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**Robert L. Arrington and
Hans-Johann Glock, eds.**

Wittgenstein and Quine.

New York: Routledge, 1996. Pp. xvii + 286.

Cdn\$91.00: US\$65.00. ISBN 0-415-09676-6.

When Quine visited the Vienna Circle in 1932 he missed Wittgenstein by about two years. While the views of these two luminaries have since been much-encountered, they have often failed to meet each other. The editors of this collection of eleven essays contend, with some justice, that unless such a meeting takes place, analytic philosophy runs the risk of splitting into two mutually uncomprehending camps.

Quine's scientism is unlikely to be compatible with the views of someone who once wrote that science sends us to sleep in the face of wonder. But such judgments turn on what kinds of similarities one takes to be relevant and which side of the W/Q-divide one stands on. I confess my W-affinities in advance. As Hacker argues in the first essay (evincing his customary erudition and less of his customary sarcasm), there *are* similarities, but on balance they are not so deep. He offers and assesses no less than eighteen points of likely comparison, but most enlightening are his discussions of analyticity and necessity, on the one hand, and the revisability of our web of beliefs on the other.

Dreben's playful piece suggests by example that Q's affinities with Russell are too great to think that there are not serious differences between the author of the *Investigations* and the author of 'It Tastes Like Chicken' (40). But other friends of Q — Hookaway, Gibson and Winblad — try to make the case for likeness over disparity.

Hookaway's 'Perspicuous Representations' is mostly harmless, but it never really grapples with W's notion of an *übersichtliche Darstellung*, settling instead for a tenuous comparison of the clarification sought by reductive analysis with that of commanding a clear view of our language.

Gibson's article is one of the best selections, mostly for what it tells us about Q that we didn't already know, though Gibson does not clearly distinguish meaning-holism from holism about justification, and he — like Winblad — overlooks Q's remarks on analyticity in *The Roots of Reference* and *Pursuit of Truth*. Gibson urges that Q's holism is more moderate than 'Two Dogmas ...' suggests, that Q rejects the *intelligibility* of external-world scepticism (not just its plausibility or adequacy of motivation, as Winblad contends), and that Q 'accords a special status to common sense' (89), which is usefully compared with W's privileging of 'hinge-propositions' in *On Certainty*. Against Gibson, I would argue that W is not a holist nor an 'absolute foundationalist' but a semantic and epistemic contextualist, and that the river-bed analogy of *On Certainty* involves a tripartite distinction amongst propositions, not a binary one.

Winblad also reads the river-bed in binary terms, but avoids the error of seeing the revision of certain grammatical propositions as a revision of their

truth-values (something of which Q was accused by Grice and Strawson). Less compelling is his attempt to save Q from Stroud's charge of closet Cartesianism and external-world scepticism. This turns in part on an odd insistence that the sceptic is advancing a positive view, not doubts that are merely parasitic on the knowledge-claims of others.

Post's 'Post-Quinean' postscript stands apart from the other selections like a sign-post for telefunctions. Its criticisms of Q's narrow supervenience thesis (no non-physical difference in a thing without a physical difference in it) hold some plausibility, given various other Q-ian theses (e.g., the failure of the analytic-synthetic distinction). But the extension of this critique to W begs a lot of the questions that other contributors try to answer. It is helped neither by a bizarre reading of *Investigations*, §103, nor by an ill-supported attempt to portray W as a Cartesian anthropocentrist.

My favourite piece is Canfield's 'The Passage into Language ...' which clearly illustrates the differences between Q's behaviourism and W's linkage of speech with action. Canfield's account of 'proto language-games' (128) shows lucidly how one can be 'naturalistic' without being scientific, and it makes plausible the seemingly paradoxical contention that the autonomy of grammar is rooted in our natural history — our 'species' inheritance' (128). Words, on this view, get their meanings initially from serving the same functions as are served by forms of instinctual behaviour. 'It is this *internal* connection that Quine does not see' (133).

Similar themes emerge in Glock's discussion of radical translation and in Shanker's lengthy contribution on constraint-theory in cognitive psychology. Criticizing Q's indeterminacy-of-translation thesis, Glock plausibly argues that, while 'the bald white man from Harvard' (154) gets indeterminacy from behaviourism, it is equally the case that the indeterminacy arises only because Q violates his own behaviouristic constraints. The exchange between speaker and field-linguist is itself 'a *specific kind of dialogue*' (154). This is recognized by W's version of radical translation, which stresses the importance of our shared animal natures, perceptual capacities and transcultural 'patterns of behaviour' (169).

Shanker meticulously rebuts the behaviourist reading of W promoted by Chomsky *et al*, while finding in Q a latent attachment to the 'idea'-idea. His discussion of training in the *Investigations* elucidates the contention that W was not doing child-psychology, by arguing that W's concern was not with cognitive development, but with the grammatical transition from describing behaviour as mere response to describing it as a manifestation of understanding.

Both Dilman and Arrington criticize Q for treating language as theory. Dilman argues that Q's treatment of existence-talk as univocal leads him to suppose that there is some acontextual sense to the question, 'What is there?' whereas the proper, contextual question is 'What kind of existence does this or that kind of thing have?' (182) Arrington focuses on W's view that talk of the (non-) existence of universals and physical objects alike is always non-sensical, trivial, or a confused way of making empirical claims about the

existence of specific particulars. Both papers offer a much-needed challenge to Q's quantificational criterion of ontological commitment.

This volume may not save analytic philosophy from the rupture that the editors fear, but it certainly helps by furthering our understanding of the work of both these important philosophers.

Michael Hymers

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Henry St John, Viscount Bolingbroke.

Political Writings. David Armitage, ed.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.

Pp. xliv + 305.

US\$64.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-44393-8);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-58697-6).

Since the French Revolution, the British Tory/Conservative Party has been the most successful political party of modern times. Before that revolution, however, the Tories had been a party of losers. Their predecessors, the Royalists, had lost the civil wars; the early party had lost out to the Whigs in the Glorious Revolution of 1688; and after a brief period of power under Queen Anne, it was again outmanoeuvred by the Whigs over the Hanoverian succession and was reduced to an impotent rump for much of the rest of the century. It was at the lowest point in their fortunes that the Tory Party was led by one of its most remarkable figures: Henry St John, Viscount Bolingbroke.

Bolingbroke's brilliant ministerial career under Anne (he was the architect of the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, one of the most important treaties of modern European history) was cut short by her death. At this point he made the dreadful political error of throwing in his lot with the exiled Catholic Pretender to the throne whose cause was doomed. Bolingbroke was declared traitor and lost his title and lands. In his French exile he influenced both Voltaire and Montesquieu, and was partly responsible for the French Enlightenment's admiration of the British constitution. Only after the expenditure of massive bribes (mainly to the King's mistress) was he pardoned and returned to England.

British politics were then entirely dominated by the 'Court Whigs' led by Robert Walpole who created the office of Prime Minister. Bolingbroke set about orchestrating the opposition, despite extraordinary disadvantages. He was banned from Parliament, had the reputation of a traitor and sought to lead MPs who tended to regard opposition to the King's government as immoral. Nevertheless, Bolingbroke welded together an alliance of Tories

and dissident Whigs (the 'Country Party'), which harried the government, forced concessions, prevented the erosion of parliamentary independence and English liberties, and in general provided the first example of sustained opposition in the manner for which the British constitution was to become famous; a remarkable feat of political skill and a model for any out-of-office politician.

To hold the disparate elements of opposition together, Bolingbroke fashioned a 'country' ideology, woven from strands of Whiggism, Toryism, and Ancient republicanism. He, more than anyone, represents the late flowering of Renaissance political thought in Britain. The idea that since time immemorial the English had, in its King, Lords and Commons, a mixed and balanced constitution of the kind the Ancient authors approved was a commonplace of English political thinking in the 17th Century. What Bolingbroke developed was, first of all, the view that those free independent citizens prepared to defend their nation and their liberties by force of their own arms, which were the mainstay of Greek and Roman republics, could be identified with English freeholders who were principally responsible for keeping alive that 'spirit of liberty, transmitted down from our Saxon past' (28). He argued, second, following Polybius and Machiavelli, that the natural cycle of rise and decline that afflicted unmixed constitutions could be overcome in the mixed and balanced constitution so long as it were not corrupted by one element extending its powers at the expense of the others.

This was the crime Bolingbroke sought to pin upon Walpole: corrupting the constitution through bribes, filling the Commons with placemen and pensioners, and awarding fat contracts to followers. Independent landowners, the guardians of liberty and fount of civic virtue, who should bear the burden of the country's land defence as a citizen militia, were being undermined and overtaxed to pay for an unnecessary standing army that was a further threat to liberty. Bolingbroke accused Walpole of acting against the spirit of England's ancient constitution, restored by the Revolution of 1688, that is, of acting 'unconstitutionally'. This was a word coined by Bolingbroke to introduce a new political concept.

Bolingbroke's oppositional case was set out in a series of pamphlets, editorials and 'letters' addressed to the people of England and their representatives and subsequently published as *A Dissertation upon Parties*, which is the first of the texts in this volume. The second is an article in the form of a letter, 'On the Spirit of Patriotism', which is a Ciceronian plea to the aristocracy to regard service to the country as the highest good, and resist the corruptions of the current system. The final work is the most famous, *The Idea of a Patriot King*, which is addressed to the monarch, the third element of the mixed constitution. This portrays his ideal monarch who acts for the good of the whole and is above party. Under such a king, parties would be unnecessary.

In his conception of unconstitutional government, his analysis of the relationships between citizenship, property, arms and civic virtue in a modern context, and his notion of an executive above party, Bolingbroke had

something for all persuasions in the rest of the century. French royalists and Jacobin revolutionaries, English Whigs and Tories and American Founding Fathers, all read him with interest and profit, just as we may today.

This new scholarly edition of the major texts is a welcome addition to an excellent series.

Ian Adams

(Department of Politics)

Durham University

David Boucher, ed.

The British Idealists.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.

Pp. xlvii + 304.

US\$64.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-45336-4);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-45951-6).

Paul Coates and Daniel D. Hutto, eds.

Current Issues in Idealism.

Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Press 1996.

Pp. xiv + 307.

US\$69.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-85506-435-9);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 1-85506-434-0).

In a recent essay, Hugo Meynell cites David Stove's comment that, at the beginning of this century, 'the vast majority of English-speaking philosophers had been idealists, though nowadays the species is almost wholly extinct; and yet it is not obvious that our contemporaries are any more intelligent or well-informed than their predecessors.' Why it is that there are not many idealists among academic philosophers is, perhaps, more a sociological than a philosophical question. It is clear however that, in most philosophical circles, there is a fear of, or a sense that there is a stigma attached to, being called an 'idealist'.

Still, in the past 15 years there has been an increasing interest in Anglo-American idealism. Though regarded by many as an aberration in the history of philosophy, recent conferences sponsored by the British Society for the History of Philosophy, the Bradley Society, and the Collingwood Society, and several studies and reeditions of classic texts published by Oxford and Thoemmes Presses, have brought British idealist political philosophy and metaphysics out of the shadows. These two volumes confirm that interest in Anglo-American idealism is no longer marginal.

David Boucher's valuable collection of essays of the British idealists serves to fill a gap in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought series. Boucher provides a useful general introduction and has selected 14 essays by several leading idealists, focusing on three themes: 'evolution and society' (by Bernard Bosanquet, D.G. Ritchie, Henry Jones, and Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison), 'individualism and collectivism' (by Bosanquet, Ritchie, Jones, F.H. Bradley, Edward Caird, and J.S. Mackenzie), and 'the state and international relations' (by the Canadian philosopher John Watson, Bosanquet, J.H. Muirhead, and T.H. Green). Although most of these essays deal with political philosophy, some (e.g., Bradley's and Pringle-Pattison's) centre on ethics.

A collection on this theme is useful for a number of reasons. First, British idealist political theory confronted perceived inadequacies in individualism and, generally, in natural rights theory and utilitarianism — issues which continue to be present in political philosophy in the English-speaking world. (Boucher and others have found it to bear particularly on the recent 'liberal-communitarian' debate.) There is, moreover, a need for a volume to serve as a corrective to much of the misreading or misunderstanding of idealist thought that began with J.A. Hobson and L.T. Hobhouse, but continues through Herbert Marcuse (*Reason and Revolution*) to Tom Hurka's recent *Perfectionism* (Oxford 1993).

Boucher's collection largely satisfies this need. He provides the reader with several essays on a topic on which the British idealists have often been misunderstood — international relations. Moreover, Boucher shows the diversity in idealist thought by furnishing a cross section of the work of not only the major, but also of some of the lesser-known, idealists. This volume is, in short, a good survey of British idealist political philosophy.

One can, of course, always quibble with any collection of essays, and Boucher notes that, had he the space, he would have added a section on punishment — an important topic discussed by Green, Bosanquet and Bradley. Other sections that no doubt might have been included would be on rights or political obligation. (In addition to Green, Bosanquet, and Bradley, essays by William Wallace and John MacCunn are worth noting here.) Or, again, since idealists have frequently been charged with confusing 'society' and 'the state', with defending the status quo, and for having too idealised a view of the state, a section on this theme might also have been included. (Here, one could have essays by the philosopher-politician, R.B. Haldane as well as by Green and Bosanquet; this would help dispel some conventional lore — which Boucher, it appears, repeats — e.g., concerning the conservatism of Bosanquet versus the liberalism of T.H. Green.)

In general, the range of authors included in this volume is broad, and Boucher gives a representative sampling of issues that idealists were concerned with. But one should not think of British idealism as monolithic in character. Boucher is careful to note that there were some 'internal differences of opinion' within idealism (e.g., between the personal and the absolute idealists) and — though this may not be obvious in this volume — this is also

true concerning their *political* philosophy. Not only were there significant disagreements on public policy (e.g., over the Boer War and concerning charity relief), but there were also differences in theory. There is reason to believe, for example, that Bradley's essay on 'Ideal Morality' (which introduces the section on 'Individualism, collectivism and the general will') is actually inconsistent with the moral and political philosophy of several other idealists. Perhaps any potential misunderstanding here would have been avoided had Boucher brought the selections into closer contact — for example, by adjusting his choice of authors, or by identifying and suggesting why one finds differences among the idealists, or by providing some introductory comments on the specific context of each of the essays included in the collection.

This volume will be of use to students and scholars alike, though primarily to those who already have some background in British idealism and who are already well placed to situate the authors within the idealist movement. It is unfortunate, however, that the book suffers from a number of minor, technical flaws. Within the first 70 pages alone, one notes several typographical errors — the names of Carlyle (26), Tarde (69), and Shelley (45), for example, are misspelled and some references are not consistent in style or (e.g., to the *Bible* [26]) are simply incorrect.

Like Boucher, the editors of *Current Issues in Idealism* believe that British idealist thought is important because many of the issues it discussed bear on matters of continuing debate. Dan Hutto and Paul Coates's collection is, however, much broader in scope.

The papers in this volume are taken (with the exception of an essay by Donald Davidson) from a conference on 'Idealism in the Twentieth Century' held in Hertfordshire, England, in 1994, and they give one some sense of where idealism can make a contribution in contemporary philosophy. This collection complements two other books published by Thoemmes in 1996 — *Philosophy after F.H. Bradley* (ed. James Bradley) and *Perspectives on the Logic and Metaphysics of F.H. Bradley* (ed. W.J. Mander).

In their Introduction, the editors note that the focus of many of the essays reflects the ongoing debate between realism and idealism. But this might be misleading. First, to see 'idealism' as engaged in a debate with 'realism' invites the question, 'which realism?' The editors note that the realism they have in mind is of a rather recent vintage — e.g., that of Thomas Nagel (represented in this collection by Tom Sorel). But those idealists of the early part of the 20th century referred to in this volume — Bradley, Bosanquet, and McTaggart — were responding to a variety of other 'realisms' — that of Samuel Alexander, that of G.E. Moore, that of the 'new realists', such as R.B. Perry, and that of 'critical' realists (e.g., R.W. Sellars). *Pace* Richard Rorty's comment, cited in the Introduction, that 'philosophers in the English-speaking world seem fated to end the century discussing the same topic — realism — which they were discussing in 1900,' the present debate between idealism and realism is *not* what it was 100 years ago.

Second, one might also ask 'which idealism is being discussed?' Idealism is not just 'anti-realism'. Five of the ten essays (i.e., those by Fred Wilson,

Phillip Ferreira, Timothy Sprigge, Leslie Armour, and Guy Stock) focus on idealism as it is understood within the British idealist tradition; the remaining essays (i.e., those by Donald Davidson, Tom Sorel, Coates, Hutto, and Michele Marsonet) — so far as they address the issue of idealism — have a much different idealism than that of McTaggart, Bradley, and Bosanquet in mind. Hutto, for example, is concerned with whether Wittgenstein was a 'transcendental idealist,' Marsonet writes of 'linguistic idealism' — the view that 'reality *is* language,' and the object of Sorel's criticisms of idealism seems to be the Berkeleyan variety. In short, the reader is not provided with a clear statement of what idealism is. Thus, while Wilson claims that, since the time of G.E. Moore's critique, 'whatever idealism we now have, it is not [Bradelian] idealism' (53), it is not obvious that the other authors in this collection would assert even this.

This 'breadth', however, works to the volume's advantage, for it reminds the reader that 'idealism' is a far from narrow theory, and that one need not automatically be suspicious of a view that is labeled as 'idealist'. In fact, this volume is quite useful in that the essays show how some idealisms can be appropriate in addressing contemporary philosophical concerns (e.g., Sprigge's essay on environmental ethics). Other essays bear on idealist metaphysics and logic, and others clarify important issues in the history of philosophy — for example, Wilson's paper on the only infrequently discussed 'first part' of G.E. Moore's 'The Refutation of Idealism'.

The range of topics addressed in this volume, then, allows one to see some of the ways in which philosophical idealism bears on contemporary debate and to understand the place of 20th century idealism in the history of philosophy. The accusation of 'obscurantism' that is frequently, and unreflectively, applied to idealism is rather dated, and it is instructive to remember that even someone of such an anti-idealist temper as Russell long regarded Bradley's philosophical acumen with considerable respect. Readers might, it is true, have been even better served had the editors included essays on political philosophy (given that idealist political thought is regarded as having a relation to, if not an influence on, contemporary communitarianism) or some further studies on applied ethics. Still, this is a minor concern. The quality of the essays in this collection is good, and representative of the work being done by those interested in the history and the philosophy of idealism.

It is unlikely that there will soon be a reversal in received opinion concerning Anglo-American idealist thought, but the generally high calibre of these and other recent collections and studies should serve to make a rejection of idealist philosophy much less routine.

William Sweet

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Keith Burgess-Jackson

Rape: A Philosophical Investigation.

Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Co.

1996. Pp. vii + 217.

US\$72.95. ISBN 1-85521-485-7.

With the exception of capital punishment, no subject in criminal law has created more controversy among the public than the law of rape. The reason, of course, is that the law of rape has been expanding to prohibit acts that were once taken for granted as morally unproblematic. In *Rape: A Philosophical Investigation*, Burgess-Jackson (BJ) attempts 'to sift and sort through the various issues that arise in the law of rape, distinguishing those that are conceptual in nature from those that are either normative or empirical, and showing how, where, and why these issues are interconnected' (3). As a result of this modest objective, BJ often contents himself with explaining the various positions instead of defending one of his own. One notable exception occurs in the first part of the book, where BJ addresses the criticism that radical feminists are engaged in persuasive definition insofar as they expand the meaning of 'rape' to include nonviolent sexual behaviors without diminishing its negative emotive force. BJ argues that there is no single understanding of what makes rape wrong and hence that it is legitimate for radical feminists to make 'rape' more precise by including within its extension borderline cases about which there is reasonable disagreement.

Next, BJ elaborates three conceptual theories that attempt to explain what makes rape wrong. The conservative theory views rape as a trespass against property. What makes rape wrong, on this view, is that 'the man to whom the woman belongs has not consented to the intercourse' (45). The liberal view conceives rape 'as [an] unlawful touching of another person without his or her consent' (49). What makes rape wrong, on this view, is that the rapist violates the victim's autonomy as a moral person. The radical view conceives of rape as sex-based subordination that degrades the social status of women. The radical argues that female consent is meaningless in a patriarchal society where sex reflects and perpetuates a male-dominated power structure. What makes rape wrong, on the radical view, is that it exacerbates the sexual subjugation of women. While BJ's exposition is excellent, his unwillingness to evaluate these theories is disappointing.

The second part of the book develops the main elements of the law of rape as it has evolved in the United States and Great Britain. In this part, BJ also explores, without attempting to resolve, the tension between liberal and radical perspectives on how to achieve equality in rape law. The liberal argues that rape should be treated no differently than any other criminal battery. Thus, the liberal attempts to promote equality in rape law by taking the sex out of rape. In contrast, the radical regards rape as unique among batteries in that it is essentially sexual. Radical efforts to promote equality in the law focus on eliminating sexist assumptions that are incorporated in

the law (e.g., the assumption that women are vengeful liars, which seems to motivate the corroboration requirement).

In the third part of the book, BJ applies the three conceptual theories to a number of normative issues relating to rape law. Chapter 6 concerns the traditional view that consent should be inferred from the absence of forcible compulsion or coercive threats. BJ points out that '[s]ometimes other types of harm are threatened, and offers as well as threats can be coercive' (94), but does not attempt to draw the line between coercive gestures that negate consent and those that do not. Chapter 7 discusses various arguments in favor of the legal exemption for marital rape, including the argument that a woman's decision to marry constitutes blanket consent to sexual intimacy and the argument that marital rape causes less harm to its victim than rape by a stranger. Chapter 8 concerns the view that a reasonable but mistaken belief that the woman consents to intercourse should be an absolute defense to a charge of rape. Chapter 9 focuses on laws that prohibit sex between adults and minors on the strength of a presumption that no minor is sufficiently mature to give meaningful consent. Chapter 10 argues that society must remedy the unjust burden that women bear in virtue of being disproportionately fearful of rape and other crimes.

BJ does an outstanding job of cataloguing and summarizing the various positions on these issues, but the specialist who is looking for much in the way of philosophical originality is likely to be disappointed. BJ limits himself to the modest but worthwhile task of 'applying [the] three theories to the law of rape and to the moral issues that that body of law generates' (215). Although the book breaks little new ground, its treatment of the existing literature is clear, insightful, and comprehensive. As a result, it is an excellent resource for the reader wanting to survey the difficult issues associated with rape law.

Kenneth Einar Himma

University of Washington

Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede, eds.

The Original Sceptics: A Controversy.

Indianapolis: Hackett 1997. 168pp.

US\$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-348-4);

US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87720-347-6).

This book consists of a collection of five seminal papers, connected with one another in various ways, that originally appeared in print between 1979 and 1984. In order, they are: 1) Michael Frede, 'The Sceptic's Beliefs', 2) Myles Burnyeat, 'Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?', 3) Jonathan Barnes, 'The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist', 4) Myles Burnyeat, 'The Sceptic in His Place and Time', and 5) Michael Frede, 'The Sceptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge'. (From now on, I shall refer to the individual essays by number.) These are preceded by a brief preface, and followed by a select bibliography covering both the Academic and the Pyrrhonian strands of Greek scepticism. (Essay 4 has its own bibliography as well, but this is naturally more specialized, being restricted to the works actually cited in that essay.)

The appearance of this volume is very welcome. I call these essays 'seminal' without looseness or exaggeration. The editors remark in their new preface that at the time of the essays' original appearance little — or at any rate, little of a seriously philosophical nature — had been written on the ancient sceptics, but that the situation (as revealed by the new bibliography) is very different now. They modestly refrain from saying in so many words what is surely the case: namely, that the flourishing of scholarship on ancient scepticism in recent years is to a considerable extent a *result* of the interest stimulated in this hitherto neglected area of philosophy by these essays themselves. On the other hand, despite the large amount of secondary literature that has followed, the essays' relevance and interest has by no means diminished with the years. Collectively, they still provide an excellent sense of what is philosophically exciting about the ancient sceptics, and also of what is difficult and controversial in the interpretation of them.

All the essays have reappeared in print at least once before this (though in the case of essay 1, this was in the form of an English translation of the original German); and with one possible exception (essay 3), they were already available in collections that any decent university library in North America could be expected to possess. The merit of this volume — and it is no small one — is simply to bring them together in a cheap and convenient format. This makes it easy and attractive to assign them as required reading for seminars or other classes (I, for one, have already done so); and that was presumably Hackett's main aim in publishing the volume. But it is not only students who stand to gain from its appearance. Philosophers, or scholars of Greek philosophy, for whom the ancient sceptics have not been a particular focus can now easily dip into the subject, and perhaps find themselves tempted to go deeper. And even those who have made ancient scepticism a specialty, and who have been familiar with these essays for years, will find

themselves learning new things from them; one reads them a little differently when they are all adjacent within the same covers.

As several of the titles suggest, the essays center especially around two connected issues: the nature of the beliefs, if any, that the ancient sceptic may consistently adopt, and the implications this has for the sceptic's ability to act and to form coherent practical attitudes. An ancient and abiding reaction to the sceptics is 'How can you decide anything, or do anything at all, if you have no beliefs?' The sceptics themselves constructed sophisticated responses to this challenge. But did these responses take the form of *denying* that the sceptic does in fact lack *all* beliefs, or did they consist, rather, of showing that it *is* after all possible to make decisions, and to act in a recognizably human way, even *despite* having no beliefs? This is really the central question to which the essays return complex and divergent answers — frequently in explicit conversation with one another. Essays 1-4 concentrate almost exclusively on the Pyrrhonist strand of scepticism, and largely on Sextus Empiricus, the only Pyrrhonist whose writings have survived intact; essay 5 deals with Academics and Pyrrhonists together, but with somewhat greater emphasis on the former. There is a pervasive concern to emphasize the distinctness of ancient scepticism from what is understood by the term 'scepticism' in philosophy today. Nowadays 'the sceptic' is usually taken to be someone who denies the possibility of knowledge, in some domain. But the ancient sceptics — or at least, the ones treated here — are not in the business of *denial* (but of suspending judgement), and they are not especially concerned with *knowledge* (as opposed to any of the other topics on which non-sceptical philosophers had positions). This lesson has been widely taken to heart by now, but it is still salutary — especially when introducing ancient scepticism to people with a background in modern philosophy. In essay 4 comparison between ancient and modern approaches to scepticism itself becomes a central theme; Burnyeat argues that contemporary philosophers 'insulate' their philosophical conclusions from ordinary life, whereas ancient philosophers (sceptical or anti-sceptical) do not — and he then tells an intriguing story about how and when the change took place. The concept of 'insulation' needs some refinement, I think (see my 'Scepticism and Everyday Attitudes in Ancient and Modern Philosophy', *Metaphilosophy* 24 [1993] 363-81); but it has nonetheless proved highly fruitful in attempts to understand the relations between ancient scepticism and its modern counterpart. Essay 5 extends the historical reach of the volume in another direction, touching on treatments of scepticism in the medieval period — a subject Frede has pursued further elsewhere (see his essay 'A Medieval Source of Modern Scepticism', in R. Claussen and R. Daube-Schackat, eds., *Gedankenzeichen* (Tübingen 1988) 65-70).

Of course, the previous paragraph does no more than hint at the depth of scholarship and the philosophical subtlety contained here; the essays deserve to be read, compared and reread. Two final comments. First, though the essays clearly constitute a single debate, they are not exactly uniform in the demands they make on the reader, or in the levels of background knowledge

they presuppose; essay 3, for example, differs from the others in being liberally scattered with Greek. This is no doubt due to the somewhat disparate circumstances of their original production; essay 2 started as a paper delivered to the first Symposium Hellenisticum, essay 3 was originally delivered to the Cambridge Philological Society, and essays 4 and 5 were first presented as lectures in a wide-ranging series entitled 'Philosophy in History', hosted by Johns Hopkins University in 1982-83. These differences in the audiences for which they were originally designed mean that some care and preparation may be needed in assigning the essays to students. Second, there are numerous typographical and other printing-related errors — not all of them trivial, if the volume is to be used to *introduce* the subject. Among the ones I spotted almost immediately are 'Poplin 1981/2' for 'Popkin 1951/2' (120n45); 'Rorky' for 'Rorty' (123); in the same place, information about the earlier appearance of a shorter version of the essay (essay 4) embedded in the bibliography, so that it looks as if it applies to one of the items *within* the bibliography; 'Autipater' for 'Antipater' (151n12); 'Epirtermology' for 'Epistemology' (155). I hope that these and others can be corrected in a reprinting relatively soon.

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Judith Butler

The Psychic Life of Power.

California: Stanford University Press 1997.

Pp. i + 218.

US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-2811-9);

US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-2812-7).

In this relatively short volume, Butler presents the reader with a philosophically compact yet superbly crafted analysis and development of a selection of theories concerning the formulation of the subject and its relation to internal and external powers of subjection. The overall approach to these theories is via the problematic of power's 'double-valence', that is, the difficulty of understanding power, on the one hand, as that external subjectivizing power by means of which the subject is forced to locate and articulate itself as an 'I' and a 'we' (in a socio-linguistic context), and on the other, as that power exercised by the subject in its autonomous speech and actions. Butler illustrates the difficulty that emerges from this observation by framing it in the form of a question: 'How can it be that the subject, taken to be a

condition for and instrument of agency, is at the same time the effect of subordination, understood as the privation of agency?" (10)

Articulating her enquiry around this question, (a stylistic strategy which, whilst helpful at times, is perhaps somewhat overused in the course of the book as a whole and often raises problems that are left unaddressed), Butler's text necessarily engages with two traditionally distinct discourses: the *theory of power*, understood as a primarily external and subjectivizing regulatory force and the *theory of the psyche*, concerned with the dynamics of internal power relations. To this end, Butler chooses to focus upon a number of theories concerning subjection taken from the texts of five canonical thinkers in the Continental tradition: Hegel (specifically the *Phenomenology of Spirit* #178-230); Nietzsche (*Genealogy of Morals*); Foucault (*Discipline and Punish* and the *History of Sexuality*); Freud (especially but not exclusively *Mourning and Melancholia*, *On Narcissism* and *The Ego and the Id*); Althusser on the Doctrine of Interpolation.

The arguments developed by Butler in response to her readings of these texts are engaging and rigorous. As with her previous books however, there is presupposed a working knowledge of those theories with which the text engages, an absence of which, on the part of the reader, may leave him/her somewhat disoriented. On these grounds the text could not be recommended with any degree of confidence to an undergraduate or general audience.

Central to Butler's thesis are the themes of ambiguity, resistance, conscience, melancholia and a 'turning back' movement of the subject upon itself. Of these, the last two are pivotal, being used both as critical devices for opening out the theories under consideration and as conceptual conditions for understanding and creatively developing the problematic relation of power and the subject (as elaborated above). The movement of 'turning back' is also the source of a second problematic which Butler refers to as the 'paradox of subjection'. The problem here lies with the idea that the subject only comes into being by virtue of a movement of turning around. This 'turn' is analysed in a variety of forms: in Hegel, as that which signifies the ascetic and sceptical modes of thought that mark the unhappy consciousness; in Althusser as the subjectivizing event wherein the individual acknowledges itself as the one hailed by the voice of the law; in Freud as the effect of melancholia whereby the ego turns upon itself so as to take itself as its own (perceptual) object. The problem in each of these cases concerns how it is possible for a subject (as the one that does the turning) to pre-exist that turning whose movement instigates their formulation as a subject. The resolution of this paradox is attained, according to Butler, when we understand the movement of turning back in a Nietzschean sense where that which founds the subject is understood as an effect of power in recoil and where the 'turn' is thought of as a trope with no ontologizing power.

Throughout the text, Butler has two goals in mind: firstly, the possibility of conjoining the discourses of power and psychoanalysis in the formation of the subject, which is explored rigorously and at length; secondly, the consequent (political) role of this subject in relation to power, which, sadly receives

scant attention. This said however, there are undoubtedly political implications to be drawn from the chapter analysing gender and sexuality as forms or effects of melancholia. This section marks a welcome return to and development of some of Butler's earlier work on the performance of masculine and feminine gender roles (in her book *Gender Trouble*).

Following on in response to Butler's overall claim that the (heterosexually based) gender division is governed by a logic of repudiation, Adam Phillips (a practising psychoanalyst) supports Butler's claim that masculinity and femininity are identifications formulated and consolidated in large part in relation to disavowed grief. Phillips is quick to point out however, that the tendency of certain psychoanalytic discourses to idealise mourning risks consolidating rather than blurring the traditional gender boundaries he sees Butler as engaged in the process of deconstructing. Nonetheless, he argues, Butler's use of mourning as a way of nuancing the performativity of identity construction avoids this retrograde step. Butler's rejoinder to Phillips takes up his criticism of the sacralizing of mourning drawing from it an important distinction between repudiation (leading to foreclosure) and resistance (in the form of a permanent declining), articulating an account of homosexuality that does not assume the repudiation of heterosexuality for its formulation. For, as she remarks, just because the economy of desire works through refusal and loss does not mean that it is necessarily structured by a logic of non-contradiction.

It seems likely that Butler and Phillips' analysis of (homo)sexuality and melancholia will be of most interest and draw the greatest critical attention to this text (if for no other reason than the fact that they may be read in relative isolation from the book as a whole). It will be a great pity however, if the more complex and demanding aspects of Butler's theory in general suffer neglect as a result of this.

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Diana Fritz Cates

*Choosing to Feel: Virtue, Friendship,
and Compassion for Friends.*

Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press 1997. Pp. xi + 298.

US\$32.00. ISBN 0-268-00814-0.

This is a deeply serious and painstakingly argued book in which the landscape of compassion is explored at length. Cates takes her theoretical framework both from Aristotle's virtue ethics and conception of primary friendship and from Aquinas' interpretation of, and additions to, Aristotelian theories. Her book is thus to be situated in the recently very active trend of Christian — not to say Catholic — interpretations of ancient and mediaeval aretaic thinking. It enriches and reinforces this trend, and the objections voiced below are not aimed at undermining the book's general purpose, theoretical underpinnings and/or methodology but merely at expressing reservations about some aspects of the whole enterprise.

One will object, firstly, to some lack of historical awareness. The Aristotelian notion of virtue friendship, which provides Cates with her basic theoretical tool, i.e., a concept of selfhood pliable enough to yield that of 'other selfhood', is torn from its doctrinal context in Aristotle's philosophy in particular and Classical Greek thinking in general. This allows Cates to assume that, like ours, ancient Greek concepts of selfhood primarily denote the singularity of each entity capable of being so designated, and that Aristotle's own concept of selfhood is that of a constantly shifting bundle of particular desires, thoughts and perceptions. She writes, 'In the best of Aristotelian character-friendships, the kind of friendships with which we are concerned in this project, both parties encourage themselves and each other to become fully their own unique selves in intimate relation with each other' (77). This is a tendentious reading of Aristotle who equated the self — to designate which he had to press the pronoun *autos* beyond normal grammatical usage — with the part that he deemed the best in us, i.e., intellect or reason. As we learn to be good, so, according to Aristotle, we *become* selves and, in the process, are rendered capable of 'other selfhood', a relationship which enables us to actualize the rational, inter-personal, element which defines the human *ergon*. The singularity of the self does not enter into this equation.

Cates is much more attuned to Aquinas' own distinctive views in these matters. The role assigned in his ethics to the theological virtue of charity provides her with the philosophico-theological background against which to explore the moral interrelatedness of compassion, caring and charity. This task is carefully and interestingly carried out even if one feels somewhat short-changed on the subject of the conceptual boundaries between charity (directed at all sentient beings) and compassion (towards one's friends). After all, if compassion towards friends can be deemed to constitute part and parcel of friendship the problem still arises as to who my friend — not to say my

neighbour — is, and to what extent I am morally obligated to attend to the needs of strangers. Disappointingly, the concept of pity is left out of account altogether. As for Aquinas' account of passion and its impact on choice, together with his concept of *complacentia* (i.e., love's enlargement of the self), Cates extends them not implausibly to accommodate her repeated descriptions of the enlargement of the compassionate person's bodily self to encompass the suffering self of the other. True, the doctor angelic would have looked askance at some of Cates' 'extensions' of his insights, e.g., her reference to 'an imaginative, physical sensation of passing right through the visible (skin) boundaries that seem ordinarily to separate our respective bodies. ... The pleasure of warm flesh against flesh ... yields to the bittersweet pleasure of "touching" another's bodily experience, which in turn yields to the suffering of her-my pain' (186). Such extravagant phrases notwithstanding, Cates account of Aquinas' ethics of virtue fills a gap and should serve as a useful introduction for those who are interested in aretaic ethics but remain daunted by the elaborate structure of the *Summa*.

Works of this kind usually offer rich and detailed 'case studies', drawn from real life or literature, to serve as occasions for further explorations of the virtue or disposition under examination. This book is no exception but Cates' choice of examples is sometimes odd. For instance the description of her own feelings of compassion for a hypochondriac friend suffering from influenza strikes one as either trite or a case of misplaced *compassion*. At other times, her handling of an aptly chosen example, i.e., rape, strikes one as hollow and oddly impersonal. Everyday situations, by contrast, are minutely and feelingly handled, none more so than compassionateness for a toddler on the occasion of grazing her knee.

The emotional attunement between the object of compassion and its agent is often insightfully described. More particularly, the aggressivity and resentment elicited in the carer by the wretchedness and self-loathing of the 'other' deserves to be made compulsory reading for all carers.

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David Cockburn

*Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives
on Past, Present, and Future.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.

Pp. xiv + 355.

US\$59.95. ISBN 0-521-59213-3.

Traditional treatments in the philosophy of time, Cockburn argues, rest on the mistaken assumption that the important issues are metaphysical, rather than ethical. Cockburn looks to correct this by exploring 'the ways in which time may feature in our articulation of reasons for actions and feelings' (8). What results is largely an account of the manner in which tensed, as opposed to tenseless, language is central to our lives.

The book is divided into three parts. The first seeks to make explicit the manner in which tensed discourse, the language of A-series, figures into our conceptual scheme. The goal here is neither defense nor rejection of the presence and importance of such language. Rather, it is descriptive, with an eye to clearly presenting the manner in which we do so conceive things.

The second part of the book is divided into three chapters, one each on the present, past, and future. The discussions here are largely independent from the main argument of the book, though they may be taken to be further elucidations or applications of the central threads. Topics include, among others, the meaning and significance of 'living in the present', Aristotle's sea battle and questions of agency and fatalism, Hume on induction, and relevant literature on the philosophy of history.

The final part of the book is a single chapter, exploring the place in which Simon Weil and Spinoza should occupy in treatments of time, with emphasis on the role in which tenseless temporal language, the language of B-series, may have.

The manner in which tensed locutions figure essentially in our lives is revealed, most centrally, in 'the different ways in which past, present and future events feature in our emotional lives — the different ways ... in which they may be offered as reasons for feelings' (35). My past drunken behavior is a reason for me to feel regret and shame now, and makes it appropriate to apologize to my host; my fearing future pain can be offered as a reason why I don't go to the dentist. The tense of these beliefs or emotions plays a non-eliminable role in their being the appropriate ones to have. Cockburn's opponents are those who, such as Nagel, maintain that the reasons we have for acting have nothing to do with the time in which those reasons occur to us or the time at which they are offered. On that view, reasons for action and emotion are timeless. Cockburn argues that this fails to appreciate the important asymmetry in our thoughts and feelings about the past, present, and future.

A similar conclusion is reached via considerations of meaning. Both A-series and B-series advocates, in Cockburn's view, give priority to the present. The former do so in taking the present to be more real than other

times, while the latter look to model all times on the reality of that which is present to us. Linguistically, the latter (and some versions of the former) are manifest in the notion that all that is required to master tensed language is a mastery of timeless grammar, e.g., 'He is (timelessly) in pain', supplemented with general principles about the use of past and future tenses. Cockburn argues against this: 'It is rather that I only have a grasp of what a pain is, or of what it is for someone to be in pain now, in so far as I have a grasp of what it is for someone to have been in pain, and of what it is for someone to be going to be in pain' (131). Reflection upon this reveals, once again, the extent to which our lives are immersed in time in a way only A-series or tensed talk takes seriously.

Care is needed here, though. For while Cockburn uses these considerations to argue against numerous views, his conclusion is not that because we do feel differently towards the past than we do towards the present and future that we ought to. His goal is not to endorse the tensed view of time, in so far as it is presented as a metaphysical position. In fact, having presented the ways in which we do take A-series talk seriously, Cockburn looks to explicitly deny any ontological implications that may be drawn, either for or against the A-series.

Examining various ploys to reach metaphysical conclusions from the linguistic considerations he has examined, including appeal to truth-conditions, grounds for ascriptions of properties, and ontologically weighty explanations of linguistic behavior, Cockburn concludes that when it comes to metaphysical questions about the nature of time, 'there is no reason to suppose that there is anything of philosophical interest to be said in response' (98). Cockburn notes throughout his debt to the later Wittgenstein, and certainly the influence is felt here. One does wonder, however, whether Cockburn's anti-metaphysical streak in the philosophy of time is simply a species of a more general anti-metaphysical stance, or whether there is something particularly troubling about time. Without guidance it is difficult to assess the extent to which the metaphysics of time, in particular, should be worried about in the manner Cockburn suggests.

Besides covering a wide range of topics, including an interesting discussion of Lucretius' arguments against fearing death, and the nature of temporal passage, a wide range of authors are covered. Cockburn moves such thinkers as Augustine, Spinoza, McTaggart, Dummett, Nagel, Collingwood, and Weil. Readers not familiar with some of these figures, particularly Dummett, may find the going tough at times. Curiously, Husserl and Heidegger are ignored. Obviously one can only cover so many topics and so many figures, but the wealth of material those philosophers have provided, particularly on the role of the future in giving meaning and content to our language and lives, a topic close to Cockburn's heart, makes their omission noticeable.

In conclusion, one suspects that Cockburn's downplaying the ontological import of traditional discussions will fall on deaf ears for those who are convinced there is something metaphysically important at issue. However,

to the extent that philosophers are obliged to keep an eye not just on their particular projects, but on why their projects are worth pursuing, Cockburn's rich book provides much for reflection.

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Paul M. Cohen

Freedom's Moment: An Essay on the French Idea of Liberty from Rousseau to Foucault.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1997.

Pp. xii + 229.

US\$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-11285-3);

US\$13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-11286-1).

Jeremy Jennings and

Anthony Kemp-Welch, eds.

Intellectuals in Politics:

From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie.

New York: Routledge 1997. Pp. viii + 304.

Cdn\$97.95: US\$69.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-14995-9);

Cdn\$26.95: US\$18.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-14996-7).

The thesis of Paul M. Cohen's book is simple, though the elaboration and discussion of it is not. Cohen's claim is that there is a French idea of freedom that can be distinguished from both the negative and the positive liberty of Berlin's famous distinction. The French idea is neither the freedom of the individual from external interference, as envisaged by the classical liberalism of Locke and Mill; nor is it the attainment of the individual's 'self-mastery' through an organic relationship with the community or the state, as proposed by the Hegelian tradition. Rather it originates in Rousseau's notion of democratic self-rule for both the individual citizen and society as a whole.

While recognizing that there is nothing novel in the basic claim, Cohen wishes to break new ground by seeing if a distinct idea of freedom can be traced through a succession of French thinkers from Rousseau to the present day: through Robespierre, Stendhal, Michelet, Bergson, Péguy, Sartre and Foucault. Although at first sight a group with little in common, Cohen (borrowing Bourdieu's phrase) sees its members as 'consecrated heretics', men who reached positions of social or intellectual eminence and yet were

'outsiders', critics who insisted on maintaining their autonomy and resisted full incorporation into the institutions of the French Establishment.

Cohen traces the lives, works, thoughts and deeds of his chosen representatives in intricate detail, and does indeed find a tradition of consecrated heresy, but his methodology is not straightforward. The model against which the consecrated heretics are measured is not Rousseau, nor any actual individual or intellectual; rather, it is Julien Sorel, the 'hero' of Stendhal's fiction, *Le Rouge et le noir*. Sorel himself, however, was woven by Stendhal from Rousseauian strands, so there is a puzzling element of both circularity and anachronism in Cohen's narrative. Sorel, however, typifies the consecrated heretic who is both a populist and a critic of the corruption of the populace by modern society, both an insider who needs a position from which to launch his criticisms and an outsider who maintains an autonomous will and is horrified by the thought of dependency and subjugation.

Is Cohen successful in his re-reading of the history of French thought? To a considerable extent, yes: the analyses of the lives and works of the heretics and the juxtapositions of the elements of their thoughts produce a bold and brilliant narrative full of stimulating insights. But questions do arise about the extent to which his eight protagonists can be seen as a unified group. Bergson in particular, the quiet, dedicated philosopher, seems to fit less than comfortably into the role Cohen creates for him. Since the heretics were anti-clerical, for example, Bergson's criticisms of positivism have to be seen as an attack on the church-like pretensions of science. Furthermore, even if there is the strand of thought that Cohen identifies, it is not the only one, so on what grounds has he selected his protagonists? Obviously, they are largely selected because they fit, or can be made to fit, the argument. There are plenty of other intellectuals who would not fit, Comte, for example (a heretic but not consecrated), Durkheim (consecrated but not a heretic), or Aron (far too liberal all round).

By the end of the book we have travelled a long way from the superficially attractive romanticism of Rousseau. Is what is significant about the French idea of freedom an autonomous will repudiating conventional morality? Or should this be reinterpreted as that combination of sentimentality and violence that constitutes modern machismo? Cohen agrees that the 'heretical narrative' is 'masculine' but denies the charge that it is 'inherently "mysogynistic"' (181). He also distances his account from the well known accusations that the tradition of Rousseau is totalitarian, and that the French intellectual is, as Aron put it, addicted to 'the myth of revolution and salvation by violence'. But there is more to such indictments than Cohen allows. Whether looking back to Sparta (as did Rousseau) or to the 'nobility' of the French middle ages (as did several others), it is not unreasonable to discern at the base of the French idea of freedom a rejuvenated atavism ill-suited to the aspirations of the modern world. As such it fails to provide a model for either political or intellectual virtue.

The nature of such virtue is one question that Cohen's book shares with the collection edited by Jennings and Kemp-Welch, though the latter, being

multi-authored, has no single case to argue. *Intellectuals in Politics* is a fascinating, wide-ranging, uneven casserole of a book, full of ideas about, analyses of and insights into the nature and status of the intellectual in today's world. Whether it ultimately satisfies our philosophical puzzlement about intellectuals is doubtful, however. Most of us have our intuitions, vague and unfocussed as they are, but can we give them a coherent form and substantive content? As David L. Schalk says at the start of his contribution, 'Few of us are absolutely certain that we know precisely what an intellectual is, even if we have sensitive antennae which tell us when we meet someone whether we think he or she is a member of the species' (271). Sartre surely qualifies, and so does Orwell, and yet if they are of the same species they are surely very distinct varieties. But was W.B. Yeats an intellectual at all? Was Auden? Both feature in D. George Boyce's chapter on poetry and politics before World War II, yet it might well be thought that Yeats especially, though he shared some of the characteristics of the intellectual, was too passionate and too mystical to qualify fully.

So what is an intellectual? The overall view in this book is that the intellectual is a thinker, a pursuer of ideas or even of the truth, an analyst and a critic, both engaged and detached yet always autonomous, and at least to some extent or on some occasions an activist, identifying with the powerless or the oppressed. Whether this constitutes a coherent ideal type is precisely what the controversy is about. There is, however, a general consensus that to avoid anachronism we should see the intellectual as emerging in France at the time of the Dreyfus affair in the 1890s. Before that there might have been philosophers, sages or prophets, but not fully fledged intellectuals. But we learn from other contributions that the intelligentsia had emerged in Germany and Russia earlier in the nineteenth century, and what is the intelligentsia if not the collectivity of intellectuals? Jeremy Jennings, however, returns to France in finding an even earlier proto-intellectual in the Enlightenment man of letters, as represented by Voltaire. But given the strangeness of the territory, these historical boundary disputes are neither surprising nor particularly worrying.

A cynic might say that there are two types of intellectual: those who concern themselves with the state of society, of humanity, of the world, and how it can be improved, and those who worry about what it means to be an intellectual. The latter, the theoreticians of intellectualism, Weber, Benda, Gramsci, Chomsky, Walzer, Edward Said, Bernard-Henri Lévy (and many others), receive their share of attention in these pages, especially Weber, Gramsci and Walzer. Alan Scott provides what he claims with some justification is a more sensible reading of Weber on the issue of value-freedom which distances it from the perennial question in the philosophy of the social sciences and places it instead in an analysis of the social location of the scholar. Richard Bellamy finds the notion of immanent criticism relied on by both Gramsci and Walzer as a route between relativism and universalism to be incoherent, and this is backed up by the late Martin Hollis in his conclusion to the book, where he says of Walzer's idea that it 'saws off the crucial branch

on which it expects the critic to perch' (297). That certainly leaves Walzer without a leg to stand on.

As well as these theoretical considerations, the book also contains many analyses of intellectuals in various societies, in France, Tsarist Russia, the USSR, Poland, Israel, Algeria, Ireland, Great Britain, the USA. These chapters are full of information, some inspiring (dissident intellectuals in communist Poland), some horrifying (the 'elimination' of intellectuals in Algeria). Not surprisingly, these analyses concentrate on periods of crisis, such as war, occupation and repression, because it is precisely in such conditions that the dilemmas of the intellectual are at their sharpest and most demanding. But one thing that becomes clear is that the cynic's distinction, separating those intellectuals who intellectualize about the world from those who intellectualize about being an intellectual, is far too cynical. Artists, philosophers, politicians, even scientists, have to practice their trades while at the same time considering methodological and ethical questions about their practise, and it is no different for intellectuals. 'How to be a good intellectual' is a question that arises all the time, and the more difficult and demanding the circumstances, the more urgent and pressing the question.

This question also raises what is the underlying and unifying theme of the book, a theme to which almost all the contributors refer but which primarily occupies the initial chapter by the editors and the conclusion by Hollis. The editors raise the issues, and Hollis attempts to answer them. The question is: on what ground does the intellectual stand? Or: what is the source of the intellectual's authority and legitimacy? Is the intellectual inside society, or outside? If inside, how can there be sufficient distance between intellectual and society to provide the ground for an objective critique? If outside, how can the intellectual's critique have any relevance? Must the intellectual be locally based and have only local mores to work with? Or does the very notion of critique call upon universal values and principles? At this point the argument tends to deteriorate into a slanging match, with accusations of relativism thrown at the localist and of hubris thrown at the universalist.

Is there a rational way forward? The universalist's case does at first look dubious. How could there be an Archimedian point from which the universalist can lever the affairs of the world back into good order? Surely the best we can do is try to be objective from within and thus engage in the immanent critique favoured by Walzer and others. Hollis will have none of this. Even immanent critique, he argues, must have at least one foot outside the camp (in the rational universe, so to speak), otherwise there is no critique at all. Thus, he concludes, the intellectual can still operate with a clear conscience in the tradition and spirit of the Enlightenment.

This might be so, but intellectuals can operate only if there are intellectuals. So do intellectuals still exist? (Call this the intelogical argument.) There are several complaints in the book that intellectuals, seduced by money and superficial prestige, have abandoned their vocation for that of media

guru. David Schalk goes further, in coming to a conclusion more pessimistic than Hollis's, that the emerging postmodern world challenges the traditional role the intellectual. But perhaps things are even worse than this. If we are witnessing the end of history because of the end of ideology and the triumph of consumer capitalism, then intellectuals will indeed have no place in the brave new world. Decisions that once were matters of policy, and thus within the province of intellectual analysis and debate, are more and more being handed over to the market, that impersonal decision procedure that avoids the imperfections of merely human politics and philosophy. So, intellectuals of the world, unite! You have nothing to lose but your irrelevance.

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Vincent M. Colapietro, ed.
Reason, Experience and God:
John E. Smith in Dialogue.
New York: Fordham University Press 1997.
Pp. ix + 158.
US\$28.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8232-1706-X);
US\$18.00 (paper: ISBN 0-8232-1707-8).

The work of John E. Smith deserves to be signaled as one of the most original and consistent of the successors of the classical American philosophers. In his extensive work (twelve books and nearly 200 articles), Smith 'has contributed to contemporary philosophy in primarily four distinct capacities; first, as a philosopher of religion and God; second, as an indefatigable defender of philosophical reflection in its classical sense (a sense inclusive of, but not limited to, metaphysics); third, as a participant in the reconstruction of experience and reason so boldly inaugurated by Hegel and radically transformed by the classical American pragmatists, and significantly augmented by such thinkers as Josiah Royce, William Ernest Hocking, and Alfred North Whitehead; fourth, as an interpreter of philosophical texts and traditions (Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche no less than Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey; German idealism as well as American, the Augustinian tradition no less than the pragmatic)' (33). For those of us who long for the reconstruction of the authentic American philosophy, both firmly rooted in the classical tradition as well as highly innovative, the publication of this book should be celebrated.

The book consists of four original articles by the late Vincent G. Potter, Robert J. Roth, S.J., Vincent M. Colapietro, and Robert C. Neville, and the

respective responses by Smith, plus a rather short introduction by Merold Westphal and a useful list of Smith's publications. One of the most outstanding features of the volume is the great care that Smith took to draw a line of continuity between the articles, giving as a result a comprehensive look at his life-long work. The title of the volume makes reference to one of Smith's most commented books: *Experience and God* (1968), and exposes one of Smith's central concerns: 'the restoration of recovery of *experience* as a rich and full-blooded category against the weak and bloodless account of it made popular by many Enlightenment thinkers' (8). Potter's article ('John E. Smith and the Recovery of Religious Experience') clearly shows the connection between Smith's notion of experience and that of the classical American pragmatists, and explains 'the application of this recovered and enriched notion of experience to our understanding of religion in general and of religious truth in particular' (8). Roth's article ('Morality and Obligation') centers on the problem of the origin and nature of moral obligation and its relationship to religion in the work of John Smith, while Colapietro's long paper ('Living Reason: A Critical Exposition of John E. Smith's Re-Envisioning of Human Rationality') drives attention to what he considers one of Smith's more valuable contributions to the reconstruction of experience and reason: the concept of 'living reason', in which the works of Hegel and the pragmatists conjoin. Finally, Neville's article ('John E. Smith and Metaphysics') shows how Smith's metaphysics is based largely on the theory of categories of Charles Peirce.

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John Earman and John D. Norton, eds.

The Cosmos of Science. Essays of Exploration.

Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press/Universitätsverlag Konstanz 1997.

Pp. ix + 581.

US\$75.00. ISBN 0-8229-3930-4.

'The Cosmos of Science' is a weighty volume containing 18 essays by illustrious authors. Their contributions, split into four sections, range from the history of science to hard-core philosophy of physics and include some mainstream philosophical topics such as induction, causation and action. Other than that, the content of the book is rather diverse and there is no common thread running through all the essays. This is not too surprising, however, in the eyes of the editors. They concede that the various subdisciplines of the history and philosophy of science have developed and diverged,

and that each of them is 'with its own community of scholars and scholarly standards' (ix). So, although the lack of a common theme could be seen as a weakness of the volume, it is the result of the goal to 'document just how advanced are the explorations of the best work of the subdisciplines' (ix). In this the editors succeed, and the contributions to 'The Cosmos of Science' are indeed of high quality. The authors are given space to explore issues in detail, with some essays as long as 50 pages. Consequently the essays are rich in information as well as sustaining depth of examination. They are carefully prepared and supplied with detailed endnotes and extensive bibliographies.

On a critical note, it needs to be said that the list of represented science-related subdisciplines cannot lay claim to comprehensiveness. There is a strong bias towards philosophy of physics, whereas other areas, such as the philosophy of biology and of chemistry, are entirely missing. The choice of subdisciplines represented is rather conventional, as is the treatment of many issues.

I shall now give an overview of the topics and authors, naturally biased by my own interest and subdisciplinary affiliation: In the history section, Bernard R. Goldstein contributes to a reevaluation of Kepler's achievements and opposes an anachronistic treatment of Kepler that disregards his intellectual commitments. Daniel Garber's essay on 17th-century science discusses the history of the notion of an experimental fact focusing on Descartes, as well as Bacon and the Royal Society. How Newton's argument for universal gravitation displays his methodological ideal of empirical success is examined by William Harper who claims that this ideal guides gravitational physics to this day. Don Howard explores Schopenhauer's influence on Einstein and the notion of 'spatiotemporal separability'.

The philosophy of physics section contains three papers on quantum mechanical problems: David Albert on superposition, Jeffrey Bub on modal, Bohmian interpretations as preferred solutions to the measurement problem and Linda Wessels on the 'preparation problem' (comparable to the measurement problem, though relating to the process of experimental set-up). Carlo Rovelli covers relativity by reviewing contemporary research on space and time. In addition, there is an essay, 'From Constructive to Predicative Mathematics', by Geoffrey Hellman, and John Winnie examines the effect of chaos theory on determinism and chance.

Disunity of science is the key conception of R.I.G. Hughes' paper. Disunities come in various kinds, and the most challenging is when the theoretical treatment of an issue involves the use of different and not even complementary principles. That this is no hindrance to success is nicely demonstrated by Hughes' example of Einstein's treatment of Brownian motion (in which assumptions were made about solutions, suspensions and gases without regard to their inconsistency with each other). According to Hughes, a 'structure of scientific theorizing' needs to take account of these 'contradictory' practices of physicists and therefore centre on models. Models, however, are not in a position to be concerned with realist claims because they are merely intermediaries between theory and reality, an aspect which the

semantic view of models fails to accommodate. This paper is interesting not because it makes new claims or provides new solutions, but because it highlights a set of important questions in the philosophy of science that are likely to be with us for some time.

The section on scientific methodology begins with a paper on the continuum of inductive methods by Sandy Zabell. Frederick Suppe, in turn, argues that scientific knowledge should be construed as noninductive. He favours a closer collaboration between philosophy of science and epistemology and supports his position of denying the importance of induction with a case study of J.J. Thomson's discovery of the electron. J. Michael Dunn undertakes to provide 'A Logical Framework for the Notion of *Natural Property*', and the relation between singular causation and laws of nature is explored by David Armstrong.

A wider perspective on doing philosophy is projected by David Hull. He cuts rather close to the bone of contemporary philosophical practice when he argues against the use of made-up examples in the philosophy of science. His reasoning is that such fictional examples lack a larger context from which an investigation could be supported. Moreover, there are no criteria that monitor the use of fictional examples.

As far as its topics are concerned, the final section on 'Action and Rationality', though no less interesting, appears a little disjunct from the others. Fred Dretske, in 'Action and Autonomy', argues for the independence of intentional behaviour from external determination and the freedom of our actions, despite the fact that the *reasons* for our actions may be determined. Finally, Peter Railton explores the possibility of laws in a belief-desire psychology, with particular attention given to Davidson's skepticism about a nomothetic psychology.

To conclude, it is tricky to envisage an intended readership for this book, precisely because the professional explorers of science have long separated and split their interests into subdisciplines and, in them, they have attained a high degree of specialisation. The individual essays may not attract the attention of a wider readership because they rarely stretch across disciplinary boundaries or address general issues. They are, however, likely to be of great interest to experts in particular subdisciplines.

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John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza
Responsibility and Control:
A Theory of Moral Responsibility.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. vii + 277.
US\$59.95. ISBN 0-521-48055-8.

Over the past decade, John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have produced a number of important books and articles on the problem of free will. *Responsibility and Control* provides the most developed statement of their position, and will be essential reading for anyone interested in the topic. The book begins with a statement of the problem from two directions. First, Fischer and Ravizza draw to the reader's attention the significance of ideas of freedom and responsibility to the most familiar and cherished forms of human interaction. As Peter Strawson famously argued, to think of someone as a person is to think of him as responsible and as a candidate for 'reactive attitudes' such as praise and blame. Second, they raise the spectre of determinism, the familiar idea that human actions involve human bodies which are ultimately part of the natural causal order. As a result, the initial condition of the world and the causal laws that make it up are sufficient to produce all human thought and action. Determinism makes ideas of praise and blame seem out of place. They illustrate the tension between the ideas by inviting the reader to imagine learning that the behaviour of a close friend is the result of a brain injury, or the intervention of (yes) a crazed neuroscientist. Since the friend would lack control over his actions, he would no longer be a candidate for the reactive attitudes. The rest of the book is devoted to showing that causal determinism does not, in fact, pose the same problems for the reactive attitudes as do more mundane interruptions of normal processes of reasoning.

F&R say that their purpose is to provide a philosophical explanation, rather than to compel assent, and, although their arguments are sometimes compelling, the project needs to be understood in light of this aim. They frequently employ hypothetical examples in order to show that various putative necessary conditions on responsibility are not necessary after all. But the real point of the book is not to display their (remarkable) prowess at clever example-mongering. It is instead to dispel a certain kind of worry about responsibility, by showing it to grow out of a set of suspect presuppositions. The style of examples may distract the reader from their point, which is to show what *is* at stake when we worry about control by illustrating the superficially similar things which are *not* at stake.

The key to Fischer and Ravizza's solution is the concept of guidance control. The basic idea is that responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise (which determinism would rule out), but only that one's actions stand in the right relation to one's reasons for performing them. They make this idea plausible by exploring various 'mad scientist' cases that have been prominent in recent literature on freewill, cases in which neurological tampering guarantees that an agent will follow a certain course of action by

setting up a sort of backup mechanism to override normal decision making processes should the agent fail to choose the right act on his own. Following out an idea first put forward by Harry Frankfurt, F&R contend that we have no difficulty thinking of the agent as responsible, provided that he has chosen the action, and the fallback mechanism never gets a chance to operate. From this they conclude that the key to responsibility is the relation between an agent's reasons and his actions.

An agent is said to have guidance control of his action 'insofar as the mechanism that actually issues in the action is the agent's own, reasons-responsive mechanism' (46). Defining 'the' mechanism in question admittedly faces problems of appropriate description; F&R concede that this is no simple matter, but argue that in particular cases, mechanisms are intuitively easy to identify. A mechanism is said to be 'reasons-responsive' if it recognizes reasons, translates those reasons into choices, and produces actions in light of those choices. An agent is morally responsible for his or her actions if she is capable of recognizing and acting on moral reasons as such. Still, a psychopath, who can recognize moral reasons but does not act on them, is still responsible, because he is capable of acting on other reasons, such as those provided by self-interest.

The same account is developed to explain responsibility for consequences and for omissions. There is much interesting and detailed argument in the discussion, but the general strategy is the same: responsibility for consequences does not require that the agent could have done otherwise. Instead, it requires only that her bodily motions be sensitive to her reasons, and the consequence in question either be foreseeable, or sensitive to those motions.

In sum, responsibility requires that an action be the result of the right sort of mental processes, and those processes must themselves not come about in the wrong way. So, for example, involuntary drunkenness is different from the voluntary variety, even if the alcohol's effects on reasoning are identical. More generally, an agent must come to take responsibility for his own capacity for guidance control, either through moral education or later reflection. F&R also make the stronger claim that responsibility must be 'taken'; in order for an agent to be responsible, she must view herself in a certain way, namely as responsive to reasons, by taking responsibility for her own mechanisms, or for ones sufficiently like them. Since the vast majority of people suppose themselves to be responsible, the condition is by and large easily satisfied. If metaphysical speculation leads some people to deny their reasons-responsiveness and so the appropriateness of the reactive attitudes, though, then they are not responsible after all. While F&R doubt that anyone actually fits this description, they defend the requirement that responsibility be taken with arguments that appear to establish that a responsible agent must understand the concept of responsibility. Something more is needed to get to the conclusion that those who understand but reject the concept of responsibility thereby escape its clutches. I am not sure how F&R think the connection is supposed to be made, but once made, it may prove difficult to cabin. If the person who denies responsibility in general thereby evades it,

why not the person who does so on a particular occasion, by claiming, for example, to have been in some way overwhelmed or incapacitated?

Talk about mechanisms sometimes makes F&R's position less clear than it might have been. Talk of mechanisms is most at home in cases of ways in which responsibility can be interfered with — head injuries, psychoactive drugs, and of course the ubiquitous brain surgeons. Given that these all are mechanical impediments to ordinary processes of reasoning, it is perhaps tempting to think of ordinary reasoning processes as themselves mechanical. Yet nothing in F&R's positive account seems to me to commit them on this question, and the book's Strawsonian themes suggest that their approach is at least compatible with thinking of reasons in a less mechanical way. Responsiveness to reasons is easiest to grasp in terms of the things that it is not — mechanical interference and the like.

Focussing on mechanisms sometimes makes it seem as though F&R suppose that everything for which a person might be responsible is the result of a process of reasoning. This is not their view. They allow that there may be more than one mechanism that produces a particular action, and that the taking of responsibility extends to mechanisms that are merely similar to the one for which responsibility is explicitly taken. They also recognize that agents can be responsible for things for which are done habitually or impulsively. Such acts can still be thought of as reason-responsive in those cases in which we are confident that other reasons would have influenced the behaviour in question. The person who habitually drives along a certain route can be responsible for doing so if she would have changed course had the road been closed. And, although they do not offer this example, the person who would have controlled his rage had a policeman been standing at his elbow is also responsible for his deed, even if neither his rage nor his deed was the product of a process of reasoning.

The focus on mechanisms also means that F&R offer no account of a familiar sort of responsibility, namely culpable ignorance. Those who are culpably ignorant might well have responded to appropriate reasons if they had thought of them, but their failure is in the failure to think of those very reasons. (Antony Duff once offered the example of a man who fails to attend his own wedding because it 'slipped his mind'.) Reactive attitudes are appropriate in this case, as in those of the driver who forgets to check before changing lanes, and the camper who forgets to put out his fire. In such cases, the failure to exercise guidance control is the problem. F&R's account has the resources to explain such cases, provided we keep mechanisms in their proper place. Each of these people might have responded differently had they thought of it, and all had the capacity to do so. Perhaps it is the capacity for reasons-responsiveness, rather than its operation as a 'mechanism' on any particular occasion, that really lies at the core of their account. Where the capacity is undermined, guidance control also is.

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Joseph Flanagan

The Quest for Self-Knowledge:

An Essay in Lonergan's Philosophy.

University of Toronto Press 1997. Pp. xii + 292.

\$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-0866-6);

\$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-7851-6).

People generally have two obstacles when trying to grasp the significance of Bernard Lonergan's work *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*: 1) his examples are complex and technical, and 2) the length, density, and approach of the volume make understanding it difficult. Joseph Flanagan's *The Quest for Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Lonergan's Philosophy* deals with these problems. He has written clearly and concisely about Lonergan's philosophy, he has drawn attention to some of the most significant points of Lonergan's *Insight*, and he has presented Lonergan's thought in its developed form with illustration that are not as technical.

Like Lonergan, Flanagan begins by discussing insights: what they are, how they function, and what they achieve. Both Lonergan and Flanagan also follow up this initial discussion with examples. However, Lonergan has a more organic approach. He begins with specific examples that lead to basic insights; these insights are then refined as Lonergan moves the reader from the examples to discussions of the whole fields of mathematics and physics. Flanagan starts with the discussion of these fields to present the ideas in their final form. Both are trying to get the reader to recognize the operation of human inquiry, but Flanagan's approach skips over some of Lonergan's technical examples and his slow development to introduce the thrust of Lonergan's chapters on mathematics and physics.

Flanagan's examples provide the background for introducing two major themes of Lonergan's thought: heuristic structures and schemes of recurrence. A heuristic structure is a mental construct that guides one's knowing of an unknown (95). It does not provide the content of the object in question but provides a tool that directs and orders one's inquiry. The heuristic structure for understanding human existence is the notion of schemes of recurrence.

A scheme of recurrence is a 'set of events related to one another in such a way that the last event in the sequence sets the conditions for the sequence of events to be repeated' (100). The repetition of the event depends upon the initiation of the cycle. Probabilities can help determine when or how often these conditions will be met. Thus, the emergent probability of some schemes can be anticipated through statistical laws that tell one how frequently certain situations occur. Schemes that depend on other schemes to emerge are called conditioned schemes (108). This emergence of higher schemes that subsume and build on lower schemes is called development. The breakdown of this integration is called declined (192).

These notions — schemes of recurrence, conditioned schemes, emergent probability, decline, and development — combine to form the heuristic

structure for understanding the order of the world and human existence (107-8). Flanagan takes these Lonerganian concepts and shows how they form a method for understanding the order of the universe (Metaphysics, Chapter 6), the order of human behavior (Ethics, Chapter 7), and the order of human desire (Religion, Chapter 8). While these chapters parallel chapters in *Insight*, Flanagan has drawn from outside sources and Lonergan's later works to present his thought as it developed beyond *Insight's* discussion.

Flanagan's presentation of these concepts differs from Lonergan's. *Insight* is written from a 'moving viewpoint'. Lonergan's thought develops and grows as the reader moves through the text. Flanagan's work proceeds from an end viewpoint. *The Quest for Self-Knowledge* presents the material after it has been fully developed, rather than while it is still 'in progress'. Flanagan moves material around, draws from Lonergan's later work, *Method in Theology*, and presents the final form of the concepts and ideas developed by Lonergan in order to get the reader to understand Lonergan's thought. Without the developmental approach, the text becomes shorter. Flanagan gets to the main idea more rapidly even though he has to sacrifice some of the background discussion of the ideas to do so.

Flanagan's book thus helps to make Lonergan's philosophy more accessible not by simplifying it or watering it down, but by changing the viewpoint from a moving one to a viewpoint that presents the final development of Lonergan's thought in a clear way. Thus, the work serves three purposes: 1) it is a great tool for those who want to know Lonergan's thought in more detail but do not have the leisure of reading *Insight*; 2) it provides a good, solid introduction to Lonergan's philosophy that helps one to grasp the major themes of *Insight*; and 3) it approaches the material differently (a new viewpoint, less technical examples, new descriptions) that might make *Insight* more accessible for those who are frustrated by Lonergan's approach. Although there are a few minor editorial errors that need to be cleaned up (e.g., p. 30 — 'whatis', p. 108 — a missing 'the', chapter 2 — a number for endnote 20 but no endnote), they do not undercut Flanagan's achievement. He has done a great service in explaining Lonergan's achievement and its implications.

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Jeffrey A. Gauthier

Hegel and Feminist Social Criticism.

Albany: SUNY Press 1997. Pp. 233.

US\$57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3363-3);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3364-1).

Attempting to support key feminist claims through the theories of a philosopher who consigned women to domesticity may seem incongruous; but in *Hegel and Feminist Social Criticism*, Jeffrey Gauthier shows that valuable insights emerge from the juxtaposition of these unlikely allies. Gauthier's project is twofold: he aims to develop Hegel's moral and political theory in a way useful to feminist thought, while at the same time seeking to illuminate Hegel's own writings. Hegel offers two resources to feminist theory: first, 'a historical account of the emergence of self-consciousness through social and political practices' (xiii) which is relevant to the development of women's consciousness as members of an oppressed class. Second, Hegel's 'historicized realism' could be used to solve a familiar feminist problem: while feminists criticise concepts of objectivity and universality, their criticism itself implicitly relies on such notions.

Explicitly taking Hegel's thought beyond (and sometimes against) Hegel's own intentions, Gauthier offers Hegelian readings of several issues which are of central concern to contemporary feminist theory: consent, ascription of blame to sexist agents, the role of the emotions in morality, and the clash between ideals of difference and of equality. There is a considerable range and depth of scholarship, and the comparisons drawn are instructive: to cite just one example, Gauthier argues that women's experience of fear under patriarchy is similar to the near-death experience which is necessary for the slave's eventual self-recognition (a move which de Beauvoir suggested, but failed to make). Gauthier's own interpretations of Hegel's notion of moral agency and critique of Kant's ethics represent a significant contribution to Hegel studies in their own right.

But while Gauthier shows why a Hegelian ethics might be useful to feminists, he does not provide convincing independent reasons for accepting crucial Hegelian contentions (e.g., the development of consciousness in the master-slave relationship, the compatibility of realism and historicism). This raises doubts as to whether Hegel really offers a solution for problems in feminist theory. As well, the first third of the book consists entirely in exposition of Hegel, necessary for readers unfamiliar with Hegel, but leaving me wishing for more developed accounts of feminist theory than the compressed descriptions we are given. Nevertheless, the project of reclaiming Hegel for feminists is an important one, and Gauthier provides new ways to think about both subjects in the attempt.

Hegel's writings have acquired a certain notoriety for being, at least stylistically, difficult and obscure; but philosophers writing on Hegel need not fall into this trap. Gauthier mercifully uses Hegelian terminology with an eye to rendering Hegel's system comprehensible to the uninitiated. He

has succeeded in writing a book which should be accessible and interesting to moral philosophers with scant prior knowledge of Hegel or feminist social criticism; but the book is not an introduction to either topic, and would prove difficult reading for undergraduates.

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Trudy Govier

*Socrates' Children: Thinking and
Knowing in the Western Tradition.*

Peterborough: Broadview Press 1997.

Pp. xi + 343.

Cdn\$19.95: US\$16.95. ISBN 1-55111-093-8.

If one were to say that Govier's book is a study that belongs in the history of philosophy, most readers would have a rough idea of its proper placement. Yet, because that category is so rough-hewn, little justice would be done to her work. We need to distinguish between the history of philosophy, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of an historical figure (who often happens to be a philosopher). Govier's work is largely an exposition and criticism of the philosophy of ten historical figures, nearly all of whom any knowledgeable person would call philosophers.

From the ancient period, she discusses Socrates, Plato and Aristotle; from the early modern period, Descartes; from the enlightenment period, Hume, Kant and Wollstonecraft; from the period of German idealist, Hegel; and from the contemporary period, Beauvoir and Wittgenstein. In the last chapter she provides an overview of four current philosophical trends especially noticeable since 1970: 'artificial intelligence projects, the Informal Logic — Critical Thinking movement, deconstruction, and feminist epistemology' (287).

The primary focus of the book, as indicated by its subtitle, concerns what each philosopher thought about thinking and knowing. But Govier's work is more than a study of meta-cognition and epistemology in historical perspective. Although the reader *will* learn what Wollstonecraft thought about the place of reason and emotion in making moral judgements, s/he will also learn what Wollstonecraft thought about immortality, human nature and the purpose of human life on earth. And while the reader will discover what Wittgenstein thought about the relationship between the use of language and thinking, s/he will also discover something about Logical Positivism and The

Vienna Circle, about the contrast between the early and late W, and even about how to read W.

A work of this scope is unlikely to satisfy everyone completely, even though the exposition is consistently good, with much of it being insightful and illuminating. In a few places the commentary is questionable.

Plato's use of the Myth of Gyges and the Myth of Er is more pointed in both cases than Govier suggests in Chapter 2 (42, 43). For instance, after acknowledging that the Myth of Er 'could' be interpreted as 'providing additional reasons for men and women to be just,' Govier says (puzzlingly) that Plato 'ends a lengthy dialogue with a myth — not, it seems, to make a point or introduce a thesis of his own, but rather to give the reader something more to think about' (43). But Plato's complete argument is that justice pays, not only in this life (IX 576B–588A), but also in the afterlife (X 608C–end). Plato knew that his argument would work only if it could be shown that there *is* an afterlife. In addition to a 'proof' for immortality, Plato offers Er's out-of-body experience with its mythical imagery as suggestive evidence of an afterlife.

In Chapter 9, the account of Sartre's theory of consciousness isn't quite right. Instead of saying that there are 'three kinds of consciousness' (220), it is more accurate to say that there are basically two kinds which can exist in either of two general modes. For Sartre, all consciousness is intentional or positional: it posits an object that is not itself. As well, every positional consciousness is non-positionally aware of itself; it has a non-positional consciousness accompanying it. Whether consciousness exists in an unreflective or reflective mode, it is always both positional and non-positional.

In the same chapter, Govier argues that Simone de Beauvoir was partly responsible for the misinterpretation that exists about the significance of her contribution to Sartre's work. 'Beauvoir contributed to this interpretation when she insisted that it was Sartre who was the philosopher, that she herself was a writer, and that Sartre and not she had created an original philosophical system' (224). Beauvoir was a precocious student of philosophy, a bold and original writer, who certainly deserves credit for her contributions to Sartre's work. However, both she and Sartre inveighed against living in 'bad faith' (self-deception). The reader is left to wonder how someone with Beauvoir's brilliant mind and strong convictions could either be blind to her own contributions to Sartre's work or misrepresent them deliberately.

In Chapter 10, Govier says that 'Wittgenstein was not a behaviorist: he did not argue that there is no inner experience, only that inner experience did not explain our meaningful use of language' (268). But neither radical behaviorism nor methodological behaviorism denies the existence of inner experience; each denies primarily that mental states and feelings are the causes of behavior. To hold that mental states and feelings are epiphenomena is not to hold that there is no inner experience.

These are small blemishes in a work that is commendable overall. Govier's book is distinguished by its clear explanations of difficult philosophical ideas, sometimes achieved with thoughtful diagrams, and by its sensitive under-

standing of the times in which these ideas were developed. As well, the chapters of the book speak to one another. In Chapter 11, for example, Govier explains how 'Derrida moves in a different direction from Wittgenstein, arguing that no context is so "normal" that it sets a foundation for interpretation' (298). This student-friendly book will serve well as a primary text in the so-called 'history of philosophy' course whose purpose is a wide and selective survey, or as a secondary text where the aim of the course is narrowly defined.

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John Kekes

Against Liberalism.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1997.

Pp. xi + 244.

US\$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-3361-4);

US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8400-6).

John Kekes argues against liberalism on the ground that its basic aims and values are hopelessly inconsistent. The core value of liberalism, according to Kekes, is autonomy. Liberals view individual autonomy as a necessary condition for choosing and living a good life. They also embrace and support a range of other basic social values (including pluralism, freedom, human rights, equality, and distributive justice), but only because these are conducive to autonomy. Autonomy provides the 'ultimate reason' (1) for liberal values and political programs. The aim of liberalism is to establish policies and institutions that reflect and secure liberal social values, thus promoting autonomy and making good lives possible.

Kekes contends that forces of evil will inevitably frustrate liberal moral and political goals. Liberalism's fundamental defect, in his view, is that its positive aim of increasing individual autonomy to make good lives possible is inconsistent with the negative aim of preventing evils that make good lives impossible. He argues that, rather than producing more good (and more good lives), increased autonomy will actually produce more evil (and fewer good lives).

Beneath this argument lurks a familiar controversy about human nature. Kekes claims that liberal political morality is based on a foolish and unfounded faith 'that people are naturally good and that they do evil [only] because of corrupting external influences' (38). Liberals believe 'that if people

were allowed to make choices ... without having their evaluation and understanding clouded by poverty, discrimination, crime, and other social ills; if they were not brutalized, indoctrinated, or enraged by injustice; if they had the time and opportunity to think about their lives and actions, then they would do what is good and would not do what is evil' (38). Their basic faith in human goodness leads liberals to conclude that increasing autonomy will help to prevent evil, since autonomous individuals are better able to overcome the social pressures and problems that might otherwise push them to do wrong.

Kekes blasts this liberal faith as 'a sentimental falsification that substitutes illusion for reality' (40). Liberals, he says, need to face the fact that evil is prevalent in all human societies. He argues as follows: If evil is prevalent, then evildoers are already numerous. If autonomy is increased, evildoers will have greater scope for wickedness. And if evildoers have greater opportunity, they will do more evil. Thus, increasing autonomy will also significantly increase evil.

Kekes presents this argument as conclusive proof that the liberal faith in human nature is misplaced, that liberal values and policies lack justification, and that the positive and negative aims of liberalism are in conflict (since increased autonomy will tend to encourage evil-doing instead of goodness). However, he fails to establish that evil is prevalent, or that increasing autonomy will necessarily increase evil.

Kekes appears to think the prevalence of evil is obvious, and expresses confidence that: '[a] moment of reflection on the morality and politics of our age [will bring] to mind mass murder, unjust wars, vicious dictatorships, concentration camps, large-scale preventable starvation and disease, oppression, rampant crime, systematic torture, and an easily expandable list of further evils' (25). It is unclear whether Kekes intends only to assert that such evils are widespread in the world, or to make the stronger claim that they outweigh countervailing human goods. He offers no evidence to show that horrendous evils are commonplace, let alone that they prevail in liberal societies.

Kekes also asserts the prevalence of what he calls 'wickedness', defined in terms of 'habitual patterns of evil-causing action' (157). But even if wickedness is widespread, it does not follow that it will increase as autonomy increases. This inference requires the additional premise that, other things being equal, most people will choose evil over good whenever they have the chance. Kekes cites no evidence to establish that vice generally prevails over virtue in human conduct. Instead, he concedes that 'if the facts warrant any inference, it is that human beings are morally ambivalent' (40), and that 'the vices of selfishness, greed, malevolence, envy, aggression, prejudice, cruelty, suspicion and laziness motivate people just as much as the virtues' (202).

Ambivalence about human nature isn't sufficient to prove liberalism fatally inconsistent. It does discredit the naive view that people are essentially good and always do good (but liberals don't seriously believe this). It doesn't defeat the more modest liberal claim that people free from bias,

injustice, violence and poverty are better positioned to choose virtue over vice. If promoting autonomy (along with other basic social goods) makes it possible for even a few current evildoers to become better, social progress results, and the positive aims of liberalism are arguably realized. Liberalism is inconsistent in promoting autonomy only if habitual evildoers won't change their ways no matter how much their living conditions improve, or if increased autonomy motivates a significant number of good people to go bad just because they can get away with it. But these scenarios assume a quite pessimistic view of human nature — and if the facts of human behavior establish only that we are morally ambivalent beings, then cynicism is just as unfounded as the liberal faith in human goodness.

Kekes' other arguments against liberalism are also cynical. He attacks the basic liberal principle that all persons deserve equal concern and respect on the grounds that people are morally unequal (as the prevalence of evil shows), and that human worth is proportional to moral merit. He challenges liberal theories of justice for similar reasons, claiming that they require redistribution of scarce resources to those who are worst off, regardless of moral merit or desert. Kekes seems convinced that the 'immoral majority' (42) don't deserve better lives, and that liberal policies will inevitably result in redistribution from the good to the wicked. (He doesn't consider the possibility that evil might be prevalent even in upper socio-economic classes, and never questions whether the well-off deserve what they have.) His reasoning sometimes degenerates into curmudgeonly rage against liberal optimism. Readers hopeful about positive prospects for human society will likely not find such pessimism especially appealing or persuasive. But they may wish to withhold judgment until after the sequel to this book, where Kekes promises to develop 'whatever is worth saving from liberalism' into a constructive theory of conservative pluralism (212).

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Oliver Leaman

Moses Maimonides. Revised edition.

Concord, MA: Paul and Company (for Curzon Press) 1998. Pp. xvi + 190.

\$29.95. ISBN 0-7007-0676-3.

Despite the publisher's claims, this book is more a reissue than it is a revised edition. First published in 1990 (London: Routledge) in a series on Arabic Thought and Culture, it is now included in the Curzon Jewish Philosophy Series issued by Curzon Press. Aside from a three-page introduction to 'the second edition' (xiii), the text of the volume, including references, bibliography, index, and pagination, is exactly that of the volume published earlier and reviewed previously (*Canadian Philosophical Reviews* 11 [1991]: 115-17). Nevertheless, if the book was a useful introduction a decade ago, it is still so today.

The interest of the book now as then lies in the lucid exposition and historical context that Leaman brings to a discussion of selected issues in Maimonides' thought. Leaman situates the issues within the Islamic philosophical tradition of twelfth-century Spain that shaped both the questions and answers of Maimonides. These include, for instance, questions about the meaningfulness of our language of God, the nature of prophetic inspiration, the extent of divine knowledge, the nature and limits of human knowledge, creation of the world, the afterlife, the basis of ethics, and the relationship between philosophy and theology. Although the context of these issues for Maimonides is undeniably religious, their treatment in his thought is admittedly philosophical.

Throughout Leaman not only highlights the way Maimonides came to understand specific problems but emphasises the argumentation Maimonides offers in support of his views. He thus brings out a philosophical focus that purports to show the significance of Maimonides 'not just as a religious philosopher or thinker, but as one of the major philosophers' (xv). In this intent Leaman succeeds well.

However, the latest entry in both the References and Select Bibliography dates from 1988. Much interesting work has been produced since on epistemological, ethical, and metaphysical themes in Maimonides, not to mention his influence on both medieval and modern thinkers. At least an updated bibliography could have been included, if not a reconsideration of views or a recognition of developments in light of more current Maimonidean scholarship.

Unfortunately, the promise of a 'new edition', given on the back cover but not mentioned on the front nor on the inside title page, has gone unfulfilled.

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Nicholas Malebranche

The Search after Truth.

Trans. Paul Olscamp and Thomas Lennon.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.

Pp. 821.

US\$79.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-58004-8);

US\$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-58995-9).

Nicholas Malebranche

Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion.

Ed. Nicholas Jolley, trans. David Scott.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.

Pp. 329.

US\$64.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-57402-1);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-57435-8).

In 1748 David Hume could comment that the fame of Cicero was flourishing while that of Aristotle was utterly decayed. 'But,' he went on, 'the glory of Malebranche is confined to his own nation, and his own age' (*Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* [ed. Nidditch], 7). Whatever the fate of the first two judgments, the third continued to hold well into the second half of the twentieth century. There had been English translations of Malebranche's greatest work, *The Search after Truth*, that of Thomas Taylor (1694, second edition 1700) and that probably by Richard Sault (who signed the dedication, 1694-5), but none since then. These were hard to find. When I was a graduate student, Harry Bracken had made available in mimeographed form from the University of Minnesota some sections of Taylor's translation. But even that was not readily available to the philosophical community. This scarcity of translations was made worse by the fact that both the translations were hopelessly out of date. Thus, where Malebranche refers to *l'Église*, Taylor refers to the 'Gospel' while Sault refers to the 'mysteries of religion.' Until 1980 it is safe to say that the general attitude of the philosophical community towards Malebranche was that he had developed his occasionalist views as a solution, taken to be not so very good, to the mind-body problem in Descartes' philosophy, and that his claim that we 'see all things in God' was an odd and extreme form of Christianized Platonism. These views reflected the fact that very few had actually read Malebranche.

There were, of course, a few studies. A.A. Luce had drawn attention to Berkeley's indebtedness to Malebranche (*Berkeley and Malebranche*, 1934). (As part of the more recent revival of Malebranche studies, these and other connections with the broader sweep of British philosophy have been carefully explored by Charles McCracken in his *Malebranche and British Philosophy* [1983]). There were a few studies devoted exclusively to Malebranche. There was W.C. Swabey's study (*The Philosophy of Malebranche*, 1921), and one by Ralph W. Church (*A Study in the Philosophy of Malebranche*, 1931). Beatrice Rome gave us her account of Malebranche (*The Philosophy of Malebranche*,

1963), and more recently Dasie Radner presented her thoughtful account (*Malebranche: A Study of a Cartesian system*, 1978). Richard Watson devoted considerable space to him in his study of Cartesian philosophy (*The Downfall of Cartesianism*, 1966), and there were a number of important essays such as that by Gustav Bergmann ('Some Remarks on the Philosophy of Malebranche' [*Review of Metaphysics* 10 (1956) 207-226]). But compared to the literature on, say, Descartes or Spinoza, that on Malebranche remained scarce.

All this has changed. Indeed, the fact that we now have available for undergraduate courses a set of *Selections* (Hackett, 1992) from *The Search after Truth*, *Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion*, and other works, is a measure of the change. The selections from *The Search after Truth* are from the translation of Paul Olscamp and Thomas Lennon (Ohio State University Press, 1980). It is safe to say that it was this translation that brought about the change in Malebranche studies that we have seen in the English-speaking world. The translation made the Oratorian accessible to a much wider audience. More importantly, however, there was a long commentary by Lennon which was appended to this translation. What Lennon did in this commentary was show that Malebranche was after all not a somewhat addled minor follower of Descartes, that he fully deserved the reputation that he had in his own age and continued to have in France of being not a mediocre Cartesian but a first rate philosopher in his own right. Lennon showed how Malebranche was a serious ontologist and epistemologist, who developed by means of subtle arguments positions that continue to be worthy of study. It is safe to say that the revival of interest in Malebranche is almost wholly due to this translation and Lennon's commentary.

This translation of *The Search after Truth* together with Lennon's translations of the seventeen *Elucidations to the Search after Truth* has now been re-issued by the Cambridge University Press. It lacks, alas, the Lennon commentary that was in the first edition. This is a real loss. But the present edition has a new Introduction, again by Lennon. This Introduction provides a brief summary of the main themes in *The Search after Truth*. These include, of course, the doctrine that we see all things in God and the occasionalism. Lennon makes clear that both these doctrines have their roots in Descartes, the former being a development of the doctrine of ideas that attempts to shed the remnants of Aristotelian dross, while the latter makes explicit the Cartesian idea that the real cause of anything that happens in the world and in the soul is due to the activity of the Deity. Lennon also brings out how the search after truth implies the avoidance of error (as the full title of the book indicates: *The Search after Truth, wherein Are Treated the Nature of Man's Mind and the Use He Must Make of It to Avoid Error in the Sciences*). As Descartes had already made clear, there is a sense in which we attain the truth simply by the avoidance of error. The Malebranchian doctrine of method is rooted in Malebranche's doctrine of the will and its freedom. The problem requires that Malebranche treat extensively the ways in which a

person can misuse his or her will, under misleading proddings from the senses or the imagination, or from the passions.

Lennon goes on to discuss briefly the reception by critics of *The Search after Truth*, including Simon Foucher, Antoine Arnauld, and Leibniz, as well as several lesser figures. He ends by sketching the influence of Malebranche, more immediately on French thought, and more remotely on Berkeley and Hume.

This Introduction will prove useful to any student.

As part of the new interest in Malebranche we have in the same series a new edition of his *Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion*, edited by Nicholas Jolley and translated by David Scott. (There were previous translations by Morris Ginsberg, 1923, and Willis Doney, 1980.) One should also note as part of this developing interest two other new translations. These are the *Treatise on Ethics*, translated by Craig Walton (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1993), and the *Treatise on Nature and Grace*, translated by Patrick Riley (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992).

In *The Search after Truth*, the doctrine that we see all things in God does not appear until we are well into the work (in Book III). In contrast, Malebranche places this doctrine front and centre in his *Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion*. The crucial Biblical text for this work is Acts 17:28: 'For in him [the Lord] we live, and move, and have our being ...'. Unlike Descartes or Aquinas, Malebranche shared the Augustinian tradition of not supposing there is a sharp line between philosophy and theology. This tradition has its roots in Plato. Knowledge comes not from sensible experience but is a result of the illumination of the intelligible world by the Good itself as the sun illumines the sensible world. For Augustine and Malebranche, of course, the Good itself is God, but the point is the same: knowledge comes from within the soul itself. But where Plato talked of 'reminiscence,' Augustine spoke of 'divine illumination.' God provides the conditions for humans to grasp the eternal truths of which God is the foundation. The need for divine illumination, the doctrine that we see all things in God, is, like Malebranche's occasionalism, a doctrine that emphasizes the dependence of humans on God, a dependence extending to that capacity — rationality — which defines humankind. These Augustinian features of Malebranche's thought are well, if briefly, presented in the Introduction to this new translation. There are also interesting discussions of Malebranche's claim, against Descartes, that the existence of a material world is indemonstrable; and of his theodicy.

Malebranche followed his *Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion* with a set of three *Dialogues on Death*. Jolley and Scott choose to omit these from their translation on grounds that they contain little that is of philosophical interest. But death is, of course, a central topic of philosophy, from the Socrates of the *Phaedo* through Pascal and Spinoza to Heidegger. Malebranche's treatment is very much a part of the Augustinian tradition, with the fear of death the result of sin and something that can be removed by the saving grace of the sacrificed Christ. The contrasts to Socrates or Pascal or

Spinoza, not to say Lucretius, are very interesting, and I, for one, therefore regret that these have not been included in the translation. Nonetheless, this is a very useful work to have.

Both volumes appear in the series, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, and are handsomely done. Included in each is a substantial list for 'further reading'.

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Ralph McInerny

Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Revised edition.

Toronto, ON: Scholarly Book Services;

Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press 1997. Pp. xi + 129.

Cdn\$23.95: US\$14.95. ISBN 0-8132-0897-1.

McInerny's objective is a brief statement of Aquinas' moral philosophy, which he believes true, though incomplete. He contrasts Aquinas' approach to moral philosophy with modern approaches: while Descartes' Methodic Doubt places knowledge beyond the reach of non-philosophers, Aquinas' moral theory presupposes (naturally known) truths common to all. Whereas the former approach often leads to philosophical obscurantism, Aquinas' provides a criterion for evaluating a moral theory. By this criterion, McInerny's book should be consistent with what we already know.

The first chapter argues that the moral sphere is coextensive with human action — action that is freely directed to an end or good. Real goods are distinguished from apparent by asking whether an act contributes to one's well-being. This leads McInerny to a consideration of the views of Aristotle and Aquinas on the notion of the ultimate end of human action. For Aquinas, while agents act to realize some aspect of the good and, ultimately, happiness, the desire of the good can be satisfied by God alone. Aristotle's conception of terrestrial happiness is thus incomplete, though it grasps certain fundamental truths. The third chapter attempts to show that natural law is 'compatible and complementary' (36) with this analysis of ends, since its general precepts direct agents to the ultimate end, and are its constituent means. In place of a critical discussion of Grisez and Finnis, the revised edition considers the positions of Moore and Stevenson. McInerny holds that the problem of inferring value from fact does not arise for Aquinas.

The fourth chapter outlines the several movements of the will in a complete act and the fifth explains that for Aquinas an action must be good in every respect in order to be evaluated as good, while any deficiency renders it evil. This corrects Abelard's view — still influential today — that intention alone matters in morals. In the sixth chapter, Aquinas' theory of virtue shows the deficiency in treating actions as isolated events. Past actions stamp us with a moral character, disposing us to act in certain ways. Virtues are thus central to moral life, for they help ensure that future acts are performed well. Prudence is of special importance because it governs the application of general principles to particular circumstances — which for McNerny is the real problem of moral life, not universalizability (as with Kant). Thus moral philosophy is incomplete without a doctrine of the virtues, and of itself can be of no concrete guidance. In the remaining chapters McNerny elucidates Aquinas' distinction between conscience (a purely cognitive judgment) and prudence, and discusses the relationship between philosophy and theology.

McNerny provides an insightful and compelling account of Aquinas' moral philosophy that controverts key modern positions. One can be impressed with this accomplishment and still question his criterion for evaluating the book, because of Aquinas' appeal to religious faith. Aquinas' moral theory is informed by the ideas that God is the ultimate end materially considered, and that it is possible to attain such an end — yet these are not among the things we know. This gives his account a very different trajectory than Aristotle's, even though they both accept eudaemonism. Aquinas recognizes a good desired more than happiness, and so escapes the charge, valid against Aristotle, of egocentrism in morals.

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Jay Newman

Religion and Technology:

A Study in the Philosophy of Culture.

Westport, CT: Praeger 1997. Pp. 195.

US\$55.00. ISBN 0-275-95865-5.

'Given that religion and technology are comparably situated at the very heart of any civilization ... we can reasonably assume that their evolving relations — or at least the changing relations between particular religious phenomena (beliefs, attitudes, values, practices, institutions ...) and particular technologies — have always had and will continue to have a powerful influence on social and personal development. We can assume further that at any given time ... deeper insight into the prevailing state of those relations, and into

the processes and circumstances by which the prevailing state of those relations has come about can be of substantial value' (2-3).

This short, wide ranging, contribution to the debates about religion, culture and technology makes many interesting points and brings together many people's contributions to these fields. The opening three chapters of the book are largely summaries of philosophical thinking about technology, taking a somewhat unusual angle focusing mainly on 'antitechnology'. The last two chapters delve into the interdependence of religion, technology and culture.

Religious antitechnology, '... a distinctively religious form of criticism that has been directed against technology itself ... because of technology's alleged role in undermining the religious world views, religious practices, and overall tone of spirituality needed to sustain a civilized society' (4-5) is the focus of the first chapter. Here the interchange between theology and philosophy of technology is explored.

An endeavour is made to arrive at a conceptual clarification of the idea of technology while simultaneously demonstrating the difficulties of such an endeavour (39). Chapter 2 discusses the contributions made by philosophers to this field. Newman later reminds us that: 'No comparable clarification has been provided for the idea of religion; discussion of this notoriously complex idea would likely be superficial in a study of this size and scope and would probably be more of a distraction than an aid to understanding' (143).

'Understanding technology better helps us to understand better the cultural relations obtaining between religion and technology' (73). Products such as the book — developed from the germinal technologies of the spoken and written word combined with later technologies of printing and automation — are clearly technological developments while at the same time being of great benefit to the development and dissemination of religious ideas. Through developments such as these the content of a technology takes on whole new dimensions of cultural influence. Newman argues that part of that which identifies us as the kind of human beings we have become is our development and use of technology (75-80).

The exploration of Judaeo-Christian perspectives on technology (chapter 4) leads to reflections on the uses of technology to further religious ideals (e.g., freedom, happiness and peace). This chapter endeavours to provide a survey of the ways in which technology has affected religion and culture, and the ways in which religious and cultural values have been embedded into technology. More than this, Newman reflects on ways in which technology can be construed, in keeping with the spirit of religious faith, as a kind of religious endeavour itself (112).

Culture involves among its basic features things that have been created and promoted by humans in the expectation that these will be adopted and used by others (155) e.g., art, religious rites, tools, etc. Cultural products are normally intended as ameliorative (156). Technology thus, it is argued in chapter 5, is a basic form of expression of culture. Technology and culture are not interchangeable terms, but are closely intertwined. 'It is ... a specific

allegation with respect to the causal influence of biblical faith in encouraging technology and a protechnological attitude that has probably elicited more controversy in recent years than any other academic thesis concerning the relations of religion and technology. ... that mainstream Christianity, having promoted a world view that led to certain technological thrust in the West, is largely responsible for the environmental crisis now facing humanity' (134). Such questions have come to dominate discussions of technology and religion and set the boundaries for questions that can be raised and permissible responses.

Newman is clearly familiar with the field and incorporates a wide range of material into this project. However, I found three main difficulties with the book. First, often when one expects Newman to clinch an argument and make a strong point there seems to be a change of direction or broadening of the discussion. Related to this is a tendency to use key terms somewhat loosely. Second, while the discussion appears to address the broad concerns of technology and religion, almost all the focus is on the Judaeo-Christian tradition. It would perhaps have been best simply to limit the discussion to this tradition. Third, I personally find material difficult to read when in the endeavour to provide gender balance an author vacillates between the pronouns 'he' and 'she'. The book was not smooth to read, and frequently negative in tone, but the last two chapters were worth wading through the rest for some of the interesting insights provided.

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Friedrich Nietzsche

Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, eds.

Trans. R.J. Hollingdale.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.

Pp. xlii + 247.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-59050-7);

US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-59963-6).

R.J. Hollingdale's translation of Nietzsche's *Daybreak* was first published by Cambridge in 1982 as part of their *Texts in German Philosophy* series, which has now been absorbed by the new series *Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy*. This revised edition of *Daybreak* leaves Hollingdale's translation untouched, but editors Clark and Leiter have replaced Michael Tanner's introduction with their own, and they have enriched the edition with end-notes, a 'Chronology' of Nietzsche's life and works, a section on 'Further

Reading', and an improved index. These changes follow the directives of the series, the objective of which is 'to expand the range, variety and quality of texts in the history of philosophy which are available in English' (*frontispiece*).

The volumes in the series are 'designed for student use at undergraduate and postgraduate level' (*frontispiece*), and for that purpose, the new textual apparatus in *Daybreak* is an improvement on the earlier edition. The endnotes by Saul Laureles, et al., are especially helpful, including fairly detailed biographical entries along with translations and interpretations of Nietzsche's customary smattering of Latin, French, and Italian phrases. The endnotes also explain any conceivably unfamiliar expressions, philosophical or otherwise — everything from 'dialectical principle' (n. 3) to 'angekok' (n. 14). The two-page 'Chronology' consists mainly of the publication dates of Nietzsche's major works, but since it concludes with Nietzsche's death in 1900, the publication dates of *Will to Power* (1901 and 1904) and *Ecce Homo* (1908) are excluded — although *Ecce Homo* is erroneously listed as published in 1888, the year in which it was in fact written. The index has had only an entry or two added or dropped; otherwise, the main improvement there is the substitution of section numbers for page numbers.

The section on 'Further Reading' is surprisingly limited. In fact, over a third of the suggested readings are authored by the editors themselves. According to Clark and Leiter, 'there is a voluminous secondary literature on Nietzsche, but nothing that can be recommended on *Daybreak* itself and only a little of philosophical interest on the main themes broached in *Daybreak*' (xxxviii). Granted, *Daybreak* has yet to be expressly confronted in the literature, and the secondary literature can tend toward being more figurative than strictly scholarly and historical. But there are philosophically defensible reasons for this approach to Nietzsche, and one certainly need not conclude that there is 'little of philosophical interest' published on *Daybreak*'s themes — especially when making recommendations to students. Perhaps these restrictions stem from the quarrel between 'analytics' and 'continentals', or from an unduly constrained idea of what would count as philosophically interesting. But wouldn't it be more pedagogically sound to recommend readings with a vocabulary of enrichment rather than exclusion?

Nevertheless, Clark and Leiter have an intelligent plan for introducing *Daybreak*. They wish first, to clarify the development of Nietzsche's views on morality, and then to discuss the intellectual influences underlying those views. However, their theses are overly ambitious for what winds up being a fairly short introduction. Specifically, they undertake two projects. First, according to the back cover, they want to 'argue for a dramatic change in Nietzsche's views from *Human*, *All Too Human* to *Daybreak*, and show how this change ... presages the main themes of Nietzsche's later and better-known works such as *On the Genealogy of Morality*.' Second, they want to situate *Daybreak* within the context of three important influences: in the 'empiricism' and 'realism' of the Sophists, the Presocratics, and Thucydides; in the moral philosophies of Kant and Schopenhauer; and in the German

Materialist movement circa the 1850s. They accomplish just a bit of each project.

Clark's and Leiter's most pronounced argument says Nietzsche's morality in *Daybreak* is a 'naturalized Kantian interpretation of the morality of custom' (xxxiv): 'That Nietzsche uses almost exactly the same terms [as Kant] to describe what he takes to be the earliest form of moral motivation provides overwhelming evidence that he is taking Kant's conception of morality and, as it were, *naturalizing* it, so that he can tell a story about the origin of morality *without* invoking a 'noumenal' world ...' (xxx). This is not quite right. Have they missed the point that Nietzsche uses the language of other philosophers as a rhetorical device to *critique* their philosophies? In thinking through Nietzsche's critiques of morality, one must always be careful to distinguish between a 'moral theory' as a theory about how we decide what actions are right and wrong, and a 'critical theory of morality' as either a theory about the origins of what is or has been called 'moral', or as a critique of ethical theories. Clark and Leiter risk losing this distinction, and in any event, they don't address it. Writing as if Nietzsche's critiques of morality also serve as a moral theory obscures this important distinction, and could make for a good deal of confusion for the book's intended audience.

All else aside, this new edition of *Daybreak* is a worthwhile revamping of the textual apparatus for Hollingdale's translation.

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John C. O'Neal

*The Authority of Experience: Sensationist
Theory in the French Enlightenment.*

University Park: Pennsylvania State

University Press 1996. Pp. viii + 284.

US\$45.00. ISBN 0-27101-515-2.

Introducing his sensationist tract, the *Essai sur l'origine des connoissances humaines*, Condillac complains that philosophers often declare themselves in favor of a principle without ever truly recognizing what it entails. Their concerns lie less with establishing the truth of their maxim than in the effect its adoption may have on their reputation. Consequently, the true import of many philosophical *idées reçues* is still not understood. Such, Condillac suggests, has been the case with the Aristotelian proclamation: '*Nihil est in*

intellectu quid non prius fuerit in sensu'. While the refrain has been repeated by philosophers through the ages, not until Locke, and Condillac, does the sensationist principle finally come of age.

O'Neal's study of its influence in the French Enlightenment represents a welcome attempt to introduce English language readers to this important but often ignored theme in European intellectual history. He argues for the return of sensationism to its rightful place in the history of French thought, as the principal philosophy of the era. Through the attempt both to legitimate and delimit human knowledge by tracing its lineage to sensation, sensationism places the body at center-stage of contemporary epistemology, replacing the dominance of abstract thought as expressed in the Cartesian *je pense*, with its own affirmation of an original carnal *je sens* (3). This appeal to embodiment represents a radical expression of the Enlightenment's self-conscious rejection of the half-grasped catchphrases of a tradition, and the return to 'the authority of experience'.

Sensationism's departure from Cartesianism begins by emphasizing the indissoluble *unity* of mind and body as against the metaphysical primacy of the 'real' distinction. 'Man is', in Bonnet's words, 'a mixed being' (63), and sensationism is a 'mixed' doctrine; lying as it does on the cusp between the traditional adherence to the 17th century rationalist and Christian conception of the immaterial soul and the new materialism. O'Neal begins his study by tracing the background to the evolving materialism through the philosophies of Condillac, Bonnet and Helvétius. The abiding image that emerges is that of the statue-man: a methodological device deployed by Condillac (in the *Traité des sensations*) and by Bonnet to illustrate the development of the faculties from sensation alone. Their imagined statue begins as a *tabula rasa*. As its senses are given life, it escapes its primary egocentric state, evolving an awareness of its own and other bodies as it is propelled into action by its natural tendency to avoid pain and seek to prolong pleasure.

The statue, however, does not merely explicate the true meaning of the sensationist maxim, for it becomes a figure for the intellectual awakening of the age of Enlightenment. Moreover, O'Neal reads Condillac's *Traité*, as 'an indirect aesthetic treatise' (109) and develops its implications for the early French novel. Primarily through an illuminating study of Graffigny's *Lettres d'une Péruvienne*, O'Neal produces a convincing case for accepting sensationist epistemology and theory of mind as the expression of a deep-seated set of 18th century preoccupations recognizable in the character and plot of the period's literature. Graffigny's heroine, like Condillac's statue, develops from a state of narcissism and naiveté and — under the spurs of pleasure and pain — progresses towards intellectual enlightenment. In place of the statue's 'sensitivity', 'feminine sensibility' becomes the guiding principle of her development from confused alien to sophisticated critic of French mores.

O'Neal turns from Graffigny, in an analysis of *Les Liaisons dangereuses* and *Philosophie dans le boudoir*, to pursue the theme of the perversion of the sensationist aesthetic. The process of education and moral elevation becomes, for the characters of Laclos and Sade, one of depravation. What had

been a journey toward spiritual enlightenment is inverted towards base physiology. Pleasure and pain reduce to ends in themselves, and characters stagnate within their own original narcissism and hedonism. This process mirrors sensationist epistemology's degeneration into materialism, as the soul's sensitivity is increasingly identified with physiological activity. Sade's and Laclos's materialism threatens to condemn as unrealistic the aspirations of the Enlightenment, and create a determinist and pessimistic view of human progress.

Having traced this trajectory, O'Neal, perhaps understandably, is reticent about embracing its outcome. Retaining a certain nostalgia for the 'refreshing' humanism of sensationism, he expresses his apprehension in the face of a degraded legacy which today threatens to eclipse the possibility of meaningful discussion concerning the nature of God, consciousness and the soul (223). O'Neal appears more comfortable with the *Idéologues's* critique of sensationism, which retains an immaterial soul, only to invest it with an innate active principle truer to man's concrete existence. Whatever the advantages of such modifications, they surely too can serve only to undermine the purity of the sensationist adherence to Aristotle's maxim. For the sensationists, this critique, far from 'devastating' (249), must misconstrue their radical identification of knowledge with sensation, and to find sympathy with it is simply to underscore the fact that the significance of the sensationist maxim has once again been forgotten. Perhaps then, the dearth of contemporary engagement with sensationism is an inevitable consequence of a legacy which is deaf to the insistence that 'nothing is in the mind that was not first in the senses'.

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Philip L. Peterson

Fact, Proposition, Event.

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997.

Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy

Series Vol. 66. Pp. xi + 415.

US\$150.00. ISBN 0-7923-4568-1.

Besides such entities as substances, universals, and propositions, philosophers have come to posit other entities such as moments and states of affairs. States of affairs and moments made their debut in the early twentieth century in the work of such philosophers as Edmund Husserl, Adolph

Reinach, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Bertrand Russell, to mention only a few. Roughly, neither propositions nor states of affairs have spatial location, while substance, or things, and moments do — though moments have spatial location only through their participants. Thus, for example, a picnic has spatial location only by dint of the things, or substances, involved in it. States of affairs and propositions do not have temporal parts either. Substances too do not have temporal parts, though substances, unlike propositions and states of affairs, endure through time. Moments, however, do have temporal parts. Yet, unlike substances which are such that, if one part is present, all of its disjoint parts are present, moments are such that, if one part is present, all of its other disjoint parts are not present.

The latter third of this century has witnessed a renewed interest in moments, now most commonly called events, and states of affairs, commonly called facts. The impetus for this interest has come from two sources: the work of Donald Davidson, the rudiments of whose hypothesis has, in the last decade, enjoyed great, but uncritical, popularity among linguists; and the work of Zeno Vendler. Vendler, inspired by the philosophical work of John L. Austin and the linguistic work of Robert Lees, elaborated, in a number of essays, collected in *Philosophy in Linguistics* and *Res Cogitans*, an ontology, which included not only substances and propositions but also events (moments) and facts (states of affairs).

Vendler's genius has been, among other things, to track how these distinctions surface in the grammar of English. A main English clause typically comprises a verb and a number of 'arguments'. These arguments may be noun phrases or clauses. Consider, for example, the sentence '*That Bill left early surprised his wife*'. The verb of the main clause has two arguments, a subject clause '*that Bill left early*' and an object noun phrase '*his wife*'. What Vendler sought to disentangle is the many-many relation between the kinds of syntactic units which serve as arguments, on the one hand, and the entities such as propositions, states of affairs, moments, and things, on the other, as modulated by various kinds of verbs. One characteristic which sets Vendler's work apart from comparable work by other philosophers is his linguistic work is sound, devoid of the amateurishness which marks or mars the work of many otherwise good philosophers.

The thirteen essays by Philip Peterson, collected together in the book under review, carries on this line of investigation, initiated by Vendler, living up, I believe, to the high linguistic standards set by him. While the philosophical topics covered by these essays are diverse, they are unified by the relevance of the distinctions between things (substances), states of affairs (facts), moments (events), and propositions.

The essays are divided into five groups. The first group, Part I, contains two essays. Ironically, the first essay, entitled 'How to Infer Belief from Knowledge', takes issue with an essay by Vendler in which Vendler had argued that belief cannot be deduced from knowledge. The second essay, 'Propositions and the Philosophy of Language', sets out the views on the

nature of propositions, as found in recent Anglo-American philosophy of language.

The four essays comprising Part II are devoted to revamping and elaborating the distinctions, as they were first set out by Vendler. The article, entitled 'On Representing Event Reference', sets out to improve upon the empirical work done by Vendler on the distinctions, insofar as they appear in English. In the next article, 'Event', Peterson shows how these distinctions appear in Arabic, French, German, Hebrew, Hindi, Kannada (a Dravidian language of South India), and Marathi (an Indo-European language of Maharashtra, the Indian State which includes Bombay). Other new ground is broken by Peterson in the sixth article, entitled 'Anaphoric Reference to Facts, Propositions, and Events'. There, Peterson shows how elements, such as relative pronouns and the third person personal singular pronoun 'it', acquire values corresponding to moments, states of affairs, and propositions.

The two essays comprising Part III develop the view that an event has parts. This idea proves particularly useful in addressing the problem first raised by Elizabeth Anscombe regarding the relation between a main verb in a clause and a gerund introduced by the preposition 'by', as in 'Dan shot the gun by pulling its trigger'. This problem is the subject both of the ninth essay, 'The Grimm Events of Causation' and part of the tenth essay, 'Four Grammatical Hypothesis on Actions, Causes, and "Causes"'. Also discussed in this last mentioned essay is a hypothesis, first advocated by such linguists as Leonard Talmy and subsequently adopted by many others, that clauses expressing agency all have, as part of their grammar, at some level of grammatical analysis, causation. The problem of the relation between causation and agency is further investigated in the eleventh essay, 'Causation, Agency, and Natural Actions'.

Two other issues addressed in this tenth essay pertain to English adverbs. In the first instance, Peterson argues that English adverbs, like English adjectives and English relative clauses, may be either restrictive or appositive. The other issue is one on which linguists and philosophers who have endorsed Davidson's treatment of adverbs in his now famous 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences', have nevertheless remained silent. This is the problem, raised by such philosophers as Terence Parsons, Romane Clark, and Richard Montague, that Davidson's theory of adverbial modification cannot account for a variety of forms of adverbial modification, including iterated adverbial modification.

Another issue pertaining to adverbial modification is taken up in the first essay of Part V, called 'Facts, Events and Semantic Emphasis in Causal Statements'. Here, Peterson is concerned with the logical form of adverbial modification (e.g., *at dusk*) within gerunds (e.g., *Socrates's drinking hemlock at dusk*) serving as subjects to the verb 'to cause' (e.g., *Socrates's drinking hemlock at dusk caused his death.*) The second essay, entitled 'Which Universals are Natural Laws?', sets out to show how his theory of complex events can rescue David Armstrong from what some see as a serious flaw

in his theory of natural laws as relations between universals ('What is a Law of Nature?').

Peterson's book deserves the attention of those philosophers and linguists for whom the term 'event', 'proposition', or 'fact' is a term of art. His essays are original and insightful, contributing to the very important line of research initiated by Zeno Vendler.

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Christopher Phelps

Young Sidney Hook.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1997.

Pp. xii + 257.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-8014-3328-2.

Subtitled *Marxist and Pragmatist*, the book takes as its central histori-cotheoretical premise the idea that, contrary to the views of numerous Marxists and pragmatists alike, these two major currents of thought coexisted quite easily in the early years of the career of John Dewey's prize pupil. It leads us briefly through Hook's childhood and student days, showing the genesis of a philosopher-activist whose avowed commitment to, and intellectually astute defenses of, Marxian socialist ideals, while occasionally jeopardizing his professional status, on the whole propelled him into the position of a respected, albeit highly polemical, theorist and 'New York intellectual' at a young age. The bulk of the book deals with the 1930s, which were also more or less Hook's own thirties (he was born in 1902), documenting its subject's central position in the evolution and agony of the American Left during those years of sectarian disputes, of stunned reactions to the Moscow Trials and the Stalin-Hitler Pact, of the political vindication of Trotsky by Dewey's tribunal, and of the nascence of virulent anti-Communism among some former Leftists, notably Hook himself. It shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Hook remained committed to some form of revolutionary Marxian socialism long after he had abandoned efforts to form common cause with the Communists — until, roughly, the summer of 1938, when he composed his turning-point article, 'Reflections on the Russian Revolution'.

The author is an historian, and documentation is his forte. He has conducted admirably extensive research into archives, corresponded with and/or interviewed a number of those still alive who were Hook's associates

during the period in question, and read widely in other literature connected with his topic. This includes philosophical literature, especially Hook's own works. For example, this book provides a valuable service in calling readers' attentions to the high quality of insight and informed interpretation that characterizes Hook's *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx* (1933), a work that has been relatively little read for decades for reasons having much to do, no doubt, with the heavily anti-Marxist image of himself that its author (despite his continuing assertion, almost universally disbelieved by friends and critics alike, that he was still a socialist) unceasingly projected in his later years. On the other hand, philosophers should not expect extensive original analysis on the part of Phelps himself, whose knowledge of philosophical writings about Marx and Marxism is spotty. For instance, he evinces only a very superficial understanding of Hegel (134), and he is bound to occasion surprise when he says (138) that 'most studies' of Marx's evolution — a book by David McLellan is cited as 'the chief exception' — do not take account, as Hook did, of the importance of the Young Hegelians!

But one should not be excessively critical of a book for falling short of perfection in an area in which it does not aspire to it. Phelps, while not a professional philosopher, certainly shows a keen sense for conceptual critique. This is clear especially when, toward the end of the book, he describes what can only be called Hook's intellectual 'decline' as the latter's obsession with 'totalitarianism' (a blanket term which apparently came increasingly to serve as a slogan-like substitute for careful thinking) came to dominate his life. Phelps details instances of Hook's blatant self-contradictions, sloppy failures to make distinctions upon which he would have insisted in his earlier years, and general retreat to namecalling (e.g., 'Stalinazi', 'humorless fanatic', 'sickly failure of nerve') and to a moralism that led him to encourage purges of Communists from university positions for specious reasons, reasons that the aging Dewey himself considered to be 'dangerous policy' (229). It was a trajectory that Phelps quite rightly characterizes as 'tragic' — a trajectory of which a younger generation of philosophers caught glimpses in Hook's fulminations, at American Philosophical Association meetings in the late 1960s, against student protesters and all those opposing escalation of the Vietnam conflict.

The phenomenon of ideological 'conversion' is a fascinating one which deserves closer examination, and the history of Sidney Hook is an excellent case study. As to the obvious 'Why' question concerning *this* case of (apparent) radical conversion, Phelps ultimately provides no satisfactory answer, though he shows that and how Hook's own later explanations of it were greatly oversimplified and, by way of demonstrating that Hook's turn was not historically necessitated, names contemporaries whose sympathies had once been roughly similar to his but who later moved in different directions. Phelps has perhaps done as well as he could with the material at his disposal, but the matter still remains puzzling. At any rate, he has managed to shed new light not only on the young Hook himself and the intellectual atmosphere of the period discussed, but also, incidentally and inferentially, on the mildly

chauvinistic neo-pragmatist revival that is currently being spearheaded by the author of an astonishing recent book-length essay, *Achieving Our Country*, by the son, Richard, of one of Hook's associates of the time whom Phelps mentions often, James Rorty. (For Canadian readers, the country being here referred to as 'ours' is the one immediately to your south.)

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**Philip L. Quinn and
Charles Taliaferro, eds.**
A Companion to Philosophy of Religion.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1997.
Pp. xvi + 639.
US\$84.95. ISBN 0-631-19153-4.

The editors of this most recent addition to Blackwell's 'Companion' series have commissioned 78 new essays, the collection intended as 'a guide to philosophy of religion for the non-specialist' (1). Novel, perhaps, in a philosophical guide, are the first three sections (23 essays) which survey the major religious traditions and some of the philosophical/theological issues peculiar thereto. Other sections remain more traditional in their subject matter: theistic language, our conception of God, theism's justification and rationality, and theism's relation to both modern science and values. An exception to this purely philosophical inquiry are the 10 essays surrounding particular theological concerns of the Christian faith (e.g., the trinity, original sin, and incarnation, among others). I shall have more to say about these exceptional features than the more traditional contents.

This untypically broad approach is both a virtue and a vice. It brings some non-standard theological issues to light, some of which are treated here in a first-rate philosophical manner. Its vices are two-fold: it seems to have thinned this volume by the addition of topics of little interest outside their congregations, and, with respect to some contributions, it has lowered the level of philosophical debate which surrounds these issues. A further difficulty 'supervening' on these is that of its intended audience. Some of the contributed essays are models of scholarly entrances to their subjects — presupposing little philosophical or theological sophistication, yet providing careful, clear, and significant insights. Less successful were those entries which seemed to prefer esoteric minutia, appreciated, I am sure, but only by initiates.

The problem of audience is apparent in the opening group of essays, 'Philosophical Issues in the Religions of the World'. Ninian Smart's contribu-

tion on Hinduism is purely descriptive and non-critical, despite a promissory note, 'The Hindu tradition is important for the philosophy of religion from any number of angles ...' (7). Paul Griffiths, too, promises 'philosophical problems ... together with the kinds of answers' Buddhism provides; a Buddhist ontology, he supposes, offers a 'middle way between extremes ... [of] eternalism and nihilism' (16), where eternalism is limned as the view that everything exists just as it seems, eternally and without change, nihilism, that nothing at all exists. It is hard for this western philosopher to see what connection either of these two extremes (or the middle path supposedly sought by Buddhists) have to our ontological concerns; I can only wonder what the non-specialist is meant to see. Nor are we told here. We *are* told the internal role this type of claim plays in, say, achieving nirvana, and other central Buddhist themes. Griffiths does critically assess various 'construals' of such doctrines from among the various schools of Buddhism, including doctrines regarding epistemology, philosophy of language, and persons. But, again, this provides neither a philosophical, nor Buddhistic, primer. Hansen's attempt to interpret Taoism, an attempt to see how much of what Taoists say can be understood as being about traditional western concerns (transcendence, the afterlife, evil, etc.), is marred by the use of unexplained superscripts, surely demanding an edifying footnote by the editors.

A treat for the reader (but perhaps not the editors) is Kwasi Wiredu's contribution on African religions, a model essay for this volume in both style and wit. Wiredu argues that European colonizers, who believed that Africans were not capable of religious thought, and African scholars, who insisted on the contrary that Africans had an idea of God *before* Europeans, were both operating under the mistaken assumption 'that having a religion is necessarily either a moral or intellectual credit' (34). Throughout his essay, Wiredu is forced to explain why most western religious constructions do not fit African 'religious behaviour', why the behaviours have been misconstrued to do so, and what such behaviours might actually signify from the point of view of the Africans. This is, indeed, a philosophical service. And despite Wiredu's disavowal, at every turn, that African concepts are at all parallel to traditional Western themes, his mention of each western term is followed by a cross-reference (by the editors) to a western article in the text which — if Wiredu is right — will be of no help whatsoever.

Nanji and Esmail's survey of Islamic thinkers (Al-farabi, Avicenna, Averroes, among others) is noteworthy both for its appropriateness for this volume, and because it seems that between the lines one can sense both a longing for these intellectual giants of the Muslim world and a correlative disappointment at the current state of Islamic theology (and politics).

Goodman's essay on Judaism is not concerned with the philosophy of Judaism, but with Jewish philosophy; not with 'talmudic logic', but with respect for past Jewish thinkers as points of departure; a conversation. This is not natural theology as we know it, and shifts the ground significantly, allowing Goodman to spend the remainder of his essay in an uncritical survey of the history of Jewish thinkers. Wainwright's essay on Christianity, too, is

largely descriptive, but it is not without insightful suggestions (e.g., the distinction between problems that are endemic to religious views generally versus those that are typically Christian, in particular the Christian response to the free will problem [58], as well as noting the tension between Christians and philosophers generally, i.e., the threat to faith posed by too much philosophical thinking [60]).

Parts II and III, again novel in a philosophical introduction, some 16 essays, are markedly uneven in their approaches, in part a reflection of this tension between philosophy and theology. Part II, 'Philosophical Theology and Philosophy of Religion in Western History' surveys the contribution to philosophical theology from ancient, medieval, early modern, and modern thinkers. Flannery's scholarly recounting of these themes from Parmenides, Socrates/Plato, and Aristotle provides a citation for every sentence, a distraction to the reader, unnecessary at this level of inquiry and surely an editorial lapse. In contrast, MacDonald's essay on medieval Christianity is a model for this volume, explaining both the influence of Christianity on, and its hostility to, the beginnings of modern philosophy. This philosophy/theology tension is reflected, too, in Rudavsky's essay on the Jewish contribution to medieval thinking, which outlines Maimonides' and Gersonides' attempts to reconcile scripture with the Greek philosophical tradition of Plato, Aristotle, et al. The last two essays in Part II, by Pereboom and Westphal are both sound, but necessarily thin. Pereboom's account of the early moderns surveys Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley, Leibniz, Hume and Kant in 7 pages; Westphal attempts to cover the Enlightenment 'deist project', from its pre-Kantian inception by Lord Herbert of Cherbury and other English deists (Hume, too), to Voltaire and Rousseau in France, and Lessing and Kant in Germany, to its post-Kantian consequences in Schleiermacher, Hegel, Nietzsche and Marx, and all of this in less than 7 pages. These essays, too, illustrate the unevenness of this volume, and the editors' perhaps too light-handed approach.

The 'deist project' brings to our attention some of the central concerns of the Enlightenment, concerns which motivate us still, on several fronts. Elements of this project, Westphal tells us, lie in 'three powerful, interlocking Enlightenment motifs: an epistemic concern for the autonomy of ... reason, a political concern for religious tolerance, and an anti-clericalism designed to deny to the church both epistemic and political authority' (112). The presupposition of this project, that '... non-violent religion could only rest on the universality of reason and not on the particularity of any special revelation ...' (112) seems pressingly relevant today. And yet the reader will struggle to find this important thread from among the 77 others woven here.

Part III, 'Some Currents in 20th-Century Philosophy of Religion' suffers many of the same defects. We get both esoterica, and unevenness. This Part includes, among others, a philosophically uncritical survey of Pierce, James, and Dewey's pragmatism, defending 'a species of justified hope more than ... propositional belief' (13); a peculiar school of thought called 'personalism' (located in America largely at Boston University) which, with its commitment

to Christian theism, belongs more properly in Part X: 'Philosophical reflection on Christian Faith'; an essay on the process theology of Whitehead (and others) marred by the abuse (again, by the editors), of the 'see article#' notation (used here 28 times). All topics are given equal weight, all approaches (philosophical/critical, purely expository, narrow, broad) are equally tolerated. This section is salvaged (again) by Merold Westphal's thoughtful essay on Phenomenology and Existentialism, and a superb piece by McNerny on Thomism. Westphal neatly sums the contributions of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche: 'Kierkegaard demands that we take the reality of God more seriously than Christendom does, while Nietzsche demands that we take the unreality of God more seriously than secular modernity does' (144). McNerny strikes exactly the right tone for this volume, providing us with insightful portions of history, biography and philosophy, all via suitably energetic writing, in particular on the modern Thomistic revivalists Gilson and Maritain.

The last four essays in this part obscure whatever philosophical thread the editors intended this section to follow. Wolterstorff, in his essay on 'The Reform Tradition', makes clear that Calvin and his followers rejected natural theology and its attendant 'evidentialism'; Calvin's modern day exponent is Plantinga, but he is the last we see of the *philosophy* of religion. The essays on the Anglican, Jewish, and Orthodox (Eastern Christian) traditions are more nearly pure theology, and a history (and bibliography) of past and present exponents. Very little, if any, of their philosophical arguments are displayed there.

As noted, much of the remainder of the text is traditional in scope: the theistic conception of God; justification of theistic beliefs (where the standard arguments for God's existence are adumbrated); challenges to the rationality of theism; and theism's relationship to both modern science and modern value theory. There is also a section on problems peculiar to Christian theism, as well as a short section entitled 'New Directions in Philosophy of Religion' (somehow distinct, in the minds of the editors, from the 20th-Century 'currents' of Part III). However traditional, it remains unsatisfying, and unsatisfying in ways that may well escape the intended 'non-specialist' reader. The overwhelming tone of these essays (with a few noteworthy exceptions: Kai Nielsen, Anthony Flew) is theological rather than philosophical; many of the positions defended are done so without due regard to either their tenuousness, or the vast critical burden they must carry. For instance, the novice will come away from this volume with the idea that the problem of evil is both marginal and solvable, and that the ontological argument is a going concern.

There are 14 volumes in this series to date. Blackwell produced the first 8 approximately one per year. The present volume and one other were produced last year. Six more are on tap for 1998. I cannot help but think that a less hurried editorial schedule may prove helpful.

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Jeffrey Reiman

Critical Moral Liberalism: Theory and Practice.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield

Publishers, Inc. 1997. Pp. vii + 277.

US\$62.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8313-3);

US\$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8314-1).

Critical moral liberalism is an ethical theory which has at its core a moral principle that Reiman calls the ideal of individual sovereignty, according to which 'all human beings are entitled to the maximum ability to live their lives according to their own judgments, subject to the conditions necessary to realize this for everyone' (1). CML is *liberal* in that it insists on the right of all human beings to freedom to live as they see fit, to the extent that this is compatible with the same freedom for all. It is *moral* because it claims to identify a universal good (self-governance) and a universal moral right (the right of all human beings to the exercise of their capacity for self-governance). It is *critical* because it recognizes that our understanding of what threatens freedom, and of what rights are needed to protect freedom, changes over history and that a particular version of liberalism may function ideologically by allowing unjust coercion to operate unrecognized as such.

Reiman presents his account of CML, and four arguments for its moral content, in the introduction to his book. The following chapters were written over a period of more than twenty years, and all but two were originally published elsewhere. They are sorted under two headings: 'theory' (Chapters 1-5) and 'practice' (Chapters 6-11), though Reiman says that 'the division is only one of emphasis. All of the chapters deal with issues of theory and practice' (x).

In Chapter 1, Reiman argues that the self-conscious rationalism of Western philosophy makes it inherently self-critical and ultimately liberal. Feminist and multiculturalist critiques of the Western intellectual tradition are steps *within* that tradition, not beyond it, and presuppose that tradition's own commitment to liberal ideals (in particular, the ideal of individual sovereignty) and to rational self-criticism. In a similar vein, Reiman contends in Chapter 2 that postmodernists presuppose a universal moral standard in their very critique of moral universalism; that standard is precisely the ideal of individual sovereignty, and it can be defended, Reiman argues, 'subject to the postmodern requirements of argumentation' (25).

In Chapter 3, Reiman develops a liberal theory of the moral virtues as those dispositions that promote the sovereignty of practical reason. In Chapter 4, he argues that CML needs a standard of economic justice capable of determining when the terms under which people labour for one another are fair, and that Rawls's difference principle, interpreted as a principle distributing labour rather than money or goods, supplies the requisite standard.

In Chapter 5, Reiman shows how the doctrine of the social contract functions as a critical tool for testing for the presence of oppression even in social institutions we take for granted; the chapter is argued in the context

of a defense of a liberal theory of constitutional interpretation, but it suggests (or so Reiman claims in his introduction) 'how the social contract idea can make good on the critical nature of critical moral liberalism' (26).

In the 'practice' chapters, Reiman's topics are privacy, abortion, euthanasia, police discretion, and capital punishment. Privacy, he claims in Chapter 6, is necessary for human beings to become *selves* — individuals who regard their existence as their own. In Chapter 7, Reiman develops a general analysis of the right to privacy and examines the moral risks to privacy posed by the new information technology. He goes on to argue that a pregnant woman has a right to abortion at any stage of gestation (Chapter 8), and that individuals have a 'liberal right' to active and passive euthanasia (Chapter 9). In Chapter 10, he develops a liberal view of the nature of law and public force, and concludes that the discretionary police enforcement of serious laws is unjustified in a free society. Finally, in Chapter 11 he presents an account of retributivism that he thinks gives us 'a conception of crime and punishment appropriate to a liberal moral theory' (240), and argues that, while the death penalty is just punishment for some murders, its abolition is 'part of the civilizing mission of modern states' (27).

The essays that make up the chapters of this book are uniformly interesting, lucidly written, and well argued. In his introduction Reiman says that they are writings in which his ethical theory was 'aborning and abuilding', not writings that flow from that theory. Fine. But it is puzzling and regrettable that he did not rewrite at least the 'practice' chapters (in which CML is not mentioned) so as to relate the argumentation of those chapters to the theory's core principle — a principle which, after all, he presents as 'the standard to use in choosing actions and policies' (2). This would have allowed him both to illustrate the principle's application to a variety of moral issues and to make a case for it by arguing that it yields independently defensible, or intuitively plausible, results.

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Kelly Rogers, ed.

*Self-Interest: An Anthology of
Philosophical Perspectives.*

New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. 293.

Cdn\$105.00: US\$75.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-91251-2);

Cdn\$34.99: US\$24.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-91252-0).

This book fills a previously unoccupied niche: it is an anthology of philosophical writings on self-interest, but does not focus primarily on the twentieth century. It is an historical collection, divided into five sections including classical, medieval, early modern, nineteenth century, and twentieth century writings, most of them exploring the relationship between self-interest and benevolence, some of them discussing the nature of the good for an individual. The largest section is the one containing writings from the early modern period. There is a brief and very good introduction to the views of the philosophers at the beginning of each section. Within each section, each author is given a *very* brief introduction.

This text is a refreshing antidote to one current emphasis on the theory of games and rational choice. Sometimes one gets the impression that everyone already understands what self-interest is, and the only question is either (a) how to maximize one's own, or (b) how to reconcile it with the interests of others. It is an excellent idea to consider the nature self-interest and self-love in and of themselves. Rogers's collection does this by including writings from authors such as James and Dewey (discussing what it is to love oneself and have interests), and Joseph Butler (discussing the relationship between self-love and happiness).

There is a wide range of writings, and they are fairly comprehensive, given the size of the book. The only exception is the twentieth century, which contains only excerpts from Dewey, Gauthier, and Ayn Rand. The collection lacks any writings from evolutionary psychologists who debate the evolutionary basis of egoism or altruism. (While the book is an anthology of *philosophical* perspectives, it does include, e.g., William James and Adam Smith, so there is interdisciplinary interest.) This omission is too bad, because some evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Matt Ridley) claim a genetic basis of limited altruism, providing a response to Prisoner's Dilemma-type problems that goes beyond the important 1961 essay by David Gauthier included in the collection. More disappointing is the omission of any writing regarding the 'ethic of care'. Gilligan e.g. could easily be excerpted to present the concept of 'self-in-relation-to-others', which would nicely complement the other writings on this theme. Since Gilligan writes that this characteristically female conception of the self obviates the need (for those who hold the conception) to reconcile morality with self-interest, it would be appropriate to include an excerpt from *In A Different Voice*. In fact, the only female writer in this

volume is Ayn Rand, who, if there is a distinctly female perspective on self-interest, could not be said to represent it.

The selections have been carefully edited, keeping the book compact. However, the virtue of this book is also its vice. Rogers has selected parts of various texts so as to represent the views of an author without forcing the reader to work through longer pieces in their entirety. (In the sub-section on Plato, for example, there are excerpts from not only the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*, but also the *Laws* — totaling only ten pages.) In a way, this saves the reader unnecessary work; but it is demanding on the reader in another sense: no context is given in which to understand, e.g., what prompted Thrasymachus to say what he did, or why the conversation is occurring at all. This might be confusing for undergraduates, who would probably be better served by a single longer excerpt from the *Republic*, for example. Still, with effort on the part of the instructor, this obstacle need not be insurmountable, as most sub-sections contain fairly continuous excerpts from the works of only one author.

There are a couple of minor disadvantages. One is the unfortunate format of the notes. All of the citations for the original sources are placed together at the end of the book in serial order, and are not distinguished by either section or sub-section, making it very frustrating to check the source of the excerpt. Since, e.g., Lucretius and Cicero are both excerpted under 'Epicureanism', without any headings indicating a change in author, many students are almost certain to finish with the impression that they had only read the writings of Epicurus.

The other disadvantage is the proofreading. Routledge has been producing books with less than careful copyediting. The problem has not been entirely resolved. In the introduction to the twentieth century, there is an entire paragraph that is repeated with slight changes in wording only in the final sentence; on the very next page, the phrase 'taking ethically seriously' appears. The book is not full of such errors, but even these two are too many. It sets a bad example for students, and detracts from an otherwise good textbook.

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Jerald Wallulis

The New Insecurity.

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The insecurity referred to in the title is that experienced by people whose life plans have been shaped by socioeconomic patterns which no longer exist, if they ever did. Specifically, the author is concerned with the often unrealized expectations of a permanent, stable job and a permanent, stable marriage. Once upon a time, apparently, men sought and received good jobs, at which they worked until retirement, and sought and married women with whom they formed stable marriages, which they enjoyed until death did them part. Now, thanks to a variety of business trends, including corporate mobility and downsizing, people may have to relocate or seek new employment or both. Thanks to a variety of social trends, including a divorce-friendly culture and narcissistic individualism, people may find it difficult to depend on a life-long marriage. Jerald Wallulis provides an analysis of the stable expectations of the past and the security they engendered, and contrasts them with the unsettled present condition, and its ensuing insecurity. Wallulis further argues that the security experienced by past generations was due not only to the availability of stable work and family situations, but also to the development of the 'social insurance state'. Government programs were an important component of the security of those times. Using the techniques and vocabulary of Michel Foucault, the book analyzes the structure of various corporate, social, and government institutions of the past and of the present in order to derive a clearer understanding of the ways in which there used to be a greater degree of security than there is today.

Was there ever a time when expectations were so settled? One supposes the middle ages, or the Victorian period, to have consisted of stable social institutions. The period from 1947 to 1973, which is the focus of Wallulis' analysis, though, hardly seems to have been as stable as its myth or image would have it. Surely people suffered from insecurity during that period also. But let us concede that people were secure, at least, about their work and marriage situations during that time. Were the social structures of those times which facilitated those expectations truly worth being nostalgic about? Women were for the most part expected to stay at home and tend to the home and children. The fact that they now participate in the nation's economic life unsettles the expectations once present, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. Blacks and other racial minorities were explicitly excluded from the corporate community, yet their inclusion, surely a good thing, may well unsettle expectations. Other business trends which result in relocation and downsizing also have the desirable result of increasing the availability of consumer goods and services, which contributes to social stability. It seems like a pointless nostalgia to romanticize the stable expectations produced by

unjust or inefficient social and economic structures. Wallulis argues that it is difficult to plan one's life without stable expectations. That is surely true, but the fact that a variety of social changes have occurred during this century does not imply that we can have no expectations. Perhaps we need to have different expectations, ones guided not by a romanticized nostalgia, but by an open-minded vision of a dynamic future.

In any case, Wallulis recognizes that we cannot return to the social structures of the old days, so he comes back to the contribution to past security of government programs, and makes the case that some sort of guaranteed income or income supplement would go a long way towards enabling secure expectations and facilitating life planning. This is the weakest section of the book, as he glosses over the economic unfeasibility of such schemes, and dismisses moral concerns about them without considering actual arguments by their critics. The earlier chapters, where Wallulis provides an analysis of much contemporary angst, are much better, although somewhat obscured by the reliance on Foucault.

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