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As a rule, P.I.R. publishes only invited reviews. However, we will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English.

En général, C.R.P. ne publie que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, nous prendrions en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais.

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George Allan
Rethinking College Education.
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997.
Pp. xi + 228.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-7006-0842-7.

Rarely have I seen a dust-jacket so thoroughly misunderstand the nature of a book as is the case here. The jacket would have us believe that this is yet another in the long series of books decrying the decadent state of higher education, and yearning for a purer, more civic-minded, less market-driven system.

Nonsense. Allan gives us something much more interesting than this tired tune. In six chapters, he first sets up, and then gives a unique spin to three core understandings of the university. The first chapter, 'The College as Faithful Community', chronicles the transformation of the college's 'persuasive' function from the days when the persuasion was religious to the present, when persuasion represents the sharing of visions and tasks. Chapter two, 'The College as a Guild of Inquirers', establishes an account of the creation and advancement of knowledge. The writing style changes as well, from historical to schematic. Just as the generation of knowledge is governed by precise method, so is this chapter. The third chapter, 'The College as Resource Centre', reads like a series of intellectual pamphlets in a post-modern kiosk. They are fragmented, yet unified in a critique of the campus as polity. Allan shows the resource centre at its best and worst: idiosyncratic, insightful, critical, and sometimes trendy.

Each of these represents a different vision of the university, and to some extent, each undermines the other two. The second group of three chapters attempts to rethink the limits of the first three models. Chapter four, 'The Essence of the College', addresses the potential loss of vision represented in all three earlier chapters by showing that coherence is possible after all. Neither the loss of tradition, specialization nor postmodernism need result in aimlessness. And, the focus on persuasion in the first chapter is mirrored by reflection on the nature of practice here. 'The Playfulness of the College' takes the seriousness out of the method described in chapter two. Postmodern irony, far from being the death of liberal education, gives us a new metaphor to counterbalance the sullen pursuit of knowledge — a kind of Gadamerian notion of play, which allows us to engage the world apart from the logic of means and ends. And chapter six, 'The Standards of the College', argues (as much as an unsettled dialogue between four unidentified disputants can constitute an argument) that the needed postmodern critique represented in chapter three need not result in a lack of substance.

A very clever book. But is it a successful book? In large part, yes, precisely because Allan avoids doing what the dust-jacket says he does. He does not simply rely on either a traditionalist account of liberal education, and bemoan its loss, nor does he characterize it as a remedy for society's ills and complain that we have not yet reached the goal. This is a book about how we

understand the world, and the place that the university should have in that understanding. It is a philosophical book that should not be limited to the shelves of either philosophers or education professionals.

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Ian Angus
A Border Within.
Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens
University Press 1997. Pp. x + 268.
$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7735-1652-2);
$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7735-1653-0).

A Border Within defies categorization of any kind. It aspires to the articulation of an English-Canadian identity through the analysis of thematic discourses about Canada and their reconstruction into a phenomenologically based discourse that will encompass multiple perspectives on who we are. Some themes involved in this undertaking are: socio-political dialogue characterized by left-nationalism; shared axes of debate (concepts whose significance and relevant justificatory uses fuel our disagreements); the works of Harold Innis and George Grant; the exploration of the metaphor of 'border'; and Grant's concept of 'particularity'. Angus's familiarity with multiple disciplines situates him well to cross academic borders.

Chapter III on Harold Innis sparkles with contemporary relevance as the reader encounters a major paradox in Canadian thought: how to sustain the sense of self when technological control of communication can result in monopolies of knowledge that tend 'to fragment human capacities, and to fracture the concept of the self' (71). Angus sees Grant (ch. IV) as the source of ideas that facilitate the salvaging of the self. Grant, Angus argues, recognized the subjectivist-relativist foundations of moral value in a world where nature is dominated by technology. 'Thus the ethical principles that might guide human action are divorced from any ground in the nature of things and come to be seen simply as "values" that are chosen, or willed, by individuals' (99). Universal truth requires a concept of the good that is not metaphysically contingent upon the tinkerings of human beings. Grant turned to Heidegger, Plato, and God.

Angus has set the stage for his attempt to bring the Canadian tradition of seeking a sense of self or identity in contradictions over which we have little control 'together with phenomenological philosophy' (101). 'Maintain-

ing the Border' (ch. V) is the crux of this effort. Although Angus rejects beginning from within a 'received tradition' (105) of philosophy, a footnote acknowledges 'the deeper influence in this work, however, is that of the phenomenological tradition of Heidegger and Husserl' (251n41).

Angus's claim that philosophy is a 'decisive act' (105), and so begins in the wilderness, sets the tone for what is to come — a morass of metaphors of borders, fusings, homelessness, strivings, and the 'Other'. 'Our primal experience is wilderness. Thus the metaphysical fusings of inner and outer cannot occur. Civilizing cannot be a completion, an "again", or an expansion of this origin into wider dimensions. Rather, it must confront radically and repeatedly the question of the beginning of philosophy' (126). Angus discounts earlier attempts to articulate English-Canadian philosophy. He claims 'those who have commanded the institutional and linguistic resources to define their activity as philosophy' (122) have no real grounds for defending their work as philosophy. He refers to the first major work, *The Faces of Reason*, L. Armour and E. Trott (WLU Press, 1981), as an 'excellent history' with a 'defect' (251n43) — the defect being its authors only 'claim' to be presenting philosophy because universities allowed them to call themselves philosophers. His point is that philosophy emerges in multiple-disciplinary contexts. Angus acknowledges some helpful contributions by L. Armour, B. McKillop, and makes cursory reference to John Watson. But his mission to create English-Canadian philosophy overwhelms his research in the field.

The renaissance of our identity requires a suspension of dialectical theorizing about contradictions — the Hegelian traditions identified by Armour, McKillop, Northrop Frye, Bruce Elder — and a leap into the hermeneutics of interpretation inspired by the metaphor of a border as the new vision for self-expression. Sentences such as, 'Metaphysics stumbles to an end, having lost direction in the muskeg' (127), and, 'The encounter with the primal, unhistorical, is an annihilation of temporal relations into the purely spatial extension of a thick present' (133) are to guide us in the quest for self. As the momentum of discovery builds, the poetic rhetoric escalates. Philosophy is to be discovered in 'the murmur of convention', 'the babble of the wild', and the border becomes place in the 'silent switching of madness and naming' (133-4).

Angus returns to more traditional cogency in his commendable chapter, 'Multiculturalism as a Social Ideal' (ch. VI). He critically reviews Charles Taylor's *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton 1992). He focuses on an application of Grant's concept of 'particularity' as a tool for forging multicultural selves. Particularity is not contingency (Rorty). We can be individuals beyond universal sameness and relativistic values. Angus says, to preserve particularity multicultural debates need to be formulated as shifting contexts of discourse. He deftly sidesteps dissolving contradictions into new syntheses by setting them aswirl in the multiple discourses of ethnic groups.

Not all of what Angus says may be new. Northrop Frye, in *The Critical Path* (Indiana 1971), wrote about fences: 'Whether or not good fences make good neighbours, the fence creates the neighbour' (105). The affirmation of a

fence or a border entails both the enclosed and the excluded. Much of what Angus aspires to is captured in Frye's simple sentence.

Yet, for Angus, Canadian Identity must be more complicated. His book is also a challenge to philosophers to reevaluate their turf.

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Michael Beaney, ed.
The Frege Reader.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1997. Pp. xv + 409.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-19444-4);
US$27.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-19445-2).

Beaney's collection is dedicated to Peter Geach and to the memory of Max Black, and might well be thought of as a contemporary replacement for their *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*. It brings together many of papers that were included in the earlier collection as well as selections from Frege's *Begriffsschrift, Grundlagen*, volume I of the *Grundgesetze*, the *Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence* and the *Posthumous Papers* previously published by Blackwell. Beaney has used his own translations of the three previously translated books, 'mainly to avoid inconsistencies of style and terminology' (x), and has modified the translations of the other papers in line with his policy of leaving of *'Bedeutung'* untranslated and signalling uses of cognate verbs (45-6). There is a long introduction, as well as short paragraphs explaining the relevance of each selection. Beaney also provides summaries of the omitted sections of the books, and there are three appendices.

A good deal of Beaney's introduction deals with three issues of interpretation; the proper understanding of the role of the 'context principle' in Frege's work, how we are to understand Frege's notion of sense, and the appropriate translation of the word *'Bedeutung'*. The discussion of these issues has a very Oxford orientation. Michael Dummett and Gareth Evans have clearly set the agenda for Beaney's reading of Frege. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it means that the notion of sense is made rather more central to Frege's thought than is warranted by its relatively late introduction into his thought, and by the fact that it seems not to have been properly thought through. Beaney uses the horrible neologism *'semaino-menalism'*, to characterise the view that Frege expresses in the paper 'Thoughts' that thoughts inhabit a 'third realm' (30). He echoes his earlier

book *Frege Making Sense* (220) and claims that this captures a Fregean/Platonic position that meanings, or senses, are objects which are ontologically fundamental. He also suggests that for Frege the objectivity of senses implies that senses are objects. But this interpretation of Frege's understanding of objectivity jars with Frege's repeated insistence that concepts are objective, but are not objects. Here the discussion makes Frege's position look more arcane than it need do. Elsewhere, Beaney is sensitive to the fact that Frege's later notion of sense is the descendant of his earlier idea that contents can be split up in different ways, and in the book, *Frege Making Sense* he does a great deal to clarify the relationship between this first idea, which only requires the recognition of objects and concepts, and the notion of sense (223-45). There his discussion demonstrates that, as others have argued, there is no single clear notion of sense to be found in Frege's writing. So it seems uncharitable to characterise a thinker as scrupulous as Frege as having taken senses as ontologically fundamental when it is evident from his writing that he never quite got clear what senses are. It is the decomposition of judgements into objects and concepts, and the analysis of concepts as functions, which are truly fundamental for Frege. And although the distinction between sense and reference was certainly important and meant to simplify the treatment of concepts as functions, it brought with it questions that Frege never satisfactorily resolved.

Beaney's interests as a translator come out in the last section of the introduction which is devoted to the question of the proper translation of '*Bedeutung*'. While the issues this problem raises are interesting to the expert, it is not clear that they provide the best way into Frege's thought for the student who wants a basic understanding of Frege's work. Beaney has shown in his book on Frege, and in his summaries, that he is quite capable of providing a clear and uncontroversial exegesis of Frege's major insights. The introduction would probably have been more helpful to the initiate if it had involved more exposition and less controversy.

Of the three appendices the second (reprinted from Beaney's *Frege Making Sense* [279-89]) is much the most useful and interesting. There Beaney discusses Frege's logical notation, provides equivalents in modern notation for Frege's theorems, and elucidates Frege's rather obscure discussion of his notation for definite descriptions. This is Beaney at his best, and should be compulsory reading for any student who wants to understand Frege on definite descriptions. The other two appendices, a chronology and guide to further reading, are unexceptional.

Taken altogether, Beaney's collection provides a very satisfactory replacement for the earlier collection and should serve a new generation of potential Frege scholars well. Let's hope, however, that the word '*semainomenalism*' doesn't catch on.

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Ermanno Bencivenga
Freedom: A Dialogue.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. 1997.
Pp. viii + 107.
US$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-365-4);
US$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-364-6).

Derk Pereboom, ed.
Free Will.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. 1997.
Pp. x + 302.
US$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-373-5);
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-372-7).

These are widely different books. *Free Will* is an anthology containing classic and contemporary readings on issues that will be familiar to philosophers working in the analytic tradition: determinism, compatibilism, and the theory of agency. *Freedom* (translated by the author from the 1991 Italian version) is a dialogue that treats an array of issues, few of which overlap with those dealt with in *Free Will*. The writing of the two books also differs. That in *Free Will* is quintessentially analytic: clear, precise, and connected, with a good deal of sophisticated argumentation. In *Freedom*, the author focuses more on insights than on arguments, he hints more than he analyzes or exposits, and he sometimes shifts abruptly to new topics. The style is conversational rather than didactic or systematic. Those who are used to reading Continental philosophy will be comfortable with *Freedom*, possibly finding it lively and engaging, but they may view *Free Will* as narrow and stiff, perhaps even unimaginative. Those who do best with analytic philosophy will regard *Free Will* highly, but will be challenged, often frustrated, by *Freedom*.

There are five participants in *Freedom*: a determinist, an advocate of freedom, two others, plus one who never speaks. This last one, whose ideas are explained by one of the speaking participants, is loosely Kantian. His 'inclusion' in the dialogue is evidence of Bencivenga's aim, stated in the Preface, of coming to terms with Kant. The reader senses a bit of intrigue with this unspeaking participant.

The dialogue starts with a consideration of punishment and moral responsibility, but soon moves to other topics. Among them are subjectivity, the nature of philosophy, conceptions of truth, realism, the feeling of freedom, the future, and, near the end, death. Sometimes the connection of these topics to freedom is evident and other times readers must discover it for themselves. One of the Kantian themes in the conversation is the activity of the subject in the production of its experience. The advocate of freedom claims that this activity introduces freedom as a 'transcendental requirement' (55). To this claim it is retorted that 'this freedom of yours seems quite strange: it's a theoretical freedom to describe the world as we like, rather than the practical

freedom that I talk about — the freedom to perform actions' (55). Another Kantian theme links the activity of the subject with interpretation, which is said to be the essence of philosophy: 'that very interpretive practice of which philosophy is the purest expression ... now comes to be the logical foundation of every activity' (60). On occasion these Kantian ideas are linked to libertarian and compatibilist conceptions of freedom.

Free Will begins with a short introduction, which explains the main categories in the free will debate and places each of the reading selections into one of these categories. The introductions to each of the selections, usually less than a third of a page, do the same. Though short, these introductions are especially helpful, for they pinpoint the main themes.

The ancient and medieval authors are Aristotle, the Stoics (about twenty), Lucretius, Augustine, and Aquinas. Aristotle and the Stoics are said by the editor to be compatibilists, and the selections from Aquinas's *Summa Theologica* are also said to be compatibilist. Partisans of Aristotle and Aquinas may justifiably complain that this categorization does not do justice to the conception of agency that each advocates. Nevertheless, compatibilist themes are prominent in the readings by them. The only two authors from the modern period are Hume and Kant, and each is represented by two selections. This arrangement has the advantage of giving depth to each, but the disadvantage of leaving out other representatives from the modern period.

Two-thirds of *Free Will* contains articles from the twentieth century, starting with one each by A.J. Ayer (1954) and P.F. Strawson (1963), two compatibilists. Roderick Chisholm's well-known Lindley Lecture (1964) represents the theory of agency. Then come two articles by Harry Frankfurt — his influential 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' (1969) and his 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person' (1971). These are followed by Peter van Inwagen's 'The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism' (1975) and Susan Wolf's 'Asymmetrical Freedom' (1980), the latter of which argues that both compatibilism and incompatibilism are partly right. 'Determination,' she says, 'is compatible with an agent's responsibility for a good action, but incompatible with an agent's responsibility for a bad action' (206). John Martin Fischer then defends compatibilism in his 'Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility' (1987).

The last two articles are not likely to be known as well as the others, because they appeared very recently. In 'Determinism *al Dente*' (1995), Derk Pereboom, the editor of the volume, argues for a version of hard determinism that is not as hard as traditional hard determinism. Because determinism is true, he says, we do not have the freedom required for moral responsibility and, therefore, 'never deserve blame for having performed a wrongful act' (244). Nevertheless, moral principles are still valid, so that hard determinism does not 'subvert the commitment to doing what is right' (272). His long defense of these claims is intricate and fascinating, and may be appealing to those who are uneasy with libertarianism, soft determinism, and traditional hard determinism.

Randolph Clarke, in 'Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Pro-
duction of Free Action' (1996), argues for a variant of the theory of agency.
The traditional theory of agency states that free actions are caused by agents,
that the agent-causation involved is not reducible to event-causation, and
that free actions are not also caused by any event. Clarke accepts the first
two of these claims, but rejects the third. Free actions are caused both by
agents and events. To the objection that this double causation is a case of
overdetermination, he replies that the event-causation involved is nondeter-
minist. To this it may be responded that because nondeterminist event-cau-
sation is not sufficient for the production of an action, it is not causation at
all on the customary conception of event-causation. The traditional agent
theorist can, accordingly, agree with Clarke that free actions have nondeter-
minist event-causes. Despite this weakness, Clarke's analysis is rich and
subtle.

The whole book is rich and subtle. It is a superb sourcebook for those who
want some of the history of the free will-determinism debate plus major
English-American essays in the second half of the century. Given the lack of
current anthologies on the subject, *Free Will* fills a niche very nicely.

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Heribert Boeder
*Seditions: Heidegger and the Limit of
Modernity*. Translated, edited and with an
introduction by Marcus Brainard.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1997. Pp. lii + 359.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3531-8);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3532-6).

The book comprises 20 essays — 5 of which appear in this collection for the
first time — an introductory essay written by Heribert Boeder for the book
in hand, and an introduction by the editor and translator Marcus Brainard.
The essays are organized according to three major titles, namely History,
World, and Speech — and, as we will see, this categorization has not been
adopted by chance, but rather follows Boeder's own approach of the explica-
tion of Western thought. Rounding up this collection, the editor has added
very helpful indexes, a glossary and a bibliography of Heribert Boeder's work.

Heidegger's thought is the starting point of each of these essays, and, as
Marcus Brainard makes clear at the outset of his introduction, the seditions

in question are not Heidegger's from the tradition of Western thought, but rather Boeder's seditions from the thinking of his former teacher. Considering that the back cover promises the reader 'the most important philosophical thinking since Heidegger', the expectations with which the reader takes up this book are quite high.

Boeder himself makes quite clear that his attempts to distance himself from Heidegger's thought are not any private matter between student and master. Instead these seditions first of all bring the history of modern thought into perspective. He claims that it is first through Heidegger's *What is Metaphysics?* and then by means of Boeder's 'correction' of it that we can grasp the limit of modernity (190). What is disconcerting in this union is that Boeder feels it necessary constantly to belittle all other philosophical thought since Heidegger. Hence he calls the lot of Lévinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Derrida or Foucault the submoderns whose inability to understand philosophy corresponds to their ignorance of Boeder's work.

What is somewhat refreshing about these readings of Heidegger's text is that they counteract the separation of philosophy from reality. In a free adaptation of Hegel's famous adequation of the real and the rational, Boeder opposes the tradition of Nietzsche and Heidegger, both of whom seem to understand our history as a history of decline. Where Heidegger paints doom onto the horizon, Boeder moves in like a second Candide to tell us about the achievements of philosophy. 'Each epoch of philosophy is concluded in the certainty: it is accomplished' (189f), Boeder states and then concludes as to Heidegger's acquiescent 'Only a God can save us' with a decisively upbeat 'as if he had not already saved us' (196). Finally, with Boeder's seditions from Heidegger's thinking we are looking at a philosophy that looks back at its own history as a history of achievements.

Yet, the mere wish to congratulate oneself would not suffice to motivate these breaks from Heidegger's thought. And, in fact, the main ground for dissent between the two thinkers pivots around the conceptions of reason and nature. Where Heidegger attempts to develop the phenomenological turn of philosophy through a return to *phusis*, Boeder insists on the totality, or rather the totalities, of reason. He then understands the realization of reason in its totality as the liberation (203) of philosophy from any external domination.

This is where the strangeness of this work appears. While Boeder repeatedly attacks Heidegger for reading the history of Western thought as a continuum from the Greeks to the age of technology; while he 'has come to deny the hermeneutic assumption that the history of metaphysics is a sequence of interpretations of the Being of beings'; while he assails Heidegger for failing to see the plurality of differences appearing in the history of thought; he himself reduces it to a modulation of three different totalities (History, World, Speech), which, in their turn, are determinate of three forms of reason (natural, mundane, conceptual), which in each epoch of thinking are each explicated by three thinkers. The whole of our history is then symbolised by a matrix containing the three lines ABC, CAB, BCA, while the

limit of modernity appears through their sublation into hermeneutic, technical and temporal reason.

These schemata of interpretation read as machinic and facile, as the essays are difficult to follow. Boeder's learning is truly vast and he mobilizes its totality against Heidegger's thought, always attempting not to damage its credibility too much, insofar his own project relies on its re-interpretation. Maybe there are good reasons for the fact that philosophy is often difficult to read; maybe it is true, as Boeder quotes Heidegger, that 'making oneself comprehensible is suicide for philosophy' (199), yet this book is esoteric to a degree that it becomes unintelligible. The author and the editor of this book are both convinced that they have found the truth and that they have found it against Heidegger; yet this truth is expressed in their own words — so much so that these words become like a secret code out of which now and then some sparks of a meaningful experience shine forth. The attempt of the reader to follow the argument of the different essays is not helped by the fact that the translation is in places absolutely impossible to read. The text does not read as English, while German sentences are often translated in a way that their grammatical references are lost, so that one is left to reconstruct the original German. Frequently the text is simply ungrammatical and fails to make any sense and that before one even tries to understand the philosophy behind it.

Finally it remains to be said that, yes, we want to criticise Heidegger; we wish to be for him what Nietzsche desired in those who make his truths incredible. Yet the way in which Boeder's seditions claim to have done so, leaves the stale feeling of not having achieved much.

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Tim Chappell
The Plato Reader.
New York: Columbia University Press (for Edinburgh University Press) 1996. Pp. xi + 307.
US$24.50. ISBN 0-7486-0788-9.

One of the aims of *The Plato Reader* is, according to Chappell's preface (ix) 'to provoke the reader to read far more Plato than is included here.' In this it may well succeed. The book is a compilation of excerpts from various works rather than, as is the usual case, a grouping of some of the works in their entirety. As a translation, it can certainly suffice for the reader just starting to study the works of Plato. A good balance is maintained between the literal translation of the texts and a more colloquial feel. That is to say that with

only a few exceptions most of the language used will probably not soon find itself out of date. This, along with the fact that the chosen passages are not very long — the reader is spoon-fed passages ranging in length up to about 12 pages — makes for an unintimidating introduction to the works of Plato.

One of Chappell's strengths in this compilation is his restraint. Given the richness of the works of Plato it would have been very easy to try to include too much in this book. As it is, Chappell has included 46 selections taken from 16 of Plato's dialogues. These are grouped under 7 headings which range over topics which include the theory of Forms, Socratic ethics, and the soul. Apart from a brief explanation of some terms in the preface, there is little in the way of exposition. What there is comes in the form of endnotes to each chapter. These serve to fill in information not included in the selections, such as explaining references to mythology and people not encountered in the presented passages, as well as to point out problems with the arguments presented and their similarities to other passages in the collection. For the reader unacquainted with the works of Plato these notes will probably be quite valuable, and perhaps even too brief. The more advanced reader can take heart that the notes are used sparingly, rather than being included at every available opportunity. Again, restraint is the word that comes to mind.

As is common with compilations, not everyone will be satisfied with the choices made by Chappell. He has tried to include selections which range over Plato's entire career, but this has resulted in the inclusion of a great deal from some works, such as the *Republic* and the *Theaetetus*, and nothing from others, such as the *Symposium*. However, given the manner in which the book is set up it is difficult to fault Chappell for his choices. The selections do give a fairly clear picture of what Plato broadly thought about certain topics. While one could read this book as an introduction to Plato, I think it would serve better as an aid to study or as an introductory course textbook. The more advanced reader would probably gain more from reading the dialogues in full.

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Daniel W. Conway
Nietzsche's Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.
Pp. xii + 267.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-521-57371-8.

Daniel W. Conway has written an important book that warrants serious attention from both Nietzsche scholars and the broader scholarly community interested in Nietzsche's critique of modernity. Focused almost exclusively on Nietzsche's texts following *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Conway examines the political philosophy that emerges as Nietzsche diagnoses the ills of modernity. Conway's thesis, well-supported and powerfully argued, is deceptively simple: following *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche simply lacked the strength to continue the project of overcoming the decadence of modernity. Instead, he chose (consciously or unconsciously) to display himself as the exemplar of the decadent tendencies he sought to diagnose in an effort to advance the cause of those he hoped would eventually pick up his critique of modernity and carry the project beyond where Nietzsche himself realized he would have to leave it.

Conway's book is organized well. He begins by defending his 'preferred method' for reading Nietzsche, namely, to 'read Nietzsche (the theorist of decadence) against Nietzsche (the exemplar of decadence)' (13). He then reconstructs the general theory of decadence that informs the post-Zarathustran writings by examining the parallel accounts of decadent souls (ch. 2) and decadent peoples (ch. 3). Chapter 4 situates Nietzsche within the critique of modernity that animates his post-Zarathustran political philosophy, as Conway argues that Nietzsche's attempt to moralize about the decadent age shows Nietzsche himself to be succumbing to the decadence of that age. In chapter 5, Conway examines Nietzsche's 'dangerous game' — the rhetorical strategy Conway names 'parastrategesis' — by which he refers to Nietzsche's (voluntary and involuntary) attempt 'to attract the sort of readers who will detect and correct for his own complicity in the decadence of modernity' by intentionally crafting his texts in such a way that they will 'exceed the sphere of his own authorial control' (152-3). This strategy is then examined in the context of Nietzsche's 'revaluation of all values' and his declaration of war on Christian morality (chs. 7-8). Here, Conway suggests that while the revaluation must be viewed as a failure, his strategy may have in fact brought forth unintended successes in the war on Christianity, successes that set the stage for Conway's conclusion.

While following this itinerary, Conway addresses most of the standard Nietzschean themes, often challenging some of the more popular Nietzsche interpretations. Among these, none is more significant than his claim that far from his usual portrayal as a champion of the heroic will, Nietzsche 'stands as the most radical critic of voluntarism itself' (40). Conway's argument here is powerful: if we take seriously Nietzsche's critique of agency

within the context of his vitalist account of 'life' as 'will to power', it is impossible to read Nietzsche as calling upon the transformative power of the will in order to overcome our contemporary decadence. Rather, 'decadence must run its inexorable course' (56) insofar as 'his philosophy of power summarily reduces all individual agents to conduits of the amoral, trans-individual will to power' (53). Conway here demonstrates convincingly that the Nietzschean critique of subjectivity ('there is no doer behind the deed') does not depend solely on a metaphysic of the will to power, for while Nietzsche might have given up the will to power itself as a concept, he never renounced his vitalist affirmation of 'life.' Moreover, he makes as strong a case as anyone has to date that Nietzsche's late political philosophy's critique of modernity turns precisely on the claim that decadence will be overcome not through an act of will but when, as trans-human conduits, human beings ('micro-capacitors') and institutions ('macro-capacitors') will have been created so as to increase rather than decrease the power that passes through them.

Central to Conway's argument is the claim that Nietzsche himself emerges as something of the poster-boy of decadence and he is relentless in supporting this thesis. We might view Conway here doing to Nietzsche what Nietzsche himself did to Wagner, and his construction of 'The Case of Nietzsche' is no less damning: Nietzsche appears in the *Genealogy of Morals* to 'unwittingly present himself as a *Doppelgänger* of the ascetic priest [who] recapitulates the logic of the slave revolt even as he documents it' (131); he 'is a creature of *ressentiment* [who] openly resents the apparent victory of slave morality' (132); he 'as a decadent in his own right ... sincerely wants for his readers to be strong, but ... instinctively needs for them to be weak' (165); he is indistinguishable 'from the historical and psychological type to which he assigns Paul. Both are self-proclaimed decadents who revaluate existing values rather than create new ones' (230-1); and 'by virtue of his misguided quest to take the measure of modernity, he has actually transformed himself into a sign of the times, riddled for all to see by the tensions that define the epoch as a whole' (234). But here, where Nietzsche might have located his own worst failure — that he finds himself dependent upon readers who he despises to carry on his work and bring his project to fruition — Conway locates Nietzsche's greatest success: Nietzsche ultimately 'contributes to our appreciation for the governing pathos of his age by bodying forth (albeit unwittingly) an incarnate critique of modernity. Although ultimately unknown to himself, he trained his successors to probe the self-referential blind spot that vitiates his critical enterprise. Regardless of its success or failure, any attempt to take the measure of Nietzsche will lead to the parastrategic dissemination of his teachings' (250).

We see here one of the attractive characteristics of Conway's own position on Nietzsche, namely, he remains provocatively ambivalent. Unlike many interpreters, who write either as enthusiastic sympathizers or hostile critics, Conway sits on both sides of the fence. We are never allowed to forget for very long that insofar as every philosophy is put forward as a personal confession, Nietzsche may be putting himself forward as 'a *living human*

being in whom the signature contradictions of Christian morality have become incarnate' (203). Yet at the same time, Nietzsche is credited for being 'the first serious critic of modernity to acknowledge his own complicity in the cultural crisis that he reveals and attempts to address' (2). The result, in the end, is that he may have succeeded in training his readers to 'beware of all priests, especially those who, like him, strike the pose of the anti-priest' (255). Which leads Conway to conclude this fine study with the cautious suggestion that while Nietzsche may in fact have lost his battles, the final outcome of Nietzsche's war against the decadence of late modernity is yet to be determined.

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Frederick C. Doepke
The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument.
La Salle, IL: Open Court 1996. Pp. xii + 280.
US$41.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9319-1);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9320-5).

Doepke uses a Kantian epistemology to arrive at an Aristotelian view of persons as continuants. In employing a transcendental method, the book is refreshing in going against the current of contemporary piecemeal discussions of the topic. In Chapters 1 and 3, Doepke discusses the basic views of personal identity and argues for the practical importance of the issue. Chapter 2, 4 and 5 contain the transcendental part of the argument. It begins with the transcendental premise that we cannot avoid making empirical judgments. The very possibility of our making such judgments requires individuation (Chapter 5). Individuation in turn demands that we think of at least some things as continuants (Chapter 4). Since individuation also depends on self-awareness (Chapter 2), we are committed to thinking of ourselves as continuants. Chapters 6-8 lay down the metaphysics of the identity relation, elaborated into an account of personal identity in Chapter 9.

In Chapter 6, Doepke employs the Aristotelian thought that a thing is what it becomes, as a foundation for the relation of identity. An acorn is identical with the oak tree as it is responsible for becoming the oak tree. The identification of the essence of a thing with a characteristic form of activity allows him to argue against the very idea of a person branching since what

is required for identity is a very special kind of causal connectedness (distinctive of the kind of thing involved). Chapter 7 investigates the metaphysical nature of substantial change (things coming into and passing out of existence) as opposed to mere alteration. Doepke argues that it involves two things: the thing created (destroyed) and the 'matter' which undergoes the change and which 'constitutes' the new (old) thing. (This duality reverberates in Chapter 9 where Doepke claims that we are two rational beings: the person and the (sentient) body. Animals are only bodies.)

Chapter 9 proposes that the activity distinctive of persons is to make decisions on the basis of reasons. Doepke argues that the resulting 'long' view of personal identity is superior to the 'short' ones in that it is more parsimonious. It does not demand the introduction of new rules governing interactions between 'different persons'. (The principle that identity conditions ought to be as general and simple as possible is defended in Chapter 8). Taking the tendency to develop through rational reflection as distinctive of us can accommodate even cases where the very values that have guided a person's life change.

I want to briefly address one foundational issue arising from Chapter 4, where Doepke alleges to have refuted 'Humean' stage-ontologies. His argument begins with the thought that individuation requires true predication, which in turn presupposes the distinction between external negation ('It is false that Susan is evil') and internal negation ('Susan is not evil'), only the latter of which supports truly predicating a property of something (which exists) as opposed to mere feature placing (which is existentially uncommitted). According to Doepke, the stage-ontologist cannot distinguish between external and internal negation. Since she is limited to the momentary stage she cannot appeal to the possibility of it losing a property. As such, the object-stage cannot lack a property (as required by internal negation) as so cannot truly possess any property either. She cannot think of the object-stage as anything, so cannot individuate it, so cannot make empirical judgments. Doepke's transcendental conclusion is that we are not merely a series of momentary stages but rather continuants, beings whose essential nature is to undergo changes. But his argument for this claim is misdirected for it can only establish that we really have and really lack some properties. He confuses the fact that stages do not really 'undergo' changes with the fact that they do not really have properties, and the fact that they cannot change with the fact that they cannot have different properties. More generally, Doepke's argument is directed against attribute stage-ontologies that reject the notion of a substratum altogether and reduce objects to mere bundles of properties. It is conceivable, however, for a stage-ontologist to adopt a substance metaphysics but to admit only momentary substrata. In such a case, it would be possible to individuate object-stages for it would be possible to say that the (existing object-stage in which a number of properties inhere) lacks some property. To the charge that object-stages would have all properties essentially, one can respond that there are some properties that the

object-stage lacks but that it could have. Doepke's claim to have transcendentally refuted stage-ontologies is premature.

Although the book is many ways a treat and deserves special praise for its systematic aspirations, it is hard to read. The chapters, deprived of sections, take the form of continuous prose but their content is far from continuous. The paragraphs are frequently long and tangled. Despite its shortcomings, it will be of interest to metaphysicians in general and to philosophers interested in personal identity.

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The argument from marginal cases (hereinafter AMC) is likely the single most interesting (and, for status quo proponents, troublesome) piece of reasoning in the animal rights debate. The AMC's chief thrust is to destabilize the widely shared notion that some sort of 'magic moral bubble' encompasses all and only members of the human species, justifying our enormously deep, systematic, and destructive preferences in favor of our own kind at the expense of nonhumans. While expressed in a number of importantly different forms, an admirably succinct version of the AMC's basic strategy is provided by R.G. Frey:

1. Criterion X, while excluding animals, also excludes babies and the severely-mentally enfeebled from the class of rights-holders;

2. Babies, and the severely mentally-enfeebled, however, do have rights and so fall within this class;

3. Therefore, criterion X must be rejected as a criterion for the possession of rights. (Frey, *Interests and Rights* [Oxford: Clarendon 1980], 28-9, quoted in Dombrowski 81)

Dombrowski sorts out and assesses how versions of this reasoning operate in the positions of animal rights theorists who draw heavily upon it (Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and James Rachels, most notably), clarifies why certain

'pro-animal thinkers' have reservations about the AMC (as do, *inter alia*, S.R.L. Clark, Cora Diamond, Steven Sapontzis, and Donald VanDeVeer), and rebuts those who seek to dispose of it in service of defending some version of received attitudes and practices toward nonhumans (e.g., Michael Leahy and Peter Carruthers).

He starts with a recap of the canonical points of departure in contemporary philosophical thinking about animals, Singer's utilitarian analysis and Regan's deontological approach, and generally is both clear and careful in isolating and evaluating the different spins both thinkers give the AMC. Much of the remainder of the book is devoted to considering contractarian theories, which traditionally are vexed by trying to account for common moral intuitions regarding humans too weak to pose a threat to the rest of us, or otherwise unable to be effective contractors; blends of contractarian and neo-Cartesian thinking have been strongly represented in the theoretical backlash to the Singer/Regan challenge.

What is most distinctive about Dombrowski's writing here is a discussion of the relevance of Rawls's theory, as developed in both *Theory of Justice* and *Political Liberalism*. Dombrowski's criticism of the curious poverty of Rawls's thought on the question of nonhuman moral status, and in particular, of Rawls's rather clumsy appeal in *PL* to a 'Christian' comprehensive moral view to defend anthropocentrism, is the most interesting and effective section of this text. It chimes extremely well with a later treatment of Nozick's views as expressed in a *New York Review of Books* notice of Regan's germinal *Case for Animal Rights*. Nozick there asserts that being a human matters morally simply as such, and although seemingly lacking the first idea how to defend such a view, he is very confident that someone will manage to vindicate this claim. The juxtaposition of two of our most distinguished moral philosophers each being conspicuously simple-minded about the AMC is very effective rhetorically.

We've moved a decade and a half down the pike from that 1983 review, and it is fair to say that Dombrowski's book provides good reason to think that Nozick's patience has not yet been rewarded. Dombrowski is fairly comprehensive in treating the literature produced on all sides of the AMC since the early 70s (and beyond — there is even a reference to very similar reasoning in Porphyry's *De Absentia*). He shows the burden of proof still is with anyone who doubts that the AMC forces a serious reconsideration of attitudes and practices toward either nonhumans, or 'nonparadigmatic' human beings, or both. Dombrowski's own reasoning is not always as fresh, clear and sharp as it is in the Rawls discussion — the desire to note virtually everyone who has weighed in on the AMC sometimes has a regrettable effect on depth, clarity and smoothness of transition. Despite the fact that the argument has been continually turning up for over two decades, the impression given by *Babies and Beasts* is that philosophers are still at the point of exchanging fairly early thoughts, which is somewhat unfortunate; the relevant literature is more sophisticated than one might suspect from reading this book. Further, the final chapter is a bit disappointing: Dombrowski

tantalizes throughout with allusions to his own 'temporal asymmetry' view, but the conclusion is just a recap which involves lifting phrases and paragraphs verbatim from earlier sections of the book, coupled with an inadequately developed discussion of Dombrowski's own intriguing position. Yet as an introduction to a fascinating and disturbing move in moral philosophy, *Babies and Beasts* is well worth reading.

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Edward Erwin
*Philosophy and Psychotherapy: Razing the
Troubles of the Brain.*
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 1997.
Pp. xi + 179.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8039-7520-1);
US$23.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8039-7521-X).

With any ostensible work of philosophy that purports to deal with psychotherapy, the reader is well advised to inquire into the author's agenda. On the surface, Erwin's apparent agenda is straightforward and laudable: to open up the general field of psychotherapy to philosophical investigation and to introduce philosophical standards of rigour and clear thought into psychotherapeutic literature. The first half of the book succeeds in making some tentative steps in this direction by pointing out some of the areas Erwin believes are in need of clarification: the idea of client autonomy and its relation to the possibility of a psychotherapeutic 'science'; valuative thinking and therapeutic goals; the concept of a 'self'; and, returning to Erwin's overriding concern with scientific status, an examination and critique of a tendency toward something Erwin calls 'postmodern epistemology' in psychotherapeutic theory. Erwin proceeds to discuss three major 'paradigms' (81) of psychotherapy — 'behaviourism, cognitive (or cognitive-behaviour) therapy, and psychodynamic therapies' — ruthlessly exposing the examples of muddy thinking and unsubstantiated knowledge-claims he finds there. He closes with an argument for the view that the discipline of psychotherapy is in a state of confusion: a hopelessly pluralistic hodge-podge of ideas without common referents, lacking significant demonstrations either of its effectiveness as distinct from a global 'placebo' (150) effect, or even that specialized training produces more effective therapists.

The discussions in the first half of this book each provide a thumbnail sketch of appropriate alternative positions (some of them Erwin's). These

might be informative to the uninitiated, but each is far too brief and superficial either to qualify as philosophically interesting or to be truly relevant to any insufficiently philosophical psychotherapists Erwin might hope to reach. Thus we have, in the first chapter, schematic accounts of compatibilism, incompatibilism and the apparent conflict between human autonomy and a science of psychotherapy, all of which account lack convincing rationales for their practical relevance to therapeutic work. By the same token, the lack (in Erwin's eyes) of a sufficiently rigorous (i.e., unambiguously referential) concept of 'self' may be disgraceful to some philosophical purists, but it is not likely to be of more than academic interest to the practicing therapist faced with so-called 'borderline' or 'narcissistic' phenomena. Equally dubious is Erwin's polemic against attempts to conceive the psychotherapeutic project in ways distinct from the objectivist scientific approach he prefers — ways Erwin curiously lumps together under the rubric of 'postmodernism' (60ff.). He consistently claims that the 'postmodern' models of constructivism and relativism, and conceptions of psychotherapy as analogous to the humanities, 'are not useful in validating knowledge claims' (67). Yet the reader is obviously expected to take this as a given, since no evidence or supporting argument is given. Erwin closes this chapter with a straw-man argument that is simultaneously a double non sequitur: 'If [...] one argues that clarity, ... precision, rigorous empirical testing and the like are unnecessary, what is being rejected is not merely the need for more and better science, but also a firm basis of any kind for believing psychotherapeutic claims. The inevitable result [...] will be continued confusion and sterility' (80). The reservation of 'clarity, precision, rigorous empirical testing and the like' to Erwin's own objectivist epistemology is, in the first place, false and bears no discernible connection to the possible merits of the alternative models he presents previously in the chapter. Furthermore, in identifying these traits with the only possible 'firm basis' for belief without a supporting argument of any kind, Erwin produces his own knowledge claim as unsubstantiated as those he is so intent on banishing from psychotherapeutic discourse. Equally unsubstantiated are the claims to the inevitability, and even to the existence, of 'confusion and sterility' in psychotherapy today, although the 'arguments' of the final chapter on 'The Crisis in Psychotherapy' (143-61) make Erwin's confidence in his view abundantly clear.

It is hard to decide which fault renders this book the more unsatisfying: the tendency of Erwin's philosophy of science to devalue the humane and specifically therapeutic elements of any psychotherapy thought of as a helping profession, or Erwin's failure to exemplify the high philosophical standards he demands of others. Too much riding on what, for Erwin, is simply given, and significant philosophical issues are neglected in the single-mindedness of his rigid enforcement of neo-positivist doctrine. In addressing the field of psychotherapy as a somehow unified class, and hence subject to a single set of evaluating criteria, Erwin ignores the crucial philosophical questions that arise out of the radically different conceptual foundations, types of knowledge claim, and treatment modalities of the three

paradigms of therapy he discusses in any detail. This weakness is no surprise, for to do otherwise would entail a critical examination of the presuppositions of Erwin's apparent scientistic ideology. In the end, where Erwin attempts to show the faults of contemporary theories of psychotherapy, it is ultimately his own approach to philosophy itself that comes off badly.

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Fred Feldman
Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.
Pp. ix + 220.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-59155-4);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-59842-7).

This book is a collection of ten previously published essays by Fred Feldman. The essays included in the collection were originally published over a period of more than twenty years, but the majority are relatively recent. The collection is not intended to be representative of Feldman's opus as a whole: for example, it does not include any of his several writings on the topic of death. Rather, the aim was to bring together essays that can be read as presenting different aspects of a single theory.

Each of the essays is preceded by an introduction of a couple of pages, written for this volume. These brief introductions bring out the connections between the essays, and thus help the reader to appreciate the book as a unified whole. With the same aim, Feldman has also supplied a freshly written introductory essay.

The theory presented in the book is a version of act utilitarianism. Feldman refers to it as 'world utilitarianism,' because one of its features is that it applies utilitarian calculations, in the first instance, to choices among different possible life histories ('life history worlds'). This feature of the theory, as Feldman argues in the first essay of the collection, is needed in order to avoid the paradoxical implications of the possibility that a complex act that is the best among its alternatives has components that are not the best among their alternatives. In agreement with Mill, but in disagreement with many other utilitarians, Feldman's version of utilitarianism leaves room for the moral significance of the differences between higher and lower

pleasures. The theory incorporates an analysis of the concept of pleasure according to which pleasures are propositional attitudes. Unlike most versions of utilitarianism, Feldman's allows desert to be regarded as morally significant in a way that is not merely instrumental.

Feldman's overall strategy in dealing with the intuitions that seem to go against utilitarianism is to create numerical representations of what these intuitions are about, and include them within utilitarian calculations. Thus Feldman deals with the challenge posed by the intuition that higher pleasures are more significant than lower ones by pointing out that it is possible to include in utilitarian calculations coefficients that numerically represent the quality of pleasures. Similarly, he deals with the objection that utilitarianism does not (fully) acknowledge the significance of desert, by throwing into utilitarian calculations extra points that represent whether pleasures and pains are deserved or not.

These moves are likely to strike at least some readers as ad hoc. There seems to be nothing in Feldman's method to constrain his willingness to tinker with the theory in order to accommodate his moral intuitions. The resulting view lacks the neatness and simplicity that gives utilitarianism, in its other versions, much of its appeal as a theory. One is left wondering why one should accept the view.

Such moves in Feldman's reasoning also don't seem to do justice to those who hold the opposite views. Thus, most people who have been criticizing utilitarianism for not taking desert seriously probably did not think that a theory that would have the form of utilitarianism but include in its calculations points that represent desert, would be impossible to formulate. Their concern is more likely to have been that taking desert into account would be at odds with what makes utilitarianism otherwise plausible. Feldman does not really address that concern.

Moreover, not all of the intuitions that play crucial roles in Feldman's reasoning are shared by everyone. I, for example, do not at all have the intuition (invoked in Feldman refutation of Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion) that all people *deserve* something simply in virtue of existing.

These problems with some of the crucial moves in Feldman's reasoning are in sharp contrast with the attention that he devotes to developing the details of his arguments. Regardless of what one thinks about the overall plausibility of his views, one can't help admiring the careful, painstaking crafting of many of the specific arguments that appear in this book. It should also be acknowledged that much space in this book is, in fact, devoted to the business of conceptual tidying up, which one may find useful quite apart from whether one finds the content of Feldman's views plausible.

One may wonder about the wisdom of including in the collection essay 'The Principle of Moral Harmony', in which Feldman argues that situations are possible in which everyone's performing an action that is utility-maximizing leads to a combined result that is not utility-maximizing. That argument is likely to strike many readers as an objection to utilitarianism, and they will be left wondering how it is supposed to fit into a theory that is,

on the whole, utilitarian. Feldman does try to address that concern in Chapter 7 of his book *Doing the Best We Can* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1986), where the issue is discussed in more detail, but a typical reader of the present book cannot be expected to be familiar with the earlier one.

Given that both the author and the publisher have clearly intended that the book be perceived as a unified whole, it is slightly annoying that no one has bothered to make the format of bibliographic references uniform throughout the book. One's appreciation of the interrelatedness of the essays could also have been enhanced if 'On the Consistency of Act- and Motive-Utilitarianism: A Reply to Robert Adams', which directly uses the main result of 'World Utilitarianism', had been positioned immediately after it.

Regardless of whether they agree or disagree with Feldman, many ethicists will want to refer to these essays, and will certainly find it convenient to have them reprinted in book form.

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Emmanuel Guillon
Les philosophies bouddhistes.
Collection Que sais-je? 3003.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1995.
128 pages.
40FF. ISBN 2-13-047165-X.

Fidèle aux objectifs de la collection encyclopédique dans laquelle il s'inscrit, cet ouvrage oriente le lecteur non-initié aux écoles de la pensée bouddhiste en prenant pour centre la dimension intellectuelle de cette tradition plutôt que sa dimension spirituelle ou religieuse. Dès le départ, l'auteur clarifie l'importante distinction qui sépare la dimension religieuse et la dimension philosophique de la doctrine. Est proprement religieux ce qui relève des divinités et de leurs mythologies, ainsi que la cosmologie, les rites et plus généralement ce qui relève d'une conception du sacré. En ce sens, il est clair que le bouddhisme est une religion et non seulement une forme de spiritualité comme on pourrait le croire dans le contexte de récentes appropriations occidentales. En contraste, l'auteur appelle 'philosophie' l'édification de systèmes ordonnés de concepts et c'est dans cet univers qu'il veut nous fournir des éléments d'orientation. Cette façon d'aborder le bouddhisme a le mérite d'orienter le lecteur vers l'incontournable comparaison avec la tradition philosophique occidentale. Comme on le constate en lisant l'ouvrage, le

chemin de cette comparaison est semé d'embûches et on apprécie que l'auteur les signale au passage. La thèse vers laquelle converge ce panorama de courants et d'écoles est fort modeste: 'oui' serons-nous forcés d'admettre en conclusion, 'il existe d'autres philosophies que celles que l'Europe cultive depuis deux mille cinq cents ans (125).'

L'organisation de l'ouvrage suit le développement historique de la doctrine. Au premier chapitre, on retrouve un aperçu intéressant des conceptions de l'homme et du monde en Inde au Ve siècle avant J.-C. On remarque la richesse et la diversité des doctrines qui forment le contexte historique de la naissance du bouddhisme. Ainsi l'originalité apparaît dans l'opposition aux doctrines des «maîtres rivaux» de l'époque: Gautama s'opposera autant à l'éternalisme qu'au matérialisme, au nihilisme qu'au scepticisme. Comme ces doctrines sont évoquées sommairement, il est difficile de se faire une image claire des oppositions originelles. Quoiqu'il en soit, il y a une proximité frappante entre ces formules cosmologiques spéculatives et les thématiques présocratiques du changement et de la permanence, de la composition — décomposition du réel, ou de l'unité du divers sensible.

On sait que le bouddhisme repose sur quatre thèses fondatrices qui se présentent selon un schéma thérapeutique: *Tout est douleur* (le mal); *la douleur naît du désir* (l'origine du mal); *la suppression du désir est possible* (le remède); *il y a un chemin qui conduit à la suppression de la douleur ou nirvana* (la voie de la guérison). C'est l'analyse et l'interprétation de ces quatre 'nobles vérités' qui va engendrer les nombreux débats philosophiques, sur la conscience, la possibilité de l'action, la structure de la temporalité et la nature du nirvana. On se retrouve très rapidement dans la jungle de sectes qui forment la tradition et qui ont entre elles des rapports de filiation et d'opposition. Dans la section consacrée aux sectes anciennes du Petit Véhicule, l'auteur n'hésite pas à affirmer que tous les problèmes fondamentaux que les hommes se posent y ont été discutés, analysés et résolus de diverses façons (39). Amené à constater la diversité et le foisonnement dans cette tradition d'exégèse et d'interprétation, le lecteur aura souvent le sentiment de se retrouver les mains vides pour ce qui est d'identifier un contenu doctrinal déterminé. La doctrine s'avère fuyante ou semble s'agresser d'elle-même lorsqu'elle est affranchie de l'expression mytho-poétique qu'elle revêt dans ses sources. On sait par exemple qu'il y une tension, voire une contradiction, entre le postulat de la décomposition perpétuelle de tout (impermanence) et l'idée que l'action humaine peut être utile ou efficace. Dans le même esprit, mais sur le plan moral, on s'inquiète de ce qu'un idéal de sagesse qui fait de l'indifférence une vertu ultime ne puisse faire droit à la compassion que nous devons face à la souffrance d'autrui. Le premier problème est formulé (24) mais on cherche en vain une piste vers la solution. Pour le second, une solution par décret est mentionnée dans la tradition des 'Adeptes de la Grande Assemblée' dont la 30e thèse accorde un statut primordial à autrui. Dans cette variante qui dépasse la doctrine originelle, les 'Buddha renonçant' peuvent reporter 'leur entrée dans le nirvana tant qu'un seul être souffrira encore' (37).

Le quatrième chapitre traite de conscience, de vacuité et de logique. Ce qui est dit des deux premiers concepts est profond ou obscur, il est difficile d'en juger. Ce qui est dit de la logique bouddhique indienne de Dignaga est en revanche très peu convaincant. La fusion entre la théorie de l'inférence et la théorie de la connaissance (84-85) n'a jamais avantagé la logique, ni l'épistémologie. De même, on ne peut suivre l'auteur lorsqu'il considère comme une innovation logique importante la distinction entre 'syllogisme pour soi' et 'syllogisme pour autrui' à propos de l'enthymème 'Ici il y a du feu car il y a de la fumée' (86).

L'ouvrage se termine sur un survol extrêmement intéressant des extensions de la pensée bouddhiste et du tantrisme. On ne peut manquer de remarquer la diversité des écoles tibétaines, chinoises et japonaises, cette dernière donnant l'occasion de parler sommairement du Zen. En complément, on trouve une bibliographie de plus de soixante titres dont une majorité sont en français.

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Arto Haapala, Jerrold Levinson, and
Veikko Rantala, eds.
The End of Art and Beyond: Essays After Danto.
Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press
1997. Pp. xi + 218.
US$55.00. ISBN 0-391-03998-9.

This is a collection of essays on themes directly connected with or inspired by Arthur C. Danto's thesis that the development of Western art as narrated by a succession of art theories has reached its logical conclusion. The essays are an outgrowth of a 1990 symposium held in Lahti, Finland on the future of art. In some cases the essays reflect their vintage. Few of the writers were aware at the time of the supersaturation of images that the internet would soon proliferate, or of the computer's destiny to become the next folk art medium. To their credit none of the arguments in the book has been gainsaid by recent events, even though Danto's thesis fails to arouse the interest it once did.

The collection is divided into two parts, Art's Progress, and Art's Prospects, each containing seven essays. Also included is a brief reply by Danto to Joseph Margolis's lead essay, 'The Endless Future of Art', in which Margolis rejects Danto's view that art has an internal 'logic' which has driven

it to become philosophy. Each of the essays in Part I critically engages some aspect of Danto's thesis, either by directly challenging its assumptions or its logic (Joseph Margolis, Noël Carroll), by denying its implications for the practice of art (Hilda Hein, Yrjö Sepänmaa, James Young), or by suggesting that the nature of art is still in transformation (Crispin Sartwell, Lucian Krukowski).

Briefly, Danto's thesis is that art in the West developed as a striving for a certain kind of knowledge, the 'conquest of appearances' (29), and that around the end of the nineteenth century was forced to confront its inherent limitations. As a technique for revealing the truth about reality art was no match for photography, whereupon it retreated into self-examination, stumbled upon its true nature, and was transformed into philosophy. In its last stages art considered its nature to be that of asking the question, What is art? After a brief period in which works of art approached pure reflexivity the answer emerged: art is self-knowledge, more specifically, it is the articulated realization of its own quest for self-knowledge. When it was realized (circa 1960) that the making of objects as instruments for achieving self-knowledge was gratuitous, art as a cognitive inquiry came to an end. While the making of objects continues as a cultural activity or *praxis*, Danto holds that it is not the activity of art. We are now in what he terms a 'post-historical period of free play' (29) which is not, will not be, and cannot be, art.

Noël Carroll's 'Danto, Art, and History' is a very helpful essay which brings together several different strands in Danto's thinking. Carroll examines the relation between Danto's philosophy of art and his philosophy of art history, and shows the dependence of each upon the other. Danto's philosophy of art holds that an object is a work of art only if there exists 'an historically relevant theory supporting it' (33). Danto's philosophy of art history holds that art theories are historical products which emerge from the incomplete efforts of preceding theories to account for art practice. Pressed to its fullest the most recent theory of art implies that there can be no *works* which exhibit the reflexive property of asking, What is art? Thus art must come to an end, since 'there are no more projects or programs available to artists' (34) which can exemplify art's nature. The curious result of Danto's reasoning, according to Carroll, is that if art has indeed ended, then Danto's theory of art turns out to be immune from the possibility of future counter examples. Carroll's objection to this 'neat trick' (37) is to question whether the problem of indiscernibles 'is the right form for the question "What is art?" to take' (37). This assumption, Carroll suggests, may simply be a way of begging the question in favor of an essentialist theory of art.

The question of art's self-consciousness is also at the heart of Hilda Hein's strong and insightful challenge to Danto's thesis. In 'The News of Art's Death Has Been Greatly Exaggerated' Hein claims that the institution of art is actually 'being invigorated' (46) by change, collaboration, reassimilation, adaptation and even opposition. Traditional notions of the solitary artist are being 'displaced by a more corporate, mediational art-making' (47), and well-known works of art are being treated as elements in works of meta-art.

Collaborative works such as film, dance and theatre are no longer seen as executions of the director's vision, but 'new collectivisms' (48) whose primary techniques are organization, assembly, combination and redefinition. Despite its transformed and even 'transfigured' nature however Hein points out that post-historical art is still looking for its own meaning. 'Art's trajectory toward self-knowledge has not been achieved' (55). Thus, she concludes, Danto's news of art's demise is premature.

The essays in Part II explore ideas or themes associated with or inspired by Danto. For example, in 'Theoreticity in Art' Veikko Rantala argues that while art in the twentieth century 'has been becoming more theoretical' (111), this is not due to its having an internal structure which forces it to focus on the question of its own essence.

The idea of art's having or not having a future is implicit in Jerrold Levinson's 'Nonexistent Art Forms and the Case of Visual Music'. Levinson asks us to imagine a matrix of logically possible art forms, and to extrapolate from them certain 'transformational principle(s) ... for projecting artforms that could someday exist' (129). If there are more forms for art to take, then art cannot have ended.

The idea of the death of art is taken up in 'Art and Time' by Arto Haapala, who ventures that works of art necessarily incorporate time to the degree that past, present and future styles are present within them (147), all the while acknowledging that art is constantly undergoing change, 'dying all the time' (151). While Haapala is correct in observing that past and present styles can be recognizable qualities of artworks, it is difficult to see how a future style, i.e., a quality 'that will only later become broadly accepted or even dominant' (149), can exist in advance of its actually becoming accepted or dominant. We hear the 'future' style of *leitmotiv* in *Der Freischütz* but it is doubtful that Weber heard what Wagner would later transform into a structural principle. Haapala is right that 'what becomes a future state of affairs is somehow determined by the present state of affairs' (150), but this is not the same as saying that future states of affairs can be *identified* in the present.

The idea of the representation of space in a post-historical age is taken up in Victor Burgin's 'Geometry and Abjection'. Burgin observes that postmodernism's 'changed apprehension of space' (155) is one in which subject and object are constantly changing places, in which the subject is actually part of the object, in which our identity is a product of the way we represent others, and in which the boundary between the self and the social world cannot be determined. Ironically however, because of 'a mutation in technology' (157) our apprehension of space continues to be governed by the Euclidean metaphor of the 'cone of vision' (154 *et infra*). Burgin proposes that quantum theory provides a more appropriate grounding for our present worldview.

The theme of art as an autonomous institution is discussed in Thomas Heyd's 'Performance Art's Avant-Gardism'. Heyd argues that because contemporary art is cognitively isolated from everyday interests and concerns, and because it is socially ineffective, it must undertake to more thoroughly

integrate itself into the activities of everyday life. So long as art remains an autonomous institution even socially conscious art, such as Picasso's *Guernica* and Kurt Weil's *The Rise and Fall of the City Mahagonny* (erroneously attributed to Bertolt Brecht, who provided the libretto), remains little more than entertainment, isolated within a domain of aesthetic knowledge and connoisseurship (173). In Heyd's view performance art is a remedy for this elitism.

A most interesting essay is Harold Cohen's 'The Computability of Art', in which he ventures that a computer will be able to make art when it produces images (or music, or literature, etc.) using the same sort of semantic knowledge and information processing 'principles' (181) that humans use in making art. In other words, passing a Turing test cannot be sufficient for arthood. Cohen identifies the problem of computer-made art to be one of enabling a computer to realize 'meaningful self-modification' (187). For those who may be interested Cohen has elaborated his ideas and made them available on the world wide web along with examples of art generated by his program AARON. They may be accessed at http://shr.stanford.edu/shreview/4-2/text/cohen.html.

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Barry Hallen and **J. Olubi Sodipo**
Knowledge, Belief, and Witchcraft: Analytic Experiments in African Philosophy.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1997.
Pp. xvi + 163.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-2822-4);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-2823-2).

It is a delight to see this rich and very important work reissued as an affordable paperback. That it now contains a new foreword by Quine, new afterword by Hallen, and updated bibliography is icing on the cake. Like Dewey, Quine, and Radin, Hallen and Sodipo (H&S) labor fruitfully at the interface of anthropology, epistemology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of mind, and comparative philosophy.

H&S cogently argue: (a) that the most plausible interpretation/translation of Yoruba linguistic behavior involving abstract terms and concepts (such as *mo* and *gbagbo*) used to evaluate and grade information yields a reading which does not map neatly onto English terms and concepts (such as 'belief' and 'knowledge'); (b) that as a consequence, Yoruba epistemological concepts

and distinctions do not map neatly onto Anglo-American epistemological concepts and distinctions. In so doing, H&S make a strong prima facie case for the nonuniversality of propositional attitudes as well as the nonuniversality of epistemological concepts (e.g., knowledge as justified true belief); (c) that the network of Yoruba epistemological concepts and criteria is 'markedly critical, sceptical, and empirical in character' (138) and hence not exclusively or even predominantly symbolic, expressive, or emotive; (d) that 'traditional' Yoruba thinkers and thought systems — and hence by implication, 'traditional' thinkers and thought systems generally — are, on the one hand, *more* reflective, theoretically attuned, sceptical, empirical, and open to criticism than has been maintained by intellectualists such as Horton; and, on the other, *less* uncritical, emotive, prereflective, non-reasoned, symbolic, and expressive than has been maintained by symbolists such as Beattie; (e) that an ongoing tradition of philosophical reflection and criticism does *not* require a written culture; and finally, (f) that Yoruba thought contradicts the view held by many anthropologists that oral cultures view truth as a performative doing, making, or creating rather than as a successful semantic representing.

My sole reservation with this book is that H&S base their conclusions upon extensive interviews with Yoruba *onisegun* ('masters of medicine') but show no interest in interviewing the disenfranchised, marginalized, and powerless within Yoruba society: i.e., individuals who arguably engage in critical epistemological reflection but who possess no socially recognized authority or voice in such matters. Yet since the empowered enjoy no monopoly on what Oruka calls 'philosophical sagacity' (i.e., the ability to reflect critically and systematically upon the received views of one's culture), such subaltern individuals merit interviewing. After all, their different social position may lead their critical reflections down an interestingly different path.

In conclusion, this is an engaging, clearly written, cogently argued, and broadly accessible book. It should be of interest to epistemologists, philosophers of language, mind, and social science, anthropologists, africanists, african-americanists, and anyone interested in comparative (multicultural) philosophy. I heartily recommend its use as a text in undergraduate and graduate courses alike.

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Zellig S. Harris
The Transformation of Capitalist Society.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc. 1997. Pp. xvi + 245.
US$62.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8411-3);
US$23.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8412-1).

Can capitalist society transform itself into a more humane, democratic society? Can post-capitalist society emerge without revolution? This book should interest those who follow the ongoing discussion of how and whether post-capitalist society might occur. It is a left-libertarian perspective that succumbs to utopianism.

It is a curious book. The promise of its bold title is fulfilled neither by a convincing empirical case nor a persuasive normative theory. It is a book of anomalies and ambivalence. A muffled (but not muted) historical materialism has been appropriated — Marx has been invoked but revolutionary change disavowed. The book pecks at capitalist reformism as utopian but its own normative prescriptions for post-capitalist society are cast in utopian terms of 'may' and 'maybe.' A critique of the evils and conflicts of capitalism flows like an undercurrent through the book. What accounts for such an anomalous book? Upon his death in 1992, friends prepared for publication a manuscript that Harris, a linguist, had left. This book's discussion is undeterred by the disciplinary constraints of history and descriptive and normative social theory.

The thesis is that when confronting capitalist crises, capitalists historically have ceded decision-making power to two 'non-capitalist' sectors: government and workers. Capitalists relinquish control to government in the form of governmental regulation of the economy. No argument is given for such governments as 'non-capitalist' elements. Decisions are yielded to workers in the form of collectives, cooperatives and Employee Share Ownership Plans. The road to workers' ownership and control passes through capitalists' relinquishing of control. Harris hoped worker-controlled enterprises could be both viable within capitalism and efficient in capitalism's successor.

The evidence offered is inadequate: in the growth and development of capitalism there were non-capitalist elements present, such as workers' cooperatives and collectives. Harris admitted most examples of workers' control have not survived, but they 'may' prove feasible again in the face of capitalist conflict and crisis. This historical observation, however, may only show that capitalism was not monolithic; it is insufficient to dispel utopianism.

There are some insightful observations and suggestive chapters. Chapter 6 is a concise treatment of capitalism's emergence from feudalism, useful for those (if there still are any) who believe capitalism always existed and for those (and there are many) who believe it is always utopian to project what capitalism's successor might be. Chapter 7 discusses what worker-controlled

enterprises can look like. Chapter 9 is an explicit injunction against political and revolutionary change of capitalism. (Was this the impetus behind the book?)

The efficiency and desirability of workers' control of enterprises in and after capitalism will be discussed as long as there is capitalism and a critical effort to think about plausible and humane alternatives.

Harris was responsible for consulting literature available before 1992. This lucid left-libertarian perspective on post-capitalist society is weakened by a utopianism for which there were and are correctives (Schweickart, 1980, 1993; Miller, 1989; Roemer, 1994) in the literature.

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David Hausman and **Alan Hausman**
Descartes's Legacy: Minds and Meaning in Early Modern Philosophy.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1997.
Pp. xiv + 148.
$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-0947-6);
$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-7957-1).

The Hausman brothers contend that Descartes's philosophy of mind is designed to solve what they call the 'intentional problem': how can an intelligent being acquire information from the physical world? In broad outline, Descartes's solution is that our minds derive information about the world from internal representations (ideas). The Hausmans argue that Berkeley and Hume adapt the essentials of this approach, in different ways, to systems in which the external world is abandoned. By contrast, more recent views (functionalism, neutral monism) are largely motivated by the suspicion that the early modern 'way of ideas' inevitably invokes homunculi: if we perceive the world, who perceives the ideas?

The first part of the book (Chapters Two through Four) is devoted to showing that Descartes's solution to the intentional problem is successful even though homuncular. The Hausmans attribute to Descartes an elaborate semantical framework for ideas. The meaning or intentionality of complex ideas is a function of the intentionality of simple ideas. The intentionality of simple ideas is intrinsic, i.e., neither derived from the causes of the ideas nor assigned from without (20). According to the Hausmans, this is what Descartes means when he says in the *Meditations* that all ideas have 'objective reality'. Since, they hold, Descartes did not think that bodies could possibly

have intrinsic intentionality, he was forced to posit a new kind of stuff — mental substance. In this way, Descartes's substance dualism is a consequence of his semantic enterprise (22). This account of the source of Descartes's dualism faces the obvious objection that his official arguments for that view have nothing to do with the semantics of ideas.

According to the Hausmans, the intrinsic intentionality of ideas is guaranteed by a certain *ex nihilo* principle embraced by Descartes. One notorious version of the principle says that the causes of our ideas must contain formally or eminently whatever reality is contained formally or objectively in the ideas themselves. They maintain that this constraint on efficient causation ensures that our (simple) ideas are about things that exist, although not necessarily that all judgments based on our ideas are true. This is Descartes's real solution to skepticism about the external world, despite his frequent appeal to God's truthfulness (58). The Hausmans conclude that the *Meditations* are secular. And yet Descartes says explicitly that God, or even our own minds, could eminently contain such qualities as motion and extension, and so could be the cause of the objective reality in our ideas of bodies. Hence, there is nothing in the *ex nihilo* principle which guarantees that our ideas are about or represent their causes. We can be certain that bodies are the genuine cause of our ideas of bodies, according to Descartes, only because God is not a deceiver. This is a matter of theology, not semantics.

The Hausmans seem to think that God would need to violate the *ex nihilo* principle in order to create sensory ideas in us directly since, in that case, God would have to create an objective reality that he does not formally contain (41, 44). On the basis of this assumption, they argue that if God contains the reality of our ideas of bodies merely eminently, then he could only create those ideas from external 'exemplars' that contain the reality of the ideas formally. The Cartesian doctrine of eminent containment thus requires semantic exemplars (46, 53). This is an intriguing suggestion. Unfortunately, there is nothing in Descartes's actual writings that connects eminent containment to exemplars. The Hausmans do cite a passage (45) in which Descartes refers to 'archetypes' for our ideas, but that passage has nothing to do with eminent containment. Nor is there anything in the *ex nihilo* principle itself which would require appeal to such things as exemplars. For Descartes thinks that it is sufficient, in order to cause our ideas, that God eminently contains their objective reality.

All doubts about the intentionality of sensory ideas are settled once and for all, according to the Hausmans, when Descartes concludes in the *Comments on a Certain Broadsheet* that all ideas are innate: 'innate ideas after all, cannot be semantically messy' (38). Perhaps not. Still, it is not obvious how the innateness of ideas is supposed to fix their intentionality. For Descartes, innateness is a matter of the origin or ideas, not their content. If one can have doubts about the reference and meaning of adventitious ideas, why not innate ideas as well? Once again, the Hausmans appeal to exemplars in order to explain the intentionality of innate ideas (39, 49). But the ex-

planation is very sketchy. In any case, Descartes himself does not relate innateness to exemplars.

The second part of the book is concerned with related problems in Berkeley and Hume. For Berkeley, the Hausmans argue, ideas are not intentional since they do not stand for anything outside themselves. Given this, one might wonder why Berkeley regards ideas, particularly sensible qualities, as mental at all. The Hausmans attempt to answer this interesting question in Chapter Five. Chapter Six is concerned with 'Hume's Use of Illicit Substances'. The Hausmans argue that Hume's explanation for our belief in the continued and distinct existence of bodies presupposes a mental substance in which our perceptions adhere. This interpretation is obviously bought at a significant cost, since it implies that Hume's account of personal identity is incoherent and that his empiricist rejection of the concept of substance is misguided and self-defeating. Chapter Seven, which includes a long but worthwhile digression on twentieth-century phenomenalism, attempts to explain the precise function of arguments from illusion or 'perceptual variation' in Berkeley's idealism. The Hausmans maintain that such arguments cannot by themselves establish that ideas or sensible qualities are mind-dependent. Rather, recognition of perceptual variation merely encourages the displacement of the 'third-person' ontology of things by the 'first-person' ontology of sensible qualities.

Each of the later chapters are valuable in their own right since they offer provocative and, in some cases, attractive interpretations of the semantic problems facing Berkeley and Hume. But since the earlier chapters fail to establish that Descartes's problems are the same as theirs, I am unconvinced that the struggles of these radical empiricists are Descartes's legacy.

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In this book, Hill examines the foundations of the analytic tradition in philosophy inspired by the writings of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell in the turn of the twentieth century. In Part One, she lays out some confusions one might fall prey to in connection with statements of identity, confusions of signs and objects, proper names and descriptions, Fregean concepts and objects, and, finally, identity and equality (in a given respect).

In Part Two, she argues against what she calls the 'extensional ontology' and concludes that 'intensions are part of the ultimate furniture of the universe' (152).

Hill uses 'intension' very broadly. She understands by the term 'essences, attributes, senses, meanings, essential properties, attributes, [Fregean] concepts, propositions, and universals' (136) and probably some others of the sort (e.g., relations). I think it is useful to distinguish them into two different kinds: (i) intensions of linguistic expressions (contrasted with their extensions), e.g., their senses or meanings; (ii) the so-called intensional entities, e.g., attributes or properties (essential or not), Fregean concepts, essences, or universals. Not every intensional entity is an intension of something, linguistic or not; and one who, like Frege, thinks that proper names like 'Byung' have intensions might hold that their intensions are not intensional entities any more than their extensions like Byung.

Hill holds the view that there are both kinds of intensions. In this regard, she completely disagrees with W.V. Quine, a major figure in analytic philosophy that champions the extensional ontology, the view that recognizes neither of them, while partially disagreeing with Russell, who believes in properties (or propositional functions), though not intensions of expressions. But she fully agrees with Frege in this regard and, accordingly, defends her view by in effect recapitulating his argument for the senses of expressions and clarification of the nature of concepts in contrast to that of objects.

But Hill aims at more than defending the doubly intensionalist ontology with Fregean arguments. She devotes most of the book (10 out of 12 chapters) to attempts to clarify what she regards as Frege's fundamental mistake inherited by those who adopt the logic he developed, i.e., most analytic philosophers (except perhaps Jaakko Hintikka and Ruth Barcan Marcus, whose works on modality Hill commends). The alleged mistake concerns Frege's treatment of identity.

Identity, indicated by the sign '=' in his symbolic language, is a relation that an object has only to itself. It is strictly stronger than the relation of equality in a given respect, e.g., color. Two things not identical with each other might be equal in e.g., color; a red Porsche is equal to a red rose in color, but they are not identical. She charges that Frege identified the two relations and did so explicitly. Did he? If he had, he would have had concluded that, for example, a red Porsche is identical with a red rose. Hill, however, does not maintain that he argued in this way from equality to identity. What is then the reason for attributing the elementary mistake of identifying equality with identity?

Hill cites Frege's use of the following principle in his theory of arithmetic:

> Law V: Concepts F and G are equal in extension (e.g., everything that is an F is a G and vice versa) if, and only if, the extension of F is identical with the extension of G.

As she explains, Russell has showed that this principle leads to a contradiction with the argument known as Russell's paradox. (Consider whether the

extension of the following concept falls under the concept: 'extension of a concept whose extension does not fall under it'.) Thus, as Frege came to admit painfully, it was his mistake to accept Law V. To accept it, however, is not to make the elementary mistake that Hill charges him for; it is not to do so any more than to accept that 'If John and Carol are equal in having the same father, then the father of John is identical with the father of Carol'. To confuse equality (in extension) with identity, one should accept that if concepts are equal in extension, the concepts themselves [NOT: their extensions) are identical; but Law V does not state this.

Hill sometimes suggests that Frege's mistake lies much deeper than in accepting Law V, which, thanks to Russell, he came to see as false soon after its formulation. She gives her diagnosis of the contradictions resulting from Law V (or similar principles in e.g., set theory). Their ultimate sources, according to her, lie in informative identity statements, such as

(1) Byung is identical with Paul,

coupled with the principle of substitutivity of identity (102). Her argument runs as follows. 'Byung', let us assume, is the true name of a Korean (namely, Byung) who holds an account under that name; he has another account under the false name 'Paul', which he uses to open an account (which was possible until recently as Hill describes) to avoid tax. Then

(2) Byung holds an account under his true name.

Because, moreover, (1) is true, we can get the truth of the following, which results from substituting 'Byung' in (2) with 'Paul' (by the principle of substitutivity of identity:

(3) Paul holds an account under his true name.

Now, she argues that

(4) Paul does not hold an account under his true name.

because the name 'Paul', she says, 'designates someone who holds an account that is not under his or her true name' (104). She concludes that 'The more informative an identity statement is ... the more potential there is to reach contradictory ... conclusions' by applying the principle of substitutivity of identity (104).

Hill seems to think that this shows the falsity of the principle. But it should be clear that her argument for (4) is fallacious. (4) does not follow from the truth that Paul holds an account that is not under his true name (or, equivalently, that 'Paul' designates someone who does so). One who holds an account under a false name might hold another account under a true name as well; Paul (i.e., Byung) is such a person.

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This is a very scholarly work. Jacob plots his way through the thicket of contemporary work in the philosophy of mind to answer the two big questions about content: Can intentionality be naturalized? and, Can the semantic properties of propositional attitudes figure in the causal explanation of behaviour? Answer æYesÆ in each case. Part 1 (Chapters 1-4) deals with the first question; part 2 (Chapters 5-8) deals with the latter. A short concluding chapter compares Jacob's position with Fodor's current (1994) picture of the computational representation theory of the mind. Jacob defends a 'bottom-up' approach to content, the semantic properties of a system's propositional attitudes must be explained in terms of the non-semantic properties of the system.

The book comes across as a contribution to an in-house debate. The first half is mostly pure Dretske with a little dose of teleology in order to resolve the problem of the transitivity of meaning. This is the problem you get if you hold that what it is for a state to have the information that a is F is for that state to nomically depend on the fact that a is F and the latter fact nomically depends in turn on some other fact. Which then is the one involved in the individuation of the information that the state carries? Jacob thinks that teleology will turn the trick here, providing that it is a minimal 'stimulus-based teleosemantics' rather than the richer 'benefit-based' approach in Millikan's work. At this point (114f.) Jacob is discussing Dretske's magnetosome example. The bacteria's magnetosome nomically depends upon the direction of magnetic North, but also, for northern hemisphere bacteria, it nomically depends upon anaerobic water. Jacob's thought is that the dependency upon anaerobic water is a benefit of selection for possession of magnetosomes. In contrast, the dependency upon magnetic North is a stimulus for selection. Concentrating only on an etiological notion of function, the information-based theorist (which is basically what Jacob thinks is de rigueur if intentionality is to be naturalized) can then accommodate the weak notion of etiological function to solve the transitivity problem. There is a problem here, but first a point about style.

When Jacob introduces the minimal teleological turn (117) he notes that Dretske has, in effect, endorsed this, although not in the terms Jacob employs (the distinction between stimulus- and benefit-based teleology is taken from Neander). This means that Jacob's contribution is limited to teasing out ways of resolving major philosophical issues from within a theoretical perspective the general contours of which are largely fixed. This is not a criticism as such, but it does limit the appeal of the book to a wider readership. For example, graduate students already familiar with Dretske (and, to a lesser extent,

Fodor) will find it a rewarding exercise to work through Jacob's discussion. Although Jacob frequently recounts examples and basic moves in more detail than necessary (the Chapter 7 opening resume of how functionalism came on the scene is a case in point), there is insufficient distance from the informationally-based semantics approach for the argument to be sufficiently transparent at key points.

One example of this is the case of the magnetosomes — as Dretske has noted, if we say that the bacterium's state represents North, not anaerobic water, then we seem stuck for an adequate account of misrepresentation. When the bacterium is transplanted into southern oceans its states continue to represent North, correctly, and guide the bacterium to oxygen rich water and death. Now the problem here is whether the stimulus-based teleosemantics gives an account of misrepresentation and, as Jacob says (119) he thinks the approach does not preclude 'the possibility of describing what a northern bacterium transplanted in the southern hemisphere would do as a case of misrepresentation.' And yet, on the previous page, his initial response to the question whether his minimal teleology accommodates misrepresentation is to say that it is 'not absurd to say that the magnetosome of a northern bacterium transplanted in the southern hemisphere is doing its job when it is indicating the direction of geomagnetic north and "blame" the environment' (118). But this is irrelevant, for to say this just concedes, in this particular example at least, that there is no misrepresentation, despite the fact that two paragraphs later he says that misrepresentation is possible here. This is not the only place where Jacob's fine-detail survey of options for a Dretske-type naturalization project suffers from not seeing the wood for the trees, or at least not making it transparent to the reader what the view is that we are supposed to be lighting upon.

I found the Chapter 8 defence of externalism, the locality of causation and the idea that semantic properties are causally efficacious similarly detailed but lacking in transparency — see the (237) discussion of Baker which seems to beg the question against the explanatory relevance of relational legal properties.

This is a very detailed book and the attention to the fine detail of debates surrounding Dretske's work is impressive. The large questions do not, however, get much of an airing. Jacob says (47) a Fregean top-down approach is disallowed as failing to fit the naturalization project. Apart from the fact that this begs the question against the possibility of non-reductionist versions of naturalization, it also ignores the constraint which something like the Fregean approach can legitimately demand of Jacob's bottom-up approach, namely that the account of content he provides should capture the familiar everyday notion of belief content that the Fregean takes for granted. This issue gets no airing, he just gets on with the project of working out the details of a Dretskean story.

The narrowness of Jacob's approach shows in some brief discussion (64f.) of the idea of non-conceptual content. This is an idea which changes shapes with each new article about it, but Jacob runs together at least three different

ideas in the space of a few pages including the claim that the conceptual/non-conceptual distinction is the same as the descriptive/non-descriptive content distinction!

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Walter Jost and **Michael J. Hyde, eds.**
Rhetoric and Hermeneutics in Our Time.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1997.
Pp. xxiii + 406.
US$40.00. ISBN 0-300-06836-0.

This anthology explores areas of historical convergence between the disciplines of rhetoric and hermeneutics and suggests areas for possible collaboration and cooperation in the future.

In 'Rhetoric and Hermeneutics' by Hans-Georg Gadamer (translated into English for the first time in this volume), Gadamer examines the history of the relation between rhetoric and hermeneutics, noting their similarities and points of overlap, making clear the essential role that each plays in human being-in-the-world. Paul Ricoeur makes a similar point about *Dasein* in 'Rhetoric — Poetics — Hermeneutics'. In an interesting essay, 'On the Tragedy of Hermeneutical Experience', Gerald L. Bruns compares themes of tragedy to Gadamer's conception of the fundamental hermeneutic experience. Just as King Lear was naked and unprotected before the fierce storm, interpreters must place their provisional judgments at risk, facing possible challenge by the interpretandum.

Calvin O. Schrag, in 'Hermeneutic Circles, Rhetorical Triangles, and Transversal Diagonals'; Victoria Kahn, in 'Humanism and the Resistance to Theory'; and Eugene Garver, in 'Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Prudence in the Interpretation of the Constitution', try to find in rhetoric resources for overcoming some of philosophy's failings, including the latter's denigration of difference (Schrag), its often exclusive concern with deductively valid systems (Kahn), and its distortional tendencies as it makes abstract everything it touches (Garver). Each of these thinkers argues for the primacy of the practice of argument itself over any particular doctrine or theory.

Richard E. Palmer's 'What Hermeneutics Can Offer Rhetoric' gives very practical suggestions for future collaborative research involving hermeneutics and rhetoric through twenty *topoi* that indicate specific problem areas relevant to both disciplines. Michael Leff's quite interesting 'Hermeneutical

Rhetoric' uses Lincoln's interpretation of the Declaration of Independence in the Gettysburg Address (which both appropriates and transforms traditional tropes) as an exemplary model of the rhetorical uses of careful interpretation. In 'The Uses of Rhetoric: Indeterminacy in Legal Reasoning, Practical Thinking, and the Interpretation of Literary Figures', Wendy Olmsted challenges the belief that meaning is either univocal or undecidable, arguing that different kinds and degrees of ambiguity can be appropriate for the various inquiries they serve.

David Tracy's article, 'Charity, Obscurity, Clarity: Augustine's Search for Rhetoric and Hermeneutics', explicates the structure of Augustine's *de Doctrina Christiana*. Tracy argues that books I-III and book IV of *de Doctrina Christiana* do not constitute two self-contained works — the former, Augustine's hermeneutics, and the latter, his rhetoric — but that the rhetorical cannot be understood properly without the hermeneutical, and vice versa. In 'Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Interpretation of Scripture: Augustine to Robert of Basevorn' (not, as its title may suggest, an historical survey), Donald G. Marshall argues that a rhetorical way of thinking can lead to hermeneutic insights into the meaning and language of texts at a deep structural level. Rhetoric not only made Augustine a more effective preacher; his rhetorical tools gave him access to greater depth of scriptural interpretation.

Allen Scult's essay, 'Hermes' Rhetorical Problem: The Dilemma of the Sacred in Philosophical Hermeneutics', examines Heidegger's lifelong task to 'reiterate the wordless call that gives understanding without posing as the godhead who originates the gift' (292). Scult maintains that Heidegger's early work points to Being without making ontological claims for itself while his later work, increasingly self-reflexive, comes dangerously close to no longer giving us the language of Being but simply the being of Heidegger in language. Gadamer's 'Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Ideology-Critique' maintains that neither rhetoric nor hermeneutics requires explicit awareness of their techniques for correct performance and contains Gadamer's most famous statement about the two disciplines: 'the grasping of the meaning of the text takes on something of the character of an independent productive act, one that resembles more the art of the orator than the process of mere listening' (317-8). Rita Copeland, in 'Rhetoric and the Politics of the Literal Sense in Medieval Literary Theory: Aquinas, Wycliff, and the Lollards', undertakes an historical survey of the relation between rhetoric and the literal sense of a text in order to demonstrate that all competing schools of interpretation performatively illustrate that 'rhetoric is precisely what is political about the literal sense' (353).

In 'Reason and Rhetoric in Habermas' Theory of Argumentation', one of the most interesting articles in the collection, William Rehg attempts to remedy deficiencies in Jürgen Habermas' account of rhetoric in the latter's theory of communicative action. Rehg shows that Habermas' 'idealized pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation' (which, as regulative ideals, rule out devices that undermine the freedom of participants in a discourse)

allow a more substantial role for rhetoric than Habermas suggests. Steven Mailloux's 'Articulation and Understanding: The Pragmatic Intimacy Between Rhetoric and Hermeneutics' examines myths found in Platonic dialogues for what they suggest about the 'practical inseparability' of interpretation and language use.

This volume is a well organized, interdisciplinary venture that brings together excellent essays by some of the finest scholars in their fields. I highly recommend it as introductory text to contemporary issues in rhetoric and hermeneutics.

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Besides nearly one-hundred glaring typos, this volume from the SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy includes an introduction, four chapters that the author admits can be read as separate essays, an appendix addressing the soundness of the collection of notes that has come to be known as *The Will to Power*, an index and a bibliography. Klein's place in recent Nietzsche scholarship is worth considering, especially by advanced students interested in Nietzsche's views on truth, language and rhetoric. The beginning student who needs assistance in developing an overall view of Nietzsche will find little help here.

Klein demands strict reading, and the textual history of *The Will to Power* is so bad, he thinks, that 'scholars risk having their own interpretations of Nietzsche influenced by readings of passages that have been edited, broken up or otherwise corrupted' (199). Klein's belief that the collection 'is corrupt, and hence should not be counted among Nietzsche's writings at all' puts him apparently in the fine company of the splitters in Nietzschean studies (194). Splitters treat the notes Nietzsche did not publish and the texts he did publish differently, while lumpers treat both alike. Klein is a devoted splitter with regard to the compilation forged by Nietzsche's sister and her editors into the famous volume with the exciting name, but with regard to the *Nachlass* in general — he is a classic lumper. The actual notes from Nietzsche

do belong to Nietzsche's writings, thinks Klein, but the way that some of those notes have been selected and edited for *The Will to Power* is unacceptable.

Klein spends most of his time with material from the early 1870s that went unpublished by Nietzsche, including the essay 'On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense', the unfinished 'Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks', the largely unknown notes for Nietzsche's lectures on classical Rhetoric, the equally obscure essay on 'The History of Greek Eloquence', and the rarely cited '*Philosophenbuch*', a notebook in which Nietzsche jotted notes and drafted portions of his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy*. Though he believes that only the study of Nietzsche's style can unlock the meaning of his 'otherwise hermetic texts' (39), and in spite of his insistence on taking 'texts on their own terms as texts' (50), the question of whether the style of these early, unpublished and mostly fragmentary writings is as important as the style of the published works is left unaddressed by Klein.

That might be important, because the early notes provide foundation and background for Klein's reading of *The Birth of Tragedy*, which occupies his third chapter. This is the only published text from Nietzsche that is read closely and as a whole. Klein considers only excerpts from Nietzsche's other published works, and these primarily in the final chapter. This chapter, an interpretation of Nietzsche's naturalism, is the weaker of the four essays and mostly unrelated to the project Klein has taken on here — at best it provides him with an opportunity to demonstrate the usefulness of his methods in another context.

For Klein, too many studies have so far perpetuated the bad habit of privileging 'content over form; the "what" of Nietzsche's writings is thoroughly divorced from the "how"'. This encourages superficial reading, and the practice continues despite the fact that many influential interpreters also admit to varying degrees that Nietzsche the writer is an important aspect of Nietzsche the thinker. Against this tendency Klein urges that 'Nietzsche's writing is, in a rather direct way, an integral part of his thought' (42) — in fact, he frankly believes that 'for Nietzsche, philosophical thought is a type of writing' (5). Nietzsche's philosophy must then be read in the same way that other texts are read — closely, and with attention to context and stylistic detail.

His philological attentiveness certainly appears to pay off for Klein. Most importantly, his methods enable him to contribute to the growing awareness of the consistency and coherence of Nietzsche's development by reading *The Birth of Tragedy* into the context of that development — from the fragments of the early 1870s to the works of the final year of Nietzsche's productive life. In contrast to many, Klein does not see Nietzsche as having later rejected his first book. Close reading also empowers Klein's valiant confrontations with other recent interpreters, including Nehamas and Clark.

Beyond his contextual reading of *The Birth of Tragedy*, Klein also promises to clarify Nietzsche's understanding of language and truth. As Klein sees it, 'truth for Nietzsche is essentially linguistic.' The early, unpublished material supports him here. But Klein is at greater risk in asserting that 'in

his later writings Nietzsche employs the concept of truth in a way that exceeds the logic of binary opposition which grounds the traditional philosophical understanding of truth' (60). Merely telling us that Nietzsche occasionally suspends language between the literal and the figurative, without investigating what that means, is simply unhelpful here, and Klein will have to do more for himself on this point given that most of us take the figurative to mean the non-literal in its entirety, and cannot conceive any such suspension.

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L-J in this book presents an interpretation of Plato's middle-period epistemology. On her interpretation, Plato holds the 'Combined Doctrine of Knowledge' in his middle dialogues, such as *Meno, Phaedo, Symposium*, and *Republic*, and a late dialogue, *Theaetetus*. Its main theses are: (a) a person can acquire knowledge of Forms through recollection and dialectic, and (b) two kinds of objects can be known: Forms and objects of perception, which she calls 'cognized objects'. With this interpretation, L-J challenges the traditional interpretation of Plato's epistemology, which attributes to Plato the following views: (A) only souls can acquire knowledge, and (B) only Forms can be known.

L-J argues that Plato holds (a), assuming that it contrasts with (A). But it is not clear whether (a) and (A) are incompatible. Whether or not they are depends on how L-J understands the notion of 'person' in Plato. In her discussion of the notion (Chapter 2), L-J uses 'person' with 'embodied soul' interchangeably and so treats person as a specific form of soul. If so, (a) and (A) are not incompatible. Now L-J might think that thesis (A) is to be understood as: Only embodied soul can acquire knowledge. But this is an implausible view which no one would attribute to Plato, because Plato in his dialogues repeatedly emphasizes that we, the embodied souls, must strive to know the Forms. In any case, it is difficult to decide how Plato conceives of the person. Thus it is not surprising that L-J does not settle the issue; she says (p. 10) that either soul is part of a person (in which case person and his

part, soul, are not the same thing) or the person is the soul in a modified form (in which case the person and the soul are the same). But if she does not rule out the second option, she cannot show that Plato does not hold (A) by arguing that he holds (a).

In order to attribute (b) to Plato, L-J discusses Plato's accounts of perception in the *Theaetetus*, in particular the so-called Secret Doctrine of Perception (152c-153d). She adopts Modrak-Cooper's Phenomenalist Interpretation of the accounts, according to which Plato views objects of perception as produced as a result of perceptual apprehension. On his view, she argues (Chapters 5 and 6), perceptual apprehension involves both the interaction between sense data and sense organs and the soul's organization of the sense data with relevant Forms. The two interactions join to produce the object of perception, a sort of mental object which she calls the 'cognized object'. To use L-J's example, a white box is produced from the influx of sense data, e.g., datum of a white thing and datum of an edged thing, and the soul's classifying and defining them by means of relevant Forms, e.g., Straightness and Equality. Now, L-J claims, a perceiver who has knowledge of the relevant Forms can acquire knowledge of cognized objects such as a white box. (L-J does not explain how one's knowledge of Forms such as Equality and Squareness can lead to the knowledge concerning the whiteness of the box.)

This interpretation has several problems. First, it is controversial whether Plato endorses the Secret Doctrine, which he presents as belonging to Protagoras. And there seems to be little textual evidence indicating that Plato posited mental object as an object of knowledge: The passages L-J cites to support her thesis hardly provide such evidence. The most important is the difficult passage in the *Theaetetus* 185c-6e, which contains the distinction between objects of individual senses, e.g., a particular instance of sound or color, and the common things which the soul deals with when it reasons about objects of senses, e.g., likeness, sameness, or being. Plato in this passage suggests how things like sameness or being might be utilized in making a perceptual judgment, but this does not mean that knowing them enables one to have perceptual knowledge. Furthermore, even if Plato recognized the possibility of knowledge of perceptual objects in addition to knowledge of the Forms, the idea that knowledge of Forms is required for one to know an object of perception appears to be at odds with Plato's typical example of perceptual knowledge in the jury passage (201a-c). Here Plato seems to think that knowledge involving perception, such as an eyewitness' knowledge of a robbery, does not presuppose knowledge of Forms. According to L-J's interpretation, however, the eyewitness could not possess the perceptual knowledge unless he happens to be a philosopher as well.

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Nicholas Martin
Nietzsche and Schiller: Untimely Aesthetics.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford
University Press 1996. Pp. xi + 219.
Cdn$87.95: US$44.95. ISBN 0-19-815913-7.

Nietzsche and Schiller: Untimely Aesthetics is a valuable resource for anyone with serious interests in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century aesthetics. Those concerned to deepen their appreciation of how Nietzsche's work develops out of the German tradition will find that Martin's well researched book collects numerous key passages from Nietzsche's and Schiller's writings (untranslated in their original German), to facilitate the comparison. Martin develops two main theses: 1) that Nietzsche's early work is more consistent with Schiller's than has been recognized, and 2) that *The Birth of Tragedy* parallels Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* in many ways. The comparisons are organized around four ideas: 1) Schiller's and Nietzsche's conceptions of history, 2) their interests in the Greeks, 3) their understanding of contemporary German culture, and 4) the ways they view the aesthetic process. Martin concludes his work with criticisms of Schiller's and Nietzsche's aesthetic views, claiming that both advance a socially and politically impoverished sense of the regenerative capacity of art, and that they both lack positive accounts of the alternative life aesthetic experience is supposed to engender. Martin presents Nietzsche and Schiller as developing 'untimely aesthetics' in at least three ways — as cultural critics challenging the norms and traditions of their own time (1), who were ineffective in bringing about their desired changes (2), but who, nevertheless, have written 'timeless' works that continue to be useful for identifying our own situation and for imagining alternatives to it (3).

Readers sympathetic and otherwise to Nietzsche's provocative work will notice the occasional hostile stance taken toward Nietzsche in *Untimely Aesthetics*. Most curious is the digression in Martin's conclusion, where he considers why 'Nietzsche should have revelled in the imagery of war and pain' (199). To this he attributes Nietzsche's 'nostalgia for the allegedly robust, virile ruthlessness of the Nordic and ancient worlds' and the 'unmistakable traces of the sophisticated and refined intellectual's yearning for barbaric simplicity and raw power' (199). Citing Nietzsche's 'masochistic streak in his character,' Martin suggests that Nietzsche's violent remarks are directed at himself as much as they are at others, including his criticisms of Socrates (200 and 138). 'Increasingly,' Martin writes, 'he tends to equate the inner plastic or spiritual power required to overcome oneself with raw physical power, and at times his *"Übermensch"* resembles a grotesque *"Einzelkämpfer"* or cartoon super-hero' (200). Martin clearly finds the predominance of violent language in Nietzsche's writing disturbing. Rather than attributing it to his psychological insecurities or his political savagery, however, he might have sought to connect it to a line of argument that he did not exhaust earlier in his book.

That Nietzsche yearns for 'barbaric simplicity and raw physical power' cannot be an adequate explanation for his use of violent language, since it is precisely the brutality of those characteristics that the Greeks he admires in *The Birth of Tragedy (BT)* and 'Homer's Contest' have overcome. Without denying those impulses, Nietzsche's Greeks of the tragic age direct those desires into the creative channel of art. As Martin himself recognizes, the relation between the Apollinian and Dionysian is more complex than is usually understood (161ff). In *BT* Nietzsche advances the view that the Apollinian and Dionysian tendencies are manifested in cultural forms, which are realized not only in art but also in social and political arrangements. Nietzsche claims that Sparta, with its extraordinary emphasis on military strength and rigid order, exemplifies complete domination by the Apollinian. Moreover, it reflects a perpetual and explicit resistance to the sensual aspects of life, to the excess and intoxication that are characteristic of the Dionysian. Consequently reasons Nietzsche, Sparta displayed a propensity for war and organized itself so as to exact unrelenting cruelty. Similarly, when the Dionysian is permitted absolute expression, what is risked is wanton (primarily self-) destruction, because the Dionysian strives to deny and to eliminate individual distinction. It identifies individuality as the source of pain for humankind, and it strives to secure a recollection, a unity that is purchased at the expense of annihilating everything distinguishing itself as other. In the grip of that interpretation of life, human existence becomes a perpetual longing for a reunion that remains elusive as long as one lives (see *BT* sections 4, 7, and 8). In 'Homer's Contest', Nietzsche links cruelty to an absence of productive struggle. Cruelty represents a dysfunctional mode of resistance; it is an insatiable craving for opposition that is absent. In tragedy, the Apollinian and the Dionysian meet in an arena that permits both the opportunity to challenge, test, and struggle against the other. It is for that reason that Nietzsche 'actually prefers conflict (*agon*), which he sees as dynamic, productive, and instinct-sharpening, to reconciliation, which he views as static, sterile, and instinct-deadening' (34).

One of the most interesting points of Martin's comparison between Nietzsche and Schiller is his account of the transformative role they assign to play in the aesthetic process. However, when he discusses Nietzsche's playing child in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Martin minimizes the influence of Nietzsche's reading of Heraclitus and instead emphasizes the similarities between Nietzsche's and Schiller's conceptions of play (197ff). Had he investigated the connection with Heraclitus, he might have explored the ways in which war and play are related in Nietzsche's thought, how, under some circumstances, they can be viewed as lying on a continuum for him, and the way in which play can be as serious a matter as going to war — what is at stake, we learn in *Zarathustra*, is the quality and character of human life.

Still, *Nietzsche and Schiller* is an invaluable resource and a serious work of scholarship. Martin has provided an enormous service by weaving his interpretation through sizable portions of Schiller's and Nietzsche's writings. His work is sure to give his readers a greater understanding of the ways in

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which Nietzsche digested much of what he resisted in the work of his untimely predecessor. It is a work that clearly repays careful attention, one worth reading and consulting repeatedly.

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Richard Mason
The God of Spinoza.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.
Pp. xiv + 272.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-521-58162-1.

Spinoza presents a great many problems to interpreters. Most of these hermeneutical challenges involve reconciling different texts or parts of texts that, while they don't strictly contradict one another, nevertheless don't sit comfortably together. The *Theologico-Political Treatise* clashes with the *Ethics*, the first two books of the *Ethics* clash with the last three, and so on. Mason makes a brave — and at least partly successful — attempt in a single work to show that Spinoza's thought forms one whole. The book focuses on what Spinoza has to say about God and religion, but quite naturally (given the structure of Spinoza's thought) finds itself spreading to every corner of his work.

The work is divided into three parts: The God of the Philosophers, The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; and the God of Spinoza. The first explores Spinoza's understanding of God or Nature, primarily as developed in the Ethics. The three chapters of this part develop Spinoza's understanding of how we are to understand God's existence and his action. The latter is especially puzzling given Spinoza's refusal to distinguish between causes and reasons, and the rejection of final causation that such a refusal leads him to. The second explores the question as to how much of religion as actually practiced can be accommodated to Spinoza's philosophical system. The problem posed for historical religion posed by the rejection of final causation arises here in a particularly strong way. If all talk of purposes only arises because of our ignorance of causes, then it is hard to make sense of God's purposes in particular. This makes trouble for such notions as revelation and election, which one might be forgiven for thinking essential to Judaism and Christianity, the two historical religions with which Spinoza was most familiar. The third part can be seen as a synthesis of the first two parts, trying to restore a balance between Spinoza's religious commitments (whatever

they were) and his philosophical commitments. In the process of attempting that synthesis, Mason grapples with two of the most puzzling features of Spinoza's religious thought: his account of eternity and his frequent use of the figure of Christ. The book ends with a thorough and useful bibliography, and an index.

How successful Mason is in his task is hard to assess. In general, he shows a thorough acquaintance with the major interpretive literature, including a lot of European writing of which many in the Anglo-American tradition may be unaware. This mastery of material allows Mason to see Spinoza from angles that may escape other commentators. He also shows a great deal of respect for the two best contemporary commentators on Spinoza, Edwin Curley and Jonathan Bennett. On points in which Curley and Bennett disagree, Mason is particularly careful to be fair to both schools of interpretation. In the end, Mason tends to side with Curley, but this is largely because Bennett has so little to say about Spinozan texts outside the first two books of the *Ethics*.

On the whole, Mason's take on Spinoza is sensitive and immensely suggestive, but not complete. Students of Spinoza are likely to find it frustrating because, while it fairly represents different interpretations of the text, it doesn't really grapple with what is at issue between the different interpreters. Mason gives us his reasons for taking the position he does, but he rarely addresses directly the arguments offered by other interpreters for taking different positions. Those unfamiliar (or only marginally familiar) with Spinoza will find the book more useful, although it can hardly be called an introduction. Without some prior acquaintance with the texts at issue, it is difficult to assess Mason's claims. Perhaps the best audience for Mason's book is the graduate seminar, where it can be read alongside Spinoza himself, and placed in the context of contemporary Spinoza scholarship. In such a role, it should serve well.

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Floyd Merrell
Peirce, Signs and Meaning.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1997.
Pp. xvii + 384.
$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-4135-3);
$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-7982-2).

This densely written five-part book offers a subtle reading and adaptation of Peirce's semiotic thought, not as an independent topic of reflection, but as intrinsically related to his three basic ontological and phenomenological categories: Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. Merrell's central concern is to bring Peirce's treatment of signs into dialogue with the discussions of meaning and reference found in Frege, Russell and Quine, as well as in Goodman, Putnam, Davidson, and Rorty. In order to accomplish this, he needs to show how Peirce's treatment of semiotic reference can have a bearing on such questions as whether a sign can be 'meaningful' whose reference is vague or indeterminate, whether 'meaning' in language has any necessary connection with 'truth,' and whether the idea of semiotic 'reference' to objects in the 'real' world can be sustained at all. The Categories form the framework within which Peirce progressively worked out his thought on the range of ways in which signs may have 'meaning' or 'refer'. Understanding these Categories is essential to grasping the variable senses that can, in Peirce's view, be given to the notion of a sign's 'reference' to an object, because he uses them to distinguish not only among types of signs, but also among types of objects, and hence among their relationships. Both signs and their objects may belong to an ontological realm of 'possibility', 'actuality' or 'generality'. In a complex sign, attributes of signification may be displayed that belong to more than one type. The sense in which a sign 'refers' will vary according to its class, or (in a complex case) to the weighting accorded to a given semiotic element.

The three Categories are the structural basis for Peirce's more systematic presentation of semiotic types as a series of 'trichotomies' (see Peirce's *Collected Papers* Book II, Chapter ii), but it is common, in introducing Peirce's semiotic theory, to ignore the categories, and simply to select the second trichotomy (icon, index, symbol) as representing Peirce's division of signs. To avoid any such misconception that Peirce's philosophy of signs could be contained in only one of its schematic presentations, Merrell resists an extended presentation of Peirce's triadic schemes until Chapter 14 and emphasizes instead the outworkings of the categories, as copresent aspects of every sign. Peirce's 'first' category is that of apparent phenomenal immediacy. It picks out pervasive qualities, known by a subject as 'feelings', without any comparisons being made. These qualities may be felt and conceived as 'possible' without any commitment to their 'existence' or necessity. By contrast, the 'second' category picks out events or actualities, known in action and reaction, asserted as 'real'. A sign of 'secondness' is to be found in any dyadic confrontation between a knowing subject and some 'other',

whose resistance to the subject's will makes it impossible to reduce to a vaguely felt possibility. The 'third' category is concerned with 'generals' or laws. Its conventions, patterns and rules are symbolically represented, and habitually understood. To understand the object of a symbol (a third) requires an explicit reference to a rule.

Merrell's contention is that the vagueness of the 'first' category is reciprocal to the 'generality' of the last, and that every sign must display an element of each. If a sign is 'vague', its meaning is indeterminate because it could embrace many contradictory possibilities, which do not exclude one another for the very fact that they are simply entertained as 'possible'. In Merrell's terms, the sign of firstness is 'overdetermined' and 'inconsistent', as many possibilities can co-exist. If, in the reciprocal case, the sign is 'general', its meaning is no less indeterminate, but now its lack of closure derives from its being incompletely defined. Simply by being 'general', the sign is 'underdetermined', allowing for many different tokens as exemplars of its type. If a given sign displays elements both of vagueness and of generality, its need for ongoing interpretation will be evident. No one 'meaning' can be settled on as the final one, taken as determined by the sign, and the play of interpretation involves teasing out the many implications of its indeterminacy. By making use of Peirce's 'first' and 'third' categories, Merrell is thus able to support his own claim, that meaning is always, necessarily, the subject of ongoing interpretation, and insusceptible to any definitive point of closure. In making this emphasis, he is taking some liberties with Peirce's own brand of realism, about which he is markedly sceptical.

Merrell successfully fulfills his aim of bringing a new perspective on questions of meaning (particularly vagueness and indeterminacy) through an exploration of Peirce's semiotic thought. His subtle play with Peirce's categories and at times flowery language does not, however, make this the most accessible introduction to Peirce's philosophy, and readers without prior acquaintance with it may wish to begin with more introductory works.

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Que peut-on encore découvrir sur les *Méditations Métaphysiques*?
Qu'ajouter aux commentaires de F. Alquié, M. Gueroult, H. Gouhier, J.-M.
Beyssade et J.-L. Marion, bref de tous les exégètes de Descartes? Le pari
de G. Moyal est d'autant plus ambitieux que l'auteur s'efforce de renverser
nombre d'idées communément admises sur le célèbre texte. Il commence
par contester l'interprétation selon laquelle l'hypothèse du rêve ne peut
entacher de doute les vérités de la raison (vérités mathématiques et
logiques), interprétation fondée sur le célèbre passage tiré de la *Ire
Méditation*: 'Car, soit que je veille ou que je dorme, deux et trois joints
ensemble feront toujours le nombre de cinq (...); et il ne semble pas possible
que des vérités si apparentes puissent être soupçonnées d'aucune fausseté
ou incertitude.' Moyal est ainsi rapidement amené à accorder au rêve une
place centrale dans ce que Descartes nommait justement ses 'rêveries de
métaphysique': le rêve permet de révoquer en doute les vérités de la raison
(en remettant en question nos perceptions de ces vérités: ils nous semble
bien évident que $2 + 2 = 4$, mais la certitude accordée aux vérités
mathématiques n'est que celle dont elles nous *semblent* être pourvues dans
ce qui n'est peut-être qu'un rêve) et il ne s'achève pas avec l'arrivée du Dieu
trompeur, ou bien avec celle du malin génie. La rêverie ne se dissipe qu'au
terme de l'ouvrage car Descartes ne dispose pas, dans le cours de ses
Méditations, d'un critère permettant à coup sûr d'écarter l'idée qu'il est en
train de rêver. Ni le *cogito*, ni l'existence d'un Dieu vérace ne lui fournissent
cette garantie. Si le rêve n'occupe plus une place centrale après la
découverte de l'existence de Dieu, c'est simplement que son efficacité est
anéantie: parmi les illusions dont il demeure la source se trouvent des
certitudes que l'on peut prendre légitimement pout des vérités en se fiant
à leur clarté et à leur distinction.

L'hypothèse de la permanence du rêve étant posée, l'auteur s'interroge
sur son rôle exact dans l'entreprise métaphysique, et sur les rapports du
rêve avec la folie (que Descartes révoque rapidement), le Dieu trompeur et
le malin génie. Selon Moyal, si Descartes ne retient pas la folie, c'est d'abord
parce qu'elle implique le corps, corps dont l'existence est remise en doute
jusqu'à la *VIe Méditation* (mais on peut s'interroger sur la base corporelle
du rêve lui-même). C'est ensuite et surtout car elle ne permet pas la liberté
d'assentiment nécessaire à l'entreprise métaphysique de Descartes. Le fou
n'a aucun contrôle sur les représentations qu'il accepte ou qu'il récuse: il
est tout entier sous l'emprise des 'noires vapeurs de la bile'. Au contraire,
dans le rêve tel qu'envisagé par Descartes, le méditant a toute liberté. Il
ne s'agit donc pas du rêve tel qu'on le conçoit habituellement (où l'on ne

choisit pas de rêver de carrés ronds ou de blanquette de veau), mais plutôt de l'état ambigu où l'on se trouve au moment de l'endormissement ou du réveil, et où l'on ne sait pas bien si l'on dort ou si l'on veille. En faisant de la liberté d'assentiment un pré-requis à l'enquête métaphysique de Descartes, et en y consacrant les deux derniers chapitres de son ouvrage, Moyal rejoint le philosophe J. Lequier (dans *Comment trouver, comment chercher une première vérité?*) Cependant, contrairement à Lequier, Moyal ne voit pas dans la liberté une première vérité, mais plutôt une condition de possibilité de la connaissance, qui n'a pas besoin d'être découverte avant le *cogito* pour être opérationnelle.

Quant au Dieu trompeur, il est d'abord la cause possible du rêve, et, puisqu'il constitue un entendement ayant un accès au réel, il garantit le sens même de cette notion. De plus, il sape la fiabilité du critère de clarté et de distinction, qui échappait au rêve. Enfin, il sert de modèle au malin génie, auquel il cède rapidement la place: là où le Dieu trompeur était cause *possible* du rêve, le malin génie en est la cause effective. Les raisons du passage de l'un à l'autre ne sont pas rendues de façon très convaincante dans l'ouvrage de Moyal. Selon lui, Descartes abandonne le Dieu trompeur pour cause de contradiction, car un être ne peut à la fois être tout puissant et trompeur et parce que cette idée risquerait de priver de son fondement le doute qu'elle est censée justifier. Pourtant, un peu plus loin (p. 87), Moyal remarque que le malin génie souffre du même défaut, maintenant présenté comme une qualité et justifié car les vérités de la raison ayant été abandonnées, les contradictions ne sont plus impensables.

En supposant que les *Méditations* se déroulent comme dans un rêve, quelle est la valeur de ce que Descartes y découvre? Le rêve entame-t-il la certitude du *cogito*, de l'existence de Dieu? En ce qui concerne le *cogito*, sa structure particulière l'immunise contre l'atteinte du rêve: c'est une vérité contingente qui a la propriété d'être vraie à chaque fois que je l'énonce, et ce quel que soit l'état dans lequel je l'énonce. L'existence de Dieu étant d'une certaine façon enveloppée dans le *cogito* explique qu'elle ne puisse pas non plus être atteinte par le rêve. Quant à la clarté et la distinction, ce critère est garanti par la véracité divine. Ici non plus, rien à craindre. Si ces certitudes ne sont pas atteintes par le rêve, Moyal s'efforce également de montrer que ni le *cogito* ni l'existence de Dieu ne dépendent des vérités de la raison, et que le doute porté sur ces dernières n'empêche pas la découverte de l'un ou de l'autre. Ici, l'auteur marche sur une corde raide pour éviter le cercle, et ses arguments ne sont pas toujours très convaincants, voire même parfois carrément étranges (je pense par exemple à l'argument de la preuve conditionnelle, p. 179. Ayant posé A et en ayant dérivé B, on peut effectivement, par conditionalisation, dériver $A \rightarrow B$ et supprimer la prémisse A. Mais on ne peut certainement pas dans un second mouvement passer $A \rightarrow B$ dans l'ensemble des prémisses pour en dériver B — il suffit de considérer $A = B = p$ pour s'en convaincre — et prétendre ainsi avoir dérivé B sans hypothèse).

Le pari de Moyal, qui aurait pu s'intituler *Descartes selon l'ordre des déraisons*, est ambitieux. Sa réinterprétation de Descartes n'emporte pas toujours l'adhésion du lecteur, mais elle a le mérite de ne rien affirmer sans de multiples justifications.

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Helmut Müller-Sievers
Self-Generation: Biology, Philosophy, and Literature Around 1800.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1997.
Pp. 222.
US$39.50. ISBN 0-8047-2779-1.

In the eighteenth century, the question of the generation of new life was largely dominated by a debate between preformationists and epigenetists. The preformationists maintained that all living beings had been fully pre-formed since the Creation, and 'generation' is simply the enlargement of each tiny germ. Those who favoured epigenesis claimed that each birth represents a self-generated new formation and attempted to give a natural explanation of generation rather than simply deny it as had their preformationist coun-terparts. In the 1960s, historians of science tried to rescue the debate from the charge that it was a quaint and quirky aberration by showing that deep metaphysical, religious and scientific commitments central to early modern thought grounded the dispute. In recent years, there has been renewed interest in this history. Müller-Sievers' important book — which extends the scholarship in this area well beyond the history and philosophy of science — is an insightful example of this renewal.

Müller-Sievers' thesis is that the triumph and development of the theory of epigenesis provides a particularly fruitful starting point from which to study the changes in epistemology, philosophy of nature, philosophy of language, and literature at the turn of the nineteenth century (4). He begins with a brief overview of the debate about biological origination among eighteenth-century biologists. What is new and exciting about this overview is Müller-Sievers' suggestion of the social conditions favouring the triumph of epigenesis over preformation. Epigenesis triumphed not because of any conclusive scientific evidence but because the natural, autonomous, original, self-expressive promise of the epigenetic model was more amenable to the growing Romantic ideal than was preformation with its externally-deter-

mined and mechanical starting point (4-8). Müller-Sievers extends this thesis to the issue of gender relations, noting that the epigenetic model was more popular because of the active, subjective role that the male played on this model of generation (10), and because it rejected the preformationist indifference (after all, everything is predetermined) toward the participation of *specific* partners in generation which resulted in the separation of love and choice from sexuality and generation (30). Müller-Sievers carries these cultural themes throughout his investigation of the way epigenesis is used in the work of Kant, Fichte, Herder, Humboldt, Beaumarchais and Goethe.

Kant uses the theory of epigenesis only as an heuristic assumption to explain the deduction of the categories. He likens the empiricist position that the categories spring forth from experience to the outdated biological theory of spontaneous generation. Similarly, the dogmatic rationalist position that the categories are subjective, implanted dispositions finds its biological parallel in preformation. Only a position analogous to organic epigenesis, in which the categories are treated as self-produced first principles, can guarantee transcendental apriority and the necessity and universality missing from the other two options (45-6). But Kant's mere heuristic use of epigenesis leaves inexplicable the origin of the categories, and his transcendental apperception is ultimately ungrounded. Fichte's all-out epigenetic account of self-consciousness provides such a grounding and gives philosophical knowledge a claim to certainty. This grounding is found in the absolute I which generates or posits itself — which is pure activity (67). Fichte thus pushes Kant's heuristic use of epigenesis to the idealist conclusion, proceeding not simply *as if* an epigenetic formative drive exists in nature, including in our own consciousness, but rather by actually '*performing* epigenetic origination' (81). Here Müller-Sievers shows how closely tied the emergence of idealist philosophy is to the victory of epigenesis (47).

Herder and Humboldt, the 'language epigenetists,' represent a second 'intraphilosophical assault on Kant's critical position' (88). In the late eighteenth century debate regarding the origin of language, both thinkers attempted to provide a third, epigenetic option to two popular positions, just as Kant had with regard to the origin of the categories. One position claimed that language had a wholly natural, animalistic origin — reminiscent of spontaneous generation — while the other claimed that language had a divine origin — analogous to preformation (90). But like Fichte, Herder and Humboldt were dissatisfied with Kant's particular use of the epigenetic model. Specifically, they challenged Kant's 'alleged purity of pure reason' (88), with Humboldt's fully developed epigenetic account of language placing its origin at the 'intercourse of thought and sensibility' thereby irreducibly uniting sensibility and understanding in language (92-4).

As he did in his earlier chapters, Müller-Sievers uses his epigenetic interpretations of Herder and Humboldt's philosophy to elucidate their claims about gender roles and marriage. This subtle and complex weaving together of the various threads of philosophy and culture with biology reaches its final expression in the author's interpretations of Beaumarchais' *Le*

Mariage de Figaro and Goethe's *Wahlverwandtschaften*. In the contrast he draws between the anti-Romantic, pre-arranged marriage in Beaumarchais' play and the concentration on love, 'the expression of self-generated subjectivity' (122), in Goethe's novel, Müller-Sievers fulfills his promise to tie together 'all the strands of preformationist and epigenetic thought' (18) — physiology, nature, philosophy, language, culture — that he has developed throughout the book, and in doing so has produced a fine study of the history of an idea.

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Dennis Patterson, ed.
A Companion to Philosophy of Law
and Legal Theory.
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers 1996.
Pp. xxi + 602.
US$84.95. ISBN 1-55786-535-3.

This book is one of several wide-bodied Companions to Philosophy produced in recent years through Blackwell Publishers. This particular one on legal philosophy, edited by Dennis Patterson, is certainly useful, consisting of 602 pages-worth of forty-two articles by well-known and, well, some unknown writers in the field. Most are law professors, with a few philosophers and a sociologist found in the interstices. Some of the writers provide what amount to summaries of the core ideas of books they have written, e.g., George Fletcher on Loyalty, Ernest Weinrib on Legal Formalism, and Jeremy Waldron on Property. However many others write original essays upon what they know best; there are two excellent examples in Part I (Areas of Law) by Peter Benson (Contract) and Stephen Perry (Tort). Leo Katz (Criminal Law) discusses several paradoxes of criminal doctrine he has discussed cleverly before, including that right-wing favorite, why blackmail should (not) be a crime. Especially in these longer essays — which alone take up the first ninety-five pages of the book — the issue is almost always over theoretical foundations. Next, still in Part I, there are shorter entries on public international law (Philip Bobbitt) and then constitutional law: regarding religion (Perry Dane), interpretation (Philip Bobbitt), privacy (Anita L. Allan), and equality (Maimon Schwarzchild). All these authors — with only momentary inattentions — mean by 'the Constitution', the USA one. There are further pieces in Part I on evidence (John Jackson and Sean Doran), comparative

law (Richard Hyland), interpretation of statutes (William N. Eskridge, Jr.), and conflict of law (Perry Dane). Some of these latter entries in Part I are about legal doctrine and experience, e.g., Bobbitt's two pieces, with less meat directly for the philosophical theorist. All of these nine shorter essays — taking us through another 125 pages to 220 — were well prepared; I found the two on religion and conflicts, both by Dane, especially palatable.

Part II on Contemporary Schools covers Natural Law (Brian Bix), Legal Positivism (Jules Coleman and Brian Leiter), Legal Realism (Leiter), Critical Legal Studies (Guyora Binder), Post-realism and Legal Process (Neil Duxbury), Feminist Jurisprudence (Patrica Smith), Law and Economics (Jon D. Hanson and Melissa R. Hart), Legal Formalism (Ernest Weinrib), German Legal Philosophy and Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Alexander Somek), Marxist Theory of Law (Alan Hunt), Deconstruction (J.M. Balkin), Postmodernism (Dennis Patterson), and Legal Pragmatism (Richard Warner). These entries vary between the especially argumentative (e.g., Legal Positivism, Feminist Jurisprudence) and the largely explanatory (e.g., Natural Law, Post-realism & Legal Process). Some of the explanatory are enlightening and innovative (e.g., Legal Realism, especially, and also Critical Legal Studies) but one entry, unfortunately, falls well below the standards of the book (viz., Legal Pragmatism). The Law and Economics entry combines explanation and critical argument brilliantly, though it focuses on tort law pretty well exclusively — as apparently most of this school now do. Legal Formalism (Weinrib) undertakes to answer the rumor that formalism is dead. German Legal Philosophy and Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries is largely explanatory but certainly worth reading, as is Marxist Theory of Law. Both entries are examples of secure, mature scholarship. Several are brief. Critical Legal Studies, Feminist Jurisprudence, Deconstruction, Postmodernism, Legal Pragmatism are each merely eight-plus pages long despite high fashion. These short discussions would, however, almost always serve as useful starting places for a student, who then digs into the bibliographies. The entries Deconstruction and Postmodernism would give help and comfort to the Uncaught-up.

Part III (generally, Law and the Disciplines) consists in Law and Anthropology (Rebecca Redwood French), The Sociology of Law (M.P. Baugartner), Law and Theology (Edward Chase), Law and Morality (Roger Shiner), and Law and Literature (Thomas Morawetz). Law and Anthropology provides a useful historical survey of relevant work up the present and makes one appreciate the value of examining (and not just the hazard of neglecting) other-culture data while developing philosophical theories on the nature of law. Anthropologists seek to achieve an internal point of view to the culture that they study. The Sociology of Law is different: it is the study of legal behavior aiming to predict outcomes within more or less familiar venues using established social principles — and without relying too much on the lawbook itself or an internal point of view. Thus while the practical lawyer considers whether A is criminally culpable for his act upon B, the sociologist will wish to know whether Albert the Accused has high social status and

whether Bart the Victim has high or low; the combinations forecast how a legal complaint will be handled. Predictably, low status harming high will get more official attention than the reverse. The upshot, for the sociologist, is that very often legal 'conduct is constrained by the dictates of social laws' not legal laws. This work is largely done in real time at home by natives trying to observe their own scene as an outsider would; while sociology is 'not in a position to pass moral judgment on the facts it uncovers' nonetheless '[l]aw-yers may advise people with sociologically weak cases not to bother pursuing them...' (416). Legal sociology, as an 'alternative perspective', seems to me a place where a philosophical critic could have a ripping good time.

Law and Theology (Chase) treats this relation as worthy of study as any other 'law &' subject. A better case is made than one might have expected. Law and Literature (Morawetz) does the same kind of work, often engagingly — though its bibliography curiously begins 'Fish, S.' and contains no names earlier in the English-American alphabet. Law students — these being, as the Preface tells us, the group to whom the book is mainly directed — are liable to hear some strange things said on the topic of law and morality by their professors. Could this book help? Law and Morality (Shiner) examines the complementarity of the two normative systems, and could be a good essay for good students to read, though the same must be urged, with even more justice for all, of Legal Enforcement of Morality (Greenawalt). The latter entry is found in Part IV. This final part is Topics — I think it was wise not to do Figures. It consists of heterogeneous subject-matters: The Duty of Obey the Law (M.B.E. Smith), Legal Enforcement of Morality (Kent Greenawalt), Indeterminacy (Lawrence B. Solum), Precedent (Larry Alexander), Punishment and Responsibility (George P. Fletcher), Loyalty (Fletcher), Coherence (Ken Kress), The Welfare State (Sanford Levinson), Legal Scholarship (Edward L. Rubin), Authority of Law (Vincent A. Wellman), Analogical Reasoning (Jefferson White). I think it is a defect that Legal Ethics is nowhere examined — being a topic more apposite for students than, say, Fletcher's recapitulation on Loyalty, even if it does brush by the topic of loyalty to clients briefly.

The entry The Duty to Obey Law (Smith) argues that there is no duty as such. The entry Indeterminacy (Solum) argues that there is neither complete determination of outcomes by law nor radical indeterminacy — in a lucid and balanced article. Precedent (Alexander) aims to find what is necessary for a coherent doctrine, rejecting two suggested models in favor of a model that settles 'what is to count as the rule of the precedent case.' Fletcher asks in Punishment and Responsibility what punishment is and was unable to answer except through examples, like flogging, which is punishment 'if anything is'. Various accounts of punishment's purpose move through the retrospective to the prospective rationales, with a valuable discussion of Kant on punishment. The entry Coherence (Kress) was, I thought, unusually good, since the term does get thrown about by legal theorists — perhaps without great understanding. Yet the entry, by the many questions it raises, could show just why that happens. The entry on The Welfare State (Levinson) is a

short, reasonably neutral essay in political philosophy, specifically on the issue of redistribution and justice in a capitalist economy; I doubt that it was really required in this volume. The next entry Legal Scholarship (Rubin) helps explain the doubts one might have had about the prior article since 'legal scholarship' is a field that 'continually debates its methodology' and its scope. Authority of Law (Wellman) is a model of clear, elegant compression, focusing mainly on Raz, Hart, and Green. I would extend the same compliment to the Analogical Reasoning entry (White), which concludes plausibly that we simply do not yet understand this kind of reasoning. As for editing, everything is fine except that it was too bad to see Catharine MacKinnon's name misspelled in Feminist Jurisprudence and C.S. Peirce's name also misspelled in Legal Pragmatism. It is not that this has not happened before with these two. The editor or publisher should be congratulated for including an Index, something one does not often see in a collection of this kind.

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Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak
Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press
1997. Pp. ix + 248.
US$79.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8101-1480-1);
US$22.50 (paper: ISBN 0-08101-1481-X).

This book is a collection of previously published essays by one of the most distinguished interpreters of Emmanuel Levinas. Like a number of other Christian identified philosophers, Adriaan Peperzak has been powerfully drawn to Europe's preeminent Jewish philosopher. And while this book touches on religious themes, it remains, for the most part, an exploration of the philosophical import of Levinas's thought. As such, it does justice to Levinas's long-standing wish to be judged first and foremost as a philosopher.

For the first-time reader of Levinas, Peperzak introduces his book with a brief essay outlining Levinas's philosophical trajectory in relation to twentieth-century philosophy. Peperzak also furnishes two short chapters that sketch the Judaic context of Levinas's thought. This discussion is important because the Judaic sources of some of Levinas's ideas are often concealed within the theoretical writings. In an intellectual milieu dominated by Marxists, Nietzscheans, and structuralists, it is not surprising that Levinas, like other philosophers interested in religion in post-war Europe, maintained

a fairly strict separation between his philosophical and religious writings. Peperzak gives us a faithful assessment of the refreshingly original manner in which Levinas combines religious and philosophical issues: 'Obsessed by the Other, historical through and through and yet transcendent, religious without betraying the earth — such is the existence reflected in Levinas's surprising search for a truth that resists our wish for conceptual domination. Few adventures in philosophy are more exciting ... in such an exploration of the radical intrigues that constitute a human life' (xi).

For the more advanced reader, Peperzak offers some crucial insights into the complex relationship between Levinas and phenomenology. The essay 'From Phenomenology through Ontology to Metaphysics' is a useful appraisal of Levinas's earliest writings. This essay — one of the few in the literature to deal with the 'early' Levinas — surveys Levinas's earliest interpretations of Husserl and Heidegger. In particular, Peperzak delineates how and why Levinas came to distance himself from Heidegger. Initially a follower of Heidegger, Levinas, beginning in 1933, the year the German philosopher joined the National Socialist Party, set out to question Heidegger's investment in the concept of Being.

While much has been written on Levinas's reading of *Being and Time*, hardly anyone has ventured to compare Levinas with the later Heidegger. Peperzak sets out to fill precisely this gap in the chapter entitled 'Technology and Nature'. Peperzak takes up Levinas's alternative understanding of the 'essence' of technology — to use Heidegger's famous phrasing. Levinas's analysis of technology directly opposes Heidegger's strict opposition between the objectifying character of modern science and the natural world. Levinas is certainly aware and disturbed by the fact that nature has too often been gratuitously disfigured in the name of scientific progress. Nevertheless, he feels it important to credit modern science with extending the originally Judaic demand to demythologize nature in the name of justice, that is, to make the world a more hospitable place for other human beings. To return to a more primordial relationship with the earth 'would betray the conquest of human autonomy [as well as] deny the clear and simple truth that another's hunger ... is more "sacred" than any god or nature' (140). While such a claim requires further prudent qualification, Levinas's alternative analysis is nonetheless a much needed correction to Heidegger's primarily negative assessment of technology.

The remainder of *Beyond* is devoted to Levinas's final work, and, in particular, *Otherwise than Being*. (Readers interested in Levinas's other major work, *Totality and Infinity*, should consult Peperzak's *To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*.) For the novice, *Otherwise than Being* is incomprehensible. Peperzak puts his intimate knowledge of the philosophical tradition to good use in shedding some much needed light on this difficult text. Rather than simply summarizing Levinas, he offers illuminating comparisons with more readily known thinkers, like Descartes, Kant, and Hegel. Such an approach is also effective because Levinas continues to use classical philosophical categories in a manner that

is often markedly different than their conventional use. Peperzak heedfully demarcates these differences. He shows, for example, how Levinas's conception of the transcendental must be carefully distinguished from Kant's. One conspicuous absence, however, in Peperzak's discussions is Derrida. While this might be welcomed by some — we seem to be saturated these days with essays on the relationship between Levinas and Derrida — the complete absence in *Beyond* of Derrida's name is questionable, especially given that Levinas's final essays do contain crucial references and allusions to Derrida.

This last minor criticism aside, *Beyond*, coupled with Peperzak's *To the Other*, is by far the clearest introduction available in English to the entirety of Levinas's thought.

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Robert G. Pielke
EthicsWorks, Version 1.0.
Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy
Documentation Centre, 1997
Student Manual, pp. 23. ISBN 0912632-72-0.
Instructor's Manual, pp. 59. ISBN 0912632-72-0.
Program & Exercise Disk (DOS or Mac)
Ethics Editor Disk (DOS or Mac)
Ethics Grader Disk (DOS or Mac)
Student Copies: $24.95
Instructors Copies: $35.95
[FREE if adopted for course use]

EthicsWorks is a software program designed to augment conventional teaching of introductory ethical philosophy. The system requirements are minimal: 386 PC and above (DOS 3.0 and above, Windows) or any Mac, 4 MB RAM, 12 MB on disk, and high-density 3.5" floppy drive. The instructor should have access to a machine which can read both DOS and Mac disks.

Although some content parallels William Frankena's *Ethics*, Pielke intends the program to be compatible with most popular introductory moral texts. Future releases may be text-specific. Pielke provides e-mail support and the EthicsWorks web site (http://members.aol.com/ethicswrks) offers an overview of the program, patches, and trial downloads (curious readers should try a copy).

Each student disk is protected by an identification number which must be entered each time it is loaded. The Grand Menu offers a choice of seven topic areas (Everyday Language and Ethics; Key Analytical Concepts, Major Theorists; Liberty, Harm, and Offence; Freedom and Happiness; Duties and Rights; and Justice and Equality). Selecting any topic invokes a topically organised sub-menu of question sets (e.g., The Ecosphere, Health and Medicine, Sexuality and Xtra) containing up to forty questions each.

Most questions require the student to read the question, select an answer from a separate answer screen listing 6 to 36 possible answers, and then return to the question screen and type in the answer verbatim. (The surfeit of possible answers and the need to type every answer exactly impose a penalty of tedium on students who guess their way through every possible answer.) The program indicates if the student's answer is correct, her score, and a brief (sometimes facetious or humorous) message commenting on the answer. The student can then retry the question or move on to the next. The program automatically records accumulated scores, activities, and student work when the student exits.

The student manual and activity-specific help screens offer adequate guidance at each stage. The question sets range over basic moral concepts, a good selection of major historical and contemporary philosophers, and a dozen or so contemporary moral issues. Instructors should find enough relevant material in *EthicsWorks* to complement any introductory ethics course. A brief bibliography cites the classic sources on which the software is based.

Once students have completed assigned work, the instructor can collect their disks and use the Grader disk to automatically collate student data and marks. The Editor disk allows the instructor to compile lists of assigned questions, generate entirely new question sets or examinations and then copy them to the student disks.

Like any early release, *EthicsWorks* 1.0 has a few bugs. I tested a down-loaded Mac version and the full-feature DOS version. Both performed adequately, although the Mac version was not stable and either crashed or would not close when used with other applications open. But these are the least of *EthicsWorks's* woes.

Clearly any instructor who decides to use *EthicsWorks* to reinforce, monitor, or test student comprehension of class lectures thereby commits herself to teach at least enough of those concepts and categories which underpin its question sets to give her students a reasonable ability to answer them. But many will find Pielke's methodology (at least as it is reflected by his questions) perplexing, pedagogically unhelpful, and perhaps idiosyncratic. Some sample questions (some shortened for reasons of space): 'Epicurus is to hedonism as _____ is to hedonism.' Is Plato 'essentially' or 'purely' deontological? Is it a 'judgment call' or an 'evaluative' statement to call Burke an 'optimist'?

Further, many instructors will find many of Pielke's answers suspect or even misleading. Examples: It is *false* that Aristotle was a teleologist. It is

true that he was a socialist. Kant was not 'essentially' deontological. On the question of abortion, it is *necessarily* true that everyone is either pro-choice or pro-life (agnosticism is apparently conceptually impossible).

Pielke, of course, recognises that the very possibility of reasoned disagreement is what makes philosophy possible and he takes pains to point out that *EthicsWorks's* answers should not be understood as final and objective pronouncements but, rather, as points of departure for personal reconsideration and classroom discussion. I'm not sure, however, that this reply meets the complaint fairly and completely.

EthicsWorks is, after all, designed to test students's ability to make particular sorts of distinctions — and perhaps needlessly abstruse distinctions, at that. Its deliberately unfriendly interface is designed to thwart guessing (although Pielke admits that it is not uncommon for students to make as many as twenty guesses at a single question), and to put a premium on choosing the 'right' answer the first time — for which a precise numerical score is assigned. Given all this, it hardly seems fair — or pedagogically coherent — to beg off by saying that the answers themselves might, after all, not even be 'right'.

What *EthicsWorks* does amply demonstrate is how important a dialectical approach is to teaching philosophy — and how wide the gap still is between 'interactive' and 'dialectic'.

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This collection of fourteen essays in honor of John Rawls is intended to highlight and celebrate a dimension of Rawls' work most evident in his teaching — namely, his view that the history of philosophy provides 'a rich resource for dealing with substantive and contemporary problems' (2). The editors, former students of Rawls', report that he would always begin courses in the history of moral philosophy by saying, 'We are not going to criticize these thinkers, but rather learn from them' (3). And they go on, 'what he wanted us to see is the connection between the two sides of that formula: that

it is by making the best of a philosopher's position that you can learn the most from it' (3). Putting aside the question of whether critique and edification are mutually exclusive, one should certainly favor charitable interpretations of historical figures. However, as several of the papers here demonstrate, excessive attention to making the best of an historical position is not always in the service of progress on contemporary questions. For instance, in 'Kant on Aesthetic and Biological Purposiveness', Hannah Ginsborg is primarily concerned to argue for the internal coherence of the *Critique of Judgment*, by illustrating how Kant's appeal to 'aesthetic and biological purposiveness are applications of a single underlying concept' (330). But beyond staking out an alternative interpretative position to Paul Guyer's on this issue, Ginsborg fails to show why it matters what Kant thought about purposiveness. No attempt is made to connect the discussion to contemporary concerns about teleological explanation or aesthetic theory. Similarly, Adrian Piper's largely exegetical paper, 'Kant on the Objectivity of the Moral Law', is so weighted down with Kant's particular metaphysical and epistemological baggage that, again, its usefulness for the contemporary moral philosopher is severely compromised.

Over half the volume is devoted to discussions of Kant. In addition to those papers already mentioned, Barbara Herman and Andrews Reath each focus on the notion of a kingdom of ends, emphasizing in response to critics the indispensable role that community plays in Kant's conceptions of autonomous agency and practical rationality. Onora O'Neill considers how, on Kant's view, reason itself can be vindicated; and Thomas Pogge writes about Kant's deployment of the notion of ends — both 'ends-in-themselves' and 'final ends' — in the context of 'the point of the universe and our role within it' (361). Christine Korsgaard successfully mines Kant's work for insight on the question of how to reconcile two commonly-held thoughts: first, that 'morality is unconditional and overriding', and second 'that we can all think of situations in which, for reasons that seem to us honorable, unselfish, or conscientious, we would do things which morality seems to forbid' (297). And Nancy Sherman not only defends Kantian ethics against charges that it is affectively austere, but also argues persuasively that any principled-based ethics needs to and can grant a substantive role to the emotions in moral deliberation.

Like the latter two, the contributions on other historical figures best live up to the editorial advertisements. Susan Neiman provides an interesting paper on Rousseau's treatment of the problem of evil, showing that his analysis allows both for the reality and the intelligibility of evil. S.A. Lloyd addresses the alleged objectionableness of Hobbes' recommendations for mandatory state education as a method of securing social stability. She argues that, with respect to (i) the risks of ideological indoctrination and (ii) the likelihood that the content of state education is selective in a self-perpetuating way, the educational system envisaged by Hobbes is not all that far removed from many contemporary arrangements favored by liberals. Most notable among the papers not dedicated to Kant are Marcia Homiak's

'Aristotle on the Soul's Conflicts: Toward an Understanding of Virtue Ethics', Jean Hampton's 'The Hobbesian Side of Hume', and Joshua Cohen's 'The Natural Goodness of Humanity' (on Rousseau).

Focussing on the question of how to distinguish between the virtuous and the 'merely' continent agent, and between the continent and incontinent, Homiak manages both explicitly to argue for the substantiveness and distinctiveness of virtue ethics and implicitly to illuminate the recent debate over the plausibility of ethical internalism.

Hampton's intriguing paper aims to show that it is only Hume's notion of sympathy that transforms the consequentialist contractarianism he shares with Hobbes into something approaching a genuine moral theory. Yet, as she points out, Hume fails to explain precisely how other-regarding concern is generated; at best, 'the operation of sympathy as Hume has described it ... give[s] me a certain kind of information: it can lead me to understand another's experience as pleasant or unpleasant, welcome or distasteful and thus as something *I* should either wish or never wish to experience' (84, emphasis added). Moreover, Hampton argues, Hume's appeal to the perspective of the impartial observer can hope to supply non-self-interested motivation only if reason is allowed to play more than a merely instrumental role. Quite apart from Hampton's contribution to our understanding of Hobbes and Hume, her paper should be read carefully by all contemporary philosophers who are tempted to explain moral motivation by appeal to empirical work on the development of emotions and empathy.

Questions concerning human motivational capacities are also at the heart of Cohen's discussion of Rousseau. Cohen takes as his point of departure what he calls 'the *fundamental problem* of Rousseau's political philosophy' — namely, 'how there can be a stable form of human association that ensures protection and security to its members and at the same time enables them to be self-governing' (104). The trick is to describe and justify a political arrangement that limits the potential bad manifestations of our natural self-love without violating our natural deliberative and practical freedom, within the recognition of which resides our dignity. Rousseau's proposed solution goes via the notion of a society governed by the 'general will'. But, as Cohen says, 'The society of the general will may solve the fundamental problem, but we also need some reason to think that people could be *motivated* to cooperate according to the terms of that ideal' (106). It is Rousseau's account of the natural goodness of human nature that is supposed to provide the necessary confidence. But if one is to hold, as Rousseau did, that 'There is no original perversity in the human heart' (108), one owes an account of the structure of human motivational potentialities and, more importantly, an explanation of how those potentialities are determined — that is, fixed in one set of directions rather than another. Cohen's rich paper convincingly argues for the ineliminable role of social and political institutions in the shaping of human's self-understanding and motivations. This is a matter that should concern all moral theorists and practitioners: How can we best arrange the institutions of a society such that human capacities can

flourish in ways conducive to an associational life that respects individual dignity?

Only Daniel Brudney's 'Community and Completion' directly addresses Rawls' own work. Brudney is explicitly concerned with what several other contributors, especially Herman and Reath, implicitly have in mind — that is, the criticism that Rawls' political philosophy pays insufficient attention to community. In an interesting twist, Brudney argues that the communitarian critique is more aptly directed at *Political Liberalism* rather than at its usual target, *A Theory of Justice*.

Reclaiming the History of Ethics might not completely succeed in its mission to debunk the idea that 'doing philosophy and doing the history of philosophy are two quite different activities' (3), but it is a rich and, for the most part, thought-provoking collection.

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Rush Rhees
On Religion and Philosophy. Ed. D.Z. Phillips.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.
Pp. xxii + 389.
US$69.95. ISBN 0-521-56410-7.

In his introduction to this collection of writings ('essays' is not exactly the right term here) Phillips reports Rhees's remark, made towards the end of his life, that 'Discussion is my medicine. When that is finished so am I' (xx). What is published in this volume stands as an extraordinary testament to that way of viewing philosophy and carrying it on: in an important sense, revealed in these writings, the discussion is never finished, for any reader will surely want to continue the discussion for themselves. What they will learn from this book is, however, that such discussion is not an easy matter. To continue a discussion through a lifetime, as Rhees did, requires one to be prepared to question what one may once have thought; to go back over the ground; to confront one's own inadequacy in the face of intensely puzzling questions. What we see here is philosophy as kind of struggle to understand, not a method for solving problems. No reader should approach this book expecting either answers, or a neat systematic working through of the questions.

These pieces were evidently not originally written with a view to publication: Rhees published relatively little in his lifetime. His way of doing

philosophy did not require that and, indeed, was sometimes inimical to it. The material presented here has been selected from sixteen thousand pages of manuscript and formed into a coherent whole. The result is a delicate interweaving of philosophical and the personal reflections on religion. The editorial work has clearly been heroic: this is not to say that the pieces lack coherence in themselves, or that they have been tinkered with in any way that involves 'correction', but only that selecting from the work of a lifetime requires considerable sensitivity and dedication if the structure of thought is to be revealed as it is here.

The pieces, twenty-six in all, are grouped under three headings: Religion and Reality; Life and Meaning; Religion and Morality. Some of them come from letters written to friends and colleagues, others are more clearly essays and yet others are closer to notes and conversations, one might say, with himself. The reader should not expect, therefore, to be presented with developed theses or theories. This is not because these are, somehow, unfinished works, preliminaries to some prospective longer work, which as it happens never materialised, but because the nature of the philosophical enterprise displayed here is quite different from that involved in developing philosophical theories. It is a form familiar enough to those who are acquainted with Rhees's previously published work and displays the influence of Socrates and, it would be foolish to deny, of Wittgenstein. All this may present something of a challenge to readers whose engagement with philosophy, either in their own writing or in that of others, has taken the form of asking such questions as 'What is the nature of religious belief?', 'How can God's existence be proved?' from an external perspective, and answering these questions by producing, or responding to, theories. The distinction between an internal and an external treatment of a subject ought to be the subject of a philosophical essay in itself, but, untheorised as it is, it is important in understanding the nature of Rhees's philosophical enterprise: 'There are philosophical puzzles in religion, in a way somewhat analogous to that in which there are philosophical puzzles in science, I suppose. One gets into tangles and wonders whether there is any way of making sense of the whole thing. ... [I]t seems to me a confusion to think of philosophy as trying to defend the "validity", or as trying to show that religion is reasonable, after all ... "God is the ultimate explanation of every thing." There is probably good sense in saying that, but God is not an explanation of the sort that is sought in philosophical puzzles at all' (30). 'What religious people have in mind is something like an answer to questionings of the heart. And it might be part of the philosophy of religion to try to make clearer what that is — how it is related to other sorts of questions, for instance' (31).

These are questions *within* religion, not simply questions *about* religion. In many, though not necessarily all, of these pieces those religious questions 'of the heart' are central to the discussion; and here Rhees might well have said too that philosophy tries to make clearer how these are precisely *not* related to certain other questions, where frequently it seems people have been tempted to see a relation. Thus, although we are not presented with

grand theories, there are discernible themes which run across the editorial groupings. Just one example is Rhees's concern with the contrast between science and religion (or 'the empirical' or the 'factual') and the ideas of proof, justification and explanation which belong to them, and what he has to say in this connection can be just as illuminating about these other areas as about religion. (Though it might be said that his view of the nature of science and scientific enquiry is, as expressed here, rather limited.) So, 'You cannot "say what God is" without believing in God. That is why proofs are idle. But for the same reason "atheism" seems empty too. You may offer a proof that there cannot be a being of such and such properties. But to assert "there is such a being" is not the declaration of religious belief' (147). To understand what is involved in such belief it has to be set within the framework of religious practice: worship, prayer and institutions (Rhees is sometimes sceptical about the need for institutions). These are perhaps by now rather familiar ideas, not least through the work of philosophers who have been influenced by Rhees himself.

The beliefs and practices which form the significant points of reference for him are those of Christianity, which is not to say that he is always concerned with particular aspects of doctrine, though he sometimes is. It is rather that the form his questions and reflections take is deeply embedded in a broad Christian tradition, which includes music as well as Simone Weil, St John of the Cross, St Theresa, Thomas Aquinas and the bible. Yet this embeddedness does not mean that he is always sympathetic to such religious thought: 'I think I never understand why accepting Christ should make the difference that, in Christian teaching it does ... "Why should the question whether a man *believes* be so important?" I suppose that if you cannot understand why this should make all the difference, then you do not understand what Christian religion is. And this applies to me' (252-3).

He says that he is not a religious man '... although I often (constantly) wish I could be' (226); but also, 'although I do not belong to a church, and although I do not understand the doctrine (or doctrines) of the relation of Christ to his church — still, the reality of his life and teaching, if I am to have any sense of it at all, must be what I find in the tradition, the liturgy (including the scriptures) and the music as I have access to them now' (315). One can speak, no doubt tritely, of creative tension, but trite or not one cannot escape the thought that this tension between not being 'a religious man', not being, in some sense, a 'believer' and wanting to be, is at the heart of this book, fuelling the lifelong discussion and its remarkable insights.

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How can we find room for an account of subjective experiences — the 'redness of red', the hotness of heat, the sadness of sorrow — in the physicalistic framework of contemporary science? Our conscious lives are replete with rich subjective experiences, yet — it is argued — these phenomena cannot be explained within current scientific theory.

This problem, of explaining how qualia (subjective experiences) could arise in any physical system at all, is, according to David Chalmers in the penetrating keynote article of this compendium, the 'hard problem' (HP) of consciousness. The 'easy problems' of consciousness are those of the structural and functional aspects of cognition, which are in principle amenable to conventional scientific theory. The hard problem is not a new one — Chalmers' role has been to highlight it — but it is now being approached seriously by physicists, cognitive scientists, philosophers, and neuroscientists. The editor, Jonathan Shear, is careful to point out that from the perspectives of Spinoza, Leibniz, or Hegel, where consciousness is an essential feature of every part of reality, the 'hard problem' has a potential solution, or cannot even be articulated. Indeed, many contributors investigate some version of monism or panpsychism in their approaches to the HP. Some propose a 'pan-experientialist' thesis (where experience is a fundamental and pervasive aspect of reality), while others rely on theories such as quantum mechanics in suggesting a solution. The range of subjects and perspectives is presented here is thus diverse, and includes a number of distinctly nonstandard approaches, but the volume is intelligently organised.

The collection is divided into six main sections, consisting of about four papers each (entitled; Deflationary Perspectives, The Explanatory Gap, Physics, Neuroscience and Cognitive Science, Rethinking Nature, and First-Person Perspectives). All the papers (save a short commentary by Crick and Koch from *Scientific American*) originally appeared in the *Journal of Consciousness Studies* from 1995-7, most in response to Chalmers' keynote article.

But why should 'qualia' require, or even be amenable to, scientific explanation? It is an impressive feature of the collection that the first section — Deflationary Perspectives — includes those writers (amongst them Daniel Dennett and Patricia Churchland) who either deny that the HP is a problem (that functional explanation is all that there is to explaining consciousness), or that the HP is hard — that it is premature to expect a materialistic account of consciousness, but that one will eventually arise. Churchland, for instance, disputes the utility of various thought experiments which are used to set up the hard problem; for example, the possibility of 'zombies' (people behaviourally identical to you, but without the qualia). In short, 'carving the explana-

tory space of mind-brain phenomena along the hard and the easy line ... poses the danger of inventing an explanatory chasm where there really exists just a broad field of ignorance' (40). Also raised here is the 'implicit dualism' of the hard/easy distinction — the supposition that there must be some extra ingredient to any explanation of subjective experience, which goes further than descriptions of functions and physical processes. As Thomas Clark writes, the usual 'argument' against functionalism (the possibility of a zombie-like system which instantiates some functional architecture but fails to experience) merely begs the question. However, Chalmers' riposte to this (in his concluding response article) is that 'consciousness uniquely escapes these arguments by lying at the centre of our epistemic universe' (383) — so that subjective experience is an explanandum beyond structural and functional accounts.

In contrast, papers in 'The Explanatory Gap' argue that the hard problem is a very hard one indeed — or is even insoluble in principle. Colin McGinn writes elegantly on the non-spatial nature of consciousness — 'spatial occupancy is not the mind's preferred mode of being' (97) — and connects this with the claim that conscious states are not perceived. His thesis is that a solution to the hard problem requires a conceptual breakthrough in our account of space and thus of material objects — so that 'things in space can generate consciousness ... they harbour some hidden aspect or principle' (103). However, McGinn argues that we may be incapable of unearthing this new conception — so that the hard problem may never be solved. Both E. Lowe and D. Hodgson argue that the 'easy problems' aren't easy after all. Lowe argues that Chalmers has conceded too much to physicalism — that the representational contents of perceptual experiences need to be accounted for (not just the qualia), and that 'the intentional content of ... an experience stands in an especially intimate relation to its qualitative phenomenal character' (118).

The next four sections, however, generally accept the legitimacy of the hard/easy distinction and propose solutions to the HP. Many papers in 'Physics' suggest an examination of consciousness in terms of quantum mechanics. C.J.S. Clarke, like McGinn, concentrates on the non-spatial nature of mind, arguing that the non-locality of mind and the non-locality of quantum physics are in (non-accidental) correspondence, so that consciousness and quantum phenomena are 'aspects of the same thing' (175). Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff present a rather technical quantum account of consciousness (where quantum-mechanical reductions of the wave function are associated with experiential events) which they compare with Whitehead's account of experience and certain Buddhist writings (191). Henry Stapp presents a more philosophically satisfying approach derived from Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics — 'this most orthodox interpretation of quantum theory brings the experience of the human observers into the basic physical theory at least on a co-equal basis' (200). However, such analyses seek to explain one mystery in terms of another — the HP is translated into a variety of problems with the interpretation of quantum

mechanics — and it is questionable whether this amounts to any conceptual advance. Indeed, it is not even certain that quantum mechanics plays any essential role in neural information processing.

The papers in 'Neuroscience and Cognitive Science' attempt to isolate the neural processes associated with consciousness, and find associations between them and characteristics of subjective experience. For instance, Crick and Koch claim that investigating the 'neural correlates of consciousness' is the best way to proceed in answering, or dissolving, the hard problem. They suggest an account centred on 'the neural basis of meaning' (239) — a concept which seems at least as problematic as consciousness.

In 'Rethinking Nature' contributors entertain the radical hypothesis that consciousness should be understood as a fundamental feature of reality. William Seager argues persuasively that 'consciousness and information connect at the level of semantic significance' (274) and thus proposes a new notion of information, again linked to quantum mechanics and leading to a version of panpsychism. G.H. Rosenberg makes a strong case for a coherent version of panpsychism where consciousness is integrated into our view of nature, rather than tacked on as an afterthought.

In the final section, 'First-Person Perspectives', various contributors argue that solving the HP requires a new science of subjective phenomena. Max Velmans, like Lowe, makes the intriguing claim that 'conscious experiences are representational' (327) and focuses on a 'dual-aspect' theory of information, where consciousness and its neural correlates are to be construed as 'two aspects of one representational process' (333). The 'first-person' part of his account amounts to the idea that all scientific phenomena are part of the phenomenal worlds of observers, and that it is these data (i.e., qualia) that it is the job of science to explain. Such a view need not lead to relativism, according to Velmans, once there is intersubjective agreement about those aspects of our experience which we deem worthy of explanation (indeed, the viability of the HP itself can be seen in this context). Francisco Varela takes seriously the project of marrying cognitive science with a rigorous approach to human experience in his 'neurophenomenology' — a methodological proposal for tackling the HP. The phenomenological stance proceeds from a recognition of the irreducible nature of conscious experience (after all, subjective experience is the data to be explained), but is claimed not to lapse into introspectionism — the investigation must undergo intersubjective validation, just as mathematics does (347). Again, the idea seems to be to establish intersubjectively validated correlations between neural and experiential phenomena. Next, Jonathan Shear discusses the analysis of consciousness provided by Yoga, Vedanta, Buddhism, and Taoism. Eastern meditative traditions, he claims, offer us a way of experiencing 'pure consciousness' (seemingly devoid of qualia) — facts which might become part of a future science of consciousness (372).

In the final article Chalmers responds to his critics and the proposed solutions, describing five 'choice points' for approaches to the HP. His insightful and even-handed commentary is a great asset.

The most interesting suggestions in the volume involve a 'dual-aspect' notion of information, which has both semantic and phenomenal dimensions. Chalmers' own proposal is of this nature — he suggests (with a nod to Russellian monism) that we need to posit experience as a basic feature of reality, like mass or space-time, by way of a notion of information that has both phenomenal and physical aspects, and that a theory of consciousness will consist of 'psychophysical' bridging laws accompanying those of physics. In fact, many of these articles represent an emerging consensus on solutions to the HP. Interestingly, many proposals promote the desirability of a new, semantic information theory in which information is to be coupled with subjective experience and some quantum-mechanical basis. However, none of the authors consider current progress being made in the semantic theory of information, in particular by Barwise and Seligman (*Information Flow: The Logic of Distributed Systems*, Cambridge, 1997, extending Dretske, *Knowledge and the Flow of Information*, 1981), or Gärdenfors ('Mental Representation, conceptual spaces, and metaphors', *Synthese* 1996, who takes qualia more seriously). Collaboration between researchers in consciousness and these 'new' information theories is to be eagerly anticipated — certainly, the crucial relationship between communication, information, and qualia remains to be explored. A related and intriguing suggestion is the creation of a formalism in which phenomenological data can be expressed 'whether in informational, geometrical, or topological terms' (413).

This is a challenging and comprehensive volume, offering new directions for philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and cognitive science, and is heartily recommended. It is also an engaging read — an intellectual adventure at the heart of the issues.

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It is something of a pity that this anthology will probably not be picked up to the same extent as if it had been in English. It includes eleven papers in total, ten in German, one in English, from the November 1996 Graz conference on bioethics. Seven of the papers were presented at the conference, four were later commentaries. All address issues of 'personhood from a bioethical perspective'. The papers are of a uniformly high standard, and suggest that the conference was well worthwhile.

With the possible exception of the one English contribution, by Helga Kuhse from the Bioethics Centre at Monash, Australia, the papers reflect current thinking in bioethics in German-speaking circles. But there is a familiarity of references and issues and indeed approaches taken, which make the collection relevant to any bioethics forum. I would like to think that Anglophone writers are as familiar with the German writings as the German-speaking bioethicists are with the English literature, but I doubt it. The contributors come from medical, legal, philosophical and religious fields. Some of them may be familiar to a few Anglophone researchers in bioethics and value theory — people such as the two editors themselves, Dieter Birnbacher, Erwin Bernat and Peter Inhoffen, but to a large extent, these writers are not as well known in the English-speaking world as they should be.

Included are papers on the meaning of *person*, as an intentional/extensional expression, and normative/prescriptive term and the logical implications for decidability in bioethical disputes, issues of organ donation, organ harvesting and the moral status and ethical treatment of donors and recipients and their families, of rights of the neonates, terminally ill and dying people, advance directives, brain death and euthanasia, comatose patients and frozen embryos, the concept of a person in psychiatry, and the attitudes of practitioners to patients in intensive care units. The approaches taken in the various contributions reflect the various backgrounds of their respective authors, as does so much discussion at any bioethics conference. But this is not a difficulty or a drawback in dealing with the issues, rather it is an important element in understanding the complexity of the practical dimension in bioethics. It is what makes bioethics a philosophically challenging, sometimes frustrating, but always worthwhile pursuit. It puts the purpose into philosophy.

What is different about how German thinkers approach bioethical issues? The Nazi history lesson has been internalized in German speaking bioethics, providing a Janus quality missing elsewhere in bioethics. Perhaps the foreword says it most clearly in connection with euthanasia: 'It is understandable that in Austria and Germany, when euthanasia is discussed, sometimes people are put in mind, with horror, of the Nazi purification

program of the elimination of worthless lives (*"Venichtung lebensunwerten Lebens"*). That is a sign of the watchfulness history has taught. But the context of the current discussion is different. It is now marked by the spirit of an apparently secularized Western outlook, which tries to reconcile ethically the interests and goals of individuals with the particular dynamic and advances in technology' [my translation].

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This is a book of articles about a new theoretical underpinning for computational linguistics. Despite this narrow and technical aim, it contains much that is of interest to philosophers of mind, epistemologists, and philosophers of language, regardless of whether they also have an interest in computational implementations.

Computational linguistics has many subareas of research, such as voice recognition and machine translation and natural language interfaces to databases — to pick just three more or less at random. The area of computational linguistics that is under discussion in this book concerns the attempt to have a computer understand utterances in a natural language to the same extent that a person would understand them, starting with written (not spoken) natural language text, performing whatever syntactic and semantic measures are called for, and ending up with the ability to answer simple questions and draw some conclusions concerning the information contained in the input. This part of computational linguistics, which might be called natural language understanding (NLU), has generally followed a *representationalist* methodology. A sentence is presented as an ordered sequence of words: each word is looked up in a *lexicon* to find out its part of speech (noun, verb, adjective, etc.); these categorized words are then sent through a (syntactic) *parser* which produces a description of how the sequence of words is constructed into a sentence (which of the words form the noun phrase subject, which constitute the verb phrase, etc. ... the details depend upon

what theoretical categories the syntactic grammar presumes); this phrase structure description forms the input to a semantic module. This module uses the meanings of the individual words (as they are stored in the lexicon) plus information about how the words were combined by the parser to form longer phrases, to generate an overall interpretation of the sentence. There might then follow a process of generating some implications of this interpretation, especially for use in question-answering systems and for aid in the interpretation of any sentences that might follow the one just interpreted. All along through this procedure of generating a final interpretation out of a string of words there is a representation of the information as thus far processed. The lexicon contains a representation of the words of the natural language, including not only its part of speech but also its meaning. The result of the parsing procedure is to generate a syntactic representation of the string of words. And the result of the semantic interpretation is produce some representation of the sentence's meaning. A major trend in NLU has been the investigation of the formal powers of different types of representations. But we need not immerse ourselves in these details in order to appreciate the topic of this book: for, although the various authors adopt a variety of differing outlooks on many theoretical NLU issues, the underlying subject is quite universal and easy to understand.

NLU has had a rocky history, full of fits and starts, optimism and reversal of fortune. But one of the unexpected discoveries to emerge from the attempt to get computers 'to talk just like you and me' is that psycholinguists and philosophers of mind/language had dramatically misunderstood humans' understanding of ambiguities. This was due mostly to a lack of appreciation of how much ambiguity 'really' was in natural language. In formal accounts of meaning, even the most innocuous-seeming sentence can be wildly ambiguous. And that this is so was brought home very forcefully when the early computer programs were constructed and showed all the possible interpretations of the sentences. Consider *I do not like green eggs and ham*. Besides all the different meanings of the individual words (the *Webster's Student Dictionary* lists <5, 21, 1, 17, 16, 8, 4, 6> meanings for the words in the order given in the sentence), there is a question of whether I *dislike* them ('like them not') or merely *do not like* them (maybe I am neutral), there is a question of whether one or the other of these attitudes applies to all ham or only to green ham, there is even the question of whether I have one of these attitudes towards green eggs, or only towards mixed ham and eggs that are green. *Three girls mailed four letters* is commonly thought to be ambiguous between there being four and twelve letters mailed; such an ambiguity is called a 'scope ambiguity' (as is also the earlier *do not like them* vs. *like them not* ambiguity). The sentence *In most democratic countries most politicians can fool most of the people on almost every issue most of the time* has 120 different meanings for its different scope orderings and each of these meanings is true in distinct circumstances. Yet people (think they) can understand these sentences when they are uttered, and they do not seem to pause over the wide range of different interpretations possible.

Although the phenomenon of ambiguity has been recognized for many years in the study of language and language processing, the sheer amount of it and its presence in even very simple sentences has forced a reappraisal by workers in the cognitive sciences of their views as to how people process sentences. Bar-Hillel was possibly the first to draw attention to this, in 'The Present Status of Automatic Translation of Languages', *Advances in Computers* (1960). But it wasn't until the late 1980s that it became fully appreciated. The discovery by NLU researchers that (psychologically) simple sentences were (formally) staggeringly ambiguous has forced others to give up these three views, each one of which described an attitude that researchers had entertained:

1. People construct mental representations for all of the meanings of a linguistic item and then use contextual information (both of the previous linguistic discourse and of the situation of utterance) to pare these down to some small number (perhaps one, in the normal case).

2. People work with a 'most likely' meaning of the initial part of a sentence as it is being parsed, and then incrementally build on it by taking a 'most likely' meaning of the next part and composing it in the 'most likely' manner with the earlier part, until the entire sentence is represented with a 'most likely' meaning.

3. The preceding linguistic context and the situational context conspire to make a particular mental representation of the sentence be determined. Pretty much any sentence that is uttered that contains the same words, and pretty much in any order, will give rise to this unique representation, in that context.

The difficulties computational linguistics programs encountered in being overwhelmed by ambiguity soon showed that people would have the same problems if sentence comprehension took place by means of representationism using any of the above three mechanisms. People simply do not maintain huge databanks in their heads consisting of all the ambiguous meanings, nor has anyone come up with a plausible mechanism by which people can compute the 'most likely' meanings, nor is it true that people proceed by having 'scripts' that merely need to have some keywords be uttered to fill in the blanks. In fact, people seem mostly to be *unaware* that there is range of possible meanings, and they go about their business only extracting what is called for from the information conveyed in the sentence.

This calls for a radical rethinking of the way people process semantic information, and has led to a new direction in NLU. The book under review presents works that display the new attitude that is emerging among a wide variety of computational linguists concerning this problem of overwhelming ambiguity. The main idea has come to be called *ambiguous logical form* or *underspecified semantic representation*, and is now a hotbed of active research in computational linguistics. The idea is to avoid the need for separate storage of all possible interpretations by instead storing only one 'ambiguous'

representation. The editors trace the interest in this sort of solution for the problem of ambiguous lexical items to the Philips NLU system, as explained by Bronnenberg et al, in Bolc, ed., *Natural Communication with Computers Vol. II* (Munich 1979), and for the problem of scope ambiguities involving quantifiers and other items to Schubert & Pelletier, 'From English to Logic: Context-Free Computation of "Conventional" Logic Translations', *Am. Jnl. of Computational Linguistics* (1982), where the idea was applied to scope ambiguities of quantifiers and other items. In these approaches only one ambiguous representation would be stored and disambiguation would happen at some later point in the processing of a sentence when more contextual information was available. But, continue the editors, these ideas did not really catch on in mainstream NLU until the late 80s when researchers at SRI came up with their underspecified 'quasi logical forms'.

The move to ambiguous logical forms and underspecified semantic representations raises a number of conceptual questions, as well as practical issues of how to process this sort of representation. Here are some of the topics that are addressed by authors in this collection:

— How are different interpretations/meanings to be individuated? The fact that a given sentence can be used to truthfully describe two different situations does not necessarily make for ambiguity. It could instead be generality of a single meaning. How can the two be separated?

— What sorts of processing should be done with the underspecified representations? In particular, can they enter into inferences?

— When is disambiguation necessary?

— Is ambiguity a significant notion? After all, if an ambiguous expression can be processed in much the same way as a nonambiguous one, and used in the same mental activities, then what does the difference between them amount to?

The 10 papers in this collection, all previously unpublished, deal with the above-mentioned questions, as well as with certain technical issues of formal semantics. The paper by Georgia Green concludes that disambiguation cannot in general be accomplished, because reasoning from pragmatic information can be arbitrarily complex. Philosophers will find this paper in particular to be a very rich source of examples and puzzles for 'ordinary' philosophy of language. A paper by Jaap van der Does & Henk Verkuyl deals with the so-called distributive/cumulative distinction (*The philosophers wrote the books*), attempting to show that such sentences require only one representation (which can be interpreted in two modes), despite the possibility of intermediate readings. Jerry Hobbs also addresses the question of how to individuate interpretations, arguing that most of the information conveyed by a sentence is not due to there being different semantic interpretations but rather is due to some 'abduction-driven' method of interpretation of a single semantic interpretation. The papers by Hideyuki Nakashima & Yasunari

Harada, by Sasa Buvac, and by Anne-Marie Mineur & Paul Buitelaar, are about the issues of how to represent ambiguous information and how to disambiguate it. The first of the three is presented within the framework of Situation Semantics; the second makes use of the notion of 'discourse context' and investigates how information can be shared by different contexts; and the third concerns the extent to which the computer science notion of 'type coercion' can be employed in disambiguating lexical items. Hiyan Alshawi and Massimo Poesio each present papers that interpret ambiguous expressions by means of an 'underspecified' representation, and then semantically interpret these representations as sets of truth values. Poesio's paper will be of general interest to philosophers of language because it presents a survey and critical review of much of the literature on ambiguity, and makes many interesting comments about the psychological literature on the topic. Poesio also touches on the issue of how to reason using the underspecified representations, but the topic is taken up in much more detail in Kees van Deemter's paper and in Uwe Reyle's paper. The former paper proposes a many-sorted logic containing ambiguous constants and explores the different notions of logical consequence that can be defined in such a language. Reyle's paper presupposes the formalism of Discourse Representation Theory but can be explained as treating the premises of an argument 'universally', that is, universally quantifying over all the many interpretations of the premises — and treating the conclusion of the argument 'existentially'. An argument is valid in this framework when every interpretation of the premises (classically) entails some interpretation of the conclusion.

Much of the work in this book is, or could be, of interest to philosophers who are not already engaged in the enterprise of 'getting computers to talk like you and me'. For one thing, there is a lot of information here relevant just to the question of what ambiguity is, and for another thing there are many provocative claims made concerning whether disambiguation is a good thing and how it might be done. Researchers interested in the distinction between 'meaning vs. world knowledge' will find much to think about in Green's article especially. And finally, logicians and formal semanticists could profitably turn some of their attention to the question of what reasoning would or should be in a language of ambiguous logical forms.

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James P. Young
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James Young's *Reconsidering American Liberalism* provides a balanced and detailed account of the political culture of the United States. Written with disarming frankness and a charming casual tone, Young's work is remarkably sensitive to the intellectual nuances of the history of the United States and to the role of history in contemporary political life.

Young situates his fascinating study as a critique of Louis Hartz's influential 'consensus thesis' which suggested that liberalism has been dominant in American political life from the start (11). Young is concerned to emphasize the republican moment of American history, especially in the chapters entitled 'Liberalism, Republicanism, and the Revolution' and 'Liberalism, Republicanism and the Constitution'. In contemporary debate republicans, like Michael Sandel, are concerned to preserve citizen's substantive moral commitments as a counter to Rawls's political conception of the citizen. Significantly, Young begins his analysis with the Puritans. In his opening chapter entitled 'The Ambiguous Legacy of Puritanism', Young convincingly argues that Puritan thought placed significant emphasis on both individualism and political participation. On this basis he suggests important connection between Puritanism and both liberal contract theory and civic republicanism. (16-17)

Whereas Rawls tends to conceive the political sphere as external to religion, indicated in the contrast between public and non-public realms, Young suggests a more internal relation, with Puritanism as a religious source of the public political culture. While more needs to be said about this relation especially in terms of the development of toleration, Young's approach promises an account beyond the superficialities of the Rawlsian view which portrays American history as the gradual victory of political liberalism and which thus fails to comprehend the substantive sources of democracy.

Young's more balanced view is better able to comprehend the complexities of concrete historical events, specifically because it interprets American history as, in part, a continuous dialectic between liberalism and republicanism (54). Thus Young's account, by contrast with Rawls's blanket assertion that Lincoln's actions during the Civil War were compatible with public reason, makes explicit the many layers of Lincoln's moral view. For example, he argues that Lincoln: 'was by no means free of the common racial attitudes of his time, though he was not burdened by the harsh prejudices of his hero Jefferson. Still it was difficult for him to imagine life in society with freed slaves' (115). Likewise Young's conception of the New Deal, for example, is more comprehensive than that provided by Sandel in his recent *Democracy's Discontent*. Whereas Sandel describes the New Deal as fundamentally 'lib-

eral', Young indicates the depth of institutional change wrought by the New Deal and its achievement of what Irving Howe called the 'socialization of concern'; both elements compatible with republican interests (169, 176).

Young's approach brings a sharp critical edge to his discussion of both historical and contemporary matters. His account of laissez-faire capitalism, populism and progressivism (127-67), and his examination of race, gender, difference and equality, (203-233) are equally telling. However, while Young is particularly insightful on the importance of history in normative judgment, in his own political thought he is content to synthesize the views of Walzer, Kateb and Wolin (340). Though historically articulate, his own normative suggestions thus lack something in terms of originality.

Though it does not avoid the inevitable failings characteristic of works of substantial breadth and depth, *Reconsidering American Liberalism* will be much prized by anyone interested in the way in which the past is present in the public political culture of the United States.

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