Philosophy in Review/Comptes rendus philosophiques

formerly

Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

As a rule, P.I.R. publishes only invited reviews. However, we will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English.

En général, C.R.P. ne publie que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, nous prendrions en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais.

Subscription prices
for a volume of six issues

Institutions	*Individuals*	*Students*
$108 (Canadian)	$52 (Canadian)	$39 (Canadian)
US$107/Cdn$144 (Foreign)	US$52/Cdn$70 (Foreign)	US$43/Cdn$58 (Foreign)

Prix de l'abonnement
à un volume de six numéros

Institutions	*Individus*	*Etudiants*
$108 (Canada)	$52 (Canada)	$39 (Canada)
US$107/Cdn$144 (Hors-Canada)	US$52/Cdn$70(Hors-Canada)	US$43/Cdn$58 (Hors-Canada)

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing & Publishing
P.O. Box 4218, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6E 4T2
Tel: (780) 435-5898 Fax: (780) 435-5852
E-mail: app@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca
http://www.freenet.edmonton.ab.ca/~app

Publications Mail Registration No. 08491

ISSN 1206-5269

Published six times a year

Volume XIX, No. 3
June • juin 1999

Table of Contents • Table des matières

Mailed in June 1999.

Colin Allen, Marc Bekoff, and
George Lauder, eds.
Nature's Purposes: Analysis of Function and Design in Biology.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1998. Pp. 597.
US$30.00. ISBN 0-262-51097-9.

The editors have compiled 22 previously published papers by philosophers, biologists, morphologists, and an ethologist on the notion of teleology in biology. Though they note in their introduction that teleology has been largely discredited in science, from their point of view teleology is an irreducible feature of biology. Thus the collection of articles in this volume presents different attempts to reconcile the inherent teleology of biology with a naturalistic worldview.

Though more than half of the papers in this collection are written by philosophers, only one of the editors, Allen, is a philosopher. Bekoff, who is known for his work in ethology and animal behavior, and Lauder, a functional morphologist may have contributed to the true interdisciplinary feel of this volume. There are four papers written by morphologists and several others by other scientists, including Stephen Jay Gould and Elisabeth S. Vrba, R.A. Hinde, M.J.S. Rudwick, and Francisco J. Ayala.

The articles have been organized into 5 sections. The first of these, Looking Backwards: Teleology as Etiology, contains 3 classic accounts of teleology as backwards-looking. Papers in this section include Larry Wright's 'Functions' and Robert N. Brandon's 'Biological Teleology: Questions and Explanations'. Such a method of dealing with teleology in biology looks at the historical account of the selective pressures on a species in order to account for particular features of the species. This approach is challenged in the second section, Don't Look Back: Nonhistorical Approaches to Biological Teleology. Forward-looking accounts of teleology are offered in the six papers which make up this section. The account of a feature is given through looking at how well that feature aids the members of a species in their continued survival. These papers include both historical and contemporary accounts, including Ernest Nagel's classic paper 'Teleology Revisited' and Mark Bedau's 'Where's the Good in Teleology'.

The third section, Critical Developments, continues to debate forward versus backward-looking accounts of teleology in more depth. It also introduces another debate in philosophy of biology, whether the correct approach to studying teleology should be seen as conceptual analysis or theoretical definition. Ruth Millikan's paper presents the case against conceptual analysis, and argues that definitions of teleology should not rest on historical or popular uses of the term, but instead should be based on their usefulness within a larger theory and practice of biology. A debate is set up by grouping Millikan's paper 'In Defense of Proper Functions' with others such as Sandra D. Mitchell's paper 'Function, Fitness, and Disposition', and Ron Amundson and George V. Lauder's paper 'Function without Purpose: The Uses of Causal

Role Function in Evolutionary Biology'. Here is introduced the notion of a 'structural double'. This term refers to a sort of swampman, a creature similar in every physical respect to a familiar biological entity such as a human, but who appears through some magical or unlikely event. The structural double of a human doesn't have the same causal history as humans, though it seems that the function of the double's heart would be to pump blood, just as it is for humans.

Section four, Synthesis or Pluralism?, is a collection geared towards arriving at some way of dealing with the various uses of 'function' and 'teleology' among biologists. As such, this section can be seen as a continuation of the previous section.

This volume seems to be a very thorough account of teleology in biology, and is organized as a dialogue between authors. Debates rage back and forth, and one doesn't get the impression that these papers have been published in different journals over 35 years. The editors provide the reader with a thorough introduction which summarizes each of the articles in depth, thereby making the volume an accessible introduction to the topic. It would be appropriate as the major text for an advanced undergraduate or graduate course. However, this book is not only for the neophyte. It is the first collection of the essential articles on this debate, and as such it will be a good reference for those philosophers working on this subject.

Kristin A. Andrews
University of Minnesota

Philip Alperson, ed.
Musical Worlds: New Directions in the Philosophy of Music.
Pennsylvania State University Press 1998.
Pp. vi + 188.
US$14.95. ISBN 0-271-01769-4.

Kendall Walton puts it nicely: 'If musical works have worlds ... they are zoos — full of life, but discrete bits of life, each in its own separate cage ... ' (52).

Musical Worlds is based on a special issue of *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* that was commissioned in response to the strong interest shown in the philosophy of music at meetings of the American Society of Aesthetics. In *Musical Worlds*, editor Philip Alperson has added two new essays to the original group in that special issue, for a total of twelve here. These articles represent many of the best and the brightest authors in the

field, to wit: Jenefer Robinson, Francis Sparshott, Göran Sörbom, Kendall Walton, Peter Kivy, Stephen Davies, Jerrold Levinson, John Andrew Fisher, Noël Carroll, Lydia Goehr, Claire Detels, Joel Rudinow, and Bruno Nettl.

Alperson's introduction and summary of contributions is a model for this kind of anthology. It is a difficult task to edit these collections (even harder than reviewing them) — how much background on the topic is necessary? do you list all of the articles and provide a complete summary of each, thus vaguely pre-empting each contributor? where do you place your own view? Alperson solves these dilemmas in a comprehensive yet readable way. His introduction sketches the history of music philosophy, especially identifying the contemporary practice of placing music within a social context, and he gives a considered précis of each article.

What philosophers will particularly appreciate here is the variety of topics, including excursions into less-charted depths such as the transparency of medium, political music/politics of music, and the philosophy of John Cage. Rudinow asserts that white people can indeed sing the blues (unless you're a racist), and Detels presses for a feminist, 'soft-boundaried' approach to uniting the fields of music history, theory, and philosophy. Fisher insists on rock and roll as a multi-instanced type of music, in which the recording is central, and the score is absent. Levinson coins a new term, 'influence-value': the influence of a composer or a work upon the course of music itself. (Philosophers will also notice in several of these articles an acknowledgment of the work of Leonard Meyer and Suzanne Langer, as the philosophy of music begins to appreciate more of its past.)

Some of these authors hold widely differing views on music and emotion in particular, as attested by their publications over the years. The skirmish continues here, and the usual suspects weigh in, with Robinson and Levinson on one end and Kivy and Davies on the other. Sparshott, interestingly, offers some fresh meat by suggesting we ignore the fray altogether: 'But none of [these views] amounts to anything that could usefully be called a *theory* of the relation between music and the emotions. We do not know what such a theory should be and have no reason to seek such knowledge' (23). His article 'Music and Feeling' insists on the complexity of musical affect, arguing 'to be alive in a world is necessarily to be endlessly responsive to everything in the world,' including its ever-developing system of music.

These far-reaching essays only confirm what musicians have always known: music is indeed a world of its own, and this has contributed to both its specialness and its neglect in the philosophy of the arts. The postmodern insistence on the study of music in culture has greatly deepened our understanding of how music is appreciated, but it is the music itself — the formal relationships within the work — that brings artistic revelation.

The contributors to this collection, as musicians or philosophers with musical training, know this. The significance of the knowledge of musical style and convention surfaces all through these papers. Goehr spells it out: 'The fact, however, that musicians have so consistently been able to get away with the extreme separability response still tells us something important

about music, namely, the description of music's relation to the extramusical always falls short of being convincing' (142). Walton seconds the idea: 'But when I step outside my game with music and consider the music itself, all I see is music, not a fictional world to go with it' (60).

Musicians don't have much use for philosophers. And certainly books about musical meaning aren't aimed at the section violinist or the solo pianist. Yet musicologists (especially 'new' musicologists), who are perhaps the ideal audience beyond philosophy, are concerned that aestheticians are trapped in extreme musical formalism, unappreciative of music in culture and context. This volume, which also includes an essay by Bruno Nettl (an eminent ethnomusicologist), will help allay their fears.

Musical Worlds contains philosophically intriguing material that will demand attention in the academic musical world, which is another zoo altogether. If only Alperson could be the keeper there, too.

Jennifer Judkins
(*Music*)
UCLA

J.M. Balkin
Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1998.
Pp. ix + 335.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-300-07288-0.

In *Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology*, J.M. Balkin presents an intelligent and relatively optimistic philosophical account of the social construction of human thought and personality. The foundation of Balkin's book is the metaphor of the title *cultural software*. Through social interaction, individuals acquire various 'tools of understanding' that enable them to make sense of the world and to form beliefs and desires: this is their 'cultural software'. Vocabulary and familiar melodies are simple examples; more complex tools of understanding include narratives, metaphors, and patterns of opposition, 'homologies', all of which Balkin discusses at length. Cultural software exists within each individual in a form that is both unique to the individual and similar to that of others who inhabit the same cultural environment. Each person's software is unique because no two people have precisely the same social experiences, yet within a society, sets of software overlap because they

are derived from common sources. Moreover, cultural software is continually rewritten as we confront new social information and new problems.

The notion of cultural software leads Balkin to assert, consistently with much of postmodern theory, that individuals are 'constituted' (17) by the software they possess, and, hence, by the society in which they live. (Unless I have misunderstood him, however, Balkin stops short of the claim that there is no other ingredient to human personality.) At the same time, Balkin proposes that his metaphor can bridge the divide between individualism and collectivism and resolve some vexing questions about the ontology of culture: cultural software takes a unique form in each of us, yet our software is social in origin and overlaps considerably with the software of others around us.

Balkin's next step is to describe the development of cultural software, a process he likens to Darwinian evolution. The units of cultural information that are transmitted among individuals and form their personal software are called 'memes'. 'Memes' include such items as 'skills, norms, ideas, beliefs, attitudes, [and] values' (43) (though the basic 'memetic' unit is undefined). They exist both within individuals, when incorporated into software, and outside individuals, in storage devices such as books. People constantly encounter new 'memes', adding them to their software and also revising them to suit their own needs and experiences. As a result, the 'memes' present in a society at any time are not the product of design, but of a process of 'bricolage', in which existing skills, ideas, and so forth are adapted by individuals to new uses. The 'memes' that survive best in this process are those that are easily transmitted from person to person and likely to retain their form as they are replicated and applied.

Like biological evolution, the 'memetic evolution' Balkin describes is path-dependent and flawed, and this leads to the problem of ideology. Balkin uses the term *ideology* in a Marxist sense, connoting false beliefs, distorted perception, and ensuing injustice. Yet he distances himself from Marx and others who take a strictly pejorative view of the phenomenon of ideology. In Balkin's view, ideology is inseparable from the cultural software that enables people to deal with the world around them. Ideology (or the mechanism of cultural software that produces it) is both a cause of injustice and a source of human progress, including, potentially, the detection and correction of injustice. This insight leads Balkin to adopt an 'ambivalent' view of ideology, in which cultural software is 'simultaneously empowering, useful, and adaptive on the one hand, and "disempowering", distorting, and maladaptive on the other' (127).

In presenting his ambivalent account of ideology, Balkin takes two interesting positions. The first is that, to identify the negative ('ideological') effects of cultural software, one must adopt a normative attitude that presupposes a universal standard of justice. Balkin refuses to endorse cultural relativism and refuses to equate injustice with 'dominance' or 'hegemony' of some social groups over others, as many of his intellectual kin have done. In Balkin's view, the 'dominance' strategy is inadequate because it oversimplifies the interests, virtues, and vices of different groups and relies on the unattractive

notion of false consciousness. instead, Balkin insists that we must apply 'transcendent' ideals of truth and justice (151-2). Because our own software is imperfect, we will never be able to articulate the contents of these transcendent ideals, but we can nevertheless be motivated by them in evaluating the effects of our own culturally shaped beliefs and attitudes.

A second, related position Balkin takes is that 'self-reference' is not an insurmountable obstacle to the pursuit of justice. The problem of self-reference is this: if we are all constituted, or at least shaped, by changing and imperfect sets of culturally derived software, we must use the same software in determining what is just or unjust. How, then, can we hope to recognize the undesirable (ideological) effects of that software? Balkin accepts that our perception will always be distorted: there is no transcendent position from we which we can understand the transcendent value of justice. He maintains, however, that it is possible to evaluate and improve on our own beliefs and opinions, largely through 'dialectical' comparison with the beliefs and opinions of others (130). Thus, 'using our cultural software, we think about what we are feeling, consider what we believe, question our own motives, and compare our views with those of others. We do all these things with the goal of trying to figure out how we think about the social world and how our thought might be improved' (135). At the same time, we cannot control all aspects of our consciousness because the very elements of control must themselves be preconscious. Paradoxically, then, we might say of critical self-consciousness that it can be critical only if it is not fully self-conscious (137).

Balkin's belief in the prospect of critical reflection about cultural software leads him to make some fairly positive observations about the relation between culture and reason in the final chapters of the book. '[T]he most satisfactory approach to the philosophy of culture,' he states, 'would temper Kant's optimism with Foucault's pessimism ... The study of ideology ... is the study of the limitations of our imagination, but it is conceivable only because our imagination has already bestowed on us the freedom to imagine them' (285). Reason, he concludes, is partly, but not entirely, in the control of individuals. We are both subjects and its agents (288).

Balkin's book is intelligent and extremely well crafted. Not the least of his accomplishments is a wonderfully clear presentation of the major strands of postmodern thought. Theories of social psychology, narrative, semiotics, metaphor, and metonym are discussed sympathetically but also sensibly and in understandable terms. For anyone interested in intelligible discussion of the work of Elster, Ricouer, Geertz, Goffman, Chomsky, Levi-Strauss, Foucault, and the like, this book is an excellent source.

Balkin's own account of the social construction of human knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes is reasonable and appealing. The metaphor of cultural software is certainly an improvement on theories that posit an overarching social or cultural entity that determines individual thought and behavior. It captures the fact that our reasoning is not pure, and at the same time acknowledges individual personality and agency. Further, while Balkin may

not succeed in explaining just how we can outsmart our biases, he recognizes that we have no choice but to apply our reason and moral faculties in the best way we can to ascertain truth and secure justice. We must be willing to accept the possibility that our knowledge can be good enough for the purpose at hand if we are willing to subject it to critical scrutiny.

Yet once we accept the propositions that truth and justice exist, and that we ought to pursue them although we cannot perfectly comprehend them, it may be fair to ask what purpose is served by the whole machinery of deconstruction. We should of course be watchful for biases in our reasoning, but there is no proven formula for detecting them, and, as Balkin says, no choice but to proceed. Balkin remains faithful to postmodern methods, yet in his efforts to make postmodernism intelligible and appealing, there is a suggestion of unease with his own genre.

Emily Sherwin
(*School of Law*)
University of San Diego

Carsten Bengt-Pedersen and **Niels Thomassen, eds.**
Nature and Lifeworld: Theoretical and Practical Metaphysics.
Portland: ISBS, Inc. (for Odense University Press, Denmark) 1998. Pp. 345.
US$32.00. ISBN 87-7838-311-0.

This volume gathers together papers presented at the XI Internordic Philosophy Symposium in Odense, Denmark, in 1995. It includes eighteen articles, all but one in English: eleven in environmental ethics, four in general theoretical ethics, six in epistemology, and two in metaphysics. It should be of particular interest to environmental ethicists and philosophers of science.

Many of the environmental ethics articles aim to find a middle ground between the strong claims of deep ecologists that (at least some) wild nature has intrinsic value and that human beings should drastically change our lives to accommodate this, and more moderate, anthropocentric positions. In part this represents a pragmatic desire to find 'common ground' from which a strong majority can agree to preserve the environment, in part it springs from philosophical scruples the authors have against some of the larger claims of deep ecology. Dan Egonsson's 'Man's Place in Nature' argues that an ethical subjectivist need not be anthropocentric, clarifying in what senses a subjectivist may make room for both human dignity and some intrinsic value in

non-human nature. Per Nilsson's 'Critical Theory and Nature' suggests that Jurgen Habermas' theory of communicative action, while anthropocentric, can rationally ground a substantial reform environmentalism, unlike the earlier, utopian speculations of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, which are neither practical nor rationally convincing.

Specially invited speaker Robin Attfield's 'Progress, Nature and Metaphysics' represents another attempt to find a pragmatic center. Attfield argues that once we have reformulated our ideal of progress to focus on increased opportunities for genuine human growth, rather than increased power, desire-satisfaction or consumption, we may embrace a progress which is congruent with the preservation of nature. Rejecting both deep ecologists' attempts to identify with all nature (from self-interest to Self-interest) and the 'nature solely as capital' views of resource economists, Attfield considers other models (nature as treasure, nature as home) before suggesting 'nature as enigma', which reminds us of 'nature's otherness, needed for our sense of belonging and of proportion, without ruling out use of nature, both consumptive and otherwise, so that a sustainable future for humanity and for other creatures may be found' (24). While it isn't clear that this model provides much concrete ethical guidance, Attfield's attempt highlights issues that deep ecologists must face: how to formulate *attractive* human ideals which make a large place for preserving wild nature; how to balance human use of nature with its preservation.

The best of the environmental ethics articles, Henrik Bruun's 'Nature as a Symbol of Identity: Planning a Case Study in the Finnish Archipelago Sea', might be called empirical deep ecology. Bruun reminds us that conceptions of identity are important to ethics, particularly that half of ethics which is concerned, not with our duties towards others, but with our aspirations for personal fulfillment. In an exceptionally clear and well-written article, he reviews some claims that have been made for the importance of place to the self-identity of both modern and primitive peoples, and the role identification with nature plays in deep ecology. Included here are good discussions of the role of identity in the ethics of Charles Taylor and Arne Naess, essentialism versus constructivism in identity creation, and related issues. Bruun goes on to sketch out a research plan to investigate how residents of Finland's Archipelago Sea define themselves, whether in relation to their unique island environment or not; how this has changed over time and varies among different groups; and finally, how these conceptions of self-identity inform islanders' quests for meaningful and fulfilling lives. I look forward to the results of his studies.

Several themes recur throughout the epistemological articles, which are some of the volume's most interesting. Most important, perhaps, are efforts to defend realism, and attempts to make a place within a science-based epistemology for the perspective and insights of phenomenology. Carsten Bengt-Pedersen's 'Man and his Knowledge of Nature' clearly presents a plausible theory of direct epistemological realism. He argues, against phenomenologists' typical idealism, that the life-world is not a world of mere

perceptions, but one where people interact with a real, more-than-human world. Ragnar Fjelland's 'From Evolutionary Epistemology to the Life World A Priori' treats similar themes, while emphasizing the importance of the development of abstraction within everyday life, for the development of science.

One of the volume's strongest contributions, Jonas Nilsson's 'Rationality, Substantive Beliefs, and the Metaphysical', presents a clear account of Dudley Shapere on standards of justification in science, and uses this to make good points regarding the revisionary nature of metaphysics, against Kuhn and Feyerabend's view that the metaphysical is that which is beyond rational revision. Accepting the notions that standards of justification are evolving, socially constituted, and pluralistic (to a degree, within different sciences), Nilsson nevertheless argues that this does not lead to epistemological relativism or mutual incomprehension. Sami Pihlstrom's 'The Pragmatist Critique of Metaphysics and the Nature of Man' is a clear, well-written critique of Richard Rorty's dismissal of metaphysics and the classical problems in epistemology. Metaphysics is unavoidable and even necessary for a genuine *philosophical* pragmatism, according to Pihlstrom.

Other highlights of this volume include Robert Haraldsson's 'From Metaphysical Subjects to Naturalized Selves: a Nietzschean Perspective on Pity', and Simo Knuuttila's 'Plenitude, Reason and Value: Old and New in the Metaphysics of Nature'. Haraldsson gives us a nuanced Nietzschean take on pity and compassion, which will interest anyone following current debates on Nietzsche's value to political theory. Knuuttila provides an exceptionally clear account of some current issues in scientifically-informed metaphysics and relates these to classical metaphysical debates. This short article could stand as an introduction to metaphysical issues in an undergraduate philosophy of science course.

Fully half the articles in *Nature and Lifeworld* appear to have been written by young scholars; that they are so well written and substantive bodes well for the future of Nordic philosophy. Many are clearly works in progress and are presented as such. This is a strength of the collection, and reason enough for philosophers around the world to keep an eye on further developments up North.

Philip Cafaro
Southwest State University

José Luis Bermúdez
The Paradox of Self Consciousness.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1998. Pp. xiv + 338.
US$30.00. ISBN 0-262-02441-1.

José Luis Bermúdez is convinced that 'complete philosophical elucidation of self-consciousness' (298) is blocked by crippling explanatory circularity. He offers a theoretical revision that rejects a key assumption of analytical philosophy and gives empirical psychology a constructive role. Readers interested in the philosophy of mind and, especially, in metatheoretic questions about interdisciplinary collaboration, will find this a rewarding book. Some may, however, wonder whether Bermúdez's own commitments may not be unduly restrictive.

The paradox of self-consciousness arises, Bermúdez tells us, in the following way. If 'the only way to analyze self-consciousness is by analyzing the capacity to think "I"-thoughts,' and if analyzing the capacity to think 'I'-thoughts requires analyzing the capacity for canonical linguistic expression of such thoughts, then analyzing self-consciousness requires analyzing the capacity to use the first-person pronoun (267). But, Bermúdez argues, the mastery of the first-person pronoun relevant here is that underlying the immunity to referential error distinctive to first person thoughts. Such pragmatic mastery requires the capacity to harbor such 'I'-thoughts as, 'I produced this token of "I" and [on one account] I did so with a particular intention.' The resulting explanatory circularity precludes any account of the ontogenesis of self-consciousness: development of the capacity for 'I'-thoughts requires mastery of the first-person pronoun but mastery of the first-person pronoun requires a prior capacity for 'I'-thoughts. This poses a problem for any theorist who, like Bermúdez, believes that if self-consciousness is 'psychologically real,' there must be 'an explanation of how it is possible for an individual ... to acquire that cognitive capacity' (19). The body of *PSC* is devoted to showing that in-principle impossibility of such explanation is only apparent. On an appropriate metaphysical account of mental content, Bermúdez believes, innate cognitive abilities are conceivably capable of giving rise to forms of first-person thought that could, in turn, conceivably make mastery of the first-person pronoun possible.

Bermúdez clears the way for such explanation by rejecting outright the claim that a creature's concepts determine the range of its possible thought contents (41). He proposes instead that a creature has mental content (or mental content of one or another character) just in case attribution of such content provides the best explanation of its behavior. He then argues that observations of prelinguistic infants are, in fact, best explained by attribution of particular kinds of perceptual content. He goes on to argue further for a range of nonconceptual first-person contents, including those adequate to provide nonlinguistic beings with an awareness of themselves as physi-

cally embodied, with an appreciation of themselves as occupants of a world distinct from their experience, and, ultimately, with the capacity to recognize themselves as subjects of psychological states, including communicative intentions. At each step, Bermúdez characterizes the kind of thought content that is demanded in the light of conceptual analysis of the capacity under consideration and then offers observations for which he takes the best explanation to be attribution of such content. Here, he places major reliance on the deliverances of a Gibsonian approach to perception and studies of early social behavior.

Bermúdez writes clearly and gracefully, recapitulating arguments at helpful intervals and summarizing psychological experiments neatly. The MIT Press has done an admirable job of production. I suspect that Bermúdez is probably a bit optimistic in his belief that the major part of the book will be accessible to psychologists; despite the relative naturalism of his approach, many philosophers on this side of the Atlantic are also likely to find themselves on less than familiar ground. It is also possible to wonder whether Bermúdez's revisionism goes far enough. Early on, he endorses The Priority Principle: conceptual abilities are 'constitutively linked with linguistic abilities in such a way that ... [they] cannot be possessed by nonlinguistic creatures' (42). Thus, even though young infants show surprise when a rotating screen appears to go through a solid block (or when a moving object that has disappeared behind the first of two screens reappears from behind the second without appearing in a gap between them), there is no question of their having so much as a primitive object concept. 'Mastery of a concept,' he explains, 'is tied up with grasp of its inferential role' (67); genuine inference requires 'understanding what it is to be justified' (71). 'It is because prelinguistic creatures are incapable of providing ... justifications that the priority thesis is true' (71). Bermúdez is surely entitled to his own concept of concept — it is, after all, up for grabs within both philosophical and psychological communities — but it is unclear whether he really should embrace this formulation. He finds it 'natural' to explain 4-year-olds' conjectures that a worm but not a toy monkey has a spleen by saying that 'they made use of inference patterns linking the concepts *human being, living animal* and *internal organs*' (70). But do 4-year-olds have the grasp of justified inference that Bermúdez demands for genuine inference and thus for concept possession? Worse, if grasping the notion of *justification* is a prerequisite for engaging in genuine inference and the capacity to engage in genuine inference is a prerequisite for concept possession, we are, it seems, faced with a familiar problem: how can the concept of justification itself be acquired in the course of development? Just as Bermúdez acknowledges grades of self-awareness within the domain of nonconceptual thought, he might want to consider the possibility that concepts themselves display a range of richness and complexity rather than falling on one side of a divide that is difficult to characterize appropriately. In any case, even readers who disagree with Bermúdez on this or other

points will find themselves in his debt for a book that is elegant, thought-provoking and courteous from start to finish.

Carol Slater
(*Department of Psychology*)
Alma College

Ruth Chang, ed.
Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1997. Pp. ix + 303.
US$57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-674-44755-7);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-674-44756-5).

Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason is a major contribution to the literature on these topics. Two options for choice are 'incomparable' if it is not true that the first is better (more valuable) than the second, not true that the first is worse (less valuable) than the second, and not true that the two are equally valuable. Two options are 'incommensurable' (at least in a central sense of that term that properly makes it nonsynonymous with 'incomparable') if their comparative value cannot be represented by numbers on a cardinal scale — roughly, a scale with a unit of value, such that the number assigned to each option equals the number of units that the option realizes. 'Value' can be used narrowly, as meaning one particular type of choice-relevant consideration (for example, an axiological as opposed to deontological consideration), or broadly as meaning anything about an option that makes it choice-worthy. It is broad-value incommensurability and incomparability that are generally at issue in *IIP*. Objects other than options are sometimes described as 'incommensurable' or 'incomparable,' but *IIP* is fundamentally about the link between incommensurability, incomparability and *choice*. At the risk of homogenizing a rich and diverse volume, I suggest that all of the thirteen contributions can be seen as addressing one (or more) of the following questions: (1) Does incommensurability preclude rational choice? (2) Can options be, not just incommensurable, but incomparable? (3) If so, does incomparability preclude rational choice? Anyone interested in these questions should start here.

Does incommensurability preclude rational choice? Anderson, Lukes, Sunstein, and Wiggins argue, in effect, for a negative answer. Anderson offers a general, 'expressive' theory of rational choice, such that the choice-worthiness (value) of an option does not correspond to any property that defines a

cardinal scale. For example, if P is faced with the choice between saving her dying mother or continuing a friendship, the rational choice-procedure is not to measure how many units of pleasure, or happiness, or anything else the two options realize, but rather to decide 'how best to reconcile the expressive demands of the different kinds of concern we owe to' the two persons (103). (Although *scales* and *scaling procedures* are distinct — the value relations between options may have enough structure to define a common unit, even though the procedure of choosing between options by measuring units is not practicable or available — it is certainly possible for a theory of value, such as Anderson's, to deny cardinality in both senses.) In a similar vein, Lukes points to the existence of 'sacred' values (188), such as life or friendship, that cannot be commensurated with other values; instead, choice between an option instantiating a sacred value, and another option, is rational if it conforms with applicable cultural norms.

Sunstein, who explicitly uses the term 'incommensurability' as distinct from incomparability and in a way close to noncardinality, argues that 'choices among incommensurable options are the stuff [of] law [and of] everyday life' (240), and that 'extrinsic reasons,' 'expressive considerations,' and even 'overall intrinsic worth' can constitute reasons for choice between incommensurables (240-1). Wiggins, as I read him, sees noncardinality as one upshot of his particularist account of rational choice.

One might disagree with expressivism or particularism but accept the larger claims that (a) some options are incommensurable, and (b) incommensurability does not preclude rational choice. (For example, if value V1 is lexically ordered over value V2, options will be incommensurable but comparable with respect to the two values taken together: the rational approach will be to choose the option that is better with respect to V1 and, as between options that are equally good in that respect, the option that is better with respect to V2.) Indeed, as far as I can tell, every contributor to *IIP* accepts these larger claims. More controversial are the corresponding claims about incomparability. Can options be downright *incomparable*? At the threshold, Broome and Chang provide innovative accounts of what incomparability might consist in. I have defined incomparability as the case where it is not true that one option is better than another, not true that one option — the first — is worse than the other, and not true that the two are equal in value. The standard variant of incomparability, thus defined, is where it is false that the options are better, worse, or equal in value, and further, it is false that any other positive value relation holds between them. The innovative variant, developed by Chang, is where it is false that the options are better, worse, or equal, but they are 'on a par': 'the evaluative difference between [the] two items is nonzero and unbiased' (27). Broome's innovative variant involves vagueness: it is neither true nor false that the options are better, worse, or equal in value. Although the possibility of vague incomparability has been previously recognized, Broome provides ingenious arguments in favor of that variant, as against the standard one, and to the effect that vague incomparability must have a particular struc-

ture — that the boundaries of the zone of vagueness must, in a certain way, be quite sharp.

But why think that incomparability can exist at all? Griffin argues that options can be incomparable with respect to moral values, given the absence of an overarching framework (such as utilitarianism) by which to order them. Chang provides a rigorous overview of the arguments for incomparability. She suggests that the apparent rationality of judging an option not better nor worse than an alternative, while at the same time judging that a small improvement to the option would still leave it neither better nor worse than the alternative, provides the strongest argument. Regan, by contrast, contends that given (1) the possibility of indefinitely fine-grained intra-value comparisons, and (2) the possibility of some inter-value comparisons, we should conclude that (3) indefinitely fine-grained *inter*-value comparisons are also possible. I confess not to have been persuaded by Regan, here — plausibly, what individuates (or goes to individuating) values just is the platitude that options differing only with respect to a single value are universally comparable — nor by Regan's other two arguments for universal comparability, namely (a) that how options compare is revealed by the choice of an ideal agent, and (b) that choice between incomparables is unintelligible. It seems to me that these two latter arguments have no greater force against the possibility of incomparables than they do against the possibility of equally good options, which latter possibility everyone (including Regan) accepts. Nonetheless, Regan's contribution to *IIP*, together with a prior article therein cited, constitute the leading case for universal comparability, and are essential reading.

Finally, does incomparability preclude rational choice? Taylor suggests that 'a sense of how [options] fit together in a whole life' (179) enables choice between incomparables. Note, however, that, if one option is better than the other with respect to whole-life-fittingness, then they are not (at least in this respect) incomparable. Raz and Finnis argue that choice between incomparables that is guided by, respectively, 'desires' or 'feelings' is indeed rational. There are two objections here, one in effect advanced by Regan, the second by Millgram. First, the Raz/Finnis view of desires or feelings as choice-relevant considerations that are not full-blooded values is incoherent; either they are full-blooded values (in which case the options are not, after all, incomparable), or counter-preferential choice is not irrational. Second, even on the Raz/Finnis view, the problem of comparability simply recurs with respect to desires or feelings. One option can be more desired than a second, even though neither option is more or less desired than a third — since, as Millgram puts it, a desire 'will generally not contain within itself the resources needed to adjudicate conflicts between it and many other actual and possible desires' (154). And he continues: 'Choice on the basis of incommensurable desires undermines unified agency ... by either successively propelling the agent in different directions, or encouraging indecisiveness ... or where an agent is able to avoid [that] by dint of the sheer determination not to change his mind once it is made up, by committing him to a dogged and

unintelligent response to as-yet-unanticipated circumstances' (156). Stocker offers a more radical critique of the link between comparability and rationality than Raz and Finnis — to the effect that it can be rational to choose a worse option — but this is persuasively rebutted by Chang.

Surely some attention to the case of rational choice among equally-valued options would have helped illuminate the problem of rational choice among incomparables. I know of no one who thinks that the betterness of an option is a necessary condition for its being rationally chosen. Where options are of equal value (or at least of precisely equal value), the choice of either one is rational if not justified. Why, then, is it irrational to flip a coin between incomparables (at least where the agent monitors choices over time so as to avoid being value-pumped)? A clearer focus on the distinction between rational and justified choice, and on the case of equal value, would have made *IIP* even better than it already is. But that is just a small quibble with a truly fine volume.

Matthew D. Adler
(*School of Law*)
University of Pennsylvania

Samuel Clarke
A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and Other Writings. Ed. Ezio Vailati.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. xxxvii + 167.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-59008-6);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-59995-4).

In 1704 Samuel Clarke gave the Boyle lectures. These were then published as *A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, one of the most important philosophical texts of the eighteenth century. The central point of these lectures was a defence of natural religion in the spirit of the Newtonian synthesis. Clarke rejects the ontological argument — contrary to Descartes' claim of the Fifth *Meditation*, Clarke argues that we have no insight into the essence of God — and defends the existence of God using the *a priori* causal argument for the existence of a necessary being. Clarke had also presented the *a posteriori* argument from design (not included in this edition), but preferred the *a priori* argument on the grounds that it enabled the natural theologian to provide a better answer to the materialist objections, and, in particular, to what Clarke saw as the materialist and atheist tendencies of the Cartesian philosophy. This a priori argument for a necessary being had

appeared in Descartes' Third *Meditation* and in Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. Clarke's presentation is fuller and more perspicuous than either of these. That alone makes this a useful text, if only as something to which one can refer students when reading Hume's discussion of this argument in the *Dialogues on Natural Religion* — Clarke's argument is undoubtedly the model for Demea's. Besides the existence of a necessary being, Clarke develops arguments concerning the unity and attributes of this being. These fill in many details absent from such discussions as that of Locke, giving one a very good picture of the philosophical account of natural religion that developed after Newton and Locke.

A variety of issues arise from Clarke's discussions, concerning such things as free will, agent causation, the nature of the soul, and the relation of mind and matter. All these relate, of course, to the well known correspondence between Clarke and Leibniz. Clarke's argument concerning the being and nature of God throw considerable light on the position Clarke develops in the correspondence with Leibniz. Also included in this volume are a number of other of Clarke's works dealing with these issues, including correspondence with Bishop Butler mainly on divine omnipresence and divine necessity, and correspondence with the mortalist Henry Dodwell concerning the nature of the soul. In the latter we see Clarke struggling to reconcile his view that the soul is at once locally extended and immaterial.

An excerpt from one of Clarke's sermons serves to summarize his moral theory and his argument, based on miracles, for the truth of Christianity. These remarks give the gist of the vast amount of material from the *Demonstration* that has been omitted. The omission is in fact not serious. The defence of Christianity is now dated, and Clarke's moral philosophy can be found elsewhere, in the collections by D.D. Raphael and by L.A. Selby-Bigge on the *British Moralists*.

Ezio Vailati, as editor, provides a useful Introduction, summarizing the arguments and disagreements neatly, while providing, albeit briefly, relevant historical context. There is also a good listing of 'Further Reading.' This volume is in the series 'Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy.' It is a welcome addition.

Fred Wilson
University of Toronto

Louis de la Forge
Treatise on the Human Mind (1664).
Trans. Desmond M. Clarke.
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997.
Pp. xxv + 237.
US$125.00. ISBN 0-7923-4778-1.

Louis de la Forge (1632-66) is perhaps best known today as one of the principal founders of seventeenth-century occasionalism. The *Treatise* contains arguments for occasionalism, but much of it is dedicated to La Forge's views on the mind and its attributes, accompanied by the not always convincing claim that everything in his text is either explicitly Cartesian or else easily inferred from the writings of the master.

Classical Islamic occasionalism, vigorously combatted by Aquinas, invoked discrete time atoms and the creation of the world anew at every time atom. In the seventeenth-century discussion new factors appeared. For La Forge only *mechanistic* accounts were acceptable. Adequate explanations are limited to *imaginable* qualities — 'size, movement, rest, position, and the relation between these bodies and others and the relation between the parts which compose them' (146). La Forge notes, as did others, that there are things too large to be accurately imagined (that is, *imaged*), and things which are too small — the sun, or things smaller than a mite, for example (165). Since we nonetheless have knowledge of such things it follows that intellectual activity must be non-corporeal. Imaging is like sensing, but intellectual activity is strikingly different (164).

La Forge assumes, following Descartes, that the world is a plenum. It follows that even if bodies had a self-moving power, which they don't — 'there is no creature which can act without the simultaneous assistance of the Creator' (59) — they still could not move because any motion of one body requires a motion of *every* body, and no body could have the power to move every body — 'it is impossible for a body to have from itself the power to move itself or to move another body.' Hence, 'the force which moves it must belong to some other substance'; in fact, 'it is God who is the first, universal and total cause of motion' (147).

Quite apart from the argument from dynamics, La Forge has a sufficient reason consideration to advance. Suppose God removed motion from the universe, giving rise to an 'indefinitely extended chaos.' No motion could ensue because extension, 'the only quality which it retains in this condition, is not active. Even if it were, which part of it would move first and in which direction should it go? Undoubtedly, there is no more reason to think it would go in one direction rather than another, and therefore no part will move' (146).

La Forge's occasionalism was not an *ad hoc* device invented to allow mind/body interaction: it comes straightforwardly from his views concerning motion in a plenist universe. For La Forge minds moving bodies are no more problematic than bodies moving bodies. Both require the Creator's total

involvement. (This gives rise to internal difficulties in La Forge's position but a short review is not the place to resolve them.)

La Forge slides over some of the real problems inherent in his Cartesian position. Given that (neurophysiological) memory of individual things and occurrences will apparently be lost after death, and that intellectual knowledge is merely knowledge of universal truths, what *kind* of memory will we have? Constantine Huygens had already raised this point with Descartes and received an evasive answer. La Forge does no better, simply asserting that we *will* have memories of particulars, but *how* we are to have them remains unanswered (186-7, 213). However some postmortem problems *do* receive a solution. After death, undistracted by the body, we can make 'incomparably greater progress in the sciences.' Moreover, God can certainly 'unite the human soul with some other body [and so it is] relatively easy to conceive ... how fire could burn and torment the souls of those who died in a state of sin' (214), which at least clears *that* problem up.

The translation by Desmond M. Clarke is excellent. It is clear, straightforward and readable, and his notes contain a host of useful cross-references and comments. The brief Introduction is informative and interesting. There are very few typos, most involving intrusive hyphens resulting, presumably, from a change of word processing programs between translator and publisher, e.g., Cartes-ian (xiv.2); know-ledge (74.2), and stipu-lation (77.20). Note also immediatley (77.7), and at xxv.1, for two read three.

La Forge's *Treatise* was actually printed in November, 1665, but officially published, as the first edition's title page shows, in 1666. The current publisher, Kluwer, has added to the confusion by producing (after the work left Clarke's hands) a dust jacket and title page which shows the date as 1664, perhaps as a result of a confusion between La Forge's *Treatise* and Descartes' posthumous *Traité de l'Homme* for which La Forge provided illustrations and a lengthy set of comments. That *Treatise* did appear in 1664, but La Forge's did not.

J.J. MacIntosh
University of Calgary

Daniel Garber and **Michael Ayers, eds.**
The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, 2 Vols.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. xvii + 949; vi + 666.
US$175.00. ISBN 0-521-58864-2.

This is a splendid set of individual articles which attempts to convey a sense of the richness and complexity of a period too often reduced to stereotypes and oversimplifications. The term 'attempts' is not intended as derogatory, but as a cautionary note, since no single work could possibly accomplish this feat fully. In order to appreciate what the work does accomplish, it will be necessary to consider the editors' explicit intentions and how they are fulfilled. Only then would it be appropriate to raise questions or offer suggestions. To facilitate this attempt at evaluation it will prove helpful to provide a structural analysis of the work as a whole.

The editors have undertaken a monumental enterprise, bringing together some thirty-three writers to offer a truly wonderful array of scholarship. One hesitates to point out, therefore, that most of these scholars are British or American, with only a handful of Continental universities represented (and one Australian). The paucity of French, German and Italian writers is most surprising, although their works are widely cited. The result is necessarily a body of commentary strongly influenced by the analytic tradition of scholarship which has played such a prominent role in our century. The editors recognize the limitations of this tradition, and hope to overcome them *by means of* the present work (4). The badly needed shift in the way this period is currently taught, and the reassessment of canonical texts desired by the editors (3) are surely less likely to take place with such a restricted array of scholars (whose basic competence is, of course, unquestionable).

Rather than attempting to provide a definitive statement on each philosopher from this period, the work is structured around seven themes. Several chapters develop each theme from different perspectives, and this provides a very helpful history of ideas. However, each writer must deal with the same set of major figures (and some minor), and even though this occurs from a slightly different angle on each occasion, it remains difficult to avoid repetition, and indeed to avoid discrepancies of interpretation. The first volume is broken into the following five sections: I. The context of thought: institutional, intellectual, cultural (3 chs.; 94pp.). II. Logic, language and abstract objects (6 chs.; 162pp.). III. God (5 chs.; 160pp.). IV. Body and the physical world (8 chs.; 334pp.). V. Spirit (5 chs.; 194pp.). The second volume contains the remaining two sections: VI. The Understanding (5 chs.; 242pp.). VII. Will, action and moral philosophy (4 chs.; 205pp.). This is complemented by a Biobibliographical appendix on philosophers of the period (75pp.); a Bibliography (115pp.); a Name index (10pp.); and a Subject index (20pp.). The scholarly resource provided by these final components is of great value, even apart from matters of interpretation in the preceding sections.

Anyone familiar with this period will recognize the difficulty involved in attempting to provide a coherent treatment of each topic as though it were actually distinct from the others. And while section I profits only slightly from a discussion of European responses to an influx of Chinese culture, other more prominent influences are omitted. For example, the religious background of the period is dealt with in Section III; and the role of scholasticism, and of the occult, are only developed in Section IV. Finally, a comparison of what counted as explanation in the period — both in the traditional and in the new mechanist frameworks — occurs in Section IV. But a proper treatment of the relationship between empirically and theoretically based conceptions of probability and evidence, as well as the discussion of scepticism, is held over until Section VI. It goes without saying that attempting to coordinate the efforts of thirty-three different writers is a virtually impossible task. Yet the reader is entitled to expect a coherent development of topics, and even perhaps a consistent interpretation of issues and figures throughout. The editors intentionally chose to present the material in an order roughly like that in which a seventeenth-century student would have encountered it (2). This is historically interesting, but of questionable validity for current readers. It is also unfortunate that, because the editorial process covered such a long period (roughly 1984-98), early contributors were unable to take into consideration more recent contributions to their respective fields.

The important thing to recognize from these considerations is that this work is not to be seen as a reference tool in which more or less complete statements are offered concerning each specific topic. The result of isolating particular themes is just as stark a fragmentation as would be the complete treatment of each figure of the period in isolation. Thus each chapter can be fully understood and appreciated only when it is placed in the context of many other chapters, well beyond the limits of the specific theme to which it is related. In effect, therefore, the work must be respected as a history in the proper sense, and read as a whole rather than in fragments. But enough of structure and intentions.

It is certainly much more important to indicate some of the significant achievements of this work. The introductory discussion of Renaissance thought helps a great deal by permitting us to recognize the mind-set for which Bacon, Descartes, Gassendi, etc. were writing. The sixteenth century had already provided both a critique of scholastic philosophy in terms of consistency and coherence of doctrines, and a strong revival of ancient texts (sometimes in translation) which made it possible to compare current interpretations with the original intentions of Greek writers (34). Variant readings were possible not only in the sense which might promote scepticism, but also in an attempt to establish the best interpretation: a critical text. Some writers used these resources to promote the virtues of earlier figures, but many others were simply made aware of the limitations of the various traditions offered to view. Thus the chief legacy of the sixteenth century was the expectation of a new philosophy (34). Combining the

traditional respectability of mathematics with impressive new physical discoveries provided the basis for anticipating that this new perspective would have an essentially mechanical orientation.

Nonetheless, Aristotle remained *the* focus in philosophy as it was taught in the seventeenth century, especially in France (19). Major aspects of the traditional orientation were simply assumed as the basis for any discussion whatever: i.e., even if Aristotle were opposed, the argument would be conducted in terms of the language and principles of the tradition. As particular philosophical societies arose, their formal discussions complemented the tradition by adding in the rhetorical conventions of earlier rhetorical societies (24). But many competent individuals disliked public controversy, refused to publish, and developed a reputation simply in virtue of their extensive correspondence. We are helped to recognize that a simple reading of an isolated passage, even in a published work, is very likely to lead to distortions or misconceptions of a doctrine held. A much broader historical and contextual reading is essential.

Some of the difficulties raised concerning the structure of this *History* may be transformed into interesting advantages by the avid student. There are non-conventional insights into the thought of figures such as Gassendi, Mersenne, Malebranche and the minor Cartesians which prompt us to reconsider their positions. And it is precisely *because* these insights are scattered and developed from thematic perspectives that the reader must work to put them into a coherent interpretation. Stereotypes are avoided (or at least avoidable) in the process of recognizing intentions and achievements often ignored. In the case of Gassendi, for example, we are reminded that his major concern was not to oppose scepticism, but Aristotelianism (1158). He chose Epicurus as his model in order to replace one ancient authority figure with another. The effect, however, was not merely to eliminate Aristotelian (qualitative) physics, but rather to replace it with a model that was suited both to mechanical interpretation and to mathematical analysis (even though Gassendi resisted the use of mathematics in physics [1119]). These concerns help us to understand why Gassendi chose to write as he did in his objections to Descartes' *Meditations*. He wanted an account of knowledge which specified precisely how the particular ideas of sense could be brought to general ideas or universals (190-1). But this could not be in a manner prescribed by the Aristotelian tradition. Descartes, on the other hand, was writing for the very orthodox doctors of sacred theology at the Sorbonne, and he required certain traditional terminology in order to make his position clear — while carefully avoiding other terms which would commit him to Aristotelian doctrines. Thus, while Descartes was actually providing a theory of concept formation in Meditation III, and one not unlike what Gassendi wanted, he could not employ abstraction as requested. Distinguishing one thing or property from another was safe enough; but abstracting would suggest that he was still involved in isolating the traditional substantial form of the object conceived. Moreover, behind these epistemological details were concealed their more general conceptions of method: Descartes was essen-

tially concerned with discovery, while Gassendi was more interested in pedagogy (162). Clarification of the orientation of each writer, and the reasons behind the petty terminological wrangling, goes a long way toward providing an understanding of the underlying agreements and disagreements between them which are normally obscured.

Another sketch may prove more illuminating. Individuals such as Mersenne and Gassendi may be characterized as seeking a moderate certitude. They were 'mitigated sceptics' (1009). Their positions were clearly different; so much so that they might be seen as the founders of the 'rationalist' and 'empiricist' traditions respectively (1010-11). But neither writer believed, for example, that mathematics could give us a genuine insight into the essential nature of physical objects. In contrast, Malebranche and other 'Cartesians' sought strict certitude. Malebranche could achieve this because he felt that in our clear and distinct perceptions we are united to the divine mind (1017). But there were other movements progressing which had little to do with these more technical epistemological doctrines. The Reformation in theology and the sceptical movement in philosophy had attempted to downplay the role of knowledge, and to replace it with faith. Philosophers who were directly concerned with such issues as the validity of scriptural authority could maintain with Chillingworth that certainty is not really necessary, since if God had wanted us to understand him more certainly, he would have spoken more clearly (1118). At the same time, theories of probability (not at first mathematical) were developed in terms of which insurance rates could be established, governments could plan tax strategies and anticipate population shifts (*e.g.*, as a result of the plague), etc. (1108ff.). In the courts, authority gave way to the credibility of witnesses, and events were weighed in terms of internal (causal requirements) as well as external (reported) circumstances (1119). A 'new reasonableness' (1116) grew up which gave a strong role to common sense and experience, with little tolerance for any attempt to know the mind of God.

Such a movement, of course, would undermine the development of a strict, mathematically accurate science — both in its traditional sense as *scientia* and in its modern Newtonian sense of a unified physical system. In order to resolve the potential conflict between these two movements (even within the individual), two questions had to be addressed: What is the true purpose of science? And what are the criteria to which the mind must naturally give assent? Upon closer examination, the questions are not so unrelated as at first they might appear. If, as Locke expressed it, our meager knowledge is sufficient for us to work out our salvation, then it might seem that much of science is superfluous, a mere intellectual curiosity. But if responsibility for understanding the world (science) is a moral issue, because such understanding is required in order to make correct moral judgments, then the relationship between these elements is significantly altered. It is only in Section VII, therefore, that the reader is provided the moral and practical aspects of decision theory that permit a corrected conception of the epistemological controversies of this period to emerge.

The discussion begins with a chapter on determinism and human freedom. But the argument is not dealt with simply as a matter of whether scientifically conceived causal relationships will permit us to view human actions as freely chosen and thus moral. The more interesting question concerns whether the power of choice itself is able to function without being determined by its object — through desire or other appetitive drives. Much earlier, Aquinas had pointed out the difference between the exercise of a power and the specification of that exercise (1199). In the present case, because the will is a power inherently directed toward the good, when we exercise this power we are unable to direct it toward that which is seen as specifically *not* good. However, it would be possible not to exercise this power at all, simply by diverting the intellect to something else entirely. For individuals such as Locke and Leibniz, this distinction and the ability to suspend the decision-making process provided the ultimate basis for claiming human freedom (1199).

Others, however, recognized that this was not a real solution, since it would simply commit the individual to making no decisions at all. Thus, figures such as Hobbes and Spinoza employed this distinction in another way. Rather than opting not to choose, they pointed out that we may suspend judgment (a basic Stoic recommendation) by focusing on the criterion to which the mind is permitted to respond. (Neither Hobbes nor Spinoza sees the will as a separate faculty [1235]). Descartes, in similar fashion, advocates the suspension of assent until we are certain that we are not in error. If this criterion were viewed as the recognition of necessity in the matter under consideration, then the distinction between Spinoza and Descartes at least would be eliminated: both would see necessity as the only acceptable criterion for assent. Clearly this option is not always open to us in moral issues where the press of events may force action; but in speculative matters (and speculative *moral* matters) it *is*. The essential distinction that is made apparent, therefore, between matters of science and matters of morality is that in the latter case we are often immersed in desires and passions stimulated by an unavoidable flow of events which requires an active intervention. But it would be a strange individual (moralist or academic) who failed to recognize that it is not only the poet who must reflect upon experience in tranquility. Sound judgment requires repose.

Within this discussion, the role of the will in morality is subjected to a variety of helpful analyses. Several perspectives are offered concerning the very possibility of indifferent (disinterested or objective) judgment (1239). Leibniz is shown to offer a resolution of certain difficulties by insisting that spontaneity (and thus genuine freedom) flows from the very nature of reflective self-awareness (1263). Theological problems are raised in the context of natural law when we are the recipients of divine grace and its intervention (1318ff.). The role of a 'neutral logic' (geometrical reasoning) in providing an objective basis for morality is considered (1300). And the gradual transition is displayed as morality shifted from essentially a religious response to authority to the adoption of a social and rational set of criteria flowing from theoretical considerations (1339ff.).

All of these perspectives are extremely helpful; but there were two issues developed in different contexts which helped to display the tenuous relation between our sense of speculative scientific certitude on the one hand, and the concrete immediacy of moral issues on the other. The first was the position of Locke, Pufendorf and others that morality is essentially an artifact produced by a particular cultural or social group (1345), a set of practical principles ultimately validated by its ability to guide us in promoting happiness and avoiding pain. This constructed morality might even achieve the status of a deductive science (1162 & n.90). Locke was proud that this perspective would account so easily for the moral diversity which we find in different times and places (1347). Even if we choose not to accept this conception of morality, it certainly helps us to understand how Locke could consistently hold the seemingly contradictory positions that a genuine knowledge of the essential nature of objects in the world is beyond our grasp (1160), and nonetheless that a perfectly sound science of physical objects is possible. (Locke was importantly influenced by Newton's achievements, and he held that there is no conceivable argument for doubting the real existence and *perceived* nature of things in the world. What we do not fully understand we simply ascribe to the good pleasure and arbitrary will of God [1161]). The point would be that any deductive science that we attain would be a matter of nominal essences and expressed in our conventional language. Like our moral code, it would be subject to the corrections of experience and be adequate to bring us to salvation. Of course, this would not give us knowledge in the strict sense; but in any case such knowledge could only be had by the creative mind of God, and therefore it would be of no concern to mankind (1162).

The second issue that is raised concerns the term 'moral certainty'. We may often be inclined to think of this form of assurance as having very little significance. After all, one must either be entirely certain or not certain at all. But in fact the term was intended to convey enormous significance, since in addition to its ordinary sense of practical or experiential assurance, it was quite literally intended to signify that assurance on which one would stake his salvation. Moreover, even in the more mundane sense of the term, it was given a very strict definition by a writer such as Nicholas Bernoulli: a probability of .999, accepted only after a sufficient number of trials (1134). Only a clear recognition of the intended significance of this term will permit us to respect what writers of this period strove to attain, and what they believed their arguments to have achieved. What we find in this period, therefore, both with respect to morality and physical science, is a very well founded fiction: beyond mere common sense and reasonableness, to be sure, but a fiction nonetheless. This was not the ideal toward which Spinoza or Leibniz might direct us, but it was certainly accepted by the majority of writers. The story sounds very familiar.

While these sketches can only hint at the wealth of perspectives and insights that can be developed through synthesizing the keen observations of so many scholars, they should at least suggest clearly that this is a rich

source of information for anyone who would like to understand the period more fully. Once again, it must be emphasized, gleaning these insights will require the student to read the entire *History*, and to read it attentively. But this effort will be richly rewarded.

Frederick P. van de Pitte
University of Alberta

Jean-Joseph Goux and
Philip R. Wood, eds.
Terror and Consensus: Vicissitudes of French Thought.
Stanford: Stanford University Press 1998.
Pp. xi + 222.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-2969-7);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-2970-0).

This anthology emerges from a conference on 'Terror and Consensus: The Cultural Singularity of French Thought' held at Rice University in April 1993. As the editors, Jean-Joseph Goux and Philip R. Wood, explain in their introduction, the papers collected in *Terror and Consensus: Vicissitudes of French Thought* address two issues. First, they identify the historical and cultural conditions which occasioned the 'French exception,' the 'unusually conflictual French political process inherited from the revolutionary past in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and its accompanying avant-gardism in artistic, literary, and philosophical practice, both of which distinguish France from other European countries' (1). Second, the essays discuss the 'progressive "normalization" of French society that has been the final outcome of the liquidation of the colonial empire, the collapse of Marxism as a social force, and the integration of France into the European Union' (1), which together seemingly have extinguished the French exception. This normalization also has resulted in a consensus that liberal capitalism, human rights, and democracy are the fundamental values of 'the West'. One question raised by many of the essays is whether this consensus makes invisible some conflicts, and if certain forms of oppressions actually are caused by the terms of the consensus itself.

This consensus has been accompanied by 'the attenuation of the avant-garde in the arts, the decline of the kind of intellectual figure exemplified by Sartre, and a systematic assault on the last representatives of the philosophical avant-garde (Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, and others) — *"la pensée '68"* — by an aggressive constituency of neoliberal thinkers and conservatives' (1-2).

This has produced the paradoxical result, noted by Goux and Wood, that French thought has received unprecedented attention outside of France, especially in the humanities and social sciences, while simultaneously the distinctive conditions which made possible that thought may be disappearing permanently.

Following the editors' introduction, the book is divided into three sections. The first section, 'Parameters of an Ongoing Crisis', contains Barbara Cassin's 'Speak, If You Are a Man, or The Transcendental Exclusion', Jean-François Lyotard's 'Terror on the Run', and Goux's 'Subversion and Consensus: Proletarians, Women, Artists'. 'Situations of Current French Thought: The End of "The French Exception"?', the second section, consists of Marc Augé's 'The French Exception: End or Continuation?', Françoise Gaillard's 'The Terror of Consensus', Wood's '"Democracy" and "Totalitarianism" in Contemporary French Thought: Neoliberalism, the Heidegger Scandal, and Ethics in Post-Structuralism', Mark Poster's 'Postmodernity and the Politics of Multiculturalism: The Lyotard-Habermas Debate over Social Theory', and Françoise Lionnet's 'Performative Universalism and Cultural Diversity: French Thought and American Contexts'. The final section, 'Mission and Limits of Enlightenment', is comprised of Jean-Marie Apostolidès' 'Theater and Terror: *Le jugement dernier des rois*', Pierre Saint-Amand's 'Hostile Enlightenment', Susan Rubin Suleiman's 'The Intellectual Sublime: Zola as Archetype of a Cultural Myth', and Maurice Godelier's 'Is the West the Universal Model for Humanity? The Baruya of New Guinea Between Change and Decay'.

Terror and Consensus will be invaluable to persons interested in the recent French theoretical avant-garde, the social and intellectual conditions of its actuality, the arguments that can be advanced to defend against detractors charging it with conceptual terrorism and irresponsibility, and its prospects.

J.M. Fritzman
Lewis and Clark College

Amy Gutmann, ed.
Freedom of Association.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1998. Pp. vii + 382.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-05758-3);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-05759-1).

In her introductory chapter to this collection of essays, Amy Gutmann cites Alexis de Tocqueville's remark that nothing deserves more theoretical attention than the proclivity of American citizens to form secondary associations. She then points out that political philosophers have largely neglected to follow Tocqueville's lead in seeking to understand the proper role that freedom of association plays in the functioning of a liberal democracy. The essays in this volume take a first step toward remedying that neglect.

A primary aim shared by a number of contributors is to combat what Nancy L. Rosenblum calls the 'logic of congruence,' the idea that the 'internal life and practices of voluntary groups' must reflect 'the public culture of liberal democracy' (75). Taken together, the essays by Rosenblum, George Kateb, and Yael Tamir build a powerful case against applying the logic of congruence to social and expressive associations that is one of the volume's most important contributions to contemporary debates.

In 'Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-Respect, and the Dynamic of Exclusion' Rosenblum denies that 'second-class membership' in a voluntary association necessarily leads to 'second-class citizenship' and argues that the 'dynamic of exclusion' involved in the creation of voluntary associations is consistent with a public commitment to liberal values. Similarly, Kateb in 'The Value of Association' defends the right of voluntary associations to discriminate in their membership policies because the freedom to create and join exclusionary groups is an essential part of the freedom to create one's own identity that should be abridged 'only with deep constitutional regret' (39). Tamir in 'Revisiting the Civic Sphere' argues that the potentially illiberal effects of an autonomous civic sphere can be counterbalanced by an activist welfare state that promotes democratic values through public institutions.

Michael Walzer's and Kent Greenawalt's arguments against particular applications of the logic of congruence are less successful. In 'On Involuntary Association' Walzer argues against the claim that all associational life can or should be reconstituted on a purely voluntary basis. But he fails to address the primary reason most political theorists have for stressing the importance of voluntarism — namely, that some associations are oppressive precisely because they stifle their members' ability to voluntarily accept or reject them. Greenawalt's highly informative 'Freedom of Association and Religious Association' suffers because he does not clearly connect his claim that the 'transcendent' orientation of religious associations justifies the deferential treatment they receive under the First Amendment to his more specific judgments regarding the proper scope of religious liberty.

Peter de Marneffe's 'Rights, Reasons, and Freedom of Association' is the only essay to explicitly address the question of whether it is possible to formulate a general theory of associational freedom that applies to all types of association. He concludes that a general theory is impossible because the balance of reasons for and against interfering with the practices of an association will vary depending on the character of the association in question, its purpose, and its relation to other important social goods. The decision of de Marneffe's co-contributors to focus on specific aspects of associational freedom rather than on freedom of association in general attests to the truth of his conclusion.

A second major theme of the volume is the role that secondary associations play in furthering important liberal purposes. Will Kymlicka's 'Ethnic Associations and Democratic Citizenship', in which he defends ethnic associations against the charge that they promote societal 'balkanization', is largely a reprise of arguments that readers will find familiar from his past work. Daniel Bell's more innovative 'Civil Society versus Civic Virtue' presents a counter-example to the Tocquevillian view that small and intimate associations are more likely to promote the public good than large governmental institutions. Through a comparative analysis of Residential Community Associations and the National Park Service, he shows how the former actually promote narrowly self-interested behavior while the latter has enjoyed much success in promoting a commitment to the public good.

Stuart White's 'Trade Unionism in a Liberal State' also breaks new ground by comparing the state's treatment of trade unions with its treatment of religious organizations. He argues that since trade unions are 'instrumental' associations designed to secure equal access to important public goods like income and wealth, the 'religion model of state-association relationships' does not apply to them. The state should be willing to provide unions with positive support and to intervene in their internal affairs to ensure that they remain politically effective and responsive to their members' interests.

The essays by Kymlicka, Bell, and White are exemplary in the attention they pay to the differences between different types of associations and in the care they take to avoid assumptions that are uninformed by empirical evidence.

The remaining two essays take up the question of how the state can promote forms of associational life that are conducive to civic virtue. Same Fleischacker's 'Insignificant Communities', the volume's most original contribution, focuses on the 'insignificant' or 'particle communities' that arise when citizens join together to pursue 'low-level' (non-comprehensive) ends. Fleischacker argues that by supporting unjustly neglected forms of association such as athletic associations, neighborhoods, and social clubs, the state can provide many of the benefits of community championed by communitarians without jeopardizing either the individual freedom or state neutrality championed by liberals. Fleischacker's discussion of communities 'with bonds weak enough to preserve freedom but strong enough to allow for morally fruitful interaction' (279) is particularly useful for the contrasts

it draws between different kinds of community and their relation to individual liberty.

Alan Ryan's 'The City as a Site for Free Association' considers how 'the built environment' indirectly affects the prospects for civic life. Unfortunately, such strong claims as that suburbanization is an aesthetic, social, and political disaster (324) do not find adequate support in his cautious and tentative reflections. Those who are interested in how the state can indirectly promote civic life would more profitably consult Fleischacker's essay.

Although the volume would have benefited from the inclusion of voices on the other side of key debates, e.g., those who would more aggressively pursue the logic of congruence, *Freedom of Association* succeeds in providing readers with a synoptic view of the place of secondary associations in a liberal democracy. I recommend it for anyone investigating the under-explored terrain that lies in between the individual and the state.

Erik A. Anderson
University of Connecticut

Jean Hampton
The Authority of Reason. Ed. Richard Healey.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. xii + 310.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-55428-4);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-55614-7).

This is the book on which Jean Hampton was working when she died in April 1996. She had completed what would probably have been the penultimate drafts of the Introduction and the first three of nine chapters; earlier drafts of four other chapters; and sketchier outlines of the remaining two chapters (6 and 9). Richard Healey has lightly edited and annotated the manuscript for publication.

It is impossible for those who know Hampton's work to read the book without a renewed sense of what philosophy lost by her untimely death. Although it is frustratingly incomplete, it displays many of her philosophical virtues, exercised in her distinctive voice: her lucid and authoritative fluency in dealing both with the complexities of formal decision theory (in her discussion of expected utility theory in Chapters 7-8), and with the more informally discursive aspects of moral or practical philosophy; her willingness to make the best that can be made of an opponent's argument — and her ability then to show what is wrong with it; her readiness to swim

powerfully against the prevailing tides of contemporary philosophy, seeking to retrieve ideas which many have thought to be irretrievable; the honesty and integrity with which she faced difficulties in the positions she sought to articulate and defend.

However, the book should certainly not be read merely as a memorial of her work. It carries through several stages of a large and ambitious project — and challenges the reader either to help complete that project by trying to fill in the gaps and to complete its final stages; or to work out why it must fail. Hampton's final aim is to defend a species of moral 'objectivism' — the view that 'there are value-laden, non-reducible moral judgments that are objective' (1) — against the kind of science-inspired 'naturalism' which finds no room for such objective values in the world as science (properly) portrays it. For reasons which should become apparent, however, not much of the book is concerned with moral philosophy as normally conceived.

There are three stages to Hampton's project. The first stage, occupying the first three chapters, aims to show just how difficult a task the moral objectivist faces, by showing how radically 'queer' — at odds with a naturalist conception of the world — the idea of objective moral values is. This involves dealing briskly (sometimes brusquely) with some familiar anti-objectivist arguments from Mackie, Harman and Williams, which — Hampton argues — fail to capture what is really 'non-natural' about moral values, and equally briskly with various attempts to 'naturalise' moral values within a scientific world view. The crucial feature of moral values, their central 'non-natural' element, is that they involve 'moral norms generating moral reasons that have "objective" authority' (45): moral reasons which are 'external' rather than 'internal' (there is a useful critique of various versions of 'internalism' about reasons), and which are thus, for the objectivist, binding on us whether we like it or not — whether or not they can be derived from our existing motivational set. But such norms, and their purportedly objective authority, resist any naturalistic explanation or analysis: for they involve a kind of metaphysical normative necessity which is 'ineffable' — which cannot even be understood from within a naturalist world view (100-9); and in explaining what it is for actions to be guided by such norms we must offer 'final cause' explanations which can have no place within natural science (109-14).

Much of the argument so far is illuminating and persuasive, and cuts through a number of confusions which infect standard arguments both for and against 'objectivism'. I suspect, however, that Hampton tends to move too quickly from scientific ineffability to ineffability tout court — from the persuasive argument that moral norms and the reasons they generate cannot be understood with the framework of natural science, to the not yet persuasive claim that they are in some much more radical way opaque and mysterious. This has to do with her insistence that such norms are utterly 'culture-independent' (96) — which does indeed make their metaphysical character and status deeply puzzling: but whilst she rightly rejects the simpler kinds of relativism which she discusses under the heading of 'The Psycho-Social Thesis' (93-9), there are other and subtler species of relativism,

notably those inspired by Wittgenstein, which might not be so clearly inadequate, and which might open the way to showing moral values and norms to be non-mysteriously (and non-scientifically) effable.

The first stage of Hampton's project seems — as she herself insists (115) — to leave the moral objectivist in a parlous position: how can we hope to make sense of such ineffably authoritative objective norms? The second stage, however, is to show that moral objectivists are not alone in facing this difficulty: that they have plenty of 'companions in guilt', since other modes of human thought — including those which naturalists and other kinds of anti-objectivist are happy to accept as unproblematic — depend on objective norms of reason whose metaphysical status is no different from, and no less problematic than, that of moral norms themselves. Hampton's main focus here is on instrumental reasoning (Chapters 4-5), though Chapter 6, had she been able to complete it, would have developed a matching argument for science itself.

Chapter 4 discusses four possible accounts of the authority and motivational efficacy of the kinds of hypothetical imperative which issue from the exercise of instrumental reason, and argues for a particular kind of Kantian account according to which 'the "instrumental norm", which directs us to pursue those objects and perform those actions that will be the most effective means to a desired end' (140) has the same kind of objective authority as, and can directly motivate in the same way as, the moral norms which anti-objectivists reject. Thus even if we admit, as pure instrumentalists insist, that reason itself cannot set our ends, we must still recognise that instrumental reason depends on an objective, non-instrumental norm. Chapter 5 then argues that, once we try to give an account of instrumental reason as it is to be used by beings like ourselves, with multiple rather than single preferences or ends, we must also recognise the essential role played by other objective, non-instrumental norms of reason — norms which help to define the structure, and at least to constrain the content, of a rational agent's (conception of her own) good. These norms concern the preferences which are to be included either in the 'good-defining set' — that set of preferences which an agent takes to define her own good — or in the 'source set' — that set of preferences from which the good-defining set is derived: they must include not just an objective requirement of internal coherence, but also norms concerning which preferences are to be included; and such norms cannot themselves be grounded in the preferences which they govern — they must therefore have objective authority as non-instrumental norms of reason.

These two chapters are the most impressive in the book: the argument is careful, incisive and thoroughly persuasive. They are followed by two chapters on expected utility theory, which are (at least for those not versed in the technicalities of the topic) the most difficult in the book. Hampton argues that whilst we can transform the theory as developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern into a normative theory of reasoning, such a theory will still have to rely on the kinds of non-instrumental norm discussed in Chapter 5;

and that it still cannot capture the non-consequentialist preferences which human agents reasonably have.

Of course, as Hampton points out, none of this establishes the truth or reality of moral norms; it is still open to instrumentalists to argue that their norms are demonstrably sound in a way that the moral objectivist's norms are not — though it is not clear just how that is to be argued. But the third stage of the project should now be to show how we can make sense of the kinds of 'ineffable', objectively authoritative norm to which, Hampton has argued, both instrumentalists and moral objectivists must appeal; and then to begin to develop a general theory of norms and of reason which will enable us to distinguish sound from unsound norms. This would have been the topic of Chapter 9, of which we have only the first four pages — pages which end with the suggestion that if we are to make sense of the idea of objective normative authority, without falling into the 'occult' or engaging in 'metaphysical flights of fancy', we need to redraw 'the line separating what counts as natural and what counts as occult' (291).

Hampton thus finally challenges anti-objectivists to show either that the kinds of reasoning on which they rely do not depend on objective norms of reason (though her arguments on this point will be hard to rebut), or that their objective norms are metaphysically unproblematic in a way that the moral objectivist's norms are not (but how will they show this?). She challenges moral objectivists to carry through the task of making sense of such objective norms, and showing how moral norms are as sound as any others. These are challenges which demand to be taken very seriously.

R.A. Duff
University of Stirling

John Haugeland
Having Thought.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1998. Pp. 390.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-674-38233-1.

Having Thought is a collection of John Haugeland's fine papers. It makes readily accessible several of his provocative and well written pieces on metaphysics and mind. Particularly memorable pieces are 'Ontological Supervenience' [1984], in which he deftly tackles token identity theories of physicalism, and 'The Intentionality All-Stars' [1990] in which he wittily utilizes baseball imagery to survey the then current state of play regarding theories of intentionality and representation. These papers, especially the former, ought to be more widely cited than they are, for Haugeland has

always been an intelligent critic of physicalist orthodoxy. But *Having Thought* also contains Haugeland's (broadly Heideggerian) criticisms of representationalist theories of mind, and an extended discussion of rule-following, ontological commitment, ontological constitution, and objectivity. These latter themes are taken up in the only new paper of the volume 'Truth and Rule-following'. The conclusion is described as a ' ... Kantian/Heideggerian conclusion ... [and] can be summed up this way: the constituted objective world and the free constituting subject are intelligible only as two sides of one coin' (6).

The book is divided into four sections: mind, matter, meaning and truth. Throughout each section Haugeland takes on various other prominent thinkers in the philosophy of mind, particularly Searle, Dretske, Dennett and Davidson. Section one, on the mind, presents papers critical of cognitivism. Section two, on matter, reprint his papers on supervenience, including the well-known early [1982] piece 'Weak Supervenience'. In section three we find Haugeland discussing intentionality, representationalism and perception. Finally in the section entitled 'truth' we find Haugeland's more positive program articulated. The critical commentary and the positive program are, as one would expect, two sides of the same coin. Cognitivism comes under attack for its failure to accommodate skills, moods and (existential) understanding, concepts that Haugeland takes up (in new guise) in the final new chapter, following up with his normative concepts of constitutive and mundane skills. Objectivity and truth are Haugeland's central concerns in the last two chapters, and they form the most challenging chapters. Haugeland wants to give an account of objectivity that recognizes our normative constitutive input to what counts as an object, yet one that can also accommodate a notion of objective correctness and incorrectness. He distinguishes between constitutive and mundane skills, the latter resting upon the former. Mundane skills involve our ability to recognize objects, but objects themselves exist by virtue of our prior constitutive skills delineating their conditions for individuation. Thus, chess players can recognize the pieces of the board (a mundane skill); yet these objects only count as chess pieces due to their prior involvement in constitutive skills that circumscribe their conditions of individuation. Constitutive skills are, however, achievements that are not easy and cannot be changed willy-nilly. The achievement to allow things be, as constituted, isn't easy, for the success of such skills is not merely up to the subject: ' ... objective phenomena are both accessible as normative criteria and literally *out of control*. The constitution of the domain determines what it comes to for them to be or to behave in this way or that; but whether they then *do* or not is "up to them" — and skillful practitioners can *tell*' (347).

Thus the analogy with the chess pieces is somewhat misleading, for it might seem that the constitutive skills that determine that something counts as a chess piece is somewhat easily achieved. Being committed to certain constitutive skills is to be existentially committed. This commitment is normative, for it is a commitment to the authority of certain kinds of things. Haugeland is eager to distinguish this normativity from the normativity of

deontic commitment, or even of an intentional state. It is ' ... no more a psychological or an intentional state than it is a communal status; rather it is a *way*, a *style*, a *mode* of playing, working, or living' (341). Objectivity is grounded then, in a lived commitment to certain constitutive skills that allow objects to be apprehended and to be subjects for the application of mundane skills. It is between the activity of constituting and the activity embodied in our mundane skills, that we find the concept of objectivity.

Haugeland's later work is not easy, but it is thought-provoking. However, it suffers from a lack of any serious attempt to show that the concepts employed can be illustrated in familiar scientific examples, or in any examples beyond Haugeland's favorites. Haugeland (almost obsessively) returns to his one clear example, that of chess, in order to explicate his concepts of mundane and constitutive skills; but given that he is discussing subjectivity and objectivity in general, one might have expected that he would have taken a leaf from Kuhn, whose controversial claim that 'the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds' Haugeland is out to expand, explain and to some extent reinterpret. That is, perhaps we should have seen how these concepts figure into the history of the great constitutive skill — science. Thus, Haugeland's book becomes steadily more abstract and metaphorical, the older (more clear) papers yielding to the younger, abstract and metaphorical papers.

My problem with collections of papers like this is that they are apt to be somewhat repetitive just where the reader wants to see the position developed and advanced. Nevertheless *Having Thought* is thoughtful and worth having.

Brian Jonathan Garrett
York University

Salim Kemal, Daniel Conway, and **Ivan Gaskell, eds.**
Nietzsche, Philosophy and The Arts.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. xv + 351.
US$69.95. ISBN 0-521-59381-6.

Although it is increasingly difficult to keep up with the scholarly output of the booming Nietzsche industry, this book should be considered essential reading. Several essays concentrate on specific art-works. Stephen Bann, for example, insightfully discusses the composition of an 1809 painting by Coupin de la Couperie from the perspective of Nietzsche's *Use And Abuse Of History*. And Timothy Hiles illuminates Gustav Klimt's *Beethoven Frieze* as a 'utopian vision of the arts as humanity's salvation' (162), arguing plausibly that Klimt's work embodies an interpretation of Nietzsche's vision of 'the artist as a conveyor of *veritas*' (177). The essays concentrating on Nietzsche's philosophy, however, collectively undermine Klimt's thoroughly conventional interpretation of Nietzsche's aestheticism.

In *What Is The Meaning Of Aesthetic Ideals?* Aaron Ridley bluntly sums up Nietzsche's 'official doctrine' regarding 'aesthetics' with the words 'art-works are entirely trivial' (132). Of course, he goes on to detail an 'unofficial aesthetic'. Its 'descriptive core' is a *non-normative*, involuntary urge to transform the world which 'functions as a condition of those *normative*, life-ameliorating practices' (143) devised by sophisticated religio-philosophical figures in order to shape the souls of people to fit a meaningful way of life. The necessity of distinguishing such artistry from art-making informs otherwise diverse essays. Ernst Behler's *Nietzsche's Conception of Irony*, for instance, traces the transformation of 'irony' from its pejorative origins in Greek drama to its status as an essential characteristic — a mastery of masks of dissimulation — of a Nietzschean 'savoir vivre or art of living' (33). Yet the relationship between the two is complicated. In naming exemplary *artists of life*, Behler falls back inconsistently on a list composed largely of *artists* (Goethe, Stendhal, Beethoven, etc.), but Ridley's insistence that Nietzsche's aesthetic ideal must be dissociated from art-works of any kind runs up against two profound re-readings of *Birth Of Tragedy*.

Martha Nussbaum has often emphasized that the arts can generate order and meaning without external metaphysical justification. And *The Transfigurations of Intoxication: Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Dionysus* complements Randall Havas' elaborate argument in *Socratism And Aesthetic Justification* regarding the way in which tragic drama expressed the authority of Greek culture without needing to justify that form of life with Socratic reasons. Both essays focus on the moment of self-recognition in ancient tragedy when the dichotomy of art and life is overcome — when the spectator, represented by the tragic chorus and 'intoxicated by Dionysus, becomes a work of art, and an artist' (62). Nussbaum gives a superb account of how Nietzsche, in conscious opposition to Schopenhauer, worked toward the

complex artistry characterizing this moment. In a Platonic coda to this long essay, moreover, she notes the 'erotic' character of Dionysian intoxication, pointing out that art is the 'outgrowth of a profoundly erotic interest' and also that 'the artistry of desire' can make 'the human being into a work of art' (65).

Nussbaum's allusive comments mesh perfectly with a wonderful essay by Daniel Conway, *Love's Labor's Lost: The Philosopher's Versucherkunst*, which addresses Nietzsche's youthful idea that human existence can be justified only by the production of rare genius. Conway appears to take the Walter Kaufmann line that this is an apolitical ideal. For the philosopher, artist and saint practice *internal* self-creation. But 'private self-legislation' often 'leaks into the public sphere' (292) where people can willingly consent to participate in endeavors initiated by 'great men.' In *Dionysus Lost and Found: Literary Genres In The Political Thought of Nietzsche and Lukacs*, Henry Staten argues that Nietzsche could not even *formulate* 'the problem of how the exemplarity of the hero is to be reconciled with the ordinariness of the masses' (250). Conway, however, elucidates 'willing consent' in terms of *eros* and identifies *eros* as 'the psychological mechanism that renders politics the self-overcoming of exemplary individuals' (294). Hence he can conclude that 'the consecratory properties of *eros*' can alone 'establish the micro-communities' worth inhabiting within the 'decay of late modernity' (287).

Nietzsche's Politics of Aesthetic Genius by Salim Kemal demonstrates how Nietzsche overcame his early 'fetishizing cult of genius' (269) by uncovering the complicated creative activity of 'ordinary genius'. Taken together, Kemal and Conway deal with his alleged 'tyrannophilia' (as Staten puts it) much more successfully than Kaufmann's strategy of denying a political dimension to Nietzsche's work. *Performative Identity: Nietzsche On The Force Of Art And Language* by Fiona Jenkins seems to confront a very different issue: 'it is common to attribute to Nietzsche a hyperbolic version of the egological model of agency, expressed in the assumption that meaning can be individually legislated' (218). Yet her contrary view of the Nietzschean self trying to *disclose* the meaning of a reality in which it is immersed does not simply destroy this pervasive assumption (held by a spectrum of readers from Danto to Heidegger). It also makes clear that the strongest essays in *Nietzsche, Philosophy And The Arts* share a revisionist slant well-suited to dealing with a problem articulated by Aaron Ridley, namely, that Nietzsche was never altogether clear about 'his own ... counter-version' of the normative ideal he rejects (145).

Jenkins captures the flavor of Nietzsche's Dionysian ideal partly because she wields a concept of 'performance' so effectively, but like other revisionists she tends to use tragic theater as the sole link between art-works and the broader sense of artistry infusing politics or language. So *Improvisations, On Nietzsche, On Jazz* by John Carvalho stands out as an intriguing exploration of how modern jazz (exemplified by Miles Davis) can provide 'a model for artistic self-fashioning comparable to the model Nehamas has fashioned for

Nietzsche out of literature' (204). The concept of performance is employed much less discursively in Claudia Crawford's *Nietzsche's Dionysian Arts: Dance, Song And Silence*. Her discussion of Nietzsche 'as an earth mystic' (312) is fascinating, although philosophers might be tempted to quote Nietzsche himself (in *Birth Of Tragedy*'s retrospective preface) regarding this approach to Dionysus — 'I should have *sung*, not spoken, of this new soul.' Much more frustrating is the way Adrian Del Caro, in *Nietzschean Self-Transformation And The Transformation of The Dionysian*, analyses the Dionysian ideal within the closed context of a mythical 'symbology' (84). Still, perhaps this is nothing more than a twist on the old Platonic antagonism between artists and philosophers that not even this excellent book can overcome.

Roderick Nicholls
University College of Cape Breton

Janet Kourany, ed.
Philosophy in a Feminist Voice.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1998. Pp. 322.
US$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-03313-7);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-01936-3).

This is a very good collection of papers authored by feminist philosophers, each one addressing the shortcomings of Western philosophy according to feminism. Most of the papers have not been previously published, although a couple of the chapters have appeared elsewhere. Chapters by Virginia Held and Susan Okin are taken from books that have been in print for quite a few years. The aim seems not so much to break new ground, but to put together an anthology that allows one already familiar with the terrain of philosophy to survey the most important feminist criticisms of it, one sub-field at a time. The history of philosophy, the idea of human nature, ethics, political philosophy, aesthetics, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of language, epistemology, and philosophy of religion — as well as feminism itself — are each given a chapter.

While the book mainly explores the sins of philosophy, (both of omission and commission), the first essay by Eileen O'Neill exhaustively details the surprising history of women in early modern philosophy. O'Neill ventures some interesting speculation as to why the works of these philosophers, when it is possible to find them, are no longer read. The answer is both outright discrimination and a shift in what counted as *philosophical* writing — a shift

that did not, apparently, specifically target women but managed to exclude them nonetheless.

The other essays, with the exception of that authored by Susan Bordo, provide an overview of major feminist criticisms. Most of these essays do not try to develop a specific feminist position in detail, although Louise Antony does conclude her survey of feminist concerns about the concept of a human nature with her own cogent defense of rehabilitating the idea, rather than discarding it. Okin's excellent survey also includes a brief and convincing defense of a kind of cultural androgyny against her critics on the left and right — maternalists and communitarians, who wind up looking oddly similar. Lorraine Code also defends her own program of feminist epistemology. Overall, the volume informatively describes the more recent feminist perspectives that have taken root and developed a little, without elaborate justifications of those perspectives. This is an important achievement, as the literature of feminist philosophy has grown large and is only beginning to sort itself out.

Bordo's concluding chapter is an interesting piece of meta-feminism, exploring the question of why most philosophers think feminist philosophy is an optional topic of study. Her depressing (but probably correct) answer is that the profession seems compelled to convert 'cultural critique to simple advocacy for the rights of the Other.' Thus, she points out, 'it becomes perfectly possible for a philosopher to assign Gilligan for a special class session on "Women and Morality" while continuing unselfconsciously and without remark to organize discussion around highly abstract and uncontextualized case studies.' True, but she assumes that in order to teach feminism as cultural critique, one must accept it and employ its results. She is surely right that there is no neutral standpoint from which to teach ethics — the game is up when the first principle is introduced — but many feminists such as myself see the work of such writers as Gilligan, Baier, Held, and Walker as interesting challenges to other, more traditional conceptions of ethics, not necessarily a decisive replacement for it.

A drawback of the collection is that one is given a single perspective on each subfield, and there is tremendous diversity in feminist thinking. Thus, while Held usefully recounts the themes of difference feminism that inform ethics today (the important of care, the public/private distinction, and the concept of the self), she leaves the impression that this perspective is *constitutive* of feminism in ethics. She writes, '[We] recognize that the problem requires more than changing patriarchal attitudes, for moral theory as so far developed is incapable of correcting itself without almost total transformation' (96). This is probably misleading, both within academic feminism and mainstream 'popular feminism', as there are still plenty of feminist Kantians and Rawlsian contractarians, and probably even utilitarians. While Aristotelianism and Humeanism both enjoy revived interest, it is not clear that these are specifically feminist ethical views, even though many difference feminists are enthusiastic about them. In light of this, it is far from clear that moral theory requires a 'near total' transformation.

Similarly, Janet Kourany gives a very useful and cogent account of how some feminists have challenged not only Logical Empiricism but the Kuhnian approach to science. Yet she provides no hint of how traditional philosophy of science (feminist or otherwise) has responded, and is uncritical of (for example) Fox Keller's claims that the biologist Barbara McClintock's methodology was distinctly 'feminine'. Kourany also reports that sociologist Ann Oakley has a 'non-masculine way of doing science' because she expresses concern for her informants and does not present a falsely objective demeanor. Since these claims are not statistical claims about women and men who do science, we need to understand what kind of claims they are. What does it mean for science to be done in a masculine or feminine way? As a counterbalance, Kourany points out that some scientists such as Stephen Jay Gould also claim to have methods similar to McClintock's (249), but that does not gainsay the fact that Kourany refers to his approach as 'feminine'. Perhaps the McClintock/Oakley approach is simply *better science*; but then why not just defend *this* claim instead of trading on the honorific 'feminine'? Kourany does acknowledge the necessity of further research: 'But it may also turn out that other ways of doing science than theirs, or a variety of ways drawn from the various sciences, will be the models that should be argued for. Additional research will be needed to decide. In the case of McClintock's way of doing science, we will need to have a better understanding of such things as McClintock's affectionate relationship with her experimental subjects, *its connection, if any, to gender*, and how this relationship enabled her to make her novel scientific discoveries,' (249, my italics). Yet she uses — not mentions — the distinction between masculine and feminine science. Feminist theory has advanced to the point where there is not only a significant body of positive theory, but important criticisms as well. Why not include them along with a survey of those theories?

Still, I think that what one can conclude from this is not that the collection is inappropriately biased, but that it has a point of view and is not masquerading as a supposedly neutral survey. That the perspective is controversial is a function of the fact that it is still really the cutting edge of Anglo-American philosophy today.

Ruth Sample
University of New Hampshire

Lenore Langsdorf, Stephen H. Watson, and **Karen A. Smith, eds.**
Reinterpreting the Political: Continental Philosophy and Political Theory.
Albany: State University of New York Press 1998. Pp. xvii + 330.
US$74.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3793-0);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3794-9).

Reinterpreting the Political is a collection of papers delivered at the 1991 and 1992 meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, divided into three groups: I. Reinterpretations, II. Theory and Politics: On the Fragmentation of the Political, and III. A Case in Point: The Uses of Foucault and the Legacies of the Enlightenment. Each article deals with an issue in political philosophy with reference to some continental thinker or thought. The introduction states that the motivation behind this collection lies in the apparent lack of thought and sophistication in continental attempts to address political issues. The editors situate the debates within these pages in the middle of an ancient-modern debate. Certain critiques which arise within continental philosophy of modern ethics and political thought echo voices from the past from which the moderns broke. But such thinkers as Sartre and Heidegger, Lefort, Castoriadis and Habermas can be seen not so much as trying to resurrect an ancient political thought but attempting to salvage the possibilities for virtue and freedom from both ancient and modern sources. The reader should take this claim as a reference point while reading these essays, but she should remember that the essays do not so much address questions between the ancients and moderns as engage certain continental thinkers on contemporary political issues.

In the first section, Margaret Simons provides an intriguing discussion of 'Beauvoir and the Roots of Radical Feminism'. Simons argues that radical feminism can find a theoretical basis in the works of Beauvoir's *Second Sex* (65-8). While much feminist thought has rejected or ignored Beauvoir, Simons argues that a recovery of Beauvoir is needed, for she moves beyond liberalism and Marxism to an activist feminism — a collective struggle for freedom (68-71). Beauvoir moves beyond Marxism by arguing for the irreducibility of women's oppression. She describes the relationship between men and women as a caste relationship — one in which women gain some advantages and are complicitous once other options are available (71-4). Thus, according to Simons, Beauvoir provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the plight of women and working towards ending that oppression: 'Institutions create uniformity. Beauvoir's appeal is instead to a celebration of individual differences and uniqueness ...' (90).

In the second section, David Rasmussen provides an interesting analysis of 'Rights, Narrative, and Legal Practice'. Rasmussen claims that rights are necessary fictions in a narrative. He examines Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment* as background for understanding Hobbes' *Leviathan* as a nar-

rative about rights. Other thinkers like Rousseau and Hobbes also write narratives to explain rights. These narratives, according to Rasmussen, are necessary to shape legal practice, to further debate, and to refine the (political) game.

One of the more critical articles is James Marsh's 'Truth and Power in Foucault' in the third section. According to Marsh, a pessimistic Foucault rejects modernity particularly as the locus of new forms of power such as disciplinary techniques and bio-power. Marsh, however, holds that Foucault needs to differentiate between normalization and socialization (298). Indeed, a dialectical critique of modernity allows for action aimed at social change. Marsh is exactly right here. Foucault attacks modernity as totalizing. Yet, Foucault's own thesis totalizes forms of socialization which emerge in modernity. In order to eradicate oppression in modernity, one must realize the possibilities of critique and radical action which lie dormant therein.

The most important article in the whole collection is Axel Honneth's 'Decentered Autonomy: The Subject after the Fall'. Recognizing that psychological critique and linguistic analysis have undermined classical autonomy, Honneth attempts to reinvigorate a sense of autonomy. Rather than undermining autonomy, the uncontrollable powers of language and the unconscious provide the possibilities for a reconceived, plausible continuation of classical autonomy, via the possibilities of articulation, narrative coherence and context sensitivity. This discussion and description of decentered autonomy should prove fruitful. Such a reconceived notion can eliminate the worries arising from determinism on the basis of the very studies that give determinism its impetus. Yet, the need Honneth has for 'continuing' a tradition and for the 'universalizability' of moral principles is disconcerting. Presumably in greater discussion, Honneth could explain what he finds so powerful and important about classical autonomy. In this regard, Honneth's clinging to universalizability both explains a lot and remains troubling. For Honneth, moral decision making should be context-sensitive and yet universalizable. By emphasizing universality, Honneth's decentered autonomy remains atomistic. On the other hand, modifying Honneth's decentered autonomy with the recognition that reason and moral norms are constituted by traditions brings autonomy closer to an Aristotelian account. Such a properly modified conception of autonomy explains the acquisition of virtues which define a life in a community. Honneth's work forms the prelude to such a conception of autonomy.

All the articles in this collection offer original analyses and interpretations of various continental thinkers for political issues — from a rethinking of Kierkegaard on authoring, or Husserl or Stein on community and state, to possibilities available in Fichte for thinking about the subject or Castoriadis and Lefort on democracy, to the many discussions of Foucault. Overall, these articles concern the problem of legitimation in modernity in the absence of transcendental authority. While none of them offer a substitution for or answer to the problem, each points to a possible solution or rethinking of the problem. The essays on Foucault tend to be more critical while the essays in

the first two sections focus more on reconfigurations of major thinkers which lessens the need for a critical stance. This is not to say that the essays simply accept the positions of the major figures tout court. Rather, they engage those thinkers on important political issues which engagements provide a foundation for further study. Perhaps the only fault of the work collectively is that each article is necessarily short (due to its origin in a conference). Yet, anyone interested in what continental thinkers provide in terms of new concepts or ideas for addressing political problems and issues should read the articles in this collection.

Jeffery L. Nicholas
University of Kentucky

Brendan Larvor
Lakatos: An Introduction.
New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. xi + 128.
Cdn$91.00: US$65.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-14275-X);
Cdn$27.99: US$19.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-14276-8).

In *Lakatos: An Introduction*, Brendan Larvor presents a comprehensive survey of Imre Lakatos' work in the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of science. Historical and political, as well as philosophical, influences on Lakatos' thought are considered, so as to explain the rationalist starting point of Lakatos' philosophy. These considerations serve to locate Lakatos' position as part of (what appears to be) a natural, demarcationist, progression in twentieth-century philosophy of science, and are ultimately used to explain the existence of a conflict Larvor identifies in Lakatos' thought. Larvor's detailed exposition of *Proofs and Refutations*, Lakatos' main work in the philosophy of mathematics, is a welcome (and long overdue) contribution to the discipline. He contends that the dialectic of *Proofs and Refutations* provides the key to a rational reconstruction Lakatos' thought, and thus presents a novel, and enlightening, perspective from which to view Lakatos' legacy.

Larvor's presentation of Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes shows him as holding the Popperian demarcationist torch in the light of threats to the rationality of science from the likes of Thomas Kuhn. Lakatos' commitment to the demarcationist idea that one can distinguish between good and bad science on objective, methodological grounds is linked to his experiences as an academic in Hungary. Working under the restrictions

of a totalitarian government, Lakatos came to value academic autonomy highly, and strongly resisted philosophical claims which led to the conclusion that there is nothing privileged about any one scientific method over any other, including those based on political ideologies. With this background in mind, Larvor gives a detailed explication of the methodology of scientific research programmes, and diagnoses its ultimate failure as resulting from the uneasiness of the combination of its demarcationist background with the realisation that scientific methods change over time.

The idea that scientific methods are not static is, according to Larvor, perhaps the most important theme of *Proofs and Refutations*. This work is often held up, approvingly or otherwise, as a fallibilist tract, its main lesson being seen as the claim that we can never be certain about the truth of our mathematical results. While acknowledging the importance of Lakatos' fallibilism, Larvor's close textual reading of *Proofs and Refutations* leads him to label it an 'essay on dialectics' (14). Fallibilism is seen as a consequence of the dialectical view of mathematical concepts as changing over time. While Larvor also discusses the Hegelian influences on Lakatos' thought, the dialectical pattern he has in mind has more in common with that found in Plato's dialogues than it has with Hegel's 'three step model of knowledge-growth' which Larvor rightly points out 'can be "found" in almost any intellectual field if it is searched for with sufficient ingenuity' (26). Rather, the Hegelian ancestry is seen in the more subtle relationship between Hegel's distinction between dialectical and (what he calls) 'mathematical' reasoning and Lakatos' distinction between the heuristic and deductive styles.

'[D]ialectical logic', Larvor tells us, 'studies the development of *concepts*' (9). *Proofs and Refutations* is, then, seen as an essay in dialectics in the sense that 'it illustrates some of the ways in which mathematicians can improve concepts even as those concepts are put to use in arguments' (14). Through their search for a proof for Euler's theorem for polyhedra, the characters in Lakatos' dialogue are shown as developing their primitive understandings of the concepts of polyhedra, points, edges, and so on. As concepts change, new counterexamples to the theorem are made possible. Even the concept of a counterexample changes, as the characters come to distinguish between 'logical' and 'heuristic' counterexamples. Larvor also shows how *Proofs and Refutations* is itself dialectical. While displaying how mathematical concepts change through their use in mathematical reasoning, *Proofs and Refutations*' own central concepts develop as the narrative progresses. The somewhat elusive word 'heuristics', which appears in Lakatos' scientific, as well as his mathematical, work, is thus clarified through a dialectical understanding of Lakatos' writing.

Larvor argues that, because of the conflict in Lakatos' work between the 'demarcationist search for One True Method and the dialectical sensitivity to changing methods' (106), a consistent 'Lakatosian' should pick just one of these two strands as Lakatos' important legacy. Larvor picks the dialectical strand, the strand found most prevalently in the less political *Proofs and Refutations*, as it is this aspect of Lakatos' work that comes from his close

historical studies of mathematics and science, rather than from any background political agenda. Larvor suggests that Lakatos' best philosophy is that motivated purely by his 'philosophical curiosity' (109) about mathematics and science. Indeed, by pointing to the proliferation of texts in the philosophy of mathematics which 'hope to show that mathematics poses no obstacle to whatever grand philosophical project is in question' (109), Larvor leaves one with the feeling that Lakatos' true legacy is to mark the way for alternative, less ideologically motivated, approaches to the discipline.

Mary Leng
University of Toronto

Emmanuel Levinas
Discovering Existence with Husserl.
Trans. Richard Cohen and Michael Smith.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press
1998. Pp. xxii + 198.
US$69.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8101-1360-0);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8101-1361-9).

Emmanuel Levinas
entre nous: Thinking of the Other.
Trans. Michael Smith and Barbara Harshav.
New York: Columbia University Press 1998.
Pp. xiii + 256.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-231-07910-9.

Emmanuel Levinas
Of God Who Comes to Mind.
Trans. Bettina Bergo.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1998.
Pp. xv + 211.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3093-8);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3094-6).

'Except for the other. Our relation with him certainly consists in wanting to understand him, but this relation exceeds the confines of understanding. Not only because, besides curiosity, knowledge of the other also demands sympathy or love, ways of being that are different from impassive contemplation, but also because, in our relation to the other, the latter does not affect us by means of a concept'.

This is from the first essay ('Is Ontology Fundamental?') in *entre nous,* one of three collections of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, each superbly translated and arranged. Together these volumes signify a great moral project, one

crucial for postwar French philosophy in its complex movement between phenomenology, ethics and religion in the name of an otherness whose force presides over all else. *Entre nous* is the best introduction to Levinas' work of the three, since the other two are weighted towards questions of God and of phenomenological method respectively. However, in the end none of these books should be read independently of the others, since the breadth of each and their overlapping of themes (and occasionally, essays) are so considerable that they form (like Wittgenstein's work) one continuous genre. The essays which comprise them incessantly return to the topic of the other: to the existence of the other and the responsibility of each of us, of each 'me' considered as a singularity to each 'she', also considered as a singularity. This theme forms a cantus firmus, a 'fundamental ontology' which interrupts the representationalist theory of the self that is Husserl's, the solitary/solipsistic conception of 'authentic being' that is Heidegger's, and the entire post-Cartesian emphasis on the primacy of self and self-knowledge. It is the other who counts — but not in the manner of a series of duties prescribed by the great moral theories of modernity and of Victorian culture. Justice has its place in his philosophy (see for example 'The Other, Utopia and Justice', *entre nous*). But even in the ideal state of justice, conceived in terms of an equitable distribution of rights and goods, of fairness in redress and freedom in public and private life, there is still the other: the one whose face requires not a general reckoning by a theory of humanity but my presence, my acknowledgment, in short, me. This responsibility that remains is (as Levinas would put it) infinite, for there is always another call, insofar as there is an other at all. To him it is the call of Abraham by God to Mount Moriah, the call by an infinity Abraham cannot finally understand to perform an act of sacrifice in his name. This call is sublime and implacable. Its inhumanity makes Abraham human. Such is the voice of these volumes, a voice of return and reminding, a voice which states and claims, that is, recalls from Judaic tradition, that is, reminds us from our own experience, that the other is acknowledged before being known, or rather, that it is a condition of knowing her that she be first heard, responded to, that one become present to her voice. Hence, borrowing the terms of Kant's *Third Critique* in 'Is Ontology Fundamental?': '... in our relation to the other, the latter does not affect us by means of a concept'.

This is a hard idea to get a handle on, since clearly the use of concepts and the generation of new ones is a crucial aspect of listening to and acknowledging a person. Levinas' use of words like 'prior to' or 'more primordial than' hardly helps. We might compare the idea to some remarks of Wittgenstein's: '"I believe that he is not an automaton", just like that, makes no sense' (*Philosophical Investigations*, p. 178). And: 'My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul' (*Ibid*). Our relation to the other is, on the Wittgensteinian line, not one of opinion, nor one in which belief has an immediate ('primordial') place. It is rather a way of seeing (which, reading the text of the *Investigations*, will turn out to be an attitude inextricably intertwined with belief at deeper levels). Like Wittgen-

stein, Levinas aims to remind us that our relations with others is not, in crucial ways for morals, conceptual. The work of reminding is also one, Levinas will say, of awakening: awakening us to an other who is always on the brink of being forgotten. Indeed awakening and reminding are interconnected processes. For to show (remind us of) the non-conceptual character of our sense of the human in the other is to *awaken* us to him: the proof is in the pudding. This work of showing through awakening and awakening through showing lends Levinas' writing a mixture of argument and poetry. For to find a language for this double performative (reminding and awakening) while carrying on a debate about Husserl, Heidegger and philosophical traditions is no easy task. It is not always successful, but always engaging.

Levinas' own language game begins with phenomenology, in which Levinas always believed. In Parts 1 and 2 of *Discovering Existence with Husserl* one finds him working through phenomenological conceptions of consciousness — going beyond Husserl's representationalist view of the mind and Heidegger's self-centered one with its emphasis on a self responding to its own mirror (the face of its own death, its oneness with the language that it speaks, etc.). Phenomenology nevertheless licenses him to describe or limn the attitudes of consciousness and their importance for meaning (as in Wittgenstein's remarks quoted earlier). The concept of awakening is perhaps the most central to his mapping of subjectivity. It is spoken from the shards of scripture, poetry, philosophy (but not, apparently, psychoanalysis, which is a deficit in Levinas' entire vision of the call of the other and its repression). Otherness does not effect us by a concept, it wakes us up from the sleep of reason, of culture, of moral lassitude. Modernist traditions have construed otherness as a form of self-alienation, stressing the moment at which one becomes other to one's culture, one's tradition, oneself. Existentialism is the most extreme version of this, treating it as a metaphysical landscape. Levinas' otherness is far more simple: it is given by the fact of a 'neighbor' 'in proximity' whose face demands reckoning as *this* face, *this* individuality, *this* morality, *this* need, *this* silence, *this* voice, *this* face. What language may insure the transmission of the importance of this encounter for 'first philosophy'? or for any?

To articulate the way the other awakens us, Levinas speaks to the idea of the other's face. The terms are at once literal and metaphorical: we face her, her face speaks to us when we see it (as in the eyes, which Rembrandt alone of all painters understood to be the first and last thing we see in a face, its central guiding feature, its entitlement to the human, its source of expression). We recognize its call and face ourselves in listening to it. The face of the other faces us and gazes at us, and we must see ourselves as she sees us to recognize her need. The idea of the face is also a place-holder for the entire human encounter, a way of stressing that presence to the other requires space and time, being there, not away but near, and a whole repertoire of language which follows in this vein. The language is also a way of refusing the traditions of philosophy which conceive of the work of the senses (sight, hearing, even touch — curiously absent from Levinas' work) as proprioceptive, cognitive, matters of systems of observation and gazing. This kind of

seeing and hearing, closer to Nietzsche's nose than Hume's observing gaze, listens in seeing and envisions in hearing. Its relation to the face is to a need stripped of all else, to a voice whose feeling compels. Levinas's way of picturing the call of another, in terms of the face, is sometimes highly inflated ('To be in relation with the other face to face — is to be unable to kill. This is also the situation of discourse' ('Is Ontology Fundamental?', 10). It is close to the sublime (since stripped of concepts) but not quite, since the mind is not overwhelmed with awe but rather attention is focused on detail and the power of need. 'The thought awakened in the face or by the face is commanded by an irreducible difference: thought which is not a thought of but from the very beginning a thought for ... exposure, point blank ... the tracked down ... before all tracking ... face as the very mortality of the other' ('The Philosophical Determination of the Idea of Culture', *entre nous*, 186). The face compels in the Abrahamic way: 'ethical signification signifies not for a consciousness that thematizes, but to a subjectivity that is all obedience ... obedience means obedience prior to understanding'. ('God and Philosophy', *Of God Who Comes to Mind*, 76-7). This obedience prior to understanding can of course in the wrong circumstances produce the compulsion of orthodoxy, the violence of fundamentalism, the dogmatic rule of the script of God, Kafka's penal colony where the law is stamped on the body by a machine which brands its identity on it in a way permanently incomprehensible to it and permanently incapacitating to it, if also in a weird way, pleasurable. One must be skeptical of a face which compels, for it may compel something known and in the background (an authority, a text, a tradition, a psychology of domination). Indeed the very possibility of articulating the concept of the face as a force of moral compulsion depends on Levinas' ingestion of a Judaic tradition where God is in place without doubt. For it is only in that context that the story of Abraham (the addressee) makes sense (vis à vis the addressor, God). Derrida, meditating on Levinas, has discussed this in his book *The Gift of Death*. All of this fails to render otiose the indelible force of the face though: in life, where we meet it, and in philosophy, where Levinas presumes it, even if it renders the concept — insofar as it is a concept with a tradition of use — problematical. To me, the recourse to the idea of the face privileges the greatest of art and writing, which brings home by an act of showing that which can only be shown and is shown through the contingencies of form (Rembrandt's eyes). And it awakens us to the power of photography to reveal a reality which stands out from its horizons and shows the poignancy of the individual face: Uncle Harry's from the past and not another's, Angie's, when she was young and it held the sunshine, the face of that man (we do not know his name) taken just before he was deported to a place from which he never returned. There he is in the photograph. Him and none other. The face still compels, even though the man is dead. 'Isn't art an activity that gives things a face? Isn't the façade of the house a house that is looking at us?' ('Is Ontology Fundamental?', 10).

Levinas' concept of the face (insofar as it is a concept) brings with it three others. First, that of subordination (of self to other), of the asymmetry of the

relationship between self and other, the face of the other as issuing a commandment to acknowledge it and respond to it. This idea, formulated in the Judaic terms of 'thou shalt', but removed of all specific content of the 'thou shalt' (the 'Mitzvot' or commandments of the bible to do this and that), distills the idea of commandment as an Abrahamic form of response into an abstract shape, ready to be filled in in the particular encounter. It does not give rise to laws in the Kantian sense of their subjection before the categorical imperative, but rather to actions or activities. The second concept is substitution. By substitution is meant a number of things: the capacity to recognize oneself from the other's perspective, the capacity to put the other in the place of self, but most important, that while I can substitute myself for another, 'no one can substitute himself for me as me. When one begins to say that someone can substitute himself for me, immorality begins.' ('Questions and Answers', *Of God Who Comes to Mind*, 84). No one can substitute for my fathering of my child, my showing up for her school plays, my responsibility to family and society. Hence Levinas' love of the Dostoyevskean adage: 'We are all responsible but I am more responsible than all the others'. And it is not for nothing that Ivan, the tortured genius of a Karamazov who utters this, is obsessed by visions of having seen sons humiliated when their father's beards were pulled off in front of them. In front of them, meaning a humiliation to the face at which the other is present as witness (perhaps the central structure of suffering in this century). Third, infinity, which brings up both the infinity of the other and of God. Here Levinas is the phenomenologist par excellence: 'I think that God has no meaning apart from the search for God.' ('Questions and Answers', 95). This is Levinas' search. It is again a matter of awakening, the dawning of an attitude towards the finite systems of meaning and economy which sees an infinity opposed to them and within them.

Where there is a picture there is the question of an alternative one or a variation on the same. Levinas' language game relies on a picture of faces, awakenings to them, commandments without legal content, and the confluence of seeing and hearing. Does this picture 'force itself on one'? (Wittgenstein) Is it, once remembered, inevitably convincing? Even with its Judaic roots, roots, that is, in a specific tradition of thought (concepts) and duties (commandments)? Levinas' picture has become a central article of French philosophy, just as the picture of minorities and their rights has captured the Anglo-American philosophical market when it turns towards the other. It is a picture which invites others about others, so that there might be a pair, a genre, a conversation. 'A new meaning of spirit', different from the Hegelian one ('The Philosophical Determination of the Idea of Culture', 187).

In a century so vile that we should feel relief (in addition to terror) at departing from it, the human can use all the help it can get, and there is none more responsible to it than Levinas.

Daniel Herwitz
University of Natal

Jerrold Levinson
Music in the Moment.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1998.
Pp. xii + 184.
US$25.00. ISBN 0-8014-3129-8.

Levinson's aim in this book is to combat the notion that keeping music's form before the mind — particularly large-scale structural relations or spatialized representations of a composition's shape — is central to musical understanding. The degree to which musical understanding requires reflection or intellectual awareness of musical architecture is 'approximately zero' (xi). He proposes instead that much in the aural comprehension of extended tonal pieces that seems to require explicit architectonic awareness can be explained by appeal to unconscious correlation of a present passage with earlier ones, rather than, 'explicit, conscious grasp of relationships of a broad-span sort' (ix).

'Concatenationism', the position Levinson defends, is inspired by the work of nineteenth-century music theorist Edmund Gurney. It can be summed up in four propositions: understanding music is centrally a matter of apprehending individual bits of music and the immediate progression from one bit to the next; musical enjoyment is had only in successive parts of a piece of music, not in the whole as such; musical form is centrally a matter of cogency of succession; and musical value rests wholly on the impressiveness of individual parts and the cogency of succession between them.

It should be noted that Levinson is not defending the (untenable) thesis that a coherent listening experience is possible on a *strictly* moment-to-moment basis. He gives the name of 'quasi-hearing' to the apprehension of a musical unit (most commonly, he thinks, a standard four to eight measure phrase) that goes beyond what is strictly heard but stops well short of intellectual contemplation of a recollected event. Quasi-hearing is comprised of actual hearing, vivid remembering, and vivid anticipation. The scope of quasi-hearing rarely exceeds a minute or so in length, and is marked by a 'certain phenomenological quality' (129). Nor does Levinson argue that the large-scale organization of a piece has no effect on a listener's experience. What he is concerned to deny is that a conscious grasp of this large-scale organization is required for understanding the content and assessing the value of a piece.

The bulk of the book is given over to elucidating concatenationism and defending it from various challenges. To the objection that reflection on large-scale relationships within a piece or conscious awareness of its formal structure (sonata form, theme and variations, etc.) can influence the nature of moment-to-moment awareness, Levinson answers that coming to a greater understanding of the structure is importantly different from understanding the piece itself. Formal or structural understanding of a piece is an understanding of how that piece *works* on a listener, not of what the piece *is* for a listener. Furthermore, the pleasure that comes from perceiving large-scale

relationships within a piece is pleasure in cleverness — the composer's and one's own — and is secondary to the pleasure taken in the music itself.

A further problem for concatenationism would seem to be the argument that the aesthetic and expressive elements of a piece, while conveyed by the quality of parts heard in context, would seem at least sometimes to be conveyed also by large-scale relationships among those parts. Levinson admits that 'conceptually involved states' — humour, wit, nostalgia, to name a few — in music are indeed typically embodied structurally. This type of aesthetic effect in music will not likely emerge for a listener who eschews all forms of large scale awareness. However, while missing the allusiveness or philosophical resonances in such music would be to miss a substantial part of it (Levinson cites Mahler as a prime example), basic understanding does not require this type of large-scale awareness. Furthermore, such cases of complex expression are rare. (Yet if recognition of the *presence* of such aesthetic affects requires large scale awareness, might not recognition of their *absence* also require it?)

Levinson allows that the scope of quasi-hearing admits of some degree, and that the same feature in music may be cognized differently by different listeners, and even by the same listener at different times. He also concedes that if aural cogency of a piece has not been achieved by a listener, reflection on the piece's form can be of help in understanding the piece. Such facilitation, however, is of instrumental value only, and is not strictly necessary for aural synthesis.

Music in the Moment is clear, well written, and uses a minimum of technical language. Along with explicit philosophical argument, Levinson's methodology involves taking the reader through detailed analysis of concrete musical examples. His deep engagement with music and respect for formally untrained listeners is evident on nearly every page.

Unfortunately, Levinson never gives neither a detailed account of the view he rejects, nor shows any appreciation of how its proponents might defend it. Why exactly, for example, are Gurney's (and Levinson's) views on music 'inimical to one many music theorists and educators seem to adopt implicitly' (2)? Another shortcoming has to do with Levinson's use of the phrase 'basic musical understanding.' By 'basic' Levinson means 'essential,' 'fundamental,' and 'central,' rather than simple or rudimentary (33). The main features of such understanding are present-centered absorption in the musical flow, encompassing an inward seconding of musical movement, sensitivity to musical alteration, reproductive and continuational ability, and a grasp of emotional expression. All of these features do require careful listening and, arguably, do not require awareness of large-scale forms. However a different account of musical understanding might demand more than concentrated attention on the part of the listener.

Levinson intends *Music in the Moment* as both a defense of 'the intuitive listener' against 'purveyors of intellectual appreciation of music' and a corrective against the 'fear or guilt' caused by such approaches to appreciation (173-4). Yet, if, as I do, readers have serious doubts about Levinson's

discounting of the intellectual appreciation of music, they may well conclude that despite Levinson's sincere and well-meaning defense of 'the intuitive listener', his advice, if followed, could serve to block a richer appreciation of music.

Jeanette Bicknell
York University

Peter Machamer, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Galileo.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. 462 + xii.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-58178-8);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-58841-3).

This book consists of twelve previously unpublished papers dealing with a large part of Galileo's life and work. I will summarize the papers, mostly in the order in which they appear.

Two papers discuss Galileo's early work, especially the influence of Aristotelian philosophy and Jesuit mathematicians. William Wallace describes some of the main influences on Galileo when he was a student in Pisa. Wallace particularly emphasizes Galileo's deep understanding of Aristotelian philosophy, and his contact with scholars who were defending mathematics as a genuine science that meets the standards of the *Posterior Analytics*. Rivka Feldhay continues discussion of the prevailing attitude towards mathematics when Galileo comes on the scene. She surveys debates about the scientific status of mathematics, the certainty of mathematical proofs, and the nature of mathematical entities, particularly among the Jesuit mathematicians who were seeking to extend the legitimate range of their subject. She then examines selected passages from the *Dialogue* to argue that Galileo's project was an Aristotelian-Archimedean synthesis that violated basic rules of both 'discourses'. Feldhay also argues that while Galileo's work drew heavily on Aristotelian thought and the work of Jesuit philosophers and mathematicians, here too he transgressed established boundaries and disciplinary interests. In particular, Galileo cut across accepted boundaries between discrete and continuous magnitude, and between mathematics and physics. Feldhay suggests that this reshaping of disciplinary boundaries is somehow political — the phrase 'politics of knowledge' occurs at least nine times in the essay, including one section heading. I would

have preferred an explicit discussion of this thesis instead of repeated innuendo.

We move next to discussion of Galileo's scientific contributions. Wallace Hooper argues that Galileo grasped many aspects of the idea of inertia, but continued to think in terms of impetus and impressed forces, and never fully developed this new concept. William Shea summarizes Galileo's route to Copernicanism, his telescopic evidence and other arguments for Copernicanism, and his use of rhetoric to bring home these points as well as 'to persuade his listeners that science is not mere rhetoric' (233). Noel Swerdlow provides a more detailed account of Galileo's telescopic discoveries and of his interpretation of them as evidence for the Copernican view.

A large part of the book is devoted to the reasons for Galileo's clash with his church and to some aspects of the aftermath of this clash. Ernan McMullin argues that the root of the clash is to be found in the 1616 decree that banned Copernicanism. 'The promulgation of this decree set the Church on a collision course with the new astronomy. If Galileo had not offered the occasion, someone else (Descartes perhaps?) would very likely have done so' (276). According to McMullin, the tendency of the new cosmology to reduce the status of humanity in the universe was not the main issue. Rather, given apparent contradictions between Copernicanism and scripture, cosmologists proposed their own interpretations of biblical texts. They drew on exegetical principles going back to Augustine, but they challenged the church's authority as sole interpreter of scripture. McMullin then analyzes the principles of interpretation that Galileo adopted in his *Letter to the Grand Duchess*. This leads to discussion of one point at which Galileo's exegesis and epistemology intersect: his insistence that only sense experience and necessary demonstration could overcome apparent conflicts between science and scripture — a test that Galileo thought he could meet. Kepler avoided this trap, and McMullin argues that Galileo's insistence on the strongest possible proofs was an unfortunate holdover from his Aristotelian training.

Richard Blackwell argues that similar clashes between science and religion can still occur because 'the contemporary sense of religious authority, at least in the Catholic tradition, is monolithic, centralized, esoteric, resistant to change, and self-protective' (359). Blackwell's contrasting picture of scientific authority as 'pluralistic, democratic, public, fallibilistic, and self-corrective' (ibid.) is, by contemporary standards, somewhat naive, although not completely inaccurate. Marcello Pera also argues that conflicts between religion and science are a permanent possibility, but for a different reason than Blackwell's. For Pera, Catholic believers must reject the 'independence principle' which holds that science and religion cannot conflict because they deal with different realms. Rather, science and religion are in permanent danger of a clash because some questions of fact are central to religion. Two examples from Pera's brief list are 'Life in the universe stems from inorganic matter,' and 'Life originated in more than one place' (380). From the perspective of a Catholic believer, he tells us, such questions should not be tolerated as legitimate subjects for scientific investigation. Contemporary theologians

have accepted the independence principle as a matter of practical accommodation, but Pera has 'doubts about the theoretical status of the principle and the legitimacy of the consequences sometimes drawn from it' (377). Pera and Blackwell both limit their discussions of religion to Roman Catholicism, although they claim to be providing a more general discussion of science and religion in the contemporary world. It is worth recalling that there are also doctrinal conflicts among religions and that Pera's non-tolerance thesis would apply here too. This seems an appropriate occasion for reflecting on the superior virtues of practical wisdom over theoretical rigor.

The volume concludes with Michael Segre's account of the changing image of Galileo and his science from his own day through the present, followed by Paolo Galluzzi's account of the fate of Galileo's body and the campaign to provide him with a proper tomb and monument.

I have kept back two papers for the end. Peter Machamer's paper is the most creative in the volume and, to my mind, the most interesting. In his 'Introduction' to the volume Machamer asks why Galileo became a hero of science. He gives his answer in his paper where he argues that Galileo, drawing on Archimedes, synthesized mathematical and physical arguments and created the 'mechanical philosophy' which served as the dominant model of intelligibility in science until it was replaced by Newton. On this view, we understand problematic phenomena when we reduce them to an appropriate mechanical model. This is exemplified by Galileo's reduction of all simple machines to the lever, and the lever to the balance. Physical phenomena such as floating and falling objects are then analyzed by assimilating them to the balance. The machine provides an instance of mathematics in the world and thus shows that mathematical accounts of phenomena are not mere fantasy.

Pietro Redondi's contribution is the only thoroughly disappointing paper in the book. He offers an account of 'the creationist and theological framework of Galileo's physics expressed in the *Dialogue* and the *Two New Sciences*' (201). The discussion mainly proceeds by quoting passages from Galileo's writings that include references to God, scripture, divine inspiration, and such, and juxtaposing them with passages from theologians and from Plato.

On the whole, the volume is a fair representation of current Galileo scholarship in which little new ground is broken. In my view, it is also a bit light on the content of Galileo's science. The most important gap is the lack of a paper devoted to the *Two New Sciences* that would stand alongside Shea's summary of Galileo's arguments for Copernicanism in the *Dialogue* and Swerdlow's account of Galileo's astronomy.

Harold I. Brown
Northern Illinois University

Herbert Marcuse
Technology, War and Fascism: Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, Volume One.
Ed. Douglas Kellner.
New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. xvi + 278.
Cdn$49.00: US$35.00. ISBN 0-415-13780-2.

The first of six projected volumes of the collected works of Herbert Marcuse, introduced and edited by Douglas Kellner, and published by Routledge, this volume consists of material written in the 1940s when Marcuse, having just fled Nazi Germany and arrived in the United States, first received support from the Institute for Social Research, then held various government positions in military intelligence and the State Department. Except for two previously published articles, the material is unpublished and unavailable until now outside the Marcuse archives in Frankfurt.

The main topics of Marcuse's work in this volume are (1) an analysis of Fascism and the potential for revolutionary response to it, (2) an analysis of rationality and the new role that it plays in later modernity, and (3) an analysis of how the Enlightenment promise of individual freedom can be sustained. Marcuse developed a left-wing response to the social and political situation of the late twentieth century, strongly influencing the New Left, a post-Marxist response to contemporary society given that classical Marxist theory seemed to be disproven by the fact that Capitalism did not collapse as predicted. In the 1940s, despite his claiming to uphold orthodox Marxist theory (217), Marcuse was already recognizing new social and political conditions and considering new modes of critical analysis.

Marcuse's analysis of fascism is at once political and philosophical. On the practical political side, he was involved in the development of anti-Nazi propaganda at the Office of Strategic Services during the war. The central claims of his analysis are that the German people really did not so much believe in the rhetoric of the Nazis, but rather had chosen a higher standard of living over freedom since Democracy had been terribly discredited in the minds of Germans by the failures of the Weimar Republic. National Socialism achieved its full employment and higher material production by instituting a technological society, so much so that Marcuse claims that the Third Reich was not a state at all since there was no longer any separation between politics and society. In this sense, Fascism is no longer modern, that is, it no longer fits the model of the liberal democratic nation state set out in the Enlightenment. Both under National Socialism and in the Democratic west, surplus capital allows a portion of the working class to have a bourgeois standard of living, and this 'labor aristocracy' is well enough off to be co-opted into the system, thereby posing problems for classical Marxist theory. Worse yet, the Soviet Union offered no hope for real revolution since Marcuse was already arguing by 1947 that planned economies are technological societies as well. Planned economies become dictatorships, not free societies.

Marcuse's philosophical reflections on Fascism is grounded by his analysis of rationality in the late twentieth century and makes the hope for revolutionary change seem bleaker still. Developing a theme that becomes central in *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse argues that there is no way to rebel in Western society, since everything has come to be measured in terms of technical efficiency. Reason is now in service of technology, rather than the critical force that was envisioned during the Enlightenment. Marcuse uses the term 'technical rationality' to convey a rationality that has become a form of domination, a term that is very important in the work of Habermas as well as Marcuse.

Marcuse holds out for a very utopian ideal of individual human freedom. Claiming that individuality has changed in mass society, Marcuse sees art and sexuality as the two areas that can (hopefully) remain private individual expressions and transcend society, another theme that he will develop in his later writings. It seems clear in these early works that Marcuse's ideal society is one based on individual freedom and that socialism is only a stepping stone towards this goal. Even technology could help free human beings from the drudgery of work, if it were not used as a means of social control, as it was under Fascism (63-4).

While those new to Marcuse certainly should not skip *One-Dimensional Man* and other works to read the collected works first, there is much material here of interest to the general reader, especially those interested in modernity or philosophy of technology, as well as to specialists on Marcuse, the Frankfurt School, the German Left and the Nazis, and the American New Left. For many, the brief exchange of letters between Marcuse and Heidegger (his former teacher) on Heidegger's role in the Third Reich will amply justify seeking out this volume. The book is handsomely and accurately typeset, the items chosen for publication are interesting and appropriate, and the Foreword by Peter Marcuse and the Introduction by Douglas Kellner are clear and provide very valuable information about the historical and social context of Marcuse's writings. Brief editorial notes in individual articles provide further guidance.

David J. Stump
University of San Francisco

Michelle Moody-Adams
Fieldwork in Familiar Places.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1997. Pp. xii + 255.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-674-29953-1.

According to Michelle Moody-Adams, moral philosophers past and present, in their methods and their aims, have failed to capture the complex structure of moral experience. Modern moral philosophy oversimplifies moral problems, turning highly context-sensitive and complicated situations into schematized, context-free philosophical puzzles. Moral philosophers talk about an artificial 'we', make wildly optimistic claims about the homogeneity of cultures, and make exaggerated assumptions about the existence of profound moral disagreements between cultures. The result, claims Moody-Adams, is a discussion that is so removed from everyday moral life that it has nothing to offer moral agents who are trying to understand the moral realm and do the right thing. Moral philosophy is in danger of becoming (or remaining) superfluous to the moral life. Philosophers would make none of these mistakes if they did some fieldwork in familiar places. For example, if philosophers looked more carefully at moral disagreements between cultures, they would see that these do not exist at fundamental levels, only with respect to details. With these charges, Moody-Adams challenges some of the central assumptions and methodologies in contemporary ethics, both meta-ethical and normative.

She defends a version of moral pluralism that she calls Critical Moral Pluralism. It is a pluralism because it allows that there is more than one acceptable moral approach. Indeed, if Moody-Adams is correct, no single moral theory could ever capture the richness and complexity of the moral realm. The theory is critical because it allows that some moral values and practices are outside of the range of what is acceptable. It is also critical in so far as it requires moral agents to be critically self-reflective with respect to the moral beliefs and practices that they and their cultures have come to accept.

Moody-Adams places a high premium on the value of everyday, non-philosophical moral inquiry. Moral philosophy is one among many perspectives that should be expected to contribute to an on-going moral inquiry. Literature, ethnography, religion, and the moral reflections of average moral agents also make integral contributions to moral knowledge. Therefore, moral philosophy will never provide the authoritative answer that is the key to all moral questions. The reason is that moral philosophy is not, according to Moody-Adams, a project of discovering the moral truth (or the fact that there is no moral truth). Rather, moral philosophy is an interpretive discipline. It interprets the 'complex web of belief, judgment, sentiment, and action that constitutes the structure of moral experience' (151). Moral change is never a change in the fundamentals, according to this view. It is a reinterpretation that results in a change in the details. For example, we have

no reason to believe that ancient Greece had a radically different moral structure even though the ancient Greeks did not question the moral status of slavery. As long as the people in ancient Greece had the ability to use language, particularly the ability to form the negation of any statement, they were in a position to question the moral practices of their society. Thus, they had the capacity to reinterpret the available moral data in a way that would help them to see that slavery was morally wrong.

The slavery example, in addition to illustrating Moody-Adams's idea of moral reinterpretation, has two other functions. First, it helps to illustrate her claim that more often than not, affected ignorance — failure to see what one ought to see — is the best explanation for a cultural group's ability to ignore the moral data that would indicate the wrongness in its practice. Second, it challenges relativism, particularly a relativism of historical distance, according to which contemporary cultures are not in a position to judge past cultures because we are too far away from them historically to understand their moral frameworks. If the ancient Greeks had the tools to recognize the wrongness of their institution of slavery, as she argues they were, it is perfectly legitimate to criticize them despite historical distance.

This book makes a contribution to the growing body of literature defending moral pluralism. But the more interesting contribution is meta-philosophical. Moody-Adams's theory and approach force the thoughtful moral philosopher to reflect about the goals of moral philosophy. Particularly, she challenges philosophers to consider what impact, if any, moral philosophy is supposed to have on the moral knowledge of ordinary moral agents, those not participating in scholarship. In her view, 'if contemporary moral philosophy is to recapture the attention of sincere, reflective people seeking new ways to make sense of moral experience, moral philosophers must seek a different conception of the subject' (185). Discussions of principles of right action have artificially narrowed the moral domain, and seem to offer no guidance about how to negotiate the moral complexities of real life. Indeed, she suggests that if it is possible to have moral knowledge without knowing anything about moral theory, then moral theory might be irrelevant to the moral life (175). The question is, how relevant should moral philosophy be to everyday life? For, that those who do not do moral theory might nonetheless possess moral knowledge does not entail that moral philosophy is entirely superfluous. To claim that would be analogous to claiming that since ordinary language-users can get along just fine without any knowledge of linguistic theory, linguistic theory is superfluous. Moody-Adams, at times, seems to assume that all moral discussion must take place at the same level. Any discussion whose relevance to everyday moral inquiry is not immediately evident is, for that reason, deficient. But that seems an unfair criterion of legitimacy, akin to condemning automotive engineering because the average driver knows how to drive a car without knowing what's behind its construction. Whether or not the reader agrees with Moody-Adams claim that moral philosophy needs to be more grounded in actual moral experience, her book

will certainly encourage reflection on the purpose of moral philosophy, its place in on-going moral inquiry, and its connection to moral practice.

Tracy Isaacs
University of Western Ontario

Novalis
Philosophical Writings.
Trans. and ed. Margaret Mahony Stoljar.
Albany: State University of Albany Press 1997.
Pp. xii + 194.
US$52.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3271-8);
US$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3272-6).

'Novalis' was the pen name of Friedrich von Hardenberg. For the uninitiated, a quick analogy that helps introduce him is a comparison with Keats. Both were keen thinkers and brilliant poets during the Romantic period; both died of 'consumption' at tragically young ages (Keats: 1795-1821, Novalis: 1772-1801); both dealt with themes of aesthetics, beauty and the human relationship to nature in their lyric verse; both were close to traditions of mysticism and hermetic philosophy.

Although he has long been a staple of German idealism, it is doubtful whether Novalis will appeal to contemporary Anglo-American philosophers. Even those who have worked their way into Fichte and Schelling will find the fragments and aphorisms, which constitute the bulk of his writings and of the selection offered here, to be either frustrating or obscure. Nothing like a coherent system of thought is visible at first sight. The brief introductory essay by Stoljar (1-21) makes various stabs at making Novalis relevant, connecting him, for example, to Richard Rorty and to Nelson Goodman, but these are not entirely convincing. If anything, there would be more affinity both in style and intent with Kierkegaard or with Wittgenstein. Stoljar's introduction may actually keep potential readers from exploring Novalis's thought, which would do him a disservice. Certainly Wm. Arctander O'Brien's recent study, *Novalis: Signs of Revolution* (1995) makes a strong case for the coherence and importance of Novalis's thought, and should be consulted in tandem with this book.

Assessing translations is always a matter of taste, and perhaps one should not cavil when texts are made available for audiences who would otherwise not have access to them. Nevertheless, much could have been done to make this selection more useful. Already the title is misleading, suggesting as it does the possibility of neat divisions of the œuvre into 'philosophical' and

'non-philosophical' writings. However, Novalis's best-known prose works, *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* and *Die Lehrlinge zu Saïs (The Novices of Saïs)* are just as meditative and speculative as these texts. The principles upon which the selections from the whole corpus were made should have been explained more clearly, just as it would have been fair to explain why these translations are preferable to those already available (listed in the select bibliography). Stoljar also owed readers a more thorough critical apparatus, given the complexities of the editing history. The editorial intrusions of Novalis's first editors into the essay 'Christendom or Europe' should be flagged.

The annotations are quirky and uneven. Who needs to be told 'Archimedes boasted of being able to move the world if he were given a place to stand on' (170)? Yet surely it would be helpful to know more about Hemsterhuis and why Novalis is invoking him specifically (42, 134) or what 'Asthenia of the Chinese — intervention of the Tartars' (101) could possibly mean. The inclusion of Novalis's eccentric politic treatise on the Prussian monarchy needs more immediate contextualization than a reference directing us to F.C. Beiser.

On the most fundamental level, Stoljar has given no hint of the difficulties presented by Novalis's language, whether in German or as translated. This makes the English versions sometimes wrong and often imprecise. Not surprisingly given his poetic bent, Novalis wrote defiantly against a univocal style of scientific discourse, so that the German resonates with puns and allusions in the manner of Nietzsche or Heidegger. Take the opening sentence, rendered as 'We *seek* the absolute everywhere and only ever *find* things' (23). The original reads: 'Wir *suchen* überall das Unbedingte, und *finden* immer nur Dinge.' There is a play on 'das Unbed*ing*te' and 'das *Ding*' without which the aperçu falls flat. Novalis was also steeped in Biblical language under the influence of pietism, so that the translation of 'Samen' as 'seed' (66), while technically correct, gives no indication of its connotation of 'semen' (and hence to Derridean plays with dissemination). The translation of 'Märchen', an important technical term for Novalis's analysis of the epistemological potential of different genres, as 'fairy tale' is misleading. While no one has an adequate English term, a note on the etymology of 'Märchen' (< 'maere') would point readers in the direction of narrative, report.

Translating hardly ever earns unblemished gratitude. It would be good if this book were to pique the interest of philosophers and others, but it would be better if they then turned quickly to the German originals.

Arnd Bohm
(School of Languages, Literatures and Comparative Literary Studies)
Carleton University

Kelly Oliver and **Marilyn Pearsall, eds.**
Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche.
University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press 1998. Pp. xii + 340.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01763-5);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01764-3).

This useful collection provides both Nietzsche-for-feminists and feminist-theory-for-Nietzscheans. It also assembles some key texts that should be helpful to those already engaged in Nietzsche scholarship but who are less familiar with French and French-inspired Continental interpretation. The selections included by Derrida, Kofman, and Irigaray both reflect their interpretations of 'Nietzsche's Use of Woman' (the heading for the first of two parts of the book), and represent their general approaches to engaging philosophy. Part two, 'Feminists' Use of Nietzsche', explores and develops the service of Nietzsche's philosophy for feminist theory.

Nietzsche's attraction for those engaged in feminist theory is identified in the introduction as the compatibility of specific ideas, such as his emphasis on the body and his challenges to the authority of reason and its privileged status over irrationality. Also attractive to feminists are the prospects of Nietzsche's methods of perspectivism and genealogical analysis, particularly for the light these shed on how values are shaped and transformed. A subset of this category consists of investigations of the utility of Nietzsche's conceptual tools for critiquing feminist theory.

Feminists have found fuel for resistance to Nietzsche's work not only in his specific comments about women and what is feminine, but also the use to which he puts discussion of specific women characters and mythical figures, as well as his use of 'gendered metaphors' (4). Several selections explore the problems and possibilities of Nietzsche's use of ideas about gender, with some disagreement regarding the degree to which Nietzsche succumbs to or transcends conventional notions of women, femininity, and masculinity.

Collecting previously published essays spanning nearly twenty years, the volume includes a revised and re-edited translation of Derrida's 'The Question of Style', which identifies and explores possible different types of women in Nietzsche's texts; Kelly Oliver's engagement and critique of Derrida's argument; Kofman's well-known essay on the Dionysian figure 'Baubô'; and Irigaray's 'Veiled Lips', which exemplifies her effort to 'speak woman' through a discourse in which she assumes the position of Nietzsche's lover. Other authors develop sophisticated interpretations of Nietzsche's disparaging comments about women and their place in his writings (particularly, Debra B. Bergoffen and Maudemarie Clark), the destructive and creative possibilities of the sexual imagery pervasive throughout much of Nietzsche's work (Linda Singer and Lynne Tirrell), the relation between Nietzsche's politics and his view of oppression (Ofelia Schutte), and detailed analyses of several of Nietzsche's most widely-read texts, including *The Gay Science*

(Kathleen Marie Higgins), *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (Tamsin Lorraine), *Beyond Good and Evil* (Ofelia Schutte), and *Ecce Homo* (Jean Graybeal). Daniel W. Conway and David Owen provide notable discussions of how Nietzsche's writing might be fruitful for critiquing and evaluating the contributions of feminist theory to philosophy, particularly in the areas of epistemology (Conway) and feminist politics (Owen).

The only essay not previously published, excluding the editors' introduction, is Kathleen J. Wininger's 'Nietzsche's Women and Women's Nietzsche'. Wininger aptly describes the opposing dispositions toward Nietzsche on 'the woman question' thus: 'We waver between finding his misogyny the most boring thing about Nietzsche and the most fascinating. It is boring because it is so typical and conventional. ... It is the most fascinating issue because, like the culture he was trying to heal, he suffered from his inability to make peace with women and his own sexuality both metaphorically and literally' (242). Wininger persuasively argues that Nietzsche's misogyny should not be ignored, but that Nietzsche's undermining of privilege and authority and his practice of examining values and how they develop and change in their social and historical context make him a useful ally in the feminist critique of power. She cautions readers not to obscure either of these facets, and she provides profitable examples of how contemporary scholarship often struggles to meet that challenge.

Also notable is Wininger's discussion of nineteenth-century receptions of Nietzsche's ideas, including the work of Hélène Stöcker, Lou Andreas-Salomé, Lily Braun, Grete Meisel-Hess, Helen Zimmern, Malwida von Meysenbug, and others. These views are largely neglected in the English (particularly American) literature, and Wininger takes an important step toward bridging that gap. She calls attention to the importance of the aesthetic focus of Nietzsche's work. What struck some as irrelevant or distracting from his serious philosophical writing was of particular interest to feminists concerned with developing theoretical and literary texts that would enable them to reformulate conceptions of beauty that they found stultifying and constrictive.

The placement of Wininger's essay within the volume is odd. It covers, without too much repetition, a number of issues raised in editors' introduction, and it situates those ideas within a broad array of contemporary scholarship. It has the additional advantage of facilitating an appreciation of how the present 'woman question(s)' developed and emerged from other earlier concerns. The reader might have found it helpful to encounter this selection nearer the beginning of the book.

Other features of the volume include a helpful index and a worthwhile bibliography. Several possible additions to the latter include recently published work, such as *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies* issue on 'Nietzsche and Women' (vol. 12, Autumn 1996), which includes articles by Kathleen Higgins, Debra Bergoffen, Babette E. Babich, Caroline ('Kay') Picart, and Carol Diethe. Interested readers should also consult Diethe's *Nietzsche's Women: Beyond the Whip* (Walter de Gruyter, 1996) for a discussion of Nietzsche's

relationships with women and their relevance to his philosophical development, and Marion Tapper's 'Ressentiment and power: some reflections on feminist practices' in *Nietzsche, feminism, and political theory*, edited by Paul Patton (Routledge, 1993), which contributes to discussions of the critical prospects of Nietzsche's work for feminist theory.

Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche is a good resource for those seeking to explore the productive possibilities at the intersection between feminist philosophy and Nietzsche's work. It spans an impressive range and collects some of the most important writing on the topic. The editors' thoughtful introduction provides a compelling case for why these issues should be of concern to the specialist and non-specialist alike. Together, the articles chart many of the paths that lead to and follow from Nietzsche's writing about women, gender, and sexuality, and the philosophical tools Nietzsche provides for the exploration of these topics in other areas of philosophy.

Christa Davis Acampora
University of Maine

George Pattison and
Steven Shakespeare, eds.
Kierkegaard: The Self in Society.
New York: St. Martin's Press 1998.
Pp. xii + 225.
US$55.00. ISBN 0-312-21166-X.

Kierkegaard has frequently been charged with both irrationalism and a-social individualism. These seem related since the irrationalism is seen in the emphasis on a 'subjectivity' which has also been construed as ruling out genuine 'inter-subjectivity'. Some think the first charge has been refuted but 'post-modern' readings of Kierkegaard revive the specter of irrationalism in amodified form; predictably, post-modernists have also been accused of being a-political. This volume exhibits some of the interrelations between attempts to recover a non-fideist religio/ethical Kierkegaard, a politically engaged Kierkegaard, a Kierkegaard concerned with genuine egalitarian community, and a Kierkegaard who undermines every kind of establishment, ethical, religious, and political. The result is not neat, but would Kierkegaard have cared?

The editors, rather than summarizing the essays which follow, review the debate over Kierkegaard's social thought as it has unfolded in recent years. They are cognizant of the non-equivalence between a-social, anti-social,

a-political and anti-political individualism, but do little to clarify just what relations other than equivalence do obtain.

Marilyn Piety argues that Mackey (an early source of something like a postmodern reading) found 'a-cosmism' in Kierkegaard by confusing the particular senses of 'actuality' in his works. Piety focuses largely on the *Postscript* (by the pseudonym Climacus) but provides striking quotes from the journals in support of her view. Robert Perkins finds an essentially egalitarian social view in Climacus, but, with Piety, doubts the possibility of any political realization of that view prior to the formation of genuine individuality (read 'subjectivity') in (most of?) the members of a polis. That seems unlikely since it requires ethico-religious, perhaps even specifically Christian, development. That formation would in any case require informed ethical and religious choices, thus something more than the irrational opting for liberal democracy advocated by Rorty. Such irrationality is implicated in the romantic or post-modern ironical stance which, Anthony Rudd shows are explicitly or implicitly critiqued by Kierkegaard in *The Concept of Irony*.

Anita Craig tries to acknowledge limits to freedom as she examines 'possibilities of personhood' but remains worried about the 'tormenting' infinity of choices facing people newly aware of the 'cosmic scale'. Her discussion does not reflect any sustained encounter with the (qualified) religious/ethical realism which Piety, Perkins and Rudd see as essential to Kierkegaard's thought, and so she can give no coherent account of what could guide 'choice'. Similar difficulties arise for the notions of 'liberation' (Shakespeare) and 'responsibility' (Dooley). All three want to credit post-modern readings, which requires showing how these notions can have content apart from the existence of norms of some kind.

Many commentators have mined *Works of Love* for social content. Peter George argues that Kierkegaard's notion that proper love of the dead (who cannot possibly reciprocate) is the criterion for proper love of the living, is an 'anti-social' denial of genuine interaction in which persons depend on one another. Hugh Pyper finds a richer context for Kierkegaard's criterion in an understanding of fully accepted death as the means to ending the socially and personally destructive claims of the earthly polis (culture) to God-like status. Learning to love anyone (including oneself) 'as dead' amounts to seeing that one as under the aegis of God alone. But Pyper also admits that mutuality is threatened by such a view. Martin Andic tries to find in the same work the representation of neighbor love as honoring both particularity and a common humanity, which he confusingly assimilates to 'personal' and 'impersonal' love. He tries to draw some conclusions for 'social ethics' (abortion, euthanasia) from these reflections. The connection to the apparent premises is, to say the least, opaque.

Kierkegaard's later writings also invite political/social comment. Jim Perkinson tries to maintain a social meaning for Christ as the 'lowliest' which Kierkegaard affirms but then qualifies in *Practice in Christianity*. Historian Bruce Kirmse assembles fascinating historical details in support of the claim that honest readings of Kierkegaard's last works must allot a central place

both to his unequivocally Christian stance and his unqualified rejection even of that level of sociality represented by the congregation. Kirmse does not explain how these can be consistent with one another, or why, as he asserts, it would be a kind of 'murder' of Kierkegaard for someone to mine his multifarious authorship for various purposes without endorsing his denial of congregation and (by clear implication) the sacrament. Finally, Andras Nagy traces the influence of Kierkegaard upon revolutionary politics and Lukacs in particular, and affirms that in Russia and eastern Europe Kierkegaard is still something more than a topic for professorial study and comment.

While these essays are uneven in quality they contain much fascinating discussion and assemble citations from Kierkegaard which show that his views amount to more than simple contempt for 'the crowd', and they are diverse enough to unsettle anyone who is sure about Kierkegaard's understanding of the self in society.

Norman Lillegard
University of Tennessee - Martin

Paul Ricoeur
Critique and Conviction: Conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay.
Trans. Kathleen Blamey.
New York: Columbia University Press 1998.
Pp. 194.
US$24.50. ISBN 0-231-10734-X.

Critique and Conviction is an intellectual auto-biography of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. It is constructed from a series of conversations about his life and work by François Azouvi and Marc de Launay. This format is common in France, but less so in English-speaking countries. Consequently, such books are not taken seriously. However, this is an important work because in all of his voluminous writings R. has remained exceptionally silent about himself. This book provides important data about R. in relation to his central core philosophical concerns. Also his discussion of some of his more important texts provides insight on how to read and appropriate them.

The book is organized as eight conversations. The first conversation traces the trajectory of R.'s life with special emphasis on his fundamental existential and intellectual commitments. Subsequent conversations range widely, but in an orderly manner, through the transformation of these fundamental convictions, the development of his intellectual and professional life, and key texts in his philosophical project. The overall product is a formidable philo-

sophical reflection by R. of his own work and the work of others that influenced him. The meditations are artfully cast into anecdotes and narratives and R. reflects on his relationships with some of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, including Heidegger, Jaspers, Eliade, Lacan, and Foucault. In the process, R. explores problems in ethics, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, hermeneutics, and politics as these areas of concern have been incorporated into his central preoccupation with the central philosophical question of what it is to be a human being. The conversations individually and collectively are a superb introduction to R.'s diverse and rich philosophical work. At the same time, specialists will find their reading of R.'s texts enriched because of the personal insights that R.'s conversations contribute to the central problems and questions that animate his texts.

The book is well constructed. The conversational format never intrudes on the thinker or his thinking. Each conversation has a spontaneous and yet finished quality to it. Given R.'s central concern with narrative, it is not surprising that the conversations tell a story and provide an engaging context for coming to grips with R. as a person and an intellectual. One of the most interesting conversations is R.'s reflection on the relationship of philosophy and religion. R.'s integration of his Christian convictions and his philosophical work provides more than a few clues to the critical rigor of R.'s work. This chapter is an essential one for those who come to R. through theology, where his work attracts keen interest. The least satisfying aspect of the conversations is the relatively brief place given to R.'s involvement with *l'Esprit*, Emmanuel Mounier, and French personalism. Ricoeur's essays for *l'Esprit* are an essential part of his corpus and it was disappointing that R. did not address this work or his relationship with the personalist movement.

Overall this is a book that adds to our understanding of R.'s philosophical project. It is characterized by elegance, a self-critical stance, and intellectual depth. R. reveals himself as a thinker of exceptional intellectual openness who offers an invitation to every reader to reconsider the most basic and fundamental questions of philosophy.

James B. Sauer
St. Mary's University

Helena Rosenblatt
Rousseau and Geneva: From the First Discourse *to the* Social Contract, *1749-1762.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.
Pp. xiv + 298.
US$59.95. ISBN 0-521-57004-2.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was a political theorist who was also concerned to develop the implications of his theories for the resolution of practical social and political problems. While this much is already clear from his works on Poland and Corsica it is a great merit of Helena Rosenblatt's book that she clearly establishes the considerable extent to which Rousseau's major theoretical works were themselves also interventions into the troubled social and political life of Geneva, the city of his birth.

Rosenblatt argues persuasively that previous work on Rousseau has paid inadequate attention to the disputed social and political issues in contemporary Geneva and the debates and struggles which took place around them. She sets out the rationale of her work as follows: 'Rousseau has been read out of his historical context ... This book is an attempt to rectify this problem. Its purpose is to illuminate the historical meaning of Rousseau's political works written between 1749 and 1762, using Geneva as an interpretive key ... Rousseau's most famous political works all engaged issues central to the Genevan political debate' (1-2). In pursuing her programme Rosenblatt recreates with great clarity and exceptionally careful, thorough and detailed scholarship the Genevan context of Rousseau's works from his *Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts* (published in 1750) through to *The Social Contract* (1762).

By the early eighteenth century Geneva was becoming a major commercial city and centre of international banking. Consequently, the wealth of the city grew rapidly and social inequalities intensified as powerful merchants and bankers accumulated unprecedented riches. Accompanying these economic developments was an increasing concentration of political power into the hands of a small number of rich families, which fundamentally challenged and undermined the Genevan tradition of a politically active and influential citizen body. Considerable opposition developed within Geneva to these economic and political trends.

Rosenblatt vividly reconstructs the vigorous and turbulent debates which took place in Geneva around these issues, and shows convincingly how Rousseau's major works contribute to those disputes. For example, she shows (Ch. 2) how one of the purposes of the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* (1755) was to combat the theory of *'doux commerce'* (52). This theory, associated with such writers as Mandeville, Montesquieu and Hume, argued that trade and commerce are forces which render human life more comfortable, gentle and civilised. Rosenblatt demonstrates how Rousseau's critique of the theory illuminates the meaning of the *Dedication* which he gave to the *Discourse*. While the *Dedication* is often viewed as an attempt by Rousseau

to ingratiate himself with the Genevan authorities through flattery and exaggeration, Rosenblatt shows how it is much more plausibly read as a warning to Genevan citizens (to whom the *Dedication* is addressed) that the commercial enrichment of the city was having seriously harmful moral and political consequences (84-7, 159-63).

Rosenblatt's work has a number of limitations and weaknesses. First, in her consideration of Rousseau's critique of social inequality, she does not successfully clarify the full extent of his opposition to it. She claims that Rousseau 'was an economic egalitarian only to a limited extent' (70), but offers little to support this judgement and elsewhere represents profoundly egalitarian aspects of Rousseau's social and economic thought (e.g., 68, 73, 74, 169, 235). Rosenblatt's treatment of this issue falls short of her characteristic standards of clarity and thoroughness.

Second, there is no critical discussion of what enduring value Rousseau's theories might have. The Genevan context is so completely dominant that no consideration is given to Rousseau's wider importance. Yet two of the main problems which Rousseau addresses in his writings, namely the growth of social inequality and the increasing concentration and centralization of political power, are at the very forefront of the problems which humanity faces today. What can we learn from Rousseau's discussions of these issues? Rosenblatt seems to convey the unfortunate impression that the significance of Rousseau's political philosophy is confined to eighteenth-century Geneva.

Third, the detailed discussion of Rousseau's views stops in 1762 with *The Social Contract*. Yet two years later Rousseau made a further and very explicit intervention into Genevan politics with the publication of *Letters Written from the Mountain*. This work was a response to *Letters Written from the Country*, by Jean-Robert Tronchin, attorney-general of Geneva. Tronchin, who favoured firm action to control dissent and protest, was hostile to Rousseau's theories and defended the government's banning of *Emile* and *The Social Contract*. Rousseau's *Letters* are briefly cited on the last page of the 'Epilogue' (280) but this is scarcely adequate. The omission (which is unexplained) of any serious consideration of Rousseau's *Letters* is surely very odd indeed, given the focus and intention of Rosenblatt's work.

Despite these weaknesses Rosenblatt's book makes a valuable contribution to Rousseau scholarship and deserves to be read by all those who seek a fuller understanding of Rousseau as a political theorist and an active participant in Genevan politics.

Barry Wilkins
(*School of English, Communication and Philosophy*)
University of Wales, Cardiff

Quentin Smith
Ethical and Religious Thought in Analytical Philosophy of Language.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1997.
Pp. xii + 255.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-300-06212-5.

This is a tightly and well-written book which offers detailed discussion, deals lucidly with its material and engages the reader. It presents a well-woven, finely-tuned, although at times complex, argument and deserves to be carefully read. A central topic of the book is whether the (or any) linguistic method can provide an answer to the question: Does Human life have an objective meaning (86)?

The book seeks to provide a critical history of the analytical philosophy of language from its inception in the late nineteenth century to the present day. Smith focuses on an analysis of the four leading movements in analytic philosophy — logical realism, logical positivism, ordinary language analysis, and linguistic essentialism. He outlines each position in turn, examines the connections of the position with its predecessors and offers a critical analysis including an analysis of that position's influence on twentieth century theories of ethics and religion.

The discussion of the four philosophy of language movements includes as much critical evaluation as exposition, and can be summarised as follows (see x-xi and 126-7): 1. Logical realism: Every word in a sentence has a sense which is its referent. Human life has an ethical meaning but no religious meaning. 'God exists' *has a sense and is false*. 2. Logical positivism: The sense of any sentence that is neither a tautology nor a contradiction is the method of its verification. Human life is ethically and religiously meaningless (literally *senseless* as it lacks cognitive sense [29]). 'God exists' *has no sense*. 3. Ordinary language analysis: The sense of an expression is its ordinary use. Human life is ethically and religiously meaningless. 'God exists' *has a sense but is neither true nor false*. 4. Linguistic essentialism: The sense of most singular and general words is their rigid designatum. Human life (for some essentialists) has ethical and religious meaning. 'God exists' *has a sense and is true*.

Part of the point of the book is to counter the widespread view of analytic philosophy as indifferent to important questions about ethics and philosophy of religion, and rather to argue that they are integrally intertwined. In making this point the book provides a focused philosophical discussion with a single line of argument running throughout. Smith underlines his argument with the view that: 'In some respects, the discipline of the philosophy of language is more fundamental than the discipline of ethics and other disciplines, in that its conclusions serve as premises of major arguments developed in other disciplines. The method of linguistic analysis may thus be understood as the methodological procedure of using the conclusions reached in the philosophy of language as premises of other disciplines' (x).

In the first part of the book, Smith's critique of logical realism, logical positivism and ordinary language analysis is thorough. He understands these movements well, situates them in their historical context and delineates the main proponents of each movement. He knows the literature and understands how the work of various thinkers is related to each other and in what ways their work has been influential on the work of others. He also sees keenly some of the finer distinctions within and between the movements. I found his handling of Logical realism and logical positivism and the application of his argument into ethics and philosophy of religion particularly helpful. His ability to make a succinct case pertinent to his argument, without taking on the whole of the broader debate, keeps the book focused and readable — see for instance his outline of the ten problems with the positivist theory of ethics (37-40). If there is a fault with this first part of the book, it is that sometimes it becomes difficult to distinguish between the discussion of other's views and Smith's own views.

Smith argues that the respective theses about objective meaning adopted by these three movements are not adequately justified by the arguments offered by members of these movements. His response in the second part of the book is to work towards a positive theory of objective meaning, a version of naturalist moral realism (in the perfectionist tradition of ethics).

The second part of the book is closely based on the results of the critical study of the first part. Smith commences with an overview and analysis of the philosophy of language of linguistic essentialism. He then proceeds to discuss the philosophy of religion of this movement, concentrating primarily on the work of Alvin Plantinga's *The Nature of Necessity*. Following this Smith discusses several applications of linguistic essentialism to metaethics and normative ethics. Robert Adams and David Brink, in particular, use the essentialist method of linguistic analysis to argue for moral realism (the metaethical theory that human life has an objective ethical meaning). Smith's examination of their work concludes that their arguments for moral realism are unsuccessful. However, both writers have introduced ideas which Smith utilises in an endeavour to formulate — in his view — a more plausible version of moral realism. This discussion then provides the groundwork for his discussion of normative ethics, and in particular for his development of Thomas Hurka's recent theory of perfectionism where he seeks to construct a viable theory of the ethical meaning of human life. 'The conclusion ... will be that there is reason to think that an objective ethical meaning of human life exists and that this meaning is stated by the theory of global, naturalist perfection. This conclusion about ethical meaning will enable me to derive ... a theory about an objective religious meaning of human life that differs from monotheism, specifically, a naturalist pantheism' (159). Smith's philosophy of religion based on his theory of perfectionism offers, he claims, a logical argument from evil that takes into account Alvin Plantinga's free will defense and the falseness of monotheism, paving the way to a naturalistic pantheism.

While I am not wholly convinced by the book's conclusions, I nevertheless found it fascinating and engaging. It was refreshing to read a well written book, which leads the reader clearly through the argument presented. Each section is strongly concluded and a direction is set for the argument of the following section, enabling the reader to follow the argument as a whole. Overall the argument is finely tuned and will take further reading to fully absorb.

Erich von Dietze
Curtin University of Technology

Francis Sparshott
The Future of Aesthetics.
The 1996 Ryle Lectures.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1998.
Pp. xii + 173.
$35.00. ISBN 0-8020-4426-3.

This is a book that comes replete with its own not entirely favourable review, a disarming move that deprives the present reviewer of any impulse to rail about its disorder or confusion. 'My books,' says Sparshott, 'tend to consist of asymmetrical and intractable masses of material only partially ordered,' and this particular instance should be taken as 'a parable of retirement from the university and the world, with an ageing brain's shift of data-processing procedures' (96, 97). 'All the things I have said about the future of aesthetics, and about the global tendencies that will affect that future, even though my generalizations are the outcome of a lifetime of study, are nothing but a residue, a froth that has come to the surface of my mind under the stimulus of a speaking engagement, working on a backlog of unpublished or uncollected papers, my recent reading, and the random churnings of my daily ruminations' (89). Not quite what the Press was going to put on the jacket. Apparently, the enjoyment attached to lambasting authors who do not deliver has little to do with the non-delivery, everything to do with some notion of the author basking in a fraudulent sense of accomplishment. But the photograph on the book's cover, of Sparshott sitting in twisted beach wreckage by a gloomy Lake Ontario, forehead in hand, seems to fit the author one senses behind these pages, who is no basker in glory. Indeed, self-critique is such an extravagant and delightful gesture in academic writing that one is endeared to Sparshott and anxious to point out everything that is good in this book.

Interest in this book could not be, however it might have been written, its power with a topic like 'the future of aesthetics', an implicit question mark if ever there was one. This is a publication of the Ryle Lectures delivered at Trent University in 1996, expanded by the addition of annotations making up the book's 75 pages of endnotes. Lectures are not reports, unless they are hijacked at the expense of their captive audience. They happen to be perfect occasions on which to explore an intriguing topic like Sparshott's: 'to consider the prospects of aesthetics as an academic discipline in our time of intellectual and cultural turmoil' (xi). What one hopes to see in a brief book on such a theme, therefore, is a clear and focused exploration that drops us off at an avenue that will seem well worth further exploration. Sparshott's great and long experience in this region of philosophy, moreover, leads one to hope that the progress will be quick and the landmarks that we pass impressive. But you can only actually enjoy this book if you know in advance that that is not what is coming.

The major questions here are, more or less, beside the point. One of Sparshott's tasks is a summation of what aesthetics is, an 'expansion of [the] notion, formulated over some decades of reflection but never pursued, that aesthetics as a discipline arises from the persistent convergence and divergence of three radically different lines of inquiry' (97): deciding 'the status of beauty among values,' determining 'the nature of the arguments' used in art criticism, and assessing the part played by art in the life of the mind (5). Sparshott suggests that 'aesthetics as a fully fledged discipline requires ... the confluence' of all three, which converge when carried on with enough intensity. Why? Because only in that state of 'threefold unity' can aesthetics 'be taken seriously by philosophers' (15, 16, 18). 'Professional philosophy has always found aesthetics embarrassing' (25). Sparshott's interest in 'futurity' now seems somewhat clearer, and his diagnosis of the situation suggests a vivid picture: aesthetics is a kind of endangered conception, inside a mother (philosophy) who may not want it, since she herself is already one too many in her somewhat hostile home (the university), made only more so by the rough state of things outside (civilization). Sparshott assigns a chapter to each member of this triad, ostensibly pursuing the question of how things are likely to go in philosophy, the university, and civilization.

But as he eventually tells us (89), he has nothing much to say on the topic of the future. Chapter two, 'Philosophy and the Future of the University', begins with the admission that we don't know whether the three strands of aesthetics will stay popular (people may 'get bored', etc.), since 'our practical understandings of what philosophy is also keep shifting' (19, 22). By this point the appetite for substance is quite keen, but Sparshott is not ready to come through, and veers off to concentrate on the third strand of aesthetics, the somewhat oddly framed issue of 'the place of the fine arts on the map of knowledge' (23). When after several pages the idea of 'the map of knowledge' is called suspect (33), there is an overwhelming sense that we have all lost our bearings.

In fact the structural questions of this book (its title, and the composition of aesthetics, and the future of philosophy and civilization ('My attempt to understand the idea of civilization has left my wheels spinning in the mud,' 60) are just a kind of hanger, something to be ignored. It is what is hanging on it (excepting, of course, the rather frequent wheel-spinning) that is interesting. Sparshott has searching things to say about the condition of the present-day university, precisely in its relation to a subject like philosophy. This is a highly philosophical topic that few philosophers seem to have the gumption to broach. Is the shape of philosophy, this business of 'footnotes to Plato' with roots in an ancient tradition of reflection, unaffected by its position in a university 'inhospitable' to the aspirations that reflection was meant to serve (46)? How can that be, with all that we know about institutions? And what is the writing on the wall as the university shapes itself ever more completely into 'the consumer university,' the 'central institution' of the information age: a manufacturer of research that 'knows no limits' (43, 44, 52)? What really is the status and significance of critiques (like the undermining of the idea of 'basic civilization') that originate in an institution committed to generate issues 'as part of [its] ongoing business' (81)? Is not a more and more substantial part of that business 'catering to' a clientele (129)? Having the answer to these questions is not the point; surely just a look around, some calling of the weather, is only intelligent before the weather starts filling our boots. Sparshott is reluctant to think that the university today represents an actual 'perversion of the original university ideals,' 'but it is certainly a very powerful solvent' (52). Philosophers who care about the thing they are, ostensibly, devoting their labours to might wish to give such questions some of the attention that Sparshott has done here. To that discussion, this book is a useful addition.

Edward Tingley
Canadian Centre for Architecture, Montreal

Avrum Stroll
Sketches of Landscapes: Philosophy by Example.
MIT Press 1998. Pp. xiv + 282.
US$35.00. ISBN 2-262-19391-4.

Stroll's book is interesting and well-written. It includes seven loosely-related chapters on topics in contemporary philosophy, including skepticism, meaning and reference, and the debate over representative and direct realism. Stroll rejects skepticism on the grounds that it is not possible to give a uniform account of all epistemic situations like that proposed by skeptics, and he rejects direct reference theories on the grounds that the meanings of natural kind terms involve the phenomenological character of those kinds. He also suggests that the debate over direct and indirect realism isn't a fruitful one since it depends on one or more bad assumptions and since it distorts our everyday way of talking about representations. The discussions are lucid and moderately erudite, as well as being philosophically provocative.

As the subtitle suggests, Stroll tries to exemplify a style of philosophizing that relies principally on examples. This approach is inspired in part by Wittgenstein, and those who are not sympathetic to Wittgenstein may find themselves disagreeing with the method or the results. Although his method relies heavily on examples and he rejects the claim that the essence of philosophy is argumentative, Stroll also uses more traditional arguments. He presents a number of interesting arguments in the course of each chapter. These are clear and largely well-argued. In some cases where Stroll uses an example, his purposes might be better served by an argument. On the other hand, the examples help to make the writing clear and energetic; they allow Stroll to move more quickly than would otherwise be possible. While Stroll suggests that 'the method is not the message' (x), it is clearly *a* message. The work as a whole is an example of philosophy by example, and thus if the work is favorably received, it can be interpreted as supporting the use of this method.

One case where an argument would have been superior to the examples Stroll uses lies in a discussion of Russell's theory of descriptions. Stroll there attempts to show that Russell's arguments for the theory are unconvincing. Rather than analyzing the suspect arguments, Stroll presents structurally similar arguments to show that Russell's arguments do not show that the theory is correct. On one interpretation, Stroll is providing examples that show how Russell's arguments are flawed. On another interpretation, Stroll is making an argument from analogy in which he criticizes Russell's choice of examples by presenting a different set of examples. In either case, it isn't clear that Stroll's examples successfully show that Russell's arguments are flawed since Stroll's examples are distinct from Russell's. Stroll's conclusion would be more clearly established if he could have shown how Russell's arguments were fallacious.

Another troubling aspect of Stroll's book is the degree to which Stroll relies on dictionaries. They provide grist for his philosophical mill, but Stroll does not justify the use to which he puts them. A long chapter on examples relies

particularly heavily on data from a dictionary. Since this chapter is partially a justification of the method of philosophy by example, it seems awkward that it makes use of the very method that it justifies. In addition, since it seems perfectly reasonable to regard dictionaries as tools that do not indicate anything of philosophical significance, some further justification of their use would be beneficial. Perhaps the use of dictionaries is a part of Stroll's debt to Wittgensteinian scholarship, but even given that standard linguistic usage is philosophically respectable, Stroll should take a more critical attitude toward the data that he gleans from the dictionary.

The final chapter of the book includes an impressive discussion and analysis of a philosophical disagreement within what appears to be a strictly scientific dispute. Stroll examines a dispute between J.J. Gibson and R.L. Gregory over the nature of perception. He argues that both men have seen the dispute as an empirical one when in fact it is a conceptual or philosophical dispute involving the interpretation of empirical data accepted by both disputants. Stroll further suggests that the empirical data and the causal-physiological theories developed to account for it are neutral between representative realism and direct realism, contrary to the suppositions of Gibson and Gregory. In addition, he suggests that the contrast between direct and indirect forms of realism is something of a mistake since it does not match our everyday use of the terms 'indirect' and 'direct'. The discussion here is an exemplary mixture of the philosophy of science and philosophy of language used to approach basic questions of epistemology and metaphysics.

Sketches of Landscapes is fruitful and suggestive. It is accessible to a wide range of philosophical interests, though particularly interesting for those who are concerned with the contemporary issues surrounding intentionality. In addition to the other virtues of Stroll's work, its greatest virtue may be to spur further consideration of the metaphilosophical issue of the role of examples in philosophy.

David V. Newman
Western Michigan University

Mark Tunick
Practices and Principles.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1998. Pp. viii + 242.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-691-01560-0.

This is an essay on the place of social practice in law and morality. Its central chapters contain interesting and often subtle discussions of legal and moral issues, notably on the theory of promising and the law of contracts and privacy. These chapters are surveys of an abundance of material which any reader will find useful and illuminating. The official argument of the book is that both principles, i.e., universal ideas true independently of social conventions, and practices, a highly ambiguous term which should (but often doesn't) refer to beliefs or behavior made normative by being actually accepted by some group (typically, 'us'), are central to law and morality. The point seems to be to show how each figure in the resolution of the controversies examined.

Perhaps no one but an extreme Kantian (among whom Tunick includes Kant himself) denies that social practice plays some role in morality. 'When in Rome' seems to be more than a counsel of prudence. Yet only an extreme social relativist would hold that following social custom exhausts the field of morals; we have every right to assess social customs by the standards of moral principle. But that line threatens to squeeze out practice altogether; if every practice may be evaluated by principle, what role is left for practice? How can the mere existence of a practice determine what is right for us to do? Throughout the book Tunick identifies ways in which practices come into play in moral thinking (including underlying our intuitions), but insofar as he has a central answer to this question, it seems to be that practice enters at the point of application: principles generally fail to determine particular cases, and when they fail, we not only may and should, but (evidently) must appeal to social practice. We have, for example, a reasonable right to privacy as a matter of moral principle, but what counts as reasonable is defined by social practice. Or, that promises should be kept is a matter of principle, but the circumstances in which we are exempt from our promises are matters of practice. Principle itself will not tell us, say, whether we must keep our promises even in the face of an unexpected incompatible contingency. (You have promised to meet your friend at the airport, but the neighbor's dog gets hit by a car; are you justified if you rush it to the vet?) Since principle is not sufficiently specifiable to lead us to actual decisions, social conventions are required.

Yet this homely example immediately illustrates the difficulty with Tunick's argument. It is not simply that our social conventions are often as ill-determined as our moral principles. The problem is that on the face of it, there seems to be a rather large number of options to which one might appeal. When it happens that some principle fails to determine a case, why not appeal to some other: to Nature, or to God (what would Jesus do?), or to personal

preference, or to general utility, or to intuition, or to virtue, or to blind choice (as the Taoists and existentialists say we must)? All these sources of moral assistance could be defended, and at least some of them seem more attractive than appeal to social practice. True, picking and choosing among favorite principles produces a moral hodge-podge rather than a coherent point of view, but is not our real moral life just such a hodge-podge?

Presumably Tunick's contention is that none of these alternatives will solve the problem. But this is unconvincing. Tunick's conception of principle seems problematic. Though he gives many examples of principles throughout the text, the conception itself he seems to take from Kant, who, not unreasonably, he regards as the great philosopher of principle. But Kant does not appeal to principles but to principles of a specially bedeviling kind, namely, those derived from the form of moral judgments alone. Tunick relies on Hegel's critique of Kant that principles are excessively abstract, yet this critique works best against principles of the peculiarly Kantian nature. But is not the Orthodox Jew's injunction to follow the Talmud, or the Stoic's (or modern naturalist's) injunction to 'follow nature,' an appeal to principle, though principle conceived differently from Kant's? If so, the Hegelian critique seems misplaced; how can one show in advance that appeal to these principles must fail to find answers to important questions? (that the answers are morally admirable is another matter).

If Tunick's conception of principle is too narrow, his conception of practice is so loose as to render his argument virtually true by definition. Only a trivial definition of 'social practice' occurs in the text: 'standards of behavior recognized within a community,' 11. This tells us very little. That Orthodox Jews regulate their lives by Talmud is certainly a practice by this definition, yet to the Orthodox it is a matter of principle, for there is nothing conventional or voluntaristic about it: the Talmud contains decrees of God, handed down to Moses at Sinai. Groups rarely justify their practices simply by their continued existence; typically groups explain themselves by saying, 'because we are a democracy' or 'because we are trying to be a loving community.' These explanations of their practices imply that if they came to suppose that certain practices no longer suited their conceptions of themselves, they would be willing to abandon them. But willingness to alter your practices if they do not conform to some conception, would seem to be the hallmark of principle. Communities presumably can act on principle as well as individuals; so the fact that some behavioral standard is accepted within a community shows very little about whether or not it is a matter of principle.

Does practice enter at all? Consider promises. Promises made under duress are not binding. But our conventions determine acceptable from non-acceptable duress. But at best this is true at the margins, where practice is apt to be as silent as principle: what is needed in problem cases is decision, informed by whatever (possibly non-determinative) considerations seem best. Such decisions may or may not refer to social practices. Bentham's principle of utility, one might think, is about as determinative of cases as one could wish, given certain (perhaps implausible) assumptions; but Tunick's

contention is that even this cannot be applied without social practice, because what makes people happy differs in different societies. But this is to confuse following social convention with taking into account social fact. It may be a socially constructed fact that people feel guilty about breaking rules which the utilitarian finds rational, and if it is, utilitarians can debate whether to take this into account; but they are not obligated to follow these rules themselves. No doubt there are cases where we are justified in doing something just because it is generally done, but Tunick is not convincing that morally significant cases are among them.

So despite its interesting middle chapters, the theoretical argument of the book seems weak and we are left no wiser about the role of practice in morality.

Joseph Ellin
Western Michigan University

Jeremy Weate
A Young Person's Guide to Philosophy.
Illustrated by Peter Lawman.
New York: DK Publishing, Inc. 1998. Pp. 64.
US$16.95. ISBN 0-789430-74-6.

A Young Person's Guide to Philosophy uses text and illustrations to introduce young people to philosophy. It would be appropriate for persons ten to thirteen or fourteen years old (Jostein Gaarder's *Sophie's World: A Novel about the History of Philosophy* or Robert M. Pirsig's *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* would be appropriate for older adolescents). It may be compared to similar books which introduce young persons to musical instruments, horses, or dinosaurs. Its primary aim is not to present information, but instead to interest its readers in philosophy. In many cases, it may be able to do that on its own, although it would be best if an adult serves as a resource.

The photographs and illustrations are brightly colored and attractive, as well as informatively annotated. Frequently, they are humorous too. Highlighting Aristotle's interest in marine biology, he is shown sitting on a shore while a crab pinches his toe. And Descartes is pictured inside a wood-burning stove — an accompanying note explains that a mistranslation from the French had him sitting, not in a stove-heated room, but rather in a stove.

The book begins by briefly discussing such questions as 'So what is philosophy?', 'When did it all start?', 'What's the use of philosophy?', 'Is a

computer virus alive?', 'Am I an android?', 'What rights do we have?', and 'Is time travel possible?' This is followed by sections on thirty-four philosophers, devoting about two pages to each. There usually is a full-page drawing of each philosopher, with important events and concepts depicted in the background. The facing page has a representative quotation in large print, with a brief description of the philosopher's main ideas. *A Young Person's Guide to Philosophy* concludes with sections on fourteen schools in the history of philosophy. These consist entirely of text, and will be useful for those persons, perhaps slightly older, who wish to delve deeper into philosophy.

There are points at which a philosopher might cavil. There is a section on Hypatia, but none on Augustine. In addition, there are many statements that, although not false, might mislead or confuse. To cite examples at random, the book states that 'the roots of Western philosophy can be found in Africa' (4), that Socrates paid off a debt with a chicken before he died (12), and that Descartes 'even considered that the world might be the creation of an evil genius' (24). Insofar as the book is viewed as a device to introduce young persons in philosophy, however, such objections are irrelevant. What is important is that philosophy is represented as something interesting and important, and *A Young Person's Guide to Philosophy* does that well. Further, if an adult is available to discuss the book with the young person, infelicities could serve as a way to begin the conversation. The book is an excellent introduction to philosophy for younger adolescents.

J.M. Fritzman
Lewis and Clark College