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Editors • Directeurs

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
4-108 Humanities Centre
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

E-Mail: roger.a.shiner@ualberta.ca

Alain Voizard
Département de philosophie
Université du Québec à Montréal
C.P. 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville
Montréal, QC
Canada H3C 3P8

E-Mail: voizard.alain@uqam.ca

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Mailed in July/August 1997.

Antoine Arnauld and **Pierre Nicole**
Logic or the Art of Thinking. Trans.
and ed. Jill Vance Buroker.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. xxxviii + 281.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-48249-6);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-48394-8).

Jill Buroker's translation of the Port Royal Logic is everything a good translation should be, i.e., close enough to the original to count as scholarly, while at the same time readable enough to fully convey the sense and style of the authors' text. As a clear improvement on either of the two previous translations (T.S. Baynes [1851], and Dickoff and James [1964]), it will be of interest to anyone studying logic written in this period.

While it may seem that, on balance, translating a logic text should be relatively easy, this is no ordinary logic text. *La logique ou L'art du penser* (1662) is an exercise in what might be called ironic logic, for while it retains the all-over structure and many of the specific components of the standard Aristotelian texts of the day, Arnauld and Nicole openly and repeatedly side with the (then widespread) criticisms of that style of logic (including, most prominently, those of René Descartes, whose thought is a constant presence in the work). The reason for this dissonance is immediately apparent: while A. and N. have no quarrel with Aristotelian logic as such, for them it is of little use, for it has little to do with what for them logic really was, i.e., 'the art of conducting reason well in knowing things, as much to instruct ourselves about them as to instruct others' (23).

With logic so defined, it is not surprising that for A. and N., while (formal) rules of inference may be of some limited value, they are of little use in eradicating error in reasoning, for such error occurs primarily in accepting false judgments rather than in making faulty inferences (9). So for them, Cartesian metaphysics and epistemology win out over the vacant structures of Aristotelian logic. Hence what is needed, A. and N. say, are ways to generate clear and distinct ideas, judgments properly composed of them, and a method for properly employing such judgments. The product of their efforts, if the remaining nods to Aristotle were removed, could pass for a workbook to accompany the *Discourse on Method.*

If this is logic, it is logic in the thickest, most content-laden sense; hence translating it holds all the pitfalls awaiting any attempt to translate the broader literature of the day. As an example of what Buroker faced, there are many places in the original in which it is not clear what sort of thing is being talked about, i.e., words, thoughts or things. Buroker navigates these shoals effectively, producing a translation which seems to provide a maximal fit with the original.

One of the most striking features of the Port Royal Logic is the fact that its style — direct, engaging and often very witty — makes it seem like something written in this century. For instance, after dutifully laying out the

standard classification scheme (i.e., into genus, species, etc.) found in texts which cleaved to the pattern established in the late sixteenth century revival of Aristotelianism, A. and N. say that 'This is more than anyone needs to know about the five universals treated so extensively in the Schools. Knowing that there are genera, species, differences, properties, and accidents is not very useful. The important point is to recognize the true genera of things, the true species of each genus, their true differences, their true properties, and the accidents that apply to them' (44).

Because much of the text has this tone, it is tempting to translate it by lifting it out of its historical context and dressing in twentieth-century clothes. That, in fact, was the guiding principle behind the (until now) most commonly available English translation, the Dickoff and James (Bobbs-Merrill) translation of 1964. For instance, their translation systematically replaces the philosophically contentious term 'proposition' with the distinctly modern term 'sentence', despite the fact that the original clearly intends the former, not the latter. That is a completely legitimate method of translation — in effect, a moving of the text into a new context — and the result is interesting in its own right, albeit now detached from its historical roots (indeed, one of my colleagues used it successfully in a course in informal logic in just that way).

Buroker's translation, by contrast, stays much closer to the language of the original. The result is sometimes a little stilted, but always clearly understandable, and much more faithful to A.'s and N.'s intent. For instance, the original title for 1, XI, is, 'D'une autre cause qui met de la confusion dans nos pensees & dans nos discours, qui est que nos les attachons a des mots'. Dickoff and James translate this as, 'The ambiguity of words as a source of confusion in thought and speech'. Buroker, by contrast renders it as, 'Another cause of confusion in our thoughts and discourse, which is that we connect our thoughts to words'. In this case and many others, Buroker captures the sense of the text much better than did her predecessors.

The only weak feature in Buroker's edition of the work is that it lacks a satisfactory account of the seventeenth-century logical setting in which the work appeared. She does provide an extensive account of the *sturm und drang* surrounding the role of the Port Royal theologians in the Jansenist movement (some echoes of which find their way into the text). She also devotes a few pages to the place of the logic in history conceived broadly. What is largely missing is an attempt to locate the text in the (very active) logical landscape of the day, or to assess its impact in the subsequent development of the subject. There are, fortunately, several solid accounts of this period of the history of logic available (including E.J. Ashworth's 1974 *Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period*).

The Port-Royal Logic is a remarkable work by many standards. Highly popular, it appeared in five editions within its authors' lifetimes, and has been in print, in one version or another, throughout the entire period since its first publication (a full publication history to 1965 is available in Clair

and Girbal's Presses Universitaires de France edition of that year). Jill Buroker's new edition will renew interest in this significant work.

James van Evra
University of Waterloo

Frederick C. Beiser, ed.
The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. xli + 203.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-44501-9);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-44951-0).

Although there have been several important studies of the early political thought of the German romantics — for example, Beiser's own *Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism* — it has not received the attention it deserves. One reason for this had been that many of the texts were unavailable in English. Beiser is to be commended for rectifying this. He has edited and translated the political writings of the early romantics, 'the most fertile and formative period of Romanticism' (vii).

There are three periods of German Romanticism. Beiser's anthology focuses on early Romanticism or *Frühromantik* (1797-1802), whose chief members are Wilhelm Wackenroder, Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), Ludwig Tieck, Friedrich Schelling, Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schlegel, and August Wilhelm Schlegel. The main figures of high Romanticism or *Hochromantik* (1803-15) are Zacharais Werner, Gotthilf von Schubert, Achim von Arnim, Adam Mueller, Joseph Görres, Casper Friedrich, and Clemens Brentano. Late Romanticism or *Spätromantik* (1816-30) is represented by Johann von Eichendorff, Friedrich Schelling, Friedrich Schlegel, E.T.A. Hoffman, and Franz Baader. Although there is a continuity of themes and motifs between early, high, and late Romanticism, Beiser warns that it is a mistake to assume that the politics of early Romanticism are the same as those of its subsequent phases.

In *The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics*, Beiser provides texts suitable for an introductory edition (this is why he excludes Schelling's *Deducktion des Naturrechts* and Schleiermacher's *Versuch einer Theorie des geselligen Betragens*). The first text is the anonymous 'Oldest Systematic Programme of German Idealism'. Beiser next includes Novalis' 'Pollen', 'Faith and Love', 'Political Aphorisms', 'Christianity or Europe: A Fragment', and 'Fragments from the Notebooks'. He then includes Friedrich Schlegel's

'Essay on the Concept of Republicanism occasioned by the Kantian tract "Perpetual Peace"', excerpts from the 'Athenaeum Fragments', 'Ideas', excerpts from the 'Philosophical Lectures: Transcendental Philosophy', as well as excerpts from the 'Philosophical Fragments from the Philosophical Apprenticeship'. Finally, Beiser includes Schleiermacher's 'Monologues II and III'.

According to the early romantics, religious and political differences are unified and reconciled by aesthetics. For them, art is 'the criterion of absolute knowledge, the means of unifying the personality, the mediator between man and nature, and the source of social harmony' (xii). Advocating the autonomy of art, they also believe that art symbolizes the good and freedom. Art is the means to realizing moral and political ideals. It overcomes the crisis of reason initiated by the German Enlightenment or *Aufklärung*. Welcoming the critical force of reason, the early romantics nevertheless urge that this force was negative. Beiser writes: 'Rather than laying down restraints on reason, they even advocated taking criticism to its limits ... Nevertheless, their strong endorsement of reason was tempered by a clear recognition of its limits. Since the demand that we criticize *all* our beliefs is self-reflective, applying to criticism itself, they stressed that a completely critical reason is self-conscious, aware of its limits. A fully self-conscious reason will acknowledge the vacuum it creates yet cannot fill' (xvii). Reason can discover moral principles, but only art can arouse and direct passion, impulse, and imagination. Art unites reason and sensibility so that persons do their duty from, not against, their inclinations. The early romantics believe that — unlike tradition, religion, and law which are threatened by criticism — art incorporates criticism and is the result of play. Irony allows artists to distance themselves from their creations, and so subsequently to recreate themselves. The early romantics agree with Novalis in thinking that 'philosophy originates in "homesickness" (*Heimweh*), the urge to feel at home again in a demystified world' (xvi). Art recreates at a self-conscious level the lost unity of society and nature: 'if only we make nature, society and the state beautiful, magical and mysterious again, the young romantics believed, then we will restore our sense of belonging to them. Cured of our homesickness, we will finally feel at home again in our world' (xviii).

In articulating these ideas, the early romantics articulate a political vision that merits attention. As Beiser notes, they 'developed a concept of community to counter the atomism and anomie of modern society; they formulated an ethic of love and self-realization in reaction to the formalism of Kant's ethics; they questioned some of the main presuppositions of the liberal tradition, especially its individualism; they criticized the inhumanity and "philistinism" of civil society; and they championed many modern social values, such as the emancipation of women, sexual freedom and the right to divorce' (xii-xiii). Rejecting violence and revolutionary change, they instead maintain that society only can be improved through gradual reform and that the state should be organized according to the ideal of beauty. The early romantics seek to provide the enlightenment and education needed to

achieve such reform and such a state. They attempt to find a middle path between liberalism and conservatism by emphasizing the social nature of persons. Endorsing the French Revolution's *liberté, egalité et fraternité*, they nevertheless urge that a republic must combine democracy and aristocracy. As Beiser recognizes, 'although the young romantics stressed the value of community, they also insisted upon the need for individual liberty; while they emphasized the value of organic growth, continuity and tradition, they also championed progress, development and reform; and if they pointed out the dangers of a narrow rationalism, they also recognized the value of reason and defended the rights of free enquiry' (xiii).

Beiser has provided a great service in making available the political writings of the early German romantics. As suggested above, their ideas still have relevance and the problems which they address have not yet been overcome. This anthology will be welcomed by all who are interested in contemporary debates in political philosophy and the history of ideas.

J.M. Fritzman
North Central College

John Coates
The Claims of Common Sense: Moore, Wittgenstein, Keynes and the Social Sciences.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. xiii + 178.
US$49.95. ISBN 0-521-41256-0.

In his later methodological reflections, John Maynard Keynes challenged the presumption that an adequate social scientific theory will be articulated in a formalised language. Such a language would be a precise language comparable to those used in the natural sciences and would be shorn of the vagueness that characterises the expressions that we use in the course of everyday life. John Coates argues that Keynes' rejection of the demand for formalisation was inspired by the attitude towards common sense then evolving in the work of his Cambridge contemporaries, Wittgenstein, Moore and Ramsey. Keynes saw in this reassertion of the validity of common sense idioms a way of understanding, on the one hand, the aridity of so much formal social science and, on the other, the power of social scientific theories whose natural expression seemed hopelessly 'homely' from the perspective of the 'serious', hard sciences.

Early in its twentieth-century history, Cambridge philosophy had been dominated by the belief that one could analyse any genuinely meaningful utterance in terms of a precisely-articulated, formal language, such as that used in *Principia Mathematica*. This dominance began to disintegrate in the late 1920s. To take Wittgenstein as an example, his early work presupposed the Fregean thought that all genuinely meaningful claims are *precise* claims, apt for re-expression in a Fregean *Begriffsschrift*. In his later work, Wittgenstein came to see this assumption *as* an assumption, and a confused one at that. There is no such thing as precision *as such* and claims which might appear hopelessly vague ('Stand roughly there!') may exhibit the very degree of specificity that their particular uses require. Thus, only by making inappropriate demands upon ordinary language does it appear to be vague in any bad sense. Crucially, our ordinary language may be *less* prone to generate misunderstandings than the kind of refined, formal language that one might fancy to take its place. Ordinary language, which is in one sense vague, thus has a precision all of its own, *superior* to that of what are, in that other sense, *more* precise languages.

Coates argues that these insights inspired Keynes' later defence of the use of everyday language by social scientists. In a comparable way, Keynes sought to expose the influence in economic theorizing of inappropriate methodological demands, demands concerning the language of respectable theory. Here too was a demand for precision, an insistence on sharp definition which Keynes found hopelessly cramping and ultimately fruitless. Like Wittgenstein, Keynes attacked the authority of this demand, arguing against its unconditional acceptance by the social theorist. The correct methodological demand is not for precision *per se* but for the level of precision appropriate to the subject matter under examination.

The position Coates defends in this book can often seem confused but, on careful reading, merely reveals itself to be *complicated*. There is no straightforward 'defence of common sense' here. What are on offer are arguments in defence of vague concepts not ordinary language as such. There *are* arguments which would take one the further step to a *recommendation* of common sense concepts, arguments concerning the economy of using ordinary language and the utility of using such a language if one's theory is to have implications that might be fed into policy-making decisions. But these considerations do not render ordinary language *essential* to social science and both Coates and Keynes insist that some explanatory tasks are better handled through formalisation.

The sense in which this work does 'defend common sense' is not by demonstrating the need for a 'common-sensical' methodology but by attempting to break the authority of formalism. The ordinary practice of social scientists is already, and as a matter of fact, 'mired' in ordinary language and this book seeks to explain why that is nothing to be ashamed of. As a result of what Keynes came to see as bad philosophy, social scientists have been made to feel guilty about their use of what are perfectly respectable concepts and even those theorists that interest us most are made to appear inept. By

exposing the confusions behind this chastisement, one can reconcile the theory of what it is to do social science with the ways in which social scientists actually go about their business. Social scientists often naturally reach for ordinary language in articulating their thoughts and, in doing so, have done nothing wrong. A formalised language is not *the* dialect of the serious scientist and ordinary language, vague as it is, may be the most appropriate medium in which to express certain insights.

Considered as a contribution to the history of philosophy, Coates' book has an unusual breadth in bringing together the evolution of Cambridge's philosophers and that of its economists. Although Coates argues convincingly for his claim that Cambridge's philosophers influenced Keynes' later methodological outlook, the book does, however, disappoint here. This influence seems to have been largely one-sided and thus sheds little light on the work of those philosophers. Moreover, the influence of Sraffa on his philosophical associates, and on Wittgenstein in particular, remains as opaque as ever. To his credit, Coates does provide an exploration of the role that Ramsey played in the development of philosophy in Cambridge, a role which is so often and so criminally overlooked. This apart, Coates' analysis of Moore and Wittgenstein throws up few surprises.

It must be said that this is a book of loose ends and there are too many ill-focused ideas allowed to float through its pages. As such, the book is suggestive rather than compelling. Also the book's worth, it appears to me, lies not so much in its historical contribution as in the good sense of many of the proposals for the philosophy of social science that Coates extracts from Keynes. I would look forward with interest to a more thorough defence of those proposals.

Denis McManus
University of Southampton

Gary Cziko
Without Miracles: Universal Selection Theory and the Second Darwinian Revolution.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Bradford Books) 1995. Pp. 385.
US$30.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-03232-5);
US$17.50 (paper: ISBN 0-262-53147-X).

Cziko's universal selection theory is based upon 'the bold conjecture that all knowledge and knowledge growth are due to a process of cumulative blind variation and selection' (x). Although in Part IV Cziko does give details of current uses of selection which do not count as knowledge, including evolutionary computing and artificial selection, his main claim is that 'knowledge itself may be broadly conceived as the fit of some aspect of an organism to some aspect of its environment, whether it be the fit of the butterfly's long siphon of a mouth to the flowers from which it feeds or the fit of the astrophysicist's theories to the structure of the universe' (ix). Thus every sort of knowledge may be expressed more abstractly as the fit of one system to another.

Universal selection therefore solves what Cziko in Chapter 1 calls 'puzzles of fit'. The paradigm case of such puzzles arises from the remarkable fit of organisms to their environment. However, he goes on to isolate the phenomenon of fit in a number of unfamiliar contexts, suggesting that the best explanation for this fit, in all of these cases, is selection. Instead of giving a definition of fit, he gives examples and suggests that we know it when we see it (8). Although this might disappoint those who are looking for a list of necessary and sufficient conditions, some plasticity in the concept seems unavoidable. In each case of the fit of an organism to its environment, the sum total of adapted characteristics demonstrates functional knowledge of the environment. An example from his chapter on cultural knowledge helps clarify the notion of fit in non-biological contexts: on Cziko's view, the religious observations of Balinese rice farmers exhibit a fit to the requirements of maximal rice cultivation (155).

Propositional knowledge, on this view, will presumably be a species of this more encompassing genus of phenomena in which one system exhibits a fit to another. Although Cziko does not say so, his is an externalist view of human knowledge possessing two of the traditional three requirements of knowledge: belief and truth. As Cziko puts it, Darwin 'made possible a reconceptualization of knowledge as a type of adaptation of the brain to its environment...' (85). Here belief is an internal representation of the external world, and the closeness of fit between our mental representation and the world will give us something like a correspondence theory of truth. No explicit account of justification is presented, although one may assume that the process of selection provides all and only the justification that a universal selectionist would require.

Cziko devotes a short section to detailing the acknowledged achievements of selectionist explanations, but the main focus of the book is an extension of selectionist explanation to fields in which it is rarely applied. These include language acquisition, perception, education, culture, accumulation of knowledge during the life of an individual, and the growth of science. Cziko calls these various fields 'different types of knowledge' (x), although perhaps he would have been well-served by the caution which led Dretske to talk, not of knowledge, but of the 'flow of information'.

Another unifying theme in the book is a developmental view of the history of ideas, such that we can trace the law-like progression of knowledge in these various fields from providential, through instructionist, finally to selectionist explanations. Cziko believes that he can demonstrate that the areas of knowledge which he surveys have developed through the first two of these three stages. If history were always to unfold in this way, his case for universal selection theory would be strengthened, because selectionist explanation is the next conceptual step in the sequence. However, his attempt to demonstrate such a developmental progression is sometimes strained by his attempts to force data to fit theory. This is particularly true of his terms 'providence' and 'instruction'. For Cziko, a providential explanation usually entails some meddling by a deity, but not always. In one case he calls innate behaviour a form of providence (286). 'Instruction' encompasses all forms of direct transmission without mediation by trial and error. Both Pavlovian conditioning (297) and empiricism — 'knowledge instructed by the senses' (79) — count as instruction. Such dissatisfying slippage of terms does not help Cziko make his case.

Biologist and philosopher of biology Richard Lewontin once warned against taking too seriously the two favourite metaphors of biology: developmental unfolding, and trial and error selection. Curiously, *Without Miracles* makes use of both metaphors, while reference to Lewontin's article is notably absent. Lewontin's main complaint with these two metaphors is that an exclusive adherence to either model will blind us to details which diverge from it. This danger of overarching explanatory metaphors is worth bearing in mind as one works through Cziko's examples. Natural selection does not account for all of what happens in the evolution of life — as Cziko comes close to admitting, but then downplays — nor should we expect it to do so in this text. However, the real value of a new model is in its ability to clarify aspects of the phenomena that we did not before notice. For this, *Without Miracles* is very valuable. Even if we are not willing to go all the way with him, Cziko gives us new perspectives on the nature of understanding, especially the tentative and often fallible nature of the geneses of our knowledge.

In formulating his universal selection theory, Cziko has taken seriously Popper's injunction that theories must be stated as bold conjectures. Whether his bold conjecture also meets the falsifiability requirement, as he claims, is less obvious. It is not always clear what the observational predictions of universal selection theory would be. It is not apparent how one could test

whether blind variation and selective retention, rather than some other mechanism, are at work in these more speculative contexts.

This is an accessible book and will be appropriate as a supplementary text for an upper level undergraduate course in philosophy of biology or naturalized epistemology. No prior biological knowledge is assumed. Cziko sometimes gives an overly simplified and occasionally misleading gloss of the philosophers he mentions, but this might be forgiven since the book is written primarily for a general audience.

The concept behind universal selection theory is not new; Cziko's precursors include Campbell, Hull, and Darden and Cain (whose important 1989 article is not referenced). However, Cziko's accomplishment is to draw together an unprecedented number of fields for which selection is a plausible explanation, and to show how it might explain them. Indeed, more than half of the text is devoted to extending selectionist explanation into fields in which only a marginalized few so far endorse it. Cziko admits, in the end, that he cannot rule out the possibility that universal selection theory will be supplanted by some other hypothesis which better accounts for the puzzle of fit, but adds that this presents something of a paradox: the better theory would have to be *selected* as the fittest among its rivals in order to be adopted (325).

Dawn Ogden
University of British Columbia

Arda Denkel
Object and Property.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. xii + 262.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-521-55010-6.

This book is a thorough treatment of some important issues in metaphysics. The book's jacket mentions that 'it can serve as a textbook in ontology courses.' In addition to historical and introductory material, there is enough sophisticated argument to appeal to professionals.

Denkel argues for a modified property-bundle view of objects. Properties are the analytic ultimates of existence. But properties cannot exist on their own, outside of compresences of properties. So objects, as compresences of properties, are the physical ultimates of existence. They can exist independently.

The properties that constitute objects, for Denkel, are not universals. The redness instantiated in one object and the redness instantiated in another

are not one and the same property. Objects are compresences of particular properties. Particular properties instantiated in different objects resemble each other to a greater or lesser extent. Denkel is a realist about particular properties but a conceptualist (like Locke) about universals. Particular properties are real and instantiated in space and time. Their resemblance to other particular properties is construed by the mind as identity and the mind constructs concepts and universals on that basis.

Denkel believes this system allows him to account for change without having to suppose a mysterious substratum: an unknowable thing that is the bearer of properties and underwrites all change. 'An individual is a concretion of qualities at a spatiotemporal position in accordance with certain fundamental principles' (56). The individual is said to change if certain determinate qualities are replaced by other determinate qualities under the same determinable.

An individual is only destroyed by change if there is a change in the object's form. That is, every individual is partly characterized by a certain group of properties (its essence) that determines the individual's kind. 'Accordingly, essential properties individuate an object, for they restrict the possibility of change it may undergo while it retains identity' (207). To retain identity, there must be no change in the particular properties constituting the object's *form-token*. Dismantling a watch and reassembling it out of the same parts results in a new watch. Though the form of the original watch resembles the form of the reassembled watch (they are of the same form-type) they have distinct form-tokens. This is partly because one and the same form-token cannot have two different origins (as it would if the reassembled form-token originated both at the original assembly of the watch and the reassembly). One might wonder why the reassembly must be taken to be a point of origin for the second form-token. This is a somewhat minor point.

More problematic is Denkel's treatment of resemblance. Though he mentions a *Thesis of Resemblance* we never find out exactly what this thesis is. His conceptualism about universals is such that, though there are objective resemblances among objectively existing particular properties, universals themselves are mind-dependent. One standard objection is that, since resemblances among objects must always be in virtue of some respect, these respects must be identical among the resembling objects (which is just to admit universals). Denkel notes that 'the success of the criticism depends ... on the acceptability of the logical move from the respects of resemblance to universals, and merely assuming such a thing would beg the question' (160).

One way the logical move could fail, according to Denkel, is if the respects themselves merely resemble. 'The resemblance of substances is a matter of the resemblance of their particular attributes' (170). But cannot we now ask the same question with regard to attributes? In virtue of what do they resemble? There is the danger of a regress here, which Denkel could embrace. He offers two other possibilities. First, there is the possibility that resemblance is (a la Hume) a philosophical primitive (163). Second, there is the possibility that attributes only resemble each other insofar as they fall within

the same class (162). He seems to speak favorably, albeit briefly, of the latter. Yet that option should be distasteful to someone who wants to be a conceptualist about classes and a realist about resemblance. In virtue of what does each attribute fall within its class?

Does Denkel want to say that resemblance is a primitive? Does he want to say that the regress is acceptable? Does he want to say that attributes resemble each other only insofar as they fall within the same class? There are no explicit answers to these questions.

A more promising section is the chapter on causation. Denkel frames his view as an answer to a question raised by Lewis' counterfactual analysis of causation. He says, '[Lewis'] account ... fails to answer the ontic "why?". This C is the cause of this E, iff in a closest world to this one E does not occur if C does not occur. But *why* should this be the case and not otherwise?' (237). Denkel's answer: 'Because C and E are the parts of a single temporally extending structural property' (237). Structural properties are single, complex, particular properties containing simple component properties unified in a specific configuration. The component properties can be instantiated at different positions in space or, more topically, time. So, 'after the cause occurs the effect will occur, because part of a whole structural property has been observed, and the rest is still to come' (235).

This seems a worthwhile line of thought. One should be wary of monism, however. If cause and effect are two components of one property, then, if every effect is itself a cause, there will be exactly as many structural properties in the universe as there are causal chains. If there is ultimately only one (possibly branching) causal chain in the universe then there is only one particular structural property. This monism is not as vicious as other kinds, as it doesn't imply that there is only one property, nor does it imply that there is only one object (since 'the components of structural properties that account for causation do not always inhere in a single substance' [230]). But it does seem to be an implication of Denkel's position.

Jeremy Fantl
Brown University

Stephen Engstrom and **Jennifer Whiting, eds.**
Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness And Duty.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. ix + 310.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-521-55312-1.

This book combines essays by well-known commentators on ancient philosophy (John McDowell, T.H. Irwin, Jennifer Whiting, Julia Annas and John Cooper) and influential interpreters of Kant (Barbara Herman, Stephen Engstrom, Allen Wood, and Christine Korsgaard). The papers were written for a conference on the relationship between the ethics of Aristotle and the Stoics and Kantian moral philosophy. The conference's theme (from which J.B. Schneewind's paper dissents) was strongly revisionist: to challenge the received view that ancient moral theories and Kantian moral theory are fundamentally opposed.

As the editors suggest, the contributors pursue two complimentary strategies: some argue for Kantian readings of Aristotle, while others read Kant in ways that are, broadly speaking, Aristotelian. The main idea in the re-interpretation of Aristotle is developed most fully by Korsgaard. Aristotle says that the virtuous person acts for the sake of the fine or the noble (*kalon*). Of course this view is not a new discovery, but it is not usually placed at the centre of Aristotle's moral theory.

The idea has obvious potential for connecting Aristotle and Kant. When Aristotle calls a brave action noble, he is evaluating it in a distinctively moral way (Annas points out that Aristotle also applies the concept of nobility to actions that we would not think of as morally right, but she argues in her own way that Aristotle distinguishes between non-moral prudential reasoning and moral reasoning). This answers the radical claim that our notion of morality is itself a modern invention. And Aristotle thinks that a virtuous person must perform a noble action because it is noble. This is at least analogous to Kant's view that the moral agent should act from the motive of duty.

These similarities might seem less important than the fact that Aristotle also pictures the virtuous person as acting with the ultimate end of realizing his own *eudaimonia*. A Kantian moral agent ignores his own flourishing and conforms to universal law. Aristotle's eudaimonism, and Kant's passionate opposition to eudaimonism, support the traditional contrast. Here several authors in the book counter that Aristotle regards noble actions as constituents of *eudaimonia*, not as means to some independently understood happiness. Presumably they would add that a just act counts as a constituent of *eudaimonia* just because it is noble. So for Aristotle acting for the sake of the fine and acting to realize *eudaimonia* amount to the same thing. Irwin suggests that since Aristotle thinks that *eudaimonia* is an end prescribed by reason — I should aim at my own *eudaimonia* even if my desires oppose it

— eudaimonism would be, in Kantian terms, a categorical rather than a hypothetical imperative. Some of the authors wonder whether Kant would reject Aristotelian eudaimonism if he had properly understood it (as well as Irwin, Stephen Engstrom writes about the differences between Aristotle's and Kant's understanding of happiness).

However, even if we grant all of these claims, there is reason to doubt that the *rapprochement* succeeds. Aristotle thinks of *eudaimonia* as a property of a person's complete life. Even if a just action counts in its own right as a component of *eudaimonia*, his eudaimonism implies that the agent should decide whether to act justly by viewing the action in the context of his life considered as a whole and assessing its implications for whether his own life will achieve *eudaimonia*. That is very different from Kant's way of assessing moral actions, even if we think that it will lead to the same conclusions about particular actions. But would it lead to the same results? When we consider how acting nobly now might prevent me from performing other noble actions in the future, it is not clear that the Aristotelian view will always tell me to do the noble thing in my present circumstances.

Aristotle's eudaimonism would be less problematic if it told us to have the same kind of concern with other peoples' *eudaimonia* as with our own *eudaimonia*. No author in the book questions the (at least) formal egoism of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. However, Allen Wood and Jennifer Whiting take on the more limited task of making the self-love of Aristotle's virtuous person palatable to the modern reader. That person's self-regard depends on his appreciation of his own objectively valuable qualities of character and intellect. Whiting believes that his self-assessment is not competitive — he does not value himself for being better than other people. Instead he measures himself against the demands of morality itself, or God. Whiting sees this as evidence of a basic moral egalitarianism in Aristotle. If the virtuous person identifies himself with universal *nous*, he should not think that one person is intrinsically more worthy than another. However, the passages Whiting cites do not balance out more central texts in Aristotle, most importantly, Aristotle's view of justice as distribution in accordance with merit. She points out that Aristotle can be considered a political egalitarian for believing that in the best state the citizens should take turns ruling. But this is not evidence of Kantian (or Stoic) moral equality. Aristotle believes there are significant differences in virtue between different people, and he regards those differences as morally important. But he thinks that the differences are not great enough to justify designing the state so that the best people will rule.

By comparison the re-interpretation of Kant makes less fundamental and less interesting claims. For example, Herman suggests that if Kant believed (as she supposes Aristotle does) that some natural desires could be developed until the desires themselves contained moral values, he would not object to desires of this sort motivating moral action.

My impression is that, despite the ambition of the book, most of the essays do not have an interest that transcends the particular occasion of their production (an exception is Cooper's clear discussion of Stoic ethics). This is

not to say that readers interested in the particular issues covered by the papers will not find them valuable. But I do not think that the papers do the right kind of work to give us a new understanding of Aristotle's moral philosophy in particular.

Dennis McKerlie
University of Calgary

Harry J. Gensler
Formal Ethics.
New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. vi + 213.
Cdn$83.95: US$59.95
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-13065-4);
Cdn$23.95: US$16.95
(paper: ISBN 0-415-13066-2).

The extent to which deductive logic has application to moral reasoning has been a topic of debate through much of the history of modern ethics. Certainly there are deductive relations between both normatives and imperatives, for we infer from the proposition that X ought to do action A whenever circumstance C is present and the fact that C is the case to the conclusion X ought to do A and from 'Do A and B' to 'Do A'. But whether the logics devised from such inferences can be applied to the interesting forms of moral deliberation — the forms found in the central ethical disputes — is far less clear.

Gensler attempts in his *Formal Ethics* to convince us that both deontic and imperative logics have important applications, primarily in trapping a disputant into an inconsistency inferred from agreed upon premisses. A system for providing such resolution is based on four moral 'axioms'. These axioms are (1) a Rationality Axiom that one ought to think and live consistently with logic and the other axioms of formal ethics (44); (2) an End-Means Axiom stating that doing an action E entails that if one's doing M is causally necessary for doing E, then one is to do M (46); (3) a Weak Prescriptivity Axiom that if one ought to do A, then the command to do A is to be obeyed (52); and (4) a Universalizability Axiom that if action A ought to be performed there are some relevant properties of A in terms of which actions like A in those respects ought to be performed (69). From these axioms he derives a number of 'corollaries' and 'theorems', chief of which is the 'golden rule theorem' (said to be the 'most important principle of formal ethics') that we ought to treat others as we ourselves want to be treated. With but a few exceptions where he avails himself of deontic logic, these derivations are cursory and informal. Interspersed are discussions of examples of moral

judgments such as our condemnation of racism and ambivalence towards pacificism to which this axiomatic system can be applied. The result is an interesting supplement to his logic text *Symbolic Logic* where he skillfully included deontic, alethic modal, and imperative logics within the framework of a basic introductory symbolic logic course. Here he provides some content and examples to the formal structure of his earlier text in a way that should benefit students provided with this background.

But whatever its value as a pedagogical tool, *Formal Ethics* suffers from the kinds of confusions all too common in this area of philosophy. Formal ethics is said to be 'modeled after formal logic' (5), and 'formal ethical principles' are said to be analogous to 'formal logical principles'. But as examples of the latter Gensler gives rules of inference such as modus ponens, while his ethical principles are a mixture of rules and categorical 'ought' sentences. Thus, the rationality axiom is a categorical normative of the form 'Everyone ought to do A', while the remaining four are stated as conditionals that seem to be disguised rules licensing the inference of their consequents from the assertion of their antecedents. The Weak Prescriptivity Axiom, for example, seems to be the rule licensing the command 'Do A' from the normative 'You ought to do A'. Certainly in standard logic, categorical propositions and axioms are not confused with rules of inference, and Gensler gives no reason for not respecting this distinction in the area of moral reasoning.

The Universalizability Axiom plays a central role in Gensler's system, as this is the primary basis for the golden rule and impartiality principles that are applied to specific examples. His discussion of this axiom is marred by a failure to recognize the central role that universalizability plays in moral inferences. A *prudential practical inference* is of the form 'I want end E; my doing action M is necessary to attain E; therefore, I ought to do M'. It is, of course, formally invalid, even with further qualifications about the agent's having the opportunity and ability to do M, since there may be costs attending M's performance that outweigh for X the value of E. The inference has, as Anthony Kenny noted, only 'prima facie validity', the best to be expected for this type of reasoning.

The dominant tradition in ethics has regarded the principal inferences used in moral reasoning as having very different features. For this tradition we somehow establish general normatives on the basis of intuitions, perhaps through a process of reflective equilibrium of the kind argued for by Rawls, and then derive from them specific requirements of conduct. Gensler's project is a continuation of this tradition.

But an account of moral reasoning faithful to actual practice should recognize a basic similarity between moral and prudential inferences. As a first approximation, a *moral practical inference* seems to be of the form 'We want E; most of us doing M is necessary to attain E; therefore individual X ought to do M'. Thus, we want mutual trust as a prerequisite for social cooperation. To attain this it is not necessary for everyone to keep their promises, for a limited amount of reneging may occur and still social trust is

maintained. What we instead claim is that only if most or nearly all keep their promises can mutual trust be maintained. But this weakened premiss is insufficient to derive the conclusion that a specific individual X be required to do M, for why can't he claim himself as one of the exceptions? To derive the conclusion we must add the universalization principle that if most ought to do M, then everyone should, a principle that has the effect of not allowing this or that individual to make himself an exception to a rule of conduct which if generally followed is of benefit to the community.

A moral practical inference is no more a deductive inference than is a prudential inference. The conclusion 'X ought to do M' inferred from 'We want E' together with supplementing premisses is defeasible for reasons similar to those leading to the defeasibility of the prudential 'I ought to do M' as based on 'I want E'. Since they are not deductive, deontic logic has no applicability. Nevertheless, like inductive inferences, they do have a structure, and we can specify precautions to be taken to rule out certain defeats of the conclusion. Pursuing Gensler's ideal of an axiomatic systematization of ethics may be helpful in setting inconsistency traps. But the vast majority of ethical disputes seem immune to such resolution, arising instead from a failure to reach a consensus on shared ideals and their relative weighting, and for these Gensler's project has little relevance.

D.S. Clarke
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

John Gray
Mill on Liberty: A Defense, Second Edition.
New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. xii + 175.
Cdn$24.95: US$17.95. ISBN 0-415-12474-3.

Maria H. Morales
Perfect Equality: John Stuart Mill on Well-Constituted Communities.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1996.
Pp. xiv + 219.
US$57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8180-7);
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8181-5).

The second edition of John Gray's *Mill on Liberty: A Defense* reproduces the text of the first in full, with the addition of a new preface and a thirty-page postscript. Gray defends, without emendation, both his interpretation of Mill — that there is nothing incoherent or misconceived in Mill's project of 'liberal utilitarianism' provided Mill is read as an *indirect* utilitarian — and his

conviction that Mill's argument for liberty stands head and shoulders above any yet offered by his liberal progeny. Yet Gray now believes that Mill's argument for liberty, and *a fortiori*, all subsequent arguments, cannot be defended. It is not just that no interpretation — including, Gray now admits, his own — rescues Mill's project from traditional criticisms of it. Rather, the fundamental weakness of all liberalisms, and a weakness that traditional criticisms of Mill do not address, is that liberalism relies, either tacitly or implicitly, on an 'anachronistic and parochial Eurocentric interpretation of history — in which modernisation and Westernisation are conflated and there is an unshakable expectation of cultural convergence on a universal liberal civilisation' (132). At best, 'liberal cultural forms embody only one way of life among many,' and a contemporary liberal account of justice 'has only local interest, as an articulation in systematic terms of the intuitions and self-conception of certain strata' (157) within a liberal culture.

'Modernization' consists in achieving a certain level of technology, literacy, and industrialism indicative of first-world economies. 'Westernization' is the adoption of the central tenets of liberal culture; most importantly, the promotion of autonomous choice. Mill, Marx and, most recently, Joseph Raz, suppose that modernization and Westernization must go hand in hand, because, in a modern society, the 'skills of autonomous choice are functionally indispensable to personal well-being' (151). Gray originally argued that, although no thorough-going empiricist could adequately justify this supposition, it was considered by Mill, and by Gray himself, to be a not unreasonable wager based on the evidence of his own society and the more general history of which it was a part. Now, however, it seems to Gray that 'Mill's wager is closer to Pascal's famously bad bet than to any kind of empiricist hypothesis about the future of the species. Rather, it is an act of faith, expressing his Religion of Humanity' (147). The centrality of autonomy and choice in the 'good life' — indeed, the image of human beings as ideally and inevitably a choice-making species — is a patently culture-bound conception. The evidence for this belief is that newly modern non-Occidental societies, particularly those of the Pacific Rim, exhibit all the salient aspects of modernization without valuing or exhibiting liberal autonomy. Even for members of Asian subcultures within Western liberal societies, autonomy is not prized. Rather, such cultures 'have prospered precisely because ... [they] draw on the ample resources of a flourishing communal life' (154, quoting Bhikhu Parekh). Even if the empirical claims of writers like Parekh are not accepted, such arguments, according to Gray, reveal how tenuous the link is between autonomy and well-being, and that modernization and autonomy need not necessarily go together.

Central to Gray's argument is the contention that a flourishing communal life is necessarily inimical to liberal autonomy. One of the central tenets in Maria Morales' thoughtful and forceful study is that the conflict or divergence between autonomy and community taken by Gray and others to be manifest in Mill's writings simply does not exist. On her original interpretation, Mill did not hold many of the positions that communitarian and feminist critics

take to be essential to liberalism. Rather than defending his position in the name of 'an abstract, legalistic, atomistic, possessively individualistic, and egoistic conception of social life' (16), Mill instead thought that the full self-development of autonomous individuals could only arise in communities of selves who are deeply enmeshed in other-regarding relationships of a certain nature. The particular feature of such well-constituted communities is that they be based on the substantive or 'perfect' equality of all concerned. For Mill, '[e]galitarian relations are alone consistent with each person's development and moral improvement, with each person's dignity, and with the possibility of happiness' (111). Morales' interpretation certainly merits attention. Whether or not her interpretation prevails over the received view, Gray's conclusion certainly appears too hasty; the primarily communal nature of a society or culture is not by itself sufficient to show either that such societies are illiberal — at least in Mill's sense of 'liberal' — or that Mill's wager was merely an act of faith.

According to Morales, previous interpreters' misunderstanding of Mill is in large part due to their neglect and/or marginalization of his egalitarian writings, most notably *The Subjection of Women*. Morales *starts* with Mill's egalitarianism, and argues that it is the proverbial 'missing link' which synthesizes his practical philosophy into a coherent and compelling conception of moral, social and political life. The task she undertakes in the first two chapters is to show that Mill's interest in substantive egalitarianism and gender equality not only predated his association with Harriet Taylor, but was central to his early criticism of and break from the formalistic, legalistic and psychologically denuded Benthamite conception of human well-being. Drawing on a vast array of textual evidence, Morales constructs a convincing case that from quite early on Mill was committed to many of the ideals espoused by the socialist Saint-Simonians, in particular, their vision of 'an altogether new pattern of social and personal relations between women and men, ... their perfect equality, that is, their equality in "all respects" ' (35). Morales' work poses a serious challenge to various commentators insistence that Mill wrote *The Subjection of Women* either because he succumbed to the domineering and dictatorial wiles of Taylor — a thesis defended by Max Lerner and Gertrude Himmelfarb — or, only slightly less odoriferously, that it would not have been written save for his relationship with Taylor — Alice Rossi's conclusion. Even if Morales' more substantive interpretive claims are not accepted, Mill's egalitarianism does emerge as a genuine and central aspect of his practical philosophy.

Morales is particularly concerned to defend Mill against two sorts of feminist criticisms. Himmelfarb construes Mill's arguments for gender equality in *The Subjection of Women* as purely formal; that is, as being designed 'to guarantee nondiscrimination and equal opportunity against the background of a free market economy' (99). To support this claim, Himmelfarb argues that for Mill, gender equality has value only insofar as it is instrumental to liberty; that, in fact, *The Subjection of Women* and Mill's other 'egalitarian' writings are really disguised pleas for liberty. Throughout

most of Chapter 4, Morales argues that nothing could be further from the truth. Rather, the 'ideal of liberty ... is *part of* the ideal of perfect equality' (111). Even if this claim is too bold, Morales is certainly correct that Himmelfarb's argument only takes into account what Mill says in the first chapter of *The Subjection of Women* and fails to consider the rest of that work.

Another feminist criticism of Mill, coming from virtually every quarter, is that his defense of gender equality in *The Subjection of Women* breaks down when he defends the 'common arrangement' between men and women in marriage whereby the man earns the income and the woman takes care of domestic matters. Morales does admit that Mill made a '*faux pas*' both by assuming that the functions of child-bearing and child-rearing must go hand in hand and by drawing a normative inference about social roles from a fact about biology. Nevertheless, she insists that Mill's remarks 'must be understood as a hypothetical prediction of what form the family would take *under conditions of perfect equality*' (173). The received interpretation of Mill construes liberty as being opposed to community. Morales, however, takes Mill to be opposing liberty to *power*, and to be consistently arguing that the general ethic of power is inimical to human flourishing. Throughout, Morales places great emphasis on Mill's remark in the first paragraph of *The Subjection of Women* that relationships based on domination/subordination are one of the chief hindrances to human improvement. In other places, Mill suggests that how much power one has should not depend on the form of labor in which one engages. All these remarks suggest to Morales that, for Mill, under conditions of perfect equality 'it would not be *necessary* for women to earn a wage *if they want to preserve their dignity and status as equals in society*' (174). In short, Mill might be faulted for shortsightedness — and, perhaps, for failing to see the connection between dignity and *paid* work — but he is not guilty of the gross inconsistencies of which feminists critics have accused him.

John Gray's Mill is an outmoded theorist who is better buried than praised. Maria Morales' Mill is a social reformer whose practical philosophy is as applicable today as it was in his own time; and contemporary feminists and communitarians would do well to embrace him as one of their own. Hers is certainly a more challenging position, and one that deserves to be more thoroughly examined.

Edward M. Barbanell
University of Utah

William Hare and **John P. Portelli, eds.**
Philosophy of Education: Introductory Readings. Revised 2nd edition.
Calgary, AB: Detselig Enterprises Limited
1996. Pp. xvi + 381.
Cdn$23.95. ISBN 1-55059-136-3.

This collection is designed mainly for students in teacher education programs, and offers a treatment of a number of important topics in the field of philosophy of education. Most of the articles are more recent than 1988, the year of the first edition. The collection is divided into sections, each with an introduction by the editors. This review mentions several but not all of the articles.

The first section is on Theory and Practice, a topic which gives a rationale for the book itself. Harold Entwistle, in 'The Relationship between Theory and Practice: A New Look', addresses the question of why trainee teachers should have any patience with educational theories. His main insight is that while many theories about childhood and learning are utopian, the intelligent practitioner makes reasonable compromises based on a critical perspective of the theories and practical necessity. Even sound theories do not yield recipes for practice, but serve as ways to understand complexities and to inform discretion and judgment.

The contribution from David Carr, 'Practical Enquiry, Values and the Problem of Educational Theory', is also a warning against expecting the wrong things from theory. For him, theories should not be regarded as sources of specific techniques; their role is to generate questions and problems. A theoretical perspective also reinforces professional autonomy, and facilitates articulate criticism of managerial initiatives. Carr's timely piece also reminds us that education is not merely a technical enterprise, but is intricately tied to human values.

The second section is on the topic of Critical Thinking. The point of this is that young people in schools should not only gain information and basic skills, but also learn to assess beliefs and knowledge claims and to distinguish knowledge from other things, such as dogma, received opinion and guesswork.

The articles 'The Role of Reasons in (Science) Education', by Harvey Siegel and 'Critical and Creative Thinking' by Sharon Bailin convey a good sense of the importance of learning to reason, but also indicate differences that exist among the supporters of critical thinking, such as on whether thinking skills are subject-specific or generic and transferable, and on the boundary, if any, between critical and imaginative thinking.

The article by John P. Portelli, 'The Challenge of Teaching for Critical Thinking', gives a useful discussion of objections to critical thinking, such as ones based on relativism, nihilism and conservatism, while also drawing on experience in the teaching of philosophy to children.

In 'Is Modern Critical Thinking Theory Sexist?' Barbara Thayer-Bacon finds flaws in a spread of different critical thinking positions, and objects to their common preference for detachment. Instead, she proposes a constructive theory, in which receptiveness to various subjective voices enables people to come to know while in relation to others. She concludes: 'It should help us continue to grow and work towards peace, which is my ultimate concern' (104).

Another section is on Controversy in the Classroom. Arguing against the view that teachers in their work should try to remain neutral, Mary Warnock, in 'The Neutral Teacher', makes a strong statement that the teacher should disclose positions she or he holds on questions of value. Students should be taught to think hard for themselves on moral matters, but it is salutary for them to encounter sincere persons of principle or vision. Warnock thinks that time will be the remedy if pupils are unduly influenced by a teacher's personality.

Warnock's position is not sufficient for dispelling the danger of indoctrination, according to William Hare. In 'Propaganda in the Classroom: The Keegstra Case', he points out that Mr. Keegstra, a Canadian teacher convicted of promoting anti-Semitic hatred, was sincere and had principles. Hare also argues that Keegstra does not deserve the defense that he was an honest heretic because, despite frankness in the content of his beliefs, his methodology was not honest: he did not indicate to students reputable sources of different views, and he held to a conspiracy theory in such a way that evidence counter to it was seen as further proof of it. Hare's article ends with the disconcerting observation that Keegstra, because of good classroom management, was widely hailed as a 'good teacher'.

The Keegstra affair has given new urgency to the topic of indoctrination in philosophical analysis. Further, an interesting contribution from Eamonn Callan called 'Indoctrination and Parental Rights' gives a provocative argument against the right of parents to indoctrinate their own children.

In the section on Conceptions of Education, Richard Rorty, in 'Education without Dogma', argues that grade school should be devoted to socialization — initiation into the conventional — while college should allow students to shape an individual perspective and subject the conventional to critical scrutiny. Many, including the critical thinking supporters, would oppose socialization thus construed, while others might doubt whether the individuating stage can occur if prior schooling has been limited to the acceptance of the conventional.

Other articles in the collection deal with topics such as an ethic of caring, education in relation to democracy, and multiculturalism.

Overall, the collected articles are philosophically competent while being at the same time tied to practical concerns that educators face. It would be of undoubted value as a text for students of education. Its substance and range are greater than is suggested by the term 'introductory'.

The volume shows philosophy of education in a good light in at least two ways: philosophy is directly involved in important developments in school

curricula, notably critical thinking: and, philosophical reflection makes a valuable contribution to the education and thoughtful practice of teachers.

It is a pity that the influence of philosophers in Faculties of Education is not as great as the value of their subject. In fact, philosophy and other discipline-based courses have largely disappeared from education degree requirements. One must hope that a book such as this might make enough people see the value of philosophy of education.

Richard Barrett
(Department of Educational Policy Studies)
University of Alberta

Anselm Haverkamp
Leaves of Mourning: Hölderlin's Late Work, With an Essay on Keats and Melancholy.
Trans. Vernon Chadwick.
Albany: SUNY Press 1996. Pp. xii + 163.
US$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2739-0);
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2740-4).

In *Leaves of Mourning*, Anselm Haverkamp considers Hölderlin's late poetry in terms of the poet's own reflections on the possibilities of moving beyond mourning (20). Rather than seeing Hölderlin's last poems as the work of resignation, they are understood as working out what remains after mourning.

Several of the chapters in the book focus on particular works by Hölderlin, such as 'Mnemosyne', 'Souvenir' and 'The Church-yard'. In each of these poems, Haverkamp suggests that Hölderlin offers an alternative to the 'romantic predicament' (xi), where the objects of mourning return, aesthetically, as fetishes and melancholic rage (as with Keats). For Hölderlin, the objects of mourning return, but they are incorporated in a way that does not lead to melancholy.

Haverkamp's book concludes with an essay on Keats and melancholy, which takes up again the idea of a theory of mourning and its relationship to melancholy. The basic modern position, according to Haverkamp, is one where mourning must conform to melancholy (where the sense of loss is secondary to the feeling of despair or 'incurable sorrow'). In Keats's 'Ode on Mourning', Haverkamp finds an example of the early modern attitudes towards melancholy, which tend towards narcissism. In contrast, he claims that mourning, rather than melancholy, leads us to acknowledge 'that which remains inaccessible to [both] those terms — the human condition of mortal-

ity' (101). With melancholy, we have sorrow; with mourning, we move beyond sorrow, not to happiness, but to a recognition of our condition.

An adequate summary of the book is impossible to give. Haverkamp's writing is very dense, sometimes convoluted, and often difficult to work through, especially for someone unfamiliar with either Hölderlin or the secondary European works that are located around him (Dilthey, Benjamin, Adorno, Derrida and many others). The book exists well-within the already-established literature on Hölderlin and the references to other writers assume a familiarity that make the work unintelligible to the unprepared reader. Thus, while in no way an introduction to Hölderlin, *Leaves of Mourning* would be relevant to someone concerned with the later work of Hölderlin or more recent work with mourning (such as the later works of Derrida). It is clearly not a book for everyone.

Brian Richardson
University of Hawaii

Dale Jacquette
Meinongian Logic: The Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence.
New York: Walter de Gruyter 1996.
Pp. xiv + 297.
US$146.70. ISBN 3-11-014865-X.

It has long been a commonplace of analytic philosophy that the Meinongian theory of objects is ontologically profligate and easily discredited. It is greatly to the credit of recent work on the reconstruction of the theory that such hasty dismissal has become increasingly untenable. With this book Dale Jacquette consolidates his own contribution to this process. The book falls into three sections, which I shall address in turn. The first section is a defence of Jacquette's version of the theory of objects; the second a presentation of the logical system underpinning his account and the third a survey of some of its philosophical implications and applications.

As Jacquette stresses, Meinong's position rests on three pillars (80). Firstly, the unrestricted assumption thesis, that thought can be turned to anything that can be given a well-formed description — including the golden mountain and the round square. Secondly, the intentionality thesis (inherited from Brentano), that every such thought is directed towards an object. Thirdly, the thesis that *Sosein* (being so) is independent from *Sein* (being), so that objects have the properties ascribed to them whether or not they exist.

Thus the (non-existent) golden mountain is golden and a mountain, and the (impossible) round square is round and square. To avoid paradox it is vital that the distinction between existent and non-existent objects is clearly maintained. This is generally achieved by employing either two sorts of predication or two sorts of predicate. Jacquette follows the latter course, distinguishing between nuclear properties — ordinary descriptive terms, constitutive of the *Sosein* of an object — and extranuclear properties, which are concerned with the object's ontological status and are not part of its *Sosein*. The classic objection to this is Russell's notion of an existent round square. This is generally taken either to refute Meinong's theory, or at least to require a retreat from some of the above theses. Jacquette argues that, since existence is not a nuclear property, the existent round square is not an object, but the assumption thesis is retained, since to think of the existent round square is merely to think mistakenly of the (nonexistent) round square.

This insight is formalized in the development of Jacquette's logic. Therein he offers a theory of definite descriptions which is a generalization of Russell's famous 'misleading form' account of that problem. Contra Russell, 'The round square is round' is evaluated as true, but 'The existent round square is existent' is still false, so paradox is avoided. The theory has Russell's account as a proper fragment, restricted to the consideration of existent objects. That Jacquette's theory preserves Russell's as a special case, and then goes on to address material inadequately treated by the latter, gives it the character of a progressive revision, to borrow Lakatos's terminology. Hence if Jacquette's system meets with technical success, we should expect it to be significantly more attractive than the classical alternative, at least when we are not exclusively concerned with existent objects.

Jacquette's system is presented as a non-standard logic with a three-valued semantics. The third value, 'undetermined', evaluates propositions that are neither confirmed nor denied by the nuclear properties of an object. The propositional constants follow Łukasiewicz's matrices. Since these are non-regular, the determination of hitherto undetermined propositions (as in soap operas or other serial fiction) may, counterintuitively, upset the prior attribution of 'true' and 'false'. However, this problem should be remediable by the adoption of a slightly different semantics.

Meinong's unrestricted assumption thesis is unconstrained even by metaphysical possibility, hence Jacquette has to accommodate objects with logically contradictory classes of properties. To this end he introduces a limited degree of paraconsistency by means of an additional, intensional negation operator, which is restricted to predicates. ('The round square may be round and not round. But this does not mean both that it is round and it is not the case that it is round' [117]. Jacquette does not discuss paraconsistency, and indeed states that his system is consistent [189-90]. So it is, for propositional negation, but the predicate negation tolerates non-trivializing inconsistencies, and is thus paraconsistent.) The strategy of maintaining two distinct negations is familiar from relevant logics. However, as paraconsistent sys-

tems, these are open to criticisms which Jacquette's system shares. Saliently, it can be asked whether the weaker, paraconsistent negation is *really* negation. If it isn't, then the simultaneous ascription of a nuclear property and its complement to an object will fail to represent a genuine contradiction. One response would be to embrace paraconsistency wholeheartedly by offering independent grounds for the rejection of the stronger, classical negation. But that would produce a very different system.

The philosophical applications of the theory of objects have been addressed in greater detail elsewhere, but Jacquette's treatment of issues such as Anselm's ontological argument and the use of idealized terms in science is insightful and helps to corroborate his version of the theory. One of the most familiar and successful applications of object theory is to fictional objects. However this area is not without difficulties; in particular it offers intuitive motivation for a telling reprise of Russell's problem of the existent round square. For there are fictional contexts within which it is vital to distinguish between existent and nonexistent objects, yet all of the objects are nonexistent, since fictional. Hence we distinguish between the dagger which Macbeth hallucinates and that which he carries in his belt. If existence and non-existence are not nuclear properties, how do the daggers differ? Jacquette's response is that the nonexistent dagger has a nuclear property, that of being hallucinatory, from which its nonexistence within the play may be inferred. This is ingenious, although the admission of nuclear properties from which extranuclear properties can be inferred might be thought to endanger the independence thesis.

There are other presentations of Meinongian object theory which make greater concessions to the novice in the field, and more thorough pursuits of its applications. However Jacquette has given his system a commendably detailed and comprehensive exposition, and exhibited its technical superiority to many of its competitors.

Andrew Aberdein
(*Department of Logic and Metaphysics*)
University of St. Andrews

Julien de La Mettrie
Machine Man and Other Writings.
Trans. and ed. Ann Thomson.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. 160.
US$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-47258-X);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-47849-9).

This is a newly translated edition of the writings of Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751), the French materialist physician whose writings significantly influenced the *Philosophes*. The edition includes not only La Mettrie's most famous work, *l'Homme Machine*, translated here as 'Machine Man', but a number of his other works, *Treatise on the Soul, Man as Plant, The System of Epicurus, Anti-Seneca or the Sovereign Good*, and *Preliminary Discourse*. According to Thomson, with the exception of *Machine Man* and parts of *Treatise on the Soul*, these works have not been translated before. These works together provide the basis for a very complete reading of La Mettrie, ranging from his metaphysical views to the social and moral consequences that he drew from them. The edition also includes a valuable and detailed introduction by Ann Thomson, a chronology, a brief bibliography, and a good index.

Quibbles first. The title of *l'Homme Machine* seems to challenge translators; it has previously been translated as 'Man a Machine', and Thomson discusses the problem of its translation in her foreword. It is difficult to see why the French title cannot be given as 'The Man-machine', which is absolutely literal and seems to express his intent far more clearly than either of the other two. A second small quibble: while the Cambridge paperback is very nicely turned out, my copy at least contains a misplaced page in the Introduction: p. xv leads to xvii which leads back to xvi and only then to xviii.

The Introduction first places La Mettrie and his works in their intellectual-historical context and then briefly summarizes and comments on each of them. It is very densely packed, often giving the impression of being written under the most extreme space constraints. Thus, while it is of very high quality, it is occasionally marred by not making key distinctions explicit. This is especially noticeable when competing theories are being described, as with the Iatromechanists or the theories of Thomas Willis or Guillaume Lamy. This does not pose a significant problem for anyone already familiar with the intellectual terrain of the French mid-eighteenth century, but students coming to the material cold would require considerable help. Finally, Thomson tends not to elaborate philosophical consequences. For example, in one place in her summary of *Machine Man* she writes: 'He uses the comparison, common in the time, ... , between the human body and a machine or watch, in which there is a mainspring driving the rest; however, he puts it to a different use, explaining that each small cog has its own moving principle, as matter is self-moved. This is his main affirmation, and is part of what he means by declaring that humans are machines' (xix), and she

concludes with this remark. But the remark cries out for elaboration. Part of the point of the machine model is precisely that the spring *avoids* a need for appealing to motive power in each particle of matter. The attribution of motion to each part is therefore something that should be explained, and the most likely explanation is that it is there in order to make the derivation of the vital phenomena (locomotion, sensitivity, nutrition, reproduction, and consciousness) from inert matter possible. The central question driving the Materialist was precisely how much had to be added to Cartesian Extension in order to make the vital phenomena derivable. A textual elaboration of this kind in a number of places might have been useful, though, again, the impression is that Thomson was limited by constraints of space.

That said, this edition provides an invaluable resource for the student of the French Enlightenment, in the development of which La Mettrie was a strange but nonetheless central character. The background that makes La Mettrie so important to students of the eighteenth century is precisely that he represents the uncompromising development of the dominant theme in the Cartesian philosophy, that of the natural/mechanical explanation of the whole of what there is. As I mentioned above, La Mettrie encountered difficulties in precisely the same areas that we have found historically to be least tractable to mechanical explanation, namely the vital phenomena. It is instructive to watch him struggle with these resistant problems, arriving more often than not at a version of emergence based on a combination of motion and complexity ('organization'). In effect, La Mettrie's solution to these problems ran parallel to the Lockean account of 'ideas of secondary qualities', which 'ideas' emerged when and only when the real particles in space assumed certain configurations.

But intransigent mechanistic Materialism is not the only reason that La Mettrie is important and interesting. Unlike the *Philosophes*, he was willing to draw the moral, social and political consequences of his brand of Materialism. He was not only atheistic, but with his atheism he also denied the existence of absolute moral truths and innate moral ideas or faculties for their apprehension. Where his morals were concerned, he was deterministic, attributing human action to the interplay of nature (the specific 'organization' of the brain and body) and nurture ('education'). In the absence of absolute values, he recommended strongly the pleasures of the flesh and self-indulgence. As far as the state was concerned, he recommended the abandonment of judgmental policies respecting crime, with a movement towards re-education and rehabilitation.

La Mettrie's relativistic/deterministic views led to his being disavowed by the *Philosophes* who were engaged in attempting to establish some kind of secular morality that would be capable of supporting, sustaining and improving society. He remains important, first, because they shared many of his views despite their public disavowals, and, second, because the debate in which he participated continues unabated today.

This is an excellent primary source text that should be included in any university library. It may easily be incorporated into any teaching context and is a valuable resource in French Enlightenment research.

Jean-Pierre Schachter
Huron College

Isaac Levi
For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. xv + 341.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-521-49713-2.

In some ways, this is an extended reflection on a remark of Frank Ramsey's: 'if two people are arguing "if p will q?" and are both in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q'. But Levi goes far beyond Ramsey, developing an intricate theory of suppositional reasoning which is contrasted with various alternatives. This theory supports a certain metaphysical outlook on 'modal realism' and conditionals — meaning *not* material conditionals but rather modal conditionals such as counterfactuals or law based conditionals — provides an interesting picture of inductive 'inference' and gives Levi a framework within which to discuss non-monotonic and default reasoning. Levi's book is very dense and closely argued; it is aimed at specialists in a field I might venture to label *pure normative dynamic rationality*. I think the explanation of this label will provide the best entry to a sketch of Levi's book. By 'pure' I mean that the kind of epistemic agents that Levi wants to consider are unlimited in their cognitive powers; for example, forming the complete deductive closure of a set of beliefs presents them no difficulties. The issues are 'normative' in the sense that Levi seeks to show how such a pure agent *ought* to revise his or her (or perhaps *its*) hypothetical beliefs under certain suppositions. Levi is concerned here especially with suppositional reasoning so it would not be correct to speak simply of *belief* revision. Thus my use of the more circumspect 'hypothetical belief revision' generated during the process of suppositional reasoning. Of course, suppositional reasoning ought to inform us how genuine beliefs would alter were an agent to come to believe the relevant suppositions. But notice (as Levi points out, pp. 5-6) that genuine belief change requires a justification of the acceptance of the 'suppositions' into one's set of beliefs whereas mere suppositional reasoning does not. Now,

it is an interesting question whether purity and normativity go exactly together, that is whether for any class of agents, relaxing their impurity would by itself make them epistemically virtuous. It appears that these issues become particularly vexed in the realm of inductive belief revision. So we might ask if the real world constraints upon the *creation* of epistemic agents can infect their epistemic virtue. I use 'dynamic' to emphasize that what is at issue here is the alteration of belief under specified changes in the agent's 'epistemic position'.

Though Ramsey's remark is suggestive, Levi wants to provide a general account of suppositional reasoning. For example, what if the agent is *not* in doubt about p (either already believing it or disbelieving it)? Surprisingly, this can reveal a dispute about how one regards suppositional reasoning in general. It would be natural to say that where p is already believed there need be no hypothetical revision of an agent's beliefs in the consideration of 'if p will q'. Just look to see if q is already in the agent's belief set. Yet consider this case (discussed by Levi, on pp. 35-6). You have the choice to take \$700 or \$1000 if a coin (believed to be fair) lands heads but \$0 otherwise. Suppose you take the coin toss option and win. Can you argue that you did the rational thing since if you had accepted the gamble you would have won? Since you *did* accept the gamble the revision rule just discussed leaves your beliefs unchanged. Thus the fact that you won the coin toss remains in your belief set and you appear to have a reasonable argument for an irrational choice! Levi suggests instead that when reasoning hypothetically from information already believed that one first contract one's belief set by removing the information and then reinserting it into one's belief set. This double operation will not necessarily lead you to the original belief set (we have here the beginning of a debate about what Levi labels the 'recovery postulate'). Reflection on such cases leads into deep water, intricate controversies over modes of hypothetical belief contraction, expansion and revision.

It also leads towards metaphysics. In particular, to the question whether conditional statements have truth values as such, which in turn leads to a high metaphysical altercation about modal realism. Levi argues that conditionals are not truth valuable. The acceptability of a conditional, say $p > q$, is to be fundamentally defined in terms of whether q ought to appear in a belief corpus expanded by the inclusion of p, and all that this entails unto infinity. (This approach engenders difficulties with iterated conditionals that Levi strives mightily to overcome.) Levi also contends that the familiar semantic treatment of conditionals in the manner of Stalnaker and Lewis (implicitly 'modally realistic' as Levi puts it) and the associated 'imaging' account of belief change cannot provide the proper guidance into the dynamics of suppositional reasoning. I suspect that despite Levi's strongly dismissive claim that 'realistically construed accounts of conditionals and imaging accounts of belief change are formalisms in search for an as yet undiscovered application' (82) it is not clear that the 'imaging approach' cannot be developed into an intuitively reasonable account of suppositional reasoning.

However, Levi does develop a very sophisticated 'logic of conditionals' in line with his modal irrealism and the denial of truth values to conditionals with appropriate notions of validity, satisfiability and entailment. It is interesting that systems of the sort Levi advocates are quite naturally non-monotonic (e.g., the fact that $h > (g > f)$ is acceptable does not entail that $g > f$ is acceptable even when h is an element of an agent's belief set). Levi draws out several connections between his approach and those undertaken by workers in computer science with regard to non-monotonic reasoning. He also links non-monotonic reasoning to so-called default reasoning, considering the approaches of several authors.

In sum, this book is narrowly focussed on a few key topics which are given an extremely detailed and intricate examination. For non-specialists it will be hard going; it presupposes a close acquaintance with the topics under discussion and seldom condescends to place these topics into a larger view of the problem of rationality (some of Levi's earlier works provide a more general entry point). Finally, I confess to some doubts about the relevance of any of this material to the epistemic predicaments in which real agents find themselves. It is of course worthwhile to trace out the implications of possible views and intuitions about rational belief change. But in the end it becomes a kind of pure mathematics whose idealizations, instead of leading towards a description of how real agents form and transform their beliefs, draw us ever farther away from the hope of such a description.

William Seager
University of Toronto at Scarborough

W.J. Mander, ed.
Perspectives on the Logic and Metaphysics of F.H. Bradley.
Herndon, VA: Books International Inc., for Thoemmes Press 1996. Pp. xxvii + 290.
US$72.00 (cloth: ISBN 1-85506-433-2);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 1-85506-432-4).

It is good to see this volume appear. Bradley was an admired philosopher in Oxford at the turn of the century. By my undergraduate days this Absolute Idealist was almost a 'taboo' figure and his books sold better in the Fraternities of Brand Blandshard's Yale. Now Bradley is rightly getting more attention, thanks in fair part to Richard Wollheim's now undermentioned *F.H. Bradley* of 1959.

The contributors are: Donald Baxter, 'Bradley on Substantive and Adjective: The Complex-Unity Problem'; Evelyn Fortier, 'Was the Dispute between Russell and Bradley about Internal Relations?'; James Bradley, 'The Transcendental Turn in F.H. Bradley's Metaphysics of Feeling'; W.J. Mander, 'The Role of the Self in Bradley's Argument for Idealism'; Richard Ingardia, 'Bradley and Aquinas: Empirical Realists'; Leslie Armour, 'Bradley's Other Metaphysics'; James W. Allard, 'Degrees of Truth in F.H. Bradley'; Leemon McHenry, 'Bradley's Conception of Metaphysics'; Fred Wilson, 'Bradley and the Demise of Classical Psychology'; Phillip Ferreira, 'Bradley on the Intension and Extension of Terms'; K.H. Sievers, 'Inference and the Criterion of Systems'; Graham McFee, 'Bradley, Possibility and a Question-and-Answer Logic'.

Fred Wilson's essay on Bradley and the course of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century psychology is much the largest and clearly the best part of the book. So often one tends to find Bradley's centrally famous attack on relations something quite brutally idiosyncratic and cut off from fulfilling kinds of philosophy. Russell and later analysts have seen to this. A brilliant type of antidote is given by Wilson. With extremely readable pages of patience and lucidity he takes us through 'monadic' treatments of relations in Locke, Hume, the Mills and other founders of Associationist Psychology, including Bain. He then clarifies James Ward's critique of psychological accounts of the self. The lights suddenly go on and we can discern Bradley's handling of selfhood and relations as a timely and rational response to worthwhile opponents on permanently challenging problems. The genius and fallibility of Hume come to look more exciting than ever. Wilson's handling of Bradley and Hume makes Bradley come across as a major figure in conflict with a perennial philosopher. Wilson and Armour emerge as fine choices that the editor made. Why not maintain a more uniform level? Then the volume's impact could have been stronger for its commendable purpose.

Now for some gentle complaints. There is the matter of Bradley's attraction to tension between predication and the so-called *'is' of identity*. It is taken up, for example, in direct or indirect ways by Mander at p. xvi, and Baxter at pp. 5ff. (Compare Baxter, 26ff; James Bradley, 36ff.) But the extent of historical excitement is too limited. Although Leslie Armour does talk a little of Bradley and Plotinus (if more enticingly of Bradley and Ayer), nowhere in these papers do I find helpful discussion of Bradley on 'is' and of 'is' in Parmenides' *Way of Truth* — at a decisive beginning in Western philosophy! Was Bradley *critically* aware of the Eleatics, did he ever comment on them in detail, or on Plato's and Aristotle's reactions to them? In notes or recorded conversations? If the editor wanted to see Bradley taken seriously as a figure in the *history* of philosophy, he *could* have usefully seen to it that some essays touched more on such historically basic problems, and that at least one writer gave fair space to contrasting views on 'is' of Bradley, Russell and Parmenides together. But in saying this, I do not wish to deny that other contributors besides Wilson raise some intriguing points about various predecessors. On the other hand, a first-class chapter that expanded Bradley's degrees of

ontological likeness to Hegel, Spinoza and Eriugena would have helped the cause.

Again, some of the writers miss another fine chance to reevaluate Bradley's positions as plausible, and as challenging in history. For they have missed or ignored the development in recent decades of a *monist system of logic and semantics*. This can convert statements of Russell's and Aristotle's pluralist ontologies into statements about a unique Ultimate Reality that might serve as a One for Parmenides, or Eriugena, or Spinoza or Bradley — and probably some ancient Indian forms of monism. Such monist systems can be at least partly vindicated against Russell's and other analytical pluralists' mockery. Yet, the authors who discuss issues which eventually tie up with Bradley's logic and ontology lack the needed space or knowledge, it seems, to articulate and assess Bradley on recent formal terms. (See F.J. Pelletier and J. King-Farlow, *Idealistic Studies*, 1978; King-Farlow, *Iyyun*, 1995.) Again, different studies, published by Mark Glouberman on Bradley, monism and relations, should have been weighed before these chapters became so public. (See, for example, Glouberman, *Iyyun*, 1993.) Possible metaphysical implications of F.T. Sommers' noted Logic of Terms deserve comment, too, from authors.

An Index, Bibliography and Glossary of Terms should be added — with a good personal sketch. But, all the same, thanks to these judges for giving Bradley quite a break.

John King-Farlow
University of Alberta

Harvey C. Mansfield
Machiavelli's Virtue.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1996.
Pp. xvi + 369.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-226-50368-2.

All chapters of Mansfield's *Machiavelli's Virtue* with the exception of the first were published previously between 1967-1995. Mansfield examines a wide array of subjects divided between ideas, textual interpretations, and politics. Separate chapters focus on virtue (Chap. 1), necessity (Chap. 2), moral principles (Chap. 3), progress (Chap. 4), a study of the *Florentine Histories* (Chaps. 5 and 6), a study of *The Prince* (Chap. 7), a study of *Art of War* (Chap. 8), an introduction to Strauss's Machiavelli (Chap. 9), the new regime (Chap. 10), political science (Chap. 11), the state (Chap. 12), and the modern

executive (Chap. 13). The general reader should find the early chapters on virtue, necessity, principles, and progress, and the chapters on Machiavelli's politics (Chaps. 10-13) of special interest.

While each chapter might stand on its own, central arguments recur through the book including the newly written preface and first chapter. Three themes dominate: 1) Machiavelli is Machiavellian; 2) Machiavelli has influenced our own politics; 3) Machiavelli's politics benefit all.

To say that Machiavelli is Machiavellian is to recognise him as a teacher and practitioner of evil in politics. Scholarship on Machiavelli exhibits controversy about whether Machiavelli taught evil or some benign variant of political good (220-6). There are countless indications of the first theme and Mansfield presents them convincingly. When Machiavelli rejects the marriage of classical republican virtue and Christianity (Hobbes's 'Aristotelity') he dismisses the possibility of regulating politics with moral principle (21-4, 276-9). As Mansfield says, 'human conditions do not permit it' (20).

The division of humankind into two 'humors', those desiring power and those desiring to be left alone and to be good (24, 30, 55, 92, 115, 172-3); the 'necessity of acquisition' (16, 181); the admonition that princes must appear to be good but employ evil (36-42, 183-6); and the focus on 'effectual truth' whereby the ends of politics become the prince's *created* effects and justify the use of evil means (30, 33) easily show Machiavelli's Machiavellianism.

According to Mansfield, Machiavelli has also influenced our own politics. But he overstates the case when he says that 'Machiavelli might be chiefly responsible for the spirit of modernity and thus in himself the origin of the modern world' and that modernity 'could have been founded by the free act of a human being' (262). Machiavelli is said to have intended and to some extent accomplished a 'perpetual republic' (56, 109, 119-22) defined as a commitment to 'linear progress' (115). In a very general way, this does describe the common view of modern political change and contrasts sharply with the classical, cyclical view of change (112-15, 273-80).

But commitment to progress does not make a perpetual republic since it is neither perpetual nor descriptive of commitment in a real republic. There is no sense in which players on Team Modernity (liberals, Marxists, and followers of Nietzsche) aim at or share in a common good. Further it seems strange to attribute the origin of modernity to the free act of an individual when diverse others (e.g., Petrarch, William of Occam, Erasmus, Luther, Bacon, and Descartes) also made strong, *independent* marks on modernity.

Still, Machiavelli does influence modern political thought, to some extent, through Hobbes (given the latter's emphasis on the cycle of ambition and fear, the problem of acquisitive behaviour, the problems of pride and prudence, and the utility of coercive force). And Mansfield shows how Machiavelli placed his stamp on modern institutions and practices, probably most importantly those associated with the political executive (295-314).

It is difficult to take seriously the claim that Machiavelli's politics grant benefits to all (103, 160, 238, 252, 278). The claim appears inconsistent and

ironic. Mansfield seems to fellow-travel with Machiavelli when he writes '[a]ny supposed betterment of mankind at the cost of [Machiavellian] virtue is no bargain ... [w]hether modernity has taken its intended course is doubtful ... Machiavelli's successors [have] formalized and emasculated his notion of virtue ... created pitiful creatures seeking security instead of risk ... [d]espite Machiavelli's best efforts the weakness of the moderns continues' (122). Because what is common translates into 'what is common to everyone *individualized*' (110) (my emphasis), there are no bridges across individuals such that they could conceive of and cooperate toward a common good. Benefits might accrue to *some* on the basis of what defines them as individuals pressed out of the two 'humors' (e.g., ambitions or fears).

In fact, Machiavellian politics holds that what is most importantly common to humanity is a lack of humility. Machiavelli admired the way that Christianity manipulated its subjects on this very ground. More a problem for potential princes, the masses suffer too. Mansfield writes exaggeratedly, and in a reflective moment, that 'no man is so modest about his own merits as to think he is not entitled to security for himself, his property and his wife and children. Since no one is thankful for receiving his due, justice cannot be the source of trust or obligation' (239). Enter Machiavelli's politics which tames immodesty through regular exposure to disorder and violence, that is, to political beginnings (55-78, 97). When describing Machiavelli's virtue, Mansfield says that '[a] virtuous prince must make the good feel exposed so they will turn in gratitude to the one who provides security' (30).

Such a politics seems ironic since benefits are said to accrue via competition *between* Machiavellians (50), by an unspecified 'glory' (52), via 'imperialism' (91), through the people's 'self-inflicted wound[s]' (234), by a virtue 'repulsive to the people and unappreciated by them' (238), by 'removing justice' from laws (257), through frequent warfare (191, 263), and through the prince's use of 'deceit' (278). Might it be said that the pit bull benefits the mail carrier when it tears only one arm off her torso?

Even admitting tiredness, worry, and scepticism in the face of modern progress, it is not clear how a *pure* form of Machiavellian politics could have yielded worthier benefits, or that there is some surviving, practical sense in which it might do so. Mansfield's book badly needs a concluding chapter on the question of benefits, along with a defense, straight-up and devoid of irony, of why anyone *should* 'take a more generous view of Old Nick' (109).

Michael P. Bradley
(*Department of Political Studies*)
Augustana University College

Larry May
The Socially Responsive Self.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1996.
Pp. xii + 209.
US$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-51171-5);
US$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-51172-3).

It comes as no great surprise to most people that individuals are affected by outside influences, and yet this phenomenon has been a nagging problem for philosophers interested in moral responsibility. In traditional liberal accounts, a person is an independent and autonomous being who naturally carries the praise and blame for his or her acts. The individual needs to recognize and assess influence and interference with working out the right thing to do, but essentially it is a rational exercise done by the sovereign self. Framed in these terms the role of family, community and professional groups is largely tangential. Some, like Peter French, have argued that entities like corporations can themselves be regarded as moral individuals, but still the view that we are all moral atoms remains paramount.

Larry May in his book *The Socially Responsive Self* has done a service to professional ethics by laying out an elegant and methodical claim that the self is not an isolated object, but rather a dynamic and intersubjective process. According to May the self is a flux which is partially determined by its participation in and response to the various communities to which it belongs. Given this notion of the communitarian self, influences which we now describe as 'outside' are better thought of as constitutive. The upshot is that we ought not to make moral assessments of individuals without reference to their environments, together with the correlative claim that families, associations and professions have a greater degree of responsibility to their members. Consequently May suggests that codes of conduct that fail to recognize how notions of responsibility are embedded in social structures are unrealistically going to place too much weight on the individual decision-maker.

May uses the first half of his book to give some philosophical underpinning to his claims about the nature of the self. His argument is clear and compelling, although May presumes a familiarity with the standard theories of identity and moral responsibility, and in that sense his book is a continuation of his previous works in social responsibility rather than a freestanding overview of traditional approaches and arguments.

The second half is taken up with four applications of his theory, in issues of conflict of interest and fiduciary duties, legal advocacy, medical authority and whistle-blowing in the scientific community. These chapters do not provide a comprehensive view of professional ethics, but instead serve as cases which attempt to 'break the stranglehold' of current liberal analyses. His practical claims rest on notions of community, compromise and critical assessment.

He treats professions as communities which help form the values of the individual. Consequently he believes that not only does the individual have a responsibility to the profession, but that it has a corresponding duty to support individuals. For example, if an engineer blows the whistle on a poor design there should be professional solidarity and pride in standards among engineers that over-rides loyalty to particular corporations. This is a welcome conclusion, in that it stresses professional responsibility and promoting the common good. Nevertheless, May consistently treats professions as homogenous wholes with unanimity of standards, an assumption which is open to question. Following his example, engineers come in a variety of sub-specialties and may have cross-cutting or conflicting loyalties without a simple over-arching standard. In the nuclear industry, for instance, the regulators are employed by private interests and may oversee their own colleagues, and those involved in constructing turbines may have very different views from those who run them. Thus May's account needs to posit a unanimity of standards or else to slice the professional groups much more thinly — perhaps litigators and bond lawyers instead of 'lawyers' as a whole.

May's view of the community involves negotiated compromise, allowing plural visions of the good life. In his section on legal advocacy he implements this notion by saying that in many areas of the law we should prefer a policy of mediated dispute resolution to one of adversarial law. His analysis of the law is qualified though, since he recognizes that some areas are not subject to compromise: clearly murder is different from divorce. And, as he notes, mediation has come under fire because of its potential to allow settlements that are voluntarily assented to by unempowered or unequal parties at the negotiating table. Similarly talk about compromise in general needs to be supplemented by an account of what is unacceptable or unconscionable. In his analysis of the competition between Christian Scientists and the medical community he believes that there may be room for compromise. However he limits the examples to ones where each side may have greater authority — spiritual welfare in the case of the terminally ill and medical authority in physical diagnosis. He does not tell us how to resolve the common awkward cases where each side has an equally compelling claim and there seems no middle ground.

A central tenet of his work that demands greater explanation is the claim that we are capable of critical assessment of value questions, allowing us to filter competing views, compare multiple claims about motives, and compromise when negotiated agreement is possible. May suggests that the individual is able to achieve integrity of values and resist the force of social institutions. This mature critical judgement comes through 'a self-critical process stimulated by confrontation with diverse values and beliefs' and he tells us 'the mechanism for moral growth is the confrontation process.' However he remains vague about the way that we are to develop such acumen, and treats it as an innate ability rather than a talent developed through guidance and training. It is not clear or self-evident that such

exposure to plural views by itself will result in mature judgement instead of greater confusion.

May's work is forcefully argued, and its problems are a stimulus for more discussion rather than mortal blows. He has exposed the central contemporary issues in professional ethics. His conclusions are provocative and will be necessary reading for future discussions of the subject.

Kevin Gibson
Marquette University

Carl Mitcham
Thinking through Technology: The Path between Engineering and Philosophy.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994.
Pp. 397.
US$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-53196-1);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-53198-8).

Because of my long association with Carl Mitcham — as collaborator and editor, but also as friend — I may not be the most objective reviewer of one of his books. When I was asked to write this review, I raised that issue with the editors but was reassured; I was told that all I have to do is inform readers and let them decide whether there is a conflict. Moreover — I was told — I do have, as long-time editor of the publications of the Society for Philosophy and Technology, a unique perspective on the philosophy and technology field.

I decided to take the task upon myself, however diffidently, for two reasons. First, it has been alleged many times that the philosophy of technology has neither an adequate basic textbook nor an adequate history of the field — and Mitcham's book, it has been claimed, can serve as either or both of these. Second, Mitcham's book seems to me to have sufficient importance to merit wide discussion, including the kinds of criticisms it has already received and undoubtedly will continue to receive.

The first issue I want to take up is that of a history/textbook. How does *Thinking through Technology* fare by contrast with other histories of or primers in this new field?

I should say at the outset that I think an academic discipline — and only some philosophers believe that the philosophy of technology is or ought to become such — does need some sort of basic textbook. I think, furthermore, that historically grounded textbooks are the best kind.

There were five principal English-language competitors when Mitcham's book appeared on the scene: Friedrich Rapp's anthology, *Contributions to a*

Philosophy of Technology (1974); Rapp's monograph, *Analytical Philosophy of Technology* (1981); Don Ihde's early effort, *Technics and Praxis: A Philosophy of Technology* (1979), along with his later, *Philosophy of Technology: An Introduction* (1993); and Frederick Ferré's *Philosophy of Technology* (1988). Two other books might be mentioned, Larry Hickman's anthology, *Technology as a Human Affair* (1990), and Mitcham's own anthology (co-edited with Robert Mackey), *Philosophy and Technology: Readings in the Philosophical Problems of Technology* (1972; reprinted with enlarged bibliography in 1983). For comparative purposes, I will limit myself to the non-anthologies, by Rapp, Ihde (two attempts), and Ferré.

Mitcham's book is far and away the most comprehensive, as well as the best grounded in the history of the field, among these five books. Mitcham includes a long part one on historical traditions in philosophy of technology, where he summarizes both pro-technology ('engineering') and (mostly) anti-technology ('humanities') philosophies of technology, along with attempts to reconcile the two (especially efforts in Germany and the United States).

In this long historical introduction to his book, Mitcham summarizes contributions by a long list of authors, from Karl Marx and Ernst Kapp in the nineteenth century, to Peter Engelmeier in the early twentieth century, Lewis Mumford, José Ortega y Gasset, Martin Heidegger, and Jacques Ellul in mid-century, and on to Rapp, Hickman, and Ihde, among others. In addition, he discusses the relations of the developing field to philosophy of science, history of technology, and such other disparate fields as theology and political philosophy.

Though Ihde's *Philosophy of Technology* includes a long discussion of the history of human technological engagements with nature — and something of a history of the philosophy of technology — none of the comparator books comes close to matching the breadth and depth of Mitcham's historical introduction.

Nor can any of the other would-be textbooks match Mitcham's evenhanded discussions of competing viewpoints. Rapp's text is avowedly 'analytical'; both of Ihde's are rooted in phenomenology (though the later text does provide a somewhat broader focus); and even Ferré's — which is the only one that reads like an introductory textbook — ends with a defense of a Whitehead-inspired metaphysics, a holistic critique of narrow technological thinking. As I will show next, Mitcham's book also ends up defending a particular viewpoint, in a way that introductions to other fields typically do not. But there is much more evenhandedness about dozens, perhaps even hundreds, of different attempts to define the new field.

All of this detail, however, ends up working against the book as a textbook — at least as an introductory text. Too many approaches and too many topics are touched on too concisely for the beginning student to be able to grasp them. At most, the book might serve as a sourcebook for an advanced seminar in philosophy of technology, where advanced undergraduates or graduate students could follow up bibliographical leads and summary discussions in search of topics for seminars or theses.

Turning to the second issue — the point of view of *Thinking through Technology*, its significance, and any criticisms that it warrants — the first thing to note is the subtitle, *The Path between Engineering and Philosophy*. The point is to suggest that many previous philosophers of technology have been ignorant of engineering and related technical fields or at least have not seemed to take into account, to any satisfactory degree, what technical professionals actually do, the values they hold, and the things they produce — often for the betterment of the human condition. Mitcham intends to undercut this criticism, almost swamping the reader (at least the reader of his notes and references) in details of what engineers and technical professionals say about the objects they work on, their procedures and methodologies, the knowledge claims they make and defend, and even their values and motives. This last heading — motives — is the least developed, and Mitcham says that is because neither engineers nor philosophers have written much about it. (The chapter entitled, 'Types of Technology as Volition', includes a long and detailed discussion of Martin Heidegger's mysterious philosophy of technology — and Heidegger is one of the main philosophers that defenders of technology have in mind when they claim that philosophical critics are ignorant of the real world of technology.)

Unfortunately, despite the minute detail on engineering in Mitcham's notes and references, his critics still accuse him of evaluating technology from an outsider's perspective. This is partly because he does not do, or even depend upon, any detailed studies of the development of particular technologies or technological institutions. There are few references, for instance, to recent studies of particular technological developments by the new contextual historians of technology or the devotees of the 'social construction of technology' and similar approaches. But it is also partly because 'the path between engineering and philosophy' is really a path from engineering to philosophy — and, in fact, to a humanistic philosophy whose avowed aim is to 'take the measure of' not only technology (in the abstract) but of our modern technological culture as a whole. This is most explicit in a section headed, 'A Brief for the Primacy of Humanities Philosophy of Technology' (in contrast with what he calls 'engineering philosophy of technology'), but the attitude is pervasive throughout the book.

In his book, Mitcham also has a somewhat strange attitude toward the ethics and politics of technology. He says he wants to emphasize 'the vitality of theory' (12), but what theory means in his view is primarily metaphysical, and to a lesser extent epistemological theorizing about the objects, processes, and knowledge claims of technologists. When it comes to the values and motivations of engineers and other technical workers (as well as modern consumers, the users of their products), Mitcham seems to be most comfortable with a Heidegger-like claim that they are 'forgetful of being,' unwilling to grapple with goals or ends as opposed to instrumental means. And he concludes his book with an appeal to Heidegger (though, he says, it is an appeal 'not wholly consistent with Heidegger's own analysis or intentions,' 297), as well as to 'the romantic way of being-with technology.' Here Mitcham

concludes with a lament: 'The paradox of the romantic way of being-with technology is that, despite an intellectual cogency and expressive power, it has yet to take hold as a truly viable way of life' (299). But his very last word on the matter, and the very last sentence in the book, is a question, about whether, perhaps, the 'internal ambivalences' of a romantic critique of technological society 'vitiate its power?'

To sum up, Carl Mitcham's *Thinking through Technology* is an exceedingly ambitious and detailed summary of the major contributions to the growing field of the philosophy of technology, as well as a refreshingly complete summary of what engineers and technical experts say about their work and its products. But it is also a brief for an attitude toward modern technology, and the culture within which it holds a central place, that wants to be 'romantic/critical' — while also recognizing the weakness in that posture. *Thinking through Technology* is an outstanding history, probably too detailed and concise to be a good textbook, and a sometimes eloquent statement of an anti-modern point of view.

Paul T. Durbin
University of Delaware

Jay Newman
Religion vs. Television: Competitors in Cultural Context.
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers 1996.
Pp. ix + 155.
US$55.00. ISBN 0-275-95640-7.

Newman's book is an interesting and informative attempt to link media, religion and culture. His exploration of religion, television and their cultural relations is primarily philosophical. By considering the cultural phenomenon of competition between religion and television from a wider perspective, one informed by the philosophy of religion, of culture and of mass media, Newman aims to see beyond unproductive polemical debates. More specifically, he hopes to establish that the competition between religion and television is a 'complex multifaceted phenomenon' that has been oversimplified in the analyses of various polemicists and ideologues. As his inquiry is humanistic rather than social scientific, few practical observations or recommendations are offered.

Newman is adept at presenting the issues in question in historical and philosophical context. He provides a balanced view of the critique of televi-

sion, and some of the problems with that critique. As he points out, the problem of the 'relative superficiality' of television is the problem of democracy itself; an issue that has occupied philosophers since at least the time of Plato's *Republic*. His analysis of religious television (including televangelism) is thought-provoking. He points out that to some extent, the popularity of televangelism represents a repudiation of certain traditional religious institutions. Competition between the two is hence properly seen as competition between two rival forms of religion; the role of television in this case is 'purely instrumental.'

Newman's most interesting move is to compare the contemporary competition between religion and television to the ancient competition between religion and philosophy. He claims that, like philosophy, but unlike other pastimes such as baseball or opera, television is a 'genuine form of experience and culture in its own right' (122). Both philosophy and television can be seen as cultural rivals of religion, and indeed reactionary criticism of television is in some ways reminiscent of the ancient criticism of Socrates and philosophy.

While Newman is clearly correct in seeing a religious dimension in much overtly secular programming, his treatment of almost any television with moral content as religious is questionable. Søren Kierkegaard, among others, has argued that similar moves reduce religion to the status of secular morality.

A more serious concern with this book is the lack of any phenomenological investigation. Newman claims that for the purpose of his study, common sense suffices to understand the power of television. This is at odds with his analysis of television as a 'form of culture' in which the form is more important than the content. He later argues that the distortion involved in television coverage of say, a war zone, is not necessarily any more dangerous or misleading than the distortion involved in coverage of the same event in a religious sermon, literary representation, philosophical argument or historical account. This less than compelling claim could have been strengthened by phenomenological analysis. While Newman's account of the complexity involved in these issues is convincing, a phenomenological analysis would have added richness and sophistication.

Jeanette Bicknell
York University

Michael O'Donovan-Anderson ed.
The Incorporated Self: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Embodiment.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1996.
Pp. 165.
US$52.20 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8281-1);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8282-X).

The Incorporated Self: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Embodiment consists mostly, though evidently not entirely (see 'Acknowledgements') of papers originally presented at a conference on 'Theories and/of Embodiment' held at Stonehill College in 1995. After the editor's introduction previewing the papers, the book is divided into three parts. 'I. The Nature of the Natural Body', 'II. The Embodied Self', and 'III. Knowledge Incorporated'.

Part I contains the most explicitly philosophical pieces, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone's 'Darwinian Bodies: Against Institutionalized Metaphysical Dualism', and Edward S. Casey's 'The Ghost of Embodiment: Is the Body a Natural or a Cultural Entity?'. Part II begins with an essay in cultural history, 'Phantoms, Lost Limbs, and the Limits of the Body-Self' by Stephen Meuse, followed by three literary analytical pieces, 'Identity and the Subject in Performance: Body, Self and Social World' by Loren Noveck, 'What Meaning in Her Breast? Ambivalence of the Body as Sign and Site of Identity in *Beloved* and *The Woman Warrior*' by Michele Janette, and 'Hamlet, Nietzsche, and Visceral Knowledge' by David Hillman. The first two papers of Part III, 'Living Words: Physiognomy and Aesthetic Language' by Colin Sample, and 'The Mindful Body: Embodiment and Cognitive Science' by Evan Thompson, are philosophically minded essays in psychology, while the final piece by O'Donovan-Anderson brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to the more purely philosophical article with 'Science and Things: On Scientific Method as Embodied Access to the World'.

This collection then is 'interdisciplinary' in the good because feasible sense that each author approaches the theme of embodiment from her or his distinctive discipline rather than offering a dilettantish mish-mash with each go round (the recurring and mostly honourific appearances of Descartes and Merleau-Ponty, in their respective black and white hats, notwithstanding). And if you're left behind here and there, no big whoop.

The Sheets-Johnstone essay, an excerpt from her book *The Roots of Thinking* (Temple University Press, 1990) contains enough intriguing and *prima facie* dubious claims (e.g., the mental can [even if it shouldn't] be conceived 'thoroughly independent of' the physical [14]; Merleau-Ponty started with 'the wrong body' [18]; the observability of the mental depends on 'analogical apperception' [17]), to make me want to look up her book. Stephen Meuse's piece on phantom limbs draws connexions between the nineteenth century's discovery or rediscovery of the phantom limb phenomenon and the rise of spiritualism characterizing that age. The historical data presented here are fascinating, though I'm inclined to find the familiar

experience of 'the phantom hat' a deflationary corrective to the kind of psycho-philosophical significance Meuse (and, e.g., Merleau-Ponty) find in phantom limbs. The literary pieces by Noveck and Janette are delivered in that stern, no-nonsense tone characteristic of deconstructionist nonsense. They are real eye-glazers for an unre-and-deconstructed philistine like me. By contrast, Hillman's piece on Hamlet is great stuff, and not just because it's intelligible. But coming directly after the two preceding essays it is truly a 'site' for sore eyes.

Evan Thompson's essay rather shrewdly brings out the latent Cartesianism in Dennett's views, arising from the fundamental negative doctrine shared by both Descartes and Dennett, namely that it is not people who are conscious but either souls or brains.

The essays by Casey, Sample and O'Donovan-Anderson made little impression (though O'Donovan-Anderson's introduction can usefully be read at both the start and the finish). But the collection as a whole does rather impress. The book is marked mainly by philosophical good sense, it has a substantial index, and there are end notes galore.

Philip Dwyer
University of Saskatchewan

Joseph Owens
Some Philosophical Issues in Moral Matters: the Collected Ethical Writings of Joseph Owens.
Ed. Dennis J. Billy and Terence Kennedy.
Edmonton, AB: Academic Printing and Publishing (for Editiones Academiae Alphonsianae) 1996. Pp. 500.
Cdn$34.95: US$29.95. ISBN 0-920980-68-6.

This collection brings together a number of papers of one of the towering Christian philosophers of the century, Fr. Joseph Owens. Owens is most recognized for his contemporary expositions of Thomistic metaphysics, and for the profound perspective he brought to bear on the metaphysical thought of Aristotle. But, in the burst of productivity that has marked the past twenty years of Owens' career, much of his attention has turned to Aristotelian ethics. We do not (yet) have a synthesis of Owens' thought on Aristotle's ethics, comparable to *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto: 1951, rev. 1963 and 1973), but the gap is partially filled by the present collection.

All of the papers deal with ethical matters, though some do so less directly than others. Many, but not all, bear on the ethical thought of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. They are marked by Owens' clear and vivid style. As is to be expected in such a collection, there is a good deal of repetition, as Owens often approaches the same general issues from slightly different perspectives. I here discuss only four major points that Owens makes in these 500 rich pages.

1) Owens argues that it is indeed the case that an 'ought' cannot be derived from an 'is' statement, and that Aristotle recognized this fact. That is why Aristotle, and after him, St. Thomas Aquinas, insisted that the first principles of ethics have as their origin a human act of reason: choice. Owens argues that this is why the goal of ethical action, the Aristotelian *kalon*, differs from 'values' posited by contemporary thinkers, which are thought to exist in the world independently of human will.

2) Owens exploits the above point to explain how Aristotelian ethics is flexible enough to account for the fact that different people, in different cultures, will make different ethical judgments. Ethical first principles are due to choice, and these people choose differently on account of differing habituation. Yet the common truth of human nature and the stability of a common culture keep this flexibility within certain limits (52-4, 168-75).

3) Such flexibility accounts for the possibility of universality in moral science, and is what enables Aristotle to appeal to 'right reason' (*orthos logos*) as an ethical criterion. Owens worries about a theoretical circularity here: right reason depends on cultural habituation, which depends on someone's prior right reason, and so forth. Owens claims that a Christian, committed to the temporal beginning of the world, would find this circularity intolerable, and would avoid it by appeal to a supernaturally revealed morality (228, 238).

4) Owens argues that the open-ended character of Aristotelian ethics is to its credit. It is this which allowed it to be imported into the Christian theological framework, as in the ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas. Owens argues that this strengthens Aristotelian ethics in a number of respects. Following Maritain, Owens asserts that revelation has identified the true ultimate object of intellectual contemplation, of which Aristotle was unaware (136-7). The revelation of divine rewards and punishments provides an effective deterrent against evil, which, in Owens' view, is missing in the original formulation of Aristotle's ethics (240-3). Only such theological grounding leads to proper respect for human life (292).

The first of these points is central to Owens' understanding of Aristotelian ethics. In my view, however, it is questionable. To support it, Owens repeatedly appeals to two passages. One is *NE* III 5, 1113b7-21, in which Aristotle compares the relation of agent to ethical action with the relation between a parent and child. Owens interprets this as meaning that the ethical choice one makes is bringing something totally new into the world, an 'image of what is dominant in oneself' (41, see also 235), but surely this is an over-interpretation. The relation of parent to child is Aristotle's standard example of efficient causation (*Phys* II 3, 194b30-1), and Aristotle need not be saying

more than that the efficient cause of a chosen action (not the ethical principle that governs this action) is the one performing the action. The other is *Metaph* E 1, 1025b18-27, in which Aristotle denies that first philosophy is a practical science, on the grounds that the principle of things that are done lies in the doer, i.e., in choice. Owens interprets this as meaning that practical science differs from theoretical science insofar as the first principles of a practical science such as ethics have their origin in human choice, not in the being of things antecedent to choice (159-61). Again, the passage need not be read in this way. The context shows that Aristotle is distinguishing the sciences of physics and ethics not on the basis of the source of the principles of each science, but on the basis of the efficient cause of the change that is studied by each kind of thought. Physics studies things with efficient causes internal to the changing substance at issue; practical science studies changes in the world of which the efficient cause is the choice of the human agent. That is not to say that the first principles of that study are themselves chosen. Owens' view that Aristotle takes the first principles of ethics to be chosen also runs into problems when considering the central role given in his ethics to the biological notion of the 'good' of each substance, its intrinsic final cause. Animals without reason nonetheless have a *telos* which is their true good, although they do not choose it; the argument of *NE* I 7 identifies a life of rational activity, that is, happiness, as just such a good in the case of human beings.

All of the essays are reprinted, with the exception of the Introduction, written especially for this volume. This piece itself is a gem that admirers of Owens' writing will not want to miss. In presenting an overview of the themes of these essays, Owens sheds new light on the issues they raise, situating their problems in the context of the larger issue of the possibility of a Christian philosophy.

The volume is unfortunately marred by many typographical errors, many of which obviously resulted from lax proofreading following the computer scanning of the original articles.

Owen Goldin
Marquette University

Markku Peltonen, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Bacon.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. xv + 372.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-43498-X);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-43534-X).

A collection of twelve papers contributed by an international group of prominent Bacon scholars constitutes the substance of the book. The essays cover a broad range of topics in Bacon's philosophy: the idea of science (Paolo Rossi), the classification of knowledge (Sachiko Kusukawa), the method of science (Michel Malherbe), the concept of form (Antonio Pérez-Ramos), the speculative philosophy (Graham Rees), the idea of cooperation in science (Rose-Mary Sargent), the relation between science and religion (John Channing Briggs), Bacon's standpoint on rhetoric (Brian Vickers) and history (John F. Tinkler), the moral philosophy (Ian Box), the political philosophy (Markku Peltonen), and the legacy of Bacon's philosophy (Pérez-Ramos). The clear and consistent plan of the book makes the mutually compatible contributions form a comprehensive survey of the recent accomplishments in Bacon scholarship.

The recurrent theme of the book is Bacon's program of the renovation of the sciences — the *Instauratio*. According to Rossi, Bacon rejected to identify his idea of science with 'sophistical' medieval scholastics, alchemy, magic, and 'blind and stupid' (29) humanists' verbiage. Rather, Bacon was motivated by the idea of human being as a master of nature, by the recent geographical discoveries, and by the idea of public, collaborative and fruitful science. The renovation of the sciences constituted, as Kusukawa argues, an unprecedented motive for the exhaustive classification of the sciences.

Malherbe claims that the priority of the *Instauratio* led Bacon to conceive of one, and entirely new, method for all the sciences — the method of induction. For various reasons though — as Malherbe says — 'Bacon's *instauratio* went to a dead end' (75) with regard to the method. If we understand Bacon's concept of form against the background of the 'maker's knowledge tradition', as Pérez-Ramos suggests, then we will be able to unravel the proper technical meaning of the term — intimately connected with the *operative* dimension of the reformed sciences.

What Rees finds inconsistent with the *Instauratio* of the sciences is Bacon's speculative philosophy — a highly Paracelsian natural philosophy and cosmology. The program of the reform, and the new method, were represented in Bacon's idea of the social organization of science, as is clearly demonstrated by Sargent. Briggs claims there was an important religious meaning of the reform of the sciences — to restore men's dominion over nature. Box demonstrates consistency of Bacon's program from the perspective of his moral philosophy. The essays of Vickers, Tinkler and Pletonen reveal that, and why, Bacon himself was not able to meet the standards he set up for the new sciences.

Another question that all the essays reflect upon concerns Bacon's legacy. However, there are different approaches on how to answer the question. The first one consists in an accurate account of the relevant historical context and philosophical tradition. That vastly enlarges the reader's understanding of the kind of problems that Bacon encountered. The reader is also able to evaluate for herself/himself the importance and novelty of Bacon's solutions. And it seems impossible to account for Bacon's legacy without addressing the preceding schools of thought, e.g., Aristotelian philosophy, neoplatonism, Renaissance humanism, etc. Vickers, among others, goes a bit further — he not only reports on Bacon's education with regard to rhetoric, but also familiarizes the reader with most debatable points in the recent accounts of Bacon's understanding of rhetoric.

There is, however, another approach to Bacon's legacy, namely, by appraising his accomplishments against the background of the problems arising today. It is foremost Briggs who construes his paper along these lines. Apart from a small note devoted to Bacon's mother, the paper says nothing about — so relevant here (Henry VIII) — religious background of Bacon's philosophy, and the traditional disputes about religion and its relation to science. Briggs, though, as well as — among others — Box, reveals tensions in Bacon's thought, e.g., the tension between the open and secret character of the communication of scientific results. This approach to Bacon's legacy, contrary to the previous one, is not compelling in the book, and seems to be superfluous in this regard.

Thirdly, it is Pérez-Ramos in his paper on Bacon's legacy, and Rossi, who appeal to the historical reception and influence of Bacon's ideas. What they emphasize is the fact of a common misunderstanding of Bacon's philosophy, which often resulted in rejection of it, for opposite reasons though.

The book constitutes not only a comprehensive introduction to Bacon's philosophy, but also vividly portrays Bacon's struggle with the received tradition, and his enormous attempts to overcome it. Each of the complementary contributions forms a self-contained presentation of a particular aspect of both, Bacon's philosophy, and Bacon's scholarship related to it. The arguments are stated clearly, and substantiated textually and historically. There being hardly any specific cross-references, however, makes it difficult for a beginner to find explanations of Bacon's technical terms. It is impossible to introduce all of them in one paper, nevertheless, relevant places in other papers are rarely mentioned, if at all.

However, what the reader will find most disappointing in the companion is the index. The entries do not include all technical terms of Bacon's philosophy, e.g., *analogy, doctrina humana, experiment, logic*, etc. There are hardly any sub-entries (in the case of *idol*, for instance, I found eleven possible ones in the text). Unfortunately, for the entries included in the index, some page references are wrong, and some are missing.

Both, *Chronology* — a preceding section of the book — and *Introduction* by Pletonen, give the reader handy reference of Bacon's major activities and works. A special feature of the book that is intended to help beginners and

nonspecialists is a substantive bibliography. The reader is also given the guidelines to it, for all the essays in the book give further references to on-going discussions.

The book will be of interest not only to those concerned with Bacon scholarship, but also to those who need a thorough and comprehensive survey of the philosophical traditions prevailing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Moreover, it might be recommended for teaching undergraduate students a pattern of philosophical-historical method of research and of exposition. Certainly, the companion will long remain a seminal work in Bacon scholarship.

Pawel Kawalec
Catholic University of Lublin

Thomas Pink
The Psychology of Freedom.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. x + 284.
US$49.95. ISBN 0-521-55504-3.

Pink defends a conception of the will that is both old and new. The will, according to Pink, is an agent that has the capacity to take decisions. When it takes a decision (not 'makes' a decision), it is performing an action as much as when we ordinarily do something. And we must perform these actions in order to act freely. In his words, 'freedom of action depends on freedom of will' (7). He defends, then, by his own understanding, a view of the will that was prominent in medieval Scholasticism. Yet he also regards the prime function of the will as being executive, and not, as in Scholasticism, deliberative. By this he means that the decisions that the will takes are 'actions by which we apply our deliberations' (31). The will does not simply assent to deliberations.

The principal view that Pink intends to refute is Hobbes' conception of the will as the formation of desires. According to Hobbes, a 'decision' is the last in a series of desires. It is not active, as the traditional theory of agency would say. It is, rather, passive — it comes to us instead of being formed by us. Pink views this conception of the will as tantamount to saying that there is no such thing as a will, and no decisions, either.

What favors Pink's conception of the will as against Hobbes'? It is not introspection, he says, because Hobbes and his followers are right in saying that desires, often at least, feel passive. What shows that the will is an agent

and that decisions are its actions is the nature of rationality. Rationality, Pink claims, is 'means-end justifiability': 'Means-end justifiability just *is* reason as it governs the exercise of control' (50). Pink devotes much of the book to explaining how this conception of rationality applies both to decisions (as second-order actions) and everyday doings (as first-order actions). His aim is to give as complete an account as possible of the workings of deciding and acting, and consequently to demonstrate that the idea of the will as an agent is consistent and plausible.

One of the fascinating twists in the book is Pink's claim that his theory of agency is independent of the compatibilism-incompatibilism issue. Traditionally, the concept of the will as agent has been associated with incompatibilism and thus with libertarianism, and Hobbes' concept of the will as desire formation has been associated with compatibilism and so with determinism. But Pink's concern is with the psychology of freedom and not the metaphysics of freedom. This means that in expounding the idea of agency he says nothing about the metaphysical theory of agency espoused by Richard Taylor and Roderick Chisholm. The idea of agent causation as distinguished from event causation plays no part in his theory. If, then, compatibilism is true, being an agent in Pink's sense would not entail being an agent in Taylor's and Chisholm's sense, in which case both libertarians and determinists could explore Pink's rich descriptions of agency and rationality on common ground, that is, without their beliefs about the existence or nonexistence of metaphysical agents affecting their assessment of Pink's psychological theory of freedom. If incompatibilism is true, however, being an agent in Pink's sense would entail being an agent in Taylor's and Chisholm's sense, in which case much more would be at stake in Pink's theory of agency than what he is concerned to argue for.

There are several ways one might respond to Pink's views. (1) One might claim that the psychological idea of being active that Pink ascribes to the will requires the will to be active metaphysically, namely, to be an agent in Taylor's and Chisholm's sense. Pink, however, seems right: whether our wills are agents in a metaphysical sense is independent of whether they are agents in Pink's psychological sense. (2) One might adopt a different conception of rationality for exercising control of actions than Pink's means-end justifiability conception so as to undercut his argument for thinking of decisions as actions. This, too, does not seem promising, for giving a means-end justification fits what we intuitively conceive ourselves to be doing when we think of ourselves as being rational. (3) One might claim, with Nietzsche, that we are a good deal less rational than Pink's clean and neat logic seems to presuppose. This is probably true. Our desires control us more often than we want to admit, and we take rational decisions much less than we like to think. But this fact does not show that we never take rational decisions. All Pink needs for his descriptions of decision rationality (which he devotes three chapters to) to fit human nature is for us to be rational some of the time. And that we are (though it is a tainted rationality). (4) One might claim that introspection is a last court of appeal, contrary to Pink's assertion that it does not settle

the controversy between Hobbes and himself. Pink himself appears to rely on introspection in his assertion that his psychological conception of freedom is the common sense view. For what else does common sense rely on for its beliefs about the will than introspection? So why should we not trust introspection when it tells us that decisions, per Hobbes, are really ways of sorting through desires? This response is more solid and is likely to be used by those who do not countenance decisions as actions.

Pink treats a number of other issues: Hobbes' regress argument against freedom of the will, the Action model of deciding versus the Pro-attitude model, a defense of the Action model against the toxin puzzle, the nature of trying, and objections to his view that the will is an agent.

Pink's writing is complex, yet clear and crisp. He explains his theory of the will with precision and depth. His overall strategy is coherent and his argumentation is sophisticated.

Clifford Williams
Trinity College, Illinois

Paul Pritchard
Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics.
Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1995.
International Plato Studies; Vol. 5.
Pp. viii + 192.
58DM. ISBN 3-88345-637-3.

Pritchard's title is misleading, for the book is mostly devoted to Plato's philosophy of number, with little attention to geometry. It falls into two parts. In the first P discusses differences between Greek and modern conceptions of number, while in the second he treats a number of central problems in Plato's accounts of mathematical ideas. I found ch. 4, which compares Greek and post-Renaissance mathematics the most interesting, perhaps because it was least familiar to me. P's aim is 'to assess Plato's philosophy of mathematics as a philosophy of fourth century B.C. Greek mathematics. ... the notion of *arithmos* is quite different from our notion of number, not only because we count negative numbers, rationals, reals and complex numbers as equally numbers, but because even the basic notion of natural number is not to be identified with the notion of *arithmos*.' (17-18). Two questions about Plato's conception of *arithmos* are central (36): whether Forms of *arithmoi* are an anticipation of the concept of number developed in the post-mediaeval

period and whether they can be compared with Frege's view of numbers as properties of concepts. P rejects both of these suggestions.

In Appendix 1 and elsewhere, P disputes interpretations offered by Wedberg in *Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics*, and by Julia Annas in her commentary on *Metaphysics* M and N; if correct, P's view undermines recent analytical interest in these theoretical aspects of Plato's work. In his view, the Greeks did not go beyond the level of first-order abstraction over sensible objects and it would be historically false to attribute to them any awareness of second-order concepts.

An *arithmos* is 'a multitude (*plêthos*) composed of units' (Euclid *Elements* VII, Def. 2), while modern conceptions begin with (63) 'the Renaissance notion of number as *abstracted ratio* or *index of ratio*.' The notion of number as something distinct from a finite set of items, P claims, is not to be found in Greek mathematics. The ancients did not define mathematical operations, such as addition, on *arithmoi*, and so do not share our concept of number (34-6, 50-3). They relied, in reasoning, upon their ability to create pseudo-visual mental representations of the objects of which they thought, while modern mathematics makes no use of this skill (43-6). In P's view, both Plato and Aristotle thought of abstraction in this fundamentally visual form: one's thoughts, if correct, contain images of what is being described.

Whether the Greeks shared a concept of number with us, and whether *arithmos* could be used to denote that concept, are topics of considerable interest that deserve methodological and philosophical discussion of a kind not found here. Proper criticism would, however, require more space than this review could provide. P's treatment of the historical notion of *arithmos* relies upon literary and philosophical evidence, with no attention to the uses of numerals (and hence numbers) in measurement, book-keeping and other commercial uses.

The chapters in the second part cover (6) Sun, Line and Cave; (7) *Republic* 525 and *Philebus* 56; (8) the inadequacy of mathematical sensibles; (9) ideal *arithmoi* and the intermediates. Appendix 2 discusses the views of both Aristotle and Plato on recollection, important for the relation of memory and the imagination to the supposed theory of abstraction to be found among the ancients. I found the discussion of the 'objects' in the Line (108-11) helpful, and liked the treatment of *Letter* 7, 343a (143).

One theme is the question of whether objects in the sensible world are *defective* with respect to their Ideal exemplars, or whether they have *contradictory* aspects. Instantiations of numbers are not obviously defective, and P follows the other standard line of interpretation: the objects of sense are images of the Forms, that can be described by *both* of two contrary predicates. Thus Socrates is one (human) and many (limbs).

For P, sensible instances of the F itself are always *simultaneously* both F and the opposite of F (145): the sticks in *Phaedo* 74a-c both are and are not equal (equal to one thing and not to another). He argues (129-30) that the universe of the *Timaeus* contains exact spheres and perfectly circular and regular orbits; perfect geometrical instances thus occur. P's concentration on

the mathematical ideas does not allow him to consider the uses of Forms in the exploration of moral ideas, but he is surely wrong to claim (131-2, 146 n.18) that nothing can be imperfectly just. Many court decisions, for example, are no more than the best in the circumstances, not perfect decisions at all.

Contrary to Aristotle's apparent evidence, P's Plato does not have both Mathematical *arithmoi* and Ideal *arithmoi*. P rejects Tarán's view that the Forms of the *Phaedo* (the dyad, the triad, etc.) are universals; he claims that 'the ten itself' (*auta ta deka*) etc. of the *Theaetetus* are clearly made up of units, and concludes that such expressions 'are used by Plato to refer to things which, while they are not forms, are nevertheless in the class of things which we have in mind only' (125).

The Forms of numbers are composed of indivisible units that cannot be operated on (or with) to obtain fresh numbers. By contrast, any sensible instance of a Form partakes of both unity and plurality, so even a perfect exemplar, like the heavenly circles of the *Timaeus*, can be viewed as both one and many. All particular instances of Forms are one of a certain kind, and many of other kinds. The Forms discussed in the *Philebus* are those that generate other Forms when divided, and hence themselves generate numbered things, each of which is one Form; Love (for instance) becomes many when there are many Forms of Love, and P believes that references to *arithmoi* of Forms should be viewed in this light.

The bibliography is useful, but incomplete; there are works cited in the text without full bibliographical information that are not listed therein. There is no index of topics, and the index of names omits all modern authors, so that it is not easy to track (for instance) P's criticisms of Wedberg, or his own views on Forms.

Janet D. Sisson
University of Calgary

Margaret Jane Radin
Contested Commodities.
Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press 1996. Pp. xiv + 279.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-674-16697-3.

In this book Radin refines and develops several themes which have become the hallmark of her analysis of property. In particular, she continues her running dispute with the Chicago school of economic analysis of law, the extent of whose influence in the American legal academy, given its relatively short history, is nothing short of astounding. Radin's strategy of counter-attack is very different from that of traditional analytic philosophers of law, who seek to show that the intellectual coherence of legal concepts arises through the institutionalisation of philosophically respectable moral ideas in a specific kind of political normative system, moral ideas which are superior to those which underlie the microeconomic/public choice analysis of Posner et al. In contrast, Radin adopts a 'pragmatic' outlook. She acknowledges the pervasive influence of the Chicago school as having established one social construction of our legal reality, by which all human values are 'commodified', that is, treated as commensurable, objectified goods that are properly traded in the marketplace like anything else. Yet Radin denies that this perspective, and its attendant discourse, has managed wholly to displace an alternative one whereby many human values, from personal relationships to political and social participation, have to a significant extent remained uncommodified. The theme of this work, then, is that we observe an 'incomplete commodification' of our sexuality, our relationship to our children, our political rights, our ownership of particular things like residential properties, and so on. The law does not allow these things to be handled in unregulated markets, but limits the commodification of these goods through, for example, the criminal law, which prohibits prostitution, baby-selling and vote-selling, or by regulating the market for homes through the imposition of rent control.

This book is a work of synthesis, which methodically and comprehensively raises those considerations which complicate or upset a picture of complete commodification of human values in the law, and Radin is to be commended for her even-handed exploration. 'As a pragmatist', Radin eschews 'ideal theory' in so far as that might be regarded as a feasible guide to understanding and action. Rather, we are advised cautiously to consider the practical transitions we can make from our current situation of injustice to one which is more just; revolutionary leaps forward to the ideal state are not on the cards. Not only are they not practical, but Radin suspects that any 'ideal' theory which we can construct from our present circumstances is unlikely to be truly 'ideal', coloured as it will be by the limits of our ability to perceive the ideal from our non-ideal perspective.

There is much sense in all of this, but I should like to point out two limitations. Given that the work is meant to explore the commodification of values, it is justifiable to track the logic of the commodifiers, exploring its

implications and objecting where appropriate. It does, however, leave little room for Radin to develop her own positive project of establishing the moral and political basis of a more just system that takes seriously the project of human flourishing in the context of a community founded on principles of equality.

Secondly, this approach leaves one with the sense that Radin has acquired some of the same blind spots as her opponents about the nature of the values she discusses. Rightly opposing the commodifiers' view that employment is simply the trading of time and effort for remuneration, she points out how individuals may truly consider the welfare of others in doing a job well, whether one is a doctor or a plumber, and she also points out that the work itself is a ground for personal flourishing (104-10). But note how both of these values appear to be localised to individuals, either the worker himself or the customer or employer whose interests he properly considers. There is little exploration of the idea that the work itself has a social value, in which *everyone* partakes, regardless if they are parties to the actual transaction. That is, Radin does not explore how we are benefitted simply because of the fact that our society is one in which people engage in stimulating and productive activity. While no one would deny that there are sharp differences between the views of distributive justice favoured by the commodifiers and their opponents, the prism of distributive justice is too narrow to capture many values. These values are 'public' or 'social', not in the commodifier's sense that these values are resistant to market allocation, but social in the sense that they cannot be understood apart from the idea that the fates of individuals in a society are substantially psychically linked. This perspective requires us to explore and understand how it is right to say, for example, that I am benefitted simply because I belong to a society in which everyone is properly educated, irrespective of whatever particular tangible benefits come to me because of that. Radin remarks (152) that 'the ability to become a parent seems to be important to self-conception. It seems analogous in some respects to the importance of education to self-development and full citizenship. ... Universal education is important to full citizenship, and many would say that a polity that does not take more care than ours to ensure equal distribution of quality education is reinforcing unjust subordination.' Surely a view of the value of education which comprises only self-development and full citizenship is an impoverished one. Much might be spun out of the notion of 'full citizenship', of course, but like her opponents Radin seems primarily to assess the value of education as a matter of individuals' own flourishing, rather than as an element of a social and political enterprise in the success of which we are all interested. I suspect Radin would concur that there is much to be explored here, but is beyond the scope of this book. Nevertheless, one has the recurrent feeling in reading *Contested Commodities* that all the chapters end too early, always on the brink of an elaboration of a bigger picture. The criticism then, I suppose, is that Radin does not provide a clear indication how she would proceed after the commodifying dragon is well and truly slain.

This book is a very worthwhile synthesis of the current legal theoretical debate about the reach of Chicago-style economic analysis in the US, but suffers from the limitations of that debate. In providing the former, Radin has helpfully indicated the latter.

J.E. Penner
(*Department of Law*)
Brunel University

Timothy A. Robinson, ed.
God.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 1996.
Pp. xxv + 225.
US$27.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-223-2);
US$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-222-4).

This book 'is meant to be a teaching text,' on the question of the existence of God. It includes selections from philosophers old and new, grouped more or less by topics and in chronological order. The book starts off with arguments for God's existence, beginning with Anselm together with parts of Gaunilon's objections and Anselm's response. This is followed by Aquinas' critique of the ontological argument and the Five Ways, and by C.S. Lewis' argument from morality. For critiques of the arguments, Robinson includes Bertrand Russell and Hume. Robinson lets the argument from design be presented by Hume's Cleanthes, which is a shame, since William Paley's statement of the argument and his defense of it are so charming. Three contemporary discussions of the arguments follow: J.J.C. Smart's classic paper from MacIntyre and Flew *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, and William Craig's courageous reformulation of the cosmological argument, with a critique by Russell of the argument from entropy. It would have been nice to see a critique of the design argument from evolution, such as provided by Dawkins or Dennett.

The argument from evil is included as an argument against God's existence, discussed by Augustine, C.S. Lewis, and Hume. Robinson omits all philosophical discussion of the charges of internal incoherence in the 'concept of God' on the odd grounds that he assumes that these can all be answered (xix). By the same thinking, Robinson could have saved himself and us lots of trouble and simply have assumed that God exists. Instead of this topic we are treated to excerpts from the old Flew, Hare, Mitchell symposium on verification of 'God talk', which, I guess, has historical interest.

Then Robinson moves on to alternatives to the arguments, with a piece by Plantinga on proper basicality and an excerpt by Pascal. In the introduction, Robinson portrays Plantinga as arguing that 'the whole project of defending belief in God along the lines of the traditional arguments is mistaken' (xxi). Plantinga's piece contains no such argument, and Plantinga himself thinks that a form of the ontological argument has value. Plantinga argues only that belief in God *can* be properly basic, that is rational and underived from any propositions. Nothing follows about the status of the arguments for God's existence.

There follow two selections from William James on religious experience and the will to believe, respectively, and selections from Otto and Eliade to show 'what religion is' (xxii). Whatever it is wasn't good enough, alas, for the likes of Nietzsche, Freud, Sartre, and Camus, who follow in order with various critiques of religion. Robinson picks well, stringing together excerpts from various works of each author. In the end, Robinson comes back to defenses of God in the voices of Peter Berger and Martin Buber, both of whom deflect our attention from arguments to the encounter with the spiritual in our daily lives.

This is a good anthology, although at times the selections consist of strings of too many small excerpts, creating the impression of a *Reader's Digest* for the philosophically curious. There are better anthologies in philosophy of religion, but not as convenient a paper-back, I venture.

Jerome I. Gellman
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Bertrand Russell
My Philosophical Development.
Revised Edition.
New York: Routledge 1995. Pp. xvi + 207.
Cdn$20.95/US$14.95. ISBN 0-415-13601-6.

Though by no stretch of the imagination one of Russell's major philosophical works, *My Philosophical Development* is an excellent — perhaps the best — introduction to his philosophy and a very enjoyable read. In this book, which first appeared in 1959, Russell mainly describes his philosophical journey from his earliest reflections, some from as early as 1888, to the views he published in *Human Knowledge* in 1948. But there is also a fair amount of self-justification and stock-taking. Russell believed that *Human Knowledge* suffered because he omitted 'the various perplexities and tentative hypothe-

ses through which [he] had arrived at [his] final conclusions' (141), and *My Philosophical Development* seems to have been written partly to persuade us the journey was worthwhile and to publicize its results.

In an 'Introduction', new to this edition, Thomas Baldwin contrasts Russell's scientific outlook with the philosophical approach often associated with the 'later works of Wittgenstein which Russell so despised' (xvi). This is helpful as long as it is remembered that there are significant similarities, as well as enormous differences, between Russell and Wittgenstein. Few philosophers can match Russell's scorn for those who 'philosophise from their armchairs without bothering to acquaint themselves with contemporary work in the natural sciences' (xvi). And there can be no denying his commitment to what he calls the 'grave and important task which philosophy throughout the ages has hitherto pursued', namely that of trying 'to understand the world' (170). Only someone with Russell's philosophical temperament — and his 'almost unbelievable optimism as to the finality of [his] own theories' (32) — could so peremptorily dismiss Wittgenstein's later philosophy as 'involv[ing] an abnegation of his own best talents' (159).

Less clear, however, is whether Russell was much concerned with philosophical skepticism and 'the issue of the extent of human knowledge' (xiv). His work on mathematics and science was directed towards elucidating their foundations (and determining how solid they are), not towards providing a philosophical foundation or grounding for them. Russell was bothered by doubts that crop up within natural science and everyday life, not by principled philosophical doubts, and he too may be read as 'seek[ing] to respond to philosophical anxieties by elucidating the unnoticed background of many of our conceptual resources' (xvi). Russell's declaration that his 'one constant preoccupation' has been 'to discover how much we can be said to know and with what degree of certainty or doubtfulness' (9) is not at variance with his insistence that 'the method of Cartesian doubt' is not of 'fundamental validity' but at most 'a tool in the work of logical dissection' (153). Russell did not 'begin with how we know and proceed afterwards to what we know' (12) because 'he was aware of the difficulties inherent in his thesis that the objects of perception are in all cases subjective' (xv). (Actually this was not his view; he only held — as he puts it on p. 78 — that 'we cannot suppose that the physical thing is what anyone sees'.) The reason Russell reversed the usual approach was that he was impressed by the fact that 'knowing how we know is one small department of knowing what we know' (12).

Throughout his long career Russell endeavoured to develop theories that give 'answer[s] to ... problems which older theorists have found puzzling' (20). He saw himself as negotiating what he took to be 'uncomfortable gulf[s]' (78) by developing theories that are 'consistent with all the known facts and ..., so far, the only [ones] of which this can be said' (81). For him philosophical analysis was a matter of theoretical explanation, not the explication of meaning. His theory of matter as 'series of events' (13), to say nothing of his theory of space as having 'six dimensions and not only three' (79), was intended as an analysis of a phenomenon comparable to Newton's analysis

of motion. As Russell himself stresses, his 'initial prejudice' — that philosophy tries to replace 'something vague but puzzling' with something less vague and less puzzling — was 'perhaps the most important in all [his] thinking' (98).

For this reason, if for no other, Russell's brand of scientific philosophy is very different from the naturalism now in vogue. Unlike Baldwin, who takes contemporary naturalistic philosophy to be based on a 'scientific outlook of the kind recommended by Russell' (xvi), I am inclined to think that his approach has largely dropped out of sight. Few philosophers — Quine is the most notable (partial) exception — are little interested in analysis as Russell understood it, still less convinced that philosophical problems can be resolved using the techniques of mathematical logic. Russell had as little sympathy for ordinary science philosophy as he had for ordinary language philosophy, and I very much doubt that he would be less critical of our philosophical naturalists than he was of Herbert Spencer. Russell deployed what he took to be the all-important method of science in the interests of clarifying our knowledge; he did not attempt to erect a philosophy starting from the results of natural science.

Doubtless my differences with Baldwin arise because I view Russell's philosophical achievement rather differently. While agreeing that Russell contributed 'enormous[ly]' to twentieth-century philosophy — whether he 'made a greater contribution than any other person, living or dead' is another matter — I am reluctant to think of him as advancing 'philosophical understanding' (xvi). Besides finding the idea of philosophical truth problematic, I believe there is much more to be gained from exploring the ins and outs of Russell's thinking — not least when his arguments seem 'classic[ally] ... bad' (xiv) — than from niggling over the truth or falsity of his theories. To my way of thinking, Russell's greatness lies in the depth and breadth of his philosophical vision. His conception of analysis is tremendously important whether or not his 'insights and arguments' have transformed 'the whole shape of the subject' (xvi).

Andrew Lugg
University of Ottawa

J.J.C. Smart and **J.J. Haldane**
Atheism and Theism.
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1996. Pp. vi + 234.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-19291-3);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-19292-1).

The book by Smart and Haldane is a very engaging and much needed addition to the 'Great Debates in Philosophy' series, whose format excellently reflects the nature of philosophy as a primarily argumentative discipline. The participants of this particular debate take radically different views on the issue of God's existence, but nonetheless share enough general philosophical presuppositions to make their exchange intellectually fruitful. Both Smart and Haldane accept some form of metaphysical and epistemological realism, and agree that theism involves belief in God conceived as a single, omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, eternal and immaterial being that created the world and sustains it in existence. Smart believes that this claim is simply false, if not to some extent unintelligible. Haldane maintains that such a conception of God is fully intelligible and there are plausible arguments showing that God exists.

Smart holds that the denial of God's existence is supported by his metaphysics based on a methodological principle that plausibility in the light of total science is an essential guide to metaphysical truth. But that does not mean, Smart insists, that it can be accused of cherishing old materialistic dogmas. Its only substantial constraint is the much more relaxed physicalism, according to which we have to admit the existence of merely those entities that are postulated by physical sciences broadly understood. And among those entities there are not only the material ones but also abstract mathematical objects.

What can an advocate of such a metaphysics say about the arguments for God's existence? In a nutshell, none of them appears plausible. Perhaps the most widely discussed is the design or teleological argument, and recently its form that makes heavy use of the fact that our universe has been 'fine tuned' to the emergence of life and the human kind. For Smart all forms of this argument are examples of the quite respectable methodological procedure known as the inference to the best explanation. But it is doubtful whether the explanation suggested in this case is really the best. It seems that all those facts can be perfectly explained without postulating God's existence. Moreover, the theistic explanation is dangerously close to the charge of regressiveness. The other famous argument, the argument from contingency, is no better off in this respect. It explains the contingently existing universe by postulating a necessarily existing God. But it is far from obvious what it means to say that God necessarily exists, and all attempts to elucidate that claim are considered by Smart as unsatisfactory. It is also rather easy to find defects in other theistic arguments.

Haldane responds to Smart's challenge by giving a comprehensive and original outline of a broadly Thomistic metaphysics, updated and clarified by

the methods of analytical philosophy. But first he tries to show that Smart's physicalism entails unwarranted ontological reductionism. And without the latter the usual criticisms of theistic teleological arguments lose their force. Haldane insists that reality consists of a few levels that differ from each other qualitatively, and not merely quantitatively, and consequently the transition from one to another cannot be explained without invoking teleological categories and postulating the existence of God. There is also more to the traditional argument from contingency than Smart seems to concede. The gist of all its varieties boils down to the idea that without admitting that there is such a being as God we will be left with a series of efficient causes that are not self-explanatory. Moreover, Smart seems to overlook the way in which the idea of God's necessary existence arises in the argument from contingency. 'What we are led to' — Haldane claims — 'is the existence of something which exists eternally, which does not owe its being to anything else and which cannot not exist' (p. 150).

In the ensuing replies to their essays both Smart and Haldane further clarify their positions. In the context of that well thought of and accessible debate the jointly written afterward is a bit disappointing. It is concerned with the similarities and differences in Smart's and Haldane's commitment to metaphysical realism and briefly summarises their main points of disagreement with the anti-realism of Hilary Putnam. The importance of the issue of realism notwithstanding, it seems that the afterward won't be of much use to most readers of the book. It would be much better if its authors had focused their attention on some crucial issue that has kept reappearing in the course of their debate. A very good candidate for that would certainly be the issue of God's necessary existence. One has to admit that Smart deals with it quite extensively and is well aware of its crucial importance. However, anyone who denies that there are only two respectable notions of necessity, namely logical and physical, would find his suggestions in that regard very implausible. If someone insists that God necessarily exists or is a necessary being, then it is quite likely that she has in mind some kind of metaphysical necessity. And such a notion of necessity, however problematic and vague, would not allow us to maintain, as Smart seems to suggest, that the statement that God necessarily exists amounts more or less to the claim that the proposition 'God exists' is a necessary truth, whose denial is logically contradictory. On the other hand, although Haldane insists that Smart's treatment of the issue of God's necessary existence is unacceptable, he does not develop any alternative to Smart's proposal that would go well beyond short and rather enigmatic remarks such as the one quoted above. So focusing on the issue of necessity in the afterward would be more than welcome.

But putting aside my unease with the concluding pages of the book, I must admit that I have really enjoyed reading it, and can whole-heartedly recommend it to anyone interested in the philosophy of religion and metaphysics.

Tadeusz Szubka
Catholic University of Lublin and University of Queensland

Eldon Soifer, ed.
Ethical Issues: Perspectives for Canadians.
2nd Edition.
Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press 1996.
Pp. xi + 720.
Cdn$26.95. ISBN 1-55111-109-8.

This collection of 66 essays is directed primarily towards students in introductory-level applied ethics courses. The volume is divided into 9 chapters, each of which is devoted to a specific theme or issue in contemporary applied ethics: animal rights; environmental ethics; resource and distribution issues; abortion; conception reproductive rights; euthanasia; censorship and pornography; multiculturalism; and the ethics of violence.

Each chapter begins with a brief introduction to the issue at hand, outlining both its recent history and importance to current ethical discourse, as well as a short discussion of the arguments contained within the subsequent essays. As well, each essay is followed by 2 or 3 'Questions for Discussion' in which the reader is challenged both to identify the author's central thesis and to evaluate the merits of any arguments offered in support. Most chapters contain between 6 to 8 selections. These essays, primarily by contemporary North American philosophers, are, for the most part, clearly written and should be easily accessible to the average student. Soifer has done a fine job in ensuring that for each topic as many different viewpoints as possible are represented. For example, the chapter on free speech, censorship, and pornography includes not only Leslie Green's essay 'Freedom of Expression and Choice of Language' which argues for cultural/linguistic freedom, but also an excerpt of Andrea Dworkin's testimony before the United States Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, countered by an excerpt from Ferrel Christensen's paper 'Pornography: The Other Side', which argues that many of the feminist arguments against pornography are either fallacious or misleading.

The subtitle of this volume is 'Perspectives for Canadians' and Canada is indeed well represented both in authors and in issues. Well over half of the contributors are either Canadian or employed at Canadian institutions and range from Charles Taylor to Pierre Elliot Trudeau. Of special note is the fact that *Ethical Issues* concentrates on Canadian law and government when discussing either legal or political issues. For example, the first selection of the first chapter is 'Cruelty to Animals: Section 446 of the Canadian Criminal Code'. The chapter on free speech includes then Chief Justice Dickson's opinion for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada on the Keegstra affair.

This volume is a second edition, and has greatly benefited from the revision. *Ethical Issues* is now nearly 250 pages longer, and contains 2 more chapters, over the first (1992) edition. As well, 39 of the 66 selections are new to this edition. Many of the changes have been effected to make this collection as relevant to contemporary applied ethics as possible. The chapter on free

speech, for example, now contains an article on censorship and the Internet; an article on Eco-Feminism is now included in the environmental ethics chapter. The chapter on euthanasia contains two recent articles that are of particular relevance to Canadians: excerpts from the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in *Rodriguez v. Canada*; and Rudy Krutzen's article about the Robert and Tracy Latimer case. However, some of the essays are beginning to show their age. All have been previously published and over half date from between 1971 and 1990. This is unfortunate, for the last 5 years have seen some of the most controversial and thought-provoking work ever to emerge from the field of applied ethics.

Despite this preceding reservation, this collection is to be recommended both for its widespread and comprehensive treatment of contemporary issues in applied ethics, and for its particular relevance to Canada and Canadian students.

Travis Welwood-Hreno
University of Western Ontario

Michael Stoeber and **Hugo Meynell, eds.**
Critical Reflections on the Paranormal.
Albany: SUNY Press 1996. Pp. 224.
US$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3063-4);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3064-2).

In *The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark* (1995), the late Carl Sagan warned of the social and political dangers posed not only by the general public's fascination with and credulity in the face of paranormal phenomena, but also by academic postmodernists, who propose that science has no special claim to truth and is merely one conversation among many others. Although there are good reasons to work against an outbreak of irrationalism, some postmodern thinkers have good reasons for criticizing (that is, showing the limits of) some of the truth claims made by scientists, who are influenced by personal, social, and economic pressures as much as anyone else. Moreover, as the present volume shows, some paranormal phenomena deserve serious study by natural scientists and philosophers. Indeed, by refusing to examine widely reported paranormal phenomena, scientists may actually contribute to social paranoia of the kind seen in TV programs like *The X Files*. In principle, scientists should be willing to investigate any empirical phenomenon, perhaps *especially* those with a chance of questioning accepted ideas about the ways things are.

Philosophers who believe *a priori* that all alleged paranormal phenomena are explicable either as hallucinations, mistaken judgments, or frauds, might complain that the essays in this volume are not 'critical' at all, since they suggest that paranormal phenomena (including ESP, psychokinesis, and near death experience) may actually *occur*, despite the fact that such occurrences apparently challenge the basic premises of materialism, modernity's dominant metaphysics. Provocatively, more than one author asserts that there is so much (arguably) valid evidence favoring the reality of paranormal phenomena, that the credulous are not those who are open-mindedly skeptical about paranormal phenomena, but rather those who dogmatically cling to materialism. Far from proposing to abandon empirical science, however, most of the authors in this volume not only call on scientists to examine paranormal phenomena, but also criticize them for hesitating to do so.

Unfortunately, even scientists with a personal interest in paranormal phenomena fear that the cost of investigating such phenomena openly would be loss of professional credibility. If open-minded skepticism is the appropriate frame of mind with which to approach paranormal phenomena, members of such highly-publicized groups such as CSICOP may be described as close-mindedly skeptical. Not unlike Sagan, they seem to conceive of themselves as protecting science against irrationalism, but in fact their dogmatism often prevents them from engaging in empirical investigation of strange experiences reported by great numbers of otherwise competent adults. The dismissive, often contemptuous attitude displayed by such 'psi-cops' toward paranormal phenomena helps to insure that investigation of them will languish. Seeking to level the playing field, in part by distinguishing their views from those of frauds and flakes, the authors in this volume demonstrate that scientific investigation of paranormal phenomenon can occur, and that more such investigation should occur. The world, they suggest, is stranger than that conceived of by materialist philosophy.

Some authors examine the history of modern materialism, which includes Newton's hesitation to accept one of its major precepts, namely, that 'action at a distance' was impossible. This precept continues to be challenged by phenomena such as ESP or psychokinesis, not to mention less reputable practices, such as voodoo and other forms of magic. In an interesting analysis, David Ray Griffin shows that the Catholic Church agreed with the contention of early modern scientists that magic is impossible. If science could prove that there were no occult powers that witches and alchemists could use to produce 'miracles' (i.e., occurrences that challenge natural laws), then presumably only the supernatural power of the Creator could explain them.

Here, I can only mention some of the many fascinating issues discussed in this very useful volume. Michael Stoeber's introduction provides a very helpful summary of the essays in the volume. Hugo Meynell, after surveying some important parapsychological topics, concludes that so much evidence gathered over the years should have a 'cumulative' effect that favors the conclusion that paranormal events are 'real,' despite dogmatic denials by materialists. Donald Evans expertly reviews issues about scientific method-

ology in paranormal research. David Ray Griffin argues that many scientists ignore paranormal phenomena because of 'fearful thinking,' i.e., they fear that such phenomena may invalidate their materialist metaphysics. Terrence Penelhum analyzes the provocative and long-lived notion of 'incorporeal agency,' while Susan J. Armstrong examines whether animals are capable of paranormal conscious states and whether they are ensouled. In an insightful essay, Stephen E. Braude concludes that evidence in favor of postmortem personal survival may be explicable in terms of paranormal abilities, not in terms of actual life after death. Of course, verification of such paranormal abilities would itself shake the foundations of materialism, though perhaps less than acceptable proof of an afterlife. Finally, James R. Horne effectively disputes the claim that paranormal research is immoral, insofar as it is foolish, prey to self-deception, and a waste of time.

Another reviewer might prefer that this collection include more essays from authors with a far more skeptical view of paranormal phenomena, but I found the essays in the volume to be written by level-headed people with a justifiable interest in strange occurrences that are far too often ignored by mainstream scientists and philosophers. This collection provides a very insightful orientation to the basic problems facing parapsychological research, and also reveals why that research is perceived as such a threat by those who adhere to a materialist metaphysics. The collection should be a welcome addition to the library of truly open-minded skeptics.

Michael E. Zimmerman
Tulane University

Watsuji Tetsuro
'Rinrigaku': Ethics in Japan. Trans. Yamamoto Seisaku and Robert E. Carter.
Albany: SUNY Press 1996. Pp. xi + 381.
US$n.p. (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3093-6);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3094-4).

The title of this important new translation requires some explanation for nonspecialists. In Japanese, 'rinrigaku' corresponds roughly to the formal study of ethics. Watsuji Tetsuro (with his name given Japanese style, family name then first surname) wrote his *Rinrigaku* between 1937 and 1949 during a period of catastrophic upheaval and change for Japan. The subtitle 'Ethics in Japan' was added by the translators to indicate that the book is both a

Japanese contribution to ethical theory and a unique Japanese, not to say Asian, example of ethical reasoning.

The book includes (1) the first and for quite some time probably the only complete translation of the *Rinrigaku*, (2) an appendix of three letters from W.'s most outstanding student, Professor Yuasa Yasuo, to Robert E. Carter on various aspects of W.'s thought and (3) a long interpretive essay with notes by Robert E. Carter. Prof. Yuasa with typical Japanese courtesy puts his imprimatur on Carter's interpretation by calling it 'correct and appropriate' (311). A full index with cross references to Japanese terminology and a glossary of Japanese kanji with their English equivalents (containing one error: 'no' is missing from kanji 'yononaka') will help those without Japanese negotiate a very difficult text.

The translation itself must have been an enormous effort, since Japanese is not a language that lends itself well to western style philosophizing. The promotional puff on the back cover calls it 'wonderfully clear and lucid,' and on balance it is reasonably clear. But for long stretches the English, clogged with persistent inclusion of transliterated Japanese phrases along with W.'s own habitual quotation of German tags or passages, rises just barely above the level of clumsy literalese. Here is an example from page 133: 'Consequently, we must assert that the gradation of values or the positive/negative distinction of values are [sic] all grounded on the law that presides over a human being, basically speaking.' The text is also marred by a considerable handful of serious typos that testify to the continued erosion of editing standards at academic presses.

Given the immense destruction of Japan's aggressive war for 'Dai Nippon' ('Greater Japan') waged during the very period when W. was engaged in writing the *Rinrigaku*, one might reasonably expect to find some sign of ethical awareness for what his country had done to China, Korea and Southeast Asia. One finds nothing. This is hardly surprising in a country that suffers from the perennial tendency to view itself as a victim and from the inability — or disinclination — to engage in serious social introspection. It is more surprising, however, to find the same tendencies in a philosopher who has written what many Japanese consider their major work of ethical thought. Part of this lies in his method of philosophizing and part in the content of his ethical system.

W. follows an almost unvarying pattern in nearly every chapter of the *Rinrigaku*. He begins by making some baldly apodictic statements on the topic of the chapter, proceeds to offer reasoned support — often only minimal reasoned support — for these statements and then turns to critique a number of European philosophers or sociologists whose positions on the specific issues under discussion differ from his. As a consequence, many chapters contain little original thought but much laborious effort to confront disparate fragments of argument from western thinkers. This also makes them very slow and tiresome reading even when one allows for the effects of translation. In chapter 6, for example, a chapter that contains his crucial discussion of the negative structure of a human being, the bulk of the text dwells on Tarde,

Simmel, Wiese and Durkheim. W. had studied in Germany in the later 1920s, and knew his Continental philosophers well, but seems completely ignorant of the Anglo-American analytic tradition. Throughout the book his engagement with western philosophy is often antagonistic, trivial and derivative, particularly his comments on Kant. Yuasa confirms that impression with his observation that W. 'had no sympathy for German idealism such as that expounded by Kant' (320).

Having noted that caveat, let me try to clarify the broad outline of W.'s ethical system. It is a system at once subtle and extremely dangerous.

W. objected to the western philosophical tradition of focusing on the individual, and the individual's isolated consciousness or moral feelings, as the basis for ethics. He may have done so due to his early studies in the differences between western and Asian artistic sensibilities (as Yuasa suggests on p. 312) or to the influence of Buddhist epistemology, about which he had a very limited understanding, but he was determined to counter ethical systems grounded in the ego. He chose instead to ground his ethics in the network of social interconnections that obtain between all humans. He was helped in this by the Japanese word 'ningen,' which means 'human being,' but whose two characters ('nin' = person and 'gen' = interval, space) clearly indicate that a human being is not simply an individual but the betweenness ('aidagara') that relationally connects him with other humans. On the basis of that Heideggerian foray into etymology, W. declares that 'we Japanese have produced a distinctive conception of the human being. According to it, "ningen" is the public and, at the same time, the individual human begins living within it' (15). There is no possibility of the ego isolating itself, since it exists in a subjective spatio-temporal relation with others. How then can we be simultaneously individual and social?

He resorts to a complex and unpersuasive ontology of reciprocal negation: the individual becomes an individual by negating emptiness, the authentic emptiness of Buddhist 'sunyata' (which W. calls 'the self-negation of absolute negativity'), but then must negate his individuality in order to establish integration with the social whole (which W. calls a return to '"emptiness" itself, though engaging in association of whatever sort'). Thus, in brief summary, 'the negative structure of a betweenness-oriented being is explained in terms of the self-returning movement of absolute negation through its own negation' (117). W. insists that (1) fundamental emptiness, (2) then individual existence and finally (3) social existence are interactive with one another in practical reality and cannot be separated, working constantly in an interconnection of acts that are impossible to isolate fixedly at any place.

This double negation is called the fundamental law of basic ethics in chapter 7, which contains the key theoretical explanation of the ethical consequences of W.'s ontology. The socio-ethical whole arises from absolute negativity, and thus both the individual and society are grounded in the Absolute. Ethical valuation is not, therefore, found in moral sentiments, utilitarian pragmatism or abstract propositions like the categorical imperative: badness is the revolt of an individual against a community by attempt-

ing to stop the continuous movement of the negation of absolute negativity and stand in rebellious isolation; goodness is the continuous act, through abolishment of individuality, of return to socio-ethical unity (134). The Absolute thus authorizes badness, but so long as the movement of negation does not come to a standstill there is no badness that does not change into goodness. If you can't stand badness, W. concludes, you can't achieve goodness.

Here we have the very dangerous ethical crux: 'Consequently, obedience to gods or to the authority of the whole, that is, abandonment of individual independence, and the manifestations of love, devotion, or service have always been proclaimed as "goodness"' (134). Despite Carter's attempts to gloss over the implications of this conclusion in his essay, they are clear. If the state should decide that its eugenic health would be advanced by exterminating a certain class, devotion and service require us in the absence of any countervailing absolute ethical principles to cooperate. Yuasa is unequivocal about this when he writes that 'Watsuji's ethical system, in its complete state, attributes the ultimate standard of value to the state...' (315).

The end result is a primary ethical emphasis on obedience to the state, and the danger here is compounded when W. insists in chapter 13 that human truthfulness 'does not exist ideally and statically in the form of something completed, but occurs constantly anew, as what ought to occur' (279). Good defined as faithfulness to the social system and truth defined as constant fluctuating social standards make an ethics built on the void.

Steven J. Willett
(*Department of English*)
University of Shizuoka

Raimo Tuomela
The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1995.
Pp. xi + 470. US$55.00. ISBN 0-8047-2422-9.

Raimo Tuomela presents and defends in great detail a theory of social action that includes joint action, group action, and group beliefs and goals. The book is undoubtedly written for experts in this area of philosophy or in the social sciences. I say this not because only the experts can follow it; indeed, for the most part the non-expert can follow it, though there are some fairly technical sections. Rather, I believe that the book is intended for experts because its

discussion begins and ends with developing a theory of social action. That is, the theory of social action is not brought to bear on other areas of philosophy such as ethics. I compare Tuomela's book to David Copp's, *Morality, Normativity, and Society* (Oxford University Press 1995) [reviewed *PIR* 17.1, 17-19. Ed.], which defends a society-centered theory of morality that makes use of some of the same concepts defended by Tuomela. Tuomela himself cites Copp's work, in agreement on many points. While Copp's book builds upon the notion of a society and related concepts and develops them into a theory of morality, weaving it into a theory of truth, or epistemic justification of a moral code, as well as a theory of practical justification, Tuomela's does not. Tuomela's book could, however, be useful to philosophers interested in these other issues.

The book is nicely organized. Chapters One and Two deal with foundational issues, defining central concepts such as social norms, tasks, we-attitudes, and intentional joint action. Chapters Three-Six are more substantive, discussing concepts such as we-intentions, social groups, group actions, joint goals, and group goals. Chapters Seven-Nine are more peripheral, and I will skip them. Finally, Chapter Ten puts forward a theory of society. The individual chapters themselves are also nicely organized; numerous headings and subheadings make the presentation clear, and the summaries at the end of each chapter are useful because they bring the reader who is absorbed in the details of the chapter back into focus.

I will now highlight some of the key concepts in the main chapters. Tuomela begins with the common-sense view that some groups have goals and beliefs, and can perform duties. A *social group* (collective) has an authority system, which is a dispositional property representing the process by which the individuals in the group give up their wills in favor of a group will which involves group commitment (12). A *social norm* consists of social rules ('r-norms,' which are found on the books — e.g., laws) and proper social norms ('s-norms,' which are unarticulated and based on mutual belief — e.g., kneel while praying). Norms must be internalized, that is, believed to exist and accepted as reasons for acting, in order for them to provide motives that yield action for the right reason (14-15, 22).

Social norms can be *ought-norms* or *may-norms*. A social ought-norm is a prescription for action, giving the person 'an effective, obliging reason to act' (14). It is issued by an authority, and the task that the authority says a person ought to perform is performed by some people at least sometimes because they believe they ought to perform the task. Also, there is some pressure from other group members against performing this task (23). May-norms, in contrast, are merely permissive social rules, and again, are issued by an authority, etc. *Proper* ought-norms or proper may-norms are those for which it is *expected* that other group members perform the relevant task.

There are tasks: a *motivationally accepted task* is one the agent recognizes and accepts as a basis for action, and so has a pro-attitude towards performing the task (30). An agent has a *social task based on a social rule* iff there is an ought-to-do rule in force, which entails that the agent ought to perform

the task. An agent has a *social task based on a proper social norm* iff (the same as above) and the members of the group all mutually believe that the person ought to perform the task.

A *we-attitude* is a psychological attitude ascribed to a member of a group (37). A person has a we-attitude to X in a group iff the person shares the attitude and believes that others in the group do so as well and that the others mutually believe that the attitude is shared in the group (38). For example, a person we-intends to bring about X iff she shares the intention to do so and believes that this intention is shared in the group and believes that others in the group mutually believe this, too.

Chapter Two deals with joint action. I found this to be the most interesting chapter because it relates to issues in ethics, particularly the connection between an agent's actions and dispositions, as this relates to the rationality of acting morally. *Intentions* are revocable, appropriately persistent commitments to action (53-4). A person cannot rationally intend to do X and also intend not to do X, and if she intends X she must believe she can do X (54). The commitment to do X involves the view that the agent accepts that she ought to do X, the ought being an overriding one. If she intends to do X, she intends that she does X intentionally as she intended (or planned), not merely in accordance with the intention but (in part) because of that intention (59).

A *joint action* is an action performable by several agents who share a we-attitude and act on this we-attitude (73). Performing a joint action and forming an intention to do so requires that the individuals agreed (explicitly or implicitly) and mutually believe they agreed to do X or Y such that X becomes included (73). The individuals are committed to furthering the joint action X by doing their parts of X — each accepts an obligation to do her part and has a right against the others to do their part (76). A *we-intention*, then, is an intention that a participant of a joint action has (83). To have a we-intention an agent must do a part of X intentionally as her part of X (87).

Chapter Three deals with we-intentions, or, action-prompting group intentions, which Tuomela believes are central for understanding social life (112, 164). Joint intentions involve the participants' making an agreement (113). We-intentions are persistent joint commitments to action, but function like private intentions in an agent's practical reasoning (114). A *joint intention* in an individual member of a group is characterized as follows: the individual intends to do her share of X because she accepts the joint intention to do X (115). Among the reasons Tuomela cites for the plausibility of we-intentions are that a person's group affects her thoughts and actions; that a concept of we-intention that is not reducible to I-intention (mere personal intention) can best explain conflicts between self-interest and altruism; joint intentions are necessary for having a full notion of a rational agent; and the notion of an intentionally performed joint action presupposes the notion of we-intention (120-1). An example of a joint intention Tuomela cites is the intention two people form to carry together a table up the stairs.

A group *jointly intends* to do X iff the members have a joint persistent goal relative to their having done X and mutually believing that they were doing

it (135). After discussing some objections to his initial definition of a we-intention, Tuomela arrives at a modified definition — the member of the group believes that a right number of the others will do their parts of X (145). Not every member need act on the intention — e.g., a wheelchair bound person can have a we-intention to push a bus uphill, but never act on it — he just must endorse the group's intention (156).

Chapter Four deals with social groups. An *authority system* (a-system) is the group members' intentionally transferring their wills to the group (174, 181). The group will obliges each member to accept the content of the group will, say, by voting, negotiation, etc. (175, 177). Some authority systems are 'socially existing,' meaning that there is a mutual belief that there is some decision-making system in place that can produce a group will about what to do or accept (182). Basically, if a group 'in principle' has the capacity to act intentionally, it has the capacity to form joint plans and act on them, and this involves having an authority system (185). An authority system is present in any social group, since all social groups are capable of performing intentional actions.

A social core group is one that has an a-system, and its members are sufficiently motivated to participate in the a-system such that a group will can be mutually believed by them to result (192). Group action may bring about a goal that the members could not get on their own. A *functioning social group* has an a-system that has been exercised by the members of the group, creating a group will (195). It can be rational for people to act collectively: it is impossible for a single agent to do the act; it is desirable to act jointly; acting jointly may increase the likelihood of success; it can be more pleasant to act jointly; each may benefit more than when each acts alone, etc. (202-4). Finally, social groups do *not* include social classes (e.g., the class of all bachelors), since they do not form any shared group intentions nor have a-systems (216). I wondered whether upper-class, white men might constitute a group. Their individual members are privileged vis-à-vis other groups (women, minorities, persons of lower economic status), and they benefit in virtue of their class membership, though they might not, properly speaking, share group intentions, though, of course, this depends on how we construe intentions.

In Chapter Five, Tuomela defends the view that the actions of groups are 'made up' of joint actions of its members, such that if a group does X, then at least some of its members do X (228). He wants to show that joint action performed in the right circumstances can be redescribed as group action (229). What are the right circumstances? For a single operative member of a group, the most central point is task-fulfilling behavior, tasks being based on social rules in force in the group (235). A shared we-intention to bring about X creates a joint commitment and joint rule-task to bring about X. It also creates a rule-task for each participant to perform her task (236). The circumstances, then, are those satisfying the relevant task-rules for bringing about X. Forming a group will creates a rule-task. This is because the

formation of a group will always creates a social rule. Finally, the actions of the group supervene on the actions of its operative members (259).

In Chapter Six, Tuomela argues that group goals and group beliefs can be analyzed in terms of the joint goals and joint beliefs of relevant group members (270). Usually certain operative members of a group accept goals for the group (273). The group decides who will bring about the goal, and so who will acquire a we-intention over and above the group-intention (273). In short, a group *intends* to bring about some goal iff the operative agents have come intentionally jointly to group-intend to bring about the goal, and the members of the group tend to accept the group-intention to bring about the goal, and there is a mutual belief about these points (286). Joint goals are *not* the aggregates of goals of the group members. A *joint goal* is had by some agents when they each have the same goal and are mutually aware of this fact and will mutually drop the goal.

Finally, in Chapter Ten Tuomela argues that society does not have independent existence, so it is not 'a spooky supraindividual entity' (377). We (the members and the groups) create society (409). Society exists because social institutions exist and they amount to the joint following by the members of collectively beneficial (or rational) r-norms or s-norms under an a-system (378). Social institutions are justified at least partly because they are collectively desirable solutions to collective action dilemmas (409).

Anita Superson
University of Kentucky

Catherine Wilson
The Invisible World: Early Modern Philosophy and the Invention of the Microscope.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1995. Pp. x + 280.
US$39.50. ISBN 0-691-03418-4.

The impact of the telescope on philosophy and theology is by now reasonably well documented. The equally important effect of microscopic studies is overdue for detailed investigation, and in *The Invisible World* Catherine Wilson provides just such an investigation. Interesting, informative, and innovative, her book will be required reading for all workers in seventeenth-century philosophy and science. As well as drawing our attention to a large number and impressive variety of important primary sources, she effectively draws together and synthesizes results from an equally wide variety of

important secondary sources. Discussing a number of early works on microscopy Wilson remarks, 'None of these works is provided with illustrations, so the author's prose must bear the entire burden of communication, leading to a certain archness of style' (85). However Wilson's own book is, unfortunately, equally unaccompanied by illustrations, and self-refutingly fails to display any archness in style; it is, on the contrary, clear and readable.

Although spectacles had been known in the west since at least the late thirteenth century, and although the possibility of using 'burning glasses' for simple magnifying tasks such as the study of insects had been noted by (at least) the early fourteenth century (72), the developments which produced the telescope and the microscope seem — the evidence is not completely clear — not to have occurred until the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century. Even after their discovery scepticism remained about the utility of such *contrived* optical systems, with Hobbes unsurprisingly being among the holdouts. Here is Hooke writing to Boyle in 1663, giving

> an account of an interview I had of Mr. Hobbes, which was at Mr. Reeve's, he coming along with my lord De. to be assistant in the choosing a glass. I was, I confess, a little surprised at first to see an old man so view me and survey me every way, without saying any thing to me; but I quickly shaked off that surprisal, when I heard my lord call him Mr. H. supposing he had been informed to whom I belonged. I soon found by staying that little while he was there, that the character I had formerly received of him was very significant. I found him to lard and seal every asseveration with a round oath, to undervalue all other men's opinions and judgments, to defend to the utmost what he asserted though never so absurd, to have a high conceit of his own abilities and performances, though never so absurd and pitiful, &c. He would not be persuaded, but that a common spectacle-glass was as good an eye-glass for a thirty-six feet glass as the best in the world, and pretended to see better than all the rest, by holding his spectacle in his hand, which shook as fast one way as his head did the other; which I confess made me bite my tongue.

Both telescope and microscope had a considerable influence on philosophy. In one sense of *could*, all the philosophical speculation they gave rise to could have been developed earlier by philosophers, but in practice it was the 'intractability of fact' (252) which gave rise to new theoretical views taking account of these new microscopic phenomena.

The anti-Whig pendulum has swung so far in the direction of relativism that nowadays one can find in respected works on the history of science serious discussions of 'accepted' and 'rejected knowledge', but Wilson carves out a middle way, 'present[ing] early modern science under a more benign aspect than has recently been customary' (38). Refusing to 'ask the period to be something other than it is' will allow us to see 'the ways in which seventeenth-century science was a restoration and a continuation of the reasoned natural history of the ancients, which had been lost in, and to a

certain extent repressed by, Christian culture and scholastic philosophy' (27-8).

If this pays too little regard to the contribution of mediaeval scientific activity, the next chapter restores the balance by highlighting the often overlooked work of Renaissance thinkers. Wilson carefully and accurately destroys the stereotyped account of the way in which corpuscularianism ousted its two main theoretical rivals, Aristotelianism and the spagyric philosophy of the Paracelsians. The views of Paracelsus were still strongly influential in the mid-seventeenth century (43), and even at the end of the century Aristotelian physics was still taken for granted by many. '[T]here was no sudden upset of the old ontology of substances, manifest and occult qualities, virtues, and forces, and its replacement with an incommensurable one. Rather,' Wilson suggests, 'the corpuscularian philosophy established itself ... as the product of a progressive refinement of the Renaissance notion of "subtlety" ' (40), a suggestion not as fully developed as its provocative nature deserves.

How, exactly, was the change to corpuscularianism effected, and what, exactly, *was* the effect? The mere *promise* of greater explanatory power offered in the programmatic works of Descartes and Boyle would not have sufficed (254-5), nor would the mere claim that greater practical results would be forthcoming. Something more was needed to allow for the overthrow of occult qualities and the rise of the belief that — *in principle* — all qualities were explicable in terms of explanatorily *manifest* ones, the *intelligible* qualities of the mechanical philosophers. What was required for this was precisely the evidence the microscope offered that these hitherto secret processes were indeed intelligible. 'The conviction that there are subvisible material causes of the most obscure phenomena drove out explanations that involved spiritual entities or correspondences' (61).

Microscopic studies, Wilson suggests, with their clear revelation of an intelligible, if strange and new, world underlying the macrocosm, helped to ground the programmatic claims of the natural philosophers even though, paradoxically, such studies did not, as critics pointed out, reveal the claimed causal, explanatory, mechanism supposedly to be found in this minute 'dioptrical' world.

There were two major problems for seventeenth-century corpuscularianism. It would, the initial claim went, account for all the important matters for which its rivals could give only verbal accounts. Gravity, magnetism, (static) electricity, fermentation, chemical interactions, the propagation of light, and the generation of animals were all, with the possible exception of the last, to be explained mechanically. But none of them received such an explanation. Indeed Leibniz, an anti-corpuscularian who was nonetheless 'as corpuscular as one can be in the explanation of particular phenomena', accused Newton of selling the pass in order to deal with some of these matters: Newtonian 'forces', he felt, were simply the old occult qualities in a new dress.

The other problem had to do with the *kind* of explanation micro-reductionism might offer: should a microscopist seeking an explanation of, say, the sharp taste of vinegar look for *actual* sharp particles in vinegar? — or should some quite different microscopic quality be called into service? (61) And in either case, how did the explanation *work*? Was it even worthwhile to have such accounts? Wilson notes Girolamo Sbaraglia's attack on Malpighi: medical practitioners must understand the *function* of bodily organs, but for those whose function we know, knowledge of structure proves irrelevant to explanation of function, while for those whose function we do not know, such as the pancreas or the spleen, knowledge of structure does nothing to relieve our ignorance (233).

It is not possible in a short review to comment in detail on Wilson's work, but there are minor areas where I found myself in disagreement concerning either her interpretation or her emphasis. Here are two such concerning Robert Boyle:

Wilson accepts an old and, I had hoped, out-dated canard concerning Hooke and Boyle: 'Hooke ... was apparently the brains behind the experimental, mathematical, and mechanical competence of Robert Boyle' (86). Boyle's wide ranging experimental activities are documented from 1653 until his death at the end of 1691, while Hooke worked directly with Boyle for at most eight of those thirty-eight years. Hooke's experimental genius, and the importance of his contributions to Boyle's work, can be amply demonstrated without any need to denigrate Boyle's own experimental virtuosity.

Wilson writes, 'For Boyle, intestine motion is occurring always, in solids as well as liquids' (52). A central facet of Boyle's character was his unwillingness to make such unqualified assertions about theoretical matters, and so it proves in this case. The conclusion of the work Wilson cites in favour of her claim is characteristically hesitant and packed with qualifications: 'since I consider, that we are not yet sure, but that though many of the parts of solid bodies may not be always moveless, yet some others of them may sometimes, for a while at least, be at perfect rest; I shall conclude, as I began, and without resolutely denying that there can be any such thing *in rerum naturà*, as absolute rest, I shall content myself to say, that it is not either absurd to doubt, whether there be or no; nor improbable to think, that there is not, since we have not found it in those very bodies, where, with the greatest likelihood, it might have been expected.'

Minor worries aside, let me reiterate that Wilson's book is interesting, provocative, and informative. Regarding more peripheral matters: the bibliography is chock full of good things. The index is helpful and moderately full. In general, misprints are minor (e.g., 257.21: *Theologica* for *Theologiae*). However something went wrong regarding the references to Boyle's *Works*. Wilson's references are sometimes to the comparatively readily accessible 1772 six volume edition (reprinted Hildesheim: George Olms, 1965) and, with roughly equal frequency, to the much less accessible five volume edition of 1744. I suspect, however, that Wilson was in the process of changing all references to the 1772 edition when the book went to press, for the references

to the 1744 edition are in fact not to that edition but are garbled references to the 1772 edition. Here, with obvious abbreviations, is a guide for the perplexed:

The references at 59 n66, 229 n53, 231 n56, and 246 nn86, 87 to *Experiments and Considerations Concerning Colour* give correct page references to (1772) vol. 1, not, as stated, to (1744), vol. 5. The reference at 239 n70 to *Experiments and Considerations*, given as (1744) 5:773-74, is to *Christian Virtuoso II*, (1772), 6:773-74. The reference at 77 n32 to (1744), 3:139, is to *Usefulness II*, (1772), 3:399. The reference at 102 n110 to *Christian Virtuoso*, (1744), 5:511, is to *Christian Virtuoso I*, (1772), 5:511. Finally, the references at 148 nn22, 23, and 156 n24 to (1744) are to (1772).

J.J. MacIntosh
University of Calgary

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