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formerly

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

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Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

## Academic Printing & Publishing

P.O. Box 4218, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6E 4T2  
Tel: (403) 435-5898 Fax: (403) 435-5852  
E-mail: app@freenet.edmonton.ab.ca

Publications Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 1206-5269

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Published six times a year

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**David Armstrong**

*A World of States of Affairs.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.

Pp. xiii + 285.

US\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-58064-1);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-58948-7).

As the twentieth century winds down, philosophers might reasonably wonder about how the history of the century's philosophy will be written. Here is one possible scenario: the most important innovation in twentieth-century metaphysics was the supplanting of a 2500-year-old way of looking at reality (which Armstrong calls 'Thingism') by state-of-affairs metaphysics ('Factualism') (4). If this history is ever written, Russell and the early Wittgenstein will be the central figures, but Armstrong (and his mentor, John Anderson) will have a place, and this book could be regarded as an important statement of Factualism. I would not write this history of twentieth-century philosophy, but that it is a possibility to be entertained is an indication of Armstrong's importance.

This book presents little less than a complete metaphysic. Armstrong provides accounts of 'universals, laws of nature, dispositions and powers, possibilities and necessities, classes and numbers' (xi). Naturalism and physicalism are assumed. Armstrong's metaphysical views always come from the philosophical A-list. He accepts Aristotelian realism about universals, categoricism about causality and a combinatorialist account of possibility (real possible worlds are a little too chi-chi for Armstrong). The doctrine unifying all of Armstrong's positions is the view that the world is composed of states of affairs, not things. A state of affairs is a combination of particulars and universals, both monadic (properties) and dyadic (relations). The world has a propositional structure. In short, this book is a defence of logical atomism, but logical atomism without the atoms, since Armstrong is agnostic about simple objects.

Armstrong's centrepiece argument for the existence of states of affairs is the 'truthmaker argument' (§8.1). Armstrong assumes that, for every truth, there is a truthmaker or 'ontological ground' (115) which makes the truth true. He then asks what the truthmaker of '*a* is *F*' could be, where *a* is an individual and *F* is a universal. He maintains that the truthmaker is not just *a* (conceived of as a propertyless particular), nor the pair of *a* and *F*, since they could both exist while '*a* is *F*' is false. He concludes that the truthmaker is 'the state of affairs of *a*'s being *F*' (116). Since states of affairs are the 'ontological grounds' of truths such as '*a* is *F*', states of affairs must exist.

One could object to this argument in several ways. Armstrong recognises that the truthmaker argument depends on the assumption that a truth is true in all possible worlds where its truthmaker exists. This assumption is dubious. A world without minds is a possible world, but many philosophers



of language believe it contains no truths, even if it contains the truthmakers that make statements true in our world. Moreover, as Armstrong notes, the argument depends on acceptance of a correspondence theory of truth and advocates of the coherence theory of truth will be unpersuaded. Even other correspondence theorists will not be convinced. Armstrong's talk about truthmakers seems intended to capture what people mean when they talk about the truth conditions of sentences. Many people say that the truth conditions of 's is circular' are captured by (T) 's is circular' is true iff s is circular'. On the right hand side of the biconditional we find a description of the truth conditions of the sentence mentioned on the left hand side. Is it a description of a state of affairs composed of a particular which instantiates a universal? Armstrong thinks so, but anyone who does not believe that sentences of the form 's is P' assert that a particular instantiates a universal will disagree. That is, the argument depends on Armstrong's Aristotelian metaphysics. Armstrong's Thingist opponents will maintain that 's is circular' does not mean that particular s instantiates the universal circularity, and that the truthmaker argument fails. Thingists will maintain that 's is circular' is just a description of a thing, as is the sentence used on the right hand side of (T).

All this said, we can still ask whether the world is composed of states of affairs. I am inclined to say that it is — under some descriptions. For a start, there is a sense in which universals exist. Armstrong endorses 'permissive mereology', according to which the elements of the world can be lumped together in any way to form wholes (23). So, we can regard all the instances of circularity as a whole: the universal circularity. Similarly, we can describe the world in such a way that it contains Armstrong's particulars. Arriving at states of affairs is just one more exercise in permissive mereology. We can pick out the whole consisting of the intersection of a particular and a universal (say, circularity) and call it a state of affairs. This is not to suggest that states of affairs are ontologically basic. Nothing is ontologically basic. If I get to write the history of twentieth-century metaphysics, the later Wittgenstein, Carnap, Goodman and Quine will be the central figures. The major metaphysical development will be the view that there is no uniquely correct account of what the world contains, just accounts of what it contains under various descriptions. The world does not have natural joints, but only the joints imposed by our ways of theorising about the world.

This book is a work of philosophy in the grand tradition. Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume and Russell would recognise its concerns as their concerns. It is rigorously argued and not the soft-minded pap that some other senior philosophers have recently made a habit of serving up. This is the work of a mature and erudite philosopher who effortlessly cites philosophers from throughout history and draws upon the insights of a wide range of twentieth-century writers, some of whose works have been neglected by others. Armstrong's other virtues include generosity, fairness and intellectual honesty. He is at pains to credit others for the ideas they have suggested to him and does justice to his opponents. He freely admits when he does not have

an answer to a question, and openly acknowledges past errors. Any philosopher can learn from this book. And — who knows? — it may even feature in the history of twentieth-century philosophy.

**James O. Young**

University of Victoria

**E.J. Bond**

*Ethics and Well-Being.*

Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers 1996.

Pp. xi + 270.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-19549-1);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-19551-3).

This book is part of a series called *Introducing Philosophy* which is described (on the back of the title page) as '... a series of textbooks designed to introduce the basic topics of philosophy for any student approaching the subject for the first time.' In the preface, Bond says that: 'First of all, it (the book) does not condescend, but assumes that the reader is intelligent, literate, has a serious interest in the subject, and is willing to work hard at it,' and that, 'the book is not ... a collection of moral theories but takes a clear position from the beginning, aiming at a definite conclusion' (ix). Indeed it is accurate to say that the entire book consists of an argument whose conclusion is no less than that there exists a universally valid morality, a morality which '... applies to all human beings regardless of the historically and geographically located culture in which they happen to be living' (22).

In Part I, Bond begins his argument by taking up five forms of what he terms moral skepticism: ethical egoism (whose plausibility depends on psychological egoism), cultural relativism in two forms, simple and sophisticated, subjective relativism, subjectivism and non-cognitivism, notably emotivism and prescriptivism. He illustrates these views by expressing the arguments for them as they have been put forward by some of their most persuasive proponents, e.g., Bernard Williams and Alasdair MacIntyre for sophisticated cultural relativism, R.M. Hare for prescriptivism, etc. Bond claims that these forms of moral skepticism must be defeated or else they will block his contention that there exists a universally valid morality, and he argues vigorously and persuasively against them.

In Part II, entitled *A Rational Basis for Ethics*, Bond attacks the fact/value distinction as a way of supporting the view that there must be a subjective element in all moral judgments by arguing that if what we mean by a fact is



'anything that is true' (116), and we can show that value judgments, including moral judgments could be true, the fact/value distinction will not be capable of blocking the construction of an objective ethics. So now the question becomes: in what sense can we say that value judgments, including moral judgments, can be true or false? This can be so for Bond in that value judgments, e.g., 'ought' judgments, are supported by practical reason. This means that value judgments can be justified by 'citing *values that can be achieved by action and choice*' (116). So we must now consider what Bond means by value. Non-moral values, which are values for any and every person, are defined as those values which contribute to an individual's thriving, flourishing, happiness or well-being (116). Non-moral judgments of value supported in terms of these values are what Bond calls 'grounded in practical reason.' He now claims that '... if there is such a thing as an objective and universal morality, then we must be able to show that there are genuine moral values and that they provide genuine reasons for action; in other words we must be able to show that moral judgments, like other value judgments, are *grounded in practical reason*' (116). Bond tries to do this using the concept of *eudaimonia*, or well-being. Non-moral values, he claims, are worth a person's striving after, and so create reasons for acting, in so far as they contribute to that person's *eudaimonia*, i.e., her thriving, flourishing, etc. But how can an individual's *eudaimonia* play a role in moral value? If this question cannot be answered, the distinction between the prudential sphere and the moral sphere, which involves the *eudaimonia* of others, cannot be maintained. Bond tries to do this by showing that an individual's good is inextricably tied up with the common good. 'Moral reasons, tied to moral values, are *values for everybody*, because **the common good is part of the good of every individual member of the community** [my emphasis]. This is because of our inherently social nature. It is impossible to achieve real personal *eudaimonia* ... except in the context of a good community' (119). On this basis Bond argues that moral reasons are not egoistic, since they reflect the necessary connection between the individual's good and the common good, and that they are not altruistic either, since when all is said and done, nothing but (personal) *eudaimonia* could be the basis of reasons for choice.

In Part III, Bond takes up both the deontic and the areatic approaches to morality, arguing that they are both required for an adequate account; i.e., we cannot eliminate one in terms of the other while doing justice to our deeply held moral intuitions. In Part IV, called *Tying Things Together*, Bond states what he claims is the central problem for ethics, which is that though we are all separate beings driven by considerations of personal *eudaimonia*, we must live together, so that any person's individual good and the common good are inextricably linked. It is this linkage which justifies his contention that there exists a universally valid morality.

Bond's book is intended to be an introductory text book for intelligent, literate, hard working students. (Would that we all had an abundance of such students!) In this regard there are useful summaries at the end of each



chapter recapitulating what has been argued, and often the next chapter begins with yet another recapitulation. However, it must be said that there is so much packed into this book that the discussions of some key ideas and figures, e.g., utilitarianism, Kant, Aristotle is very brief and densely packed, so that one might well wonder how even an able and motivated student would navigate them. Still, it is refreshing to come across an introductory text where the author takes it as his burden to do philosophy, i.e., produce arguments, and serious well constructed arguments at that, rather than to produce a (perhaps 'watered down') compendium of the views of others.

**Kenneth Alan Milkman**  
Dawson College, Montreal

**Richard Bosley, Roger A. Shiner, and  
Janet D. Sisson, eds.**

*Aristotle, Virtue and the Mean.*

Edmonton, AB: Academic Printing and  
Publishing 1995. Pp. xxi + 217.

\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 920980-64-3);

\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-920980-65-1).

The collection of essays presented in this book provide a many-hued analysis of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean and, taken together, defend the doctrine well from a wide variety of its critics. Although none of the essays in a book of this sort can provide an extended and deep reflection on its theme, the tight focus, variety and scholarly integrity of these essays provide an unusually rich and enlightening discussion of Aristotle's mean, the oft-maligned centerpiece of his moral theory.

The essays generally are sequenced well with a thorough and informative introduction by Janet D. Sisson, especially for readers unfamiliar with Aristotle's mathematical concepts. Although the essays are not grouped into sections, they fall naturally into roughly two thematic categories: the explanation of the doctrine of the mean itself, and linking the mean to Aristotle's other moral ideals, especially *phronesis* and contemplation.

The first five essays are concerned with the former. J.E. Tiles takes on the critics of the mean that contend that the doctrine is empty and wrong. Tiles places these criticisms in the context of their analytic presuppositions and, in doing so, unveils the critics' lack of appreciation for Aristotle's concern with the very nature of character and its formation in his moral and political thought.

Alfonso Gómez-Lobo turns to the issue of right reason and argues against those who transform *orthos logos* as rules to guide action. Instead, Gómez-Lobo holds that right reason reflects a 'limit' to action which is modeled by the *phronimos*, but not to be copied precisely or summarized in rules. Necessarily ambiguous to some degree, the limit is strong enough and clear enough to justify moral choices.

Richard Bosley's essay is useful and rather unusual. Bosley links Aristotle's doctrine of the mean to other notions of the mean prevalent in Athens that may have informed Aristotle's thinking, and points to other 'non-moral' uses of the notion of the mean in Aristotle's corpus. Bosley then draws implications regarding its use in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In doing so, he sheds light on the nature of the mean itself — independent of the subject Aristotle is using it to illuminate.

Stephen Leighton returns to the mean's more traditional context, i.e., the ethical writings, when he asks what it is that Aristotle meant when he claimed we should seek the mean 'relative to us'. The essay lays the groundwork for asking some very provocative questions about Aristotle's teleology. Leighton indicates 'individuals may differ with respect to virtue yet be fully virtuous' (69). I am not convinced (though I sympathize with the project), but agree that more attention needs to be paid to Aristotle's unlikely trailer 'relative to us'. This essay clears out some of the underbrush for a more comprehensive discussion.

William A. Welton and Ronald Polansky (the essay for which some readers may benefit quite a bit from Janet Sisson's introduction) provide a worthwhile investigation into the quantitative dimensions of the mean and argue that the mean is not merely 'moderation'.

The last four essays draw the mean into broader accounts of the good life. David K. Glidden's fascinating account of the *phronimos* is worth the read if nothing else for the metaphors it provides — to which I cannot do justice. The essay examines the elusiveness of the *phronimoi* and suggests that the *phronimoi* provide moral guidance that transcends cultural ethics. It is not clear to me whether the transcendence derives from the cosmopolitanism of the *phronimoi* (which can be argued fairly easily) or from a knowledge of theoretic truth (which is more problematic).

Thomas M. Tuozzo strives to link contemplation with the moral virtues. He argues that the moral virtues provide the 'psychic leisure' to pursue contemplation because virtuous actions are complete and, therefore, liberate us from action more quickly than vices. The argument is compelling. Tuozzo's discussion of the non-contemplative person's motive for virtue is weak (and brief). Aristotle must offer more options to those without the gift for contemplation than politics! Perhaps Aristotle's discussion of music at the end of the *Politics* suggests a more apt option for the leisure activities of the non-contemplative and non-phronetic individual. But Tuozzo's main point is well-delivered.

Mark McCullagh defends the doctrine of the mean against claims that it is not meaningful until Aristotle discusses reason in *NE* VI. McCullagh

reshapes the meaning of the doctrine by arguing that it is intended only for the 'moral trainer', not for the trainee. As such, the doctrine gives the trainer guidance on how to translate the standard of virtuous activity into a 'mean relative to [the student]'. When viewed from the perspective of the moral trainer, the doctrine is neither truistic nor wholly dependent on reason.

George N. Terzis resurrects a currently unpopular reading of Aristotle's account of emotion to posit that the mean most importantly addresses emotional predispositions. Hitting the mean 'relative to us' requires that we correct these unique predispositions — physiologically — and achieve new, stable, more correct predispositions. The argument brings Aristotle in line with recent advances in neurophysiology that suggest an interplay between neurochemical processes and moral choice. By drawing his work into contemporary biological science, Terzis forces Aristotle onto the front lines of contemporary ethical research and philosophy, a place where Aristotle's ideas seem quite at home. The essay is a fitting finish for the book.

This volume offers readers a host of new ways of looking at Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. Some of the arguments are stronger than others, but all provide unique entryways into the complexities of a doctrine which has often been considered 'too simple' to provide any real moral guidance. The volume links the mean to Aristotle's non-ethical works and to his moral ideals in such a way that the doctrine gathers new dimension and strength.

**Jenifer Cartland**

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**Richard N. Bosley and  
Martin Tweedale, eds.**

*Basic issues in medieval philosophy: selected  
readings presenting the interactive discourses  
among the major figures.*

Peterborough, ON and Orchard Park, NY:

Broadview Press 1997. Pp. xxii + 679.

\$34.95. ISBN 1-55111-099-7.

Bosley and Tweedale's contribution to the offerings in Medieval Philosophy textbooks is a welcome one. The editors chose and organized their material based on two premises: first, 'that medieval philosophy is best studied as an interactive discussion or debate between thinkers working on very much the same problems despite often being widely separated both in time and in locale'; and second, 'that these discussions are often as much with the



philosophers of ancient Greece as with authors in the medieval period' (xiii). Thus, the text is organized thematically, and each section of the text opens with one or more selections from the ancients: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, or Porphyry. This is a unique and useful feature, which supports what I suspect is the very general practice of utilizing selections from classical texts in the teaching of medieval philosophy.

The strategy of including ancient texts, though, raises some interesting pedagogical and historiographical questions. More often than not, the medievals engaged the Greeks only through intermediaries (Cicero and Seneca, for example), or from a very limited perspective (for much of the medieval period, Aristotle was known only through portions of the *Organon*). This suggests two different approaches an editor might take to the inclusion of ancient texts. One approach (one driven by concerns with historical accuracy) would be to include only those texts available to the medievals, indicating which were available when. But this would in many ways limit the effectiveness of the Greek selections, and would complicate the students' understanding of the philosophical issues involved. Another approach (perhaps more philosophically interesting and rewarding) might be to include relevant Greek texts whether or not they were available. Bosley and Tweedale don't directly address these historiographical issues, but do note in their introductions to various selections if they were available throughout the medieval period (though they do not always note if they were *not* available, or when they became available). Yet the general issues remain unresolved, and would certainly affect one's determination of which texts to include or exclude, a topic to which I will shortly return.

The text is organized into nine topic sections, covering both the standard 'Universals and Particulars' and 'Determinism, Free Will, and Divine Foreknowledge' and the not so standard 'The Darkness which is Beyond Intellect', a selection of mystical writings. There is a section on 'Necessity, Contingency and Causation', on the existence of an infinitely perfect being, on the eternality of the world, on identity and distinction, on skepticism, and one entitled 'Virtue and Reason, Sin and Sex'. The text includes brief, but useful, biographies and a handy glossary. As far as breadth is concerned, the text includes selections from the Arabic tradition (which has become the rule rather than the exception), and some selections from Maimonides as a token to the Jewish tradition. In these respects the volume is as good or better than Kaufman and Baird (*Medieval Philosophy*, Wadsworth), Schoedinger (*Readings in Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford) or Wippel and Wolter (*Medieval Philosophy*, Free Press), but not quite as good as the Hyman and Walsh text (*Philosophy in the Middle Ages; the Christian, Islamic and Jewish Traditions*, Hackett). Tweedale has done a number of the translations in the volume, particularly the Ockham and Aquinas translations. They are readable and faithful to the text. The other translations are all fairly standard and in most cases represent the best of those generally available.

As with any selection of texts, some will find the choices in this volume to be lacking in various respects. One might, for example, want to question why

the section on 'Necessity, Contingency and Causation' includes nothing from the pre-Aristotelian tradition in medieval philosophy. Surely the Platonic notion of participation is central to the development of the notion of exemplar causality in the medievals, but no texts from the Platonic tradition are included in this section. This might be taken to wrongly imply that there were no important discussions of causality before the reintroduction of Aristotelian texts in the 11th and 12th centuries.

The selections which make up the section entitled 'Could the World be Eternally Existent', though they include some passages from the *Confessions* and the *City of God*, fail to include selections from Plato's *Timaeus* or from Plotinus. And one can go on: Augustine is quite conspicuously absent from the section on 'Determinism, Free Will, and Divine Foreknowledge'; important Platonic texts available to the early medievals are absent from the 'Universals and Particulars' section; any discussion of the relation between faith and reason in Aquinas is absent from the section on 'Skepticism'; and though the editors discuss pyrrhonian and academic skepticism in their introduction to the section, no selections from, for example, Cicero's *Academicus* are included. Lastly, Augustine and Bonaventure are both absent from the section on mysticism. In general, the Platonic tradition in medieval philosophy, as solidified by Augustine and subtly present in the thinking of Aquinas and the later Medievals, is not nearly as well represented as one might desire. Though Augustine knew his Plato in large part through the writings of Cicero, no selections from Cicero are included.

All of these comments might seem a bit unfair. The editors have, in their own estimation, sacrificed breadth for depth, and the very idea of selecting texts from the vast corpus of the medievals for inclusion in a single-volume survey of medieval thought is a daunting one. Any text is bound to be found wanting in some areas, and different teachers of medieval philosophy will legitimately disagree about where. This mitigates many of the criticisms I have raised. Bosley and Tweedale's volume represents a unique approach which has much to recommend it. Many will no doubt find that the volume reflects their own approach and remedies some of the faults and omissions of previous texts. Without question, the volume deserves serious consideration.

**D.C.K. Curry**

University of Virginia



**Renée Bouveresse-Quilliot**

*L'empirisme Anglais.*

Collection Que sais-je ? Paris : Presses

Universitaires de France 1997. 127 p.

ISBN 2-13-048256-2.

Dans son ouvrage intitulé *L'Empirisme Anglais*, Renée Bouveresse-Quilliot présente de façon générale (collection oblige) les conceptions de la connaissance humaine de John Locke ainsi que des deux philosophes anglais qui se sont directement inspirés de l'empirisme lockéen, à savoir Georges Berkeley et David Hume.

En plus d'une biographie pour chacun des trois philosophes qui, sans être exhaustive est assez complète, l'auteure réussit à exposer avec concision leur pensée philosophique sur la connaissance et à faire ressortir leur originalité respective. Que ce soit les métaphores de la table rase et du miroir proposées par Locke, ou les affirmations de Berkeley suivant lesquelles «exister, c'est être perçu», «le mot «matière» est dépourvu de sens», ou encore celles de Hume déclarant «que la raison est l'esclave des passions» et «qu'il n'est pas contraire à la raison que je préfère la destruction du monde à une égratignure de mon petit doigt», l'auteure explique avec justesse les thèses et insère dans un contexte bien défini les citations qui ont rendu célèbres ces philosophes.

Le premier des trois chapitres s'intitule «L'empirisme de Locke». L'explication de la critique lockéenne des idées innées, sa conception de la *consciousness*, de l'identité et de l'inquiétude ainsi que sa philosophie politique y sont exposés. Dans le deuxième chapitre, «L'immatérialisme de Berkeley et le voile des mots», l'auteure présente la critique des idées abstraites et l'immatérialisme de Berkeley. Elle explique aussi en quel sens doit être compris le réalisme spiritualiste de ce philosophe et expose brièvement la pensée de Popper sur la conception de la science de Berkeley. Finalement, on retrouve dans le dernier chapitre, «David Hume et le scepticisme», une explication de l'idée de Hume suivant laquelle la science de la nature humaine est l'unique science de l'homme ainsi que de sa conception de la causalité, où l'auteure utilise, entre autres, la critique popperienne des problèmes posés par la causalité et l'induction afin de rendre compte de la possibilité ou de l'impossibilité de la connaissance suivant la conception humienne. Le rôle de l'imagination dans la constitution de l'expérience ainsi que les répercussions de la théorie humienne de la connaissance sur sa conception de la morale, de la politique, de la religion et de l'esthétique y sont aussi brièvement exposées.

Même si cet ouvrage est voué à l'explication de trois interprétations distinctes de la connaissance humaine, l'auteure manifeste clairement sa volonté de lier la conception de chacun de ces philosophes à l'ensemble de leur oeuvre respective et d'exposer les similitudes et les divergences qu'il y a entre elles. On y retrouve, par conséquent, de nombreuses comparaisons, que ce soit au sujet de leur explication des idées générales ou de leur réponse au problème de Molyneux, ainsi que beaucoup de références à d'autres philosophes, en particulier Descartes, Malebranche et Leibniz. L'auteure a



aussi souvent recours aux commentateurs afin de faciliter la compréhension et d'éclairer la pensée de chacun de ces philosophes. Tous les ingrédients sont donc là et servis dans de justes proportions pour fournir une bonne introduction à l'empirisme anglais. Deux pépins cependant. On peut se demander en effet ce qui justifie la présence de Popper ou du moins pourquoi l'auteure n'a fait aucune référence à certains représentants de l'empirisme moderne tels Carnap ou Quine, ce qui aurait été plus compréhensible et pertinent. De plus, les citations sont parfois sans références complètes, seul le nom de l'auteur étant fourni. Si l'objectif, et c'est définitivement l'objectif de cette collection, est de présenter une introduction, on ne peut prendre pour acquis que le lecteur connaît les ouvrages d'où les citations ont été extraites, surtout en ce qui concerne les commentateurs.

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**Franz Brentano**

*Descriptive Psychology.*

Ed. and trans. Benito Müller.

New York: Routledge 1995. Pp. xxvi + 198.

Cdn\$83.95: US\$59.95. ISBN 0-415-10811-X.

Brentano is mainly known for his notion of 'intentional inexistence' as he defined it in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* in 1874. Other parts of his work as well as the development of his account of intentionality are often neglected. This might be due to Brentano's notorious reluctance to publish. He preferred instead to present his new ideas in his lectures that very strongly influenced his students, such as Husserl, Meinong, and Freud. In recent years, however, more and more of his unpublished works have been printed. *Descriptive Psychology* is the most recent of these texts that was translated into English. The volume contains Brentano's lecture on *Psychognosy* from 1890-1 as well as an appendix with selections from earlier lectures and two short texts from the *Nachlass*. It provides a new perspective on Brentano's methodological position, his theory of time-consciousness and his mereology. The concise introduction and the footnotes from the editors show Brentano's place in the history of philosophy and psychology and give an understanding of the development of his thought. Even though the text contains lecture notes that were not written for publication, Benito Müller manages to give a very readable and nevertheless accurate translation.

*Descriptive Psychology* is mainly interesting for Brentano's detailed discussion of methodological problems. He distinguishes between genetic psychology, a scientific approach that leans heavily on physiology, and descriptive psychology or *psychognosy*, as he also calls it. The latter is mainly concerned with describing the mind from a first person point of view. 'Its aim is nothing other than to provide us with a general conception of the entire realm of human consciousness. It does this by listing fully the basic components out of which everything internally perceived by humans is composed, and by enumerating the ways in which these components can be connected' (4). For Brentano both methods are of equal importance. Nevertheless, descriptive psychology has a privileged status. Unlike genetic psychology it is a strict science, i.e., one that formulates strict laws that do not allow for exceptions. Moreover, it provides a general conception of consciousness on which genetic psychology is based. Thus, 'the perfection of psychognosy will ... be one of the most essential steps in preparation for a genuinely scientific genetic psychology' (11).

Brentano outlines the method of descriptive psychology by distinguishing five steps: the psychognost has (i) to experience a mental event and (ii) to notice the relevant parts of it. While there cannot be error at this level, imperfections can arise due to incompleteness in noticing. The next step (iii) is to fix the experiences that have been noticed, i.e., to put the results of (ii) in relation to other results and to describe them. It is at this step where major errors in *psychognosy* can arise: certain elements of consciousness might be denied because of incompleteness in noticing; subtleties are easily overlooked in the attempt to express the results in language. After having fixed the experiences, the psychognost has (iv) to make inductive generalizations. Finally, one has (v) to intuitively grasp general laws and (vi) to make deductive use of what has been gained.

Even though 'psychognosy will, ... even in its highest state of perfection never mention a physico-chemical process in any of its doctrines' (4), Brentano does not hold that the psychognost has to bracket all results of genetic psychology. On the contrary, he stresses that some of these results can be very helpful for descriptive psychology. Hence, Brentano's method is less rigid than the phenomenological reduction as it was developed some years later by his student Edmund Husserl. Nevertheless the two approaches show a lot of similarities; and these lectures are, in fact, one of the few places where Brentano uses the word 'phenomenology.'

Apart from the discussion of methodological problems, *Descriptive Psychology* is also important for being the only text published so far that documents Brentano's early account of time-consciousness. In order to perceive temporally extended objects, he argues, we have to be directed not only at the object as it is perceived now, but also as it was given just a moment ago. Brentano explains this capacity with his theory of *proteraesthesiaes*. While the present object is given in sensation without any temporal modification, it is modified in *proteraesthesia* with the moment of pastness. Brentano, however, is already discussing some difficulties of this position. Why should

the past object have a temporal modification, but not the present one? How can this modification, instead of enriching the object, transform it from an existing to a non-existing one? Because of these problems he eventually changed his theory of time-consciousness. The reader can follow this development in a short text in the appendix of the book (155 ff.). In this text that was written in 1901 Brentano argues that temporal differences are not part of the object, but of the judgment that is directed towards this object. Hence, Brentano changed his position some years *before* it was criticised by Husserl in his Lectures on *the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*.

One of Brentano's basic philosophical doctrines is that consciousness forms a unity. He stresses, however, that unity must not be mixed up with simplicity. On the contrary, consciousness does consist of various parts, and it is the task of descriptive psychology to determine those parts and their interrelations. In order to do this Brentano sets out a theory of parts and wholes. Based on the distinction between separable and merely distinctional parts he constructs an apparatus that helps to analyze conscious experiences.

Applying his method of psychognosy, Brentano gives a detailed analysis of sensations and the various moments of the objects that are presented in sensations. In addition, his explanation of the intentional relation helps to get a clearer understanding of Brentano's notion of the 'immanent object.'

*Descriptive Psychology* is thus a valuable source for getting a more comprehensive view of Brentano's philosophy and its development. It also demonstrates the importance of a complete edition of the unpublished works of this eminent philosopher.

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### **Antonio Candido**

*L'Endroit et l'envers. Essais de littérature et de sociologie.* Présentés par Howard S. Becker, trad. du portugais (Brésil) par Jacques Thiériot. Préface et introduction traduites de l'anglais (États-Unis) par Daniel Lemoine. Paris: Éditions Métailié et Éditions UNESCO 1995. Pp. 262. 130FF.  
(ISBN 2-86424-196-X) Éditions Métailié;  
(ISBN 92-3-203132-9) Éditions UNESCO.

Ce livre au titre ambigu pourrait se situer en sociologie de la littérature ou plus globalement en sociologie de l'art. Il s'agit d'un recueil d'articles variés, rédigés par le théoricien de la littérature Antonio Candido de Melo e Souza, et parus dans des journaux, revues ou ouvrages collectifs d'Amérique du Sud, de 1952 à 1992.

Cet ouvrage est présenté par Howard S. Becker, considéré comme le plus important spécialiste de la sociologie de l'art, et auteur, entre autres, du livre *Les mondes de l'art* (Flammarion, 1988 [1982 pour la première édition américaine]), qui demeure une référence de premier ordre en sociologie de l'art. Il faudrait d'ailleurs expliquer comment Howard Becker a été à l'origine de la parution de cet ouvrage d'Antonio Candido. Nous y reviendrons plus loin.

Il n'était que naturel que la première traduction française des articles d'Antonio Candido paraisse chez un éditeur (les Éditions Métailié) qui par ailleurs compte à son catalogue trois collections consacrées aux auteurs d'Amérique latine, et dans ce cas-ci, dans sa collection « Leçons de choses », en co-édition dans la collection « UNESCO d'oeuvres représentatives » des Éditions UNESCO. Initialement, ce recueil d'articles avait été publié sous cette forme aux États-Unis, dans une traduction (du portugais à l'anglais) et selon une sélection effectuées par le sociologue Howard Becker lui-même, sous le titre *Essays on Literature and Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Avant cette date, aucun ouvrage de Candido n'avait jamais été traduit en français ou en anglais, ce qui explique que cet auteur soit totalement inconnu en dehors des pays lusophones, et ce, malgré son importance réelle au Brésil. Signalons toutefois que l'on pouvait déjà trouver un court texte d'Antonio Candido traduit en français dans sa préface du recueil de nouvelles de J.M. Machado de Assis intitulé *La montre en or*, publié dans la collection « Bibliothèque brésilienne » des Éditions A.-M. Métailié en 1987.

Le présent recueil comprend un choix de neuf articles qu'Antonio Candido a consacrés à la littérature mondiale. Les textes portent plus précisément sur des oeuvres de Shakespeare, Alexandre Dumas, Joseph Conrad, Kafka, Gracq, entre autres, et incluent finalement deux essais consacrés spécifiquement à l'Amérique latine, l'un sur la littérature et le sous-développement, et l'autre sur l'oeuvre de l'écrivain brésilien J.M. Machado de Assis.

Les articles d'Antonio Candido sont précédés de deux morceaux, dont une importante introduction, rédigée par Howard Becker, pour présenter le présent ouvrage. Son introduction est particulièrement utile, car il s'agit d'une sorte d'apologie de la sociologie de l'art comme discipline, qui justifie la nécessité de diffuser les travaux d'Antonio Candido, à la suite d'autres sociologues qui se sont intéressés à l'art (Becker mentionne entre autres les noms de Durkheim, Weber, jusqu'à Bourdieu et Zolberg). D'entrée de jeu, Becker rappelle cette évidence que l'oeuvre d'art ne peut être comprise sans l'étude de son contexte, ce qui rend l'opposition entre l'art et la société assez banale, mais aussi incontournable (11). Ces liens, ces décalages entre l'oeuvre et son environnement social peuvent être nommés de différentes façons, et Becker reprend plusieurs termes imparfaits et déjà usités : reflet, influence, convergence, résonance (13). En fait, selon Becker, on ne peut éviter « de fournir une analyse précise du processus suivant lequel le monde transparaît dans l'oeuvre (...) » (13). Cette étude de la société à travers les oeuvres ne devrait pas non plus nous empêcher de fournir un diagnostic (même partiel) sur la société en soi, poursuit Becker (13).

On comprendra que Becker, qui a aussi choisi et ordonné les articles de ce livre, a particulièrement apprécié la façon dont Antonio Candido analyse les oeuvres, en tant qu'illustrations imaginaires, mais parfois révélatrices, du fonctionnement de ce que l'on pourrait nommer provisoirement, faute de mieux, la société « réelle ».

L'écriture régulière et simple de Candido ne ressemble pas à celle d'un sociologue ou d'un philosophe, mais se rapproche beaucoup plus du style d'un critique littéraire qui adopterait néanmoins une approche sociologique, sans pour autant trop s'éloigner des oeuvres en soi. Ici, pas de jargon, pas de démonstrations théoriques, mais seulement des analyses de romans, qui mettent en évidence certains aspects particuliers : vision du monde de l'auteur, rapports entre les personnages, présentations des situations, références historiques, évolution des habitudes et des réflexes, etc. Enfin, pour le lecteur non familier avec les nombreux romans étudiés ici, Candido se charge de bien les résumer et les décrire avant d'entreprendre de les questionner.

L'ouvrage *L'Endroit et l'envers. Essais de littérature et de sociologie* intéressera les spécialistes de la littérature qui cherchent à s'ouvrir aux approches sociologiques, et pourra également rejoindre les sociologues et les philosophes de l'art.

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**Nancy Fraser**

*Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the 'PostSocialist' Condition.*

New York: Routledge 1997. Pp. ix + 241.

Cdn\$83.95; US\$59.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-91794);

Cdn\$23.95; US\$16.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-91795-6).

To attain a complete, un-interrupted picture of justice, critical social theorists ought to link the cultural politics of recognition with politics of redistribution. Nancy Fraser exemplifies this claim in her review essays of works by Judith Butler, Carole Pateman, and Iris Young. This linkage can be achieved with a politics of pragmatics which is able to go beyond the false dichotomy of Habermasian discourse ethics and Foucauldian analytics of power.

To be sure, postmodern left theorists seem to have all but abandoned class politics at expense of identity or social politics. Beginning with Mouffe's and Laclau's postmarxist call for decentering class and opting for radical democracy, these new social movement theorists seem to have abandoned class struggle analyses in favor of identity politics. Yet it seems odd to herald Habermasian discourse theory as the way out of this postsocialist condition, as if his Kantian-inflected master discourse offers a novel way to synthesize redistribution with recognition. Fraser's thesis is thus: [to develop] a *critical* theory of recognition, one that identifies and defends only those versions of the cultural politics of difference that can be coherently combined with the social politics of equality (12). By emphasizing that such a theory should carefully sift through identitarian politics, Fraser faults postmodern feminists for failing to differentiate between progressive or emancipatory and oppressive subaltern practices. While this particular critique is directed against Judith Butler's notion of gender performativity, surprisingly her main interlocutor seems to be Iris Young, whose work *Justice and the Politics of Difference* seems to give the cue for Fraser's title.

While Fraser contends that her critical theory is shot through with Foucauldian insights, her discussion of gender raises questions about this claim. Following Appiah, Fraser thinks of gender as essential and race as nonessential. Oddly, Fraser critiques Lacanian feminists (whom she for the most part does not identify) for subscribing to a biological fixed gender identity encoded by the symbolic order, i.e., once the infant has figured out its relation to the phallus it will be once and for all marked as female or male. Yet Fraser herself does not give us a nuanced view of how a gender performance occurs and how one can contest the prescriptions. In her analysis, gender also becomes a naturalized identity.

In a noteworthy chapter on a critique of structuralism, or rather feminist neo-structuralism, Fraser interrogates the political possibilities and limits of Lacanianism. Fraser chides Kristeva for adding on to the existing theories



(of Lacan) rather than wholeheartedly abandoning them. So she argues that Kristeva ultimately succumbs to the psychologism and symbolicism of Lacanian structuralist grand theory, rather than going beyond and formulating a feminist politically progressive analytics of gender identity formation. Fraser's dismissal of Kristeva's additive analysis is instructive with respect to Fraser's own theory: this chapter not only critiques structuralism but also tries to give an alternative model of pragmatics. In a confessional note, Fraser informs us that she has been drawn to Habermas, Foucault, Bourdieu and repelled by Derrida, Lacan; and this chapter is an attempt to give us a metatheory of the anti-structuralist and pro-structuralist divide. However, Fraser fails to shed light on how she reconciles Habermas' discourse theory and Foucault's genealogy in her politics of pragmatics without merely piling up or adding on their respective analyses or theories (e.g., with respect to selfhood and power). In her previous work, she after all vilified Foucault for succumbing to crypto-normative self-referentiality.

In a chapter critiquing the concept of radical democracy which is en vogue among theorists of the new social movements Fraser puts her main thesis to work. She notes that second-wave feminists are stuck in cultural appropriations of identity politics and fail to pay any attention to social justice issues. The postsocialist condition she identifies is thus the universal abandonment of any class politics: i.e., postmodern feminists, such as Butler, have really turned into postmarxists and therefore offer at best a myopic cultural politics which coexists albeit uneasily with class struggles in the new world order. Sexuality *über alles* makes unionization efforts obsolete. So rather than thinking about the intersectionality of race, class, gender — a mantra in every Women's Studies course — Fraser argues that these postmarxists have rather rested their case comfortably in the cultural camp, and their heralding of radical democracy is an empty rallying cry. While it is true that many champions of radical democracy have left class — a previously privileged category — out of political analyses, it is problematic to state that theorists like Butler are committed to a cultural relativist position, or claim that any subaltern, counter-hegemonic struggle is to be championed. In fact, to suggest that postmodern feminists busily support cultural issues, especially queer-dominated themes, has a homophobic ring to it, since this claim imputes that politics of desire are never infected with economic concerns. In fact, what Fraser seems to put forth is the idea that class struggle is in fact more important than worries about being in the closet. Any reconciliation, Fraser proposes, will amount to little more than an adding on to class struggle in the orthodox sense of attaining womens' liberation through socialist revolution.

What would be of interest to postmodern theorists is an explicit discussion of her pragmatic programme. Fraser mentions that one has to contextualize the social self and pay attention to complexities and shifts of meaning in a public sphere which is itself pluralistically structured. The self is never only an effect of a symbolic order but has agency and emancipatory potentialities (cf. 159). Yet, one wonders if this self is really not another Habermasian (and

Kantian) monologically posited self which at times takes on different masks, e.g., discursively positing itself as therapist and patient taking on differing sides but ultimately agreeing with oneself.

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**Eric Gans**

*Signs of Paradox: Irony, Resentment, and  
Other Mimetic Structures.*

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1997.

Pp. 222.

US\$45.00. ISBN 0-8047-2769-4.

In his latest book, Eric Gans continues his development of a 'generative anthropology,' the project that inspired earlier works including *The Origin of Language* (1981), *The End of Culture* (1985), *Science and Faith* (1990), and *Originary Thinking* (1993). As in his previous work, Gans seeks to explain a variety of cultural phenomena by tracing their relationship to a hypothetical 'originary scene' in which language and human self-consciousness simultaneously emerged. Following the French literary critic René Girard, Gans posits that subjective desire arises from imitation of the desire of another who serves as a model. The crisis of the originary scene materializes as the desire of the model and that of the imitator converge on a single object of appropriation, as might occur on an early hunting expedition. In order to prevent a destructive conflict over the object, one party must abort the appropriative gesture toward the scarce object. On Gans's account, this aborted gesture is the first 'sign', simultaneously designating the desired object, establishing community by deferring violent conflict over the object, recasting the original object of desire as the untouchable center of the scene or the 'sacred', and evoking primordial resentment at the frustration of the desire that motivated the gesture in the first place.

The present work is divided into two parts. Chapters 2-9 link various linguistic and philosophical themes to the crisis of the originary scene, while the final four chapters further develop Gans's account of violence and victimization as components of culture. In his central discussion of paradox and irony in chapters 2-5, Gans develops a parallel between logical paradox and an earlier 'protoparadoxical' condition in the originary scene. For Gans, 'both are projections of the originary event of the human upon the different axes of text and world' (4). While analytical philosophy would try to eliminate paradox or explain it away as an aberration (as in Bertrand Russell's theory



of types), for Gans all linguistic representation carries a trace of paradox reflecting the deferred crisis of the originary scene.

Gans extends his anthropological analysis to a broad range of philosophical discussions. In chapter 2 he offers a brief but intriguing comparison of his distinction between gesture and object and that of Derrida between speech and writing. Citing passages from the *Gorgias*, *Euthyphro*, and *Cratylus*, Gans argues in chapter 6 that Plato's theory of forms represents a misplaced attempt to explain the 'originary' power of the sign. After providing an anthropological reading and critique of Heidegger's distinction of the ontic and ontological in chapter 7, Gans goes on in chapter 8 to explain the 'paradoxical' nature of the Freudian unconscious, linking it to a pre-conscious awareness of the imitative model in the originary scene.

In chapters 10 and 11, the text takes a theological turn as Gans discusses the problem of evil and the anti-aestheticism of Jewish theology with reference to the origin of the sacred in the originary event. Gans concludes the text with an extended analysis of postmodern culture. Haunted by Christianity's celebration of the victim and the violence of the Holocaust, Gans argues that the rhetoric of postmodernity systematically undermines claims to universality and grants authority to the position of the victim. Like Nietzsche, Gans traces this development to *resentiment*, though for Gans such resentment is not the pathological condition of an oppressed class, but expresses the inevitable frustration of desire in the aborted gesture of the originary scene.

*Signs of Paradox* will frustrate the reader in search of a concise and rigorous philosophical discussion of its central themes. The enormous breadth of Gans's discussion sometimes comes at the cost of developing his points in greater depth, especially in his often quick assessments of opposing views. The text also suffers from frequent lapses into 'Girardian' jargon and from a general paucity of detailed examples. Gans's 9-page opening chapter is too short and cryptic as an introduction to his complex and very controversial project of explaining the emergence of humanity with reference to a unitary scene. Finally, Gans's central account of the relation between the originary event and logical paradox is often imprecise and difficult to follow. For example, after claiming on p. 41 that logical paradox cannot be derived from pragmatic paradox, he states on p. 48 that logical paradoxes *are* pragmatic ones.

Despite such shortcomings, Gans's generative analyses often yield new and intriguing ways of approaching the vast range of topics that he takes up. As with the speculative histories of Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud, the strength of Gans's work may lie less with the rigor of its derivations than with the novel and penetrating insights that its peculiar and provocative hypothesis of origins affords. The reader patient enough to negotiate Gans's often difficult and tortuous narrative will not go unrewarded.

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**Owen Goldin and Patricia Kilroe, eds.**  
*Human Life and the Natural World.*  
Peterborough, ON and Orchard Park, NY:  
Broadview Press 1997. Pp. xix + 245.  
\$21.95. ISBN 1-55111-107-1.

This anthology is intended for an undergraduate course in Environmental Ethics or Environmental Philosophy. Throughout, the editors have included key texts from the Western Philosophical tradition which have been influential, historically or presently, in shaping the West's attitudes toward environmental issues. For each excerpt, the editors present a very accessible introduction to that thinker's general views, introduce a few key points in the excerpted passage and, in most cases, give some indication of the influence of the author's environmental views upon later thinkers. All of the Greek translations are done by Goldin, and all of the other translations are recent as well. No philosophical knowledge is presumed, and each excerpted passage is extensively and usefully footnoted.

Most of the readings are geared toward answering one of two questions: (1) What is our relationship to the other organisms, plants and the eco-system itself? and (2) What constitutes right conduct toward those entities? More specifically, there are a number of recurring themes throughout. Many of the authors represented here (Xenophon, Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, Bacon and Locke) state explicitly that animals and the rest of the natural world are *for the sake* of human beings. The excerpts from Kant and Aquinas go further: the only duty we have to animals comes indirectly through the duty to members of our own species not to dull our moral sensibilities toward humans. Plato, the Stoics (as presented by Cicero), Aquinas and Spinoza present the natural world as an integrated, organic whole. Others suggest that life is hierarchically arranged, but that all life has something in common: Aristotle (soul), Ray (rationality), and Darwin (evolution). There are warnings of environmental destruction going back to Plato, and later represented by the works of Marsh, Engels and Malthus.

The text is divided into six sections and covers the pre-Socratics through the nineteenth century. In *Critias*, Plato demonstrates an already sophisticated ecological understanding of the effects of deforestation on soils and flooding. Aristotle argues for all living things as having souls, although there is a hierarchy of these souls such that rational, thinking creatures are on the highest level. He also suggests that non-human animals are capable of pleasure and pain (*On the Soul*). Even so, in the *Politics*, he says that animals 'are for the benefit of humans' (28). The excerpt from Porphyry's *On Abstaining from Animals* provides a turning point in the early part of the anthology. Porphyry summarizes the Greek arguments for and against vegetarianism. Some of these are merely prudential reasons, but there are also arguments that other organisms are both rational, and 'have a nature enabling them to be victims of injustice' (57). Here is evidence that the Western philosophical

tradition is not as unilaterally environmentally insensitive as it is sometimes portrayed.

Some selections from the Old Testament Book of Genesis, which clearly had profound influence on Western environmental thought, appear in the section on 'Faith and Nature'. The excerpt from St. Augustine's *Sermon 241* makes clear, in conjunction with the editors' introduction, how he has been influenced by Platonic thought and, in turn, how this influence is transmitted.

In the section on 'Modernity, Mechanism, and the New Science', Bacon resurrects the divine right of human dominion over all of nature, including the other animals (in *The New Organon*). Bacon's influence on subsequent thought is more pervasive than this short excerpt (primarily on correct scientific method) might lead one to expect, but the editors explain that his exhortation to master nature had far-reaching effects in the history of thought. Included in this section is Descartes' famous position that non-human animals are mere automata. However, lest we think that every influential seventeenth-century figure accepted Descartes' automata, we are given an excerpt from John Ray (*The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Creation*) who suggests that animals are endowed with reason and argument, although of a cruder sort than we possess.

The section 'Order, Hierarchy and Struggle' contains a piece from Kant's *Critique of Judgment* on the nature and necessity of the sublime, which is something we feel when contemplating unspoiled nature. Included in the section entitled 'Transforming Nature: Progress or Ruin?' is Mill's endorsement of Bentham's inclusion of the animals as moral patients under utilitarianism. In addition, the excerpt from Mill's *Nature* can serve as a reminder to students that *natural* does not automatically mean *good*. The final section, 'Living with Nature', presents excerpts from Rousseau, Emerson and Thoreau demonstrating the romantic view of nature as beautiful and necessary for us if we are to attain our maximum spiritual and intellectual potential.

On the whole, this text provides a valuable introduction to environmental issues in philosophy. It gives the instructor a variety of historical perspectives on which to base an Environmental Ethics course and the student a breadth of perspectives and arguments with which to agree or to criticize. At the same time, it introduces the student to some of the main viewpoints in the history of philosophy, and so could lead to interest in other philosophical areas.

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**Jaap C. Hage**

*Reasoning with Rules: An Essay on Legal Reasoning and Its Underlying Logic.*

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997.

Pp. xiv + 264.

US\$114.00. ISBN 0-7923-4325-5.

This book is a contribution to the intersecting fields of practical reasoning, philosophy of law, and philosophical logic. Hage, who is a member of the Department of Metajuridica at the University of Maastricht, aims to show that the dominant, syllogistic model of reasoning with rules is defective, and to replace that model with a superior alternative that emphasizes instead how reasons are adduced, weighed, and balanced against other reasons. He proposes a formal extension of the first-order predicate calculus, called 'Reason-based logic' ('RBL'), which will be of particular interest to specialists in the field of artificial intelligence and the law.

In Hage's view, a truth-semantics for rules has to be rejected because it crucially fails to account for the phenomenon of rule defeasibility. For example, if it is a rule that thieves are punished and it is a rule that minors are not punished, and, further, if it is a fact that John is both a minor and a thief, it follows both that John is to be punished and that John is not to be punished. Obviously, consistency requires that something give. Theorists attached to syllogistic models tend to deal with such situations by the maneuver of 'adapting the premisses', i.e., narrowing one of the initial premisses to eliminate the potential conflict. This maneuver saves consistency by ex post rule-revisions — but, as Hage points out, this is not true to the ex ante, action-guiding nature of our reasoning with rules. Reasoning with rules is nonmonotonic, which is to say that conclusions may always be withdrawn in light of further information, but without our having to rewrite our rules to incorporate every conceivable exception, as the syllogistic models invite us to do.

Hage wants to make a more fundamental case against a truth-semantics for rules, and to this end he canvasses a wide range of work on practical reasoning, with particular emphasis on the work of Joseph Raz. Hage takes the position that rules, unlike statements, require application, which explains both the distinctively defeasible nature of reasoning with rules and the possibility of analogical reasoning with rules. In the end, though, the argument against the syllogistic model, and its rendering of rules as statements, comes down to the argument from defeasibility.

RBL, Hage's formalized alternative to the syllogistic models, incorporates a novel approach that treats rules as 'structured' individuals, rather than as statements. Its advantage is its ability to render the weighing of reasons in the process of legal reasoning. When a rule's antecedent-term is satisfied, reasons for its conclusion-terms are generated, and these reasons in turn are collected and represented as being weighed against countervailing reasons. Thus, in the above example, the two rules can be seen as colliding vectors



that survive the outcome, whichever it is, that is determined by their relative weights.

One disadvantage of this approach is that it does not transparently render the logical relations between legal rules. For example, the rule that

$\text{under\_35}(x) \rightarrow \sim\text{eligible\_presidency}(x)$

(in the symbolism of RBL) does not entail the logically equivalent rule that

$\text{eligible\_presidency}(x) \rightarrow \sim\text{under\_35}(x).$

(‘Notice that  $\rightarrow$  is a function symbol that operates on terms, and not a logical operator which operates on sentences,’ 135). Because Hage’s decision to render rules and principles as individuals is so fundamental, RBL cannot elegantly be extended to recapture the advantages of traditional approaches that render rules as statements. The logical products of a given rule-set can, of course, simply be handled metalinguistically, or by straightforwardly supplementing the domain theory. Whether such maneuvers are more or less artificial than that of ‘adapting the premisses’ to restore consistency under a syllogistic approach is a judgment that Hage tacitly leaves to the reader.

After illustrating the application of RBL and proposing possible extensions, Hage suggests yet another argument against a truth-semantics for legal rules. Legal rules have a different ‘direction of fit’ than statements — ‘world-to-word’ rather than ‘word-to-world’. In the end, Hage seems to acknowledge that this point is not decisive, as he allows that rules ‘take a position in between principles [which have no “information content”] and descriptive sentences [which do]’ (254).

Hage’s book invites comparison to Kevin Ashley’s *Modeling Legal Argument: Reasoning with Cases and Hypotheticals* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990). Ashley, like Hage, is drawn to formal models but dissatisfied with deductive ones. Taking the role of *stare decisis* in the common law tradition as the key explicandum, Ashley devised a formalism, called HYPO, eschewing rules and rule-applying altogether, and emphasizing instead the use of precedents and hypothetical cases — each schematized as a cluster of facts and an outcome — and the argumentative moves of assimilating and distinguishing cases. Hage, perhaps more in keeping with the civil law tradition, makes rules the centerpiece of his approach, and regards the defeasibility of reasoning with rules as the key explicandum. Although neither RBL nor HYPO fully capture the Protean nature of legal reasoning, they complement each other interestingly and together point the way to ever more sophisticated alternatives to deductive models.

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**David Heyd, ed.**

*Toleration: An Elusive Virtue.*

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

1996. Pp. 242.

US\$39.50. ISBN 0-691-04371-X.

In liberal democracies like ours, where pluralism is the case, tolerance seems both preferred and required. Tolerance, to be sure, is beset with practical difficulties, and it seems to face insurmountable theoretical and conceptual difficulties. Thus, the task for the contributors to David Heyd's *Toleration: An Elusive Virtue* is to attempt to ameliorate some of these difficulties.

Roughly speaking, there are two ways to think about tolerance. Most obviously, tolerance can be construed as a practical or political arrangement. Toleration is required in some cases to avert the possibility of armed conflict or to sustain peaceful co-existence, e.g., between competing religious, ethnic or cultural groups. Tolerance can also be an attitude which can take on various forms, e.g., indifference, skepticism, and so on. The problems associated with tolerance and its justification become especially difficult, or, some say, impossible, because toleration requires that agents put up with attitudes, behaviours or forms of speech that they regard as odious, wicked or base. But why, if these activities are in some way objectionable, should we put up with them at all?

Picking up on this difficulty, Bernard Williams argues that a situation in which groups have conflicting beliefs or practices and find that they are forced to live together makes toleration 'at once necessary and impossible' (18). He suggests that the practice or attitude of tolerance can be founded on the 'virtue of toleration, which emphasizes the moral good involved in putting up with beliefs one finds offensive,' but 'it is a serious mistake to think that this virtue is the only, or perhaps most important, attitude on which to ground practices of toleration' (19). Williams maintains that the 'best hopes for toleration as a practice lie not so much in this virtue and its demand that one combine the pure spirit of toleration with one's detestation of what has to be tolerated,' but 'rather in modernity itself and in its principal creation, international commercial society' (26).

As the title of Heyd's anthology suggests, toleration is indeed an elusive virtue. This characterization rings true when examining the concept of tolerance itself. It is far from clear what counts as a pure case of tolerance. Indisputably, there are some things which should not be tolerated, e.g., rape, murder, and so on. Further, in situations in which one is moved by racial prejudice or homophobia, for example, what seems best is to cease disapproving of those who are the object of one's disdain rather than embrace an attitude of tolerance towards the objects of one's disapproval. Hence, one cannot be classed as tolerant if one puts up with something that is straightforwardly intolerable; nor is one tolerant if one refrains from harming someone, whom one can harm, if one should not be objecting to the behaviours to which one objects in the first place.



Hence, in his contribution, T.M. Scanlon aptly asks: 'What is tolerance?' Scanlon suggests that there are, in fact, pure cases of tolerance which fit squarely between full acceptance and outright rejection. He claims that toleration requires not only the guarantee of legal and political equality for those with whom we disagree, but also the guarantee that 'all members of our society are equally entitled to be taken into account in defining what our society is and equally entitled to participate in determining what it will become in the future' (229). According to Scanlon, because of the notion of equality that tolerance entails, toleration is 'risky and frightening' (229). Yet, it is to be valued because 'tolerance involves a more attractive and appealing relation between opposing groups within society' (231). Like Williams and Scanlon, the contributions by John Horton, Barbara Herman, George Fletcher and David Richards deal with these types of conceptual problems.

Gordon Graham, in one of the more interesting contributions to Heyd's anthology, takes issue with the common assumption that a 'belief in toleration, and the fact of pluralism, and the metaethical thesis of relativism' (44) go together in a neat package. Graham counters that 'none of these connections holds and that, contrary to common belief, it is the subscription to objectivism that sits best with a belief in toleration' (44), thus establishing a logical link between the value of toleration and support for objectivism.

Will Kymlicka takes up the difficulties associated with liberal toleration and how it should deal with illiberal minorities. Kymlicka's discussion nicely presents the idea that both individuals and groups can be the bearers of rights and, thus, be the objects of toleration.

This anthology is clearly not for beginners; it is best thought of as pitched at the level of graduate students and professional philosophers. Moreover, although the book offers the reader a cornucopia of essays and opinions, its editorial design is both its chief asset and its chief liability. The contributors approach the concept of toleration from several different angles: practical, theoretical and meta-theoretical, which makes for a less than coherent read and, moreover, a lot of repetition in the readings. Given the elusive nature of the subject and the complexities surrounding the issue of tolerance, the anthology may have benefited from a somewhat narrower scope; at least then some of the overlap between the authors' essays may have been avoided. Yet, despite the bothersome repetition, the fact that there are several different approaches to toleration nicely details the complexity which besets moralizing about this issue.

In addition, some of the contributions seem out of place even for this anthology. In particular, the trenchant and rather lengthy contribution by Joshua Cohen, which addresses freedom of speech, might have been more at home in an anthology on social or legal philosophy, rather than in Heyd's. Further, Avishai Margalit's contribution in which he argues that it seems *prima facie* impossible for competing and conflicting religions to 'accept the idea that the other religions have intrinsic religious value' (147) seems out of place. However valuable this essay is in its own right, it adds nothing to the main topic of Heyd's anthology and should probably have been left out.



Ironically, there is no Arab contribution to Heyd's anthology, which is surprising given the venue (the Tenth Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter in Jerusalem, Israel) at which the conference took place and out of which the book grew, especially considering Israel's on-going troubles with religious tolerance and acceptance. The source of this omission is not clear, but this anthology might have been a perfect forum for erudite and earnest debate regarding the practice of toleration in Israel and the surrounding area. Perhaps Heyd (or the publishers) thought that a contribution by an Arab (or anyone else for that matter) dealing with the problems between the Arabs and the Israelis would have been intolerable!

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**Hsün Tzu**

*Basic Writings.* Trans. Burton Watson.  
New York: Columbia University Press 1996.  
Pp. xi + 177.  
US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-231-08607-5);  
US\$15.50 (paper: ISBN 0-231-10689-0).

*Hsün Tzu: Basic Writings* is as its title claims: a key collection of the primary source material of the ancient Chinese philosopher. This translation is presented not with an eye to scholarly contribution, its intent not being to shed new light on Hsün Tzu, but rather to cast this light farther afield, that is, to disseminate his writings to a wider audience in the West. True to its purpose, the accessibility of this translation is its strongest feature.

Hsün Tzu is most famous for his claim that human nature is essentially evil. However, Hsün Tzu is misrepresented if represented as a pessimist. To the contrary, much in his work speaks to the potentiality of human beings to excel through the positive influence of education, which is principally moral training; of music, but only of the civilizing variety; and of ritual as delineated by the ancient sages as being consonant with correct ethical conduct. Such devices are ennobling, serving to elevate human beings from their innate bestial natures. It is this humanism of Hsün Tzu that places him squarely in the Confucian tradition. Accordingly, an accurate presentation of Hsün Tzu's writings must express not only his case for the essential evilness of human nature, but also the positive role of education, of government in creating and maintaining a civil society, and of music and ritual as civilizing forces. Watson's selection of writings serves to display this multiplicity.

In the introduction is given a description of Hsün Tzu's time, both its history and ideological climate, and a brief sketch of Hsün Tzu's life. Also given is a general account of Hsün Tzu's philosophy, especially as it relates to contemporaries and predecessors to whom he addressed himself (e.g., Mencius, Mo Tzu, among others). The selection of writings begins with Hsün Tzu's views on the ennobling role of learning and education. In the ensuing chapter entitled 'Improving Yourself' Hsün Tzu offers well-formed advice for bettering one's life, for becoming a gentle 'person' and sage. For instance, 'He who comes to you with censure is your teacher; he who comes with approbation is your friend; but he who flatters you is your enemy' (24). In the selection 'The Regulations of a King', Hsün Tzu outlines his views on good government and the responsibilities of a good sage ruler, a benevolent despot reminiscent of Plato's philosopher-king. Chapters on the effective use of the military, a discussion of Heaven, on the proper use of music and rites as civilizing devices, on dispelling obsession and the proper use of names in language follow. In the final selection is presented Hsün Tzu's famed case for the essential evilness of human nature and that goodness results only from conscious activity.

Translating Hsün Tzu's writings with an ear to both accessibility and accuracy is certainly no simple task. Where accuracy may be compromised, Watson is careful to point out the ambiguity in translating the original text. What is perhaps lacking is a commentary or introduction to the individual selections that would serve to tie together Hsün Tzu's often eclectic thoughts, making the collection as a whole more coherent to the general reader. However, as the stated aim of the work is to allow the writings of Hsün Tzu to speak for themselves, the work succeeds admirably.

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**Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaat, eds.**  
*The Semblance of Subjectivity:*  
*Essays in Adorno's Aesthetic Theory.*  
 Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1997.  
 Pp. ix + 358.  
 US\$35.00. ISBN 0-262-08257-8.

At the outset of his introduction to this anthology of essays, Lambert Zuidervaat points to the relative neglect T.W. Adorno's aesthetics has encountered amongst philosophers in the English-speaking world. The reason for this neglect stems primarily from the sheer difficulty of Adorno's texts, particularly the posthumously-published *Aesthetic Theory* (AT); the maxim '*Nicht mitmachen*' — don't go along, don't capitulate — governs Adorno's argumentative style, which often seems to hold the notion of accessibility to be nothing but the contemptible product of false consciousness. Happily, most of the essays collected by Zuidervaat and Huhn help to alleviate bewilderment by situating Adorno's work in contexts which should be familiar to Anglo-American philosophers.

The approaches taken by the essayists can be categorized under three broad schema: 1) the relationship between Adorno's work and traditional philosophical aesthetics, especially Kantian and Hegelian; 2) the influence of Walter Benjamin's criticism on Adorno; and 3) the relevance of Adorno's aesthetics for contemporary critical and philosophical concerns. The first approach is accomplished with considerable success in two of the anthology's thirteen essays: J.M. Bernstein's 'Why Rescue Semblance? Metaphysical Experience and the Possibility of Ethics' and Tom Huhn's 'Kant, Adorno, and the Social Opacity of the Aesthetic'. Bernstein situates the significance of the aesthetic for Adorno as 'a materialist rereading of Kant's moral theology' (188), such that Adorno's treatment of *The Critique of Practical Reason's* 'postulates of practical reason' (God, freedom, immortality) in the final chapter of *Negative Dialectics* informs the presentation of the 'semblance of the non-identical' in AT. Huhn's essay lucidly presents the treatment of the Kantian 'sublime' in AT as another type of materialist rereading, in terms of which the sublime migrates historically from nature (its exclusive site in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*) to art, in a movement which corresponds to the development of modernism in the arts. For Adorno, this movement is determined by social factors; modernist art accedes to a position of sublime autonomy by becoming 'the default sphere into which migrate the historic frustrations of failed dreams and projects of human emancipation' (243).

Benjamin's influence is examined in two essays: Richard Wolin's 'Benjamin, Adorno, Surrealism' and Shierry Weber Nicholsen's '*Aesthetic Theory's* Mimesis of Walter Benjamin' (excerpted from her recent monograph, *Exact Imagination, Late Work*). Weber Nicholsen's essay pursues two separate interpretive paths: an elucidation of the elusive category of 'mimesis' in AT as an echo of Benjamin's treatment of the 'mimetic faculty' in his early philosophical writings; and an examination of Adorno's rebarbatively 'pa-



ratactical' prose style in AT as an echo of Benjamin's 'collage' technique in his unfinished 'Arcades Project'. Wolin takes up a theme which has already received considerable attention in the secondary literature, modestly supplementing the general critical consensus around the differences between Adorno and Benjamin on the merits of surrealism by pointing to Adorno's more conciliatory stance in AT. Both essays serve as good entry-points for considering the philosophical relationship between Adorno and a figure who functioned as both mentor and argument-partner to him, although their somewhat preliminary and tentative character demonstrates that more work needs to be done on this topic.

Several essays assess Adorno's aesthetics in the light of more recent philosophical developments, such as post-structuralism, feminism, and environmental aesthetics. In the most fully developed of these essays, 'Mimesis and Mimetology: Adorno and Lacoue-Labarthe', Martin Jay compares the treatment of mimesis in works such as *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (co-authored with Max Horkheimer) and AT with the discussions of mimetology in the recent post-structuralist work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. Jay astutely claims that both philosophers challenge the traditional (Platonic) negative valuation of mimesis, although Adorno's advocacy for 'an emphatic notion of truth in relation to works of art' (40) sets him apart from his more deconstructionist French successor.

Finally, three essays do not fit comfortably into any of the above topical schema. In an essay with which philosophers sympathetic with Adorno should come to terms, 'Concerning the Central Idea of Adorno's Philosophy', Rüdiger Bubner sharply criticizes Critical Theory's 'sweeping, a priori assumptions' that 'from its very beginning the world has always been thoroughly degenerate' (153), a claim Bubner finds philosophically untenable. Conversely, Rolf Tiedemann's essay, 'Concept, Image, Name: On Adorno's Utopia of Knowledge' strikes a note of intransigent partisanship; after a six-page introduction in which sundry postmodernist strawmen are pilloried, Tiedemann exalts Adorno's critique of epistemology with a perfunctory (and, to the uninitiated, hermetic) presentation of the essay-title's three topics, touching only tangentially on their relevance for aesthetics. The volume concludes with a brief conference paper on Adorno and Schönberg by Robert Hullot-Kentor, consisting mainly in thoughts occasioned by the author's disapprobation of the conference theme, 'Constructive Dissonance'. While the occasional character of this last essay gives pith and vigour to its remarks, it also lends to it a quality of slightness out of keeping with the more substantial and illuminating scholarship of the rest of the anthology.

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### Immanuel Kant

*Practical Philosophy*. Trans. Mary J. Gregor.  
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.  
Pp. xxxiii + 668.  
US\$75.00. ISBN 0-521-37103-1.

This volume of the comprehensive Cambridge Edition of Kant's works contains excellent translations of all of Kant's main and minor writings on moral and political philosophy. A 'General Introduction' written by Allen W. Wood precedes the chronologically ordered texts and allows the reconstruction of the development of Kant's thought. Jean-Jacques Rousseau provides a guiding thread for all the texts in founding the concept of morality on the autonomy of the will. For Rousseau it is '... moral liberty, which alone makes him [man] truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty' (*The Social Contract*, Book 1, chr. 8). Recall that this emphasis on the autonomy of the will could not be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason* in which Kant develops only a 'negative' conception of freedom as an empirically unconditioned condition which is '... disclosed as being possible' (CPR B580).

The volume incorporates the theme of 'pure' moral judgment into the larger context which allows to maintain the significance of formalism in all of Kant's writings on practical philosophy. In the *Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals* (1785), the first of the main writings on moral philosophy, Kant develops a 'positive' autonomy-based concept of moral freedom as a principle of moral philosophy without, however, being able to explain how freedom is possible. A problem which is common to both, the *Groundwork* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* is that the emphasis on the 'purity' of moral judgment has to be contextualized through the doctrine that man is both, of intelligible and sensible nature. Moral judgments are 'pure', i.e., they cannot be empirically determined. For the *Groundwork's* 'kingdom of ends' formula of the Categorical Imperative, i.e., '... every rational being must act as if he were by his maxims at all times a lawgiving member of the universal kingdom of ends' (87), the kingdom of ends remains a mere idea which humanity rather than the individual is bound to realize (83f, 87f). The edition emphasizes the continuity of the formalism of moral principles throughout the writings in spite of its replacement of 'purity' by the application of the conception of freedom as a basic theme.

The first text of the volume is the review of Heinrich Schulz's 'Attempt at an introduction to a doctrine of morals for all human beings regardless of different religions' (1783) which establishes a contrast between the Kantian and a speculative conception of freedom. Schulz's Leibnizian notion of freedom is deficient, for Kant, in that it does dispense with the notion of obligation: even the fatalist has to '... act as if he were free, and this idea also actually produces the deed that accords with it and can alone produce it' (10). In the publication 'On the Common Saying: That may be correct in Theory, but it is of No Use in Practice' (1793), Kant argues against Hobbes



for the non-coercive rights of subjects against their sovereign and against Mendelssohn for the moral progress of humanity. 'Towards Perpetual Peace' (1795) raises the question of the compatibility between the right of nations and the rights of persons as reasoned beings.

The *Metaphysics of Morals*' (1797) 'Doctrine of Right' follows 'Towards Perpetual Peace' thematically although it is not concerned with our duty to work toward perpetual peace but is limited to determining what our duties are. Kant emphasizes the distinction between the internal freedom of morality and the external freedom of right. The content of the 'Doctrine of Right' is *a priori* principles on which external (positive) laws are based. For Kant's conception of right, it cannot be required that the principle of all maxims is itself in turn my maxim, that is, it cannot be required that I make the principle of right the maxim of my action (388). The universal principle of right says that '[a]ny action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law' (387). The volume concludes with Kant's papers 'On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy' (1797) and 'On turning out books' (1798) which both concern the restrictions to the execution of external freedom in the sphere of right.

A deficiency of the volume can be indicated briefly. The systematic differentiation between conceptions of political freedom involves the prior distinction between Kant's 'critical' and 'dogmatic' conceptions of realizing personal freedom through the process of history. The editor's emphasis on the continuity of the development of Kant's work, however, forbids the introduction of such sections into the text collection. The 'General Introduction' provides not only a historically oriented overview but also a systematic orientation by differentiating the 'mature' work and the 'final form' of the practical philosophy. The latter is concerned with the goodness of ends or the cultivation of virtues of character rather than the moral rightness of actions.

A German-English and English-German glossary of key terms and editorial notes provide ideal conditions for understanding the translation on the basis of the original text. The book is certainly important not only for Kant-scholarship in the English-speaking world but also for the dedicated student of the history of ethics. Allen Wood certainly expresses more than a mere opinion by saying that '... a comprehensive collection of all Kant's ethical writings in a single volume will help correct the false (often grotesque) images of his ethical theory that have been formed by reading only the foundational works (the *Groundwork* and the second *Critique*) and neglecting Kant's far more extensive writings that deal with the interpretation and application of the fundamental principles' (xxxiii).

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**Peter Kivy**

*Philosophies of Arts: An Essay in Differences.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.

Pp. ix + 242.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-59178-3);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-59829-X).

In an influential treatise published in 1746, the Abbé Batteux undertook to 'reduce' the fine arts to 'un même principe'. Thus began the project of attempting to define the fine arts, this project soon became, and continues to be, the central preoccupation of modern aesthetics. Peter Kivy, a preeminent philosopher of art and perhaps the preeminent philosopher of music and authority on eighteenth-century aesthetic theory, believes that it is time for change. In this rich and engaging book, he extends a call to some philosophers of art — those sharing in his philosophical 'tastes and skills' (82) — to leave behind the project of defining art, and to take up, in its place, the philosophic study of the arts in all their particularity. This call derives its force from two main considerations: one is that the differences between the arts — especially between absolute music and the non-musical arts — are simply too vast to justify the single-mindedness with which aestheticians have long pursued a definition of art; the other is that the project overlooked in favor of definition, that of exploring the differences between the arts, is of at least equal philosophical promise.

*Philosophies of Arts* is a meditation on the past, the present, and the future of the philosophical study of the fine arts. The first chapter, 'How We Got Here, and Why', traces the history of failed attempts at defining art from Batteux's representational theory to the twentieth-century formalist theories of Bell and Fry. The second, 'Where We Are', attempts to unseat the reigning definition of art, Arthur Danto's representational theory. The remaining five chapters, which collectively might have been titled 'Where More of Us Ought to Go', present a series of 'case studies' exemplifying the approach to the philosophical study of the arts — an approach as appreciative of difference as it is of sameness — which Kivy hopes will gain more adherents in the future.

Kivy claims to present no thesis, but rather merely a recurring theme — the theme of 'wrong models' — which runs throughout each chapter (29). In the fascinating opening chapter, for example, Kivy demonstrates how the representational theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth century misapply the model of the contentful arts to absolute music, and how the formalist theories of the early twentieth century turn the tables, misapplying the model of absolute music to the contentful arts. The joint failures of representationalism and formalism ought to suffice, Kivy concludes, to make one doubt whether any single theory can encompass both the contentful arts and absolute music.

Chapter 2 opens with a discussion of Wittgenstein-inspired anti-definitionalism, from which Kivy distances himself with a series of adept criticisms. Kivy then sets his sights on Danto, in whose 'period' we currently find ourselves (ix). Seen in the light of the opening historical chapter, Danto's theory appears as a return to the representational theories of the past, and so it is Kivy's task to remind us of a lesson long ago learned: that representational theories fail because of their inability to accommodate absolute music. Because Danto says little about what absolute music might represent, Kivy simply attempts to eliminate the three most likely possibilities: that it represents emotions, that it represents fictional worlds, and that it represents itself. Though Kivy makes a powerful case against each of these, his doing so constitutes little more than a glancing blow against Danto's definition. Kivy rightly insists that Danto owes us a plausible account of musical representation, given that it has been precisely the inability to provide such accounts which has doomed all past representational definitions. Nevertheless, the power of Danto's theory derives from his famous 'argument from indiscernibles', against which Kivy says nothing. And while none of Danto's myriad versions of that argument involve a pair of aural indiscernibles, one music and one mere noise, there are no obvious obstacles against constructing such a version. Disciples of Danto will therefore likely remain convinced that absolute music must be about something, even if not about emotions, fictional worlds, or itself.

Kivy devotes the first three of his richly-detailed case studies to literature, the final two to music. In Chapter 3 he argues that by applying to read literature a model appropriate to the visual arts we have come to think of the former as representational in a way that it isn't. The chapter features a fascinating reading of Plato and Aristotle on literary representation, but fails to persuade that the view under attack is sufficiently widespread to merit the attention it is given. Perhaps the strongest of the case studies is Chapter 4, in which Kivy traces the history of the view that literary form and literary content are inseparable, locating its genesis in a misapplication to literature of a model appropriate to absolute music. Kivy succeeds equally in accounting for the appeal of this venerable thesis and in making a forceful case against it. Also strong is Chapter 5, in which Kivy argues, drawing on an ingenious analogy between the pleasures of wine-tasting and literature, that full appreciation of fictional works characteristically requires that one assess the truth of the thematic claims such works make about the world. In Chapter 6, Kivy argues convincingly that absolute music, lacking content, is logically incapable of profundity, and that our tendency to believe the contrary is the result of the influence of a false analogy with the contentful arts. In Chapter 7, Kivy attempts to explain how absolute music can hold the fascination for us that it does without representing the world in any way. His intriguing account, following Schopenhauer, is that absolute music's power resides precisely in its ability to liberate us from our world.

*Philosophies of Arts* will succeed admirably in what is perhaps its loftiest aim: by reminding its readers, by both 'precept and example' (53), that the

philosophy of art must not be pursued in absence of the relevant facts about *all* of the various arts under consideration, it will make those readers better philosophers of art, whether they choose to heed Kivy's call or to continue down Batteux's well-trod path.

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**Eric Mark Kramer**

*Modern / Postmodern: Off the Beaten  
Path of Antimodernism.*

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers 1997.

Pp. 256.

US\$59.95. ISBN 0-275-95758-6.

Kramer's analysis of modernism and postmodernism rests upon the tension between cultural expressivity and the increasing dissociation from the life-world that supposedly results when holistic perspectives are replaced by increasingly metricated ones. K. thinks that the contemporary multiplicity of perspectives can be reconciled in an integral view encompassing both modernism and postmodernism — an ambitious undertaking which tends towards generality rather than specificity.

K. first identifies time and space as the 'two most fundamental media', then posits their creation as the result of human expression (ix), and asserts that 'variances in spatio/temporal valence are what makes cultures different, identifiable' (x). Thus the four types of human expression posited by Jean Gebser — magic/idolic, mythic/symbolic, perspectival/signalic-codal and 'an emergent integral style' (xiii) — are used to argue both for the existence of a multiplicity of perspectives and the advantageous possibility of the emergent, integral mode. 'While the magic world is alive and full, the perspectival world is a dead void' (xvi), and so we are urged to seek a return to vivacity without denying contemporary modes of expressivity. 'The world,' according to K., 'is undergoing a major qualitative shift' (xvii), and this shift makes available a remedy to contemporary alienation and exclusionary ideologies: 'a new truly postmodern integral awareness is dawning which can see the limitations of nationalism, racism, sexism, ageism, regionalism, all "isms" as such' (xix).

Clearly there is a normative and prescriptive component to K.'s project. Although it is not held out to be a work of ethics or political philosophy, the 'relative relativism' which would result from an integration of different



perspectives raises fundamental issues which are not discussed at length. The mode of argument is analytical and critical: a struggling-against rather than a presentation of a normative system. The critical analysis comes into its own when K. discusses the influence of modernism in the economic realm (1-10), issues of systematization in general (10-29), truth-telling and narrative (Chapter 1), and in an especially fine portrayal of the perspectives based on race as they play out in the history of the United States (162-170). These sections of the book help to present an argument in which cultural expressivity plays the central role of shaping different conceptions of truth and socio-political relationships. In a discussion of this sort one would expect a confrontation with thinkers like M. Foucault, yet Kramer foregoes any serious encounter with the usual figures, preferring instead to draw inspiration from the work of Jean Gebser: 'Decades before either Derrida, Francois Lyotard, or Foucault wrote their respective "postmodernisms," Gebser articulated a morphological strategy based on Nietzsche's concept of "genealogy," put forth in *The Gay Science*. Not only did Gebser recognize the discontinuous nature of change, and the fragmenting tendency of a deficient rationality, he did so in a much more elegant style, and with far more evidentiary rigor than either Derrida or Foucault' (133). While it is certainly true that K.'s analyses, like those of Gebser, are based upon a critical penetration of actual, concrete social circumstances — an admirable trait — the reader is given neither clear evidence of the superiority of these insights nor of what is lacking in Derrida and Foucault. Other positions are passed-over with equally brief dismissals or polemic retorts.

Certainly this book is at its weakest when K.'s quick step and ready polemic glides over substantial points of contention that deserve more detailed consideration. Often summary remarks are given which rest upon social observations that are themselves contestable. For example, K. tells us that 'America has never presented a monolithic and finished cultural narrative. ... The idea that there exists a unified, coherent, and changeless American culture is delusional. Both the left and right Hegelians are wrong. There is no end to history' (158). Rather than this abrupt dismissal and narrow caricature of Hegel's thought, it would be better not to have mentioned the end of history at all; in so far as it is mentioned, it deserves more consideration than K. grants it. A similar example of insufficient rigour is given on p. 16, where K. relies upon a naive view of the difference between natural and artificial languages. 'Even wild "natural" languages,' he writes, 'are being streamlined in the interest of some transcending will and its ulterior goals. A famous example is Mao Tse-tung's decree to simplify Chinese script in order to enable a technological "leap forward." The 3,000-year-old script contained too many characters, and too many characters consisted of too many brush strokes. The language, it was judged, was too complicated and took too long to master. It came to be seen as an obstacle to rapid modernization. What of all the books written in the 3,000-year-old script? Irrelevant. Burn them. Culture itself is revolutionized. Dictators and law and order types tend to do this.' There is some truth to what K. is saying,

but nonetheless there is no uniform 3,000-year-old Chinese script: Chinese writing has undergone several 'modernizations' throughout its tenure, almost all of which occurred prior to modernity, and often in circumstances that make the Cultural Revolution seem relatively benign. More importantly, however, these changes can be seen as a natural, albeit revolutionary, development just as readily as their impetus can be pinned on the drive for systematization and modernization. If one wishes to base one's arguments on concrete social circumstances, then some familiarity with that society's history is in order.

K. does make use of some very interesting concepts. There is the idea of 'aperspectivity', with which 'appreciation of differences is promoted without any discursive engineering' (130), a tactic for examining the plethora of modern and postmodern perspectives on their own terms. The activity of systasis likewise permits 'an (a)waring of, and therefore a supersession of, isolated (mutually excluding) self-contained systems' (138). Synaeresis, too, enables 'a transparency of awareness, which enables one to appreciate the relational "connections between" and among various systems of awareness (the archaic, magic, mythic, and perspectival) as they form an integrating, dynamic world' (143). The articulation of synaeresis — what K. calls an 'integrum' — leads to a recognition of 'the validity of each structure *as seen through* the others' (178). While each reader will have to decide for himself or herself whether the application of these concepts can culminate in an integral, aperspectival understanding with the benefits that K. attributes to them, the clear conceptual presentation makes their evaluation possible.

On the whole this book, while not as deep or rigorous as could be hoped, will be of interest to those who are concerned about the possibility of understanding modernity and postmodernity *in toto*. As a sketch of how this may be done, and as a guide to some useful concepts, *Modern/Postmodern* is a coherent and intriguing attempt to reach a lofty and difficult goal. Many readers, however, will not be satisfied by K.'s often superficial treatment of the serious and complex issues he raises; to take the book on its own terms requires a willingness to progress by means of the quick glance rather than the deep gaze.

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**Will Kymlicka**

*States, Nations and Cultures.*

Amsterdam: Van Gorcum 1997. Pp. 72.

US\$13.00. ISBN 90-232-3224-0.

**Richard Rorty**

*Truth, Politics and 'Post-modernism'.*

Amsterdam: Van Gorcum 1997. Pp. 52.

US\$13.00. ISBN 90-232-3279-8.

Van Gorcum Press has recently published the Spinoza Lectures given at the University of Amsterdam in October 1995 and May 1997 by Will Kymlicka and Richard Rorty respectively. Kymlicka's *States, Nations and Cultures* intends to expand the vocabulary of contemporary liberal discourse so that it will be able to 'understand the nature and motivation of minority nationalist movements' and 'assess the actual and desired level of integration of immigrants' (17). Rorty's *Truth, Politics and 'Post-modernism'* attempts to show why it is that the traditional philosophical conception of truth as being or God or the order of nature is no longer useful, and yet why jettisoning such a view, specifically the Enlightenment's attempt to ground human freedom in a natural law, does not have disastrous irrational political consequences. On Rorty's view, though the Enlightenment's metaphysical project is dead, its political project is alive and kicking (13, 35). In place of the monologic tradition of attempting to mirror nature Rorty stresses a dialogic approach, the primary virtue of which is 'conversability'.

Both philosophers, then, are concerned to ensure the toleration of diverse political perspectives and social groups, but as a consideration of their conceptions of the relationship between public and private reason indicates, they approach the issue quite differently.

Kymlicka sees an important symmetry between what individuals require in the public and non-public, private pursuit of the good. On his view, freedom to revise one's conception of the good is presupposed by any authentic pursuit. Thus Kymlicka argues that the non-public realm of culture is intimately related to the public political culture. While an individual's cultural roots give him a range of intelligible options from which to choose and the confidence required to choose, the political culture protects and sustains this freedom. So, for Kymlicka, freedom is the foundational value, and toleration of a pluralism of cultures can be secured on liberal principles because culture is every bit as much as rights a prerequisite of freedom.

Whereas Kymlicka draws together the public and 'private' under the umbrella of freedom, Rorty contends that the key to conversability (read toleration) is a radical separation of public and private. Whereas Kymlicka's work is motivated by pressing and specific political issues, e.g., Quebec secession, Rorty's views are motivated by more abstract concerns. He doesn't tell us how his view can aid in the resolution of any specific political concerns; he is rather concerned with questions in the history of philosophy and the



relation of metaphysics to politics. So whereas Kymlicka enframes his argument by reference to the political struggles of national minorities and immigrant groups, Rorty enframes his discussion by reference to Spinoza, Hegel, and Derrida.

Rorty's first lecture establishes the place of 'postmodern thought' in the history of philosophy through his own caricature of the western philosophical tradition. Like Nietzsche, who saw philosophy as a history of nihilism which begins with individuals in pursuit of the intellectual vision of truth and ends with them severed from it in the Kantian view which makes no intellectual apprehension of the 'ding-an-sich' possible, Rorty sees the beginning of the end of 'philosophy' in Spinoza's notion that God and Nature are merely two perspectives on the one reality. He states: 'As soon as one deploys the idea of equally absolute descriptions, one will begin to wonder whether it matters whether one is talking about the same reality under two adequate descriptions, or about two different appearances of the same reality. As soon as one begins to raise that question, one begins the slide from Spinoza's utterly unknowable substance to Kant's utterly unknowable thing in itself ... Now it seems plausible to suggest that the only measure of description is its utility for human purposes' (16). For Rorty, the philosophical search for truth has ended in a pragmatic postmodernism which conceives what had hitherto been thought of as objectively true as the most useful description for human purposes.

Rorty argues that the pragmatist or post-modern view thus enjoins not a monologic comprehension of reality but rather a dialogic conversation in which tolerance is the central duty. He states: 'These are compatible with benign neglect of philosophy and religion' (30). So for Rorty, though one must abandon the project of western rationalism, what remains is sufficient, indeed preferable, for the maintenance of toleration of divergent perspectives. Hence in the second Lecture he argues that the view that humans should conform to an order (whether Reason, Nature or Truth) in fact presupposes the view that human nature is depraved and can only be redeemed by such conformity. On his view abandoning 18th-century rationalism in favour of 20th-century pragmatism would be good for our self-confidence and our self-respect (36, 44).

Rorty thus finds the connection between Enlightenment egalitarianism and rationalism accidental. He argues, therefore, for a dichotomous history — one story about the intellectual world and one story about everyday political struggles. However, it is unclear that this is the only or best historiological conclusion to be drawn from his description of the history of philosophy. Enlightenment-inspired political activity and Enlightenment-inspired philosophical activity on Rorty's account lead ultimately to the same point — 'conversability'. What remains even on his view is an account of how ideals supposedly only accidentally related come to the same end. Here it seems that the basic Kymlickean paradigm offers the possibility of a richer account — public toleration and private philosophy are both forms of the same human freedom.

These lectures are attractively produced though one notices a number of typos. As concise summaries from the authors' own hands, they seem particularly appropriate for use in survey courses.

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**Roger Lamb, ed.**

*Love Analyzed.*

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1997.

Pp. xvii+267.

US\$58.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-8891-0);

US\$21.00 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-3223-0).

*Love Analyzed* is a useful and thought provoking collection of well-crafted philosophical essays on romantic love. The sensibilities of the contributors are perhaps polarized: some come from a sense of the value and possibility of humbling philosophy to the rigours and richness of love. Others seek to humble love to the imperatives of philosophical discipline. Those of the first sensibility are by far the most successful, evocative, and satisfying. Nevertheless, the attempts to stuff the stuff of love into rigid categories of analytical theory are also intriguing and instructive.

The collection begins with a reprint of Martha Nussbaum's beautiful piece 'Love and the Individual: Romantic Rightness and Platonic Aspiration'. In a masterful weaving together of narrative and treatise, Nussbaum pits the philosopher against the lover, wondering aloud throughout about the advisability of analysing love at all. She perseveres to ask the question of whether the loss of a love can be a valid reason for the lover's choice of death over life. Her discussion reveals a poignant ambivalence, embracing life in the end, but demonstrating a clear understanding of, and sympathy for, the pull toward death and non-being felt by a grieving lover.

Nussbaum's essay — which is of the first sensibility I mention — is followed by one clearly of the second. Roger Lamb, the editor of the collection, in a piece entitled 'Love and Rationality' focuses on a question most likely mystifying to any but the most zealous of analytical philosophers. It goes something like this: Is A constrained by the requirements of rationality to feel erotic love for B where B and C both have properties  $P^1$  to  $P^8$  and A feels erotic love for C as a result of C's having  $P^1$  to  $P^8$ ? Not surprisingly, given his interest in the question, he constructs an argument for an affirmative answer



— and a retort to C's predictable objections to A's love for B and other P<sup>1</sup> to P<sup>8</sup> holders.

This is followed by a witty and engaging article by Deborah Brown, 'The Right Method of Boy Loving', which critiques Lamb's acceptance of the centrality of 'properties' to love. By way of a very funny narrative which explores the question of why Lois loves Superman, Brown argues that the individual — as such — is given insufficient recognition in Plato and Lamb's instrumentalist accounts of love. She argues that recognition of mutuality as a value within love is the way out of this obtuse focus on properties — rather than individuals — as intelligible objects of love.

Alan Soble's piece 'Union, Autonomy, and Concern' highlights a recurring theme of the book: love as a threat to autonomy. Soble's discussion precisely delineates the contradiction involved in viewing love as having its highest fruition in both a) the merging or fusion of the lovers and b) the robust concern of each for the wellbeing of the other. He outlines the threat such a notion of love poses to individual autonomy. Further, he illuminates our naive optimism as a culture about the promise and stability of this incoherent conception of love. His conclusion however, is unsettling: he jettisons robust concern, finding that it is not truly possible in love. He does not seem to entertain the other possibilities of either resolving the incoherence by jettisoning fusion or salvaging love by reinventing it in new ways.

'Love and Human Bondage in Maugham, Spinoza, and Freud' is a fascinating essay by Barbara Hannan. In it she gives a poignantly vivid description of the emotions of bondage love — the sort of obsessive sick love for a beloved who shows indifference or contempt for the lover. She explores both the cure for such love and the possibility of its value. Her ultimate conclusion is that a propensity for bondage love can be transcended through a process of replacing it with passions more conducive to the well being of the lover. While such a cure is always desirable, she argues that something of value is lost when bondage love is overcome. Hannan is one of the few contributors who explicitly raises gender in her account of love. She notes that women are more given to bondage love than men, since such love is often a means of directing the energy of frustrated aspirations for self. Thus, the cure for bondage love is to redirect one's energy into one's own plans and projects — to become passionate about becoming oneself.

In 'Love and Autonomy' Keith Lehrer gives a delightful account of the way love as a 'desire for whatever the beloved desires' destroys autonomy and ultimately destroys love itself. Mutuality, rather than saving this kind of love, makes it all the more circular and dangerous. His way out of the difficulty relies on the distinction between autonomous preferences and first order desires. In his argument, autonomous preference for (or autonomous preference to prefer) what the beloved autonomously prefers, is offered as the buffer of sanity and maturity necessary to redeem a mutual relation of first order desiring of the other's desires. The argument is interesting but leaves one, again, with a nagging sense of doubt about the potential of pure analytical philosophical method to yield satisfying insights about love.



In 'Love and Solipsism' Rae Langton gives a splendid account of the phenomenon of solipsistic love in its two forms: a) treating the lover as a thing and b) treating a thing as a lover. She canvasses the possible defences for such love, in particular focusing on Marcel's defence of his own solipsistic love for Albertine in *Remembrance of Things Past*. Marcel finds the value of such love in the emotive momentum it provides for him to engage in deep self-discovery. Langton rejects Marcel's reasoning, and concludes with an argument against solipsism from the value of relationality.

The collection contains many other interesting essays. Philip Pettit's piece 'Love and Its Place in Moral Discourse' disputes the claim that love is a virtue and therefore, like fairness or kindness, a justifying motivation for action. In 'Jealousy and Desire' Daniel M. Farrell gives an account of jealousy as a 'three party emotion' and attempts to give a philosophical explanation of why the experience of romantic jealousy can be so intense. Ronald DeSousa's delightful piece 'Love Undigitized' alerts the reader to the pitfalls of essentializing love, and the fatuousness of the quest for a set of foolproof conditions for 'true love'. He advises us to be more attentive to the multiplicities and infinite possibilities of 'crooked' and imperfect love. In the next essay 'Is Love an Emotion?' O.J. Green disregards DeSousa's advice against essentializing love and attempts to construct an argument that love, properly so called, is not, in its essence, an emotion, but a 'complex of desires'. In 'Love and Intentionality: Roxanne's Choice' Sue Campbell sets out what I found to be a slightly bewildering and impenetrable analysis of the tale of *Cyrano de Bergerac*, asking whom Roxanne really loves, and whether she loves at all.

The collection ends with a wonderful piece entitled 'Love's Truths' in which Graeme Marshall gives an interesting defence of the hyperboles and exaggerations of lovers, arguing that the lover's view of the beloved as incomparably beautiful and good is, in a sense, correct. We indulge the lover's perception of the beloved as perfect, not out of mere fondness, but rather out of a recognition that this exaggeration is part of the process through which we give meaning and power to love and construct love as a compelling reason for action.

Overall, the collection is marvelous. It will be of great interest to anyone who, like me, is compelled to think too much about love.

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**David Lapoujade**

*William James: Empirisme et pragmatisme.*

Paris: PUF, Collection Philosophies, 1997.

Pp. 125. 48FF.

ISBN 2-13-048640-1.

Bien que l'on ait tendance à penser à William James comme à un philosophe «littéraire» ou comme au père de la psychologie scientifique, certains des textes réunis dans *Essays in Radical Empiricism* ou dans *The Will to Believe* possèdent un degré de technicité qui n'a rien à envier aux plus grands textes de la philosophie. Comme l'écrivait Putnam 'Ces essais ont en effet le genre de profondeur mystérieuse que paraissent avoir la plupart des passages difficiles à saisir des grands philosophes: tels la déduction transcendantale de Kant ou l'argument du langage privé de Wittgenstein.' («La théorie de la perception de James» in *Le réalisme à visage humain*, Seuil, 1994, p. 421) Les réflexions métaphysiques de James peuvent cependant sembler inutilement abstruses pour un lecteur contemporain qui s'intéressera plutôt naturellement à son pragmatisme. Mais une telle attitude lui ferait courir le risque d'isoler artificiellement un pan de la philosophie jamesienne du riche terreau métaphysique sur lequel il s'élabore. Qui plus est, elle occulterait le fait que James est un philosophe complet, qui en plus d'une théorie de la connaissance et d'une méthode métaphilosophique concernant la façon d'opérer des choix entre théories philosophiques, nous offre une théorie de la réalité et une théorie morale. Lapoujade, dans son *Williams James: empirisme et pragmatisme*, ne commet pas cette bourde et fait de l'empirisme radical un préalable au pragmatisme.

C'est d'ailleurs cette conception métaphysique, qui a inspiré à Russell son «monisme neutre», qu'il présente dans son premier chapitre, «L'empirisme radical». Au cœur de cet empirisme, comme dans toute forme d'empirisme, l'expérience, mais cette fois, l'expérience pure: 'Pur ne veut pas dire ici non empirique; au contraire, il veut dire empirique, rien qu'empirique. C'est le donné à l'état pur. Il n'est le donné de personne. Il est donné en soi. Il n'est encore donné pour personne. Il est donné en soi. Il n'est encore donné pour personne; c'est le monde où n'apparaissent encore ni sujet ni objet' (24). En posant cette expérience pure, James prétend dépasser les dualismes épistémologiques des philosophies traditionnelles (qu'elles soient rationalistes ou empiristes) entre la notion de sujet et d'objet ou entre la matière et l'esprit. Il relègue donc à l'arrière-plan l'idée d'un sujet fondateur et constituant pour montrer qu'avant lui, «ça pense» et que cette expérience pure est à la base des catégories épistémologiques traditionnelles. La question devient non plus, comme le note Lapoujade, «Comment faire une expérience pure?», mais «Comment l'expérience cesse-t-elle d'être pure?» La réponse de James à cette question consiste à dire qu'une même expérience devient subjective ou objective dépendant de l'interprétation qui en est faite, de la perspective dans laquelle elle est placée, de la série dans laquelle on l'intègre. L'expérience n'est donc ni intrinsèquement subjective, ni objective, ces



catégories ne sont, en toutes dernières analyses, que relationnelles, elles dépendent de la fonction que l'on fait jouer à l'expérience. Ceci étant dit, ces interprétations ne sont pas totalement arbitraires, elles sont en quelque sorte imposées par une nécessité interne de notre expérience, «contre laquelle nous sommes impuissants et qui nous conduit dans une direction qui est la destinée de la croyance» (38).

Dans le second chapitre, «Vérité et connaissance», l'auteur décrit la tentative de James de libérer la notion de vérité de la notion de ressemblance ou de copie pour plutôt en faire une notion regroupant un ensemble de relations plus ou moins hétéroclites. Lapoujade insiste, avec justesse, sur le fait que le pragmatisme de James ne conduit pas au relativisme ou au subjectivisme, mais qu'il est plutôt mu par l'idée que la vérité est inséparable du point de vue qu'il l'énonce. La vérité n'est pas quelque *tertium quid* entre le sujet connaissant et le connu. C'est une relation «satisfaisante» entre le connaissant et le connu. En ce sens, la vérité n'est pas une propriété intrinsèque d'une idée, mais bien plutôt quelque chose qui lui arrive dans une perspective particulière. L'auteur discute également du pluralisme de James, c'est-à-dire de l'idée suivant laquelle le monde est ouvert et non clos sur lui-même comme dans les philosophies absolutistes, ainsi que de l'opposition entre la connaissance «saltatoire» (qui décrit la position classique selon laquelle nous ne sommes en contact direct qu'avec les données de nos sens et que nous devons faire un «saut» pour inférer la réalité extérieure) à la connaissance «ambulatoire» (position selon laquelle «nous déambulons à travers des séries intermédiaires qui nous conduisent à des termes provisoires» [76]).

Le dernier chapitre, «Confiance et communauté pragmatique», explore une question qui surgit dès lors que l'on accepte la caractérisation de l'univers comme indéterminé: qu'est-ce qui nous conduit à agir? Pourquoi ne sommes nous pas simplement prostré, paralysé devant ce monde informe? Dans un tel contexte, la confiance ou la foi devient fondamentale, la confiance étant ce qui nous permet de tenter une action dont l'issue est incertaine. Le rôle du pragmatisme devient donc de sélectionner les idées qui consolident ce sentiment de confiance qui permet d'élargir le champ de l'action. C'est ce principe qui fait pencher James pour la doctrine du libre arbitre contre celle du déterminisme, la première étant, selon lui, plus réconfortante que l'autre. C'est également ce principe qui fait pencher pour le pluralisme, puisque ce n'est que dans un monde ouvert que nos actions ont la possibilité d'améliorer ce qui est, qu'elles ont un sens.

Disons pour conclure, qu'en dépit du style très français de l'ouvrage qui pourrait gêner un philosophe de tendance analytique (on a parfois l'impression de lire Bergson lisant James), le livre de Lapoujade offre une présentation intéressante des principales thèses jamesiennes. On peut cependant lui adresser quelques reproches. D'abord, insensible à l'aspect génétique de la pensée jamesienne, il n'établit pas de liens entre, d'une part, le pragmatisme et l'empirisme radical et, d'autre part, la psychologie darwinienne de James. Le besoin d'une théorie pragmatiste ou conséquentialiste devient pourtant



beaucoup plus compréhensible lorsqu'on la remet dans le contexte de la psychologie de l'époque dont James disait qu'elle '... se désintéresse des fonctions purement intellectuelles, sur lesquelles Platon, Aristote et tout ce qu'on peut appeler la tradition philosophique classique avaient insisté, pour mettre davantage en lumière le côté pratique de l'activité humaine, trop longtemps négligé. Ce changement a été provoqué par la théorie de l'évolution. Nous avons, en effet, de bonnes raisons de croire à l'évolution de l'homme à partir d'ancêtres infra-humains, chez lesquels la pure raison existait à peine, si même elle existait, et dont l'activité intellectuelle, en tant que fonction, apparaît comme outil destiné à adapter les comportements de l'organisme aux impressions reçues de l'environnement. Il lui permet d'échapper à la destruction. La conscience de soi semble n'être au premier abord qu'une sorte de perfection biologique surajoutée, destinée uniquement à fournir rapidement des réactions utiles pour la conduite de l'homme et inexplicable en dehors de cette considération.' (*Conférence sur l'éducation*; on pourrait faire une remarque similaire au sujet de la notion de plurivers). Notons finalement que l'appareil bibliographique est réduit à sa plus simple expression, (ce qui est un peu triste pour un ouvrage présentant un auteur méconnu chez les francophones), et que les quelques références à des commentateurs qui émaillent le texte sont datées et ne font presque pas référence aux commentateurs anglo-saxons.

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**Emmanuel Levinas**

*Proper Names.*

Trans. Michael B. Smith.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1996.

Pp. 191.

US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-2351-6);

US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-2352-4).

'It is the face of the other, whose presence imposes an obligation prior to any ethical theory or principle, which is the origin of the ethical.' So speaks Emmanuel Levinas, along with Jean-Paul Sartre the most important philosopher of what may be called the human in post-war France. For Levinas the human arrives in the form of a reminder to those discourses of philosophy founded on abstraction, ethical principle or various other inflections of philosophical modernity, a reminder that the face of otherness is more primordial than any ethical theory and that its primordial directness and

irreducible particularity have been forgotten. Levinas' poetic, phenomenological and religious style is at the service of what might be called this Wittgensteinian act of reminding. It is at once a form of reflection (hence philosophical) on the mysterious insistence of otherness, and a task of contextual acknowledgment of the other in its various forms of particularity.

Close attention to particularity suffuses *Proper Names* and gives the text its own 'propriety'. For a book composed of trifles, ornaments, asides, little reviews, letters, acknowledgments and the bric a brac of an intellectual life lived among others, it rings with surprisingly fresh insights into the persons discussed: Buber, Kierkegaard, Blanchot, Jabes, Celan, Derrida, Proust and others. In these writings we find Levinas at work reversing the individualist predilections according to which so much of modern subjectivity has been thought and practiced. Again and again Levinas reminds us of things that modern individualism has forgotten: things having to do with the essential role of the other in generating the moods, ideals, wishes, projects of recovery and states of sublimity of the modern subject. These reminders can be breathtaking, as in the following remarks about Proust: 'Death is the death of other people, contrary to the tendency of contemporary philosophy, which is focused on one's own solitary death. Only the former is central to the search for lost time' (104). What Levinas has noticed is that the act of recollection crucial to Proust's achievement of identity is predicated on the mysterious presence of the other — and then on the equally mysterious loss of the other's presence. It is into the other (Albertine) that the Marcel of the novel continually disappears, and it is her disappearance (and finally, along with a litany of others, his own) which prompts his search for 'lost time'. When Levinas asserts that death is always the death of other people, he is in dialogue with Heidegger, for whom it is always the lone existential death — my own — which separates me from others and sets me out on the plane of authenticity and spirituality.

Equally important is Levinas' refusal of the terms by which Hegel has thought otherness, terms which also resonate in this book. One cannot deny the Hegelian insight that I become myself only by standing as the other to the other, but Levinas will resist the fact that it is *me* who is the focus of this dialectic, not the other per se. Moreover for Hegel, dialectic culminates in a state of reconciliation in which the otherness of the other in effect disappears and identities are established to be 'the same'. Abraham, closer in spirit to Levinas' own philosophical origins than any German romantic thinker, would have found this mad, for his God cannot be thought 'the same' as himself or any man or woman. Otherness is profound not because of its possibility of coming into reconciliation with the self (in the Hegelian mode of sameness) but precisely because of its irreducible edge of difference, its absolute unassimilability. The beautiful reconciliation of Hegel, symbolized by Greek art, is replaced by Levinas' sense of the other's sublimity, a sublimity which Hegel branded 'archaic in its Judaism'.

Levinas will recollect this archaic idea of the other and show it to be what the modern world knows and requires — in spite of itself. Thus again the

astonishing remark from the Proust piece: 'The success of knowledge would in fact destroy the nearness, the proximity, of the other' (105), as if the Foucauldian apparatus of control of subjectivity through knowledge were given philosophical resonance, since the project of surveillance, as Foucault believes it to shape modern life, is one which aims for nothing less than the destruction of nearness by the panoptic gaze over the other. French thought in such ways forms an *ensemble*.

This tendency to find a fresh response to an ordinary epistemic situation marks the best essays in this book. Kierkegaard is criticized for identifying existential authenticity (fear and trembling, etc.) with a solipsism that overrides the ethical and obliterates the face of the other (which Kierkegaard evidently found unbearable). Derrida is read in a surprisingly personal way: 'In reading him, I always see the 1940 exodus again' (56). What follows this remark is a paragraph about what it was like to be in a France on the verge of occupation, what it was like to disappear into marginality. In an age in which even psychoanalysis tends to intervene in philosophy and the humanities only in the guise of theory, Levinas rings with the honesty of a writing about the experiences writers have had which ring true in their ideas. He stakes truth on picturing what is at stake for the human if an idea is true. The best of recent French philosophy, including Derrida, follows from him in that. If these 'occasional writings' are uneven in quality, they ring with spontaneity and contain a lifetime of thought. Instinctively moral, occupied with a dignity of thought, we would do well to read and remember them in an age of theoretical commodification and self-overcapitalization.

**Daniel Herwitz**  
University of Natal

**Genevieve Lloyd**

*Spinoza and the Ethics.*

New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. x + 163.

Cdn\$69.95: US\$49.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-10781-4);

Cdn\$15.95: US\$10.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-10782-2).

The virtues of this book include frequently examining the ways Spinoza's concepts occur in the earlier history of philosophy, the ways Spinoza's use of these concepts differs from earlier ones, and a focus on what Spinoza can teach us now about knowledge, society and the good life.

Lloyd has many important insights. She emphasizes the plenitude of substance, the identity of thought and reality, intuitive knowledge, the



holism she ascribes to Spinoza, and the central role she gives the imagination. Lloyd develops a response to Kant's objection to the ontological proof, based on reading the attributes as ways of understanding substance, rather than as its properties. She defends the reality of the attributes (contrary to the subjectivist interpretation) by making them interdependent. But though she allows that the same absolutely infinite substance is understood through any one of its attributes, she denies that 'God understands himself under the infinity of his own attributes' (44); thus, she simply ignores the evidence of, e.g., Spinoza's assertion to the contrary in letter 66 and the definition of *attribute*.

She rightly insists that the meaning of existence in Spinoza is the involvement of things in the system of nature and that to have adequate ideas is to see how experience follows on the interaction of one's own body with others and the whole of nature. She seems to go astray, however, by considering only one of Spinoza's objections to the inadequate and imaginative ideas at work in Spinoza's first kind of knowledge. She emphasizes their subjective origin but neglects the objection that this type of idea comprises universal notions (*notiones universalis*) that distort the nature of any real particular. As a result, she regards the common notions (*notiones communes*) at work in the second type of knowledge after the manner of the abstract, Platonic universal. To make any sense of the concreteness of the adequate ideas at work in the third kind of knowledge, she is then compelled to directly contradict Spinoza's text by distinguishing the type of idea employed in the second kind of knowledge from that in the third, intuitive kind of knowledge. She describes imaginative experience as very concrete and then seems compelled to say very little to help one understand how the intuitive knowledge of adequate ideas improves our emotional lives.

Concrete ideas nevertheless play a significant role in Lloyd's thinking about Spinoza, as she clearly suggests that the idea of community can be used to explain Spinoza's controversial inference in part 3 of the *Ethics*, i.e., from the need to explain the destruction of anything in something other than itself to the idea of self-preservation as the essence of things. One's community with nature makes it follow that nature's preservation of the individual is also the individual's self-preservation; the concrete idea of the community of finite selves in nature also explains the move from this essence to altruism in part 4. However, any value one can attach to such insights is mitigated by the confusion of the concreteness of adequate ideas with the order of the imagination.

This confusion adversely affects her otherwise admirable treatment of Spinoza's rational psychology. Although she astutely examines the influence of the idea of the contingency or necessity of events on the effects of these events in the imagination and her discussion of the concepts *gaudium*, *hilaritas* and *titillatio* is invaluable, she does nothing to help one understand how the imagination can grasp rational ideas. Such ideas indicate, for example, the necessary existence of the object of love, if it is God, but it seems the idea of this necessity is abstract. The joy of the rational life is accordingly

made abstract, being divorced from the life of desire and intuition, and made to seem largely ineffective in influencing the passions. She describes the concrete life of the imagination in ways suggestive of Spinoza's adequate ideas, whereas her descriptions of the common notions are more suggestive of the distortions of individuality and ideas of abstract resemblance underpinning infatuation and prejudice and the associative connections underlying vacillation and jealousy.

With reference to the eternity of the mind, Lloyd derives a paradox. According to her, if one's knowledge of one's eternity is eternal, then it seems one's coming to know it in time must be an illusion, which would be paradoxical to say the least. However, one can also suppose that the event of one's coming to know one's eternity is in one's eternal idea of one's self; otherwise, Spinoza's doctrine would be self-refuting. A reader can nevertheless profit from Lloyd's genuine insights into Spinoza's meaning and the lessons she draws from them for contemporary philosophers, such as the need for greater integration of disciplines within philosophy, like Spinoza's integration of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics.

**James Thomas**

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**David Macauley, ed.**

*Minding Nature: The Philosophers of Ecology.*

New York: The Guilford Press 1996. Pp. 355.

US\$43.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-57230-058-2);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 1-57230-059-0).

David Macauley's anthology *Minding Nature: The Philosophers of Ecology* provides a valuable new resource for both scholars of environmental philosophy and historians of recent modern philosophy. Macauley has collected 13 essays (six of which are published for the first time) which explain the role played by environmental concerns in the work of several theorists ranging from Thomas Hobbes to Murray Bookchin. In so doing he accomplishes two tasks. First, this volume demonstrates to the reader new to the field that environmental philosophy has a history populated by some of the major figures of twentieth-century thought. Second, the essays in this book provide the more experienced reader with a genealogy of contemporary positions within the environmental movement.

Concerns about environmental issues have become widespread in the past thirty years, but as Macauley points out in his introduction, concerns about



nature have been a topic of debate since the dawn of western philosophy. For the reader who is unacquainted with environmental philosophy, this anthology provides essays which consider the role environmental issues have played in the writing of several important figures in recent history. Many scholars are aware of the environmental implications of the thought of people such as Martin Heidegger and Murray Bookchin, but several essays in this collection (such as those by Frank Coleman on Thomas Hobbes, David Abram on Maurice Merleau-Ponty, David Macauley on Hannah Arendt, Lawrence Vogel on Hans Jonas and Joel Whitebrook on Jurgen Habermas) discuss thinkers not often associated with environmental concerns. Often environmental philosophy is subsumed under the rubric of applied ethics, but these essays show that many influential thinkers of the twentieth century have grappled with the difficulties posed by the human-nature relationship, and that these environmental issues have been central to their thought. Macauley's collection of essays demonstrates that environmental philosophy need not be considered a fringe discipline, but rather is one of primary importance to many contemporary thinkers. In his introduction Macauley explains that western philosophy begins in Greece as speculation on nature but this original focus seems to have been lost to modern philosophers. The essays in this collection attempt to return to those environmental roots and discuss the 'ideas which emphasize our natural relations to the earth, our social creations, and each other' (18) found in work of modern philosophers often interpreted as having forsaken the study of nature.

For the reader familiar with environmental philosophy, this anthology offers critical essays which evaluate several thinkers who have had a profound influence upon the environmental movement. Essays by Michael Zimmerman on Martin Heidegger, Henry T. Blanke on Herbert Marcuse, Yaakov Garb on Rachel Carson, Andrew Feenberg on the debate between Paul Ehrlich and Barry Commoner, and Alan Rudy and Andrew Light on Murray Bookchin all offer discussions of theorists whose works lay the conceptual foundations for much of current environmental thought. Besides the discussions of these well-known figures, there are also essays which show that some thinkers not usually associated with the environmental movement have played a significant role in the development of environmental philosophy. The essays by Joan Roelofs on Charles Fourier, John Ely on Ernst Bloch and Ramachandra Guha on Lewis Mumford show the considerable impact these thinkers have had on the current environmental debate.

The subjects of the essays contained in this anthology are diverse, but there are several notable absences. Since, as Macauley acknowledges in his introduction, nature played a substantial role in ancient Greek thought, and since the essays on Neo-Aristotelians Arendt and Bloch rely heavily on interpretations of Aristotle, an essay on Aristotle may have been helpful and thematically justified within this anthology. Macauley provides an explanation for this absence in his introduction — he says that instead of providing a historical survey beginning with the Greeks, he wanted this anthology to concentrate on contemporary debates about nature and society. To achieve



this aim, Macauley chose to restrict this collection to essays on figures who offer critiques of contemporary society in their analyses of humanity's relationship with nature and (with a few exceptions such as Hobbes and Heidegger) who tend to do so from the left of the political spectrum.

Macauley's focus on left-wing thinkers brings to mind other, and perhaps more serious, omissions from this volume. In addition to the socialist and anarchist critiques of society and the environment considered in these essays, Macauley could have included discussions of thinkers who have played pivotal roles within environmental and political thought but who do not offer leftist critiques. Philosophers in this century have attempted to link issues of human justice to the environment from a wide variety of political positions, but this diversity is not reflected in Macauley's anthology. The range of political perspectives offered in this volume would have been broadened with evaluations of theorists who combine their environmental theories with right-wing positions, such as Dave Foreman or Arne Naess. Macauley also could have included essays on thinkers such as Tom Regan or James Rachels who believe that modern liberal ethical and political positions are not only adequate to the task, but are necessary if one is to preserve nature and to maintain social justice. Another useful addition would have been a discussion of thinkers who link social and environmental issues, but whose politics are not readily classifiable as right- or left-wing, such as ecofeminist writers Carolyn Merchant or Karen Warren.

The lack of political diversity within the articles does not necessarily diminish the value of this anthology. It would be impossible to provide a collection which is all things to all people, and Macauley has collected an excellent set of critical essays which discuss the convergence of environmental issues with leftist social concerns in the thought of some of this century's most influential thinkers.

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**John Marenbom**

*The Philosophy of Peter Abelard.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.

Pp. xx + 373.

US\$59.95. ISBN 0-521-55397-0.

Scholarship on Peter Abelard has advanced remarkably in the last twenty years both in terms of what is known about the chronology of his life and works and in terms of how we understand his basic philosophic ideas. In the former area the work of Constant Mews, Peter Dronke and others, while not settling all questions, has given us a much firmer fix on just which of the works often ascribed to Abelard are genuinely his and when they were written. In the latter effort, while many exegetical knots still remain untied, a much more accurate picture has emerged of Abelard's ideas in logic, ontology, epistemology and ethics. John Marenbom's book sums up these findings and uses them to advance what he takes to be a revised assessment of Abelard's philosophic work as a whole, one which credits him with a much more inventive and constructive philosophy, particularly outside the sphere of pure logic, than earlier interpreters had been willing to allow.

Marenbom believes that recent scholarship shows that Abelard's career divided into an earlier half in which his main work was in logic and aspects of speculative philosophy closely associated with logic, and a later half where his main interest was an ethically based theology. The divide comes in the mid 1120s when Abelard returned to his native Brittany to be abbot of a remote and degenerate monastery. The earlier period includes some theological writing — indeed some of his work in that area was condemned at the Council of Soissons in 1121 — but his major effort was expended on teaching and commenting on the 'old logic', that small group of texts from the ancient world which formed the core of scholastic philosophic curriculum until the full panoply of Aristotle's works became available in the 13th century. Nor in the latter period did he give up work on logic entirely, but the emphasis definitely falls on ethics and theology. Marenbom is particularly keen to convince us that Abelard's contributions in this area were at least as innovative as the ones he made in logic and did not amount merely to applying logic to ethical and theological questions. In this he is surely right. Marenbom gathers together the evidence which puts beyond doubt that Abelard was a serious and committed ethical reformer. He also documents the contribution which Heloise made to Abelard's thought in this area by compelling her former lover and husband to moderate the unrealistic perfectionism of his earlier ethical thought.

Marenbom makes us well aware, too, of how what Abelard called logic actually extends well beyond what we now refer to by that term into the areas of ontology and epistemology, and it is in these latter areas that Abelard's brilliance is often most evident. Even in logic proper Abelard did not restrict himself to anything like formal logic but was often concerned with problems in the theory of reference and signification. Marenbom is correct, I believe,



in claiming that the obligation to lecture on the ancient texts to some degree inhibited Abelard from producing a truly systematic treatise in this area by forcing him to organize his thoughts largely as commentary on others works. In ethics no similar constraint was at work, and as a result the basic outlines of a system are much easier to detect in that area than they are in logic. On all the above Marenbom has many useful and original insights into the meaning of Abelardian texts.

Where I have misgivings is in Marenbom's apparent acquiescence in the view that Abelard did not really have a very coherent system of ideas at all in the area of logic and ontology. First of all, Marenbom believes that Abelard's ontology underwent a marked shift away from one in which all that there is are substantial and non-substantial particulars (forms) to one in which there are *status* which are not things but which in some measure supplant the reliance on forms. Marenbom credits this shift to Abelard's efforts to make sense of differentiation in the divine Trinity, where there can be no forms and only one substance. Abelard's talk of *status* is admittedly puzzling, but on it hangs his whole nominalist position. Marenbom rejects a suggestion I myself made many years ago that *status* are closely related to what Abelard called *dicta* and that the latter, at least the true ones, are what we think of as facts. Consequently, he never really examines the possibility that Abelard had realized that the world is a 'totality of facts' not a totality of things with all that view entails for ontology. In the end he is left unable to ascribe to Abelard any very coherent position in this area, and I came away with the overall impression of Abelard as a thinker whose clever solutions to the less profound questions led him into deeper problems which he had no idea how to solve.

In ethics it is well known that Abelard often seems to adopt a very subjective view of moral guilt (sin) and merit. A person is guilty to the extent that they consent to do something even though they believe that doing it is contrary to God's laws. Merit, on the other hand, is increased by overcoming an inner temptation to do what is believed to be wrong, i.e., respecting God's law even when there is a strong desire not to. Marenbom rightly balances this view with Abelard's insistence on the objectivity of the law itself and thus on the objectivity of what actions are right and what ones wrong. Abelard coupled this with a very optimistic doctrine that everyone is endowed with a knowledge of God's law and of how to apply it in particular cases. This knowledge evinces itself as conscience. Thus guilt occurs when a person goes against their own conscience.

Marenbom goes into considerable detail about the problems this doctrine encounters when Abelard is forced to square it with Augustinian doctrines of grace and original sin. Abelard heretically interpreted original sin not as any guilt that is inherited from the first parents but as merely a penalty God is inflicting on us because of the guilt of the first parents. His defense of the horrific doctrine of damnation of infants who die before baptism is then particularly bizarre since it cannot say that these infants carry any guilt at all. Somehow this God who punishes the entirely innocent is also supposed



to be, according to Abelard, the God who created the best possible world and could not have created any other.

This last position of Abelard's would lead, one would think, to a necessitarianism, because on Abelard's view God creates *all* the facts of the world, he does not just create some set of general facts and then leave the rest to chance or human free will. Abelard thinks he has a way around the fatalistic consequences of such a view, but Marenbom correctly sees that it is a logical evasion, not a solution to the problem. In the end, though, Marenbom's discussion of Abelard's theological ethics again leaves the reader with the impression that our philosopher has worked himself into difficulties he cannot satisfactorily handle, and part of the problem is that logical skill ends up being a means to philosophic self-deception.

Marenbom certainly would like us to think of Abelard as a strong constructive thinker, and I would be happy to concur. But, in fact, the picture Marenbom paints for us is of ideas so flawed and incoherent that the best attitude one can engender towards their creator is respectful pity. This book, skillful and insightful though it is, invites the wave of criticism which one can be certain will shortly follow.

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**Michael Martin**

*Legal Realism: American and Scandinavian.*

New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. 1997.

Pp. vii + 242.

US\$44.95. ISBN 0-8204-3462-0.

Martin aims to rescue both American Legal Realism (ALR) and Scandinavian Legal Realism (SLR) from neglect. To do so, he rebuts the criticisms of H.L.A. Hart, who did so much to discredit both, and then shows how each can be *reinterpreted* as plausible social science 'research programs.' Five American realists are canvassed — Oliphant, Llewellyn, Frank, Cook, and Moore — objections considered, the movement as a whole evaluated, and then a final chapter specifying what an ALR research program might look like. Except for a different cast of characters — Hägerström, Lundstedt, Olivecrona, and Ross — the same format is followed in the chapters that examine SLR. Martin concludes with a brief chapter on the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement showing how radically it differs from ALR. ALR put its faith in psychology and the social sciences. CLS, however, is suspicious of *all* attempts to

introduce impartial objectivity into the law: law, according to CLS, is ideologically loaded from start to finish. Not only does Martin write with admirable clarity, but he gives the reader a good understanding how various proponents of ALR (and SLR) differ from each other. As Martin acknowledges, one can quibble about the omission of Cohen, Radin, and Yntema from 'the ALR five', but not much of philosophical substance is lost by their absence.

'Realism' means different things in different contexts. The 'realism' of ALR lies in its turn away from high theory — whether natural law or conceptual analysis — to the lived experience of lawyers and (to a lesser extent) judges. Instead of offering alternative answers to questions about the analysis of legal rights and so on, 'the five' (as Martin dubs them) urge lawyers, judges, and law schools to set them aside and instead introduce the methods of social science. While the five are unanimous in urging greater introduction of the social sciences into law, not all accept that nothing is a norm of law unless it constitutes an accurate prediction of what courts will do. Indeed, Martin argues that none do, at least in the simplistic way Hart criticized so effectively. Instead of offering conceptual analysis, those realists who emphasize the importance of prediction and causal explanation are offering a *programmatic* definition: 'The term *law* would be assigned to new phenomena — the future decisions of the courts — and it would be withheld from other phenomena — statutes and precedents — to which it previously referred. However, this programmatic definition might be governed by contextual restrictions. For example, it might be inappropriate in the context of judicial decision making' (103).

The 'however' saves ALR from the devastating criticism that *lawyers* might predict how a judge will rule, but that it is highly implausible for a *judge* to understand what he is doing as arriving at a *prediction* when deliberating. Does Martin's caveat save ALR from Hart's criticism? Legal rules, precedents, and such principles as *stare decisis* or that 'no man shall profit from his wrong' are relegated to (mere?) *sources* of law. Since ALR urged reforms in legal education to match its program, would students then be taught that rules, etc. are never authoritative, but merely sources of law? Wouldn't they have to be trained to think *like* judges, who take rules, etc., as having (non-absolute but nevertheless) binding normative force?

Where ALR reacted against excessive 'formalism', SLR reacts against such 'metaphysical fictions' as rights, duties, natural justice, and the binding force of law. Where ALR had its roots in America's pragmatic tradition, SLR grew out of Hägerström's commitment to logical positivism. Consequently, much of the argument seems dated, though Martin believes that positivism has not yet been refuted. Hart again figures as the chief critic and again on the failure of SLR to distinguish between the internal and external stance. If a court declares, 'This is valid law,' yet the sentence is *meaningless*, what could it mean to take an internal stance? Martin suggests SLR could interpret such sentences *as if* they were from an evaluative internal point of view, 'playing along with' the court, as he says. But how would one play along with

'Procrastination drinks Tuesday'? If *no* logical connections hold between sentences containing 'metaphysical fictions', it is hard to see how they could be understood sufficiently to play along with them.

Each form of realism can be understood as having its own research program, with further distinctions with each. So rule skeptics, for instance, urge that we pay little attention to what a judge or jury say in figuring out why a case was decided; fact skeptics tell us to assume that witnesses are mistaken about what happened; and so on with SLR and CLS. Martin outlines over a dozen such injunctions. This device brings out, *operationally*, how realists think about law. Some seem exaggerated, but many have long been incorporated in legal practice and education.

Martin doesn't defend legal realism in terms of a naturalized epistemology, but that would be a contemporary way to develop the view. Nor does he consider one social science that has thoroughly infiltrated legal practice, thinking, and education: economics. He has, however, considered in detail Hart's criticisms and shown how far realists can go in answering them. And he has done a genuine service in describing in depth and detail the thinking of leading realists, both in America and Scandinavia.

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Swarthmore College

**Roger P. Mourad, Jr.**

*Postmodern Philosophical Critique and the Pursuit of Knowledge in Higher Education*.  
Critical Studies in Education and  
Culture Series.

Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey 1997.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-89789-488-X);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-89789-554-1).

The title might suggest a survey of postmodernist criticisms of knowledge and the disciplines, and a discussion of their implications for the overall organization of universities. The series in which it appears promises guidelines for radical and democratic education. Mourad claims he will develop an account of inquiry informed by the insights offered by postmodernist thought.

Mourad acknowledges in his introduction that it is not easy to give a brief characterization of postmodernism. To identify it with the rejection of absolute or objective 'foundations', or with crude cognitive relativism fails to capture what is distinctive of postmodernism. That is rather the thought that inquiry is not a progressive disclosure of an independent reality, guided by



aims enunciated in the past, but a spontaneous conversation, as Rorty intimates.

Mourad devotes his second chapter to the modernist position that has been found wanting. Here he describes inquiry as intimately tied to truth, in the thought of R.M. Hutchins, to science, in Whitehead, to democracy, in A.B. Giametti, and to a globally responsive humanism, in Pelikan's re-examination of Cardinal Newman.

Chapters 3 and 4 explore themes in the work of Lyotard, Rorty, Calvin Schrag, Foucault, and Derrida. The final two chapters discuss and reject the view that inquiry requires the assumption of a pre-existing reality, claim that this assumption unnecessarily constrains us, and urge a conception of inquiry as the pursuit of 'intellectually compelling ideas,' irrespective of their apparent relation to reality, an inquirer-based conception in contrast to the object-based one typical of ordinary modernist thought.

What does it all add up to? The opacity and high level of abstraction and generality of Mourad's discussion doesn't make it easy to answer this question, but it seems we can keep what we have (though perhaps without endorsing each discipline's misconstruction of its aim) and add some 'post-disciplinary research programs' — 'two or more scholars from disparate disciplines who choose to affiliate with the aim of pursuing an intellectually compelling idea or ideas that are not about preexisting reality' (104). Qualitative research and complexity theory can be seen as anticipations of a postmodernist, postdisciplinary future, and we should give due regard to Barthes' view of 'the reader as an active creator of texts' (106). Not much hope here for radicalism or democracy, nor for responsible responsiveness to what happens around us.

Mourad notices that we have 'pure' and 'applied' disciplines, and that thriving subjects are sites of contestation, but it appears that we can, after the postmodernist critique, keep all and any of our current subjects. That critique gives us no ground for thinking that, say, psychoanalysis or theology deserve no more place in the sun than witchcraft, or that the study of literature or policy analysis is a very different intellectual activity from history or sociology. Mourad quotes Searle on the obscurity and mystery-mongering of self-confessed postmodernists (76), but his own contribution does not advance their cause or give the lie to such criticisms.

### **E.P. Brandon**

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**Friedrich Nietzsche**

*Human, All Too Human.*

Trans. R.J. Hollingdale.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Pp. xxix + 400.

US\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-56200-7);

US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-56704-1).

**Friedrich Nietzsche**

*Human, All Too Human, Volume 1.*

Trans. Gary Handwerk.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1997.

Pp. x + 385.

US\$29.95. ISBN 0-8047-2665-5.

Nietzsche wrote *Human, All Too Human* while suffering from a severe, undiagnosed illness and feeling increasingly oppressed by the burdens of his career as a classical philologist. He resigned from the University of Basel in 1879, a year after its publication, and at 35 began life as a nomadic European which lasted until his complete collapse ten years later. Looking back in *Ecce Homo*, he described *Human, All Too Human* as a 'monument to a crisis,' affirming his break from social, personal and intellectual habits as a painful remedy which allowed him to pursue the work which was uniquely his. But if Nietzsche had to overcome philology in order to become a philosopher, Gary Handwerk's translation of volume one for Stanford's *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche* reminds one of the respect he retained for philologists: 'some books are so valuable,' he says in *The Gay Science* (#102), 'that whole generations of scholars are well employed in their labors to preserve these books in a state that is pure and intelligible.'

Aspiring to such intelligibility, Nietzsche battled three publishers and was obsessed with finding an appropriate audience for his writings (where one did not exist, he says in the preface to this book, he 'invented' one). All his books were based upon various outlines, went through numerous title changes, and were subject to revision up to the moment of publication. By Nietzschean standards, however, *Human, All Too Human* had a long gestation period, and Handwerk's afterword brilliantly describes the laborious process in which multiple drafts shaped great quantities of original notebook material. Prior to an 1886 republication, moreover, Nietzsche was able to make deletions, additions and revisions. All this material is clearly laid out for future scholars in 50 pages of indispensable textual notes. (Nietzsche also decided to turn two later works into *Human, All Too Human* Volume Two, which will constitute a later volume in the Stanford series.) It is hard to imagine Nietzsche not being pleased with the work 'fastidious philologists' have done on a book which in 1893 had sold less than 300 copies and was part of an intellectual estate in the process of being dismembered and distorted by his sister's proto-Nazism.



Handwerk's translation is the first based upon the definitive Colli and Montinari German edition of *The Complete Works*. To the casual reader familiar with Hollingdale's 1986 version, the most obvious difference is the deft use of gender-neutral language (chapter 9, 'Man Alone By Himself,' for example, becomes 'By Oneself Alone'), but turns of phrase in every aphorism make this a genuinely contemporary reading. Hollingdale's translation, however, stands up well. A biographical chronology, a 'further reading' list, and an index are welcome additions to its republication in Cambridge's *Texts In The History of Philosophy* series (the index could be more extensive but Stanford only provides a subject index). Erich Heller's introduction has been replaced by a longer one written by Richard Schacht. Schacht might be less eloquent than Heller, and unlike Handwerk, he has no 'philological' discoveries to convey. But his subtle and insightful assessment of *Human, All Too Human*'s place in Nietzsche's oeuvre — especially helpful to those coming to the book for the first time — suits this edition perfectly.

Hollingdale's translation, after all, was itself a significant scholarly event. In 1986 Nietzsche's status and influence as a philosopher had come full circle from 1950 when Walter Kaufmann needed to cut away an overgrowth of 'rank fiction' before starting his series of translations. Hollingdale always worked in Kaufmann's shadow (collaborating with him or translating works he had already translated, and writing a commentary that was neither as timely nor strongly argued). Yet Kaufmann never translated *Human, All Too Human* nor its successor, *Daybreak* (which Hollingdale translated for Cambridge in 1982), believing them to be less important than other books. Until twelve years ago, therefore, a complete translation of Nietzsche's longest book only existed as part of the often untrustworthy Oscar Levy set unavailable even in some university libraries. Hollingdale's gift of simple accessibility has undoubtedly benefited the latest generation of Nietzschean scholarship in myriad ways (and the Stanford edition will bring renewed attention). Is now the time to revise Kaufmann's evaluation?

Although the consistent tone and purpose of its 1,400 aphorisms support Nietzsche's combination of what were originally two volumes into one book, the title of part one of Volume Two, 'Assorted Opinions and Maxims,' is telling. The aphorisms of *The Gay Science*, for instance, are elements of a rhythmic succession of motifs which power and sharpen the ideas, whereas *Human, All Too Human* lacks such a sophisticated style, and Volume 2 can be accurately described as a 'collection'. Volume 1, however, opens with an uncharacteristically systematic sequence of conceptually circumscribed but explicitly linked chapters. This method of delivery partly explains the philosophical punch packed by Nietzsche's analyses of the most deeply-seated human needs (for metaphysical explanations, a moral explanation of behaviour, and religious or artistic transcendence of life). Effective rhetorical design also helps. The twin decisions to subtitle the original volume, *A Book For Free Spirits*, and dedicate it to Voltaire were pointedly self-conscious ways of pledging allegiance to 'Enlightenment' values after an overdose of German 'Romanticism'.



This symbolism, however, is ambiguous. Handwerk refers to Erich Heller's claim that 'Voltaire served Nietzsche merely as the stick with which to chastise Wagner' (369), but Nietzsche obviously deepened his 'cultural criticism' (as practiced in the *Untimely Meditations*) by tapping 18th-century naturalism for the free spirit's heralded 'historical philosophizing' (#2, Vol. 1) which 'can no longer be separated from natural science' (#1, 1). Recurring vocabulary, moreover, supports Schacht's claim that Voltaire was 'an exemplary free spirit' (xxi): 'free spirit' functions as the antonym of 'fanatic' as Voltaire defined the term; Voltaire's label of 'superstition' characterizes the 'erroneous' or 'false' beliefs essential to such a definition; and Nietzsche's ubiquitous judgments regarding 'childish', 'regressive' or 'retarded' beliefs or personalities presuppose historical 'stages' or cultural 'grades'. Still, this implies 'progress'. And surely the corrosive skepticism of a *Nietzschean* free spirit undermines the foundation of Voltaire's idea of progress, namely, the assumption that beliefs were devalued the moment a) they were falsified by scientific rationality and/or b) the actions they entailed were condemned by an ahistorical, quasi-Newtonian moral law?

In line with later books, *Human, All Too Human* clinically dissects belief in such a moral law. But the affirmation of scientific rationality makes one wonder whether the rhetoric with which Nietzsche originally assigned this book its strategic role in European cultural history, caught him in a question-begging scientism to be overcome in a more mature, 'consistent' skepticism? A pair of achingly beautiful retrospective prefaces suggests otherwise. (Quite typically, in 1886 he wrote a new preface for each of the two volumes of the first *unified* edition.) From these perspectives, Nietzsche persistently questions the value of 'scientific truth' in the economy of life, and affirms the benefits of error, illusion and self-deception. The crux is that skepticism regarding the *value* of scientific truth coexists with a faith that beliefs could in fact be falsified by the *existence* of truth. In 1986, the original publication date of Hollingdale's translation and heyday of deconstruction, the latter was highly significant. For if illusions could be destroyed by hard truth then (and only then) 'progress was possible' (#24, 1).

On the other hand, 'the possibility of progress' (as the title of that early aphorism puts it) requires more than free-spiritedness of any sort. In a series of aphorisms which brings Volume 1 to a fine close, for example, Nietzsche describes those 'compound creatures' or 'mixed beings' who incarnate an icy criticism betraying 'all things that can be in any way betrayed' and the illusion-creating 'fire' of 'enthusiastic devotion' (#637, 1). Nietzsche's loyalty to the Enlightenment cannot prevent him from embracing 'enthusiasm' — an anathema to Voltaire. But if humanity requires both characteristics, the key to progress lies in the practical capacity to know when critical destruction is necessary (and how it should be accomplished). The prefaces tend to take this in an existential direction which is as distant from Voltaire as Derrida, or, as *Ecce Homo* put it: dedicating *Human, All Too Human* to Voltaire 'really was progress — toward myself.' Yet there is a pervasive concern in both

volumes for transforming and adapting even 'the smallest and most everyday things' (#6, 2, part 2) for the purpose of enhancing the human species.

Interpretations of this central Nietzschean theme (which emerges for the first time in *Human, All Too Human*) can easily be affected by translation decisions. The editor of the Stanford series says that 'particular attention has been given to maintaining a consistent terminology throughout the volumes' (ix). And within this book, for example, Handwerk invariably renders '*Entwicklung*' as 'development' whereas Hollingdale often shifts to 'evolution'. Obviously Nietzsche is no Darwin, and Darwin himself tended to avoid the word 'evolution' because of connotations of progress, but context often tempts one to support Hollingdale's decision to use the more rhetorically potent 'evolution' (and its cognates). Scholars, of course, must grapple with this themselves, and a good place to begin thinking about the question might be 'Signs Of Higher And Lower Culture' (chapter 5, 1). For Handwerk is right in saying that this book's 'stylistic self-discipline' seems 'never to have seduced many readers' (376). Here, however, Nietzsche expresses normative criteria for an evolving humanity with insight and a grace that can be as appealing as his later fireworks.

### **Roderick Nicholls**

University College of Cape Breton

### **Martha Nussbaum**

*Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education.*

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

1997. Pp. xii + 328.

US\$26.00. ISBN 0-674-17948-X.

The role of the humanities in American higher education has become a subject of fierce controversy in recent years. On one side, academic conservatives rail against the betrayal of liberal education by multiculturalists, postmodernists, and kindred spirits. For their part, exponents of change argue for an education that is more culturally inclusive and press claims about the complicity of mainstream scholarship and teaching in the oppression of subordinate groups. Important civic and philosophical questions are at stake here, but they are often obscured in a debate that has become intemperate and deeply polarized. Nussbaum's *Cultivating Humanity* is a timely corrective to the excesses of both cultural traditionalists and their antagonists inside the academy.

The book is clearly intended for a very wide readership, and as a consequence, some important problems are dealt with too bluntly to satisfy



philosophically fastidious readers. Sophisticated relativists, for example, are unlikely to be persuaded by Nussbaum's brisk dismissal of their views. But parrying the cleverest objections to one's conclusions need not be the most important thing an author can accomplish, even in philosophy. This is an imaginative, engrossing, and largely persuasive book that anyone who cares about liberal education would profit from reading.

Nussbaum deftly inverts the standard argument that academic conservatives have marshalled against demands for more culturally inclusive curricula. The standard argument has been that the dominant American conception of liberal education, with its exaltation of 'Great Books' and disdain for all that is trendy or merely exotic, uniquely embodies commitment to the values of reason and truth and sustains a hallowed pedagogical tradition inaugurated by Socrates with his defence of the examined life. But as Nussbaum points out, the Socratic ideal has a far closer affinity with the arguments of the more thoughtful exponents of change in the American academy than it has with the pieties of their conservative opponents. Like Socrates, the best radical scholars challenge the received wisdom of established social practice in education and elsewhere, and they pose that challenge through criticism that exposes what purport to be universally valid norms as culturally contingent or merely self-serving. If the outrage this provokes among George Will, Roger Kimball and their kind has ancient antecedents, they are to be found in the anti-Socratic polemic of Aristophanes' *The Clouds* rather than the subversive criticism of the Socratic tradition itself. To be sure, Nussbaum acknowledges that the vogue for postmodernism has exercised a lowering influence in some quarters. But to confound postmodernist extravagance with all arguments for more inclusive research and curricula is as foolish as classifying Socrates among the Sophists.

The Socratic tradition achieved its most elaborate educational expression in antiquity among the Stoics, who tied the virtues of the examined life to an ideal of 'world citizenship'. The critical powers of the educated mind are properly deployed in the service of a universal moral community, and so the cultivation of those powers rightly proceeds alongside a growing sense of solidarity with humanity as a whole. America's deepening cultural diversity, coupled with its growing inter-dependence with other nation states, make the Stoic ideal compelling for future citizens who are to live with others in mutual respect. Of course, the realization of Stoic cosmopolitanism depends on much more than whether American colleges implement the right kind of liberal education. But in a society where higher education reaches an ever-increasing segment of the population, and formal education at all levels has traditionally been tied to the business of creating citizens, attention to the politico-ethical rationale of curricular decisions is entirely apt.

Nussbaum's version of the Stoic ideal devolves into three interlocked dispositions. World citizens must be able and inclined to challenge beliefs, accepting only those that meet the demand for consistency and rational justification; they must see themselves as partaking of a common humanity, shaped by shared vulnerabilities, capabilities and problems; and lastly, they



must have the 'narrative imagination' to make sense of human diversity by learning to understand some of the plenitude of perspectives and stories that give our common nature so many different and unpredictable realizations. Nussbaum does not say these three dispositions are all there is to an education for world citizenship, but they represent its humanistic core, and they provide an appealing vantage-point from which to think about the reform of higher education.

A sequence of chapters on the study of Non-Western cultures, African-American studies, women's studies, and human sexuality explores how the constitutive dispositions of the Stoic ideal may be well or badly served in current educational practice. Nussbaum's argument ranges widely across a vast body of recent research, and she gives vivid, detailed examples of how that research is being integrated into curricula at many different post-secondary institutions. The overall story she tells is optimistic. Although some shoddy scholarship and teaching in these burgeoning new fields may be wedded to insular versions of identity politics, there is much that keeps faith with the most exacting norms of Socratic criticism, and enlarges understanding of human differences without eclipsing the sense of a common humanity. The possibilities of a genuinely liberal education in religiously affiliated institutions are also discussed, with Notre Dame and Brigham Young serving respectively as examples of the best we might reasonably hope for and the worst we should fear.

Ambitious books provoke misgivings, and this one is no exception. Some will balk at the emphatic cosmopolitanism of Nussbaum's ideal; others will doubt the consistency of her rousing appeal for cultural inclusion on the one hand and her epistemological conservatism on the other. Another possible objection seems deeper to me. Nussbaum presents the constitutive dispositions of the Stoic ideal as if we need not worry about any conflict between them. But I think we should. The growth of Socratic autonomy does not always lead in directions that are civically wholesome; the narrative imagination may yield a sense that human differences cut so deep that talk of a common humanity is idle. If our teaching aims to cultivate Socratic autonomy above all else, then we might teach Nietzsche and Mill without caring, qua teachers, whose side our students will eventually take. On the other hand, if we want Socratic autonomy only so far as it converges with the other elements of the Stoic ideal, we only succeed as teachers when our students come to see that Nietzsche was dead wrong. Learning to follow wherever the best argument seems to lead and learning to make the substantive moral commitments of the world citizen are not necessarily the same process, and an education wedded to the latter will not necessarily give the former free rein. Nussbaum ignores this, which is a shame, since she speaks so wisely and eloquently about much else.

**Eamonn Callan**

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**Andrew Radford**

*Syntactic theory and the structure of English:  
A minimalist approach.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.

Pp. xii + 558.

US\$69.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-47125-7);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-47707-7).

Nowadays many philosophers of language take empirical work seriously. Such philosophers — I count myself among them — have a need to keep abreast of recent developments in linguistics, both empirical and theoretical. But research in linguistics, and most especially in syntax, advances so quickly, and in so many different directions, that it's nearly impossible for linguistically minded philosophers to remain *au courant*. In particular, attempting to keep up with the primary literature is nearly hopeless: most papers in the leading journals presuppose a host of other papers, mastery of which would make doing any *philosophy* essentially impossible. Woe is us!

It is in this context that Andrew Radford's new book is so welcome. It was written to serve as an intensive introductory textbook in formal syntax, presupposing little or no familiarity with earlier approaches. In particular, Radford's aim was to introduce the central ideas of Chomsky's Minimalist Program (e.g. feature checking, attraction, and greed) without recourse to either the Extended Standard Theory's or Government and Binding's related ideas (e.g. case and theta-rôle assignment, Move  $\alpha$ , and bounding conditions respectively). Though I was a bit concerned at how speculative the last chapters were, given that this is an introductory textbook, on the whole I expect the book will serve this student audience as well as Radford's two previous and equally excellent textbooks. But to my mind the book can serve a rather different audience as well: it is an easy and painless way for philosophers to bring themselves up to speed on developments in Chomsky's minimalist syntax; or, more precisely, one can get close enough to 'up to speed' for many philosophical purposes.

True enough, the text by no means provides air-tight arguments for its conclusions — too often, for example, a generalization is drawn from a single case; or again, assumptions introduced for the sake of argument are later treated as well-evidenced principles. Moreover, in some cases the book begs precisely the questions that anti-Chomskyan philosophers will care about. Hence it will likely *not* serve to convince sceptics of the correctness or importance of Minimalism. It is a pedagogical, not a polemical, book, and is for those who antecedently take generative syntax seriously. Still, as a guide to what is now widely believed within this emerging framework, the book is very useful indeed.

And there is a lot of interesting new work described. Some of it of direct relevance to philosophers of language. For example, there is material which bears on Davidson's 'paratactic' approach to quotation and propositional attitudes. According to Davidson, the word 'that' in 'John said that Mary was




sleeping' and 'John believes that Mary was sleeping' is a demonstrative which refers, in context, to the utterance of 'Mary was sleeping'. An obvious objection to this proposal is that the word 'that' can be elided, as in 'John believes Mary was sleeping'; an equally obvious rebuttal, on Davidson's behalf, is that there is a syntactically present but phonetically null complementizer in this last sentence, which does the same work as the fully pronounced 'that'. Radford (§4.6), however, presents arguments to the effect that the correct structure for 'John believes Mary was sleeping' is [<sub>IP</sub> John believes [<sub>IP</sub> Mary was sleeping]] rather than [<sub>IP</sub> John believes [<sub>CP</sub> [<sub>C</sub> Ø] [<sub>IP</sub> Mary was sleeping]]]. Which effectively blocks the 'obvious rebuttal' of the 'obvious objection': if this now widely accepted position is correct, then there is nothing in 'John believes Mary was sleeping' which can refer to 'Mary was sleeping'. This alone doesn't refute Davidson, of course; but it's clearly relevant.


As in his previous works, Radford has made some inspired pedagogical choices. As usual he provides well chosen examples; and he offers some very picturesque glosses for technical terms: e.g., he describes c-command in terms of networks of train stations! (He writes, 'X c-commands Y if you can get from X to Y by catching a northbound train, getting off at the first station and catching a southbound train on a different line ...' [112].) Moreover there is an extensive index and a comprehensive glossary, and each section ends with an excellent summary. In addition to this 'prescribed equipment', Radford also provides some rather novel teaching tools. For instance, he has wisely chosen to illustrate his points with 'non-standard' varieties of English (i.e., Jamaican Creole, Belfast English, etc), rather than employing examples from languages which few non-specialists will know. A case in point: to exemplify the difference between movement of a verb, and 'percolation' of its grammatical (but not its phonetic) features, Radford contrasts Early Modern English (the language of Shakespeare) and Modern Standard English. To paraphrase his example: in tree number (1), the whole verb moves (i.e., its grammatical *and* its phonetic features raise to the INFL node); whereas in tree number (2), the phonetic features remain *in situ*, while the grammatical features are raised to INFL. The former is a case of verb movement; the latter is feature percolation, also called 'attraction'. (The item raised, and its trace, appear in bold face.)



(1) *Verb Movement in Early Modern English*



(2) *Percolation (i.e. Attraction) in Modern Standard English*



An equally smart and novel idea, pedagogically speaking, was to include in the 'workbook' section of the text not only exercises but carefully crafted 'model answers', as well as 'helpful hints'. These are very useful indeed. (For those who have less interest in doing the exercises, Radford has published an abridged companion volume, also from Cambridge, called *Syntax: A Minimalist Introduction*.)

In sum, the book very effectively presents the emerging consensus within minimalist syntax, and provides the necessary background for pursuing topics in the primary literature. I highly recommend it to my fellow travelers in linguistically-minded philosophy of language.

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**Nicholas Rescher**

*Objectivity: The obligations of  
impersonal reason.*

Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame  
Press 1997. Pp. xi + 230.

US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-268-03701-9);

US\$16.00 (paper: ISBN 0-268-03703-5).

'Objectivity has fallen on hard days' (1), especially if one considers the notion in abstraction. Rescher's aim is to rehabilitate objectivity against what he takes to be 'a wide variety of fashionably modern and "postmodern" objections' (xi). The risks of such a defensive polemic are familiar: unduly elevating frivolous and transient trends by taking them seriously, and (more sinister) revealing the unreflective side of one's own conservatism. Rescher does not completely avoid these risks, but still produces a thought-provoking discussion of topics in epistemology, ethics, and literary theory.

On Rescher's account, objectivity is rehabilitated via its connection to rationality; the fundamental obligation on us as humans is to be rational. Analytically, rationality entails a particular sort of impersonalism, the commitment in every circumstance to do and believe what anyone in the community of reason would do and believe in the same circumstances. Thus Rescher's conception of rationality depends precariously on counterfactual claims; but if the strategy is successful he achieves a balance between the demands of universality and contextual flexibility. 'What rationality is' can be monolithically uniform while 'what is it rational to do?' can be variable according to context (18-19). There is a functionally defined hierarchy, extending between uniform general principles and indefinitely variable particular cases. By definition the rational must, at the abstract level, be universal. The rationality (and hence objectivity) of the particular judgement is indirect: the connection between the universal principle and the concrete decision is made by procedures which any rational person would follow in the circumstances.

This framework is applied to epistemology and to ethics (ontological objectivity depends on epistemic objectivity). The challenge in each is to justify non-circularly the claim that rationality involves universality of principles. For epistemology this is convincing, through an amalgamation of pragmatism (our need to get things done in the world imposes sufficient constraints on truth claims) and a broadly Kantian emphasis on the epistemic stance necessary for communication. It proves harder to develop a justification for the requirement of universality in ethics. Rescher advances a defence based on the fact that general benefit accrues only when there is a fundamental commitment to impersonal fairness. But this is a merely subsidiary argument and has long proven unconvincing. The real work of defending the requirement of universal regard for others is done by a Kantian stipulation. Non-Kantian positions in meta-ethics are, by implication, dismissed as simply not dealing with morality. Here, only the converted will be convinced. Nevertheless, Rescher's application of 'functional hierarchy' to moral deliberation demonstrates that objectivity of universal principles and articulable reasonableness in deliberation are compatible with a situational flexibility sufficient to block both clumsy universalist deontology and shallow relativism.

Rescher's final theme is hermeneutic objectivity; his critique of deconstructionism in its crudest form rests on a vigorous defense of maximal coherence as the key criterion for interpretative superiority and incorporates a disarming acknowledgement that there is a valid place for the kind of free-floating imaginative (re)-interpretation most often associated with literary theory (though not one with any rational claim on other readers' assent).

### **Brad Inwood**

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**David Roochnik**

*Of Art and Wisdom.*

University Park: Penn State Press 1996.

Pp. xii + 300.

US\$40.00. ISBN 0-271-01563-2.

In this book Roochnik addresses a question that is fundamental to any interpretation of Plato's early dialogues: what is the precise role of the analogy with *technê* (craft? technical expertise? — the word is notoriously hard to translate) which Socrates so frequently introduces into his ethical discussions? Does Socrates think that morality, or at least moral knowledge, is a kind of *technê*? Many interpretations of the early dialogues have answered in the affirmative. Indeed Roochnik sees this response as so widespread that he labels it the 'Standard Account of Techne' ['SAT']. His thesis is an attempt to rebut the SAT: 'In the "early" dialogues Plato *rejects technê as a model of moral knowledge*' (6) [his italics].

In a useful opening survey of pre-Platonic conceptions of *technê* (17-88), Roochnik argues that one can see emerging a division of *technai* into what he calls 'technē<sub>1</sub>' and 'technē<sub>2</sub>'. The former, exemplified by mathematics, has a high level of precision and determinacy; the latter, exemplified by medicine, a lower level, given that its subject-matter is human beings rather than objects.

As a representative summary of Roochnik's arguments about the early dialogues, I turn to p. 125, where he gives four reasons against a Socratic identification of moral knowledge with *technê*. Thus, 'In the *Laches*, if courage is a *technê*, three problems ensue: First, it would eliminate the possibility of risk taking ... Second ... *technê* is value-neutral ... Third ... it allows for a gap between theory and practice ...' A fourth reason (with respect to the *Charmides*) is that the human self — the object of moral knowledge — is too indeterminate to serve as the subject-matter of a *technê*.

Now two theses must be carefully distinguished here: (1) Socrates models moral knowledge on *technê*. (2) Socrates' own philosophical method is a *technê* or *technê*-like. Roochnik argues at length against (2) and in favour of the thesis that Socrates' practice is nonetheless an expression of ('nontechnical') moral knowledge. But this is not to show that Socrates does not model moral knowledge on *technê* — Socrates might consider his own method inferior to possession of a moral *technê*. On p. 209 Roochnik claims that Socrates is not nor 'even desires himself to become, a *technitês*', on the grounds that the human soul is not a passive and fixed object. But then neither is the human body, and medicine is often treated by Socrates as a paradigm *technê*. Why should not moral knowledge be modeled by Socrates on (say) *technê<sub>2</sub>*? This would certainly be compatible with the first and fourth of Roochnik's 'anti-*technê*' reasons.

Take now his second reason, namely that *technê* is 'value-neutral'. This is surely insufficient evidence that Socrates does not model moral knowledge on *technê*. Say, for example, Socrates identified 'moral value' with what is

good for the soul. He then, again, may see moral knowledge as akin to medicine, which deals in the good of the body. Each would perhaps be a *technê*<sub>2</sub>.

Roochnik's third reason is potentially the most challenging for an advocate of the SAT. The claim is that *technê* allows a 'gap' between theory and practice, as morality does not. As Roochnik reminds us (136-8), the *Hippias Minor* seems to raise critical problems for a morality-as-*technê* model, by arguing that, on such a model, the deliberate doing of injustice would be a mark of a just man. One must note, however, the crucial expression of doubt by Socrates at the end of the dialogue (376b5-6) as to whether a person exists who would deliberately do injustice. It is at least arguable that, for Socrates, one who knows justice will act justly. Furthermore, it is by no means clear that Socrates would actually bestow the label of *technitês* on (say) a builder who deliberately built bad houses. The deliberate 'bad performance' canvassed in the *Hippias Minor* may be no more than a thought-experiment — one who deliberately built bad houses *would be* better at building than one who did so accidentally. In other words, it is not evident that Socrates did conceive of a theory-practice gap in the case of *technê* in the way Roochnik describes; if so, then the absence of such a gap in the case of moral knowledge would be no bar on *technê* serving as a model for moral knowledge.

Roochnik's book is written in a clear and fluent style, and is a pleasure to read. His account should make us realize that Socrates' attitude towards *technê* is perhaps rather more subtle than some protagonists of the SAT would have us believe. His discussion of the 'kingly *technê*' in the *Euthydemus* (150-77), which I have not adverted to, is particularly valuable in this regard. If SAT remains a viable interpretation, Roochnik is nonetheless a useful corrective against dogmatic slumbers.

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**Gillian Rose**

*Mourning Becomes the Law:*

*Philosophy and Representation.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Pp. 163.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-57045-X);

US\$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-57849-3).

Critics of postmodern philosophy and social theory are legion and their arguments are well known; postmodern theory is, they claim, politically neo-conservative, theoretically superficial and ethically relativistic. Add to these the damning charge that the slogan of angst-ridden, self-interested postmodern academics might be, as Ernest Gellner puts it, *Sturm und Drang und Tenure*, and one wonders whether postmodern theory requires any critical engagement at all. But that is not the whole story. The sophistication of much philosophical reflection considered postmodern demands serious attention, not least because postmodernism's leading figures do not stand outside the philosophical tradition even if they attempt to problematize and deconstruct what is antecedent. What is refreshing about the work of Gillian Rose, and, one should add, what makes her thought rather difficult, is both the distinctive character of her critique of postmodernity and her confrontation, from a Jewish perspective, of the contemporary denigration of reason and the celebration of the 'ethical'. Rose is not an admirer of postmodernism — far from it. She even informs the reader in Chapter 1 of *Mourning Becomes the Law* that she wishes the word 'post-modernism' had never passed her lips. Nevertheless, her engagement is 'responsible' in that she affirms 'the reassessment of reason' (11) rather than a return to the (imagined) conceptual totality of modernity so denounced by postmodern critics.

It is the very passion with which Rose confronts the contemporary political, social and intellectual landscape that makes these essays so compelling. Indeed, as posthumously published essays, one could almost suggest that Rose has presented the reader with a final wish: not to despair — to mourn, certainly, but to begin again the hard work of politics, love and religious life in the morning. It is this demand, in stark contrast to postmodern theory — branded a '*despairing rationalism without reason*' (7) — that characterizes this collection of disparate pieces. One could also identify these essays, as the dust jacket does, as a 'philosophical counterpart' to Rose's highly acclaimed memoir, *Love's Work* (New York: Schocken Books, 1995). The latter's epigraph — 'Keep your mind in hell, and despair not' — finds an echo throughout this later work and, when one considers her long battle (and, indeed, reconciliation) with the cancer that eventually caused her early death, one cannot help thinking that such a sentiment summarizes Rose's entire oeuvre.

The first three chapters of this final work can, I think, be considered as an excellent introduction to that body of work. Chapter 1 takes to task the contemporary emphasis in the human sciences generally on the notion of 'community'. The irony, Rose suggests, is that the prominence of the commu-



nal comes at the very time when a distrust of the universal is at its height. Thus, we have old Athens (rationality and power abused) opposed to 'New Jerusalem' (community and power dissolved and shared). In opting for the latter, Rose suggests that 'we hope for a collective life ... without the perennial work which constantly legitimates and delegitimizes the transformation of power into authority of different kinds' (16). Consequently, Rose attacks the lack of 'hard work' in a postmodern refusal to engage with an anxiety and ambivalence inherent in power and knowledge. She brilliantly demonstrates the contemporary evasion of the reinvention of the political community through a discussion of Poussin's *Landscape with the Ashes of Phocion*. Here Rose insists on the necessity of the completion of mourning because 'mourning returns the soul to the city, renewed and reinvigorated for participation, ready to take on the difficulties and injustices of the existing city' (36).

In the second essay, through readings of *Schindler's List* and Kazuo Ishigoro's *Remains of the Day* (in each case referring to book and film), Rose argues against the postmodern desire for the overcoming of representation. She looks instead to 'the persistence of always fallible and contestable representation' that 'opens the possibility for our acknowledgement of mutual implication in the fascism of our cultural rites and rituals' (41). The refusal of representation produces a lacuna in which politics is impossible; the political is defined as totalitarian or nihilist. Rose wants to risk the navigation of the interstices and aporias of representation: a process of discovery in which one 'does not know the outcome in advance' (58).

Chapter 3 is a denunciation of 'the anarchic utopianism at the heart of postmodern thinking' (68). Rose believes that postmodernism produces, in place of the 'work' of mourning, 'a play, the Trauerspiel, the interminable mourning play and lament' (64). Derrida's New International, outlined in *Spectres of Marx*, is exemplary here in that it is memberless and bodyless and communityless. Rose wants to chase the 'spirits back into their bodies', their history and their political life in order 'to complete the work of mourning' (71). This critique of Derrida is carried out with the support of Hegel. The constant deconstruction of static dualisms, a successor to Kantian antinomies, is rejected and replaced by the requirement to 'reconfigure the broken middle' (76).

Chapters 4 and 5 can be seen as an application of the concerns of the three previous chapters. In Chapter 4, Rose shows how Geoffrey Hartman's presentation of Midrash, which he declines to oppose to politics, radically distinguishes him from the proponents of 'Judaism as ethics' — Levinas, Derrida, Bloom and Jabès (83). Rose's disagreement with Maurice Blanchot, pursued in Chapter 5, concerns his positing 'passivity beyond passivity' in response to the disaster, the endless ending. It is 'activity beyond activity' that constitutes Rose's rejoinder; an activity composed of 'acting, reflecting on the outcome, and then initiating further action' (121).

The final essay in this excellent book begins with a powerful reminder of the urgency with which Rose confronts the contemporary intellectual scene:

'I may die before my time' (125). This meditative ending asks, it seems to me, *the* question with regard to an assessment of postmodernism. 'Is all knowing mastery, and not rather *attention*, the natural prayer of the soul?' (137) To answer hastily would be foolish but, and this is Rose's bequest, to refuse the possibility of an answer is to refuse to mourn and begin again the hard work of risking the possible.

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**Michael Stocker**

(**With Elizabeth Hegeman**)

*Valuing Emotions.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Pp. xxviii + 353.

US\$64.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-56110-8);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-56786-6).

This is a long, *far too long*, book on an interesting and important subject. The repetitiveness of the authors' general concern which strikes the reader more than once on every page, aroused, at least in me, annoyance and irritation, up to the point that the following quote seemed to reveal what really moved the writing of this book: 'For present purposes, it is enough to note the ways angry or self-pitying people are all too likely to be preoccupied by their own grievances and their own status, to be too harsh on others' views, especially views of those they feel have wronged them' (93).

Judging the book in the light of this quote, ironically illustrates one of its central claims, namely, that emotions have a crucial epistemological impact, particularly in cases where what is to be judged, or known, is itself intrinsically an *evaluative* world. It also illustrates, I think, another claim made in the book, namely, that questions about the appropriateness of emotions are very important. I was very keen on reading this book, admiring some of Stocker's earlier work, and being very much inclined to defend the importance of relations between emotions, evaluations, motivations, values, practical reasoning and evaluative knowledge myself. Much to my disappointment, however, I have to admit that, unlike Stocker's anger and self-pity, my annoyance and irritation are appropriate: the book could have been good and important, but it isn't, because Stocker lost himself in too much anger and too much self-pity.



Yes, Stocker is angry on our overintellectualized culture with its long tradition of cool rationality that is bound to miss everything that should concern us in practical (moral) affairs. And he displays a lot of self-pity in his endless and repetitive complaints about the many mistakes in the standard view on ethics and moral psychology, with its emphasis on the usefulness of reason and the dangers of emotion. The impression that Stocker is preoccupied with grievances and his own status is very strong: he is too harsh on other philosophers' views, deploring the fact that his earlier work wasn't received well enough to make a major change in what he thinks is a very mistaken conception of evaluative judgement. And this goes on, page after page.

Setting aside my disappointment, however, there remains much to be said in favour of Stocker's project. For almost 30 years Stocker has been arguing against a conception of ethics as mainly being concerned with the evaluation of public acts, arguing that it implies a serious neglect of the importance of the role of the agent and the private realm of intimates in moral reasoning. Stocker has done much to raise philosophical interest in what is a booming discipline now: moral psychology.

The present book can be read as a report of this enterprise. In its first part Stocker argues for two claims: (1) emotions are intrinsically affective: they display our being *moved* (which cannot be understood merely in terms of beliefs and/or desires); and (2) emotions reveal value: our being moved shows that there is something of value, or, that we consider something to be valuable.

This last claim is elaborated upon in the second, main part of the book which is, basically, a defense of the claim that there are constitutive and epistemological connections between emotions and values. That is, it is shown (not 'argued', since there is not much of an argument in this part) that emotions are constitutively relevant to values in the sense of their being internal to, inseparable from, or even forms of values. Likewise it is shown that emotions are epistemologically relevant to values in the sense that emotions provide evidence of, are expressions of or even forms of evaluative knowledge.

The third and final part of the book contains a number of case studies in which it is shown how much we have to understand of a person's character, personality, mental make-up, and interpersonal relations — in short, of the person's complex evaluative world — in order to be able to understand some particular emotion this person has. The bulk of this part consists of a detailed discussion of Aristotle's account of self-concern and anger, but there are also interesting sections on shame and painful emotions, and the beginning of a psychoanalytic interpretation of the peculiar habit of many philosophers to use killing another person as *just an example* in their analyses of action.

I liked this part best, because it shows how good emotions (the authors' concern and enthusiasm for the details of a world in which emotions and values are given their due place) can live and breathe in philosophy.



It's really a shame that the illuminative chapters of the last part had to be preceded by over 200 pages of complaints about our overintellectualized culture, and not by a short chapter of, say, 10 pages just formulating the claim to be illustrated: that emotions are important because they not only show our being moved by what we care about, but also are themselves values and forms of evaluative knowledge.

**Jan Bransen**

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**Jenny Teichman**

*Social Ethics.*

Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1996. Pp. ix + 193.

US\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-19608-0);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-19609-9).

*Social Ethics*, subtitled 'A Student Guide', claims to be an animated introduction to moral philosophy and key contemporary ethical issues. However, Teichman seems less concerned to pen a scholarly introduction to social ethics than to defend her own brand of humanism while excoriating philosophers and others who hold contrary views. Teichman sees herself as an unorthodox slayer of all and sundry who defend what she terms contemporary dogmas, including those who defend euthanasia and abortion on demand.

Teichman's book is divided into four parts or sections titled respectively Ethical Bedrock, A Defence of Humanism, Deaths and Lives, and finally, Ideology and Value. Each part contains several chapters dealing with specific issues. Two appendices deal with natural rights and euthanasia. Teichman includes a short glossary at the end, a very brief bibliography for each chapter, an index and a short preface.

In the first section, Teichman introduces some basic concepts of ethics and defends her choice of bedrock suppositions that human life is sacred and that there are basic human rights. Her discussion of basic concepts is cursory at best, although her criticisms of psychological and ethical egoism, consequentialism, and ethical relativism are often cogent enough. She fails to note that it is open to consequentialists to take rights, justice, etc., themselves as intrinsic values. There is no mention of virtue ethics, nor any discussion of agent relativity. Sometimes her criticisms reveal more about her pet peeves than about any faults of the theory she is criticizing. For example, she says of consequentialism, 'the "best results" principle allows rulers to decide what

kinds of results are more important than others' (15). That rulers might twist consequentialist principles to their own ends is hardly a fault of the theory. The same might happen if 'rights' rather than consequences were emphasized.

The second section outlines the distinction between a person and a human being and attacks at some length those who hold a view that she calls 'personism' in contrast to her own 'humanism.' Personism, according to the glossary, is the view that not all human beings are worthy of special respect. Philosophers such as Michael Tooley and Peter Singer would be personists in Teichman's sense.

Another favorite Teichman target is speciesism. She claims (184) that speciesism is a term of abuse directed at those who hold that human life is more valuable and worthy of respect than the lives of other animals. But surely only a person who fails to give good grounds for holding that human life is more valuable than animal life is guilty of speciesism. Speciesism is unjustified discrimination based upon our being human. Even Teichman feels compelled to answer the question (46) 'Is there anything special about us?' An adequate answer to that question should defeat the charge of speciesism even if the answer does give pride of place to the human species. Teichman suggests that giving special respect to one's own species has survival value (46). This sounds quite consequentialist to me. She also notes that it is a fact that all gregarious creatures prefer their own kind (46). It is also a fact that racists prefer their own kind and elevate their own group above others. What follows from that?

The chapter on abortion does not discuss moderate positions such as that of Sumner. While Teichman rightfully blasts the view that the fetus is just a part of the woman's body, she entirely ignores arguments such as those of Judith Thomson. Even if there is a universal right to life, there is no unqualified right to what may be required to stay alive, and in particular no absolute right of the fetus to the resources of the womb.

The section on Ideology and Value seems less biased than her treatment of abortion and euthanasia. She gives brief but balanced accounts of Hayekian free-market capitalism, Bevan's democratic socialism and the green movement.

Despite its shortcomings, Teichman's book has definite virtues. She writes forcefully and clearly. She challenges students to question widely held views on important issues. On occasion she makes telling arguments against her opponents. This is not a book to use as a main or introductory textbook in social ethics, but it could be recommended as supplementary reading, especially for students who find more traditional texts boring and unreadable.

**Ken Hanly**

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**William J. Wainwright, ed.**

*God, Philosophy, and Academic Culture.*

Atlanta: Scholars Press 1996. Pp. 87.

US\$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7885-0301-4);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7885-0302-2).

This is a book about, not of, philosophy. It concerns the great gulf apparently fixed between two groups of philosophers who deal with religion: those affiliated with the American Philosophical Association, and those with the American Academy of Religion. The book is not merely of parochial interest. It sheds light on a what many philosophers, not just those in the U.S. and not just those concerned with religion, have experienced as a gap across which it is difficult to engage with others ostensibly in the same discipline.

Contributors to this discussion — eight of them, plus the editor — are drawn from both sides of the alleged divide; some with a claim to straddling it. What they aim to do is account for the division, and offer comments on what, if anything, should be done about it. Commentators include a number of distinguished practitioners (e.g., the editor himself, Robert Adams, Wayne Proudfoot, Philip Quinn and Nicholas Wolterstorff), whose observations one would feel uneasy about ignoring.

The two groups are distinguished by tendencies of geography and affiliation. APA philosophers of religion are typically located in departments of philosophy and are inclined either to be theists or to regard theism as the main contender for religious truth. AAR types, on the other hand, are generally found in departments of religion; they tend not to be theists and do not confine their attention to theism. Beyond these are fundamental distinctions in the way the craft is conducted in the two camps. APA'ers emerge as scholars in the mode of Anglo-American 'analytic' philosophy, interested in consistency, rationality, warrant and truth, and inclined to focus on the abstract dictates of traditional and undifferentiated theism. AAR members have more in common with Continental philosophers, speaking the language of hermeneutics and attending to the subtle phenomena of religion in a way resonant with the approach of social scientists. A contrast is alleged between the 'realism' of the APA members, and the 'anti-realism' among AAR sorts. Members of each tribe regard the practices of the other with suspicion at least.

A number of complementary accounts are offered of this diversity. The departmental locations of the two camps are seen by some as explaining the interest in truth (requiring the assumption that it is available) on the part of APA-types, and the prevailing view among AAR'ers that 'everything is interpretation'. The paucity of theistic belief in AAR affiliates is said to stem from the prevailing liberalism of the academy which inhibits commitment to privileged world-views; an inhibition to which Religion departments are made more sensitive by their history than philosophy departments. At the same time, the detailed attention to the phenomena of religion characteristic of Religion departments supplies an obvious push toward the tolerant stance



of the social scientist who is sympathetic to all but committed to none. Philosophers in philosophy departments, on the other hand, are permitted greater attachment to their disciplinary outlook, including its disinclination toward relativism.

So what should be done? Contributors agree that the state of affairs is not satisfactory. Their suggested remedy is not surprising. It amounts to 'listen to each other'.

APA philosophers of religion remind their associates that they need to take the 'affective and social dimensions of religious life' more seriously than they do; to free themselves of exclusive attention to theism; and to pay attention to the 'hermeneutics of suspicion' as it applies to theistic religion. And AAR adherents are advised to take seriously issues of truth and meaning, to be more critical of social-scientific explanations of religious phenomena, and to think hard about the relativism which often appears to be taken for granted in their deliverances.

All good advice, and the lessons apply beyond the split giving rise to this discussion. But it will take more meetings among receptive people for the desired effect to come about.

**Murdith McLean**

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