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Mailed in September/October 1997.

Elspeth Attwooll and **David Goldberg, eds.**
Criminal Justice. Archive for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Beiheft 63.
Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 1995.
Pp. 158.
68DM. ISBN 3-515-06687-X.

This work is the proceedings of the twentieth annual conference of the United Kingdom Association for Legal and Social Philosophy which was held in Glasgow, March 24-26, 1994. It contains essays on criminal justice which the editors identify as the topic of the conference. As one might expect, a conference with a topic of such breadth would attract participants with wide-ranging interests and views in criminal justice. And indeed we find inquiries about such varied issues as what a fair trial is, how to limit judicial discretion, and what the alternatives are for settling disputes. But there is another dimension to the volume. The editors tell us that this general topic was chosen for the conference because of the recent work of a U.K. Royal Commission on criminal justice, The Runciman Commission. Some of the papers take up specific recommendations of the commission as does the lead article, 'Reform of the Criminal Justice System: The Report of the Runciman Royal Commission,' by commission member, Michael Zander.

Now there is nothing wrong with holding a conference on criminal justice, announcing what motivated the choice of the topic, and publishing the proceedings of the conference. But in considering the work as a whole, one cannot help but feel the tension between discussions about Runciman and those which make no reference to Runciman. And this tension is particularly palpable with a lead article which brings Runciman to the fore. Those articles which do not mention Runciman seem out of the mainstream. Although they may have relevance for Runciman, the reader's urge to have this specific issue addressed is strong. This is where it seems the editors could have taken steps to create a more unified project. For example, it is hard to believe that those papers silent on Runciman did not, during the discussion of them, have their claims brought to bear directly on the reforms which Runciman discusses, or that the editors could have registered their own thoughts on how all of the papers in the volume are part of a single narrative.

The formation of the Runciman Commission was a response to an apparent miscarriage of justice in cases involving IRA terrorism. After lengthy imprisonment, the Birmingham Six were freed; their convictions had been overturned. Michael Zander brings out in the Austin Lecture that a review of every aspect of the criminal justice system was within the scope of the commission's charge. He summarizes the findings, stating that of the commission's 114 recommendations, 90 proposed ways of preventing conviction and retention of innocent people with the remaining ones having to do with improving the odds that the guilty are convicted.

The most striking thing about Runciman is its recommendation to eliminate the right to a trial by jury. Zander apologizes for this finding of the

Commission which relied on a statistic that 83% of the people who opt for a jury trial end up pleading guilty. There is an interesting and cryptic reference to a misinterpretation by the Commission of this statistic, but we are given no details. In the light of this recommendation, the most interesting contributions are those bearing on this issue of eliminating the right. Lamentably, these studies are scattered throughout the collection.

The fifth article in the collection addresses head-on the brouhaha about jury trial that Runciman stirred up. In 'The Value of Jury Trial' John Jackson points to the outcry in England and Wales over Runciman's recommendation as evidence of the symbolic force of the jury trial. His thesis is that the jury trial is a necessary component, along with the adversary approach, of a fair trial in the adversary tradition. The usual separation of these components has obscured the significance of the jury's presence; it is one of introducing fairness in that the decision makers, who have no say in the presentation of proofs and evidence, have the final say in the matter.

So the value of the jury trial is that it insures a fair trial. This article seems so obviously to be the one to follow the Austin Lecture's summary of Runciman's findings and its controversial one about eliminating the right to a trial by jury. Instead we find that lecture followed by T.R.S. Allen's 'The Concept of a Fair Trial' which makes neither a mention of Runciman nor of a jury trial. Allen's insight is that fairness is a function of the judge's integrity.

Other articles which do address Runciman directly claim that Runciman fails to invoke such significant categories in criminal law as mercy and forgiveness and that Runciman's conception of revising the criminal law needs to be supplemented with alternatives for settling disputes.

The remaining selections are silent on Runciman and argue for these theses: (1) Dialogue and communication are values connected with processes of social interaction like the criminal process; as values which are part of natural justice, they provide a non-instrumental foundation for the criminal process. (2) General conceptions of justice, truth, integrity, quality, and fair play should guide the judgments of legal practitioners, their professional lives being adventures in applied ethics. (3) Rules of evidence and not judicial discretion should be the primary guide for deciding what evidence to admit in a criminal trial. (4) An abolition of the right to silence does not serve to promote truth and justice. Again, about any of these discussions we would want a word, if only in the editors' introduction, about what Runciman said, what discussion ensued, or what the editors could say to bridge the presentation of essays about Runciman and these other essays. What, for example, did Runciman propose which might have contributed to furthering the values of dialogue and communication? Does Runciman affirm, and if so how, the importance of such guiding ideals as justice and truth?

I have quite evidently reorganized the material in the work to illustrate and underline both its dual nature and how Runciman might serve as an important organizing principle. A word should be said about how the editors chose to organize the material. They created four categories including the Austin lecture, 'which sets the scene for later contributions,' 'articles which

consider the criminal justice system generally in a philosophical context,' 'papers dealing with various specific issues,' and 'papers that question the assumptions underlying both the Runciman Report and the criminal justice system as a whole.'

I have suggested that a different organization of the material, together with further commentary by the editors, would do much to promote a continuous flow of ideas. In fairness to the editors, it should be noted that it is not obvious that such continuity is a virtue of a conference proceedings. And, even if it is, it may be that the editors had little if any input in the selection of essays to be published or very limited opportunities for factoring anything from the presentations which would unify or logically order them; under such circumstances, it seems they should not be accountable for creating this continuity. Still, it does seem that, under the specific circumstances we have before us, the editors could have done a little more to piece the contributions together.

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John Bacon
Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of Being.
Volume 15, Aristotelian Society Series.
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1995. Pp. xiv + 159.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-631-19629-3.

This book is about trope theory, a metaphysical proposal at least as old as John Cook Wilson — and some say Plato. There have been several terms for tropes, including 'particular qualities', 'abstract particulars', 'ingredients', and 'property instances' (my preference, which Bacon uses in the title but hardly anywhere else). Bacon ably develops and defends his trope theory in nine chapters ranging over relations, complex universals, states of affairs, situations, events, modality, time, belief, causality, and even duty and goodness. I will discuss some basic themes in Bacon's book, but I will do so in a very unBaconian manner by ignoring all of his elegant notations and much of his use of recent research in mathematical logic.

Bertrand Russell, in Chapter VIII of *Human Knowledge* (1948), asked 'what is meant by an "instance"?' 'Is each instance [of C, some shade of a color] an unanalyzable particular of which C is a quality? Or is each instance a complex of qualities of which C is one?' (293). Bacon has an answer for Russell

which is similar to Russell's own answer in *Human Knowledge* (a book Bacon includes in his bibliography but nowhere else cites). Socrates instantiates or exemplifies wisdom because Socrates' wisdom — a *trope* of wisdom W_S, an *instance* of it 'ingredient in' Socrates (as Sellars would say, though Bacon strangely does not adopt the phrase or cite Sellars' central contribution, 'On the Logic of Complex Particulars,' *Mind* 1949) — constitutes in part what Socrates is. So, that the individual Socrates instantiates the universal wisdom *is explicable*, for it reduces to the more basic facts that (i) the individual Socrates — who is nothing other than the co-occuring tropes of properties he is ordinarily said to possess — *contains* W_S, where (ii) W_S, in turn, is also a member of the bundle of similar tropes which is wisdom itself. Thus, a universal like wisdom is not an *ante rem* entity which W_S primarily (and Socrates, secondarily) instantiates (my view in 'A Property Instance Theory of Particulars', Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke U. 1963), but rather tropes are the fundamental metaphysical entities.

'Bundling' is basic. A particular like Socrates is a bundle of tropes and a universal is also a bundle of tropes. A particular trope like W_S is a kind of metaphysical *intersection* between one kind of bundle (individual) and another kind (universal) — cf. p. 22-3. So, Bacon can say to Russell that the 'be an instance of' relation between Socrates and wisdom is really a sharing between (at the intersection of) two bundles, Socrates and wisdom. Bacon has substituted property *instances* for Russell's properties. And if you add to Russell's (1948) view what he says on p. 714 of *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, 1944 (Vol. II) — that any 'precisely defined quality' is a *particular* — Russell's view becomes *very* close to Bacon's and identical to Sellars'.

The *structures* which Bacon wants to examine for and between bundles are set-theoretic structures. Thus, all bundles (not just universals) are sets.

> If Madonna is complex and has a certain make-up, then she has a structure. The general theory of structure applies. Of course, it may be beyond our powers to say *what set she is*, just as it's beyond our powers to say what physical structure she is, even granting physicalism. Similar remarks apply to more everyday structures than Madonna. (11, my italics).

But then Bacon's view collides with Quine's argument that sets themselves are abstract, not concrete. For example, a set or class of stones might be likened to a heap of them:

> The heap is indeed a concrete object ... but the class of stones in the heap cannot properly be identified with the heap. For, if it could, then by the same token another class could be identified with the same heap, namely, the class of molecules of stones in the heap. ... Classes, therefore, are abstract entities;... (*From a Logical Point of View*, 1953, 114.)

Can Bacon have his sets (abstract, pace Quine) and eat them too (some sets being individuals)? Further, the concept of set Bacon uses in his analysis

prohibits distinguishing trilaterality from triangularity, since the set of all possible triangles and all possible trilaterals are the same set — even if the set members are triangular and trilateral *tropes*. Maybe Bacon intends that any triangular *trope* isn't also trilateral in shape. If so, he should have said — and defended it.

Having an account of relations and their tropes is crucial to making a trope theory worth noticing. Relation *tropes* must exist, since the advantage of Bacon's view is that *every* universal is a bundle of tropes. But what *are* the tropes of the relation of, say, trusting? If 'Cassio trusts Iago' is true, we would usually say that the ordered-pair <Cassio, Iago> is the instance of the relation of trusting. So, should we, on trope theory, take the instance to be something else which is merely a *member* of the bundle which is this ordered-pair? Bacon's solution is 'to relativize concurrence to argument-places' (31). This means that the trope of trusting which is Cassio's trusting Iago is partly in the bundle which is Cassio and partly in the one which is Iago. Bacon describes it as 'aspectual concurrence'. Two tropes *concur* if they occur together in the same individual. If Socrates is both wise and white, then W_S 'concurs with' Socrates' whiteness. Then, Cassio's trusting Iago concurs *in the first argument place* with other tropes in Cassio. For example, Cassio's maleness concurs with Cassio's trusting Iago — but the latter only with respect to the first argument place or, rather (as Bacon wisely delinguisticizes it), with respect to the trope's first 'aspect'. This means, of course, that the very same trope — Cassio's trusting Iago, abbreviated 'T_{ci}' (*my* notation) — concurs with tropes that constitute Iago, such as Iago's deceptiveness, though only with respect to T_{ci}'s *second* aspect. This makes relation tropes very peculiar, though that may be no surprise to many readers. For even given Russell's advances on the logic and metaphysics of relations, relations still generate philosophical difficulties today (cf. my review of Olson, *Phil. & Phen. Res.* 1990). (Although I don't see that Bacon discusses it, reflexive cases of relationships, such as loving oneself, are going to have a particularly peculiar description trope-wise; e.g., the trope of loving involved when John loves himself is going to be an ingredient in John *twice* — once with respect to the first (lover) aspect and once with respect to the second (loved) aspect.)

Peculiar as relational tropes appear to be, it is not clear that any rival is more plausible. My previous preference (op. cit. 1963) for reducing relations to relational *properties* (*n* of them for *n*-place relations) retains the plausibility of each individual consisting entirely of property instances that are monadic (since relational *properties* aren't relations). Thus, there are no tropes peculiarly shared aspectually. However, a component of the trusting-Iago trope is Iago himself and, so, Iago himself (perhaps conceived to be a Baconian individual bundle) is a component of the individual which is Cassio (since trusting-*Iago* is a component of Cassio). That is certainly not any less peculiar than Bacon's trope-sharing-aspectually.

For the individual bundle Othello, there is a set of bundles of relation tropes with respect to the first aspect, a set of bundles of tropes with respect to the second aspect, etc. Bacon calls the collection of all these sets of relation

tropes (aspect-wise) a '*chain* of bundles'. Then, individuals turn out to be bundle *chains*. If you used to be (or are a fan of) an Absolute Idealist, you may find Bacon's way with relations comforting, for now an individual shares tropes aspectually with practically every other individual, a foundation on which (to hope) to base a resuscitation of the doctrine of internal relations.

Bacon extends his treatment of relationships between concrete particulars to what he calls *metarelations* — such as the relation between tropes in the same individual bundle (*concurrence*, like Sellars' co-ingredience), the relation between tropes when they are exactly similar (*likeness*, such as W_S being *like* Plato's wisdom), the relation of *equivalence*, and the relation of *temporal precedence*. But the trope theory does not apply to any still higher-order relations — *meta*metarelations. Relations between individuals (those kinds of bundles) are explained via those individuals somehow containing tropes of the relations (as introduced above). And W_S's being exactly similar to Plato's wisdom is explained as (or reduced to) tropes of similarity somehow occurring to Plato's wisdom is explained as (or reduced to) tropes of similarity somehow occurring within W_S and Plato's wisdom, so that there is a bundle of *hypertropes*, as Bacon calls them, which is the universal *likeness* (exact similarity). So, there is a hypertrope of *concurring-with* somehow 'in' (peculiarly shared by, as I described above) W_S and Socrates' humility. Bacon does not defend this idea — though he is committed to it — of tropes not only constituting ordinary individuals by being bundle-members, but themselves being constituted of ingredient tropes; i.e., tropes contain tropes! But he does defend the necessarily associated idea of the metarelations (and presumably any monadic metaproperties) being themselves bundles of tropes themselves — viz., bundles of hypertropes. He asserts, however, that any potential infinite regress is avoided because no hyperhypertropes are needed to account for metametarelations. For example, the (monadic!) property of being a two-place relation — true of trusting, loving, being taller than, etc. *as well as* of likeness, concurrence, and being earlier than — is not a bundle of *its* instances. For even though there *is* a bundle of first-order two place relation tropes, there is no bundle containing the hypertropes of likeness and concurrence (for example). For concurrence does not contain in any way or sense a trope of being-two-aspected, even if trusting does.

Now, however, Bacon's trope theory is incapable of answering Russell's quest for a theory of instantiation ('what is an instance?'). At best, trope theory — Baconian or otherwise — can only explain *certain* instantiation relations (expressed by certain predications). None of the higher-order universal to universal instantiations, such as that concurrence is a two-place relation, find trope-theoretic analyses (since there is no trope of being two-aspected contained in the bundle which is concurrence). Notice the problem here. If a relation like trusting is a bundle of its tropes, then how can *that* bundle be taken to be an entity which is, in turn (somehow like an individual), constituted of *other* tropes? Various trusting tropes — such as Cassio of Iago, Hillary Clinton of Bill, Plato of Socrates — constitute the bundle which is the universal trusting. So, how then *could* the tropes of

being-two-aspected (the metaphysical correlate of having two argument places) be explained as trusting being constituted of, in part, trusting's being double-aspected (i.e., trusting's double-aspectedness being in the bundle which is trusting). Similarly, for the universal which is wisdom. Bacon would have to admit there is a hypertrope of being-a-moral-virtue which somehow constitutes (in part) wisdom (assuming pace Plato that wisdom is a moral virtue). So, if there are hypertropes, they either can't constitute (by being a member of the bundle) the entities they apply to (on pain of absurdities like wisdom's constitutent trope of being-a-moral-virtue being identical to a trope like W_S or there are two very different ways tropes relate to the entities they 'characterize'. (Don't confuse these two ways with singular vs. general predication. W_S is an instance of wisdom and also, thereby, an instance of being-virtu*ous*, but being being-virtu*ous* is not being-a-virtue.) It seems to me that Bacon has created a correlate of Frege's question about higher-order predications (answered by a new 'object' sometimes 'representing' the first-order concept). And I do not see that my alternative for Frege (in 'Revealing Designators and Acquaintance with Universals', *Nous* 1986) can be transmuted into an answer for Bacon.

Finally, it seems to me that Bacon conflates tropes, facts, events, propositions, and states of affairs. Whether or not tropes really exist, facts, propositions, and events certainly do (as I have explained in *Fact, Proposition, Event* [Kluwer 1997]). Bacon (74, following D.C. Williams) proposes that events are tropes, which raises the following problem (ignoring facts and propositions). Events are not only momentary events and achievements (like the event of a raindrop striking a windowpane or that of Oswald killing JFK), but are also non-momentary happenings like WWII as well as processes, situations, and states — such as the state (healthy?) of my liver today. For Bacon the *process* (an event) of Socrates drinking the hemlock is the trope (property instance) of the attribute $x[x$ is drinking the hemlock] (using Quine's notation for attribute abstraction and pretending this attribute is non-relational). What needs to be initially considered about this interesting proposal is whether the trope ingredient in Socrates — the *instance* of $x[x$ is drinking the hemlock]) — can be the *process* Socrates himself is a part of (the event of Socrates drinking the hemlock). If it is, Socrates is a part of something which is a part of him. I contend that Socrates is a part of the event of Socrates' drinking the hemlock (for a certain duration) and so that event *can't* be a part of him.

Secondly, Bacon ignores the universals which are event-*kinds*. One non-determinate (i.e., determinable) event-kind is that of someone's drinking something at some time. An instance of that event is Socrates drinking the hemlock for a certain duration d (in 399BC). Each particular event is an instance of *many* event-kinds, from absolutely determinate ones to very generic ones (like someone's doing something sometime). Is it advisable, helpful, or illuminating to identify the *instances* of certain absolutely determinate event *kinds* with tropes that are ingredient in the objects which are constituents of the concrete events? In the end, Bacon attends briefly to

causation, duty, and goodness (Chapters 8 and 9). As far as I can see, his analyses depends entirely on the undefended identification of certain tropes with various kinds of events, processes, and states. But if such identifications ultimately fail (as I suspect), then his trope theory applications to causation, duty, and goodness will evaporate. I wouldn't bet they won't.

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Gordon Baker and **Katherine J. Morris**
Descartes' Dualism.
New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. 235.
Cdn$69.95: US$49.95. ISBN 0-415-10121-2.

René Descartes
Meditations On First Philosophy.
Trans. and ed. John Cottingham.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
(Revised edition with new editorial matter).
Pp. 120.
US$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-55252-4);
US$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-55818-2).

The most recent Cambridge University Press edition of the *Meditations*, which includes excerpts from the 'Objections and Replies', is taken from Volume II of *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, 3 volumes, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (CSM) (New York: Cambridge University Press 1985); the *Meditations* and the 'Objections and Replies', are translated by Cottingham. From a researcher's perspective, Volume II of the CSM is preferred, but from a teacher's perspective, the new edition can be used effectively in a course where the *Meditations* is but one of many texts to be studied. In addition, students will appreciate that this smaller paperback edition is less expensive than Volume II of the CSM. The AT numbers are included in the margins, and perhaps as an additional plus, the pagination of this edition is almost identical to that of the CSM volume. Included in the new edition are two essays: the first by Bernard Williams, and the second by Cottingham himself. Both not only serve the reader well in placing the *Meditations* within its historical and philosophical settings, but they also provide the reader with a traditional interpretation of the aim and scope of the work.

In his note concerning the reissue of this translation, Cottingham claims to have taken the opportunity to make some small corrections (xlvi). For the most part, they are small. For example, he replaces 'wide audience' with 'great crowd of readers' (8), or, he adds a missing 'yet' in, 'The second reason for doubt was that since I did not *yet* (adhuc) know the author or my being...' (53). But other changes are not so small. For example, he changes 'since I sometimes believe that others go astray in cases where they think they have the most perfect knowledge, may I not similarly go wrong...' (CSM II 14) to 'just as I consider that others sometimes go astray in cases where they think they have the most perfect knowledge, how do I know that God has not brought it about that I too go wrong...' (14). In the former, the argument hinges on the fact that others (who are, in respect to their nature, similar to the meditator) sometimes go wrong in matters about which they claim to be most certain. But, in the latter, the argument hinges on the possibility that *God* might have brought it about that he (and the others) go wrong. As to which is to be preferred, note that the fragment '...how do I know that God has not brought it about that I too go wrong...' is not in the original Latin, but is introduced by Cottingham. In respect to this specific passage, the former translation is better. This minute criticism aside, I highly recommend this clean, affordable, excellent edition of the *Meditations*.

Descartes' Dualism joins an ever growing body of secondary literature surrounding the work of Descartes. The aim of this book is purportedly to save Descartes from the 'preconceived prejudices' of twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophers — a noble aim indeed. The view for which the book argues consists of four maxims: (1) there are two and only two kinds of (finite) substances, corporeal and thinking things; (2) the essence of the mind is thought, the essence of the body is extension; (3) Human bodies and their properties are objects of sense-perception (minds and their properties cannot be objects of sense-perception); and (4) interaction between mind and body is 'rationally unintelligible' — in a human being, a mind and body are 'substantially united' (59). But these, and their implications, in some form or other, have been a part of Anglo-American scholarship for at least two decades. See, for example, Margaret Wilson's *Descartes* (New York: Routledge 1978). And so one wonders what is new.

Further, the view that is attributed to the current Anglo-American tradition has, for the most part, been renounced, no less by the efforts of serious, Anglo-American, Descartes scholars. Of course, there are the ill-informed who still enjoy a good maligning of Descartes in their philosophy of mind or introduction to philosophy courses. But, ironically, this book is not meant for them; it is meant for the serious Descartes scholar. This view also consists of four maxims: (1') the two-worlds view (there is a world of physical objects and another of mental objects); (2') physical objects are (bits of) clockwork, mental objects are (states of) consciousness; (3') physical objects are public, observable through the external senses, mental objects are private, observable through introspection; and (4') physical and mental objects causally interact within a human being (11). In order to find defenders of these, the

book forces us to consider the Descartes of Russell, Strawson, Ryle, Anscombe and Geach, Malcolm, Richard Rorty, and Dummett (to name just a few) — none of whom is known particularly for his or her sensitivity to original text or historical context.

However, even these 'prejudicial maxims' have *some* merit. They are not, as Baker and Morris suggest, a 'tyranny' of misrepresentations of Descartes' work (69). According to B&M, there is little or no textual evidence to support them (2). For example, in showing (51) that sensory 'thoughts' are not mental effects of corporeal causes (a denial of [4']), B&M cite a passage from the *Treatise on Man* (1664), where it is said that certain movements in the brain 'give occasion for the soul to have' the sensation of pain (AT XI, 144: CSM I, 103). Since there is no explicit reference to 'causation', and this is the best passage that one can muster in support of (4'), B&M conclude that Descartes does not hold the view that motions in the brain cause certain mental effects. They go on to say that, in fact, ' ... no passage states explicitly that any movement in the body (whether in a sense organ or in the brain) is the (efficient) cause of a thought or idea' (ibid.). But, is this right? No.

In the Third Meditation, Descartes says, 'Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as much <reality> in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause. For where, I ask, could the effect get its reality from, if not from the cause?' (AT VII, 40: CSM II, 28). In respect to an idea's efficient cause, Descartes says, '[I]t is also true that the *idea* of heat, or of a stone, cannot exist in me unless it is put there by some cause which contains at least as much reality as I conceive to be in the heat or in the stone ...' (ibid.). In the Sixth Reply, he tells us that there are three senses of the term 'sensation'. In the 'first grade' sense, sensations are considered to be motions in the brain. In the 'second grade' sense, sensations ' ... comprise all the immediate effects produced in the mind as a result of its being united with a bodily organ which is affected in this way. Such effects include the perceptions of pain, pleasure, thirst, hunger, colors, sound, taste, smell, heat, cold, and the like ... ' (AT VII, 436-7: CSM II, 294). Here, the idea of heat is said to be an *effect* of certain motions in the brain. So not only does Descartes explicitly say that a movement in the body is an *efficient cause* of an idea, but these passages appear to provide stronger textual support for (4') than the passage cited by B&M.

The book's account of Descartes' dualism ((1) - (4) above) is overly complex, introducing 'the legend', as opposed to 'the myth', 'the Expansion thesis', 'the Contraction thesis', 'Cartesian Dualism', as opposed to 'Descartes' Dualism' — to mention just a few things. B&M themselves seem aware of this, admitting that their account may be 'so complex that it threatens to defeat its own purpose' (191). Much of the complexity could have been avoided, say, by presenting the account in a couple of concisely written articles. Towards the end, B&M say they have tried to show that their view ((1) - (4)) has at least as strong a textual grounding as the prejudicial, Anglo-American one ((1') - (4')) (193). But, if their argument succeeds, and the latter is shown to have little or no textual support, then where does that leave their own view?

Their view is on solid textual ground, I would contend, but it is a view that has been around for some time. Thus, serious (Anglo-American) Descartes scholars will find nothing new here. In addition to this, because of its complexity, I do not recommend this book to those making their acquaintance with Descartes for the first time.

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Ronald Bontekoe
Dimensions of the Hermeneutic Circle.
Halifax, NS: Fernwood Books; Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1996.
Pp. v + 264.
US$49.95. ISBN 0-391-03933-4.

Hermeneutical inquiry has had a remarkable history since its inception in the 19th century. What begins as a method of scriptural exegesis increasingly is viewed as a model of all understanding in the humanities and social sciences, and in some circles in the natural sciences as well. *Dimensions of the Hermeneutic Circle* has two aims. One is to explain this development of hermeneutics in terms of refinements and extensions of the hermeneutic circle. The second is to show that understanding in the natural sciences is hermeneutic and thus that 'there is, fundamentally, only one methodology which offers us any prospect of improved understanding — no matter what the object of inquiry may be' (11). The book achieves its first aim quite well, the second less well for reasons I will discuss shortly.

The scope of this book is impressive. Bontekoe takes the reader through Ast, Schleiermacher, Dilthey, the early and later Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricœur, and contemporary philosophy of science, showing how the notion of understanding is progressively deepened by reflections on the circular nature of understanding. The discussion of each thinker is necessarily compact but clear, comprehensive, and focussed. Discussions are enhanced by the frequent use of schematic pictorial representations that show the relationships between the various components of the hermeneutic circle. This book is pedagogically superb and would make a fine text for students serious about the study of hermeneutics.

The phrase 'hermeneutic circle' refers to the temporal and integrative aspect of understanding that requires that we view the significance of new information in light of what has already been understood. Understanding is

circular because the network of relations that constitute current knowledge will not only determine how we understand new information but might itself be transformed by that new information if intelligibility is to be accomplished. The burden of hermeneutical inquiry is to show how this circle avoids vicious or question begging circularity. It would appear that hermeneutical understanding requires that we merely assume our starting point is true in order to confer intelligibility on new information. However, because the new information is only intelligible in light of that starting point neither the starting point nor the new information is receiving independent verification.

Bontekoe provides a general solution to this problem of circularity — a steady supply of new information without corresponding loss. Thus, the aim of hermeneutic understanding is to achieve the widest possible framework for our understanding consistent with maximal coherence. The history of hermeneutics, then, is both a history of ever widening contexts of inquiry (from textual analysis, through authorial intention, to universal history, the study of the meaning of Being in general, etc.) as well as a history of increasingly sophisticated tests of the presuppositions of inquiry culminating in Ricœur's account of explanation and the hermeneutical inquiry of modern science.

This metaphor of an expanding, cumulative circle works reasonably well in organizing the history of hermeneutics, although it shows signs of strain when applied to Heidegger's later work. Heidegger is not so much attempting to show how understanding takes place by projecting and testing truths, but is instead trying to discover how conceptual frameworks are constituted and embedded within a form of life with the aim of showing the optional character of those conceptual frameworks. Thus, Heidegger's trajectory leads him away from Gadamer, Ricœur, and modern science and towards Derrida and deconstruction.

This objection indicates a significant flaw in this book. There is no attempt to address objections to hermeneutics from outside that tradition. The book leaves the reader with the mistaken impression that there is no substantial opposition to the hermeneutical model of inquiry.

Bontekoe's larger agenda is to deny the alleged split between the natural sciences and the human sciences by showing, through a discussion of contemporary philosophy of science, that all inquiry including that of the natural sciences is hermeneutic. His strategy is to demonstrate that the practice of science requires a subjective or interpretive element — the experience and tacit skill of the scientist. Crucial to Bontekoe's argument is that this subjective element does not undermine objectivity. The various elements of scientific practice including theories, experimental methods, and the aims and values of inquiry mutually constrain and support each other in ways that provide rational grounds for settling disputes by eliminating incoherence — an exemplification of the hermeneutic circle.

Having explained the process of consensus formation in the sciences, Bontekoe then addresses the question of how truth should be conceptualized on this model. Metaphysical realism and correspondence theories are re-

jected, and he rejects pure instrumentalism on the grounds that 'we have a practical interest in seeking eternal truths' (236). However, if this is the aim of inquiry, how can we show that our *internally* coherent world view identifies how the world is in fact? Bontekoe's claim is that if science were to attain an ideal coherence of all our beliefs and experiential inputs of the widest possible scope including the social sciences, we would be entitled to claim our theories are true. Most importantly, only by pursuing such ideal coherence can we provide adequate tests of our theories. The individual sciences must submit their findings to revision by universal science.

Hermeneutics purchases its plausibility from the fact that it takes very seriously the limits of human knowledge. It eschews appeals to a purely objective standpoint and insists we can only engage in inquiry from where we stand within our limited historically and culturally mediated perspectives. Bontekoe's appeal to an ideally coherent universal hermeneutic science threatens to undermine this plausibility. If the experiential dimension must be fully captured by the ideally coherent account, a genuinely universal science of both the natural world and human behavior seems implausible at best since our culturally and historically mediated experiences are vastly different — especially regarding judgments of value.

Moreover, if our goal is to pursue the truth, one of the most important truths we can discover about the world is that some degree of incoherence might be the case. I fail to see how the pursuit of a universal science underwritten by the aim of ideal coherence would make such a discovery possible. Skepticism regarding such ideal coherence is an equally important regulative norm.

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Stanley Cavell
Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1996.
Pp. xvi + 255.
US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-09814-1);
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-09816-8).

Contesting Tears is Cavell's thirteenth book, his third about the movies. Its subtitle tells us its central topic: 'The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman'. The book consists of readings of the four principal members of this genre of melodrama, plus an introduction, plus a 'Postscript'. The movies are *Gaslight* (with Ingrid Bergman), *Letter from an Unknown Woman* (with Joan

Fontaine, in the film that gives the genre its name), *Now, Voyager* (with Bette Davis) and *Stella Dallas* (with Barbara Stanwyck).

Within these readings Cavell finds scope to engage a further range of topics, each of which helps to give the chapters their particular orbit and spin. A representative selection of these topics includes a) madness and the *cogito* (Chapter 1); the origins of cinema and psychoanalysis as intertwined with the modern history of women (Chapter 2); the thirst for knowledge of a woman, catastrophically pursued as the drive to possess the woman's knowledge; the subversion of the other's expressiveness precisely in the effort to know, beyond ambiguity, the meaning of the other's expressions; the need for a philosophical practice of reading; the connections between the pleasures that movies provide and the kind of reading that movies encourage; some questions of interpretation and otherness that are raised but not explicitly investigated by psychoanalysis (Chapters 1 and 2); identity and metamorphosis; the ironies and necessities of naming and being named (Chapter 3); seclusion, sexual anxiety and the refusal of mourning and loss (Chapter 4); class, gender and the pathos of difference; the construction of the movie screen as a medium of maternal presence and obscurity (Chapter 5).

It is difficult to gather the unity of *Contesting Tears* from such a listing of its topics. Nevertheless, the reader who bears something like this list in mind will be in a better position to see how Cavell develops these topics from his readings of the individual films and from his efforts to trace the genre of the Unknown Woman. The organization of the book is itself a significant part of its lessons. But this organization is also easy to lose track of.

Perhaps the reader's greatest difficulty in following the argument of this book will stem from the very question of genre that the book so consistently raises. Compared to the genre that Cavell was analyzing in *Pursuits of Happiness*, the melodramas of the unknown woman are far less visibly related to one another. Cavell acknowledges that 'the systematic connections' among the melodramas are, at first glance, 'hardly discernible' (3). He suggests that important connections among the melodramas will only emerge when we appreciate the ways in which the melodramas are 'derived' from the comedies of remarriage (such as *Adam's Rib* and *The Philadelphia Story*). This is a great debt for one genre to owe to another.

Cavell specifies the mechanism of derivation as a type of negation. Negation is contrasted with 'compensation', and both are defined in terms of the 'features' that they work on. As an example of a 'feature', take the tendency of the remarriage comedies to end up in some settled location in which perspective and resolution can be achieved, a place descended from Northrop Frye's 'green world'. Cavell characterizes *It Happened One Night* as *compensating* for the absence of such a place of perspective by locating the adventures of Gable and Colbert mostly 'on the road'. The hesitations, continuations and ingenuities displayed in their travels speak of an aptitude for courage and deferral. But even the green world may require these virtues of its denizens. Hence, the compensatory feature of 'the road' makes explicit

something that is present throughout the remarriage comedies: the willingness of the principal pair for adventure, improvisation and resilience.

Negation rather than compensation is at issue in *Gaslight*. Here the action retreats to the same house that it began in, not to achieve perspective but to elaborate a drama of enclosure. The place of conclusion does not permit the reconciliation of grievances but a final declaration of them. It ends not by restoring a conversation but by isolating Ingrid Bergman within the glory of her re-discovered voice, finally breaking the spell of the man's imprisoning words.

Some such negation of conversation, enacted in what Cavell calls an 'aria of divorce', forms the key to each movie's self-definition as a melodrama of unknownness. The 'negation' in question is not merely the absence of the sweep and pleasure of the conversation in the comedies. The negation is primarily constituted by the leading woman's positive powers of irony and self-affirmation. She achieves a distance from the world, without exempting herself from the need to suffer the world's presence.

In the comedies of remarriage, the acknowledgment of the woman's desire and the upsetting of the man's equilibrium remain in the sort of dramatic tension we like to call 'comic'. The shift in the balance of the actions and reactions can normally be charted in the back and forth of the literal conversations. In the melodramas, the defining negations, affirmations and ironies are increasingly possessed by the woman, and the man tends to become accordingly irrelevant to the movements of the film. This 'interiorizing' of the action contributes to our difficulties in reading the films and their generic affiliations with each other. But the difficulty contains the exhilaration of discovering a further human resource for survival in the face of the world's judgment on us.

Within our various failures of voice and conversation, the movies remind us that our capacity for knowing the world in private is not to be construed as our attachment to a private object. Each of the movies interprets the price of keeping one's private knowledge of the world intact, yet still exposed to transformation and loss. Such knowledge is expressed in our ability to preserve our judgment of the world, despite our isolation within it.

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Marcel Conche
Montaigne et la philosophie.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1996.
Coll. Perspectives Critiques. Pp. 159.
ISBN 2-130-47757-0.

Les différentes études, regroupées ici sous le titre général de *Montaigne et la philosophie*, abordent chacune d'un point de vue à la fois original et actuel les différents aspects de ce philosophe *ondoyant et divers* qui, loin d'être désuet, reste, depuis maintenant quatre cents ans, la référence obligée, la référence vivace de la philosophie moderne et contemporaine. L'A., grand spécialiste de Montaigne, reprend en fait un ouvrage, devenu classique, paru en 1987 et réédité en 1992, auquel il ajoute deux chapitres: *La signification de Dieu* et *Montaigne me manque*. Cette succession d'essais, relativement autonomes, trouve néanmoins son unité, si l'on peut dire, dans une discussion de la morale de Montaigne et dans sa présentation par petites touches contrastées qui en traduisent avec succès la complexité et les nuances infinies. Dans le débat qui partage les interprètes de Montaigne et les discussions sur le scepticisme, le relativisme culturel, le nihilisme moral, ou la morale universelle, l'A. tranche: il y a sans doute un nihilisme philosophique de Montaigne mais seulement au sens d'un nihilisme ontologique ou épistémologique. En revanche, on ne saurait parler d'un nihilisme éthique ou moral car « la morale universelle n'est pas du même ordre que les innombrables morales collectives, et la morale de Montaigne prend ses distances avec la morale collective de son temps » (xi).

Chacun des différents chapitres s'organise autour d'un problème précis que pose la réflexion de Montaigne et l'A., de manière très claire, voire un tantinet didactique, prend soin de donner en conclusion un résumé de l'argumentation et de ses positions finales. Ainsi le chapitre I, *L'homme sans définition*, montre comment le problème de l'homme joue chez Montaigne comme le problème fondamental auquel se rattachent le problème de la connaissance et le problème de l'action sans que l'on puisse pour autant rattacher à cet égard la pensée de Montaigne à celle des autres grandes philosophies. L'A. met bien au jour comment pour Montaigne, l'homme délivré des définitions est accordé avant tout au mouvement varié de la vie (25). Le chapitre II, *Le pyrrhonisme dans la méthode*, reconstruit avec une grande richesse la signification profonde du scepticisme montanien dans sa relation avec son christianisme (42). Le très beau chapitre III, *Le temps, la mort, l'ignorance*, examine les positions très personnelles de Montaigne devant les quatre principaux problèmes qui se posent au sujet du temps dans la philosophie antique (sa réalité, sa nature, son origine, son objectivité). L'A., s'appuyant constamment sur les textes, retrace avec beaucoup de finesse et de sensibilité la signification du temps pour Montaigne et finalement « son consentement au temps, c'est-à-dire au néant et à l'ignorance » (60), en quoi réside sa sagesse. La fonction du jugement apparaît ainsi chez Montaigne moins en rapport avec la connaissance qu'avec notre façon de « régler notre

action et notre vie dans le présent vivant, au fil des occurrences » (60). Le chapitre IV, *Le pari tragique*, oppose, de manière nuancée et tout en expliquant le sens d'une mentalité tragique (64), l'exigence héroïque de Montaigne au pari religieux pascalien (78). Le chapitre V, *Plaisir et communication*, établit par comparaison et différence, l'originalité de la philosophie du plaisir de Montaigne en la mettant en parallèle avec d'autres philosophies du plaisir que commente Montaigne. Pour ce dernier, en définitive, le plaisir peut et doit se partager, la question étant de définir aussi bien avec qui partager son plaisir que les degrés des plaisirs. Comme le soutient avec perspicacité l'A., « la communication est la condition sans laquelle Montaigne ne saurait se plaire au plaisir » (105). Le chapitre VI, *La conscience*, est peut-être le plus ambitieux de l'ouvrage. Il nous met au cœur de la morale de Montaigne et réussit, de manière remarquable, à nous faire saisir, comme de l'intérieur, les exigences constitutives de l'homme libre « qui, sans aucune idée de dominer les autres [...] simplement pour être véridique, et en toute indépendance obéir à sa conscience, ose être soi » (128). *Ainsi Montaigne* d'ajouter fort à propos l'A.

Viennent ensuite les ajouts propres à cette édition. Le chapitre VII, *La signification de Dieu*, soutient la thèse que la notion de Dieu n'est pas étrangère aux *Essais* et dégage les rapports de Montaigne au catholicisme et à Dieu, à travers une relecture des *Œuvres*. Le dernier chapitre, *Montaigne me manque*, se distingue par un ton très personnel. La réflexion nous livre, en fait, la clé de l'esprit ou de la méthode qui animent l'ouvrage: la nécessité pour une raison de s'éprouver au contact d'une autre raison, dans la joute dialectique. Devant tous les conformismes, Montaigne s'avère ainsi, pour l'A., davantage que Descartes, Spinoza ou Kant, le « témoin idéal [...] car il contrôle les principes par la situation. Principes, oui, mais *in situ* » (150). Enfin un appendice, fort savant, sur l'unité du chapitre « Des coches » dans les *Essais*, complète cette collection si suggestive d'études qui sera utile à tout spécialiste de la pensée de Montaigne.

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Jocelyne Couture and **Kai Nielsen, eds.**
On the Relevance of Metaethics:
New Essays on Metaethics.
Calgary: University of Calgary Press 1995.
Pp. viii + 348.
Cdn$24.00: US$24.00. ISBN 0-919491-21-9.

This interesting collection contains ten essays on metaethics preceded by a long introduction with a bibliography, and it is concluded by an even longer 'Afterward' with another bibliography. Most of the essays are contributed by well-known writers on ethics: Francis Sparshot, Richard B. Brandt, R.M. Hare, Peter Railton, Jean Hampton, Isaac Levi, Nicholas Sturgeon, David Copp, and Allen Wood. One essay, by Jeffrey Reiman, is written from a 'postmodern' point of view.

Although the activity to which the term 'metaethics' applies was incidentally practiced (the editors say) throughout the history of philosophy, it became a distinct activity with its own rationale only in the twentieth century. The editors divide its progress into three distinguishable periods. The first, in which metaethics became a self-conscious discipline, lasted from about 1900 to the 1930s; its principal text, which 'set the tone and yielded most of the problems,' was G.E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*. The editors call the second period 'the Golden age of metaethics'; this period lasted until the 1960s and produced what they consider the 'old' metaethics. The third period began in the 1970s and is still in progress; it is the age of what they call 'the *new* metaethics' — the kind represented in most of the essays included here. The editors' Afterward looks beyond this third period and bears the title 'Whither Moral Philosophy?'

The reader will note that, between the editors' Golden Age of metaethics and the onset of what they call the 'new' metaethics, there is a gap of some years. The editors do not describe the size of the gap, but they identify a number of factors responsible for it. The factors they mention include (i) a changed conception of philosophy in which the analytic/synthetic and theory/metatheory dualisms were seriously doubted, (ii) a widespread philosophical concern with social and political problems such as economic inequality and sexual discrimination, and (iii) a general consensus that Rawls' method of supporting moral principles by appealing to the 'reflective equilibrium' of a system of moral convictions provides a philosophically acceptable means of resolving those problems. When this general consensus about Rawls' method began to break down, the editors say, many philosophers began to believe that 'we must go back to basics if we are to seriously think about morality in a philosophical way' (15). The 'basics' in point here were essentially metaethical, and the new age began.

The fundamental question prompting metaethical investigation concerns the objectivity of moral precepts. As R.B. Brandt's contribution nicely illustrates, this objectivity can be understood in two basic ways. According to one, moral precepts are objectively true or false; they are made true or false by

things that exist or are exemplified in the world. According to the other way of understanding it, moral precepts are objectively acceptable: 'all thoughtful, rational, and factually informed persons' would want them 'to be taught and prevail *in the whole society* in which they expect to live' (59). Understood either way, the objectivity of morals is very difficult to demonstrate. Brandt effectively criticizes leading alternatives to his strategy for demonstrating this objectivity, but his strategy is really no more successful than the others.

If the meaning of moral predicates were susceptible of a naturalistic interpretation, moral precepts could be verified or falsified in a fairly straightforward way, but as the vigor (let alone the acrimony) of many moral disputes indicates, such an interpretation is very implausible. On the other hand, if an irreducibly moral interpretation of moral predicates is assumed, the objective truth or falsity of moral precepts is impossible to nail down. The most familiar approach is to argue that basic moral precepts can be known to be true by moral intuition, but as Brandt observes, this strategy flounders on the fact that the 'intuitions' of thoughtful, educated people conflict in a wide variety of cases. As for Rawls' method of achieving reflective equilibrium in a moral system, Brandt in effect claims that a system possessing such equilibrium might adequately represent the considered moral *attitudes* of certain people, but that this does nothing to show that those attitudes are *correct* or *true*.

One way of arguing for the second sort of objectivity is to claim that people's moral beliefs do not really differ if the 'meaning' of a pertinent act for different people is kept fixed. Brandt observes that this claim was advanced by certain psychologists some years back and that David Wiggins has recently repeated it. Brandt argues effectively against the claim, citing numerous examples of moral disagreement where the disputants understand the relevant behavior in basically the same way. Although Brandt leaves no doubt that such cases of moral disagreement cannot, in his view, be explained away, he does not seem to notice that those cases seriously attenuate his own 'foundation for morality.' Aligning himself with the tradition of Hume and Hutchinson, he emphasizes that people generally feel an aversion to others being in distress and that this 'empathetic/sympathetic' feeling provides, for those that have it, a 'foundation' for the sort of utilitarianism that he finds acceptable. But not all people who have this feeling for others can accept utilitarianism. Like Kant, some of these people may even insist that we have a duty to resist such feelings when we do what morality sometimes enjoins — such as supporting the death penalty for a vicious murderer. The fact is, the moral convictions of real people are at best only partially supported by their empathetic/sympathetic feelings for others. As Mill emphasized in *On Liberty*, the causes for most people's opinions on what is laudable or blamable are 'multifarious' and 'as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject' (see chapter one). Brandt may believe that his own moral convictions are adequately founded on the empathetic/sympathetic feelings he describes, but I think they also rest on a cluster of other things — among which is perhaps a thoroughly secular view of the human condition.

Although Bentham and Mill were moral reformers who opposed major tenets of the morality in effect in their culture, most recent practitioners of metaethics have been remarkably uncritical about the morality of their own society or social group. Allen Wood's valuable essay reminds us that 'what we call "morality" in modern liberal society is the outcome of a cultural process through which social norms and customs, most of them originally with a premodern (usually religious) basis and content, have been appropriated, modified and rationalized so as to accord with a culturally diverse society whose only workable common basis has proved to be universalistic and secular' and that 'the two perennially favorite moral theories, utilitarianism and Kantianism, are quite transparent attempts to adapt inherited social and psychological materials to the needs of a modern, hence more reflective, individualistic, and rationalistic culture' (232). Contemporary Anglophone philosophers who rarely object to the content of traditional morality do not recognize that 'the norms of traditional morality were focused compulsively on the social regulation of the sexual conduct of individuals in ways that are plainly pathological, patriarchal and homophobic' (231). Tacitly assuming that the 'true' content of moral principles is 'whatever content we decide, in the end and all things considered, these principles should have,' some contemporary moral philosophers would agree with Bernard Williams that 'there is no distinctively sexual morality' and that sexual matters engage moral principles only to the extent that they involve issues involving 'trust, betrayal, and so forth' (231). Wood, by contrast, faces up to the objectionable elements in much traditional morality, and after discussing Nietzsche's 'radical critique' of morality in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, he declares that this sort of critique deserves to be a proper task of metaethical inquiry (249).

In addition to the contributions by Brandt and Wood, the most rewarding essays in the volume are by Railton, Hampton, Levi, and Copp. Sturgeon's essay is spirited and interesting, but its argument seems to trade on a confusion about values. Sturgeon is concerned with the relation between two familiar philosophical views: one is that the problem of evil is a serious theoretical difficulty for theism; the other is the thesis that 'there is no real values in the world and that statements ascribing values to things are never true.' He takes the late John Mackie as holding the latter thesis. But Mackie himself surely valued some things and disvalued others; and what he valued and disvalued in the actual world corresponded pretty well to what theists value and disvalue there. His philosophical claim amounted to the idea that no values are objective — that is, inherent in reality and independent of what particular people happen to value. In spite of his 'nihilist' metaethics, Mackie would describe anyone depicted as behaving in the way he said God is depicted as behaving as 'bad', and he thinks the theist would agree with this depiction. Of course, the theist thinks that ascriptions of badness are objectively true, and Mackie does not believe this. He simply agrees with the theist in what he abhors and what he calls 'bad'. The problem Mackie finds with theism can be described by saying that the theist must on reflection agree that the being the theist believes to be wholly good deserves to be called 'bad'

on account of the motives He is depicted as having and the behavior He is depicted as performing.

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Judith Kegan Gardiner, ed.
Provoking Agents: Gender and Agency in Theory and Practice.
Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press 1995. Pp. 342.
US$44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-252-02132-0);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-252-06418-6).

Judith Kegan Gardiner has collected together fifteen essays from a variety of disciplines with the purpose of 'inciting action through feminist writing' (1). The main theme in the book is feminist agency, and the essays take up this theme in interesting and diverse ways. As the editor's purpose suggests, the authors are not simply trying to define agency with respect to feminism, they are also trying to promote and provoke it. As a multi- and inter-disciplinary book, it has something for almost everyone. And while many of the papers are accessible in a way that is not discipline-specific, it is not likely that everything in it will be accessible to or have appeal for everyone. The contributors are professors of Philosophy, Sociology, Cultural Studies, Psychology, Political Science, Film Studies, and History, to name a few. Most are also in Women's Studies, and the book is a worthy addition to the scholarly literature in that field. For philosophers seeking the traditional approach to the problems of agency, free will, and responsibility, this is not the place to look.

The book has four parts: Agents for Change, Reproductive Agendas, Enacting Theories, and Representation in Action. I cannot do justice to all fifteen papers here, so I shall limit my discussion to a select few, chosen in most cases for their accessibility, and hence their appeal to the widest possible audience, but also in order to demonstrate the volume's diversity.

'Agents for Change' has four papers that draw their conclusions from empirical accounts of feminist activism, including the most fascinating paper in the collection, Patricia Stamp's 'Mothers of Invention: Women's Agency in the Kenyan State'. Stamp wants to show, using the experience of women in the contemporary Kenyan state, that there are great complexities in their struggles that the North American feminist assumption of 'third world women' as a 'single, monolithic subject' does not capture. She recounts the

stories of two particular Kenyan women, Wambui Otieno and Wangari Maathai, each of whom has made significant contributions to feminist discourse in Kenya by challenging patriarchal institutions. In 1987, Otieno lost a five-month court battle with her deceased husband's clan over custody of his body. In 1990, Maathai went on a 'crusade ... to protect the capital city's park from a corrupt government development project' (70). Finally, Stamp discusses the response of Kenyan Women, including Otieno and Maathai, to a national tragedy in July 1991. Nineteen schoolgirls were massacred and seventy-nine more were raped when the schoolboys at their coeducational secondary school went on a rampage. It is in response to this incident that, according to Stamp, the women's movement in Kenya 'found its voice' and organized for change in government, protesting against the repressive regime of President Daniel arap Moi. With respect to the volume's goals of provoking action, no other contribution more effectively reminds the reader of the strength and persistence of women's agency. The story of the way the Kenyan women's movement gained momentum over a relatively short period of time inspires, to say the least.

In the section on reproductive agendas, Valerie Hertouni's 'Reproductive Technologies and the Negotiation of Public Meanings: The Case of Baby M' takes issue with the grounds of both the county judge's and the Kentucky Supreme Court's decisions in the famous Baby M custody battle between the Sterns and the woman that they hired as a surrogate mother, Mary Beth Whitehead. This interesting and accessible paper argues that both courts relied on cultural meanings that were inadequate to the task (in the one case, on the primacy of paternity, and in the other case, on the 'naturalness' of the maternal bond and the maternal instinct). Hertouni also makes the more general point that surrogacy (which she argues is not accurately describable as a 'new reproductive technology') and reproductive technologies represent new forms of practice that cannot easily be discussed in terms of more widespread practices, such as adoption. In 'Cyborgean Motherhood and Abortion', Patricia S. Mann argues that as our interactions with and dependency on technologies in general and reproductive technologies in particular increase, the idea of 'the natural mother' becomes less and less coherent. In its place is 'the cyborgean mother', and a society in which children are the products of interpersonal agency. Mann uses this paradigm as a basis for morally justifying women in choosing to have abortions.

The next section, 'Enacting Theories', is the most theoretically challenging and, perhaps, consistently intellectually demanding part of this volume. Julie Nelson-Kuna and Stephanie Riger stress the importance of viewing women's agency and women's autonomy neither straightforwardly in psychological terms, nor straightforwardly in terms of environmental influences, but rather as a reciprocal relationship with their surroundings. Sandra Lee Bartky's 'Agency: What's the Problem?' takes up the poststructuralism of Foucault, arguing that his social constructionist account of the subject need not force us to abandon 'the idea of a subjectivity free enough to build a freer society' (179). Finally, Chela Sandoval analyzes the specific struggles of 'U.S.

Third World Feminism' and the ways in which it is different from the 'white women's movement'. In particular, U.S. Third World Feminism confronts race, class, and cultural issues in addition to issues of sex and gender.

The final section of the volume, 'Representation in Action', pays attention to the way that various forms of representation, including photography, film, and writing, are media for feminist agency. In 'Resisting Images: Rereading Adolescence', Marianne Hirsch explores photos of childhood and adolescence as forms of feminist agency. Photographic reconstructions of one's own past can either highlight or disguise pivotal moments in one's coming of age. It depends whether one stresses continuity or rupture. Hirsch explores this idea through the construction of her own family album, and through the work of others, including Marguerite Duras and Teresa de Lauretis. Other discussions in this section include Linda Williams's discussion of the pornography and performance art of Annie Sprinkle as postmodern feminist agency, and Carla Kaplan's analysis of the paradox of agency that she sees represented in Harriet Jacobs's *The Life of a Slave Girl*.

Overall, the volume is moderately successful in achieving its goal of inciting agency through feminist writing. It is a mixed bag; where the various contributions figure in the mix will depend, in large part, on the discipline and orientation of the reader.

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John H. Garvey
What Are Freedoms For?
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1996. Pp. viii + 312.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-674-31929-X.

This book may seem to be the natural lawyer's defense of the Civil Liberties Union, but it isn't. Garvey, a law professor at Notre Dame, admits that '[s]ome will say that [my thesis] must lead to less freedom and more conflict ... but I think the changes are more apparent than real' (39). Were this so, his thesis, that freedoms are valuable because of the goods they protect, might seem of theoretical interest only with little practical importance. And perhaps with regard to some of the many civil liberties issues he discusses, this is the case. But Civil Liberties Unionites will be dismayed at his defense of the anti-gay rights decision (*Bowers v Hardwick*, 1986) on the grounds that '[w]hat Hardwick's suit asked for was the freedom to reach an orgasm in the

particular way that he favored,' and 'we do not put a very high value on the simple act of reaching an orgasm' (25-6). Libertarians (but not Civil Libertarians), who prize the now largely discarded right of freedom of association, will dispute his defense of cases (*Rotary International*, 1987) requiring admission of women to formerly men-only groups, when these groups are deemed essentially commercial: 'For all the Rotarian's talk about "fellowship," the case was really about playing a role in the business community' (28). And who cannot wonder about valued liberties when he points out that the First Amendment protects freedom 'of religion,' and not freedom of non-religion or anti-religion? 'The best reasons for protecting religious freedom,' Garvey claims, 'rest on the assumption that religion is a good thing' (49), suggesting that absence of religion is not.

According to Garvey, 'Love (the good) comes first, and the right to freedom follows after it.' It is not choices as such, but the right to choose what is good, that freedom is meant to protect. Sex without love is not something worthy of protection. Neither is freedom to associate with the business partners of one's choice, nor, evidently, freedom to ignore the good of practicing religion: 'Our Constitution guarantees religious freedom because religious people want to practice their faith' (49). (Garvey does not actually explain how this principle might be put into effect; he does not, for example, defend 'voluntary' organized prayer in public schools nor tax-funded support for parochial education, though it might seem that these follow from his thesis.)

Liberal theory holds that what is of value is autonomy, the right to make choices for the sake of choosing. Liberalism supposes that freedoms are what Garvey calls 'bilateral rights', in which doing or not doing are equally good. This, Garvey thinks, is what Justice Powell implies when he says that *Roe v Wade* protects 'a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,' as if having an abortion were of equal value with having a child. ('It is illiberal' — against current liberal dogma — 'to say that childbirth is better than abortion,' he complains, [5].)

This liberal theory is flawed on several counts. It assumes, contrary to fact, that we are free to step back from ourselves and organize our convictions and desires in accord with second-order preferences that we freely choose. It assumes that only by so doing can we live 'authentic' or value-laden lives. It implies, counter to what everyone thinks, that all choices are on a par, and that fairness requires that we give equal treatment to all, as if practicing optometry should be no more subject to regulation than practicing sodomy (we would regulate optometry even if the optometrist 'could honestly claim that optometry was central to his conception of himself,' [28]). But autonomy as such for Garvey has no, or perhaps little, value, and is not worthy of legal protection; what is deserving of protection is the freedom to choose what is truly good. (Garvey also brushes off the idea that liberal freedom is required to keep the peace among competing, disputatious, groups.)

That different people might enjoy different goods, so that what may be good for a heterosexual male might not necessarily be good for everyone, Garvey does not apparently consider. Freedom from religion, as opposed to

freedom of religion, does not appeal to him as a good to be protected. Nor is he terribly interested in the fact that goods, at least in today's social climate, seem inherently contestable, with no commonly-acknowledged methods for resolving differences (not everyone thinks that childbirth is as wonderful as Garvey seems to). Liberalism eschews socially-determined decisions about goods and bads for reasons which are entitled to more respect than Garvey acknowledges. The obvious question, to which Garvey disappointingly does not turn, is how these decisions, required on his theory, are to be made? Natural lawyers are typically not democrats; Garvey's Aristotelian-inspired criticism of liberalism must be sharply distinguished from the anti-elitist, majoritarian critique of liberal jurisprudence launched by Judge Robert Bork. Garvey has no animus against judge-made 'new rights' and sets forth no theory of constitutional interpretation by which the powers of judges to determine rights might be assessed; he seems to be saying that judges could be trusted to do the job, if only they were armed with a better theory than the wimpish 'all choices are equal' egalitarianism of Justice Powell. Yet oddly enough, he himself seems to set out no theory other than a kind of crude 'what we all think' intuitionism.

Despite its rather frightening positions, Garvey's book is full of insightful criticisms of current doctrines and analysis of legal trends and cases. Topics covered in the later, less theoretical, chapters, include the rights of children and incompetents, freedom for groups (churches, corporations), taxing religion, unconstitutional conditions, symbolic speech (the flag burning cases), and much more. Much of this amounts to a long, extremely useful, and non-doctrinaire essay on the meaning of free speech in the American Constitution. Garvey's grasp of American Constitutional law is deep, and the book is worth reading for these analyses alone (often they are only loosely connected to his general theoretical position). Perhaps the most important point in the later sections (ch. 15) concerns the impossibility of regarding everything, or even most things, as the equivalent of the state (which is done when 'state action' is extended to private entities for the purpose of granting individuals rights against them). Finally, Garvey's writing is always clear and forthright in a kind of man-to-man chumminess, and his numerous analogies and allegories are generally pleasant and amusing.

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Alison Gopnik and **Andrew N. Meltzoff**
Words, Thoughts, and Theories.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1997. Pp. xvi + 268.
US$30.00. ISBN 0-262-07175-4.

Written in a lively and engaging style, WTT argues that recent research in developmental psychology — much of it done by the authors themselves — provides evidence for the theory-theory account of infant cognitive development. The theory-theory consists of two claims: the infant's representational structures are theory-like; and 'the cognitive processes that underlie science are similar to, or indeed identical with, the cognitive processes that underlie much of cognitive development' (32). The algorithms that scientists use in theory construction have actually been designed by evolution to enable the infant to develop (increasingly truth-like) theories about her environment (15ff.): scientists are really just big children. While the discussion of the experimental work is fascinating, much of the theoretical discussion in WTT is seriously underdeveloped.

WTT is divided into three parts. In part one an attempt is made to provide criteria which would distinguish the theory-theory from two competing models of cognitive development, modular accounts and script-based accounts. In part two G & M examine the infant's understanding of objects, actions, and kinds; they argue that the theory-theory makes the best sense of the child's developmental trajectory in each of these domains. In the final section of the book G & M present some findings from cross-cultural linguistic development in infants which seem to suggest that there is a relation of mutual dependence between linguistic and conceptual development. It is argued that this provides further support for the theory-theory.

The bulk of this book's philosophical content is contained in its first three chapters in which theories are distinguished from scripts and modules. There is much that is problematic in these chapters; here is an example. All theories, unlike scripts and empirical generalizations, are said to make ontological commitments, support predictions and counterfactuals, lead one to interpret evidence in certain ways, and underwrite explanations (34ff.). By 'ontological commitment' G & M don't have any Quinean thesis in mind. They simply mean that theories, unlike mere empirical generalizations, are thought to cut reality at its joints. 'If the event violates a script or empirical generalization, we might find it weird or surprising. However, only if it violates a theory, with all its ontological commitments, will we think it's magic' (79). This doesn't seem correct: one might hold a theory very tentatively, in which case one will not think that a theory violation is magic. Further, G & M admit that empirical generalizations can underwrite predictions, support counterfactuals, and provide explanations, but they insist that any such predictions will always be 'quite limited, basically of the form that what happened before will do so again' and 'they generate, at best, rather limited and shallow explanations' (61). These claims are also deeply problematic. Many scientific theories (e.g., evolutionary theory) fail to support

any predictions, far less novel predictions, and not all satisfying explanations must be theoretical. Certainly G & M have failed to establish that the explanatory affect exhibited by the 18-month old when she solves an object displacement task is the explanatory affect unique to theory-based explanations.

Although modules are said to share all the static (synchronic) features of theories they differ from theories in that they are indefeasible (50). This sounds like a Chomskian account of modularity. However, the examples that G & M give of modular systems are Fodorian (51f.), i.e., they exhibit informational encapsulation and so on. Thus one is led to infer that G & M do think that there are static differences between theories and modules. Although this point is never directly stated, the idea seems to be that although the infant has a number of domain-specific theories, she has one domain-general mechanism of theory change: modules differ from theories only in that they are sealed-off from this mechanism. Theories are responsive to evidence (via this mechanism), whereas modules are only responsive to non-evidential triggers (50, 82). But does the infant have to regard evidence *as* evidence in order to qualify as possessing a theory, or does it just have to *be* evidence? If the analogy to the scientist is meant seriously then presumably the infant herself has to regard certain stimuli as bearing various evidential relations to hypotheses. But one wonders how the infant could have such an understanding if, as Gopnik herself argues, children lack an understanding of representation prior to the age of about four (109)?

Part two of WTT contains detailed and fascinating discussion of research into the infant's understanding of objects, actions and kinds. G & M argue that the child's understanding of each of these domains undergoes theoretical transformations at certain predictable ages. Very young infants individuate objects in terms of the features of their trajectory rather than their static characteristics. At about the age of nine months the infant develops an improved theory of objects. At eighteen months the infant is said to develop yet another theory of objects, according to which objects are thought to exist along invisible lines of motion (102). The discussion of the child's theory of action builds on Meltzoff's influential work on infant imitation. Meltzoff has argued that neonates have a fundamental cross-modal representational system that connects self and others which provides the child with a built-in solution to 'the' problem of other minds (129, 131). G & M do a good job of arguing that the infant has an innate ability to distinguish physical action from psychological action, but the claim that this competence is theoretical is under-supported. In fact, these findings seem to support the simulationist's account of how we go about ascribing mental states to others, as does the fact that young children make certain egocentric mistakes in word use (119). Finally, G & M argue that the child's understanding of kinds is best understood in terms of the theory-theory. 'Initially, infants seem to believe that the world's joints are determined by spatial factors like places and movements. By around nine months, however, the infant seems to recognize that some spatially discrete objects in the world are nevertheless linked by some

common underlying structure ... By 18 months ... children show a very general conviction that all objects have these common underlying structures (185).

Many of the findings that G & M discuss are extremely thought-provoking, but I have serious reservations about whether these findings support G & M's interpretations of them. We are never actually given any of the infant's theories, and we are told almost nothing about the mechanism of theory-replacement. But for all its weaknesses WTT is a fascinating book, and I heartily concur with G & M when they bemoan the philosophical neglect of developmental psychology.

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John Horgan
The End of Science.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1996.
Pp. x + 308.
Cdn$33.00; US$24.00. ISBN 0-201-62679-9.

The philosopher John Passmore, preparing a recent article casting doubt on the idea of an 'End to Philosophy' (*Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, March, 1996), found more than 600 titles in the Australian National Library, excluding those of journal articles, that begin with the words 'The End of...'. Clearly, concern about the end of this, that, and the other is not at all a new phenomenon. In particular, concern with the end of science is nothing new. The ideas that physics, for example, has at some point reached its completion, or that its possible extensions might lie beyond human will or capacity, have been proposed many times.

A good deal of the reaction to John Horgan's recent book *The End of Science*, however, has treated that work as something bold and exciting, a daring challenge to orthodoxy that strikes fear in the hearts of scientists unwilling to contemplate the end of their work. One has to think that Mark Twain was not a victim of fear and denial when he observed that the reports of his death had been greatly exaggerated; one also has to think that Twain was well aware that he would die one day. Though the death of science is nowhere near so confidently predictable as was that of Twain, the proposal that science will end, at least the fundamental theoretical efforts that Horgan calls 'science at its purest and grandest' (6), is a proposition for which there

is certainly a plausible case to be made, and not a proposition foreign to scientists or to those who reflect upon science.

What does Horgan's book contribute to this ongoing theme? Nothing, I think, other than the unhealthy impact it will have as a popular seller. *The End of Science* is, to put it directly, a rather bad book. It is based upon interviews with several contemporary scientists and philosophers, so that it is more a series of scattered reports of and commentaries on the responses of a few individuals than it is a systematic case for the end of science. That in itself would not make the book a bad one, of course; a journalist's weaving of a story through the interview technique could be an illuminating presentation of a theme of genuine interest. Unfortunately, however, Horgan's story is an idiosyncratically twisted one, and Horgan simply does not have the resources to make his personal take on the theme in question of any serious interest to anyone else. There is no subterfuge here; Horgan straightforwardly presents the work as 'overtly judgmental, argumentative, and personal' (5). In the hands of one with real resources to bring to bear, such an approach could have yielded a truly interesting result, but, in Horgan's hands, the result is sophomoric.

Horgan speaks, for example, not of a continuous transition along an increasingly limiting road, but of a tidy dichotomy between the days of truth in science and the current days of an 'ironic' science that must be advanced in independence of all possible evidence. When the Nobel physicist Steven Weinberg disagrees in an interview, saying '... I don't see any philosophical discontinuity here,' Horgan simply 'reads' this remark in the style of the postmodern textual ironist, finding it to mean just the opposite of what was actually said. 'There was little conviction in Weinberg's voice,' Horgan reports. 'Deep down, he surely knew that superstring theory *did* represent a discontinuity in physics ...' (74). Horgan takes such an approach throughout, using the words of whomever he interviews to suit his own purposes, extracting from the truly interesting people with whom he talked little of value for the reader. The result is neither good journalism nor good philosophy.

In addition, Horgan is regularly either careless or ill-informed. One cringes when Yo-Yo Ma is described as 'the great Japanese cellist' (187), yearning for the days when journalists and editors had higher standards, but the errors or the carelessness are more significant when they concern the content of the science or the philosophy that Horgan is writing about. The views of Thomas Kuhn, for example, are egregiously misrepresented. Horgan is certainly not alone in misrepresenting Kuhn, but, having actually asked Kuhn about the issues in question in a direct interview, Horgan must resort to the claim that literary theory teaches us that a work is to be seen simply as a text whose author is not to be afforded authority as a privileged interpreter of his own assertions. While a work certainly can take on a life of its own, one wonders why Horgan bothers with an interview if it is to be what others think about Kuhn rather than what Kuhn himself has to say that is to be of interest.

There are more straightforward technical errors: in the characterization Horgan gives of the nature of undecidability in mathematics (228), in the description of the Mandelbrot set (194), and in the identification of nonlinearity with inherent unpredictability (192), for example. None of these errors is critical, but one has difficulty taking seriously the views of a man who can't get straight the details of the science he talks about, who must impose ironic reinterpretations upon the views of those he interviews in order to find support for the positions he wants to advance, and who passes time at a physics conference asking the attendees, 'Who is the smartest physicist of them all?' (65). As the Cal Tech physicist David Goodstein commented wryly in reflecting on Horgan's thanks to his agent for helping him to 'turn an amorphous idea into a marketable proposal' (267), 'it might have been better if he had just written a book' (*Science*, 14 June 1996). Horgan's effort has proved to be marketable, but it is not one worthy of serious attention for any contributions toward understanding why one might expect an end to theoretical science.

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John Horton and **Susan Mendus, eds.**
After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre.
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 1994. Pp. x + 322.
US$46.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-268-00642-3);
US$22.50 (paper: ISBN 0-268-00643-1).

In this volume are collected a number of essays, some originally presented at a 1991 University of York conference, which comment on a variety of issues rising from recent directions in MacIntyre's work, focusing particularly on the adequacy of his representations of the key thinkers and traditions he discusses. Of concern are his accounts of Aristotle and Aquinas' thought, and his claims about modernity, the Enlightenment and liberalism.

For example, three articles take issue with his use of Aristotle in *After Virtue* and Thomas Aquinas in the more recent works, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* and *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*. Peter Johnson examines MacIntyre's attempt to reclaim Aristotle in the context of political rationality by considering whether or not his modified perfectionism has any greater resources than modern liberal views for handling the question of Machiavellian political ruthlessness. It does, he suggests, depending on the

success of MacIntyre's translation of Aristotle into a modern idiom. Guided by character, practical wisdom can impose sufficient moral limitations on political action, but only in relation to a credible notion of the telos that provides a definite content to human flourishing. Johnson traces MacIntyre's recovery of that telos through the notions of practice, narrative order and tradition, suggesting that although MacIntyre's historicist notion of this telos is a remarkable beginning, it requires many further elaborations. Janet Coleman and John Haldane address more directly the scholarly flaws of MacIntyre's use of Aristotle and Aquinas, focusing on the glaring contrast between the essentialism of the earlier thinkers and MacIntyre's historicism. Coleman examines the connection between Aristotle's metaphysics and his ethics, pointing out that MacIntyre misconstrues the timeless nature of essential definitions and therefore, his account of traditions can neither be Aristotelian nor Thomist. Haldane highlights the irony that MacIntyre's occasional complaints about the revisionism of earlier Thomist revivals can as easily apply to his own. The interesting contemporary possibilities of Thomism for Haldane lie in its articulation of a plausible form of philosophical realism, and this is surely incompatible with the relativistic bent of MacIntyre's approach.

Another group of essays question the cogency of his historicism itself. MacIntyre insists that arguments over standards of rationality and value must be understood to be historical, but wants to avoid the scepticism and relativism to which this could lead. If he wishes to contextualize practical rationality and deny that it has any ultimate objective form, yet maintain some meaningful mode of discussion about values, there remains much for him to explain. Paul Kelly evaluates his critique of utilitarianism, that utility cannot be given a foundation that will establish it in the face of other incommensurable traditions of practical rationality, which constitute individuals as subject to some historical understanding of value. Kelly argues that MacIntyre cannot support so strong a historicist thesis that he can maintain the incommensurability of traditions. Utilitarians, then, can employ some version of Rawls' 'reflective equilibrium' to justify utility by a comparison of its resources with the resources of competing theories. Robert Stern defends a non-relative form of MacIntyre's historicism by attempting to make sense of his claim that historical traditions can be evaluated by their success or failure to resolve the problems of their predecessors. He develops a historicist notion of progress in the context of artistic development. Stylistic and technical developments, in, for example, painting, that successfully overcome the limits of previous styles, can provide a model for a contextualized discussion of value in which historical arguments can be meaningful without assuming progress toward an ultimate finality. However, this requires of MacIntyre a more subtle position than he in fact maintains. For Gordon Graham, on the other hand, no amount of subtlety will suffice. MacIntyre's emphasis on the need for a historical understanding of our moral and philosophical concepts is interesting and important, he argues, but the attempt to fuse the historical and the normative into one critical approach

must be abandoned. An adequate grasp of the role of moral concepts in a narrative life may require historical understanding of their place in a tradition, but it would also require conditions of identity for that tradition, and such conditions could not be strictly determined by the tradition. MacIntyre must choose between Hegel and Nietzsche.

It is not so clear that MacIntyre can compel a choice between liberalism and his own perfectionism and communitarianism though, for as we see in another brace of articles, several authors take issue with his reading of the Enlightenment, of Rawls, and his account of liberalism as a tradition. Philip Pettit, for example, argues for a revival of republicanism, as an alternative to the options of liberalism or communitarianism presented by MacIntyre. The liberal/communitarian dichotomy is plausible only assuming the dichotomy of Enlightenment and Romantic traditions, which has informed, but limited our thinking. This division excludes a pre-Enlightenment republican tradition in political thought, which, if explored, could provide a valuable alternative to MacIntyre's dichotomy. Stephen Mulhall attempts to shrink the distance between MacIntyre's practice-based account of rationality in morality and an Enlightenment model, by way of an assessment of MacIntyre's critique of Rawls as the central representative of liberalism. Once misunderstandings of Rawls are cleared up, Mulhall finds MacIntyre's position to be largely compatible with liberalism, and suggests that MacIntyre should really recognize liberalism as a tradition in its own right. Then it could enter into substantive debate with MacIntyre's Thomism, as a credible rival with its own claims about human life and rationality. Andrew Mason wonders whether liberals, though happy to see themselves as a historical tradition, can really be happy to see their standards of rationality and value confined to a tradition. He challenges the notion of incommensurability that seems to be at the heart of MacIntyre's insistence on the irresolvability of contemporary ethical debates, suggesting that none of the bases MacIntyre gives for this incommensurability serve to adequately explain this lack of resolution. MacIntyre's tradition-based rationality itself adopts features of the Enlightenment ideal that allow for principled accounts of value that have meaning beyond their tradition.

Beside the themes mentioned above, there remain unmentioned discussions of justice, possible feminist uses of MacIntyre, further discussion of the Enlightenment project, plus a reply to some of the concerns raised here by MacIntyre himself. All in all, this book provides a well-rounded discussion of MacIntyre's work.

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Immanuel Kant
The Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. and ed. Mary Gregor. Intro. Roger J. Sullivan. New York: Cambridge University Press 1996. Pp. 242.
US$44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-56217-1); US$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-56673-8).

It took Kant twelve years to produce a follow-up to the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. As is well known, though, the *Metaphysics of Morals* of 1797 is not a direct sequel to the earlier work, despite the title which suggests otherwise. Mary Gregor has undertaken the difficult task of rendering the linguistically intricate and somewhat out-of-date German of the original into a readable and precise English version. As far as I can see, there are no major inaccuracies.

In his introduction Roger Sullivan rightly points out that most people who are 'interested in Kant's moral theory have tended to neglect the *Metaphysics of Morals*.' In other respects the introduction to Gregor's fine translation is unhappy, to say the least, as it reinforces many of the exegetical distortions Kant's practical theory has suffered over the years. One of the major ones certainly consists in attributing to Kant the view that 'the function of the categorical imperative is to help us generate *maxims*' (ix, my underlining). Nowhere does Kant say this. And rightly so, because such a claim would overburden the categorical imperative with tasks it is not designed to deal with — and weaken the theory as a whole considerably. On the contrary: the categorical imperative is a means to *test* maxims we have already formulated and which we consider acting upon. It is designed to help us find out whether to act on a given maxim is morally permissible or not.

Another slip is Sullivan's statement that universality requires nothing less than that 'maxims apply equally to everyone' (xii). Though it is true that Kant is not very forthcoming on the subject of maxims as such he does give a few clues. We learn from the opening paragraph of the second *Critique* that maxims are more or less general in scope and license various subordinate practical rules. This makes it plausible to view them as long-term guiding principles for our lives. Now since human beings may have different aims, there is no need whatsoever that my maxims 'apply equally to everyone'. What the Categorical Imperative invites with regard to maxims is a thought experiment. We are only required to ask ourselves: *would it be possible* for everyone to follow the maxim I am about to act on and would this lead to some sort of contradiction sooner or later. The modal operator is essential in this context, indeed.

And there are more inaccuracies. 'The moral law requires us to act morally right' (xii) claims Sullivan. This obscures an important step in Kant's argument. The moral law *describes* what is morally good. It takes the *form* of an imperative only for finite beings who do not invariably will the moral good — as perfect and holy wills are supposed to do — because they are determined

not only by reason but also by their sensible nature. Only for such beings must the law take the form of a command. If one is not careful here, many of the argumentative moves Kant makes in his attempt to avoid any reference to empirical conditions in the justification of the moral law are obscured or become unintelligible.

I will stop here and go back to the beginning. It is still true that the *Metaphysics of Morals* has been strangely neglected by people who are interested in Kant's ethics and it is equally true that it is quite an undertaking to translate a work which is so very much part of a larger framework, of a 'system', as the *Metaphysics of Morals* undoubtedly is. One meets with theoretically loaded concepts in almost every sentence. Considering this, I think Gregor did an admirable job. So don't be scared off by my remarks on the introduction. If your German is not up to Kant's beautiful but sometimes exerting sentences, get this translation and read it.

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James L. Kastely
Rethinking the Rhetorical Tradition: From Plato to Postmodernism.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1997.
Pp. viii + 293.
US$30.00. ISBN 0-300-06838-7.

Ever since Wellek and Warren's *Theory of Literature*, it has been commonplace to distinguish internal and external approaches to discourse. Internal approaches concentrate on texts in themselves, whether spoken or written. External approaches may focus on the biographical, psychological, or sociological contexts of texts. Kastely's book is externalist, a new take on the ancient topic of rhetoric. Situating it will require some reference to its antecedents.

Rhetoric declined over a period of two millennia from its privileged place in classical education to total irrelevance. Relying on Bender and Wellbery, Kastely makes the demise of rhetoric coincide with modernism (136-7). But since 1950, roughly, rhetoric has revived. Evidence abounds, but one point of reference is the work of Oxford Marxist Terry Eagleton. In his *Walter Benjamin* and *Literary Theory*, Eagleton attempts to build on Benjamin's claim that 'there is no cultural document that is not at the same time a record of barbarism.' Recalling that traditional rhetoric took the entire field of

discourse as its object, attending particularly to persuasive power, Eagleton argues for a recovery of rhetoric. To combat barbarism, rhetoric should become political criticism, exposing 'the link or nexus between discourses and power' — ideology (*Literary Theory*, 210).

Like Eagleton, Kastely calls for a recovery of rhetoric to combat ideology, 'the mystification of power within discourse' (222); summons his reader to assume responsibility for injustice; opposes the political disengagement of postmodernism; and lionizes Plato. But though he shares Eagleton's goal, he has 'a different way of trying to achieve this goal' (243). There are two major differences. Whereas Eagleton's historical materialism presupposes a sharp Platonic divide between truth and opinion, Kastely avoids Eagleton's appeal to a standard of justice 'outside rhetoric' (243), professing himself skeptical about truth: 'when one is persuaded, what is one persuaded of? Not truth ... Instead, one will be persuaded of what a rhetor has allowed a reader or audience to have figured out' (219). Second, Kastely has limited faith in economic solutions: 'no economic reorganization can ever do away with injustice, even theoretically' (228).

Hence Kastely's 'new rhetoric' is not informed by a Marxist class analysis; it is a 'rhetoric of class' in Kenneth Burke's sense (256). Kastely agrees with the Burkean thesis that language is inevitably hierarchical — a secular version of original sin (227-8). And he approves of Burke's view that 'implicit in our attitude toward things, is a principle of *classification*. And classification in this linguistic, or formal sense is all-inclusive, "prior" to classification in the exclusively social sense. The "invidious" aspects of class arise from the nature of man not as a "class animal," but as a "classifying animal" ' (229). Kastely believes that the unavoidable result of these drives to hierarchy and class is oppression, which 'becomes a natural occurrence for symbol-using creatures' (229). But whether the classification and hierarchy are economic, racial, or sexual, 'rhetoric can either bolster or challenge' their claims (229).

Notice that Kastely's project might be carried forward without reference to classical rhetoric, particularly since some have argued that classical and postmodern rhetoric are incompatible: the rise of the latter requires the fall of the former (138). Kastely demurs. He claims there is a skeptical rhetorical tradition — skeptical about justice, not knowledge — that stretches from Plato, Sophocles, and Euripides to Jane Austen, Sartre, Burke, and de Man. What Plato and the tragedians bequeath is 'a skeptical vigilance that seeks to refute the polis and to make it recognize those whom it is presently excluding' (132).

Tracing this tradition makes up the bulk of the book, and meets with mixed success. On the one hand, the reader finds Sophocles' Philoctetes and our homeless (84), Euripides' Hecuba and our bureaucracy (119), Socrates' gadfly and our cities (58), successfully met in the same breath. But the key figure of Plato is mishandled in three respects.

Kastely sees the rhetorical tradition as 'the play of two competing positions': one of Platonic irony, the other of Aristotelian praxis (218). Whereas Aristotelian refutation is part of persuasion and aims 'to bring the Other to

silence,' Platonic refutation (the Socratic elenchus) employs persuasion 'to provoke the Other to speech' (14). These oppositions are well worth developing, yet there is no recognition of the deeper affinities out of which Plato-Aristotle contrasts usually grow. Plato and Aristotle have a common foe: the unscrupulous rhetoric attributed to Tisias and Corax, rhetoric's presumed founders, at *Phaedrus* 273b-c and *Rhetoric* 1402a18-27. The view of rhetoric as ethically neutral that Kastely correctly attributes to Aristotle — and passes over for missing the deeper Platonic point (13) — originates with Plato (*Gorgias* 456d-7c). But most importantly, the *Phaedrus* sets much of the agenda for the *Rhetoric*.

The second Plato difficulty is occasional distortion. Take the assertion that 'for Socrates rhetoric is essential precisely because it allows us to indict ourselves and our loved ones' (46). Kastely cites *Gorgias* 508b-c, where Socrates returns to his argument that we should accuse ourselves and our loved ones of crimes such as Archelaus'. But Archelaus' crimes were intentional; Kastely's focus is *unintentional* injustice, the inevitable result of using language. This Burkean view of injustice cannot be attributed to Plato's Socrates, who compares injustice to curable illness (*Gorgias* 478a, *Sophist* 230b-e), nor would indictments of self and loved ones necessarily follow even if it could. In addition, Kastely's discussion of the *Phaedrus*' 'apparent contradiction' (50, 186) of distrusting writing in writing misleads through omitting Socrates' segregation of good writing from bad and his claim that only the latter is shameful (258d).

Finally, though the *Phaedrus* appears in these pages, the rhetorical program laid out in its second half does not. This program influences the entire rhetorical tradition, fleshing out the good rhetor foreshadowed at *Gorgias* 504d and undergirding Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Plato cannot be placed without it.

Despite these flaws, this is a provocative, sensitive, and original book. For those looking for a non-Marxist wakeup call, this is it.

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Andrew Light and **Eric Katz, eds.**
Environmental Pragmatism.
New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. 380.
US$19.95. ISBN 0-415-12237-6.

Moral philosophers are not immune from the temptation to use their writings as an occasion for moralizing. Environmental ethicists are no exception here; all too often their discussions involve obeisance to some shibboleth (typically the doctrine of non-anthropocentrism), including a kind of ritualistic expression of revulsion at those of heterodox views, who stand in need of doctrinal correction. That is, all too often, work in environmental ethics employs a reductive notion of morality, as if genuine moral engagement in the world did not require profound sensitivity to the deep complexity of most situations where moral controversy arises.

It is as an antidote to the moralizing impulse in environmental ethics that Andrew Light's and Eric Katz's collection of essays *Environmental Pragmatism* is particularly welcome. As the editors explain in their lucid introduction, a key issue that confronts environmental ethics at this moment is the dispute between moral monists and pluralists. The former hold, in general, that there is a single correct view on environmental questions: 'that only some ways of developing an environmental philosophy will yield a morally justifiable environmental policy' (2). Specifically, the consensus that dominates the field holds that 'an adequate and workable environmental ethics must embrace non-anthropocentrism, holism, moral monism, and, perhaps, a commitment to some form of intrinsic value' (2). These tenets constitute the paradigm under which 'normal' environmental ethics proceeds — tempting practitioners to believe that only those who subscribe to them have a genuinely moral attitude toward the environment. Thus the impulse to moralize; those in the know, morally speaking, take themselves to be in a perfect position to pronounce the moral truth to everyone else — in particular those who disagree with them.

But the problem with moral monism is more than a matter of, so to speak, philosophical attitude or style. As Light and Katz argue, the crucial danger it presents is practical: it seems to stand in the way of progress in environmental policy. 'The small set of acceptable approaches to environmental ethics may be inapplicable to the development of an acceptable environmental policy .... Thus methodological dogmatism may account for the failure of environmental ethics in the realm of practical affairs' (3). That is, a central theme of *Environmental Pragmatism* is that the primary culprit responsible for the poor match between the environmental ethics paradigm and effective environmental policy making is environmental ethics' dominant moral monism. For the most salient feature of the public policy arena is that it is a realm of disagreement. The process of policy formation is meant to forge a workable consensus out of a background of divergent aims. But moral monism, by definition, is hostile toward disagreement: those who do not share the foundational moral axioms are simply wrong, and discussion of what is

right can proceed without them. Of course, however, in most cases the discussions that actually lead to policy formation take place among the non-elect. Thus, the reluctance of monists to genuinely engage with people who disagree with them means that their positions are not adequately represented in the debates out of which policy is forged.

The goal of *Environmental Pragmatism* is, therefore, to offer an alternative vision for environmental ethics. According to this vision, philosophical discussion of environmental issues should not aspire to doctrinal purity, but instead to usefulness in solving environmental problems. To that end, the book brings together essays (most of them original to this volume) by sixteen noted environmental philosophers. Light and Katz hold that these essays exemplify four specific (but non-exclusive) tasks environmental pragmatism tries to accomplish.

The first task is to re-read the classical American pragmatists, to find ways their approach can be employed in thinking about environmental issues. This is the focus of Part I, which begins with Kelly Parker's broad overview 'Pragmatism and Environmental Thought'. Parker's essay is a very successful introduction to the main pragmatic criticisms of standard positions in environmental ethics. Two points he raises regarding anthropocentrism resonate throughout the rest of the book. On the one hand, the rejection of anthropocentrism in favor of some other *single* source of value is, quite literally, an invitation to tragedy — whether that source is human well-being or ecocentrism. 'Denying that one or the other sphere is worthy of consideration may appear to prevent potential moral conflict from arising, but only at the risk of serious moral blindness' (33). Parker cites *Antigone* in this context, and his rejection of monism recalls Martha Nussbaum's discussion of that play, and of her more general account of the philosophical aspiration to the moral self-sufficiency promised by a single scheme of values (see *The Fragility of Goodness* [Cambridge University Press 1986]).

On the other hand, Parker provides a sensible justification for accepting the inevitability of anthropocentrism. On the pragmatic theory of value, experience of the world is the touchstone. Whatever might be valuable for other organisms, what we as human beings can know of value is based on human experience. Parker notes that 'We can and should speak on the others' behalf when appropriate, but we cannot speak from their experience' (33). It is not only appropriate, therefore, it is necessary that debates about the value of the environment — which after all take place among human beings — be phrased in value categories human beings are capable of understanding. This is by no means to subordinate the interests of other creatures or ecosystems to human whim; it is simply to recognize that the policy discussions that will affect those interests will take place between human beings.

Of the remaining essays in Part I, Bryan Norton's 'The Constancy of Leopold's Land Ethic' is most valuable. Norton makes a persuasive circumstantial case that Leopold took up pragmatist ideas fro the work of A.T. Hadley, and that these themes can be detected in writings from throughout his career. Norton offers a very sensitive reading of Leopold's texts, showing

that his eventual disavowal of the predator eradication programs he had once favored was based less on a moral rejection of anthropocentrism than a practical recognition that '"violent" methods of management and control are inappropriate because they also cause unforeseen effects and damage the biotic community' (98).

The second and third specific tasks Light and Katz associate with environmental pragmatism are 'the articulation of practical strategies for bridging gaps between environmental theorists, policy analysts, activists, and the public' and the investigation of the 'overlapping normative bases' of different groups with an interest in environmental matters 'for the purposes of providing grounds for the convergence of activists on policy choices' (5). Part III of the book contains five essays that deal with the question of communication between people who hold fundamentally different views in various environmental disputes. Of particular interest is the examination of the role of philosophy in the process of attaining consensus that is carried out by the opening and closing essays in this section.

Paul Thompson's 'Pragmatism and Policy: the Case of Water' provides a model of how pragmatists can contribute to policy disputes. He rejects the 'applied philosophy' approach, by which philosophers help the parties to a dispute grasp the underlying commitments of their positions in terms of the standard views in moral theory. The problem here, Thompson argues, is that once in possession of abstract moral justifications of their positions, disputants are less likely to be willing to compromise in order to reach a workable solution. He follows Dewey in urging a rejection of foundational arguments, in favor of the 'reconstructionist' project that encourages disputants to attend to maintaining their broad sense of community.

Thompson's suspicion that foundational justifications leads to a hardening of positions in disputes is directly challenged by Gary Varner's, Susan Gilbertz's and Tarla Rai Peterson's essay 'Teaching Environmental Ethics as a Method of Conflict Management'. The authors describe a project where they offered workshops on the main concepts in environmental ethics to citizens in two areas of Texas where there have been environmental policy disputes. They hold that 'when partisans are stuck in intractably opposed positions, retreating temporarily to a higher level of abstraction can facilitate communication among interest groups' and that philosophical study can be 'a vehicle for encouraging calm, interactive reflection, rather than posturing and confrontation' (280). That is, the philosophical workshop becomes an incubator for the attitudes of respect for others and for rational discourse that pragmatists seek. *Environmental Pragmatism* leaves open the disagreement over the role of philosophy illustrated here — but by juxtaposing these two essays it raises the question in the most effective way.

The remaining task for environmental pragmatism Light and Katz propose is the most abstract: to argue for moral pluralism. Although this is a theme throughout the book, it is most explicitly thematized in Parts II and IV. These contain the three essays that, in my view, constitute the intellectual core of the book: Norton's 'Integration or Reduction: Two Approaches to

Environmental Values', and Anthony Weston's 'Before Environmental Ethics' and 'Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics'. In these pieces the reader finds the clearest, most direct statement of the pragmatist outlook on environmental ethics. They are philosophically sophisticated, yet not narrowly philosophical, in their critiques of the standard positions in the field. At the intersection of their criticisms is their repudiation of monism.

For Norton, monism is tainted by an outmoded (realist) epistemology, commitment to which forces theorists to reject alliances with people who might seek compatible practical ends, but with heterodox justifications. For Weston, in 'Before Environmental Ethics', monism represents a wildly premature attempt to short-circuit the necessarily lengthy process by which new values emerge out of messy historical and social changes. And, in 'Beyond Intrinsic Value', he notes that pragmatism insists on the interrelatedness of values. Rather than forming a hierarchy, in which a master value grounds all the rest, he argues that our values constitute a web, in which a plurality of 'many different kinds of value, and many different sources of value, can be recognized as serious and deep without requiring further reduction to some single all (sic) end in itself' (286).

In sum, then, *Environmental Pragmatism* ably succeeds at showing how the pragmatist strategy can be employed to criticize the standard approach in environmental ethics — in particular, its dominant moral monism. In his concluding essay 'Environmental Pragmatism as Philosophy or Metaphilosophy: On the Weston-Katz Debate' Light underscores this point quite well with his demand that members of the environmental philosophy community tolerate each other's divergent views — since what is at stake 'is not success in solving some interesting puzzles or winning some intellectual game — it is, rather, success in developing adequate environmental policies' (327). The reader who is disturbed by orthodoxy is thus likely to be enthusiastic after finishing the book, since it articulates the critical case so forcefully.

Yet that enthusiasm might be tinged with the wish for more examples of the positive use of the pragmatist strategy to help solve actual environmental problems. The book seems to urge philosophers to engage in practical issues. And with its focus on sensitivity to contingent circumstances rather than a retreat to abstract theories, pragmatism seems to be the model for the proper mode of philosophical engagement. If so, it might seem self-defeating to continue to discuss pragmatism in a general way. The cash value, as they say, of environmental pragmatism will be found in its usefulness in actual cases. But this presents something of an irony: a successful example of environmental pragmatism will be richly sensitive to the details of a particular situation; thus, it is likely to end up looking rather unlike a conventional work of philosophy.

Pragmatically inclined philosophers could therefore benefit from other models for discussing the environment. Certain work in the field of environmental history warrants attention. Especially interesting is the writing of Richard White, who emphasizes labor as a central mode of the human

relationship to nature. Indeed, a comment of White's does much to illuminate environmental pragmatism's criticism of environmental ethics:

> One of the great shortcomings — intellectual and political — of modern environmentalism is its failure to grasp how human beings have historically known nature through work. Environmentalists, for all their love of nature, tend to distance humans from it. Environmentalists stress the eye over the hand, the contemplative over the active, the supposedly undisturbed over the connected. (*The Organic Machine* [New York: Hill and Wang 1995], x)

Correspondingly, environmental pragmatism holds that environmental ethics' moral view of nature is strictly theoretical — based on a disembodied seeing. What is needed, however, is a morality that emerges from human beings' practical engagement in nature — that recognizes the simple fact that human life rests on human labor in the environment.

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Todd C. Moody
Does God Exist?
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company
1996. Pp. ix + 96.
US$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-344-1);
US$5.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-343-3).

Here is a new approach to an old subject. It is a trialogue between college students on proofs for the existence of God. 'David' is the traditional believer, 'Sophie', the philosophy student, and 'Oscar' (The Grouch?) the non-believer. David is convinced at the start that he can prove God's existence but by the end loses his confidence. The book ends with a chapter on the rationality of belief in God in the absence of good proofs.

A good feature of this book is the absence of almost any technical philosophical jargon and the near-absence of names of philosophers. The result is fresh philosophical discussion clear and to the point, readily accessible to the intelligent reader. The knowledgeable reader will not gain many new ideas on the proofs, however. Rather the book is a compendium of what philosophers have said before. The book ends with a bibliographical essay for suggested reading on each subject.

A deficiency of the book is that it too often introduces issues that require careful, detailed presentation, which lies beyond the book's scope. The result is the creation of a false sense that a topic has been exhausted when it hasn't.

The students decide early on that the burden of proof is on the theist to prove that God exists and not on the atheist to prove the opposite. That's because the theist is making an existence-claim he should be willing to defend (3). So David begins with a form of the cosmological argument, which comes to grief because Oscar has trouble with the notion of a self-caused being and because Sophie casts doubts on the principle that every event must have a cause. Next comes the ontological argument and the rebuff that existence is not a predicate that can be added in to the definition of a perfect being.

The next topic is the argument from order, which flounders on the possibility that the world has been around for 15 billion years and that a chance event started a chain of coincidences that gave order in an unintentional way. But Sophie is struck by the fact that humans are 'overendowed' with capabilities far beyond what would be expected from evolutionary needs. This suggests a higher power who has endowed us with such abilities. Next the problem of suffering is tackled, followed by a chapter on miracles. The penultimate chapter is on experience of God, the evidential value of which is questioned mainly because of the multiplicity of religions and their concomitant experiences. The final chapter is on rationality without proof, in which Sophie advances that it can be rational to interpret one's life experiences theistically even if one lacks a proof for God's existence.

Unfortunately, Moody hits a sour note when he puts these woefully uninformed (or worse) words into the mouth of the philosopher, Sophie: 'I don't think Einstein, even though he was a Jew, believed in the judgmental, wrathful God of the Old Testament. His conception was much more subtle and mystical and, perhaps, more mature and suitable for a scientific age' (85). Such a statement has no place in a respectable work by a philosopher of religion.

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Josef Niznik and **John T. Sanders, eds.**
Debating the State of Philosophy: Habermas, Rorty and Kolakowski.
Westport, CT: Praeger 1996. Pp. x + 150.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-275-95712-2);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-275-95835-3).

When some of the greatest philosophers of our century meet, the occasion is likely to be stimulating and significant. On May 8 and 9, 1995, Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas, together with Leszek Kolakowski, the late Ernest Gellner, and other philosophers, met in Warsaw under the auspices of the Polish Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy and Sociology. The debate centered around the question whether the Enlightenment project has any use left for secular culture. Should we, in other words, do away with the belief in objectivity and truth, and with it the distinction between 'finding' and 'making' and look instead for a new way of talk, bypassing entirely the question of objectivity?

Habermas' paper ('Coping with Contingencies — The Return of Historicism') starts with a narrative on the motives of Platonism and of anti-Platonism. The desire for abstract, universal truth is hampered by reason's own self-critique, emerging when the desire for universality is perceived to leave too many particulars behind; hence a new way of 'coping with contingencies' is offered (5). The emergence of modern science went hand in hand with philosophy's critique of its own past, Platonism included. However, the presuppositions of these self-critiques are also laid bare and found to lie upon the very reason that they attack. This self-referentiality is, for Habermas, characteristic of any attempts to dethrone reason from its eminent place as the arbiter of universal truth. The contemporary fascination with the embodiment of truth and knowledge in contexts is reminiscent of Dilthey's method of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, which grounds the historicist mode of thought in which everything including reason and objectivity itself is embedded. Since the interpreter cannot start working at all if he had no clue by which he can interpret the text, the interpretation and what is interpreted are equally inside the circle of history. There is no way out, and this leads to the unpalatable consequence of subjectivization of truth claims.

Habermas' critique of Rorty goes in the same vein. Rorty's attempt to deflate the notion of truth and objectivity is but a symptom of the self-refuting historicism. The argument centers around a criticism of the epistemic notion of truth. Since we can always ask of any belief, no matter how well it is warranted, whether it is true, the epistemic theory falls short. Thus truth claims for the neo-pragmatists would degenerate into mere assertion having no persuasive force. Also Rorty's insistence that notions such as truth be subordinated to happiness would destroy the force an ethical theory has of convincing others. To all this Rorty's replies are familiar. 'We pragmatists' (to use Rorty's repeated way of addressing himself) wouldn't even talk about reality or representation, for this is a symptom of the persistent dualism that

Rorty sees plaguing philosophy. Rather he suggests we should opt out of such talk altogether. The basis for such a proposal is detailed in his own paper ('Relativism — Finding and Making'). Rorty's defense against those accusing him of being a relativist is that 'we ... stop using the distinctions between finding and making, discovery and invention, objective and subjective' (33). Giraffes and bank accounts, to use his example, are on this account on a par, for both have roles in language only because they suit our purposes. Rorty, however, does not endorse the ridiculous position that we make giraffes. He distinguishes between causal connection and what justifies our talks and beliefs about them. He does not offer an argument for this, since that would beg the question; he merely presents the version of his thinking, hoping that the reader would see things the way he does.

For Kolakowski, Rorty's appeal to happiness as the arbiter of action and beliefs won't work because happiness is impossible to gauge. Narcotics produce 'happiness' too, though only in a short run, but do we want to use them to judge our truth claims? Gellner contrasts American and European cultures, and argues that Rorty's is a product of the former, which experienced no trauma resulting from the Enlightenment struggle against the ancient, agrarian mode of thinking. Americans for him are already blessed with the fruits of the Enlightenment from the beginning. What this entails is that Americans can afford to be so cavalier about truth and reason, whereas Europeans had to put forward universalist claims in order to fend off the old system.

Instead of a philosophical tug-of-war between relativists and anti-relativists, what we have here is, strictly speaking, no battle at all. To avoid begging the central question, Rorty does not offer an argument for his vision, while Habermas, Kolakowski and Gellner appear to engage themselves fully in the contest, employing full traditional philosophical weaponry. Thus what has happened is that both sides largely missed each other. It is in fact very difficult to argue against such a position as Rorty's, for if one employs standard philosophical arguments, the neo-pragmatists would not be deterred, for they would claim that the attacker employs outmoded distinctions and dualisms that 'we pragmatists' don't accept. On the other hand, merely offering an alternative viewpoint or vision would mean succumbing to the neo-pragmatist position from the beginning. Perhaps the situation is as Rorty himself says, that the positions being debated here are so deep that the hope of eventually convincing each other is virtually nil. But is this a recipe for pessimism and despair? Not at all, for disagreements on philosophy hardly spill over to disagreements in other spheres. Rorty and everyone else at the conference agreed that slavery is bad, for example. And no one is hankering for the return of the *ancien régime*. Hence it appears that, with or without the notions of objective reason and truth, the fruits of the Enlightenment project are generally regarded, even by Rorty, to be favorable, and are here to stay.

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Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr.
and **Jeffrey Paul eds.**
Scientific Innovation, Philosophy,
and Public Policy.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. xv + 323.
US$21.95. ISBN 0-521-58994-0.

The complex relationship between science and philosophy is a familiar and often frustrating fact to those who labor within its boundaries. In addition to perpetual theoretical conflicts, the contemporary picture is further complicated by technological and scientific advances which proceed at the speed of the silicone chip. Frequently, the literature of these transformations concentrate upon the rhetorical rather than the analytical leaving the reader with many opinions but little substantive material. This collection, derived from articles originally printed in *Social Philosophy and Policy*, does much to restore the balance.

The initial set of papers address recent developments in biotechnology. Alexander Rosenburg examines the policy and value judgments underlying the Human Genome Project. His skepticism about the inevitable usefulness of the program and the utility of large government funding is supported by a concise description of the biology, economics and politics at issue.

Alan Buchanan approaches biotechnological advancement from the perspective of human disabilities and social justice. While by no means advocating unconstrained implementation of new discoveries, Buchanan draws a dynamic linkage between technology and morality, proposing that under certain circumstances, the requirements of justice 'can speak in favor of genetic interventions when they are needed to assure equal opportunity by preventing undeserved and unchosen serious limitations on opportunity' (36).

Tristam Engelhardt, Jr. considers molecular engineering within the framework of what it means to be human. Through an ambitious if also superficial interpretation of religious viewpoints, he concludes that Judeo-Christian theology militates against genetic interventions by supplying 'a cluster of vague intuitions regarding the impropriety of radically reconstructing human nature' (53). In its place, Englehardt finds an agreement-based secular morality, capable of multiple outcomes. As a result, the stability of human nature, particularly as it is dictated by chromosomal architecture is no longer assured. Moral diversity under this scenario is thus engendered and perhaps mediated by scientific progress.

The complexities of governmental initiatives and regulation are considered in a pair of essays. Eric T. Juengst, former Chief of the National Institutes of Health's Ethical, Legal and Social Implications Branch, offers an experiential account of the program's inception and implementation within the research community. Henry I. Miller explores the Clinton administration's attitudes toward biotechnology, making liberal comparisons to the

Russian Lysenko debacle. Regardless of whether one accepts his criticisms of the Vice-President or various federal agencies, the article clearly portrays the enormous power possessed by governments to promote or discourage scientific growth as well as the potential for its arbitrary exercise.

Typical of this collection's emphasis upon contemporary issues is its consideration of the increasingly pertinent matter of scientific property. Michele Svatos traces the traditional justifications for patent protection and applies his findings to biotechnology. The analysis, which questions the economic and social utility of conventional legal paradigms accentuates the challenges faced by modern jurisprudence. Robert P. Merges goes behind the formal juridical landscape to reveal a private version of scientific exchange based upon informal rights and professional agreements. Svetozar Pejovich rounds out the trio by providing a defense of classical proprietary schemes, linking contractual liberties and ownership initiatives to the smooth flow of technological innovation.

Several papers are directed at specific issues which are currently gaining attention within scientific, political and legal spheres. R.G. Frey outlines arguments for and against animal experimentation, deftly balancing the needs of medical research with humanitarian concerns. David Friedman explores the world of encryption, providing a comprehensive technical description and a reasoned consideration of its effects upon notions of privacy and autonomy. James Fetzer examines problems of agency and liability as presented by the malfunction or misuse of digital systems. William Bechtel investigates the feasibility of locating moral responsibility in artificially intelligent agents.

Susan Haack concludes the volume with a series of reflections on the current status of philosophy as it has related to the sciences. The essay points to the increasing tendency of the discipline to mimic the processes of science. At one level, this has produced a 'culture of grants-and-research-projects' (301) — a dubious enough situation in the sciences — but within the present context, one which has 'encouraged a kind of philosophical entrepreneurship, which often diverts time and effort from real work, and is sometimes, to speak plainly, nothing more than philosophical hucksterism' (303). Haack attacks what she sees as philosophy's advance toward a result-oriented ethos which fosters the value of efficiency and suppresses the 'candid acknowledgment that one may work for years at what turns out to be a dead end' (304).

Haack's conclusions are indeed strong reminders that philosophy must retain its ability to examine its subjects from an objective and informed position. This comprehensive and provocative collection suggests that the goal remains well within reach.

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William Armstrong Percy III
Pederasty and Pedagogy in Archaic Greece.
Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press 1996. Pp. x + 261.
US$24.95. ISBN 0-252-02209-2.

In contrast to the title Percy's book is not so much an examination of the relation between pederasty and education as it is a historical examination of the origins and diffusion of institutionalized pederasty in Archaic Greece. Percy argues that pederasty was first institutionalized in Crete in seventh-century BCE in order to curb population growth. From Crete the institution was adopted by Sparta and then spread elsewhere throughout the Greek world.

Percy's thesis is both new and old. His theory is a departure from the traditional theories of 19th- and 20th-century scholars who had argued that Greek pederasty was derived either from the Northern Indo-Europeans or from the East. There is simply no evidence that the Proto-Greeks ever practiced institutionalized pederasty. Moreover, Greek pederasty differs in its essential character from homosexuality as it was practiced in the East. Percy's position is old insofar as he has returned to the accounts of the origins of the pederasty given by the early Greeks themselves (e.g., Aristotle, *Politics* 1272a12). Percy holds that the Cretan origins best accounts for the literary, historical and archaeological evidence on the subject.

Pederasty and Pedagogy is divided into three parts. Part one summarizes and evaluates most of the notable theories on the origins of Greek pederasty held over the last century or two. In part two Percy examines the Cretan origins of Greek pederasty and the Spartan adaptation of the institution. Pederasty was instituted to check population growth in Crete and the concommitant threat to landowners. By keeping the young men erotically occupied, marriages could be postponed until the men were 30 years old. Percy argues (68), 'delayed marriages for upper-class males from eighteen or nineteen to thirty would reduce the birthrates significantly.' Drawing heavily on Ephorus' lost history (partially preserved in Strabo's *Geography*) Percy points out that the Cretan pederasty was centered on the ritual abduction (with the assistance of the boy's family and friends) of the most manly and decorous youths and a subsequent two month 'honeymoon'/hunting trip. Other elements associated with this institution included common meals, the gymnasia, symposia, and the seclusion of women.

The combination of the development of manly virtue and population control made pederasty appealing to the Spartan leaders just after the Second Messenian War. The Spartans adopted the institution but modified it by dropping the ritual kidnapping and further militarizing it. From Sparta the institution spread throughout Greece.

In the final part of the book Percy examines the character of pederasty as it was adopted in different parts of the Greek world. Percy shows that Greek pederasty was not a monolithic institution and that almost every city prac-

ticed and celebrated the practice in its own characteristic manner, with local pederastic heroes and myths.

Pederasty and Pedagogy is stylistically clear and well documented. The work is not, however, a philosophical examination of same-sex relations in ancient Greece. The obvious philosophical issues such as the essentialist/social constructionist debate are not explored; nor are the pragmatics of instituting same-sex behavior on such a scale satisfactorily treated. Percy is a historian and not a philosopher, thus the primary value of the work lies in expanding our understanding of this unique phenomenon in history given the complexity of the historical sources. It is up to the philosopher to evaluate its significance.

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Ato Sekyi-Oto
Fanon's Dialectic of Experience.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1997. Pp. 276.
US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-674-29439-4);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-674-29440-8).

In *Fanon's Dialectic of Experience*, Ato Sekyi-Oto borrows from Sartre, Heidegger, Marx, Hegel, Gramsci and others in his deconstructive post post-colonialist reading of Franz Fanon's major texts. Sekyi-Oto's own text is so dense, abstract and hyper-theoretical that many readers who are not themselves primarily interested in 'theory' will wonder how it is possible for a labyrinthine exegesis such as this to illuminate a body of work that whatever its theoretical ambiguities, is not at all difficult to read without secondary interpretation. But, conceptual sputtering and stuttering aside, Sekyi-Oto's main claims about Fanon are fairly simple and straightforward.

According to Sekyi-Oto, Fanon believed that it was necessary for peoples who had been excluded from history as a result of colonization, to return to history. Fanon did not think that the mere substitution of one racial group for another in a situation of oppression was a satisfactory solution to oppression (*Fanon's Dialectic*, chaps. 1 and 2). Fanon insisted that a complete understanding of the colonial situation required an analysis of the ways in which white and nonwhite existence were different in situations of dominance and subordination (chap. 2). Fanon thought that after liberation from colonists, the internal structure of colonized countries could not be under-

stood in racial terms alone because different classes and contending social groups had to be understood in terms of their conflicting interests (chap. 3). Fanon believed that it was necessary for intellectuals in liberated nations to develop political principles and make moral judgements for the best interests of an entire people. For this to take place, a new intelligensia, alienated from the self-serving nationalist bourgeoisie, would have to develop as an idealistic political opposition to both tribalism and nationalism. Fanon was aware of both the justice of liberating post-colonial women and the difficulty of doing so insofar as the liberation of post-colonial men entailed their assumption of patriarchal roles and privileges that white rulers had denied them (chap. 4).

The main problem with the foregoing themes in Sekyi-Oto's interpretation of *Black Skin, White Masks, A Dying Colonialism*, *Wretched of the Earth* and Fanon's political essays, is, as Sekyi-Oto is himself aware, that they create a tension between Fanon's universalist humanist ideals and his focus on particular post-colonialist historical contexts. Sekyi-Oto resolves some of this tension by a dramatic reading of Fanon as an epic dialectician who was speaking hypothetically about particularity and violence, rather than a didactic revolutionary ideologue. He argues that Fanon intended to construct an epic narrative of revolution as a creative process that would combine the liberation of nonwhites with the realization of the highest Enlightenment ideals. Sekyi-Oto's Fanon was above all concerned with the redemption of humanity through a new unity of third world life and first world ethics and reason:

> To vindicate this vision of regeneration, Fanon, to the chagrin of his future postmodernist critics, resorts to a foundationalism that is at once anamnestic and prophetic. Anamnestic because it seeks to retrieve "the permanent values of human reality," to remember the pristine promises of "human things" with which to "feast the eyes" of a resurgent people as the challenge of their strivings. Prophetic because, thanks to the thoroughness with which the history of all hitherto existing society has demolished all enacted essences; thanks to the brutal consistency with which, Fanon acidly noted — and he speaks specifically of the West — concrete and palpable human beings have been mercilessly violated at the very moment the idea of humanity was being solemnly invoked; thanks to the battering to which "the destiny of being" (in Soyinka's words) has been subjected, these foundations, understood as excellences of human existence and association, have always been contested possibilities; harried survivals salvaged from the strivings of the past for the judgment of things as they are in the name of things as they might be. (*Fanon's Dialectic*, 239)

It is difficult to contest Sekyi-Oto's general claim that when Fanon was talking about the need for radical change in situations of oppression based on race, racial difference was his primary conceptual tool, but when his subject was inequalities among post-colonial nonwhites, class was his focus. However, some may object that given situations of multiple oppression in a

racially pluralistic society, such as the United States, it is not always clear when race is the primary 'causal' factor and when class is: if nonwhites are always worse off than whites within each social class, then race is determining; if whites use nonwhite race as a marker for classes that can be oppressed and exploited, then class is determining. Also, Sekyi-Oto does not seem to notice that contemporary North American theorists of *Negritude* (which Fanon rejected after his complaints against Sartre's racially-neutral applications of Marxism to Africans) use black race as an interracial medium for post-slavery entitlement — they also use black race as an intraracial medium for constructions of Afrocentric identity.

However, on the level of emancipatory political praxes, the promise of Sekyi-Oto's Fanon as a benevolent humanist voice cannot be complicated or stilled by critics, in the wake of the brutalities of postcolonial totalitarian African governments. If the bourgeois-nationalist elites of these regimes have derived theoretical justification from particularist readings of Fanon's earlier writings, then it is the theorists who rely on racial liberation alone to correct injustice, who are in need of further contextualization. And indeed, Sekyi-Oto makes it clear at the outset of *Fanon's Dialectic of Experience* that the plight of African postindependent nations is his main concern.

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T.K. Seung
Plato Rediscovered: Human Value and Social Order.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1996.
Pp. xviii + 325.
US$64.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8111-4);
US$26.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8112-2).

Seung's main thesis is that Plato's great invention is political philosophy, that such is to be found not only in the *Rep, Pol*, and *Laws* but also in the so-called non-political dialogues, and that the non-political topics are taken up by Plato in his search for the political art. His book is an extended argument to support that thesis. In what follows, I review his methodology, review the main lines of his argument, and raise questions about his methodology and argument.

Seung thinks it is a mistake to take Plato's dialogues monadically; one should take them as all connected. But he is not the kind of unitarian who thinks that Plato's thought is unchanged throughout his corpus of writings.

Nor is he the kind of developmentalist who sees Plato as developing and elaborating a philosophical system. Plato, for Seung, is focused on inventing political philosophy. Plato's developments are properly seen, Seung thinks, not by getting precise about Platonic chronology, but by identifying thematic connections, 'frame stories, the dramatic settings, and other literary devices' (xvii). Here are some examples: Seung's connector between the *Grg* and *Rep* is in the similarity of the thoughts expressed by Callicles in the one and Thrasymachus in the other. Between the *Smp* and *Phd* the connector is the Minotaur slain by Socrates in the latter but ridden by him in the former. Between the *Smp* and *Phdr* the connector is both the presence of Phaedrus in the former and the resemblance of the names Lysis (also the name of a dialogue on love) and Lysias (the speechwriter on love in the *Phdr*). It is by means of themes that Seung weaves together the cloth of Plato's thought. The thematic connectors leads him to organize the development of Plato's thought in such a way to go against widely received beliefs about Platonic chronology. Here is Seung's thematic ordering:



That this ordering fails to correspond with a chronological ordering is no problem for Seung; Plato could have revised earlier works to add the thematic connectors.

For Seung, the *Grg* (the subject of chapter 1) is foundational in setting forth the problems that will occupy all of Plato's career. Callicles is the spokesman for 'the life of power and greed' in contrast with Socrates who champions 'the life of justice and piety' (1). To respond to this Calliclean challenge, Plato spends his career. Each of the subsequent developments in Plato's epistemological and metaphysical thoughts are seen, by Seung, as contributing to his response. The first step in the response is Plato's discussions on love and friendship and his conception of Forms separate from the phenomenal world (chapter 2 on *Lys, Phd, Smp*). These qualities, rather than power, fulfill the human longing. The second step is Plato's conception of the philosopher as grasping the Forms and descending to the phenomenal world to initiate an harmonious community of *philia* (chapter 3 on *Prt, M, Euthd, Rep*). The third step Seung sees as Plato's self-reflective interlude in which Calliclean 'negatives' are made 'positives' by Platonic revision (chapter 4 on *Phdr, Cra*). In *Phdr*, Plato combines rhetoric with love (in contrast to Callicles' rhetoric with greed). In *Cra*, Plato sees names related not only to phenomena (Calliclean convention) but also to Forms. However, if as the *Rep* has it we can have knowledge only of Forms but only belief about phenomena,

then how can the philosopher use the Forms when descending to the phenomenal world? How can Plato defeat Callicles? What Plato needs is a revised epistemology (chapter 5 on *Tht, Sph, Pol*) which permits knowing by the principle of identity and by the principle of difference. He also needs a revised metaphysics (chapter 6, on *Prm, Sph*) to deal with puzzles arising from alternating between understanding Forms as concrete paradigms and as abstract universals, which puzzles find a resolution in the *Sph* treatment of combining and separating Forms. With this, Plato has all the conceptual tools he needs to construct fully a coherent political philosophy (chapter 7 on *Pol, Phil, Laws, Ti*).

In the last two chapters, Seung steps back from detailed textual analysis and speaks more generally. He discusses Plato's overall project, and his reading of the thematic connectors and development in Plato's writing (chapter 8). For those unsure about reading the entire book, I recommend reading this chapter to see if you develop an appetite for the remainder. Seung applies Platonic thought in responding to relativism and subjectivism, and shows how a Platonic account can provide for universalism and pluralism against relativism and pluralism (chapter 9). As Seung puts it, the contrast is between Platonism and positivism, where by 'Platonism' he means the doctrine that there are transcendent norms that guide and explain the plurality of particular normative judgments (the view proposed by Socrates in many of Plato's writings), and by 'positivism' he means the doctrine that all our norms and normative judgments are a product of acculturation and indoctrination (the challenge of Callicles).

I am skeptical about Seung's method of interpreting Plato. I don't have a knockdown argument against the strategy of lacing together Plato's writings by the use of thematic connectors. But some of the connectors seem too poetic. It is difficult to decide whether Plato placed intentionally the connectors there, or Seung 'free associates' and creates thematic connectors. I am more at home with the approach to Plato's dialogues discussed by Terence Irwin, *Plato's Ethics* (Oxford, 1995) 3-16. It may be that the conclusions reached by Seung and by Irwin have more similarities than their methods and arguments for getting there. For that reason, and because he discusses a wide range of Plato's writings, Seung deserves the scholar's attention.

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R.W. Sharples
Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy.
New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. xiv + 154.
Cdn$69.95: US$49.95
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-11034-3);
Cdn$23.95: US$16.95
(paper: ISBN 0-415-11035-1).

This book is a welcome addition to the literature, since it has been 23 years since the publication of A.A. Long's *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics*, which covered essentially the same ground and had the same purpose. Both are introductory surveys of the three major schools of Greek philosophy from 323 to 31 BC. Sharples' book is 154 pages, compared to Long's 262; it is a quicker read, but does not go into nearly the depth and detail as Long's. Sharples' book is very clear and readable, accessible to an undergraduate audience. There are frequent quotations of the ancient texts, and all translations are his own. The bibliography is minimal, but the notes make liberal references to recent research.

Sharples' first chapter is a brief introduction to the period, philosophers, and sources. His book is organized by topics, rather than by schools as Long's is, and he gives two reasons for this format: it brings out the similarities and differences between Stoics and Epicureans (4), and it facilitates comparison with modern preoccupations (5). Sharples' first aim is achieved admirably. However, this book's greatest weakness is the consequence of this format: the sceptics are practically ignored. 10 of 133 pages of text address the sceptics (compared to Long's 31 of 248), and they just are not substantial enough to be a good introduction to this important school; Long should be consulted here. However, the middle five chapters are a very nice comparison of Stoics and Epicureans on the topics listed below. Each chapter begins with a theme common to the Stoics and Epicureans on that topic, then explains a few major aspects of the philosophers' views, stressing the similarities and differences between them. Sharples frequently indicates problems or possible inconsistencies in these views, sometimes compares scholars' differing interpretations, and often connects the Hellenistic theories to Plato, Aristotle, and presocratics.

Chapter 2 stresses the empiricism of Stoic and Epicurean epistemology, and is the only chapter with substantial reference (5 pp.) to the sceptics. Epicurus explains both perception and knowledge in terms of receiving 'films' of atoms from external objects. Scientific theories are evaluated by whether they are 'attested' or 'contested' by sense experience (15-16). Sharples notes three Stoic contributions to epistemology. First, the doctrine of 'cognitive impressions': impressions which cannot mislead us and which represent objects as they truly are. We should assent only to such impressions and suspend judgment otherwise. Second, the theory of 'lekta'. Third, the development of a system of logic anticipating modern propositional calculus. The

Academic sceptic Arcesilaus turned the Stoics' principles against them by arguing that no impression can be known to be cognitive, so one must *always* suspend judgment. In the absence of certainty, the criterion governing our conduct became what is 'reasonable' (Arcesilaus, 28) or 'plausible' (Carneades, 28). In Pyrrhonian scepticism no assertions are made about the nature of the external world; one can only affirm how things 'appear.' The 'ten modes' of Aenesidemus and the five of Agrippa are mentioned, but unfortunately not discussed (30); Sharples nicely describes the sceptics' attitudes, but says surprisingly little about their *arguments* for their views.

Chapter 3 stresses the materialism of Epicureans and Stoics. Epicurean atomism is described, with a special emphasis on their theology. The Stoic world is composed of passive matter and active god; Sharples discusses their pantheism, use of 'pneuma', the conflagration and determinism, providence and evil.

Chapter 4 focuses on the soul-body relation. Sharples discusses in fair detail the four sorts of atoms composing Epicurean soul, the atomic swerve, and choice (Sharples neglects to mention that there is no reference to the swerve in the fragments of Epicurus himself). Stoic soul is made of 'pneuma', which is god, and the 'tension' of this soul-pneuma does the job of Epicurus' atoms. Sharples explains the eight parts of the soul, the view that soul is purely rational, and the equation of emotions with judgments. Stoic compatibilism is critiqued by the Academic sceptic Carneades, who claimed that the truth value of future tense statements has no implications for determinism, and universal causation is compatible with freedom (78-81).

Chapter 5 addresses happiness. Sharples critically analyzes Epicurean hedonism, in which the limit of pleasure is the absence of pain; and Epicurus' belief that the fear of death (the primary source of anxiety) can be eliminated by accepting that 'death is nothing to us' (94). The Stoics claim that virtue/wisdom is sufficient in itself for happiness, and it consists in 'living according to nature' (101). Reason reveals what is appropriate, and virtue consists in 'making the right selections among external and bodily goods' (102). As determinists, the Stoics exhort us to happily accept whatever happens, even if it conflicts with what we thought was appropriate. Sharples notes the view of Sextus Empiricus: the sceptic discovered by accident that suspending judgment led to freedom from disturbance, and he lives his life without judgments by following 'the fourfold guidance of nature, affections or emotions, customs and skills' (114). Sharples fails to mention the dogmatists' criticism that the skeptic cannot *live* his philosophy; this lacuna is disappointing since his theme is the dialectical connections among the three schools, and since the sceptics are so neglected throughout the book.

Chapter 6 stresses the self-interestedness of Epicurean and Stoic views towards others. Sharples discusses Epicurean views on justice and friendship, and the Stoic belief that only one's own virtue is important (but being concerned for others is not inconsistent with this), their acceptance of slavery, and their theory of universal natural law.

The last chapter purports to conclude the survey and draw some threads together (128) with the late Stoics Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius and the Epicurean Diogenes of Oenoanda. These five pages do little more than present a series of quotations, and the book ends with a quote of Diogenes (with no commentary) exhorting everyone to escape fear and pain by converting to Epicureanism. It is very unclear how any threads are drawn together. It is a disappointing ending, leaving one with the feeling that Sharples suddenly ran out of time, energy, or space.

Sharples' book is to be recommended to beginners primarily interested in comparing Stoic and Epicurean views.

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Sydney Shoemaker
The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. xiii + 278.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-56030-6);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-56871-4).

This book is a collection of twelve essays grouped into four sections with a bibliography, references and an index. Nine of the essays have been published previously and are presented here with minor revisions and added notes. One essay, 'Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge' has been published previously, but is presented here with substantial revisions. Two essays, 'Intrasubjective/Intersubjective', and 'Unity of Consciousness and Consciousness of Unity', appear in print for the first time. This review will focus on these two new essays. In a work that is generally functionalist, these two essays also stand out for their treatment of two issues that are notoriously difficult for functionalism: qualia and consciousness.

As might be expected in a compilation of individual essays, there is some overlap and some inconsistency amongst the twelve essays. In the preface, Shoemaker admits as much. This does not so much detract from the value and interest of the work, as it is a reflection of the honest progression of Shoemaker's philosophical work. Given the progression of the essays, some material that bridges the individual essays might have been included. In the preface, Shoemaker makes some attempt to draw together the work under the one thesis of the first person perspective, but the anthology would have

been benefitted by a beginning or ending commentary on the development of the arguments through the essays.

In 'Intrasubjective/Intersubjective' (141-54), Shoemaker considers the merits of an argument he calls the 'intra-inner argument' (141). The argument is used to lend credibility to the plausibility of intersubjective spectrum inversion in virtue of the plausibility of intrasubjective spectrum inversion. ('[A] change whereby the different colors systematically look different to a person than they did before' [141].) This essay is largely a group of observations on the inverted spectrum problem that Shoemaker has gathered since his 1982 essay on the subject. Shoemaker's goal is to defend the argument against three objections, thus indicating that qualia need to be reckoned with by the functionalist.

The first objection is that so-called intrasubjective inversion is nothing more than the misperception of colors. In response, Shoemaker claims that we can suppose that it is possible for one to have a partial inversion, such that some range of the spectrum is inverted. That this partial range could still bear cogent relations to the remainder of the spectrum rules out a diagnosis of mere misperception. Given the possibility of partial inversions that are not misperceptions, Shoemaker then postulates that one could have a complete inversion after a process of several partial inversions, where at each stage the subject is not merely misperceiving colors.

The second objection denies that the plausibility of intrasubjective inversion lends any plausibility to intersubjective inversion. Specifically, '[r]elations of phenomenal similarity and difference between experiences that would constitute a case of intrasubjective inversion are relations that are well-defined only for the intrasubjective case' (142). Shoemaker responds by arguing that since intrasubjective inversion is diachronic, then it will have the same problems of definition as the intersubjective case. The thought experiment of intersubjective inversion is thus no harder to entertain than the intrasubjective thought experiment. Hence the argument of the objection is not sound.

The third objection denies that an intrasubjective inversion would be undetectable because of the structural asymmetry of the color spectrum. If so, then qualia would be functionally detectable, so qualia would not be problematic for functionalism. Shoemaker is willing to grant that our color space has certain structural features (perhaps one segment of the spectrum is more finely differentiated, or perhaps certain colors have inherent, non-learned, associations) that would make an inversion functionally detectable. But Shoemaker argues that it is possible for there to be other creatures without these structural asymmetries. Hence, the possibility of qualia must be addressed by the functionalists.

In 'Unity of Consciousness and Consciousness of Unity' (176-97), Shoemaker addresses the relationship between mental unity and one's awareness of mental unity. A simple case of mental unity is seeing something as an object, instead of seeing it as several objects: a shape, a color, this part, that part, etc. Shoemaker articulates his general definition of the unity of con-

sciousness on page 178: 'The unity of consciousness I have been concerned with so far is not the unity of all the conscious states of a mental subject, either at a time or over time. It is something much more modest — the integration of experiences into larger, more encompassing, experiences whose unity derives from their content, i.e., from their functioning as experiences of things in the world that themselves have (or would have if they existed, i.e., if the experiences were veridical) a relevant sort of unity.'

The task at hand is thus to explain how it is that one's experiential history is brought together into a single consciousness. Shoemaker discusses three mechanisms that process experience into consciousness. First, objects are not sensed in isolation, they are sensed within a field. For example, a tree is seen in a visual field with various relations to the other objects in the field. Second, there are intermodal relations; different sense modes may amplify, alter, or substantiate other sense modes. For example, one not only sees that the cat is to the left of the dog, but one can also hear that this is the case.

Third, and most importantly, sensory awareness involves an awareness of one's self. It is this mechanism that Shoemaker focuses on in the essay. Shoemaker argues that if the self is placed within the sensory space, and if that self is rational (that is, if belief is closed under logical implication and if the beliefs are roughly coherent), then the sensory space can be unified. Shoemaker tests this claim with a discussion of how it is possible that one can know that there are gaps in one's representation of the world. Since one could not be aware of a gap or a lacking without, so to speak, stepping back and examining the relations of the self to the representation, Shoemaker concludes that consciousness of unity is necessary for unity of consciousness. The essay ends with a discussion of objections to this account of the self taken from Parfit and Armstrong.

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Georg Simmel
Essays on Religion, ed. and trans. Horst Jurgen Helle with Ludwig Nieder.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1997.
Pp. xx + 223.
US$27.50. ISBN 0-300-06110-2.

Georg Simmel (1858-1918) is best known as the friend and colleague of Max Weber. As such he has had a significant influence on the social sciences and the discipline which came to be known as 'sociology', not least through his work *The Philosophy of Money* (1900). In this book the editors have taken much time and trouble to isolate and assess the works of this deep thinker as they relate to religion. As such it will be of interest to theologians and philosophers as well as to those involved with the social sciences.

Helle and Nieder present Simmel's work on religion in five distinct sections, divided by topic. These are Modernity (1909-18), Personality (1903-11), Art (1907-14), Methodology (1898-1902), and The Broader Perspective (1906 and 1912). This work then comes from the latter part of Simmel's life, largely after the doctrines of sociology had been set down and after Simmel himself had formulated his ideas on the social sciences. By way of comparison, Weber published his classic *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* in 1904.

Philosophers may find it most useful to begin with Simmel's broad perspective on religion. Simmel did not dwell on the details of particular religions, nor was he interested in religion from an anthropological point of view. Rather, like Weber and Freud, he concerned himself with the spiritual quality of the soul and with the harmony and integration of one's life (137). In particular he discussed and rejected notions connected to psychology and the philosophy of mind, such as mental images, wishing instead to study the feelings and emotions often associated with, or projected onto, organised religious belief and worship.

With this approach Simmel comes to focus on the same phenomena that fascinated Kierkegaard in, for example, *Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing*, Wittgenstein throughout his life and, latterly, Peter Winch, see for instance, 'Ein Einstellung Zur Seele', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (1980-81). As a common, shared part of human experience that brings focus to bear on the subjective and objective dimensions of human life, it is clear that this is an area worthy of study in itself.

For Simmel religion is but one manifestation, albeit an important manifestation, of our social relationships. It is grounded in a society and is to be analysed in terms of various social behaviours. These include behaviours we call art and science. Religion is a quality of our lives that we as social beings take part in. In this way Simmel wishes to make a methodical study of religion and to do this in a sociological way. To this end he picks out notions of existence, relationship, group activity, and personal development in order to highlight the integrative nature that characterises religion and religious

behaviour. Such sociological expression was new and somewhat revolutionary at the time Simmel expressed these thoughts and formulated this approach (1900-20).

From his first essays onwards Simmel concerned himself with ontological and epistemological questions. In particular he was concerned with views on the existence of God, the objective reality of salvation and the relationship between human consciousness and God (121). This latter point has relevance to what was to become a cornerstone of the influential theology of Martin Buber, see, for example, *I and Thou*. That Simmel treats these questions in a different but not wholly different way should yield fruit for scholars of both sociology and theology. In this way Simmel was able to construct an objective, sociological view of religion which in some senses is philosophical, theological and scientific.

Though, for Simmel, one may speak of a religious world view this does not consist in any knowledge of things, or of experiences, or of our destiny (145-6). The religious outlook is not a set of claims to be proven or falsified but rather a state of being. This notwithstanding it would be anachronistic and straightforwardly wrong to regard Simmel either as a behaviourist or as an anthropologist. With the works published in this volume Simmel is marking out the ground of sociology and making space for the debates of sociologists that have taken place throughout this century. Inasmuch as this is the case these are important texts and Simmel is an important thinker worthy of weighty consideration.

Simmel's description and analysis of religion as a way of being is intended to both show and ensure that religion *in propria persona* admits only of strictly sociological analysis rather than of any straightforwardly scientific, logical or philosophical dissection. Such alternative analyses necessarily miss one or more essential feature of religion and religious studies. To this end, religion, as a sociological state of being, consists in essence of individual values and needs structured by a reaction of the heart, investing the individual with a direct, personal meaning (66-9). Once its images and representations are detached from this essence, there religion becomes open to refutation by science, logic and philosophy. Such so-called refutation is only possible at the price of having misunderstood what religion truly is or through having mischaracterised what is essential to religious thought. Insofar as Simmel formulated such thoughts he points the way from Kierkegaard to Simone Weil.

Simmel develops this point further claiming that very often, in practice, religious thinking is prised from its essential spiritual matrix and rigidifies into a system of knowledge that imitates science and thus competes and is judged on scientific terms (189-90). As the church came to compete with the political state so religious thinking came to compete with lay science; it became theology.

Despite his occasionally stated aim to be objective and scientific in his approach to the subject these studies are very much examinations of *fin de siècle* Western European Christianity and its Judeo-Christian scriptural

origins. Where Simmel may be judged to differ from his contemporaries is in his concentration on the qualities associated with this religion. He is interested in the concepts that mark out religious experience as specifically religious and rightly points out that these qualities may be associated with other activities of human life and by themselves are insufficient to require religious beliefs. He nonetheless treats the subject with reverence, seriousness and piety.

Having considered Simmel's work, as presented in this volume and elsewhere, one cannot avoid the suggestion that all this is a little old fashioned. Though his God-free stance and some of his anti-theist views are refreshingly Modern, it remains true that Simmel's studies are of their time and it is further true that that time has passed. He may indeed be bracketed with the pre-Great War thinkers of middle Europe such as Freud and Weber and like them he may be regarded as a product of his culture and identified with the mores of that culture. Certainly his views on women, and, more correctly, the feminine do not sit well with current thinking on gender and gender issues, see for instance the discussion offered by Carol McMillan in her *Women, Reason and Nature*.

Overall this is a well thought out, carefully edited book covering significant areas addressed by a thinker of some standing. That Simmel is of historic importance is not to be doubted. What is questionable is his relevance to current arguments in sociology, philosophy, theology and the social sciences.

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Quentin Skinner
Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. xiii + 477.
US$49.95. ISBN 0-521-55436-5.

Readers will expect and get nothing less than a scholarly, lucid, detailed and thoroughly contextualized account of Hobbes' thought from Quentin Skinner. In loving detail, Skinner evokes the peculiarities of the renaissance background to Hobbes' attempt to provide a science of society, from the austere *De Cive* to the culminating text of *Leviathan*. The dominant theme of his book is that Hobbes initially attempted to construct a quasi-geometrical science

of society, proceeding without rhetorical device by strict demonstration from sound definitions, but later accepted the necessity of presenting a science of society rhetorically, so that a public whose interests were engaged could be convinced of its truth. Skinner shows that Hobbes' conversion is not to the use of rhetoric as we understand it, but to the use of rhetoric as discussed and practised in the Tudor renaissance revival of classical rhetorical devices deriving from Aristotle and Cicero.

Overall, Skinner makes a good case for understanding the subtleties of Hobbes' philosophy with reference to the issues of renaissance thought. For example, in chapters 7 and 8, he shows that Hobbes supports a science of society based on sound definitions and rigorous demonstration not because he seeks an answer to scepticism but because he is concerned that rhetoric may persuade us that 'fair is foul and foul is fair.' Skinner thus singles out 'paradiastolic redescription' (161) as the rhetorical device with which Hobbes is most concerned. This device was primarily seen as providing a way to extenuate vices by taking purchase of their resemblance to virtues. To take Shakespeare again, the problem is that 'there is no vice so simple but assumes some mark of virtue on his outward parts' (Quoted by Skinner from *The Merchant of Venice*, 160). While many renaissance writers were thus concerned with rhetorical excuse or mitigation, Skinner points out that classical writers such as Aristotle were aware that redescription could be used in the reverse direction to disparage virtues (166), and notes that some renaissance writers were also fully aware of this possibility (167-72). Of course, Hobbes' particular concern is with the use of rhetoric for seditious purposes. Skinner notes that for Hobbes, authors of sedition must untruthfully 'name thinges not according to their true and generally-agreed-upon names, but call right and wronge, good and bad, according to their passions' (quoted 289).

Skinner also hopes that recognition of the salience in Hobbes' thought of the need for a science of society will convince us that Hobbes is not 'the creator of an egoistic or a contractarian type of moral theory' but a theorist who tries to identify the necessary conditions of securing peace and who claims that these are in essence behaviours which exemplify 'virtues' or avoid 'vices' (11). However, his account of Hobbes' science of society in chapters 8 and 9 presents what is, on the face of it, an incoherent amalgam of a contractarian and Humean account of justice and virtue.

Thus Skinner begins by construing Hobbes as having a 'choice' rather than 'interest' theory of rights. According to Skinner, Hobbes argues that one can do something 'without right' only if one has assigned the right to do that thing to someone else by covenant, so that an action is injurious or unjust if and only if it 'involves violation of a Covenant or the taking back of a gift' (311). If this is so, the 'moral question of whether [an action] is just or unjust reduces to the factual question of whether its performance involved any breach of promise or covenant' (ibid). Hobbes is then construed as claiming that, in forming a society, every member must make a covenant or 'pact' with every other to submit to the will of a sovereign who represents all in matters

concerned with 'conservation of peace or stable defence' (quoted 312), so that in all such matters anything done against the will of the sovereign is done without right. In my book, this is certainly a contractarian account of justice.

The same unrelenting pursuit of 'science' leads Hobbes, on Skinner's account, to give a contractarian account of 'virtue' and 'vice' also. For, since 'virtue' is nothing but behaviour conducive to peace, every member of society makes a pact transferring to a sovereign the right to make judgements as to what is virtuous. Thus Hobbes' solution to the problem of rhetorical redescription of virtues and vices is to have society submit to what the sovereign decides is virtuous or vicious (319). Skinner claims that, for Hobbes, arbitration by the sovereign is 'the only possible remedy' for otherwise endless disputes over the use of morally significant terms and, in particular, what is virtuous or vicious (318-19).

However, the contractarian account of justice sits uneasily with the claim that, for Hobbes, 'it is natural for us to act to preserve ourselves, with the result that no such actions can be stigmatised as contrary to right' (320). For the consequence of the contractarian account is that if the sovereign decides that one's life is forfeit for the sake of preserving peace or stable defence, then one has no right to preserve one's life, since this is against the will of the sovereign. Further, the contractarian account of virtue sits uneasily with the claim that the sovereign's arbitration is not arbitrary but can be guided by a scientific criterion (320-2). This criterion is that virtue is behaviour conducive to peace and vice is behaviour which undermines peace. There is no reason to suppose that this criterion could only be used by a sovereign. It follows that it must be possible to solve disputes over virtue and vice other than by accepting arbitration by a sovereign, which contradicts the claim that the latter is the 'only possible remedy'.

Some resolution of this tension may be possible. Hume claims that a covenant cannot explain why a sovereign should be obeyed since it must be shown why we should keep our covenants. According to Hume, the only reason for saying that we must keep covenants is that 'society could not otherwise subsist'. However, this also gives us sufficient reason to obey a sovereign, so that there is no need to appeal to any covenant (Hume, *Political Essays*, ed. Knud Haakonssen. [New York: Cambridge University Press 1994], 197). Now, if Skinner is right, Hobbes grounds his science of society in the necessities of social subsistence, as does Hume. However, on Skinner's interpretation, Hobbes must be construed as denying Hume's further claim that reference to covenants is therefore unnecessary. In this light, Hobbes' crucial point is that the survival of society depends in turn on its members covenanting among themselves to submit to the will of a sovereign in all matters concerning peace and defence. On this interpretation, Hobbes, like Hume, believes that political arrangements may only be justified by their contribution to social subsistence but, unlike Hume, believes that a covenant to have a sovereign act for all is necessary to that end. Even so, the claim that we have an absolute right to self preservation will remain inconsistent

with the claim that we can never have a right to act against the sovereign's will.

Skinner makes a rich contribution to the history of thought at one of its crucial turning points, claiming that Hobbes' fundamental contribution to modern thought is an attempt to found a science of society. However, there is a tension in his account of the basis of Hobbes' new science which would have made the book much more interesting to philosophers if it had been explicitly addressed.

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Hans Sluga and **David G. Stern, eds.**
The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. ix + 509.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-46025-5);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-46591-5).

Given the continuing flood of increasingly diverse works on the philosophy of Wittgenstein, what can general anthologies hope to accomplish today? The laudably executed series of Cambridge Companions to prominent philosophers sets itself the imposing goal of offering guidance to new readers while also providing 'conspectuses' of recent interpretive developments for scholars. Vis-à-vis Wittgenstein, these desiderata could only have been met simultaneously in the past. Sluga's and Stern's well-conceived and -crafted anthology contains many excellent essays, to which readers interested in particular topics can be profitably directed. Several contributions, moreover, constitute propitious entrées for newcomers. The volume, however, cannot and does not essay to chart current interpretive effort, instead simply conveying some sense of its breadth.

Two of the volume's highlights are the contributions that frame it: Sluga's balanced and nuanced introductory interweaving of Wittgenstein's life and works and Stern's concluding overview of Wittgenstein's textual legacy, which convinces that Wittgenstein's published remarks are best understood in relation to their unpublished relatives and ancestors. In between, the book contains, very roughly, three overlapping sections: one examining Wittgenstein's far-reaching notion of normativity, a second concerned with the *Tractatus*, and a third about a series of themes of particular, though not exclusive, prominence in the later philosophy.

The collection's single most extensive topic, addressed in roughly half its contributions, is normativity. For Wittgenstein, rules (norms) possess extensive form-giving significance in discursive human life. Collectively, the volume contends that Wittgenstein's explorations of rules offer insight on numerous issues of philosophical interest: the nature of philosophy (Garver), the character of mathematics (Gerrard and to a lesser degree Diamond), the nature of necessity (Glock), and the epistemic structure and idealist dimension of linguistic practice (Kober and Bloor respectively). The anthology thereby champions the integrity of Wittgenstein's distinction between, for example, norms of description and descriptions of matters of fact — though Glock alone explicitly defends this distinction, against Quine's widely influential attempts to dissolve it.

Three of the collection's best entrées into Wittgenstein are also found here: Gerrard's lucid exegetical account of Wittgenstein's views on mathematics; Glock's illuminating confrontation of Wittgenstein's conceptions of rules and of grammar with the analytic/synthetic distinction, the idea of a priori propositions, and nonnormative accounts of language; and Garver's commendably adventurous survey of the relations of grammar to logic, linguistics, natural history, metaphysics, and critique, which will madden scholars already entangled in this nexus of themes. The first two writers, incidentally, unquestioningly follow Wittgenstein's assimilation of mathematics to language, a move that deserves greater reflection and defense.

The *Tractatus* is also well presented in this anthology. Ricketts meticulously thinks through this text's ideas on language — reality relations and the say/show distinction, doing so both from its inside and from its roots in Frege and Russell and thus only for connoisseurs. Sommerfield cleanly and more accessibly positions the *Tractatus*'s views on content determination in a sharply sculpted landscape of fitting versus tracking theories thereof. And Sluga's essay carefully details this book's conception of an antiobjectivist subjectivity.

The essays focused primarily on the later philosophy tackle a range of topics: ethics (Diamond), the critique of philosophy (Fogelin), the opening of the *Investigations* (Cavell), meaning and rule-following (Stroud), the social idealism of normativity (Bloor), forms of life (Scheman), and knowledge and certainty (Kober). Sluga also considers Wittgenstein's post-*Tractatus* remarks on the self. Two of these essays above all call for sophisticated readers' special attention. Cavell's text epitomizes the thoughtful reading of Wittgenstein, demonstrating the wealth of paths and ideas his remarks can spawn while also, *inter alia*, juxtaposing Wittgenstein suggestively with Heidegger. In an essay that bears careful study, meanwhile, Stroud contends that meanings, understandings, and the identities of actions that use or react to language can be specified only in an intentional idiom, developing his argument through a critique of Kripke's account of Wittgenstein on rule-following. Fogelin's and Kober's essays, it should be added, are accessible introductions to their subjects.

Combined, the topics of these essays and of those concerning normativity form a representative sampling of the central issues that exercise contemporary interpreters. Readers will disagree about which key subjects are absent. One important such thematic area is philosophy of mind, a curious lacuna given Wittgenstein's interest and the immense literature his work still generates in this area. Sluga and Scheman alone address Wittgenstein's remarks here, Scheman fairly marginally and Sluga somewhat selectively (his prime focus is the self). Two further unexamined topics worth mentioning — not just because current Wittgenstein interpretation ponders them but also because they repeatedly emerge in the current volume — are natural history and practices. Several authors cite or point toward Wittgenstein's notion of natural history, in ways whose incompatibility signals the need for greater explicit attention. Most of the post-*Tractatus*-oriented essays, moreover, invoke 'practices' without further explanation as a sort of endpoint of analysis. Unfortunately, the volume takes up neither the significance of action in Wittgenstein's thought nor how 'practices' should be conceived (Kober alone takes steps in these directions). This oversight resonates with some contributors' baneful and surprising habits of invoking unanalyzed notions of community or reifying forms of life as block-like entities. In this regard, Bloor's characterization of the constitutive social context of concepts and language as social interactions instead of communities or forms of life is refreshing.

A perennial concern in Wittgenstein interpretation is whether the search for arguments, theses, or theories in the remarks that compose the later philosophy somehow violates their character or Wittgenstein's preferred conception of philosophy. The editors acknowledge this issue: Stern denounces the hunt for theories, and Sluga insists Wittgenstein has no positive account of mind, although his introduction also avers that Wittgenstein's writings do contain arguments and seeming theses. One can rue, consequently, the volume's neglect of both this issue and Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as therapy. (Vis-à-vis philosophy, attention should be drawn to Scheman's marvelous cautionary play on the theme of returning words to their original, 'ordinary', home.) Suffice it to say that this well-done volume contains a healthy variety of attempts to unearth not just arguments and pictures, but positions and accounts as well.

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Gisela Striker
Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. xviii + 335.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-47051-X);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-47641-0).

Originally created for F.M. Cornford in 1930, Cambridge's Laurence Chair of Ancient Philosophy is the oldest academic chair in ancient philosophy in the world. Gisela Striker, following G.E.L. Owen and Myles Burnyeat, becomes Laurence Professor in July 1997. In this volume on Hellenistic epistemology and ethics, she has assembled a collection of her typically elegant and nuanced essays, which amply demonstrate why the specialist community regards her work so highly and why her historical studies merit close scrutiny by non-specialists.

All but one of these essays have previously been published, although two others appear in English for the first time. After a chapter on the Sophists, the first section contains six essays devoted to epistemological topics in Epicurus, the Stoics, and the Academic and Pyrrhonist Skeptics. Eight papers on aspects of Hellenistic ethics comprise the second part. An index of names is included, referring both to contemporary and ancient sources, and also an index of cited passages. Readers would have found it useful also to have included a bibliography. One other minor editorial complaint: instead of employing consistent spelling, both British and American usage is found throughout.

Striker is exactingly attentive to text and language. Furthermore, there is a density of argument in many of her essays. Accordingly, her work resists brief description and, in what follows, I will convey the range of topics included. The first essay, which focuses primarily on the Sophists, is motivated by a puzzle about these 5th century thinkers and later Pyrrhonists. Striker argues that both Gorgias and Protagoras engage in the construction of arguments on behalf of conflicting theses. This method of antilogic (*antilogikē*), which somewhat resembles Aristotelian dialectic, provides the Pyrrhonists with significant philosophical resources. The next essay, a monograph originally in German, is a valuable close comparison of different Hellenistic schools' treatment of the criterion of truth, which was the means for determining the truth or falsity of belief. The third essay concerns the famous Epicurean dictum that all sense-experiences are true. According to Striker, what Epicurus means is that the content of sense-impressions is expressible in propositions, which must be true if they correctly describe perceptual content. In chapter four, the response of two Academic Skeptics, Arcesilaus and Carneades, to their Stoic critics is Striker's basis for extracting Skeptical methodology. The Stoic allegation that Academic Skepticism is self-refuting fails to recognize the extent of Skeptical arguments as *ad hominem*, proceeding from Stoic premises. The puzzle about how precisely Carneades' Skepticism differs from the Pyrrhonism of Sextus is discussed in

chapter six. The Academic strategy is to assume the premises of their dogmatic critics in order to show that knowledge is then impossible. Pyrrhonists instead emphasize the difference between how things appear to one and what really is the case. A Pyrrhonist rejects the dogmatic program of discovering the reality of things and is content with appearances. The other two essays in this section concern the Pyrrhonist Tropes and a brief survey of Hellenistic debates about the criterion of truth.

The section on ethics begins with examining how the justification of moral rules eventually becomes a subject for inquiry in Greek moral theory. Earlier eudaimonists such as Plato and Aristotle ignore the issue, but the Stoics develop a position as a result of the pressure of Academic criticisms. The next essay, chapter nine, looks at the relation between tranquility (*ataraxia*) and happiness. Both Epicurus and the Stoics contend that the completeness of happiness justifies a feeling of tranquility. Why? Someone who has legitimate reason to believe that no important good is lacking ought to be unperturbed. For the Skeptics, however, happiness becomes nothing more than detachment, a state of mind consisting in the absence of any beliefs, which they identify with tranquility.

The next essay, chapter ten, and several others exhibit a contrarian element in Striker's studies, which contributes to their stimulating nature. It is not simply that she departs from established interpretations. The manner in which she does so is also novel, as Striker often constructs fresh readings of an author's ancient critics from which she elicits the interpretation at issue. In this case, through her examination of Cicero's *de Finibus* Striker explores a vexed question concerning Epicurean hedonism on whether the notions of kinetic and katastematic pleasure can be made coherent.

In a paper on ancient conceptions of natural law, chapter eleven, Striker describes what is innovative in Stoic theory. Unlike other ancient ethical theorists who simply endorse moral objectivity, the Stoics also argue that happiness and virtue consist in leading one's life in accordance with the rational pattern of cosmic laws. This point is further developed in chapter twelve, a lengthy, systematic overview of Stoic moral theory, in which she argues that their ethical theory is strongly teleological. Since goodness concerns rationality and the universe itself exhibits the best kind of rationality, the human good must conform to cosmic, rational order. Cosmic nature then ultimately prescribes moral virtue and just conduct. In chapter thirteen, Striker considers the Stoic doctrine of *oikeiōsis*, which describes a process by which the natural impulses of animals can develop in human beings into moral virtue and other-concern. Striker rejects the orthodox consensus that *oikeiōsis* serves as the foundation for much of the rest of Stoic moral theory. Two other essays are included: one about how Antipater, responding to the criticisms of Carneades, modifies earlier Stoic formulations of the final good, and another on the Stoic reception of Socrates and their defense of Socrates against Platonic objections.

Striker's essays share several general features. She systematically searches for and undertakes to justify as much as possible the premises of Hellenistic arguments. In her view, their discussions are continuous with contemporary philosophical inquiry for two reasons. Historical scholarship unavoidably incorporates the perspective of current discussions. It can also serve as a resource for current practice. Accordingly, Striker treats Hellenistic authors qua philosophers, identifying their philosophical strengths, but with equal vigor brusquely dismissing their views when she encounters weaknesses. Striker also locates Hellenistic philosophical inquiry within ancient intellectual debates. Her recognition and emphasis of these contextual features suggest that for Striker philosophical inquiry consists partly in the responsiveness of one philosopher to another. For such historical scholarship to be fruitful, it must combine a high level of exegetical skill with philosophical rigor and clarity. When the result is as thoroughly executed as Striker's work, few scholars will fail to be challenged.

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Evan Thompson
Colour Vision: A Study in Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Perception.
New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. xv + 354.
Cdn$87.95: US$65.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-07717-6);
Cdn$34.95: US$24.95
(paper: ISBN 0-415-11796-8).

In this book, Evan Thompson develops and defends the position he advanced in 'Ways of Coloring' (with Palacios and Varela, *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 15: 1-74), namely that colours are relational properties. Colours are relational properties, Thompson believes, because he believes that the proper level of explanation for colours is the ecological level — that level of explanation sensitive to the interdependence of the environment and its inhabitants. Thompson contrasts the ecological explanatory level with both the computational-physical level (generally favored by objectivists) and the psychophysical-neurophysiological level (generally favored by subjectivists). Thompson also contrasts his position with traditional dispositional accounts, accounts that Thompson insists get the phenomenology of colour experience wrong. (See below.) As I see it, however, Thompson's argument for treating colours as relational properties assumes that colours must either be reduced

to some property of interest to some science or eliminated. Thompson is not alone, of course, in making that assumption.

Why insist that colours be reduced? Thompson offers no argument. The best argument I know assumes that colours must be causally responsible for colour experiences. Since science will determine (and mostly has determined) those causes, colours must be those properties identified by science, or else we are committed to a systematic overdetermination of colour experiences (cf. Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter, 'An Objectivists's Guide to Subjectivism About Colour', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 41, 127-41). This is a powerful argument (though see Stephen Yablo's 'Mental Causation', *Philosophical Review* 101, 245-80). It is hard to see how Thompson might benefit from the argument, however, since his account is susceptible to the argument as well. If colours are relational, as Thompson contends, and science has or will identify the intrinsic physical properties responsible for colour experiences, then how can the instantiation of colours cause colour experiences? Thompson ignores this issue, so I'm uncertain what he might say. (Perhaps he would accuse me of assuming a representational account of perception, which he argues against (220-2). See below.)

Thompson's account faces other objections as well. Thompson says: 'It is undeniable that we see colours as perceiver-independent properties of things' (248). But if, as Thompson contends, colours are perceiver-dependent properties of objects, then colour experience is globally mistaken. That's an embarrassment for Thompson since his primary argument against dispositionalism is that it gets the phenomenology wrong. Colours do not appear to be dispositional properties, Thompson contends, so if colours are dispositional properties, then colour experience is globally mistaken (31-3).

Thompson faces this criticism, but not squarely. He claims that the objection 'rests on sensationalism and a representationist conception of perceptual content' (249), positions that Thompson argues against. But regardless of whether those arguments are successful, they do not touch the objection. The objection I am raising requires neither sensationalism nor representationalism. The only assumption is that we see colours as nonrelational properties of objects. Since this assumption is one that Thompson employs against dispositional accounts, I have no dialectical obligation to defend it.

Thompson attempts a more substantive reply. He claims that 'how something looks is clearly a relational property because something looks as it does only in relation to a perceiver. But *this* relation is not something that it is possible for the subject to perceive ... [since] the perceiving subject is embedded within the relation' (249). I don't see how this helps. Experience is no less mistaken just because the mistake is impossible not to make. The tension, it seems to me, is unavoidable. Thompson contends that colour experience is generally not mistaken and that we generally experience colours as observer-independent properties of objects. But if Thompson is correct about colours, then colours are observer-dependent properties of objects. Therefore, if Thompson is right, our experiences are globally mistaken.

I also worry about the role played by his assertion in the above quote that 'how something looks is clearly a relational property because something looks as it does only in relation to a perceiver' (249). Just because appearances involve perceivers, it doesn't follow that the *contents* of those appearances involve perceivers. If something looks red to John, then there is something true of John. But it doesn't follow that the redness presented to John is a property that he partly constitutes. Furthermore, even if we must appeal to perceivers to *specify* what colours are — to specify, for example, the content of John's colour experience — it doesn't follow that colours are relational. What we must do to specify what colours are is an epistemological matter. What colours are is a metaphysical matter. That we can only specify what colours are by appeal to perceivers does not entail that colours exist only because of perceivers. That Thompson fails to recognize this is obvious from his discussion of J.J. Gibson, a hero of Thompson's book. Gibson, Thompson tells us, 'supposes that although affordances [i.e., environmental properties specified by the environment's relation to some animal] are relationally specified, they are not subjective because they are not projected on to the environment, and so they must exist independently of the perceiver. But this conclusion does not follow. Gibson has conflated subjectivism — the view that affordances depend on the animal because they are mentally or cognitively projected on to the environment — with the quite different idea that affordances are constituted in part by the animal because they are ecological-level properties of the animal-environment mutuality' (228). Perhaps Gibson was confused. But then again, perhaps he merely avoided a confusion to which, I have argued, Thompson falls prey. And since we have an independent reason to believe that colours are observer-independent properties of objects (see the causal argument above), Gibson seems all the wiser.

In conclusion, the strength of Thompson's book is its clarity and Thompson's ability to integrate the empirical work on colours with the philosophical positions that work has influenced. Thompson is extremely well informed about both the cognitive science and philosophy of colour and colour perception. And although I have reservations about his conclusions, anyone wishing to be informed about these areas of cognitive science will certainly find no better place to start her studies than with *Colour Vision*.

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Jonathan Westphal ed.
Justice.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1996. Pp. xxvi + 212.
US$27.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-346-8);
US$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-345-X).

This is yet another collection of readings on the topic of justice. To quote from the blurb on the backcover of the paperback edition, this one is published in 'a versatile series of compact anthologies, each devoted to a topic of traditional interest' in philosophy. Some teachers may find in it an affordable and convenient collection for an undergraduate course. It contains 13 pieces, 11 of which taken from well-known philosophers ranging from Plato and Aristotle to Rawls and Nozick. The first and last pieces are extracts from fiction, namely, Borges' *Labyrinths* and Nabokov's *Pnin*.

The usefulness of this collection lies in the fact that a teacher will find represented here many of the philosophers generally thought to have something important to say on justice. The piece from Borges, although it does not deal directly with the concept of justice, could provide a starting point for interesting tutorial discussions. Students will also find in the *Introduction* a summary for each piece included in the volume. The summaries are valuable for students, especially because the selected pieces are all extracted from much larger works and students reading them 'cold' may lose the point intended by the author or the editor.

Indeed, if one is looking for the editor's point in this collection, one may end up somewhat confused. Although Westphal insists that the arrangement of the selections is primarily chronological, it is in fact not so. Immediately following Borges' piece, we have an extract from Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books 1974), followed by another from Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1971). The editor's justification for starting with these two twentieth-century pieces is 'that justice is not only an academic and historical concept, though it is properly discussed by academic scholars, among others, and it does have a history' and that 'justice is also a concept that has meaning today outside the universities' (xii). Rawls and Nozick are included almost as an afterthought. We also see that Rawls' exposition of the two principles of justice is included, but not his well-known refutation of the utilitarian account of justice. This looks very much like a glaring omission since a piece from John Stuart Mill's *Utilitarianism* has been included. This approach rather tends to undervalue the significance of the twentieth-century discussions on justice generally associated with Rawls and Nozick. Not only do these discussions fill the pages of academic journals today, they also figure prominently in such diverse disciplines as economics, law, social work, and political science, as well as in academic philosophy. Instead of adhering to the usual pieces of ages past, a new collection like this could have been made even more 'contemporary' than the editor has done by including other pieces from such modern philosophers

as Alasdair MacIntyre, Thomas Nagel, Charles Taylor and Ronald Dworkin, all of whom do have something interesting to say on the topic. Doing so is entirely possible even within the constraints of a small volume of this type, as we can see in such other new collections on the same topic as Robert C. Solomon and Mark C. Murphy, eds. *What is Justice?* (New York: Oxford University Press 1990).

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Kwasi Wiredu
Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1997.
Pp. 237.
US$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-33209-5);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21080-1).

'[T]he basic message of this book', Wiredu declares, is that 'human beings cannot live by particulars or universals alone, but by some combination of both' (9). It is clear from this remark that Wiredu's aim is to show that there are forms of thought that are universal to the human species and that human experiences largely reflect our various contingently distinct and particular spatiotemporal frameworks. To accomplish his goal, Wiredu divides the book into four parts: Part I, 'General Considerations' (chapters 2-4); Part II, 'Religion and Morality' (chapters 5-6); Part III, 'Conceptual Contrasts' (chapters 7-11); and Part IV, 'Democracy and Human Rights' (chapters 12-15). I shall briefly elaborate the argument of each section.

In Part I, Wiredu demonstrates that there are certain forms of thought that are universal to the human species. Essentially, his argument is that human beings are different from other animals by virtue of our innate capacity to acquire linguistic concepts and to communicate using those concepts. This linguistic capacity is actualized only in a social context and by the application of external stimuli in the form of training and habit. Both the acquisition of and communication via concepts, because they are socially based, are therefore rule-governed. It is through this rule-governedness that the objectivity of concepts, and hence of meaning, is thus established (19).

Wiredu takes the rule-governed nature of language to be rooted in certain biological facts about the human species. Indeed, he posits three fundamental cognitive modes common to human conceptual schemes and that are

grounded in our biology: perception, abstraction and induction. Perception enables us to identify and reidentify objects of experience. Abstraction enables us to classify objects. And induction enables us to anticipate future events and objects based on recognizable perceived patterns. In short, we think (or acquire concepts) in certain specific ways.

Wiredu illustrates that it is a biological fact about the human species that our thought patterns obey the most basic rules of logic — specifically, the principles of non-contradiction and identity. And in light of these principles he advances the argument that, even though our experiences may be rooted in our particular environments, as indeed they are, because we use language to communicate our experiences we necessarily formulate our thoughts in obedience to these basic logical principles. More significantly, it is in virtue of these laws that we are able to communicate cross-culturally, through the inter-translatability of languages. For this reason Wiredu regards the principles which he believes are presupposed in cross-cultural communication as cultural universals.

But does not ethical (and religious) relativism, rooted as it is on anthropological facts about different societies, pose a strong challenge to the notion of cultural universals? (28) Wiredu offers a negative answer to this question, arguing that the fundamental error of relativists is that they conflate contingent norms of life in individual societies with the rules of morality that transcend cultures (29).

Characterizing the contingent rules of behavior as norms of custom, in contradistinction to rules of morality that he considers transcultural, Wiredu offers a strict definition of moral rules in terms of a 'principle of sympathetic impartiality' (29). This principle, which I take to be an amalgam of Hume's doctrine of sympathy and Kant's categorical imperative, underlies, he says, the human adherence to such values as truthfulness, honesty, justice, chastity, etc. (30). What is significant here is that Wiredu takes the principle of sympathetic impartiality as 'a human universal transcending cultures viewed as social forms and customary beliefs and practices' (29). And he explains our transcultural regard for moral rules as a function of our biological make-up.

Part II (chapters 5-6) is taken up with illustrating further the conclusion of Part I in the domains of ethics and religion using two distinct societies: The Akan of Ghana and christian American society. The thrust of Wiredu's argument here is that the universality of moral and religious beliefs, albeit that these beliefs sometimes admit of substantial differences, presupposes some norm of thought that guarantees communication. Communication in turn is a precondition of societal living. Since society is held together by social and moral codes, it is therefore logically impossible for a human being to be destitute of a sense of morality as also of linguistic ability.

Arguing that similar reasoning applies to human spiritual beliefs, Wiredu goes on to note, however, that it is sometimes the objects and conduct with which humans variously identify moral and religious norms that differ among societies, not the norms *per se*. As an illustration, he observes that, to

the extent that all forms of religion posit a supreme creator, the Akan of Ghana and christian American society, for example, are religious. However, there are differences in the sense in which these two societies are religious. The Akan, unlike christians, do not view the supreme being as eternal, spiritual, transcendent and the archetype of morality. Nor do they believe in worshipping or revering such a being. On the contrary, the Akan hold a materialistic view of the supreme being. They take such a being to exist *in some place*. It follows, then, that Akan cosmological outlook does not admit of the spiritual/material dichotomy that exists in christianity. In this regard, says Wiredu, Akan religious beliefs are very different from Western. If therefore one takes religion to imply subscription to a spiritual entity à la the christian faith, then the Akan are not religious. But need religion be so narrowly defined?

Part III, entitled 'Conceptual Contrasts', is largely a discussion of the type of issues examined in Part II, except that Wiredu highlights some absurdities that follow upon hasty transplantations of cosmological views and concepts particularly from western cultures into African cultures.

Finally, in Part IV, Wiredu examines the issue of democracy and human rights in Africa. Specifically, he shows that majoritarian democracy, with its 'winner takes all' drive, is unworkable in any society of a complex and multifarious socio-cultural and ethnic make up. Drawing upon traditional African gerontocratic forms of governance, while admitting some of their drawbacks, Wiredu advances an argument for representative government in what he describes as a non-party consensual democracy.

Erudite and thought-provoking, the issues Wiredu examines cut across metaphysics, ethics and social and political philosophy. Nevertheless, I have two queries. First, Wiredu seems to idolize the gerontocratic system of traditional African societies, failing to note that it is largely intolerant of criticisms. Besides, he uncritically advances the idea that elders know best. Surely, it can be argued that some of the political turmoil that Africa has witnessed are a result of the very gerontocracy that Wiredu seems to be celebrating. Second, the book suffers from a minor organizational defect. Part IV could have been structured as follows: chapter 12 ('Democracy and Consensus'), chapter 13 ('Philosophy and the Political Problem of Human Rights'), chapter 14 ('An Akan Perspective on Human Rights'), and finally chapter 15 ('Postscript').

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Naomi Zack
Bachelors of Science: Seventeenth-Century Identity, Then & Now.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1996.
Pp. x + 249.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-56639-435-X);
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 1-56639-436-8).

The questions motivating Naomi Zack's book, one of a series on *Themes in the History of Philosophy* edited by Edith Wyschogrod, are about the modern scientific persona and its establishment, questions which have recently occupied those engaged in a critique of modernity. To try to answer them, she gives the reader a cross-section of 17th-century British intellectual history. This includes the reception of Cartesianism, the establishment of the Royal Society, the appearance of Locke's treatises on child-rearing, property, and politics, his theory of personal identity, the cessation of witch-burning, the rise of the bourgeoisie, and the beginnings of empire and of the slave-trade.

At first glance, the bachelorhood of Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Newton, and Boyle does not seem a point of departure for an exploration of the establishment of the modern. There have always been men who did not wish to become involved with women and children, and monastic, military, or scholarly establishments have always been ready to welcome them. There is no special mystery here to investigate; more interesting is the question how emerging conceptions of normality made marriage and fatherhood the rule even for philosophers. Zack rightly criticizes the 'object-relations' school of psychoanalysis for its claims that modern philosophy and science, skepticism, idealism, and the demand for objectivity originated in a pathological flight from woman. We have no evidence, she argues, that bachelorhood in Descartes or in other natural philosophers of the period was pathological: what is known about family life suggests that there was no cult of marital feeling in the 17th century which encouraged or prescribed warmth or emotional dependency between spouses. Locke's theories of personal identify and of child-rearing suggest that the most complex psychological accounts of personhood and its development were framed to address the problems of conduct, sin, moral error, and divine judgement and had little to do with obligations or sentiments towards others. The significance of bachelorhood, she finds, is not negative but positive. These men found deep satisfaction in being married to their work — to natural science — which offered the pleasures of an ongoing and highly agreeable 'conversation' with nature, a convivial social (homosocial, in Eve Sedgwick Kosofsky's terminology) atmosphere, and, with Newton, glory and acclaim for discovering powerful and actual truths about nature. Women were at this time not so much excluded from science and philosophy as distanced by habit and custom, Zack points out; formal barriers, supported by theories of intellectual inferiority of women, were put up only later. Though *Bachelors of Science* is described on

its back cover as a feminist analysis, Zack has little patience with other feminist historians who find sexually exploitative or even sadistic propensities and feelings towards nature expressed in the 17th-century rhetoric of discovery and mastery. She focuses quite properly on the fact that the bachelors of science were too little interested in women to have any very exciting attitudes towards them. The roots of the current environmental crisis have she thinks less to do with parasexual domination than with the profit motive, and the most interesting parts of her book describe the relationships of her protagonists with money (Newton was master of the mint; Boyle was rich; Locke was an investor in the profitable slave trade and wrote about interest rates and the valuation of currencies).

The merits of the book are that Zack, though not a professional historian of science, has a good eye for important themes and controversies. She presents a fair and balanced picture of Locke, in particular, whom she sees steadily and whole. But the book relies heavily on some major historical syntheses of the last thirty or forty years — Lawrence Stone, Keith Thomas, C.B. Macpherson, Ariès, Laquer, in addition to Kosofsky — rather than basing itself on primary texts or taking into account critical reactions. The result is that, although the summaries are well-done, there is a kind of second-hand feel, and a few ghosts of orthography and wanderers out of their proper centuries make their way onto a page. At times one wishes Zack had narrowed the focus and reduced some of the topics covered in order to argue her case more fully. The chapters on witchcraft and latitudinariaism, while useful for constructing an all-around picture of 17th-century Britain, are not directly related to the thesis of the book — that a new type of identity for men was created by Locke, Newton, et al. Occasionally, speculation is intriguing — I am thinking here of Zack's suggestion that the witch was a mere go-between in the theory and practice of witch-hunting: what the witch-hunters were after was conversational engagement with the Devil, in whose ideas and opinions, unlike those of women, they had a truly keen interest. The reader would like to know if this is true or just a good idea, and the evidence supplied falls somewhat short of what is required, as do the claims of low affect in 17th-century relations between the sexes — surely poetry and letters would be a better guide to this dimension of social history than medical and philosophical texts?

What is particularly noteworthy about the book is that — despite its title and the blurb on the back cover — it moves the discussion of modernity and science nearer to where it might profitably go — towards an investigation of politics and power in early science and away from a brooding on gender metaphors. I sense that inside a book ostensibly about the identity of bachelors is another unrelated book, with a clearer focus, about the identity of capitalists and about moral blindness, trying to get out. Drawing on her previous work (Zack is the author of *Race and Mixed Race* [Temple University Press 1993]), Zack points out that slavery is not a consequence of racism and never was; rather racial theories (which have fallen out of mainstream biology) represent rationalizations helping to justify practices which ante-

date them: Locke cheerfully denied that biological species existed anywhere except in the mind of the beholder and argued that liberty was inalienable except by criminal action, but he was well invested in the Royal African Company in 1674-5. Despite some problems stemming from its survey format and its focus, *Bachelors of Science* is an impassioned and at the same time one of the most sensible and responsible of recent books on early modern science in its personal and political dimension.

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