transformations importantes dans notre façon de concevoir la science, par rapport à l'idéal de la connaissance scientifique avancé précédemment par le positivisme logique. La première de ces transformations est le développement de l'historicisme. Celui-ci en remettant en cause les modèles hempéliens et carnapiens de la science a ouvert la porte de la réflexion épistémologique à la biologie. En effet, en 1963 J.J.C. Smart déclarait encore que la biologie n'était pas une science en raison de son échec à satisfaire au canon que constituait la physique telle qu'axiomatisée par le positivisme logique (*Philosophy and Scientific Realism* [London: Routledge and Keagan Paul 1963], 50-63). La seconde de ces transformations est l'abandon de l'idéal de l'unité de la science. Abandon qui n'a pas peu fait pour donner une respectabilité épistémologique à une science aussi éclatée et plurielle que ne l'est la biologie. Celle-ci en effet, comme le montre bien le livre de Duchesneau, contient une foule de théories partielles et de modèles plus ou moins compatibles et pose la question de l'unité ne serait-ce que potentielle de ceux-ci. C'est certainement un des apports fondamentaux de l'épistémologie de la biologie à la philosophie des sciences que d'avoir donné l'exemple d'une science pluraliste, sans unité, utilisant des modèles incompatibles entre eux et néanmoins en plein progrès, allant d'un succès à l'autre, détrônant, ou du moins ébranlant la physique dans son rôle de reine des sciences. La biologie nous a forcée ainsi à revoir nos préjugés épistémologiques. C'est une des forces du livre de Duchesneau de bien metre en lumière cette multiplicité de modèles ainsi que le pluralisme théorique de la biologie contemporaine.

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Antony Flew
Philosophical Essays. Ed. John Shosky.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1998.
Pp. 224.
US$58.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8578-0);
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8579-9).

Philosophical Essays is a collection of papers by Antony Flew, gathered by a devout admirer, John Shosky. Much of the material in this handsomely produced, but also far from cheap paperback, is already published. A lot is accessible enough already. There is no sign of the class sometimes achieved by, say, Frege, Russell, Carnap, Sartre, Quine, Goodman, Austin and other modern philosophers who already have deserved the monument of a grand anthology.

On the other hand, I don't wish to suggest that the contents are worthless. For those with a particular interest in the rise of Ordinary Language Oxford during two decades from 1940 will find some things to keep, like Flew's remarks about ideas and actors. Ayn Rand's devotees may enjoy the sounds of more matings between capitalism and atheism, etc. But with crises that rise over library space, costs and servicing, marketing, private readers' budgets, trees and other resources, should such rather ephemeral and aged essays be republished as a conventional **book**?

The price of conventional journals and their housing still increase. Yet institutions hound scholars to publish in conventional spots. Only so many submissions can ever be read, if accepted; only so many good writings on, say Don Scotus, can be accepted; only so much money can be found to publish, push and store them; and so on. With somewhat fewer journals and less investments, there could be an annual prize tournament with strong, specialist, rewarded referees. The judges could award the prizes to as many or few papers (including Don Scotus papers) as they wish. Tenure and publication could be achieved by regular publication, *and* by such prize mentions, *and* by acceptance for solid conferences. Analogies should be applied to books like this.

Flew's eleven principal essays are: 'Oxford Linguistic Philosophy', 'Philosophy and Language', 'Theology and Falsification', 'Against Indoctrination', 'Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity', 'Private Images and Public Language', 'What Impressions of Necessity?', 'Responding to Plato's Thrasymachus', 'Communism: The Philosophical Foundation', 'Russell's Judgement on Bolshevism', 'Stephen Hawking and the Mind of God', Flew's *Afterword*, has some interesting remarks for biographers, as does the Editor's 'Introduction'. It's second-string Oxonian stuff, but Flew has a lively style and he played a vigorous role in the building of temples to Ordinary Language. The article on Thrasymachus suffers from inattention to the Sophist's switch from Non-Cognitivism to Cognitivism after Cleitophon's brilliant intervention (cf. *PQ*, 1964).

The well-known 'Theology and Falsification', famous and rhetorically arousing, suffers by so using 'falsify' as to excluding (*a priori*) any reflection on the possibility of temporal, but not spatial objects. More generally, Flew's 'commonsensical' variations of Logical Positivism and of Popper's sermons for Falsification are Siren Songs, or 'Lorelei's for Lullabies' for Flew. They are melodies that attract us toward the Rocks of anti-philosophical Philistinism and savage anti-culture. Whatever his or her ultimate choice is in ideology and ontology, a good human philosopher's roots and feeling of Earth's continuing history require a certain openness and sympathy towards (Monism, Pluralism, Process), (Materialism, Dualism, Idealism), and more. It is not only towards Biblical religions, but towards Buddhism and Hinduism, endless forms of animism, of communal culture and personal world-views that Flew's treatment of evil sets an example of blind disrespect.

The Editor is an endearing enthusiast of Flew's, truly charming. But Dr. Shosky occasionally sounds leg-pulling or paradoxical: 'In all fairness, I must admit my enormous admiration for Flew on theological topics, even though I am a Roman Catholic and one of the people to whom his comments are addressed. For Flew accuses believers of indefinitely stretching observed facts to allow divine goodness'. Will Shosky's tolerance indefinitely expand the meaning of religious beliefs, in order for him to stay in Flew's camp? Flew and Shosky sometimes appear to endure the fallacy of abusing the Law of Excluded Middle by taking Contraries for Contradictories. Must we accept this one dichotomy: (Hayek, Smith and Friedman) or (Marx and Engels)?

Enfin, a serious decline in alleged Ordinary Language Philosophy's credibility already began after Flew published Chapter 2 in 1953: 'since the meaning "of his own free will" can be taught by reference to such Paradigm Cases as that in which a man, under no social pressure, marries the girl he wants to marry ... '. Is Flew just *playing* on many senses of 'free' and 'free will'? Does Flew here neglect several Greeks' message that wise philosophy does not just seek how we do use words conventionally (cf. *PQ*, 1957)? Should we not, also, use some ordinary words more wisely and even discard some others?

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Patrick ffrench and
Roland-François Lack, eds.
The Tel Quel Reader.
New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. ix + 278.
Cdn$105.00: US$75.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-15713-7);
Cdn$34.99: US$24.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-15714-5).

'Fragmentation is the source' (104), states Marcelin Pleynet, a contributor to the French philosophical and literary journal *Tel Quel*. Speaking for and to a post-Sartrean generation, the review sought to analyze the coherence in the incoherence of the 1960s and 70s. It sought to draw the disparate fragments of the proliferating French intellectual scene into a post-Gaullist, post-Stalinist alliance even as it flirted with causes that betrayed its eclectic and fragmentary vision. The journal gave voice to an intellectual avant-garde that transcended the disciplinary boundaries of philosophy and politics, of art and literature. The fragmentary intellectual turf that is Foucault, Derrida, Kristeva, Barthes and Bataille replaced the towering intellectual hegemony of Sartre in no small part because of influence of this journal, anthologized in this stimulating and enjoyable collection.

In seeking to assume their role as the new intellectual leaders of French culture, the contributors to the journal gave evidence of the struggle to be a different and edifying generation, an avant-garde that would offer an alternative to the totalizing discourses of mid-century. The result was a curious mix of intellectual rigor and a search for ideals worthy of commitment. The journal is best known for its passing admiration for the May 1968 revolts, its flirtation with Maoist Communism, the pursuit of literary saviors such as Joyce and de Sade, and investigations into the larger meaning of American experimental theater and underground culture. The inchoate and changing character of *Tel Quel*'s contents and commitments attests to the desire for a bold, new, and committed intellectualism: values associated with each new generation of twentieth-century French intellectuals. A dual longing to make sense of and to express commitment, to draw together the disparate disciplines into something as important as the political, finds expression in the growing subtitle of the review: from 'Science/Littérature' at its founding in 1967 to 'Littérature/Philosophie/Art/Science/Politique' some dozen years later.

The journal's decidedly post-Stalinist politics of the left and its desire to be the interpreter of all things intellectual, despite the sometimes conflicting and faddish currents evidenced in this anthology, were exciting indeed — from them emerged some of the most interesting voices of the next two decades. Found here are contributions by Julia Kristeva, Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault, among the most noted. The editors chose to collect materials that appear here for the first time in English, and include a bibliography of other *Tel Quel* articles already available in English. As a result some of the

material, the Foucault article at least, is of marginal interest: what of quality by Foucault remains untranslated? But the same cannot be said of the other stars included here: we receive a valuable pre-Lacanian essay by Kristeva, 'Toward a semiology of paragrams' that antedates her Lacanian 'The subject in process', also included here. An entertaining interview with Roland Barthes closes the anthology wherein he expresses his fear of publishing, for one's books contain 'outrageous', powerful words which cannot be called back.

However, the most interesting and engaging pieces of the anthology are the works of thinkers of lesser popular magnitude. Jean-Joseph Goux, in 'Marx and the inscription of labour', offers an insightful Derridian reading of Marx, showing how the intellectual production of meaning by signs obscures the productive value of those signs. Likewise, Jean-Louis Baudry's article, 'Freud and "literary creation" ', explicates Freud's struggle to explain how dreams in fiction can be a source of knowledge about real dreams. Pleynet's discussion of 'The readability of [the censored] Sade' argues for expanding the boundaries of the implicit Enlightenment canon: 'To say of Sade that he is readable, is to say that he is *still* to be read, and by all' (119).

The magnet that attracted such a diverse and gifted group of thinkers was Philippe Sollers, a founder of the journal, and the only person at the editorial level with the journal from its inception to its renaming and re-visioning as *L'Infini* in 1982. Sollers is represented by an essay on Bataille, and an excerpt from his serialized 'novel' *Paradis*, containing punctuation-less reflections on 'orthosexuals' and the relationship that inspired them.

The anthology is loosely organized around the themes of science, literature and art, and concludes with a brief 'Dissemination' by the editors. The 'Art' section begins with Marc Devade's aesthetic essay, 'Chromatic painting: theorem written through painting'. Guy Scarpetta's notes on American experimental theatre are addressed in 'The American body'. Pleynet's 'Heavenly Glory', a poem of nakedness and 'holy drunkenness', offers a sharp contrast to his reflections on the 'Thetic "madness" ' of psychoanalysis vis-à-vis the religious crisis of our age.

The editors present the material with a light hand: the introduction is brief, though helpful. However, the articles are presented without introductions: only a skimpy footnote places each in a (mostly chronological) context. The chronology is a helpful addition, but does not make up for the lack of article introductions. On the whole the brevity of contextualizing materials means that readers will have to look elsewhere (such as cultural histories by Danielle Marx-Scouras and Niilo Kauppi, and ffrench's own *The Time of Theory*) for material placing *Tel Quel* into the context of recent French thought. This shortcoming means the volume will probably find its way onto few course required reading lists. It is probably destined to be sought out only for individual articles by Kristeva or Pleynet. Given the exciting ideas in the collection, that is unfortunate. A little more attention to making the volume assessable to non-initiates would have made it more useful. Intellectuals must always choose among fragments, which to gather and which to pass on by. But Pleynet's comment in the essay 'Thetic "madness" ' is certainly right

where the topic is *Tel Quel*, 'This investigation is one in which nearly everything is worthy of more detailed attention' (211).

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Robert Goodin
Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. ix + 352.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-46263-0);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-46806-X).

This ambitious volume attempts to restore utilitarianism to its rightful place — the center of public morality. Robert Goodin defends utilitarianism against its critics, arguing that the elements of utilitarianism which its critics charge make it unsuitable as a morality for individuals in their private lives are the very elements which make utilitarianism an eminently suitable morality for dealing with the problems of public choice. According to Goodin, twentieth-century utilitarians have mistakenly articulated and defended utilitarianism in its least plausible form, as a code of personal conduct. The focus on utilitarianism as a code of personal conduct persists, thinks Goodin, even when the problems addressed are public in nature (7). Goodin writes: 'The question of war is seen, by them, as one of whether we individually should kill enemy soldiers or defenseless civilians, rather than as one of whether we collectively should wage pointless wars. The question of famine is seen as one of whether we individually should send food to the starving, rather than as one of whether we collectively should work to reform social structures and consequently exchange entitlements' (7). Goodin urges a return to the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, a utilitarianism which was seen as the basis for movements of social reform, and a move away from the utilitarianism of its present day defenders, who have come to see utilitarianism as essentially a private morality.

What's gained by this return to utilitarianism's roots? Chapter 4 'Government House Utilitarianism' lays out the details of Goodin's theory and explains the advantages of conceptualizing utilitarianism as a philosophy of public, rather than private, moral choice. According to Goodin, there is something special about the situation of public officials which makes utilitarianism more plausible for them (62). Goodin claims that it is both necessary (62-4) and desirable (64-5) for public officials to reason as utilitarians.

This is because they must deal with people as aggregates, not as individuals. In part utilitarianism is more plausible for them because their situation restricts them to indirect-rule based utilitarian strategies which Goodin believes to be central to a more plausible version of the theory. Hence, the version of utilitarianism at play in the public realm is different — and Goodin thinks more defensible — than its usual direct, act-focused version.

In Chapter 4 Goodin also shows how his theory is able to blunt the standard criticisms which beset contemporary utilitarianism. For example, a common charge against utilitarian moral theories is that they are too demanding. Individual moral agents are obliged to help others to the point where their continuing to assist others is a setback to utility overall. For moral agents in well-off countries the implication is that one is required to give away one's wealth until there are no more gains to be had by giving things away, either because one has nothing left to give or because any further giving would reduce one to a level beneath those who are worst off. Goodin responds to this criticism by noting that the theory is far less demanding of individuals when the primary moral responsibility belongs to the state. If governments are required to aid, and they can require all citizens to do their part, then the demands on individuals will be considerably less. In all cases Goodin thinks that the 'basic trick' to defending his version of utilitarianism is to draw a line between utilitarianism as a guide to personal conduct and utilitarianism as guide to public policy making. Of course in this case Goodin's response leaves unanswered the question of what the individual's obligations are when the state fails to act, or acts inadequately.

The chapters in this book deal with a wide range of topics related to utilitarianism and public policy. For readers familiar with Goodin's work there's not much new here. Aside from the introduction, all of the chapters were previously published as articles in journals or chapters in books. That said, the book serves a useful purpose by providing us with Goodin's work as an alternative account of utilitarianism and the chapters are edited to give the reader a coherent account of the view and its implications. Some of the chapters, such as Chapter 3 on the moral significance of motive, and Chapters 5-7 on responsibility are of very broad interest. Chapters 12-15 apply Goodin's theory to questions about the national redistribution of wealth. Later chapters (16-18) deal with the application of government house utilitarianism to matters of international policy such as nationalism, nuclear disarmament, and global environmental ethics.

Does Goodin succeed? In large part the answer to this question will depend on whether the reader gauges Goodin's efforts to apply this theory to real-life problems to be successful, since a major argument for government house utilitarianism is its suitability as an ethics for public choice. On this matter I leave others to make their own judgements. I will, however, raise two further critical questions one might pursue in thinking about Goodin's project. First, is he right that utilitarianism is fit to serve as a public morality? It's not so clear that some of the objections leveled at utilitarianism as a private morality don't also apply in the public realm. Consider for

example the objection that utilitarianism is too demanding. Concerted efforts at relieving poverty on a global scale would not demand so much of individual moral agents. However, first world countries would have to significantly increase overseas aid and it might be argued, by those who find individualist utilitarianism too demanding, that the global version is likewise too demanding of wealthy nations. Second, does it follow from Goodin's argument that utilitarianism is the right account of public morality, that utilitarianism is exempt from addressing matters of individual morality? What exactly insulates our private lives from utilitarian moral thinking?

Although there are reasons to doubt the ultimate success of Goodin's project, this book is notable for its optimism, detail, and scope. Whether or not utilitarianism is the right morality for public choice, or for any choice at all, Goodin is surely right to think that philosophy needs to retain its relevance to political life.

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Sandra Harding
Is Science Multicultural?
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1998.
Pp. xi + 242.
US$14.95. ISBN 0-253-21156-5.

While it is generally conceded that different societies and cultures could have different approaches to social values which could be defended on grounds of tradition, pragmatism, and the like such has not been the case traditionally concerning scientific research and knowledge. In recent times, however, the idea of science as an objective, rational discipline has come under strict scrutiny. In this connection the works of Thomas Kuhn (*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*) and Paul Feyerabend (*Against Method*) are of significance. Science, according to these two authors, is a contextual and cultural activity as any other social activity, subject to the vagaries of human psychology and temperament.

This historical and sociological approach to the history of science has also been buttressed by research efforts on the nature of science by members of feminist schools of thought in the West and researchers in the non-West. In general, the critique has been directed against the idea of science as being of Western origin only, rational, and objective and universalist in scope.

The critique of this orthodox view of science is further extended by philosopher Sandra Harding in *Is Science Multicultural?* A central point of this text is that the development of science in the West was greatly enhanced by the expansion of Western Europe into other parts of the globe. Harding's argument is that externalist forces are just as important as internalist issues in the development of scientific theories. As Harding puts it: 'Thus, the Europeans needed and developed many kinds of scientific information and technological know-how in order to get to other parts of the world and to survive there' (43).

But because of the relative success of the European enterprise in the colonization and economic exploitation of other parts of the world a Eurocentric view of the development of science becomes prevalent in Europe. The art of empirical science was then assumed to be of strictly European origin. Harding writes: 'The invention of the European miracle, the Dark Ages, and the scientific revolution all worked to obscure and deny the non-European origins of early modern sciences and technologies, as we saw earlier' (35). It is this idea of the primacy of Europe in the scientific enterprise that led to the discounting of the scientific research efforts in China during the premodern era.

In the same vein though, one would have expected Harding to elaborate on the important influences of the technological and scientific findings of the technologists of ancient Egypt on Greek civilization which in turn profoundly influenced a subsequent European civilization. The main reference Harding makes in this regard is as follows: 'However, the borrowings have been far more extensive and important for the development of modern sciences than the conventional histories reveal. It is not only the so-called "complex" cultures of China, India, and others in east Asian and Islamic societies that have provided resources for European sciences and technologies, but also the so-called "simple" cultures of Africa, pre-Columbian Americas, and others that were encountered by Europeans during their voyages of Discovery' (34). Harding should have included ancient Egypt among the so-called 'complex' cultures given that Egyptian science and technology influenced not only the classical Greek philosophers and mathematicians but also the scientific research of the European Renaissance. It was the Egyptian-origined Hermetic philosophies that influenced the development of the proto-scientific discipline alchemy and the celestial mechanics of Newton.

A major portion of Harding's text is concerned with the question of gender and science. She points out that because of distinct sociological traditions there are evident female orientations in scientific research. In the chapter 'Are there Gendered Standpoints on Nature?' Harding offers anecdotal evidence on how female Japanese physicists differ from their male counterparts in the way they conduct research (101-2). In the general context of applied science we are also apprised of the way in which female scientists of the 'North' differ in terms of interest and concerns from their counterparts in the 'South'.

Yet there are some points and emphases in Harding's text with which I must quibble. With regard to the impact that the European expansion had on the Americas I take exception to the standard view that the decimation of the local populations was caused by disease (3). The truth is that most of the indigenes of the Americas were killed off through unprovoked warfare while a minority died as a result of disease which in some cases were deliberately spread. Furthermore, it is plausible to argue that the disruption of local ecologies led to the relative starvation that led to increased susceptibility to disease.

I also believe that Harding did not sufficiently emphasize sufficiently the causal and catalytic role that the trans-Atlantic trade in humans and agricultural produce played in the eventuation of the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe. Here is an instance in which scientific and technological innovations did benefit directly from a rapidly developing capitalism. There is just a brief reference to this historical phenomenon in the chapter 'Postcolonial Science and Technology Studies' (32).

In general though, one would have expected a text titled *Is Science Multicultural?* to have focused more on these cultural areas that made modern science possible: ancient Egypt, Babylon, and China. The text should also have discussed the research findings of modernist scientific and technological workers in the Americas (especially the United States and the often overlooked participation of African Americans in the scientific and technological enterprise) and the non-European world.

Yet the text is to be recommended because it is one of a growing number of books and articles that study the growth of science from an externalist standpoint. The point of these texts is that economic and sociological conditions are what ultimately determine the growth and development of science. The small Eurasian peninsula called Europe was merely fortunate to be at the geographical juncture of those African (ancient Egypt) and Asian (China, mainly) culture areas that made the first important contributions to science and technology. The ancient Greeks (decidedly not of European origin) served as the partial conveyers of these ancient scientific findings to Europe — but only very belatedly by way of the Islamic culture area. Science is indeed multicultural.

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Mark Kingwell
Better Living: In Pursuit of Happiness from Plato to Prozac.
Markham, ON: Penguin 1998. Pp. 408.
Cdn$32.00. ISBN 0-670-87502-3.

Mark Kingwell's second book *Better Living: In Pursuit of Happiness from Plato to Prozac* is not typical scholarly fare. While the book does treat the questions of happiness and the 'good life' philosophically, its primary focus is Kingwell's honest and often amusing personal narrative as he explores various answers to them. As one might expect in a work of popular philosophy, the more 'serious' discussions tend towards simplification. One cannot, however, assess the philosophical merits of this work of 'theoretical autobiography' merely on the basis of its fit with institutional requirements for a work of scholarly philosophy. Kingwell's project is not destined to extend or clarify for other philosophers the familiar debate in moral philosophy over what constitutes a life worth living; a society worth living in. Rather, it aims to relate the terms of that debate to the real pressures which face the average North American. The sales of and media interest in the book strongly suggest that *Better Living* succeeds in this ambitious venture. And I believe that Kingwell has managed to bridge the all too wide gap between institutional and practical philosophy without undue compromise.

Kingwell's adventures in the commercial world of buying and selling happiness are related in sharp comic prose. He reports on a week spent at an American 'Happy Camp' and his self-prescribed use of Prozac with hilarious and poignant results: 'Kaufman [the Camp leader] cannot seem to resist interrupting these real moments with poetry and whispered questions, and I have a sudden guilty fantasy of snatching the microphone out of his hand and shoving it down his throat. *Eat this, happy man!*'; 'I didn't get Prozac in order to ward off a documented case of clinical depression ... I didn't get it prescribed for me by a physician. I got it by making exactly two phone calls and explaining to friends that I wanted to see what taking Prozac made me feel like ... ' (59, 96).

Based on these and other experiences, Kingwell develops his philosophical understanding of happiness and the good life. He begins with a standard critique of the assumption that pleasure and happiness are the same thing. Taking happiness in its eudaimonistic sense, Kingwell argues that since the use of commercial goods and services is always intended to leave us wanting more, their consumption, while momentarily satisfying, actually makes us unhappy. The argumentation here is deftly built on empirical considerations as well as on the assumption that happiness is best regarded as a regular state of satisfaction with one's life as a whole.

His philosophical discussion continues with a critique of the belief that if one is happy, then one is in a state of satisfaction with one's life as whole *all the time*. The consequence of such a belief, Kingwell notes, is to consider oneself depressed and so in need of medication or therapy at the slightest

sign of feeling overwhelmed. He argues that feeling overwhelmed is hardly a surprising response 'to being "buried alive" in cultural sludge' (291). Based on the writings of Descartes and Nietzsche among others, Kingwell insightfully suggests that the urge to be left alone (frequently taken as a sign of clinical depression) may be an important part of a happy all too human life.

Over the course of the book and his adventures, Kingwell canvasses the Pre-Socratics, Plato and Socrates, Aristotle, the Medievals, the Early Moderns, the Utilitarians, Kant and both Modern and Post-Modern Continentals. He exposites, analyses and synthesizes as he goes, bringing forward what seems defensible on the basis of what philosophers will easily recognize as standard scholarly criticisms. There are also two subtexts alongside the main experiential and philosophical ones, each of which merits a mention. The first lays out Kingwell's thoughts on his relationship with his wife as it absorbs the impact of his 'experiments in living'. This is no unencumbered archetypal male mind searching for 'the' answers to life's most difficult questions. The second encompasses Kingwell's reflections on the often soul-destroying quest for entry into the 'Academy'. For those of us still on the outside, these reflections bring to the fore a rebellious voice not much heard in the institutional domain.

Like all of his forebearers, Kingwell acknowledges that human happiness requires a certain level of physical and mental health, real access to a certain degree of material comfort and real opportunities for dignified work and social interaction. But it also requires regular and disciplined reflection on the effects which today's most obvious means of satisfying these needs have on life taken as a whole. There are no guarantees, but in addition to securing life's basic goods, one must approach one's life philosophically in order to enjoy it. This won't be news to philosophers. But if it persuades enough non-philosophers, it just might be bad news for business.

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Serge-Christophe Kolm
Justice and Equity.
Trans. Harold F. See, with the assistance of Denise Killebrew, Chantal Philoppon-Daniel, and Myron Rigsby.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1997. Pp. ix + 265.
US$30.00. ISBN 0-262-11215-9.

This little book is a translation of Kolm's *Justice et Equité*, which appeared in 1971 and has since become a minor classic in the field of normative economics. In it, Kolm develops two ideas that have come to play an important role in more recent debates over distributive justice. First, he attempts to develop a theory of justice that uses the idea of an envy-free allocation as its primary normative standard. This strategy is one that has since come to the attention of a broader philosophical audience primarily through Ronald Dworkin's work on resource egalitarianism. The second major point of interest in the work is that Kolm presents a version of the difference principle, at roughly the same time that John Rawls was developing his own.

The idea of using the absence of envy as a criterion of equality has been discovered so many times, one is tempted to think it must be correct (after Kolm rediscovered the envy-freeness principle, calling it 'equity', it was rediscovered again by William J. Baumol, who used the term 'superfairness'). This suggests that the core intuition is fairly obvious, but that it acquires salience only under particular historical and intellectual circumstances. The basic principle is stated with admirable clarity by Hobbes in the *Leviathan*. Hobbes, it will be recalled, wanted to show that people in the state of nature were roughly equal in both physical and intellectual endowment. The level of variation in physical ability could be ascertained fairly easily through observation. Intellectual ability, on the other hand, presented something of a measurement problem (in the dark ages before standardized testing). Hobbes argued, therefore, that the most reliable indication that people are roughly equal in their intellectual abilities is the tendency everyone has to think that they're smarter than everyone else. As Hobbes put it, 'there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.'

Hobbes did not suggest this as a general principle for gauging equality. He presented it as something of a second-best strategy, useful when the *equalisandum* is not available for direct observation. This meant that as long as philosophers remained optimistic about the possibility of measuring the various relevant dimensions of human well-being, the principle did not attract any significant attention. All of this changed with the demise of utilitarianism and the rise of welfare economics. At the center of this development was the move in economics away from the Benthamite conception of utility toward von-Neumann-Morgenstern-style utility functions, which do not permit meaningful interpersonal comparisons. This had a variety of consequences, one of which was that the Pareto-efficiency standard

acquired preeminence, for no particular reason other than that it allowed economists to make normative judgements without effecting interpersonal comparisons. At this point, the stage was set for envy-freeness to make a comeback, since this standard makes it possible to decide whether proposed distributions are equitable without making interpersonal comparisons. A proposed allocation is envy-free, or equitable, just in case no one prefers someone else's share to his own.

Unfortunately, the envy-freeness standard does not pick out a unique distribution. Since individual preferences vary, there may be a range of distributions that fail to inspire envy. If one person gets the largest share of some good that she desires with considerable intensity, her preference for that bundle may be unaffected by how the rest of the goods are parceled out. As a result, there will be a *set* of equitable distributions. The most intuitive way of representing this set is with an Edgeworth box. Kolm spends the first half of the book setting up such a model, then using these diagrams to explore various properties of the equity standard. This discussion is by-and-large helpful and illuminating, and serves as an excellent introduction to the use of this mode of representation. Kolm also spends some time in an interesting discussion of whether the 'divide-and-choose' rule can be used to implement equitable solutions under various information conditions. There is also the obligatory discussion of whether and when the equitable distributions will be efficient.

The second half of the book is dedicated to the subject of 'justice', which Kolm defines in a rather specific way. Equity is too broad a standard, and admits distributions that still seem intuitively unfair. In particular, it allows for significant departures from the 'equal' distribution, viz. the one in which all agents receive an identical bundle. In his desire to find something more precise, Kolm introduces what he calls 'fundamental preferences', or preferences that are the same for all agents. These are constructed by taking the *capacity* to enjoy a particular good and treating it as just another kind of good, over which agents have further preferences. By extruding capacities in this way, one will eventually arrive at a set of preferences that are the same for everyone. However, since equitable allocations can only stray from equality in cases where preferences differ, there will only be one equitable allocation with respect to agents' fundamental preferences — equality. This is very clever, but not obviously useful. (It is probably intended just to show that our stricter intuitions about justice can be reconstructed using only the equity standard.)

Partly in response to the impracticality of his proposal regarding justice, Kolm introduces the difference principle as a standard of 'second-best' justice. One of the advantages of Kolm's discussion here over Rawls's is that he does not attempt to confuse 'maximin' as a rule of rational choice with the difference principle as a component of the theory of justice. In a divide-and-choose game of imperfect information (like the original position), maximin represents a 'paranoid' choice rule — is only rational for those who have some reason to believe that they will get the *worst* outcome. Kolm is clear on this

point, and does not attempt to generalize from this model to the difference principle. Instead, he tries to ground the latter through a relatively straightforward appeal to our moral intuitions.

One word of caution about this book is in order. Before starting the first chapter, the reader is expected to work through an extremely irritating author's introduction, and an all-but-unintelligible foreword. The latter, written by the author in English for the present volume, should not have found its way into print in its current form. It does, however, provide the reader with a sense of what an excellent service the translator has provided.

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David Lewis
Papers in Philosophical Logic.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. v + 234.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-58247-4);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-58788-3).

His formidable achievements in metaphysics should not overshadow David Lewis's many elegant if somewhat technical contributions to philosophical logic. Several such papers are collected here; two more volumes of collected papers are to follow.

'Adverbs of quantification' (1973) examines the logical form and semantics of sentences beginning with adverbs like 'always', 'sometimes', 'never', 'usually', and 'often'. These are not simply temporal quantifiers. Rather, Lewis shows, they are 'unselective' quantifiers over n-tuples of individuals, which in turn are often subject to different express restrictions. 'Index, context, and content' (1980) extends and refines the use of multiple points of reference in Lewis's influential paper 'General semantics'. The need for points of reference to which truth is relativized is widely recognized for possible worlds, times, speakers, hearers, background knowledge, etc. Lewis explores the best way to arrange these relativities so that the compositionality of indexed sentences is maintained.

'"Whether" report' lays the semantic and pragmatic groundwork for a formalization of 'whether' contexts as governed by 'know', 'tell', etc. Lewis's solution involves double indexing: 'I know whether A or B or C' is taken to contain the sentence 'whether A or B or C', which is true at i, j ($\models_{i,j}$) iff $\models_{i,i}A$ and $\models_{j,j}A$ or $\models_{i,i}B$ and $\models_{j,j}B$ or $\models_{i,i}C$ and $\models_{j,j}C$, where the second index

indicates certain matters of fact. The analysis explains the use of 'or' to link the clauses.

'Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities II' (1986) concerns the explanation of Ernest W. Adams' widely accepted thesis that the assertability of an indicative conditional is the conditional subjective probability of the consequence given the antecedent. Lewis refutes the 'nicest explanation', viz. that for arbitrary probability functions P, $P(A \rightarrow C) = P(C/A)$. Here he shows that it fails even if P is restricted in various natural ways, e.g. to subjective probability functions (belief functions). This result can be got round by not interpreting '$\rightarrow$' uniformly.

An iterative sentence is one in which an intensional connective occurs within the scope of another. A non-iterative logic is one that can be axiomatized by non-iterative axioms alone; it may still have iterative theorems. In 'Intensional logics without iterative axioms' (1974), Lewis shows by the method of filtrations that every non-iterative logic is complete and decidable.

Lewis, Stalnaker, and Pollock's possible-world ordering semantics for subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals is well knows. An equally plausible approach is the premise semantics of Angelika Kratzer. While the possible-world approach encodes background facts in an ordering of closeness of alternative worlds, Kratzer expresses such facts in auxiliary premises which together with the antecedent of a conditional may lead to the consequent. In 'Ordering semantics and premise semantics for counterfactuals' (1981) Lewis shows that the two approaches are equivalent, given adjustments of detail which he carefully explains.

In 'Logic for equivocators' (1982) Lewis considers the motivations for various relevant logics that avoid so-called paradoxes of relevance by allowing sentences to be both true and false (having a true negation). One way, he suggests, to allow such sentences is to relativize truth to a corpus of beliefs or data. The difficulty is that we characteristically use an inconsistent corpus by fragmenting it. How then do we coordinate the fragments logically? Finally Lewis suggests that the best way to accommodate true-and-false sentences is to keep track of ambiguity and disambiguation.

Lewis defines a subject matter as a function from possible worlds to exactly like world parts. Equivalently, it is such a likeness itself, an equivalence relation partitioning worlds into equivalence classes. Lewis uses subject matters to define relevance between propositions in 'Relevant implication' (1988). It turns out that whenever P classically implies Q, P is relevant to Q in Lewis's sense. In particular, *ex falso quodlibet* preserves relevance. Lewis makes many illuminating remarks comparing his approach to that of relevant logic.

In 'Sentences partly about observation' (1988), Lewis defines such sentences in terms of sentences entirely about observation, which in turn rest on his notion of subject matter and ultimately observation-statements. Sentences partly about observation are offered as a replacement for Ayer's meaningful statements in his criterion of empirical meaningfulness.

In 'Analog and digital' (1971) Lewis revises and extends Goodman's attempted definition of digital and analog representation of numbers. Lewis suggests that the digital representation of numbers is representation by differentiated multidigital magnitudes.

J.R. Lucas argued that he could not be a machine, because he can produce arithmetical truths that no machine could produce. In 'Lucas against mechanism' (1969) Lewis shows that while Lucas can certainly go beyond Peano arithmetic, it is not clear that he can go farther than any machine. A second paper on Lucas carries the argument forward.

Lewis remarks that Carnap's ambitious *Logischer Aufbau der Welt* develops many useful concepts and has never been tested on its own terms. In 'Policing the *Aufbau*' (1969), to solve the problem of imperfect community (spurious similarity circles), Lewis proposes to expunge 'hermits', i.e. quality classes similar to few other quality classes.

In 'Finitude and infinitude in the atomic calculus of individuals', written with Wilfrid Hodges (1968), the authors answer a question of Nelson Goodman's whether one can say in the atomic calculus of individuals that there are (in)finitely many atoms. Their answer is no.

In 'Nominalistic set theory' (1970), in a mereological context that is nominalistic in the sense of Goodman, Lewis shows how to define several relations that closely ape set-membership (which itself is not nominalistic).

In the final long paper of this collection, 'Mathematics is megethology' (1993), Lewis revises his book *Parts of classes* to exploit 'megethology' (size theory), i.e., mereology plus plural quantification, to prove that given the right size of Reality, there is a singleton function. The latter provides the sole set-theoretic primitive needed to embed set theory in mereology.

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Jean François Lyotard
Postmodern Fables.
Trans. Georges van den Abbeele.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
1997. Pp. 160.
US$17.95. ISBN 0-8166-2554-9.

This collection of essays conveys Lyotard's conviction that the meaninglessness of our age does not eradicate the desire to ask the question: Is it possible to articulate a politics, aesthetics and ethics in an age in which metaphysical ideals have become defunct? Thus, *Postmodern Fables* turns out to be a political manifesto directed at postmodernism. In the words of Lyotard: 'You're not done living because you chalk it up to artifice' (vii).

The peculiarity of this manifesto, however, is that it is quintessentially postmodern. Instead of a single manifesto Lyotard presents us with fifteen dispersed fables which are loosely held together in sections entitled: 'Verbiages', 'System', 'Fantasies', 'Concealments' and 'Crypts'. The fables themselves give the impression that the topics have been chosen at random. There is no grand narrative. We find discussions on the French Revolution, the Gulf war, the holocaust and fascism, aesthetic reflection, the reception of French theory in the Anglo-American world, the events of May 1968, the collapse of communism, intellectual tourism and human rights. These essays are hardly what we expect of a manifesto. There is no forceful voice: some fables are written in dialogue form and the language and style remain tentative and reflective. Nonetheless, they do constitute a manifesto, however, a postmodern one. There is one underlying issue that unites these fragments: The desire to search for meaning even though we know that we are living in an age devoid of meaning.

This absence of meaning should not keep us from asking such questions as 'how to live, and why?' (vii). In so doing Lyotard faces the impossible, yet the only possible position. He realises that an authentic struggle against postmodernism can only be a postmodern one. Aesthetics, ethics and politics have to face the postmodern condition without seeking refuge in metaphysical ideals. 'There is no path leading to emancipation', only 'the unbearable feeling that there is no road to follow' (111). Lyotard is intrigued by the blank space and the inertia that the loss of metaphysical ideals has left in its wake. Postmodernism attempts to flee from this void by finding aesthetic pleasure in representing the ruins of Western civilisation, yet art, literature and philosophy do not allow us to do so. There is always a moment of resistance which cannot be concealed. *Postmodern Fables* seeks to 'bear witness to the fact that there is something left behind' (32). Each fable risks the encounter with the true 'other' of postmodernism, the naked nothingness and unbearable silence which is the mark of our condition.

Postmodern Fables is a thought-provoking and, indeed, inspiring collection of essays which, however, always remains elusive and open-ended. The fables not only provide philosophical reflections on contemporary issues but

transmit a truly philosophical compulsion to ask questions even though there are no answers. However, one cannot help but wonder whether these fables do not in fact suffer from their own form of romanticism. If the unsayable, the silent, the dark or the transitory is the authentic source of critique, the question arises whether we are not in danger of fabulising the 'other' of postmodernism just because it is the 'other'.

Lyotard is aware of this danger; however, he seems to believe that an authentic critique can only draw on fables. Let us take his essay on the Gulf War as an example. Here Lyotard deplores the fact that our critical practices are no longer offensive but only defensive. We defend the rights of minorities only in as far as we can incorporate them into our global system. However, what intrigues Lyotard is that the Islamic *Umma* 'escapes both a purely liberal interpretation and a summary Marxist one' (79). There is no common language. Undoubtedly Lyotard idealises the voice of the muezzin that 'echoes through the cities and the deserts' (77). He likens it to 'the voice heard long ago by Abraham and Mohammed' (77), a voice that remains completely foreign to Western culture. Though fantastic, the aim of this description is not to entice us into endorsing Islam but into thinking the unthinkable. Lyotard describes the logic which leads to the marginalisation of certain practices and eventually to their disappearance, namely the dynamism in which a system closes itself off from our imaginary. In this manner Lyotard believes that it might be possible to 'analyze the contemporary world solely in terms of the relations of forces, that is, from the point of view of dynamics' (80). This dynamism, however, only becomes visible through the fabulisation of the 'other'. It is up to the reader to remember that these fables are condemned to remain fables.

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Wayne M. Martin
Idealism and Objectivity: Understanding Fichte's Jena Project.
Stanford: Stanford University Press 1997.
Pp. xvii + 177.
US$45.00. ISBN 0-8047-3000-8.

A central aim of Martin's book is to correct the misperception that Fichte's work is not relevant to contemporary philosophy. Martin does this through an analysis of the problem of the objectivity of human consciousness as it was developed in Fichte's Jena system. To serve this purpose, the book is appropriately divided into two parts. The first details the structure of the Jena system; the second gives an account of the elements of Fichte's theory of objectivity. This strategy allows Martin to integrate a well-developed historical contextualization of Fichte's work with a solid analysis of the problem of objectivity.

Although Martin's study is based in general upon Fichte's early writings, it exhibits a particular focus on the *Grundlage* of 1794-95 — for, claims Martin, 'it exerted most influence on the trajectory of post-Kantian thought' and further, it offers a 'rich terrain' (6) for exploring Fichte's account of the relation between theory and practice. This is part of Martin's larger concern with uncovering the resources for developing an idealist theory of objectivity in Fichte's early system.

The book opens with a clear and convincing account of Fichte's distinctions between idealism and realism on the one hand, and idealism and dogmatism on the other. First Martin makes reference to a recent debate which took place within North American Fichtean scholarship between Tom Rockmore and J. Douglas Rabb. The debate concerned Fichte's use of the dogmatism-idealism distinction and its implications for his view of the relation between realism and idealism. Next, Martin turns to another aspect of Fichte's view concerning idealism and dogmatism to uncover its kinship with a contemporary naturalistic position concerning the problem of representation. Here, Martin discusses in detail Fred Dretske's recent attempt to develop an account of representation within in a strictly causal framework. Martin's claim is that this account depends, in the end, 'on finding a way of accommodating normative notions within a causal framework' (51). According to Martin, this is indirect support for Fichte's claim against dogmatism, namely that: 'If we want to explain some system as a system of representation, then we seem to require explanatory resources beyond the principle of causality and natural mechanism' (51). With this observation and the discussion from which it follows, Martin's work offers us a perspective which introduces post-Kantian philosophy into present-day philosophical dialogue. Most other work on Fichte and his contemporaries is carried out within the context of what Dieter Henrich terms a 'constellation' of thinkers who each belong to the same generation. This way of approaching German idealism has provided philosophers with a detailed historical map of the period immediately follow-

ing the appearance of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, but it has also isolated the contributions of these thinkers from analytic treatments by contemporary philosophers. Unfortunately, given the growing division between analytic and continental philosophy, many scholars working on German idealism turn their backs on analytic philosophy, just as analytic philosophers working on the problem of representation would be loath to turn to Fichte for any useful insights. Martin blends the best of both of these traditions to shed light on a problem which is of perennial interest to all philosophers.

Fichte's view that the theory of objectivity must be antidogmatic is well illustrated by Martin's bold strategy of relating Fichte's views to Dretske's views. The second insight emphasized in Martin's study is that objectivity is rooted in the practical character of human beings. In his discussion of this view, Martin limits himself to a more conservative, historical approach, and once he places himself within this traditional context some structural infelicities arise. Early in the work, Martin underscores the importance of Fichte's review of *Aenesidemus*. Aenesidemus was published anonymously in 1792 as an attack upon Reinhold's *Elementarphilosophie*. The author of the attack was soon discovered to be Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1761-1833), a professor of philosophy at the University of Helmstadt. Throughout the review, Fichte uses his criticisms of both Schulze (Aenesidemus) and Reinhold to clear openings for his own thought. Martin recognizes the importance of the review and tells us that 'we will be returning on a number of occasions in this study to this short, cryptic, yet extremely important text' (34). And Martin does indeed return often to Fichte's review, but he falls short of presenting an organized account of its alleged importance.

The issue of philosophy's starting point could have been used to solve this problem and to emphasize Fichte's insight regarding the primacy of practice. Martin recognizes the importance which the problem of philosophy's starting point had on the development of Fichte's thought, stating that: 'Reinhold's attempt to develop [his] *Elementarphilosophie* shaped the early reception of Kant's philosophy in a number of important ways. First, his demand for systematicity (and his particular conception of what would count as meeting that demand) set in motion a lively debate about the starting point and methodology of philosophical investigation' (86-7). Martin, however, doesn't elaborate further on this problem. Hence, he misses an opportunity to tie this issue of philosophy's starting point to his account of Schulze's skepticism regarding 'Reinholdian representationalism'. According to Reinhold, all our conscious states are representations (88). Reinhold located the first principle of philosophy in a fact of consciousness. Schulze's skeptical response to this position was to claim that 'the very possibility of representation requires a set of mental acts to which the principle of consciousness does not apply' (88), hence either the first principle of philosophy must consist in some other fact, or there is no first principle for philosophy at all. According to Fichte, both Reinhold and Schulze err in believing that philosophy's starting point can be found in any fact at all because philosophy does not begin with any fact (*Tatsache*) at all but with an act (*Tathandlung*).

If an act rather than a fact is in the first principle of philosophy, then there will be obvious grounds for claiming a primacy for practice. Because Martin isolates the problem of skepticism from the problem of philosophy's starting point, we never get a thorough discussion of the role that Schulze's skepticism played in the development of Fichte's insight regarding the primacy of practice. In spite of this shortcoming, Martin's study is a solid contribution to Fichtean scholarship, and his attempt to indicate the contemporary relevance of Fichte's philosophy is successful.

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Patricia M. Matthews
The Significance of Beauty:
Kant on Feeling and the System of the Mind.
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997.
Pp. ix + 239.
US$99.00. ISBN 0-7923-4764-1.

Matthews explores the possible ways in which the judgment of taste might act as a mediating link between theoretical and practical reason in Kant's system of the mind. In doing so, she illuminates our understanding of Kant's account of beauty in interesting ways. In the introduction Matthews writes, 'Beauty need not lead to knowledge or moral activity in order to have value in our lives' (1). The aim of this book, however, is to show that the feeling of beauty does serve a larger purpose for Kant. The relevant feature of the experience of beauty is its 'ability to orient rational beings in a sensible world'. Matthews' book is dedicated to explaining how the experience of beauty does this.

Matthews sets out what can be understood to be the features of an experience of beauty according to the 'Analytic of the Beautiful', and the 'Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments' in chapter one. In the following two chapters she focuses on the two salient features of Kant's account of beauty: first, that it involves an engagement with perceptual form, the nature of which is underpinned by the principle of purposiveness; and secondly, that this engagement with perceptual form gives rise to an awareness of the manifold of intuitions. In chapter two she discusses the manifold of intuitions which accompany the state of mind produced in the experience of beauty not in relation to art or genius, but in relation to revolutionary ways of thinking

(71). She concentrates on the state of mind produced by the experience of natural beauty rather than artistic beauty. If we experience the beauty of nature, then at the same time we experience the aspects of the presentation that go beyond what can be comprehended in a given concept. Matthews speculates that 'part of making connections in science may involve considering aspects of the object that might have been ignored in our original conception of it' (71). It is through logical judgment that we make connections between objects, but it is through reflective aesthetic judgment that 'imagination opens us up to the possibility of complex interconnections in nature' (71). According to Matthews: 'In addition to exhibiting the idea of purposiveness for judgment and confirming its possibility, our feeling for beauty might offer us an initial sense of where to seek order in the world. ... Our feeling for order in appreciating beauty may give us an initial sense for the objects in the world that are worth initially pursuing in order to get our bearings. Kant speaks ... of the principle of purposiveness as one that orients us in nature's diversity, and appreciating the beauty of nature may be the first step in this orientation' (72-3). The possibility of discovery in science might be dependent on us having experienced the beauty of nature (72-3).

In chapter three, Matthews discusses Kant's idea of our supersensible nature as the foundation of common sense which in turn is the foundation of our ability to judge from an enlarged, rational perspective (108); that is, from the point of view of everyone else (a disinterested perspective). A judgment of beauty, though disinterested, is pleasurable because we feel what seems like a fit (a harmony) between the categories of the understanding and what seems like the structure of the world (but which is in fact the form of the imagination's presentation of the world). She explains that our sensible natures make us self-interested but that a judgment of beauty prepares us to judge from a disinterested standpoint, an enlarged perspective. As Matthews interprets Kant in section 42 of the third critique, the felt harmony between nature and our cognitive faculties in a judgment of taste, 'gives us a hint that nature might also harmonize with our moral ends' (161).

In chapters four and five, Matthews considers how Kant might achieve a system of the mind rather than a mere aggregate. For the powers of the mind to form a system they need to be grounded by the one a priori principle. Matthews herself acknowledges that while Kant claims to have achieved a system of the mind, it is not certain that he in fact does so. Matthews simply considers the possible ways that such a unity of mind might be achieved in Kant's work, with a particular interest in the significance of beauty for this task. This interest informs her reading of Kant's aesthetic theory, prompting her to interpret some aspects of it in new ways. For example, in opposition to those commentators who view the antinomy in the 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgment' as superfluous, Matthews argues in chapter four, that the 'Deduction of Judgments of Taste' establishes the first condition of a judgment of taste which is the harmony of the faculties (that allows for the possibility of a feeling that is universally communicable), while in the antinomy he establishes the second condition which is that the judgment of taste is based

on that universally communicable feeling, 'rather than on some other feeling' (135). Given that it is the feeling of beauty which is crucial to the transition, Matthews argues that the antinomy is 'part of Kant's evidence for showing that the powers of the mind form a system, that theoretical and practical reason have a common source' (136).

Matthews herself has a larger purpose in exploring beauty's role in the transition between cognition and desire in Kant's philosophy; and that is, to explore the idea that the experience of beauty plays a more crucial and interesting role in our lives than many contemporary understandings of beauty would allow. While this book will interest philosophers with a historical interest in Kant, it will also interest aestheticians with an interest in cognitive theories of beauty and anyone, for that matter, who is seriously interested in understanding the nature of beauty.

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Thomas May
Autonomy, Authority and Moral Responsibility.
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998.
Pp. 174.
US$99.00. ISBN 0-7923-4851-6.

In *Autonomy, Authority and Moral Responsibility*, Thomas May seeks to articulate a concept of autonomy that is compatible with the influence that law and other important forms of authority exert in our lives. Many philosophers worry that law necessarily functions in a way that infringes autonomy. While May is less successful in reconciling autonomy with law than with other forms of authority, his book is worthwhile reading for anyone interested in the problems associated with autonomy and authority.

In the first two chapters of the book, May introduces the topic of autonomy and considers Kant's conception of autonomy as self-sufficiency. The self-sufficient person is 'one who pursues ends not determined by some external purpose or perceived lacking in what is needed to flourish' (40). Such a person pursues friendship, for example, not because it satisfies a need or fills a perceived lacking, but rather because friendship is intrinsically good. On this view, autonomous behavior is governed by judgments of reason that are uncorrupted by the influence of desires and needs.

May rejects the Kantian view as incompatible with a rich and healthy human life. Desires and needs might occasionally corrupt deliberations, but they also make possible some of our most worthwhile and rewarding experiences. Further, May points out that the Kantian view is incompatible with forms of authority that enhance our potential for self-determination by increasing the number of options available to us. Being able to rely on my doctor's expertise, for example, frees energy that I can spend on the philosophical pursuits that are important to me.

In Chapter 3, May develops Aristotle's metaphor of the helmsman as the foundation for his concept of autonomy as self-rule. On May's view, the concept of autonomy as self-rule implies that behavior is autonomous to the extent that it is the product of the agent's evaluative assessment. My decision to pursue a career in philosophy instead of a career in law reflects a practical assessment based on values I choose; my pursuit of such a career is autonomous because I am the one 'steering' my behavior. As the helmsman of my behavior, I am guided by external influences, but not ruled by them.

In Chapter 4, May argues that autonomy as self-rule is not threatened by the prominent role desire plays in shaping behavior. On May's view, people are usually motivated to satisfy some desire, but 'they act in this way because they value (or at least do not disvalue) the satisfaction of the desire' (83). May believes that desires *motivate*, but do not cause behavior — at least, not in the sense that physical events cause their effects. The role desires play in motivating behavior is compatible with autonomy, according to May, because the agent decides for herself how much motivational force to ascribe to any given desire. For example, if I favor a desire to be thin over a more immediate desire to eat a cake, it is because I critically value the former desire more than the latter.

In Chapter 5, May considers the question of whether the existence of normative obligations poses any threat to agent autonomy. The problem arises because normative obligations provide second-order reasons for action that are supposed to pre-empt first-order reasons, like desires, that provide the motivation for autonomous behavior. Insofar as such obligations pre-empt the agent's own practical assessments of what is best for her, they seem to pose a threat to autonomy.

May argues that a normative standard is consistent with autonomy as long as the standard (1) 'is attached to an appropriate assessment by the agent' (111); and (2) 'allows the subject to steer her own behavior' (103). Thus, to the extent that a standard functions to override the agent's practical evaluation of various options, as Kantian imperatives purport to do, it is inconsistent with autonomy as self-rule because the standard, and not the agent, steers the agent's behavior.

Of course, as May points out in Chapter 6, some forms of authority are compatible with this account of autonomy because they rely on, rather than override, the agent's practical evaluation. For example, I treat my doctor's recommendations as authoritative because I judge those recommendations as a more reliable means to an end I have decided is valuable, namely, my

continued good health. My doctor's authority is ultimately constrained, then, by its relation to my practical judgments.

But this is not true of forms of authority, like the law, that are most in need of reconciliation with autonomy: my doctor permits me to reject her recommendations if I decide that they no longer serve my ends, but the law does not permit me to reject its requirements. The requirements of law override my practical assessments when those assessments recommend noncompliance. Legal requirements seem to function in exactly the same way that Kantian imperatives do.

In response to such concerns, May argues that the authority of law is more like the authority of a doctor than like the authority of a Kantian imperative. On May's view, autonomous agents 'appeal' to law because it makes possible benefits that would not be available otherwise; indeed, many of the material benefits we take for granted would not be possible without law. May believes that legal authority is constrained by the same standard that constrains medical authority: 'If the law fails to reflect the purpose for which it is adopted, it does not obligate compliance' (171). Accordingly, he concludes that 'the obligation to obey the law [is] subject to continued assessment by the [citizen]' (162).

The *moral* obligation to obey law may be subject to the citizen's assessment, but *legal* obligation is not. Far more often than not, laws are enforced without regard for whether they conflict with the agent's practical and moral assessments. Indeed, when moral and legal obligations conflict, as they often do, courts enforce the legal obligation. And this, of course, distinguishes the authority of law from the authority of a doctor. May's analysis fails to reconcile law and autonomy because he conflates *legal* and moral obligation.

Despite this shortcoming, *Autonomy, Authority and Moral Responsibility* makes an engaging contribution to the literature on autonomy.

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Vaughn R. McKim and
Stephen P. Turner, eds.
Causality in Crisis? Statistical Methods and the Search for Causal Knowledge in the Social Sciences.
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 1997. Pp. ix + 410.
US$38.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-268-00813-2);
US$22.00 (paper: ISBN 0-268-00824-8).

This is a collection of essays by a distinguished group of authors that is a 'must read' for those with an interest in causal modeling. Much, although by no means all, of the collection is devoted to discussion of the work of Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (SGS). This discussion is my focus here.

SGS have developed novel algorithms that, they contend, do better than other current methods in uncovering causal information from statistical data. There are useful contributions in this collection from all three authors (although see their *Causation, Prediction, and Search* [Lecture Notes in Statistics 81. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1993] for more detail).

In the first instance the algorithms output 'patterns' that represent independences in the input data. (Throughout this review, 'independence' refers to *probabilistic* independence.) Each pattern represents a class of directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). All the DAGs in a class represented by a given pattern are equivalent in the sense that they all represent the same set of independence relations; and the algorithms are complete in the sense that they generate all the DAGs that represent a given set of independence relations. (Sometimes there will be no DAG that represents a given set of independence relations, however.) A DAG is a set of vertices (representing variables) connected by single-headed arrows that represent conditional independences via the Markov condition, which states that if there is no arrow from vertex X to any member of the set of vertices **Y**, then **Y** is independent of X conditional on **Parents**(X) (where **Parents**(X) = {Z: Z is a vertex at the base of an arrow to X}).

The three DAGs below, interpreted in accord with the Markov condition, all represent the fact that X_1 is independent of X_3 given that the value of X_2 is known, and they will all be represented by the same pattern.

$X_1 \rightarrow X_2 \rightarrow X_3$

$X_1 \leftarrow X_2 \rightarrow X_3$

$X_1 \leftarrow X_2 \leftarrow X_3$

(Acyclicity is crucial here: if a directed graph contains cycles, then interpretation in accord with the Markov condition can yield false claims of independence.)

Thus far I have outlined only the respect in which the SGS algorithms are powerful computational tools that yield, with relative ease, elegant representations of independence relations. The most controversial aspect of SGS's

work appears at the next stage with their causal interpretation of the DAG's generated by their algorithms: an arrow in a *causal* DAG is to be interpreted as representing direct causal influence in the obvious direction. The algorithm most discussed is SGS's PC algorithm. A crucial theorem is that, modulo certain assumptions discussed below:

(T1) The true causal DAG lies within the class represented by the PC output pattern.

SGS do not propose an analysis of causation: they adopt an axiomatic approach in which the axioms speak of causation. Glymour draws an analogy (201) to the state of probability theory: Kolmogoroff's axioms speak of probability and provide the theory even in the absence of consensus on a substantive definition of probability. However, SGS do have a control notion of cause in mind: they are interested in the problem of how to predict the effects of interventions. Of course, this is a goal of much social science. SGS's approach is unique in the relative ease with which their software generates the putative candidates for the true causal DAG, and the relative lack of domain specific information required in order to do this. (I do not use 'information' in its factive sense: one of the advantages of SGS's methods appears to be that their results are less likely to be tainted by false background information. Presumably, however, background information may be helpful in the selection of one causal DAG from an output pattern.)

Given sample data and optional background knowledge, the PC algorithm first makes judgments about population conditional independences. These judgments require distributional assumptions — a first point of contention. If, however, the PC algorithm has accessed the true independences then (T1) holds provided that: the data are generated by some causal DAG; the *Causal* Markov and Faithfulness conditions are satisfied; and every common cause of a pair of measured variables is itself measured. (Dropping this last assumption does not render SGS's machinery entirely impotent, but it does, of course, reduce its inferential power.)

The Causal Markov assumption is that a variable X is independent of every other variable (except X's effects) conditional on all of its direct causes. Thus the arrangement of the arrows in a causal DAG will, under the Causal Markov assumption, typically entail various independences. To assume Faithfulness is to assume that no part of the independence structure true of the population arises 'accidentally': all independences result from the structure of the true causal DAG (under the Causal Markov assumption) and can be recovered from the output pattern.

These assumptions entail the common cause principle: if $p(X/Y)>p(X)$ then either X causes Y, or Y causes X, or there is a common cause of X and Y; and if Z is a common cause of X and Y, then $p(X/YZ)=p(X/Z)$ (Z screens off X from Y).

Scheines (198) sums up the SGS program thus:

> Contrary to what some take to be our purpose, we do not intend to magically pull causal rabbits out of a statistical hat. Our theory of

> causal inference investigates what can and cannot be learned about causal structure from a set of assumptions that seem to be made commonly in scientific practice. It is thus a theory about the inferential effect of a variety of assumptions far more than it is an endorsement of particular assumptions.

Perhaps, then, the following (which I glean from the essays by Cartwright, Freedman, Humphreys, and Woodward) poses a challenge to scientific practice more generally. Not all acyclic causal circumstances can be captured in causal DAGs. Nested causal relations are common, and cannot be represented in DAGs. Consider a violation of the common cause principle in which, say, p(+Z/+X)>p(+Z) because +Y is present and +X causes [+Y to cause +Z], whereas -X causes [+Y to cause -Z] (X has no causal effect on Y). Since +Y is present, we might say that +X 'causes' +Z in whatever sense of 'cause' one wants to impute to causal DAGs, and draw an arrow from X to Z. But this misses a crucial part of the causal structure. Suppose +X causes [-Y to cause -Z] and -X causes [-Y to cause +Z]. Then our causal DAG will yield false predictions if cases of -Y are selected. And it might fail to predict the effect of intervening to alter the value of X: perhaps such intervention would disrupt the link between +X and +Z by altering the value of Y.

Or consider the following nested case: I seem to recall findings to the effect that the causal relation between parenting style and offspring outcome varies in accord with societal mores — a parenting style successful in the 1950s failed in the 1960s. This raises the issue of whether background conditions are to count as causes of the causal relations they 'facilitate'. If so, then causal DAGs hardly ever (never?) fully represent the causal situation. (This might, however, be of little practical import if the background remains stable.)

A concern specific to SGS is the extent to which they can, as they claim, do with less domain specific knowledge than their competitors. Woodward, for example, notes that not all variables Z that screen off X from Y are common causes in the usual sense; and domain specific knowledge might well be required to distinguish common causes from mere screens.

The SGS software is, however, surely a useful addition to the social scientist's arsenal. At the least, when a more conventionally produced causal model is proposed, it should be compared with the relevant SGS output. This might well lead to mutual confirmation of putative causal connections; and if not, such comparison will point up areas of dispute where further data collection and analysis are required.

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Martin Montminy
Les fondements empiriques de la signification.
Montréal : Bellarmin. Pp. 237.
n.p. ISBN 2-89007-825-6.

On peut comprendre de deux manières le titre de l'excellent ouvrage de Martin Montminy. (1) Il existe des fondements empiriques et non empiriques à la signification et l'ouvrage portera exclusivement sur ces fondements qui sont de nature empirique. (2) Les fondements de la signification sont exclusivement de nature empirique et l'ouvrage traitera des fondements de la signification. Il faut entendre ' empirique ' ici comme on le fait traditionnellement en philosophie — rien n'est dans l'esprit qui ne fut dans les sens, principe rappelé par Montminy à la première page de son premier chapitre (17) — et non comme on le fait parfois dans le discours populaire comme signifiant ' scientifique ' ou ' naturel '. Car si tout philosophe contemporain admet que les fondements de la signification sont naturels, Montminy, suivant en cela Quine, opte pour la position plus radicale : les fondements de la signification sont exclusivement de nature *empirique*. Rien n'est dans le verbe qui ne fut dans les sens. C'est un des fameux principes de l'empirisme purgé de ses dogmes non empiriques : ' [...] all inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence. ' (Quine 1969, *Epistemology Naturalized*, 75). Tel est le principe sémantique de l'empirisme sans dogmes au cœur de la sémantique quinienne et de l'œuvre de Montminy : en situation d'accession au sens, l'interprète ne peut compter en dernière analyse que sur les évidences sensorielles ; les fondements de la signification sont exclusivement de nature empirique. De ce principe découlent les thèses fameuses de la sémantique quinienne, thèses présentées, évaluées et, le cas échéant, corrigées avec brio par Montminy : l'impossibilité d'établir une distinction stricte entre les énoncés analytiques et synthétiques, le statut privilégié de la situation de traduction radicale, l'indétermination de la traduction et le rôle fondamental du principe de charité.

Il convient cependant de souligner le statut épistémologique du principe. Il ne s'agit pas pour Quine ou Montminy d'une affirmation a priori mais d'une donnée scientifique confirmée : 'La science nous dit que notre seule source d'information sur le monde extérieur passe par l'impact de rayons lumineux et de molécules sur nos surfaces sensorielles ' (Quine 1975, *The Nature of Natural Knowledge*, cité par Montminy, 109). C'est ce statut a posteriori qui enchâsse la théorie empiriste de la signification de Quine au sein de son naturalisme et qui permet à Montminy d'affirmer (97) qu'il défend lui aussi une conception naturaliste de la signification. A cet égard, Montminy montre parfaitement comment l'ensemble de la sémantique quinienne découle de son naturalisme. Le naturalisme est la thèse voulant qu'il n'existe pas de savoir premier, dont la philosophie serait porteuse et le philosophe l'investigateur privilégié; pas de savoir antérieur au savoir scientifique lui servant de fondement. Le philosophe qui, comme Quine ou

Montminy, opte pour le naturalisme doit sévèrement contraindre son discours philosophique car il sait qu'aucun principe philosophique n'est à l'abri d'une réfutation empirique. Le naturalisme est un lourd fardeau car il signifie qu'un système philosophique ayant réussi avec honneur et distinction les épreuves internes à la discipline peut être balayé du revers de la main par une découverte scientifique inopportune.

Or le principe sémantique de l'empirisme est aujourd'hui remis en question par les sciences, tant la biologie que la neurologie que la psychologie et ainsi ne cadre plus aussi ' naturellement ' au sein de la science qu'on a pu le croire jadis quand Quine a posé les jalons de sa sémantique. Il n'est plus évident que les mots ne contiennent que ce qui fut dans les sens et, au mieux, le principe sémantique de l'empirisme sans dogmes est une prédiction sur l'état futur de la science. Plusieurs psychologues croient en effet que l'interprétation n'est pas uniquement contrainte par les données sensorielles mais aussi par un ensemble d'hypothèses *innées* — dans un sens nouveau, voir à ce sujet *Rethinking Innateness* de Elman (1996). Annette Karmiloff-Smith (1992), dans *Beyond Modularity*, explique ainsi que les enfants viendraient à l'interprétation armés de contraintes innés : que les mots prononcés par ceux qui les informes dénotent des objets entiers, que les mots acquis doivent toujours être appliqués aux objets de même catégorie taxinomique, que les nouveaux mots s'appliquent à des objets ne possédant pas déjà une étiquette linguistique. D'autres contraintes ont été proposées par d'autres chercheurs mais il ne convient pas d'en faire la revue ici. Le point est celui-ci : on peut comprendre ces hypothèses scientifiques, qui devront peser dans la balance du philosophe qui entend développer une conception naturaliste de signification, comme suggérant que, à l'origine, *nous* ne viendrions pas à l'interprétation en situation de traduction radicale — évidemment, la situation de traduction radicale est philosophiquement triviale si elle ne s'applique pas en dernière analyse à la manière par laquelle la signification *nous* est donnée (on ne s'intéresse aux fictions philosophiques que si elles explicitent un aspect de *notre* réalité). Les contraintes innées postulées par les psychologues peuvent certes s'avérer invalides, auquel cas l'empirisme quinien peut poursuivre sans altération son programme sémantique, mais il s'agit là désormais d'un pari (et personne n'aime fonder sa philosophie sur la prière qu'un pari s'avérera gagnant !). Je crois cependant que le philosophe qui entend poursuivre *aujourd'hui* le programme quinien peut faire mieux qu'un pari et une prière : il peut montrer que les contraintes innées n'affectent pas de manière substantielle la sémantique quinienne, ou encore il peut formuler une nouvelle sémantique naturaliste qui expurge le naturalisme quinien des ses dogmes empiristes.

S'il existe désormais des raisons de douter que le programme sémantique quinien développé par Montminy puisse être qualifié de naturaliste comme le souhaitait son fondateur, et ainsi s'insérer en toute cohérence dans le cadre d'une philosophie naturaliste, il n'y a aucune raison de douter de la qualité de l'étude qu'en fait Montminy. Il s'agit d'une œuvre d'une rare clarté qui intéressera tout philosophe cherchant à comprendre la sémantique de

ceux pour qui les fondements de la signification sont exclusivement de nature empirique.

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Christopher W. Morris
An Essay on the Modern State.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. x + 305.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-521-49625-X.

In this book, Morris critically discusses several aspects of the modern state. He does not develop an overarching, central argument. Rather, Morris defends limited theses responding to sundry questions about the state: how does a state differ from other political forms? is a state necessary for social order? does a state need to be efficient to be legitimate? how might one try to justify the state? is the state in fact a justified political form? does a state have sovereignty? what is the relation between nations and states? what functions should the state perform?

Morris correctly points out that most of these questions are not thoroughly addressed by contemporary political philosophers. Most theorists take the state for granted, focusing on the issues of who should wield the state's power to make laws, what laws the state should enforce, and how the state should respond to those who break the laws. The critical exploration of relatively neglected questions makes Morris' book a welcome addition to the field.

As one would expect from a member of the Bowling Green crew, Hobbesian and Lockean perspectives figure prominently in Morris' book. He principally explores prudentialist ('mutual advantage') and natural rights ('consensualist') answers to questions concerning the state's justification. That is, he works mostly with those normative theories which place the least demands on moral agents. More demanding normative theories, such as Marxist perfectionism or Kantian deontology, get slighted. Those more sympathetic to the latter sorts of theories will find themselves routinely disagreeing with the answers Morris gives to questions about the state's legitimacy and proper functions. However, his focus to some degree suits his subject matter. Morris aims to show that many features of states do seem justified and that the state should have a limited redistributive function. Since partisans of the least demanding normative theories are the ones most likely to disagree, it is understandable that Morris concentrates upon them.

I found Morris' exploration of alternatives to the state a particularly revealing and useful part of the book. Morris points out that the dichotomy between 'anarchy' and a state is false or at least misleading. Roughly, a state is a centralized, formal organization that is constituted by people who specialize in ruling and that claims a monopoly of legitimate force within a territory. Political philosophers typically act as though the only alternatives to this political form are either market-based dominant protection agencies or community-based, informal methods of dispute resolution (viz., those of small-scale, tribal societies). Morris informatively instructs us otherwise. For example, consider the *polis* (or the network among *poleis*) in ancient Greece; it lacked the centralization and transcendence characteristic of modern states. In addition, think about feudal society. Here, political rule was based upon social and cultural membership, rather than territory, so that bishops and popes of the church often had jurisdiction over the same territory as lords and monarchs. Another example, which Morris does not discuss, would be the federations of workers councils and citizens collectives that anarcho-syndicalists advocate (and that were operative during the Spanish Civil War).

These examples drive home the point that contemporary political philosophy really lacks a sophisticated analysis and defense of the state. The method of imagining a 'state of nature' in order to justify a state is quite appropriate; to test whether states are desirable, one ought to imagine a world without them. However, many different states of nature are possible. Since a variety of non-statist worlds are possible, to justify a state thoroughly, one would need to consider non-statist worlds with (just to name a few) dominant protection agencies, non-territorial feudal governance, and federations of communes. Political philosophers have yet to do this.

Morris does not try to provide a full-blown justification of the state, though he does lay some ground. For example, in one chapter, he argues that a state is the best provider of social order. He contends that dominant protection agencies will tend toward monopolization (viz., will become statelike), that community can be a source of social order only at the cost of privacy, and that we know feudal modes of governance were ineffective since the modern state eclipsed them.

These claims seem initially plausible, but they are not substantially defended in the book. One wonders whether there could be a way of organizing society so that one both knows one's neighbors well enough to ensure social order and has enough privacy. One would like to see substantial evidence that feudalism declined because of its inability to provide social order (or some other intolerable defect). And one wants some reason for thinking that federations of communes would be less able to provide social order than states.

In general, the cardinal virtue of this book, that it raises so many important and overlooked questions, is also its main problem; major topics get raised but without particularly thorough defenses of engaging theses. However, almost nothing is everything. The book contributes to political

philosophy by pointing to new areas for research. It clears away some of the brush and lays down a path worth extending.

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Maurice Natanson
The Erotic Bird: Phenomenology in Literature.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1998. Pp. xvi + 169.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-691-01210-9.

Completed shortly before his death in 1996, Maurice Natanson's *The Erotic Bird: Phenomenology in Literature* artfully weaves phenomenology through interpretations of major literary works in an effort to explore, 'the particular manner in which phenomenology is "in" literature' (8). One of the most unique aspects of Natanson's book, which makes it most accessible to the reader, is his use of everyday examples to give a context for phenomenological concepts. As Judith Butler reveals in her foreword: 'Natanson's text does not presume that the reader has been engaged in the exegesis of phenomenology for several decades, but begins with examples, anecdotes, passages, and other fragments from the everyday' (ix). This is not to say it is not a serious philosophical investigation. Natanson analyses some of Husserl's most unwieldy phenomenological concepts, using examples of the everyday to elucidate them. The book is useful not only to beginners, but as a way to see how these abstract concepts can be brought back into everyday life.

The first three chapters which outline Natanson's approach to phenomenology in literature draw much from Husserl. Chapter one is mainly devoted to Natanson's explanation of his own 'existential phenomenology,' by which he means 'a way of attending to the "things themselves," as Husserl calls them, which emphasizes their emotive coloration and "boundary" character (a phenomenological counterpart to what William James calls the "fringes" of meaning)' (9). Natanson also uses the work of Alfred Schutz extensively to introduce and explain such Husserlian phenomenological concepts as *epoché* and essence in beginning to investigate the 'current of existence' which Natanson argues to be 'the phenomenological clue to the essence of literature' (20).

In chapter two we are introduced to the concept of fictive reality understood as 'the "irreality" intended by noetic acts which constitute a purely *meant* modality of being' (22). Natanson quotes Husserl more directly in this

chapter, providing an extremely lucid description of Husserl's phenomenology, examining notions such as *Evidenz, Lebenswelt*, intentionality, the noetic-noematic correlation and the transcendental ego. Natanson explains these concepts through everyday experiences, drawing on anecdotes from his own life and referring to the work of Camus, Sartre, Dickens, Beckett and Schutz, while at the same time distinguishing his own approach from that of Husserl.

Moving away from Husserl, chapter three is a further precision of existential phenomenology. Not to be understood as either a type or a school of phenomenology, it is simply his self-description of how he lives phenomenology. Natanson searches for a middle ground between Husserl's requirement of the necessity of generations of phenomenologists' work to build a universal formalism and Sartre's destruction of the transcendental ego (42). An in-depth discussion of the life-world is the focus of the chapter and the final part of the chapter introduces a notion characteristic of each fiction and central to the work as a whole: strangeness.

Chapter four is the beginning of the investigation of the three literary works. Natanson does not seek here in these chapters to give a definitive interpretation of the works hitherto unattained by other methods of interpretation, rather, his analysis aims to 'suggest that the relationship between philosophy and literature can be reapproached by way of phenomenology, that method here is not a device, but a modality of comprehension' (64). *Waiting for Godot*, Natanson tells us, is an irrealization of time (66); bracketed are things which one normally takes for granted as real, true, reliable in everyday life — things such as time, movement, sitting down, even death. Everything becomes uncanny.

Mann's *The Magic Mountain* is described as a 'perpendicular' novel, as opposed to Beckett's 'horizontal' fiction. Rather than being an irrealization of everyday life, Mann's novel is characterized by Natanson as 'magic realism.' Here we see Husserl's concept of horizon applied to the novel, and again the notion of time as uncanny. Natanson reads this as Mann's '*leitmotiv*' and uses it to capture Husserl's notions of protention and retention in the discussion of time-consciousness. Interestingly however, despite his employment of existential phenomenology in his analysis, Natanson concludes that *The Magic Mountain* itself is neither existential or phenomenological (103).

In the analysis of Gregor's metamorphosis into an insect in chapter six we see perhaps the most striking instance of the theme of the familiar becoming strange. While this is a central theme of the work, and Natanson refers to a myriad of philosophers and writers, and furthermore one of his implicit criticisms of phenomenology is its abstractions of concepts from the everyday, it is interesting that he does not invoke Heidegger's concept of the uncanny as found in *Being and Time*. In his investigation of *The Metamorphosis*, Natanson points out that what comes into question is the very concept of reality. Natanson recognizes Gregor's two most important questions: 'What has happened to me?' and 'Will you give a true account of this?', as unanswerable transcendental questions, returning again to Husserl's phenomenology

at the end of the chapter and in the final chapter which makes explicit what has been seen in all three investigations: the importance of metaphor for philosophy.

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Lowell Nissen
Teleological Language in the Life Sciences.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 1997.
Pp. x + 258.
US$52.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8693-0);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8694-9).

Teleological Language in the Life Sciences provides a philosophical narrative that is roughly chronological. Nissen begins with behaviouristic accounts of teleological language (Ch. 1), following this with detailed discussions of negative feedback (Ch. 2) and natural selection (Ch. 3). These failed analyses lay the groundwork for Chapters 5 and 6 which are devoted, respectively, to the influential work of Larry Wright (1976, *Teleological Explanations*) and to that of Andrew Woodfield (1976, *Teleology*). Chapter 7 offers an interesting but less-than-complete discussion of more recent ideas about teleology. Philosophers such as Millikan, Dretske, and Papineau are discussed, though not with the thoroughness one finds in earlier chapters. The book finishes up with an argument for the irreducibility of intentional concepts in the analysis of teleological language (Ch. 8).

Nissen's approach to teleology rests on the idea that ordinary language — talk of goal-directed behaviour and functions in everyday life and in science — provide the evidence and suggest the appropriate tests for a successful theory of teleology. The author practices a rigorous version of the example/counterexample style of analytical philosophy, and much of the book is devoted to the production of counterexamples for proposed definitions of 'goal directed' and 'function'. This is an approach that can become tedious — ditto for the idea that ordinary language is the arbiter of theory. Fortunately, Nissen does a thorough job of identifying the difficulties that any account of teleology must address. Such an account must deal with reverse causation. (Is it the satisfaction that comes from a meal which causes one to seek it out?) It must distinguish among potentially multiple goals and/or functions. (Is the function of the heart to pump or to thump?) It must discriminate among realized goals and unrealized ones, as well as *realizable* goals and impossible

ones. (What if my goal is to build a perpetual motion machine?) Nissen tracks these issues down, showing clearly how and where they arise throughout the literature on teleology.

The problems mentioned above — and others are discussed — lead Nissen to conclude that one will 'need to include something about representation in the analysis' (178). He is not the only philosopher to claim this — Nissen notes that the idea first appears explicitly in the literature on teleology in 1979 (33) — nor is his view that intentionality is required for teleological ascriptions unique. To cite a well known example: Daniel Dennett's 'intentional stance' (*Intentional Stance*, 1982) requires it. (It is surprising that Dennett's name makes no appearance in the book.) This is not to say that Nissen's final position is unremarkable. Most philosophers and scientists who take teleological language to be explanatory believe that its seeming intentionality can be reduced, to the non-intentional. Not so for Nissen: 'The view that seems to meet the many conditions and restrictions of teleological language is the one that takes goals as fundamental to all teleological talk, links functions to goals by claiming functions to be a product of goal directed behaviour, and grounds both functions and goals on intentionality' (227). This conclusion is derived, in large part, from the failures of reductionism — failures Nissen charts in his book. It is a lot for philosophers — and scientists — to swallow. Since only minded creatures or artifacts have goals or are produced to achieve goals, lower organisms and specific organs (e.g., the heart) cannot be literally described in teleological terms. This leads Nissen to the following pair of alternatives: 'the options seem to be to admit an external agent into the worldview ... or to exclude the use of teleological language from the life sciences ... These choices are widely regarded as so extreme and untenable that any alternative is preferred' (228). Since Nissen is committed to an intentionalistic analysis it would seem that he accepts one, the other, or some combination of these options. Wisely, perhaps, he does not tell us which of these unappealing choices he prefers, suggesting only that it is time for philosophers to reassess their confidence in reductive accounts.

Teleological Language in the Life Sciences is a good and useful book. Those unsympathetic to ordinary language as gold-standard may reject the basic approach — or wonder if Nissen's own considered view is itself consistent with run-of-the-mill teleo-talk: How does the claim that a heart has no function square with ordinary usage? However these issues are settled, this book provides a valuable survey of analytical philosophy concerned with teleological language. It is a compendium of the problems with numerous theories of such language and it offers good accounts of how the problems arise. It includes important discussions of the relationship between goal-directed and functional language. It is critical of views such as Wright's that have wide support, and defends others such as Woodfield's that have not, according to Nissen, received their due. *Teleological Language in the Life Sciences* also presents a substantive positive thesis (no intentionality, no teleological explanation) which should help to make this clearly written book

a provocative read for the burgeoning corps of analytical philosophers enmeshed in goals, functions, and evolution.

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Michael O'Donovan-Anderson
Content and Comportment, On Embodiment and the Epistemic Availability of the World.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1997.
Pp. x + 167.
US$53.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8624-8);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8625-6).

In *Content and Comportment* Michael O'Donovan-Anderson sets himself to undermine what he calls the fourth dogma of empiricism, viz., 'the assumption that our epistemic access to the world is limited to the deliverances of the sense organs' (5). As he goes on to say: 'The fourth dogma, what I wish to deny, is what is left of empiricism once we have purged from it Quine's two and Davidson's third dogmas. These dogmas relate to the nature of experience itself: to accept the arguments of Quine and Davidson ... is to deny that, prior to conceptual synthesis, sensation has qualities which can be experienced non-cognitively as such; it is to deny that (again, prior to cognitive interpretation) experience has what Rorty calls "raw feels" in terms of which we can access or get some phenomenological handle on, our sensory experience' (5). For the empiricist heretics Quine, Davidson and Rorty, 'our sensory experience of the world is always already arranged by and in terms of our conceptual structures' (6). O'Donovan-Anderson endorses this erstwhile heresy, now orthodoxy, but holds that it does not go far enough, and certainly not as far as Davidson supposes: 'The depth of this critique entices Davidson to claim that after we deny the third dogma there is nothing left to the empiricist position. But it is not so. It is true that the account of the *nature* of sensory experience we are left with would be quite alien to the classical empiricist. But the notion remains that such experience as this is our only sort of contact with the world with cognitive and epistemic significance. It is this I wish to deny' (6).

O'Donovan-Anderson then is arguing that there is *more* (and other) to our epistemic contact with the world than just sensory experience, however conceptually informed, and he argues further, that there *must* be something more if the alternatives of idealism and scepticism are to be avoided. What more? 'What I hope to show is that attention paid to the epistemic importance

of the active body is well rewarded; dilemmas like the above are compelling only when we accept the fourth dogma of empiricism, that we have but one, sensual mode of epistemic access to the world. I will argue that the active body offers a mode of epistemic access to the world which compliments (sic) but is not reducible to the mode of access offered by sensation' (16).

O'Donovan-Anderson makes out his negative thesis as to the inadequacy of fourth dogmatism in overcoming the idealism/scepticism dilemma by way of discussions of, among others, Frege, Peirce, James, Locke, McDowell, and Evans, as well as the philosophers mentioned above. These discussions are by and large interesting, original and insightful, as is much of his positive thesis about comportment as epistemic access to — in the main, bodily interaction with — the world. And yet, as I must report, in my view it is philosophically all for nought.

What nullifies much of O'Donovan-Anderson's account is *his* acceptance of what I suppose must be the fifth dogma of empiricism but deserves to be known as the first. 'I am committed', he declares, 'to the accuracy of the analyses of sensual experience given by Quine, Davidson and others, and thus I am committed to their account of the status of perceptual knowledge' (102). Such an analysis and account consists of the view that our perceptual consciousness of things is constituted by or otherwise involves some sort of epistemic dealings with mental entities or stuff and that these dealings are required to *get us from* the mental entities *to* the things. Thus, as can be seen above (and elsewhere in the book, *passim*), O'Donovan-Anderson, in time-honoured empiricist fashion, refers to our perceptual consciousness of things as 'sensation', or again as 'the deliverances of our sense-organs'. What our sense-organs 'deliver' is not the physical world but the mental world (this on the mistaken assumption that sensations — pains and itches — are objects of consciousness rather than a type of consciousness of objects — one's toe, for example). This world — the 'mental contents of consciousness', 'representations', etc. — must be interpreted and organized so as to *get to* the physical world. So we hear of how, for the sense of touch, 'the impulses it sends to be interpreted into conceptually significant content are in the same epistemic boat as the deliverances of the other senses' (117-18), of how 'the object must be defined in terms of our mental arrangements of sensual material' (15), of 'the linguistic-conceptual matrix which structures sensation so as to allow for the perceptual identification of particulars' (103), and of how 'there is no reason to suppose that there are any external limits on our possible interpretive arrangements of surface irritations' (66) since 'experience itself ("surface irritations") has no content capable of resisting any organizing theoretical overlay' (79). — 'So the question becomes: in virtue of what are we able to make the leap from interpretation of sensory information to the recognition of the attributes of objects?' (106). O'Donovan-Anderson's answer is the active body. But in fact no such leap occurs or is necessary.

O'Donovan-Anderson asserts that with 'the now popular understanding that experience is always holistic ... the idea of sense-data must be replaced with the notion of a temporally instantiated sensory field...' (62). This,

however, is no replacement of the idea of sense-data but only sense-data under another name. The sense-data are retained but with the Quine-Davidson (-Kant) overlay of an equally mythical conceptual sorting, and all of this in turn is retained — indeed 'saved' — by the appeal to bodily comportment ('In this way our comportmental access to a thing influences the formation of the concept(s) whereby perceptual information is interpreted; the shape and structure of the physical world limits and directs bodily activity, and thereby influences the concepts by which we interpret our percepts' [117]). O'Donovan-Anderson speaks of the boundaries, edges, shapes and shadings of things not as *visible* qualities but as 'visual qualities' (115), as elsewhere, again in time-honoured empiricist fashion, he speaks of 'sensible qualities' (113, 147) and 'sensual properties' (15). These sense-data are then deemed insufficient as clues to 'the individuality of objects' (115) — they are not enough to let us make the leap to things with the metaphysical significance of physical, mind-independent particulars: 'but this significance cannot be derived from the qualities of the perceptual field considered as such; there is nothing intrinsic to the phenomenological quality of the shading around a sphere which makes it signify the boundary of that sphere' (115). In other words, our sight informs us not of outness. But, of course, it does. To see is to see in depth, given which we can also see that things are round or rough or plump or plush or deep or shallow. It goes without saying that what one can see one can touch or get closer to or walk round and in general 'interact with bodily' *in other ways*. There is no question of having to make up the epistemic deficiencies of what perception allegedly gives us — 'sensation' or 'sensory experience' or 'the perceptual field as such' — in order to get to the mind-independent things. We perceive *them*. This does not require 'getting some phenomenological handle on our sensory experience' or otherwise finding it already conceptually prepared for our intentional rendezvous with 'the external world'.

But for the fifth dogma of empiricism — that our perceptual experience is a stuff we are conscious of and which in turn mediates our consciousness of the world — no one would ever suppose our experience figures in our relation to the world except as experience precisely *of* the world. The 'argument from illusion' you say? ... Humbug! Perception and bodily activity are all of a piece and all such experience is of the world. Idealism and scepticism are to be avoided by avoiding the metaphysical delusion of 'ideas' — the *Grunddogma* of empiricism. Would that it were only a surface irritation in the history of modern philosophy. Alas, it runs very deep.

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Robert F. Schopp
Justification Defenses and Just Convictions.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. x + 212.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-521-62211-5.

In this excellent study, Schopp advances a complex, tightly argued set of claims demonstrating how philosophical analysis, empirical studies, and moral philosophy yield substantive implications for the justification and excuses in criminal law.

The criminal law, Schopp argues, embodies a significant component of conventional public morality. As such, it provides prohibitory norms designed to maintain a system of cooperative social interaction, but also an important expressive function. Legal conviction and punishment paradigmatically express condemnation of requiring: (1) an offense definition that also prescribes a punishment; (2) ratification by a jury of the general category proscribed by (1); (3) condemnation by a jury of a particular instance of (1); (4) condemnation of a defendant as someone who violated the criminal law as an accountable agent; and (5) condemnation of the defendant as morally blameworthy for his conduct.

Frequently, however, cases arise where defendants have either a justification or an excuse for what they do. Schopp contends that justification defenses exempt because their actions 'do not violate the fully articulated conventional public morality' while excuses, by contrast, 'exculpate those who violate the public morality but not in the capacity of accountable agents' because, typically, they lack either *capacities* or *knowledge* (200). To show this, Schopp considers a variety of cases involving self-defense, battered woman, lesser evil, duress, crimes of conscience, and jury nullification.

Self-defense, Schopp argues, reflects liberal principles of political morality that vest fundamental and absolute value in the individual's right to self-determination and recognition of each as a sovereign with equal standing. Aggressors impute inequality of standing by unjustifiably violating the victim's protected domain. Victims may therefore use any force necessary to protect this domain: they are under no obligation, Schopp maintains, to observe either rules of proportion or retreat against an aggressor. Even if a victim could easily avoid a life-threatening encounter with an aggressor by running away, for example, he may kill the aggressor if that will protect his sovereignty. They must, however, consider the interests of innocent aggressors (e.g., children shooting guns) or shields and may not violate their sovereignty. Schopp's argument is partially descriptive, partly prescriptive, for the law as it stands does not always draw lines where Schopp would have them. Nor is it obvious that it should. Only by assuming that liberal principles of conventional political morality draw a sharp distinction between our sovereignty and our other interests (where proportionality matters) does Schopp's argument go through. Further, although he acknowledges that one might, Schopp never challenges conventional morality and political philoso-

phy that the criminal law embodies. In itself, this doesn't undermine Schopp's analysis of existing criminal law in liberal societies, but it does suggest that a complete theory may have to go beyond 'middle level' theorizing.

Schopp, who is both professor of law and psychology, expresses deep skepticism about the widely accepted Battered Wife Syndrome defense. On the basis of previous studies he has done with others, he believes that the evidence simply doesn't (yet) support the syndrome. That does not mean, however, that battered wives who kill their sleeping husbands must be convicted. For the fact that the threat is not *immediate* does not mean that a killing may not be reasonably believed to be *the last available time* to protect one's life, especially if there is evidence that, in fact, a wife will not get protection from legal authorities. In that case, a wife will be *justified*. If there is a pattern of battering and a wife *reasonably* believes either that it is now or never and that the law will not come to her assistance, then a wife deserves to be *excused* for killing. Schopp argues convincingly that battered wives should not be tagged with 'learned helplessness' or regarded as mentally ill. His analysis and recommendation deserves careful consideration, especially if his assessment of the empirical evidence proves sound.

Duress has always proved problematic in law and morality. Should it be regarded as a justification or an excuse? Schopp argues that it is neither. He contends that duress represents the kind of case that should be subject to *mitigation* resulting in purely vindicating convictions. That is, the defendant should be convicted, but not punished: 'They do not deserve punishment in a retributive system that punishes in proportion to blameworthiness ... because they are not blameworthy by the standards of conventional morality, which does not require heroic discipline and fortitude' (144). Schopp prefers vindicating convictions to suspended sentences, because the former takes the sting out of the expressive nature of punishment, yet might satisfy those harmed by coerced defendants because a conviction results.

Appeals to necessity (or lesser evil) allow 'exculpation through appeal to justificatory principles contained in the conventional morality embodied in the law' (170). Were a defendant to set fire to a stranger's house to attract attention so that a seriously injured child could be saved, he ought not be convicted, though he is fully responsible and knows what he is doing. Putative crimes are not crimes. (The defendant, however, may well be liable in tort.) However, Schopp is sharply critical of jury nullification. Although juries, in fact, will not be punished if they refuse to apply facts to the law, it is impermissible for them to do so. Schopp considers arguments pro and con, concluding that while the necessity defense can be *part* of law, jury nullification is necessarily *outside* the law. This does not entail, however, that juries should never nullify, only that where it is justified it will be because *other* moral reasons derived from their private comprehensive doctrines, not conventional public morality. But why suppose that this could be the only source of other moral reasons? Why might one not appeal to *critical* public morality?

Throughout Schopp too easily accepts Rawls' distinction into public and private.

One doesn't need familiarity with jurisprudence generally to find Schopp's analysis and recommendations clear, accessible, important, and controversial. Highly recommended for anyone interested in moral philosophy or philosophy of law.

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Steven Shapin
La révolution scientifique.
Traduit de l'anglas par Claire Larsonneur.
Paris: Flammarion, Nouvelle Bibliothèque Scientifique 1998. Pp. 260.
135 FF. ISBN 2-08-211234-9.

'La Révolution scientifique n'a jamais existé et pourtant ce livre lui est consacré. Il y a quelque temps, quand le monde universitaire présentait plus de certitudes et de confort, certains historiens affirmèrent qu'un événement cohérent et cataclysmique, une sorte de point culminant, s'était réellement produit et qu'il avait, de plus, profondément et irrévocablement modifié à la fois la connaissance du monde naturel et les méthodes utilisées pour acquérir un tel savoir. Ce fut le moment inaugural de la modernité, ce fut un Bien et cela eut lieu entre la fin du XVI^{e} siècle et le début du XVIII^{e} siècle' (11). Cette affirmation résume bien la thèse principale du livre de Shapin: l'utilisation du terme «Révolution scientifique» par l'historiographie classique n'est pas théoriquement innocente, elle implique une forme d'essentialisme qu'il importe de mettre en lumière. Selon l'auteur, cet emploi a conduit à occulter une réalité foisonnante et hétérogène qu'a révélé les travaux récents des historiens et sociologues des sciences sur cette période. C'est cette révolution dans la façon de concevoir la révolution qu'il veut rendre accessible au plus large auditoire possible. Shapin, on le sait, est un des principaux porte-parole de ce courant que l'on nomme le 'programme fort' en philosophie des sciences courant qui met l'accent sur les facteurs «externes» (principalement sociologiques et culturels) dans le processus menant à l'acceptation des croyances scientifiques. Si on est loin maintenant des débats houleux entre les internalistes et les externalistes, il reste de cet épisode un souci pour la science en action, pour la fabrication et la consolidation de la connaissance et pour son rôle qui nous éloigne de l'histoire désincarnée des idées à laquelle on nous

avait habitués. Cette préoccupation est particulièrement visible dans l'organisation du livre qui s'articule autour de trois questions: 'Que connaissait-on?', 'Comment le savoir était-il acquis?' et 'À quoi le savoir était-il destiné?'.

Le premier chapitre présente le triomphe de la connaissance mécaniste sur l'aristotélisme et sur le naturalisme de la Renaissance. La fonction de la machine dans le processus de «désenchantement du monde» (l'expression est de Max Weber) y est expliquée succinctement et clairement. L'auteur décrit entre autres comment l'idée de considérer la nature comme une machine va à l'encontre de la distinction fondamentale de la philosophie aristotélicienne entre le naturel et l'artificiel et comment la description micromécanique de la réalité en est venue à prendre le pas sur la réalité du sens commun s'opposant du même coup à la théorie des «formes substantielles». Cette brèche ouverte entre l'image manifeste du monde et l'image scientifique, cette dépersonnalisation de l'objet de connaissance qui n'alla plus que s'accentuer, est une partie importante de l'héritage culturel de cette époque. Shapin termine le chapitre en montrant que les philosophes étaient divisés quant aux conséquences sur le style de la pratique scientifique de l'idée d'une structure mathématique sous-jacente à la réalité, qui est pourtant à la racine de la conception de l'objectivité.

Le second chapitre porte sur la mécanisation des méthodes d'acquisition de la connaissance et sur les divergences entre les philosophes modernes au sujet du niveau de généralité de l'explication mécaniste ainsi que sur la nécessité des expériences artificielles. C'est que l'acceptation commune du mécanisme par les scientifiques de l'époque masque des divergences profondes dans leur façon d'en interpréter les exigences. Par exemple, vestige souvent négligé de l'aristotélisme, Galilée, Pascal, Descartes et Hobbes quoique acceptant le rôle de l'expérience dans la constitution de la connaissance, interprètent l'«expérience» comme «ce qui arrive dans la nature» et non comme ce qui est produit par des instruments dans des conditions expérimentales. Cette attitude s'oppose à celle des savants anglais qui, non seulement reconnurent la valeur des données provenant de l'expérimentation artificielle, mais en firent la promotion. Une partie du second chapitre est dévolue à l'explication du rôle de la pompe à air de Boyle dans la publicisation de la méthode expérimentale par la *Royal Society of London* ainsi qu'au débat autour de son utilité. Ceux qui, comme Boyle, acceptaient que les résultats de l'expérimentation artificielle étaient des états de faits de la nature, devaient cependant en expliquer la cause. Or comment justifier le passage des connaissances factuelles aux connaissances théoriques? Si Boyle semble avoir voulu se cantonner à la description des états de faits et attribuer au savoir théorique un statut probabiliste (dû à la sous-détermination des théories par les faits), d'autres comme Newton, plus audacieux, n'auront pas toujours cette réserve et voudront parler de «véritables causes» en leur attribuant le statut de certitude. Shapin explique comment cette différence tient au poids différent accordé par les scientifiques aux mathématiques et à l'expérience respectivement.

Dans le dernier chapitre, Shapin cherche à comprendre la raison de cette réforme de la connaissance, de la rupture qui s'opéra avec le caractère procédurier de la connaissance universitaire de l'époque. Selon lui, l'explication ne se trouve pas dans l'invocation d'une motivation vague comme un «désir de connaissance» ou «une quête de la vérité». Il faut plutôt se tourner vers l'état désordonné du savoir provenant du Moyen Age et au risque qu'il faisait courir aux institutions. Contrairement aux idées reçues, la nouvelle connaissance entretient des rapports étroits avec l'État et la Religion. Tout d'abord, outre leurs bénéfices militaires et pratiques, les nouvelles procédures de production du savoir agissent comme un remède au scepticisme qui risque d'apparaître en réponse à l'érosion des systèmes institutionnels de contrôle du savoir qui survient au début du XVII^{e} siècle. Cette période voit également une modification de l'origine sociale des savants: la science est désormais le fait de gentilshommes (souvent rattachés à des cours princières) et non plus d'universitaires. Le style même de la discussion scientifique s'en trouve modifié: plus de querelles sans fin sur la théologie et la métaphysique, on doit éviter autant que possible les sujets polémiques. Il ne faut pourtant pas croire que les préoccupations religieuses se trouvèrent exclues d'office de la science. Certains mécanistes, en lisant le Livre de la Nature, croyaient prêter un support indépendant à l'autre livre auquel, croyait-on, Dieu était la source: les Saintes Écritures. 'Plus nous en savons sur le monde-machine', pensaient-ils, 'plus nous sommes persuadés non seulement de l'existence d'un Dieu créateur, mais encore de sa sagesse créatrice, car il n'est pas concevable qu'une telle machine ait été produite par la rencontre fortuite de corpuscules.' (174)

Le livre se termine par une étude bibliographique des principaux thèmes de l'historiographie contemporaine sur l'époque de la Révolution scientifique. Malheureusement, mais on ne peut en tenir rigueur à l'auteur, une grande partie du corpus présenté est en langue anglaise, ce qui découragera sûrement certains lecteurs. En dépit de ce problème mineur, 'La Révolution scientifique' constitue une excellente introduction à cette période de grands bouleversements idéologiques et devrait figurer, pour cette raison, au programme de tout cours d'histoire des idées ou d'introduction à la philosophie des sciences.

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George Sher
Approximate Justice:
Studies in Non-Ideal Theory.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1997.
Pp. xiii + 185.
US$58.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8753-8);
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8754-6).

What does justice require when existing social arrangements fall short of the ideal? This is the question addressed in this collection, which brings together twelve papers published by Sher over twenty-odd years. Two have been re-written for this volume, while one is new. The majority discuss the right response to injustices experienced by groups such as ethnic minorities and women, particularly the justification of reverse discrimination policies. Others tackle related issues of equal opportunity, and the rationality of moral compromise over abortion, while the new essay defends Sher's retributivist account of punishment against its critics. Throughout, the style is one of rigorous analysis and argument, in areas where the waters are frequently extremely muddy.

Sher defends a limited form of reverse discrimination, as compensation for the present effects of past injustices. Such compensation is not unfair to those adversely affected by preferential policies, since they stood to gain from injustice. It is limited in two respects. First, those who have suffered from injustice only very roughly correspond to those groups normally picked out to benefit from preferential treatment: not every black person, or every woman, has suffered in a relevant way (say, in their ability to compete effectively for jobs) as a result of discrimination. And, Sher argues, it makes no sense to say in response that the injustice was done to groups as such, rather than individuals, since groups are not entities to which considerations of justice can apply, and anyway there is no non-arbitrary reason to pick out just these groups rather than the many others to which deprived individuals also belong.

The second limitation arises from the degree of preferential treatment which Sher's account justifies. We can justly treat preferentially those who stand to suffer from past injustices over those who would otherwise gain, to the extent required to rectify the injustice. But this raises metaphysical and epistemic problems of how we know who these people are, and how much each stands to gain or lose. Our inability to answer these questions with any great precision means that affirmative action policies are in practice nearly always unfair, to an uncertain extent. The implication is that we must judge whether the unfairness such policies create is greater than that which would otherwise go unrectified in their absence. We are thus forced to make trade-offs between competing claims to justice.

These restrictions on affirmative action policies arise because Sher conceives them as being addressed to providing compensatory justice. But must we think that rectification of past wrongs is the right aim to pursue? On this

fundamental point Sher's arguments seem less compelling. Some proponents of affirmative action advance a consequentialist justification. The aim, for them, is to bring about a desired situation where social roles and attitudes are less rigidly stereotyped. Sher attempts to show that at bottom this account must still depend upon a backward-looking notion of past injustice in order to determine who should benefit from preferential treatment, and that therefore compensatory justice remains the fundamental notion. But this last step is unargued, a gap Sher acknowledges in a footnote (on page 95) but does not bridge. Yet the inference seems far from obvious. Past injustice may figure in a consequentialist theory as part of the explanation of why current social practices are not what we would desire, and thus direct our attention to what should change. But it need not matter whether the individuals benefited under affirmative action are precisely those who would have done less well without it, if the aim is to have an aggregate effect.

What underpins Sher's insistence that deviations from ideal justice raise questions of compensation is the centrality he gives to the notion of personal desert. He has already given us a book on this topic (*Desert*, Princeton University Press 1987). Now he devotes one chapter to a critique of John Rawls' non-desert based theory of justice. If justice is a question of people getting what they deserve, then the question naturally arises of compensating them when the actions of others prevent them receiving their just deserts. But Rawls argued that the justice of any distribution of benefits is never a matter of people getting what we deserve, since we don't deserve whatever natural capacities we happen to have, and thus cannot deserve any advantages we derive from them either. Sher criticises this argument on the grounds that if desert depends upon our deserving the conditions for producing benefits, then lack of desert follows just as well from our not deserving to live in a life-sustaining environment, which is also necessary to the production of those benefits. Sher therefore thinks that what Rawls must be understood as saying is that we specifically do not deserve any capacities we have which give us an advantage over others, such as being able to try harder. This means Rawls accepting that we do deserve capacities which we have equally with others; moreover, Sher goes on to claim that while people make different efforts, that does not mean they have unequal capacities for effort, nor that desert only arises when we succeed more than others. The case against desert thus collapses. But this is a curious argument. It was surely Rawls' point that our natural capacities were no more earned than the chance of our birth or the benefits of our environment. In assimilating the two sorts of cases he is suggesting that we have no reason to pick out our capacities as somehow an exception to the natural order of contingency. He need not maintain the implausible thesis, with which Sher saddles him, that to deserve anything we must deserve everything which makes it possible. He was rather denying that there was an anomalous kind of condition for the results of our actions which made those results something we deserve.

In his introduction, Sher proclaims his commitment to a pluralistic approach. Those who are less convinced than Sher of the unavoidability of the

concepts of personal desert and compensatory justice will find this commitment somewhat hollow. Nevertheless, these essays provide a stimulating exploration of one line of enquiry, and a fine exemplar for applied philosophy from any perspective.

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George Sher
Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.
Pp. 251.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-57068-9);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-57824-8).

Michael J. White
Partisan or Neutral?
The Futility of Public Political Theory.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 1997.
Pp. 193.
US$52.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8453-9);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8454-7).

The ideal of the neutral state is a long-established and long-contested feature of liberal political philosophy. According to this ideal, the state should deal with the plurality of citizens' understandings of the good by refusing to take sides: it should legislate based on reasons that are or ought to be compelling to every citizen, whatever their religious or moral commitments. This ideal is tied to a pluralistic conception of legitimacy, whereby basic political institutions are legitimate only if justifiable to the diversity of reasonable citizens.

George Sher and Michael J. White both seek to challenge the liberal ideal of neutrality, and to deny connections between neutrality and legitimacy. Sher criticizes various defenses of state neutrality, arguing for a perfectionist alternative that he suggests is rationally warranted (and thereby legitimate in pluralist terms). White advances a critique not only of liberal neutrality, but of political theories that thin down their claims in pursuit of pluralist legitimacy; he instead proposes that we treat politics as a partisan contest of normative views.

Notwithstanding the wealth of recent philosophical discussions of liberal neutrality, Sher's book offers a useful contribution to debate, perspicuously

laying out various defenses of the ideal and considering these with analytical rigor. His proposal is that 'by combining some state efforts on behalf of the good with some liberal strictures against state excess, we may hope to increase significantly the likelihood that many citizens *will* live genuinely good lives' (3).

Sher denies himself one easy riposte to neutralism — that state actions inevitably favor some groups over others — noting that plausible liberal approaches treat neutrality as a property not of outcomes but of action-guiding *justifications* for laws, policies, or actions. He takes up a series of defenses of neutralism, beginning with those based on autonomy: we each must formulate, execute, and monitor our own life plans, and state perfectionism preempts this autonomous choice. A first version of this defense appeals to the value of living autonomously, but Sher counters that all political arrangements non-rationally shape preferences, and so a government doesn't further diminish autonomy by shaping preferences in light of a particular conception of the good. A second version of the defense appeals to the imperative of respect for autonomy as a constraint on the pursuit of value; under this rubric, Sher shows problems with Rawls' neutralist veil of ignorance and Dworkin's defense of neutralism as a way to avoid double-counting preferences. Sher next takes up pragmatic defenses of neutrality: he concedes dangers posed by the perfectionist state, but points out that safeguards warranted by a 'liberalism of fear' such as Shklar's — the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and legally entrenched rights, for example — are not premised on neutrality. Finally, Sher takes up epistemological arguments for state neutrality, which suggest that the state should not try to promote the good because we can't reliably know what it is. He points out that general and moral skepticism cannot ground neutralism, itself a normative view; yet a skepticism that applies to the good and not the right finds little plausible ground for this epistemological distinction.

With these treatments of arguments from autonomy, prudence, and skepticism, Sher persuasively de-couples legitimacy from neutrality, leaving it open for the state to legislate on the basis of some substantive conception of human flourishing. The second task Sher sets himself in *Beyond Neutrality* is specifying a defensible perfectionism — defensible not only to adherents of some particular moral doctrine, but to any reasonable person.

Sher's perfectionism centers upon human capacities that are inherently good because, when successfully exercised, they further "certain very abstract goals that (virtually) all humans unavoidably seek' (11). Fundamental capacities include understanding the world, acting rationally, forming close relationships, decency, and good taste. Each fundamental capacity connects to near-universal and near-inescapable goals: taste and decency, for example, allow receptivity to aesthetic, moral, and cognitive reasons. Sher's theory is pluralistic, since its elements admit of multiple specifications and orderings, but is also meant to be objective and sufficiently determinate to guide political practice.

Sher can't, however, have it both ways: his perfectionism can't tenably claim both objective defensibility and sufficient determinacy to do political work. The very abstract level at which capacities and goals are described allows appropriation from a diversity of moral perspectives: a Kantian will not deny that acting rationally is important to attaining fundamental life goals, nor will a utilitarian, nor will a Catholic natural lawyer. Yet the very abstraction that allows Sher's perfectionism to fit with a diversity of moral perspectives makes it inert: only when interpreted in terms of a thicker conception of the good can it guide political decisions on such things as public assistance, educational policy, or regulation of the entertainment industry (246). Any perfectionism that seeks pluralist legitimacy is caught on the horns of a dilemma: either it attains legitimacy at the cost of ability to guide practice, or is action-guiding but thereby illegitimate in pluralist terms.

Sher may be right that perfectionism is no more impositional than state neutrality: each allows citizen identities to be formed, and choices to be rewarded, so as to favor some life courses over others. But questions about power seem warranted in *both* cases: whose values are favored by a particular political dispensation? Whose protests count? What ways of life are being cultivated out of existence? And in the case of a deliberately imposed perfectionism, in whose eyes is this vision of perfection warranted or unwarranted?

One of Sher's defenses of perfectionism is that today's imposition can become tomorrow's choice: insofar as perfectionism changes ways of life, it also can lead agents to prefer its conception of the good. Once the state's conception of the good comes to be favored by citizens, the perfectionist state lives up to the norm of pluralist legitimacy. Indeed, Sher could bite the bullet of cultural specificity and claim that while a suitably value-laden version of his perfectionism would not persuade human beings as such, it is already persuasive to citizens of contemporary liberal democratic states. Sher, in other words, might seek to avoid the horns of the dilemma sketched above by filling out his perfectionism to reflect an existing overlapping consensus. This route to pluralist legitimacy is well-worn by 'political liberals' like Rawls and Larmore, who seek to develop an action-guiding conception of justice by teasing out the shared public understandings underlying already-legitimate liberal intuitions and practices.

Michael White targets precisely this strategy of justification. He concedes that many liberal policies and principles are accepted from diverse moral and religious perspectives, but denies that this overlapping acceptance evidences shared public values: liberal practice is best understood as a set of unsystematic and piecemeal compromises, accepted by different groups for different, prudential reasons. White's central criticism of political liberalism is that it claims to spell out principles underlying liberal practices, but 'typically, the "theoretical infrastructure" proves to be more controversial than the collection of doctrines or practices comprehended in the compromise that the theory is supposed to secure and stabilize' (9).

This critical point is cogent and important, but could in fact be made quite briefly; instead, White reiterates it through chapters of quirky prose, exces-

sively lengthy quotations, and hasty characterizations then rejections of complex philosophical positions. (White, for example, assimilates Habermas' theory to Larmore's, and takes a quick refutation of the latter to dispense with both; one has to question the seriousness of a project that rejects Habermas' whole approach to normative justification without reference to a single Habermasian argument or text.) White makes interesting points about certain liberals, but the overall impression is less of a concerted book-length argument than a demonstration of the breadth of White's historical, political, and philosophical preoccupations.

Notwithstanding these weaknesses, the constructive argument offered toward the end of *Partisan or Neutral* in fact offers an instructive counterpoint to Sher. Where Sher seeks a rationally warranted perfectionism, White sets aside the very ideal of pluralist legitimacy. Political liberalism is not publicly justifiable in the way it hopes, but this just puts it 'on all fours' with any other partisan doctrine: political justification is an inherently sectarian affair. (In the last chapter of the book, White articulates the Catholic 'paleo-natural law theory' he himself favors.)

The political liberal project of legitimating determinate, action-guiding principles may fail in the way White suggests, but liberalism generally is motivated by the recognition that struggles over values can go well or badly. White is happy to see modern politics as 'civil war carried out by other means':

> According to my relatively benign interpretation, this is simply a matter of the normal nitty-gritty business of democratic politics as compromise and acquiescence, the piecemeal, contingent, and revocable formation of alliance, agreements, and modi vivendi, and the forging of consensus when we can. (164-5)

It's important to note, though, that these 'other means' can range from respectful debate to bitter partisanship to the legal suppression of minority religious or cultural practices. Measures across this range may be accepted, in particular cases, on prudential grounds — especially when civil war by war-like means looms as the alternative. But reducing legitimacy to this sort of realpolitik — where 'the only public justification for much of the political process and its output is its political workability' (165) — too hastily dismisses the democratic aspiration at the heart of a pluralist standard of legitimacy. Political philosophers do well to reflect on better and worse ways that partisan perspectives may contend. What sorts of institutions tame partisanship and conduce to the discovery of common or convergent goals? What norms of discourse and justification allow successful intercultural dialogues? What citizen virtues and capacities allow pluralism to take on its least bellicose forms? What dangers lurk in public struggles over state enforcement of values, and what sorts of safeguards can temper these dangers?

These questions take us back to familiar liberal norms, if not of neutrality then of due process, fairness, and impartiality. The questions also highlight the fact that while liberal norms may not amount to an action-guiding

structure of principles acceptable to the range of groups and doctrines, these norms are more than mere compromises from disjoint perspectives. Liberalism as ideology and practice gradually changes the character of diverse groups and perspectives. We need to be aware of the impositions and injustices entailed by this liberal cultural project, but also of its positive elements. The common institutions, principles, terms, and dispositions of liberal public life are hybridized and interpreted from plural perspectives, but the resulting melange allows citizens to imagine and enact common goods amidst the rough and tumble of politics: this is not an advantage to be lightly set aside.

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Quentin Skinner
Liberty before Liberalism.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. xiv + 142.
US$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-63206-4);
US$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-63876-3).

Liberty before Liberalism is a revised version of Quentin Skinner's Inaugural Lecture as Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge. Skinner's expanded lecture describes the rise and fall in England of what he calls 'neo-roman' conceptions of civil liberty and the state. Skinner reviews the English reception of neo-roman doctrine (Part I), clarifies the sources of the 'liberal' theories that replaced neo-roman ideas (Part II), and shows (Part III) how the history of philosophy can break the spell of unconsidered scholarly consensus. Philosophers too often find themselves unknowingly enchanted by values embedded in their present way of life. Skinner believes that '[t]he history of philosophy, and perhaps especially of moral, social and political philosophy, is there to prevent us becoming too readily bewitched' (116).

Skinner's distinction between 'neo-roman' and 'liberal' or 'negative' liberty will not be familiar to most philosophers. Many will remember Isaiah Berlin's famous distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' liberty, first made over forty years ago in Berlin's own inaugural lecture as Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford. Berlin's 'negative' liberty meant much the same as Skinner's does: not being 'prevented by other persons from doing what I want' (113-14). But Berlin's definition (and rejection) of 'positive

liberty' as 'self-mastery' was much more opaque. In the guise of a purely neutral philosophical analysis of the concept of liberty Berlin unreflectively repeated the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century monarchist brief against older (Roman) conceptions of liberty as citizenship and equality under law. Berlin and many of his colleagues were, in varying degrees, 'bewitched' by liberal Anglo-American academic orthodoxy (116). Skinner provides the history to cast off this enchantment.

By 'neo-roman' liberty Skinner means republican liberty, as recently well described in Philip Pettit's book on *Republicanism* (Oxford 1997) (xi). Skinner's lecture provides the best existing account of the early English history and development of republican moral and political ideas. Skinner himself avoids the term 'republic' because most British readers now associate republics with the absence of kings (22-3n67). In fact, republican doctrine usually does preclude monarchy, and other forms of domination (55), but the word's central meaning requires only that government should serve the common good or '*res publica*' of all those subject to its rule. By calling this 'neo-roman' Skinner reminds his readers how much republican conceptions of liberty owe to republican Rome, and to the reading of Latin classics by English scholars and statesmen.

'Neo-roman' liberty signifies citizenship in a free society (23), which is to say an 'empire of laws and not of men' (75). Republicans believe that governments must always act for the common good (62), so that no one ever becomes subject to any other person's unfettered private will (71). Securing such government requires popular sovereignty (27), representation (not direct democracy) (32), a bicameral legislature (34), and checks and balances in the constitution (35), to guarantee just laws to every citizen alike (45). Not all self-styled republicans would endorse all these requirements of neo-roman liberty (33), but Skinner clarifies their shared understanding that liberty entails equal citizenship, in a free state (10, 23-4). Anyone without such citizenship will be dependent on the will of others, and therefore a slave (36, 46).

To call this 'liberty before liberalism' is somewhat misleading, since most authors usually viewed as early 'liberals' actually shared the neo-roman conception of what liberty should be. Skinner gives John Locke as an example (55n177), but one might add nearly all of Locke's Whig successors and contemporaries. Significant changes in the word's meaning began with Thomas Hobbes, who hoped to justify an absolute sovereign as the only legitimate source of law and justice (4). Various royalists took up Hobbes' doctrine during the English civil war, asserting that law ends, where liberty begins (and vice versa) (4-5). If so, then all states are equally despotic, including 'republics', because all states must impose laws on their citizens. Robert Filmer, Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin and many others have embraced this contention, first developed to support Charles I in his fight against Parliament (60).

Skinner is the most interesting, reflective and productive historian writing in English today, and philosophers are fortunate to have the fruits of his

insights in this short, clear introduction to the neo-roman world we have lost. Skinner sees the duty of historians, not in moralism, enthusiasm or indignation, but rather in giving readers information with which to question and 'ruminate' about their own current values and beliefs (118). This technique opens up the past as a repository of lost ideas (112). Neo-roman liberty is one such valuable and long-forgotten treasure. Skinner cuts through the brambles and enchantment of our blinding liberal consensus to reveal the hidden castle of an earlier pattern of thought. Now philosophers must decide whether they want to enter, and embrace what he has found there.

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Douglas Walton
Appeal to Expert Opinion:
Arguments from Authority.
University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press 1997. Pp. xiv + 281.
US$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01694-9);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01695-7).

The initial premise of this book is that appealing to the authority of expert opinion is inherently paradoxical: if the speaker is knowledgeable enough to be able to assess the epistemic value of the opinion of an 'authority', then she is in effect an authority herself and doesn't need the backing of the authority cited; on the other hand, if she is not an expert herself, then she seems not to be in a position adequately to assess the 'expert's' epistemic authority at all. Consequently, and probably also because of an allegiance to epistemic internalism — the view that for a belief to be adequately justified for a person all the justifying reasons must be internally available to her, appealing to authority has usually been treated as a fallacy in logic textbooks. But many authors have shown that the status of appeals to authority in informal logic texts is at odds with its perfectly acceptable and indeed unavoidable status in science and everyday life. The idea that each of us is an epistemically independent 'pure inquirer' with unlimited time and epistemic resources has been widely acknowledged to be a myth. In this light, the logical strength of an appeal to authority becomes a question of the reliability of the 'authoritative' source, and consequently appeals to authority find a central place in reliability theories of knowledge, in which the reliability of the source of a

belief replaces internally available justification as the third condition of knowledge.

Walton's analysis of appeal to authority is fundamentally different. He does not see a pronouncement of an 'authority' as a datum merely to be either accepted or rejected by an audience in a take-it-or-leave-it manner on the basis of the source's independently established reliability; instead he sees the appeal to authority as a dynamic, dialogue-based interaction first between an 'expert' and a layperson (in an 'expert consultation dialogue') and subsequently between two laypeople (in a 'persuasion dialogue'). The motivating problem of the book is solved by the development of critical questions a layperson can ask an 'expert' to assess her credibility. The purpose of these questions is to determine whether the 'expert' really does have access to a recognized but not universally available body of knowledge (e.g., by asking for professional credentials), whether she is an accurate conduit of that knowledge to the layperson (e.g., by determining whether she is generally trustworthy and unbiased), and whether the knowledge to which she has access is relevant to the layperson's interests. Thus they allow the layperson critically to assess the 'expert' without delving into the reasoning internal to the expert's knowledge-domain.

In a persuasion dialogue, whether a person appealing to authority commits a fallacy depends on whether the critical questions are answered satisfactorily. Only after such critical questioning has occurred can it be determined whether the fallacy of appeal to authority has been committed. Appealing to authority is not intrinsically fallacious. However, the failure to answer critical questions satisfactorily results in the kind of blind reliance on authority which is characteristic of the fallacy of appeal to authority.

Walton does not include in the critical questioning required for a legitimate appeal to authority a questioning of the epistemic legitimacy of the domain of 'knowledge' to which the 'expert' claims access: 'The problem I confront in this book is not whether scientific research is open to challenge ...' (19). But if this domain constitutes a so-called pseudo-science, such as astrology, psychic predictions about the future, voodoo, demonology, etc., (which, if suitably institutionalized, theoretically could pass all six critical questions with flying colors), then being an expert in that domain would not ground an appeal to authority. Walton seems to take it as relatively unproblematic which belief-domains are bodies of knowledge and which are not: they seem to be just those which have become institutionalized in Western societies.

Perhaps Walton does not think the institutionalized belief-domains themselves need justification. Possibly he does not think Evil Demons need to be combated with a Cartesian foundationalism, believing that widespread acceptance in a given society is sufficient epistemic justification. But if so, there are some unfortunate gaps in his treatment of epistemic authorities: he focuses almost exclusively on the testimony of scientific experts in courts of law, omitting, for instance, critical treatment of the moral and religious 'authorities' to which many people frequently turn for practical guidance in

their lives. The discussion of appeal to scientific expert opinion is so clear and convincing that it leaves the reader eager for a more complete treatment of appeal to authority generally.

Another difficulty is that Walton assumes an unproblematic distinction between institutional and cognitive authority, between power and knowledge. This is especially surprising since postmodernists have taught us to question the relation between institutionalized power and epistemic norms. Walton gives promise early in his book of engaging with postmodernism. Yet he does not consider the possibility that how we identify domains of genuine knowledge and what we count as good reasons, i.e., our epistemic norms, might have been the result as much of power struggles between interests and institutions as the objective application of absolute norms.

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