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Peter Abelard

Ethical Writings: His Ethics or 'Know Yourself and His Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew and a Christian. Trans. Paul Vincent Spade.

Indianapolis: Hackett 1995. Pp. xxx + 171.

US \$32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-323-9);

US \$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-322-0).

This book contains a new translation of two unfinished but important pieces by Abailard on ethics and associated matters. Both were probably written after 1135, towards the end of Abailard's life, with the *Dialogue* being earlier. Though we already have good translations of the *Ethics* (by D.E. Luscombe [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971]) and the *Dialogue* (by Pierre Payer [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1979]), both of which Spade acknowledges generously, it is helpful to have a new translation of both works in a single, affordable, volume. Hackett, like the Pontifical Institute, puts the great university presses to shame in the matter of pricing.

Spade has aimed to produce a readable, fairly literal, translation and has succeeded admirably, with the odd slip. Payer's *endurance* as a translation of *tolerantia*, for example, is happier than Spade's *forbearance*: 'Endurance is that by which we steadfastly persevere in carrying out this resolution' (Payer, 121); 'forbearance is that whereby we steadily persist in undertaking this plan' (Spade, 118). Spade sometimes intentionally preserves Abailard's vagaries of tense, which gives the *Dialogue* an unintended Runyonesque tone on occasion: 'So I am very astonished at this, and ask who brought ... them together for this purpose' (59). On the whole, however, the translation flows smoothly. The references and cross-references are helpful, as is the introduction by Marilyn McCord Adams.

Abailard was a dedicated if untypical scholar. As a young man he was precocious, clever, and confident to the point of arrogance. This ensured a talent for making enemies which never deserted him. His infelicitous interaction with Heloise's uncle is merely the best known segment of his stormy career. The wonder is that, with such a life, he succeeded in writing anything at all. However he did manage to produce a good deal, and though attention tends to focus on his work in logic and philosophy of language, his views on ethics, which are clear, generally consistent, and certainly provocative, deserve more attention than they get.

Abailard's central view is that it is the *consenting* to wrong actions which is properly called *sin*. We are commanded 'not to *satisfy* our lusts,' but we are not commanded 'to do without them altogether. For satisfying them is wicked, but going without them is impossible in our feeble state. ... it isn't the lusting after a woman but the consenting to the lust that is the sin' (6). Sin lies in scorning God, and this comes about as soon as the *consent* to the act is given.

For Abailard, there is nothing wrong with the *pleasure* a given act produces. Some think that certain acts such as copulation or eating desirable

food should be done without pleasure but this, says Abailard robustly, is impossible, and God does not command the impossible. As St John Chrysostom remarked centuries earlier concerning a similar case, 'Wine was given to us that it might be a source of delight ... God honoured us with the gift,' and we dishonour only ourselves by abusing it (*On Matthew*, lvii, 5).

In passing Abailard makes a number of nice philosophical points, distinguishing explicitly, for example, between first- and second-order wants (lust may lead us to want what we don't want to want at all), noting that an action which appears wrong under one description may be acceptable under another, more appropriate, description (murdering vs. acting in self defence), and observing the function of epistemology in morality by discussing various hooded man cases (if a man marries his sister, not knowing that the woman is his sister, no sin is committed).

There are problems with his views, and Abailard considers a number of them, including:

- 1) David was legitimate but says he was 'conceived in iniquities' (9). In response, Abailard distinguishes between sins with respect to fault and sins with respect to punishment. David was referring to original sin which attaches even to infants who cannot (lacking rationality) *commit* a sin. David 'preserves in his punishment' what his 'earlier parents ... committed in their fault' (10).
- 2) Isn't the sin (of consent) *increased* by the act — so that 'one is defiled not only by consent to shamefulness but also by the stain of the act?' No, says Abailard, what happens 'outside in the body [cannot] defile the soul' (10). Augustine provides an earlier version of the same position: 'the body remains uncorrupted if innocence does not depart from the soul itself. Whatever violence the body suffers without the individual's consent to lust ought to be termed an ordeal rather than corruption. Or, if every such ordeal is corruption, then not all corruption is base, but only that which lust has procured or to which lust has consented' (*De Mendacio* 7).
- 3) Mustn't courts punish actions and not consentings? And doesn't that mean that the innocent may be punished? Abailard accepts this. A court may justly decide to punish those that by his doctrine are innocent of sin. It may be that the law applied universally will *deter* others from consenting to similar acts, or again, the law may require a judge to pronounce against someone whom he believes innocent, but against whom the evidence is, in law, incontrovertible.
- 4) Unbaptized infants cannot *consent* to sin, but are nonetheless punished. Isn't this wrong of God? Abailard does not even begin to deal with this problem. In his commentary on Romans, as Adams points out (xxvi), he suggests (a) that they lose the vision of God, but are not otherwise punished; (b) their punishment may lead others (their parents, for example!) to conversion; and finally (c) wonders whether

all the unbaptized and therefore punished innocent would have led worse lives, and so have been more harshly punished, had they lived!

Despite the floundering over unbaptized infants and original sin, and a similar (Augustinian) stumble over the problem of evil — ‘it is good for evil to exist, since God uses even it well, and doesn’t permit it to exist otherwise’ (20) — Abailard’s arguments on ethics are, in general, interesting, plausible, and thought-provoking, and with the publication of this volume any philosopher who remains unaware of them has even less excuse than before.

J.J. MacIntosh

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**Robert M. Baird and
Stuart E. Rosenbaum, eds.**

Punishment and the Death Penalty.

Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books 1995. Pp. 258.

US \$16.95. ISBN 0-87975-946-1.

The title of this collection of essays suggests, somewhat misleadingly, that each of the contributions concerns the status of the death penalty as a punishment. In fact, the essays are sharply divided by topic. Part One of the book contains six essays addressing general philosophical questions surrounding the administration of *any* punishments (the Part is entitled ‘The Justification for Punishment’). These pieces wrestle with the respective claims of utilitarianism and retributivism in both justifying society’s decision to punish and determining the appropriate punishment. The second portion of the book (‘Capital Punishment’) consists of twelve essays and two judicial opinions that focus exclusively on the death penalty and contemporary death penalty practices. Several of these essays, like those in the first part, are abstract discussions of desert and deterrence. Others focus on specific issues, such as the potential for error in capital cases, the role of religious organizations in defending or opposing the death penalty, and popular attitudes toward the death penalty.

The punishment theory pieces in Part One offer brief expositions of classic positions. J.D. Mabbott defends a positivist position that grounds justification for punishment completely and exclusively in the violation of established law. John Rawls maintains that utilitarian considerations justify the societal practice of administering punishments while retributive considerations permit particular persons to be subject to punishment. A uniting theme of both Mabbott’s and Rawls’ essays is that the seeming inconsistency of retributive

and utilitarian principles stems largely from a failure of punishment theorists to be precise about when and how such principles operate.

The remaining four essays in Part One address whether punishment, as opposed to therapy or rehabilitation, is a morally appropriate response to lawbreaking. Karl Menninger, writing over three decades ago, defends an approach to criminal behavior that emphasizes therapy and rehabilitation. Menninger's confidence in the ability of scientific experts to diagnose and correct what he regards as the psychiatric root causes of crime leads him to eschew the 'frightened vengeance of the old penology' (49). Richard Wasserstrom rejects this position because it fails to address society's interest in general deterrence, while Herbert Morris defends punishment (as opposed to compelled therapy) because it is more consistent with our view of the lawbreaker as a person with fundamental rights. Richard Dagger likewise defends the practice of punishment by emphasizing its essential justice in distributing the benefits and costs of social order.

The six essays in Part One provide useful, albeit brief, introductions to punishment theory. The punishment-versus-therapy debate in the latter four pieces seems particularly deserving of attention given the extent to which rehabilitation has disappeared as an aspiration (much less a justification) of our system of criminal justice. Given Menninger's prediction that long-term incarceration would inevitably be replaced by 'a quiet, dignified, therapeutic program for the rehabilitation' (49) of offenders, these essays should be supplemented by some contemporary writing, both theoretical and empirical, that explains why our current practice has verged sharply in the opposite direction.

Five of the six essays in Part One were previously published in Baird and Rosenbaum's earlier collection, *Philosophy and Punishment* (1988). Indeed, this collection differs from its predecessor primarily in its more expansive treatment of the death penalty in Part Two. The death penalty section retains an exchange in which Ernest van den Haag defends the moral appropriateness of the death penalty against attacks by Stephen Nathanson and Jeffrey Reiman. Nathanson maintains that arbitrariness in the administration of the death penalty, both in punishing persons who do not deserve death and in punishing selectively among those persons who do deserve death, renders the punishment unjust. Reiman concedes that some offenders might in fact deserve the death penalty but insists that our society should nonetheless refrain from imposing it because of its brutality. In asserting that abolition is 'part of the civilizing mission of modern states' (192), Reiman elaborates on the familiar claim that state-sanctioned killings undermine the message that taking life is wrong.

Van den Haag rejects the arbitrariness argument because it proves too much. All punishments must be administered within a system subject to error, but that does not suggest that punishments should be abandoned altogether. In van den Haag's view, we should try to do justice as we see it in individual cases knowing full well that mistakes of greater or lesser magnitude will be made. Van den Haag is particularly unimpressed by the

underinclusion claim; the fact that some deserving offenders will escape the ultimate penalty is no justification, in van den Haag's view, for allowing all deserving offenders to do so. Van den Haag also dismisses as lacking in empirical support Reiman's suggestion that the death penalty has a brutalizing effect on society. Van den Haag's matter-of-fact defense of capital punishment is buttressed by Walter Berns' impassioned essay that unapologetically embraces the awfulness of the death penalty. In Berns' account, the institution of capital punishment lends majesty to a civil regime by expressing the depth of society's repulsion toward certain crimes and reminding the citizenry of the extent of state power.

The remaining pieces in Part Two offer a brief exposure to death penalty practices and the modern history of capital punishment. Two excerpts from a well-known book by Michael Radelet, Hugo Bedeau, and Constance Putnam, discuss the possibility of executing innocent persons and provide a case-study of a potentially grave miscarriage of justice. William Bowers presents powerful empirical evidence that undermines often-cited polls purporting to reflect extensive popular support for the death penalty. Bowers' contribution is particularly significant given the U.S. Supreme Court's reliance on such polls in gauging 'evolving standards of decency' in order to construe and apply the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. J. Gordon Melton offers an interesting sketch of the role of organized religion in the death penalty debates over the past two centuries. His account briefly outlines the divergent courses of the United States and Canada with respect to capital punishment, the former affirming the constitutionality of the death penalty in 1976 and the latter essentially abolishing the death penalty in the same year.

Overall, Part Two presents some eclectic information about capital punishment but cannot be relied on to provide even a cursory introduction to death penalty practices in the United States or elsewhere. The final two excerpts from U.S. Supreme Court opinions would be difficult to comprehend without additional knowledge concerning the confusing and technical course of constitutional regulation of the death penalty in the United States over the past two decades. This collection is thus best suited to readers seeking a general debate about the morality of imposing extreme punishments, including the death penalty.

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Margaret Pabst Battin

Ethical Issues in Suicide.

Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1995.

Pp. xiv + 240.

US \$22.25. ISBN 0-13-304668-0.

Although those who have committed suicide are no longer buried at a crossroads with a stake through the heart, the act continues to be widely seen as reprehensible. The only alternative to moral condemnation is a diagnosis of mental illness, an alternative which is little more appealing. Battin's book subjects this conventional view to philosophical scrutiny, concluding that there are many circumstances in which suicide is neither sinful nor pathological.

Most of her arguments are directed towards undermining the reasons traditionally given in favour of the view that suicide, if not insane, is immoral; she also argues that these traditional reasons sometimes even support the opposite conclusion, namely that suicide is morally permissible if not actually required.

Chapter 1 attempts to dispose of the religious arguments against suicide. Thus Battin argues that it is doubtful whether we find a prohibition on suicide in Biblical texts, that the idea that life is a gift from God does not support a blanket ban on suicide, that natural law arguments fail, and that the argument that suffering should always be embraced is flawed.

As far as the social argument against suicide is concerned — the argument that suicide is an injury to the community — Battin makes the obvious point that the opposite is also frequently the case, for people who commit suicide have often been burdensome to society in some way or other (chapter 2).

In chapter 3 she deals with the argument that suicide is wrong on account of the intrinsic value of life. She says something about alternative formulations of the value-of-life principle and concludes that on any plausible interpretation of it respect for life will not always rule out suicide.

In chapter 5 she discusses the view that we ought to prevent suicide for paternalistic reasons, arguing that a paternalistic attitude does not always justify suicide prevention and may indeed encourage suicide in certain situations. In other chapters (4 and 6) she argues, in the manner of Hume, that suicide can be a perfectly rational choice, and that we should take seriously the possibility that we have a right to end our lives should we so choose. Finally, in chapter 7 she applies all of these arguments to the topical case of physician-assisted suicide.

In favour of this book is its good overall coverage of the most commonly-made arguments in the area, enriched by an attention to views about suicide other than those contemporarily current in the West. The reader who wants a birds-eye-view of the debate, both historical and current, about the morality and rationality of suicide, will therefore find it here.

But the book lacks depth. In particular, it suffers, in my view, from a failure to engage seriously enough with the question, What gives meaning to

life and what deprives it of meaning? This failure is not only philosophically unsatisfying. It is also practically alarming. Thus Battin says that for suicide to be rational it must be in accord with one's fundamental beliefs and values (146). But she also says that these beliefs and values are a function of whatever ideology happens to be current in one's society (166). And she goes on to state that all of the following could become good reasons for suicide given the appropriate 'ideological manipulation' (166): non-terminal illness (such as renal failure, quadriplegia and arthritis), medical conditions in which there is no illness at all (such as retardation, genetic anomaly, abnormal personality, blindness and old age), and even non-medical circumstances such as chronic unemployment, widowhood, poverty, social isolation and criminal conviction. She adds that it is 'by no means philosophically clear' that it would be wrong for society to encourage as rational suicide in such circumstances (175). In my view, this list of circumstances in which society could favour suicide should be proof enough against the view that prevailing ideology has anything to do with the rationality of suicide. This is not to say that suicide can never be a rational response to terrible circumstances. But it is to reject the idea that the rationality of suicide has anything to do with what people can be manipulated to believe is in their interests.

Denise Meyerson

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Wendy Brown

*States of Injury: Power and Freedom
in Late Modernity.*

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

1995. Pp. ix + 202.

US \$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-02990-3);

n.p. (paper: ISBN 0-691-02989-X).

This is a sceptical book. In part, this is due to its endorsement of 'postmodern exposures' which Wendy Brown nicely summarizes as a 'consciousness of the exclusions and violations accomplished by master narratives, the oppressiveness of closure on identity, and the vulnerability to colonization and regulation presented by definitive naming' (30). In part also, it is due to Brown's awareness that means of emancipation from traditional forms of oppression may in turn impose constraints, forcing us to wonder whether struggles for emancipation may not simply replace old forms of oppression with new ones. In particular, she is concerned with feminist protests against male oppression which represent women as subject to injury, with grounds to seek

protection from the modern state. Thus, Brown claims that while seeking an erosion of the boundary between public and private to limit traditional male prerogatives, feminists may only succeed in involving the capitalist state with reproduction and sexuality so that women are produced as 'dependent, disciplined and gendered' (195) subjects.

Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of the book is Brown's critique of 'feminist hesitations' concerning postmodern exposures of the subject, truth and objective norms. Brown attributes these hesitations to a hankering after a politics infected with *ressentiment*, and asks whether it might not be possible 'for us to live and work politically without such myths, without claiming that our knowledge is uncorrupted by a will to power, without insisting that our truths are less partial and more moral than "theirs"' (46-7)? In place of a politics founded on myths of truth and moral superiority, Brown suggests that we 'contest domination with the strength of an alternative vision of collective life, rather than moral reproach' (47). It may be that Foucault presents good reasons for rejecting the idea of 'disinterested truth'. However, in the absence of an appeal to truth of any kind, how will the 'strength of an alternative vision of collective life' be apparent to those who must pursue that alternative if domination is to end? The strengths of this or that vision are not simply self-evident. After all, feminists who seek to protect women from domestic violence, rape and pornography are surely invoking 'the strength of an alternative vision of collective life'. Yet Brown is able to show that this alternative may preserve what it opposes, no more shockingly than in the case of Catherine MacKinnon's pursuit of legal prohibitions on pornography, which Brown suggests is just as vulnerable to the charge of prurient fascination with what it proscribes as any other paternalistically inspired censorship.

The strength of the book is the insight it provides by taking themes from Marx, Nietzsche and Foucault, and applying them creatively to contemporary feminist strategies. Brown takes from Marx his critique of 'bourgeois rights' as an ideology which masks and displaces conflicts of interest based on inequalities of wealth and power, from Nietzsche his critique of ways of rejecting idols which preserve them in the process, and from Foucault the idea that freedom and constraint are mutually implicated. Brown employs these themes to suggest that, in the first place, in calling on the capitalist state to redress or deter violations of rights, feminists may be displacing their struggle for freedom and equality from the domain of politics and misrepresenting it as a struggle for individual security. Secondly, to focus on redressing injury suffered under domination by males may mean that women continue to live within a masculine shadow. For, just as 'freedom premised upon an already vanquished enemy keeps alive ... a threat that works as domination in the form of an absorbing ghostly battle with the past' (8), so 'legal protection for [women identified as susceptible to injury by males] discursively entrenches the injury-identity connection it denounces [and codifies] within the law the very powerlessness it aims to redress' (21). Thirdly, Brown makes a good case for worrying about the potential which

strategies of reliance on the state have for subjecting women, for reinforcing and recasting traditional forms of vulnerability and dependency. She notes that many calls for change from the left today seem to have forgotten that Weber, Marcuse, et al. have seen the capitalist state as epitomizing the modern principle of bureaucratic rationality, of regimentation and normalization for the sake of enhanced control. Finally, Brown also makes out a good case for discerning in rights-focused feminism an element of *ressentiment*, the protest and desire for revenge of the weak.

While the book focuses on feminist issues, to represent it as exclusively concerned with these would not do justice to its richness and breadth, especially in the introduction which presents a sustained critique of leftist strategies for change in general. On the whole, however, the book is not an easy read. While the exposition is sometimes lucid, there are many rather compressed and convoluted passages to struggle through. Nevertheless, Wendy Brown's discussion of the contradictions of aspirations for change at the close of the twentieth century is sufficiently rewarding to warrant the effort required of the reader.

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Sue L. Cataldi

Emotion, Depth, and Flesh: A Study of Sensitive Space: Reflections on Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of Embodiment.

Albany: State University of New York Press
1993. Pp. xi + 215.

US \$57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1651-8);

US \$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1652-6).

Quite simply, this is a good book. It is poignantly written, carefully conceived, and will be of great value to every Merleau-Ponty scholar, anyone interested in the philosophical analysis of emotions and embodiment, feminism, the philosophy of the social sciences, and/or the philosophy of literature.

In the old days, one might have paid Cataldi a fine compliment by describing her work as a first-rate analysis of existential depth, and a valuable contribution to scholarly literature on existentialism. These days, existentialism is no longer trendy; and so any such praise might consign the work to the neglect of scholars who are preoccupied with more fashionable positions. So let me rephrase what I would have said this way: Cataldi's work is a first-rate analysis of the polysemy of *depth*. It is written in an interesting

style with a postmodern sensibility, and it makes a contribution to scholarly literature on contemporary French feminism's appropriation of existentialist themes.

Her main point is to portray depth as a basic dimension of existence. Depth has to do with both our perceptual and our emotional experience. She argues, drawing upon complementary positions of the ecologist James J. Gibson and the existential-phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, that depth is the latency of the surface rather than some dualistically-conceived metaphysical reserve.

The book is divided into two parts: 'Depth and Embodiment', and 'Emotion, Depth, and Identity'. In the first part, Cataldi uses personal experience and literary examples to effectively articulate the variety of senses of depth she wishes to explore. She then appropriates aspects of the positions of Gibson and Merleau-Ponty to use for her analysis. She focuses at length upon perceptual depth here. In Part Two, Cataldi employs these ecological and philosophical ideas to explore emotional depth, well, in depth! She takes great pains to articulate an understanding of depth which touches upon issues of personal identity, sexuality, politics, ontology, and, of course, embodiment.

The most effective passages in Cataldi's book are based upon her personal experience. Her voice is original and powerful as she explores the depth of her own emotions as she experiences personal assault (11-16 & 162-3), the domestic abuse of a neighbor (123-4), as well as the gamut of emotions as she falls in and out of love (158-60). These are beautifully written, intellectually provocative, and existentially engaging examples which she uses very well to 'flesh out' her understanding of depth.

Her analysis of Merleau-Ponty is careful and ingenious. She focuses her analysis on the passages she selects from the *Phenomenology of Perception* and *The Visible and the Invisible*, as well as a few other essays. However, her analysis might have been enhanced by basing it on more of Merleau-Ponty's work. Most notably absent are any references whatsoever to the landmark 1960 essay in aesthetics and ontology, 'Eye and Mind', which explicitly deals with perceptual depth in aesthetics, but then explores many other senses of depth. Her reflections might have also been expanded to include an historical depth, which would have brought into play a great number of Merleau-Ponty's other writings — ones which have important practical implications [i.e., *Humanism and Terror*, *Adventures of the Dialectic*, etc.] But, to be fair, Cataldi does not set out to do these things. She explicitly states that she is reflecting upon Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of embodiment. Yet, even taking into account the delimited scope of inquiry, one wonders how crucial essays like 'The Child's Relations With Others' — with its discussion of the emotional horizon of experience and our understanding of our own and others' embodiment — or 'The Primacy of Perception' — which focuses upon the constitutive role of perception in embodied experience of the world — could have been omitted from her study.

Her analysis of a 'deep' emotion is epitomized by her account of the stereotypical 'angry young man' (152-5). His anger is not necessarily a direct response to any events or states of affairs in his environment. He is 'always already' angry. His anger has acquired a depth such that it becomes constitutive of other experiences. Yet, this deep emotion is also susceptible to change. It does not become essential, but remains in the contingent realm of experience. While the alienation he experiences and embodies is quite literally a breaking of bonds with others, as physical or emotional experience it suffers the same contingency as other experience. Thus the individual in question can be held responsible for his anger, and can overcome it when it is a limitation, as well as exploit it when it is a virtue.

Cataldi dares to address the disparity and relation between depth in emotions and depth in perceptions in an age where metaphors of depth are all too often automatically dismissed as entailing a naive metaphysical foundationalism. She does Merleau-Ponty scholarship a service by illustrating how his ontology seeks to avoid these errors.

Yet she is not afraid to point out where more contemporary thought has indicated limitations to Merleau-Ponty's thought. She uses his thought as an occasion for her own thinking rather than slavishly devoting her text to paraphrase. For example, her discussion of some contemporary feminists' critiques of Merleau-Ponty's notion of flesh are interesting. Merleau-Ponty discusses a notion of the 'flesh of things' and the 'flesh of the world' with an eye to developing a unified ontology in his last, unpublished work. Some have recently criticized that Merleau-Ponty's notion is unable to account for the rich differentiation he wanted it to precisely because flesh is always sexed — it is never a generic, neuter monolith. But it is also true that these contemporary discussions implicate the earlier writings of Merleau-Ponty, where he discusses the [generic?] body as lived-through — the very passages Cataldi relies upon most heavily in her discussion of embodiment. Yet she fails to address these objections as applied to the *Phenomenology of Perception*. If they do not bear accurately, at least she might have explained why this is the case.

One final criticism is that her postmodern style, which is employed brilliantly in describing her own experiences, becomes contrived and stilted in her discussion of contemporary feminists. The myriad of puns, brackets, parentheses, and hyphens render this part of the work almost unintelligible at times (157-62). It is unfortunate that she chooses to be imp-aired by the militant playfulness of (th)inkers like Mary Daly et al. This leads her, later, to be somewhat trite about extremely important issues. 'In short, I feel very deeply about misogyny' (170). The rigorous analysis she carried out earlier is sorely lacking here.

Yet these limitations are not representative of the work as a whole. Her book is full of brilliant and original discussions of literary works [i.e., *Oedipus Rex*, *The Stranger*, *Brave New World*, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, and *Sophie's Choice*]. She uses her analyses effectively to get at the issues at hand without overdetermining them through some metaphysical conceptual apparatus.

The book would be worth owning and reading for these accounts alone, even if it did not make headway toward a philosophical understanding of depth. Fortunately, in general, Cataldi succeeds at both.

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Peter Caws

Ethics from Experience

Jones and Bartlett Publishers 1996. n.p.

ISBN 0-86720-970-4.

In *Ethics from Experience*, Peter Caws presents readers with what he refers to as 'a moral theory based on the experiences of individuals' and he tells us that it is aimed at professional academicians, the general public and university undergraduates. The book contains fifteen chapters and two appendices. It begins with a broad introduction to moral philosophy through the traditional distinctions which have been and continue to be used in the area and through the matter of method. It ends with a full blown consequentialist theory. What he refers to as his theory of moral value cannot be simply or briefly stated, though, in all fairness, this fact about it is neither a beauty mark nor a blemish. Instead, Caws gives his reader a chart which 'presents more clearly than is possible in a discursive account the moral theory toward which the argument of this book has been ["unsystematically"] directed' (169). There we find the action of two negative principles: indifference and immanence. The Principle of Indifference states that 'No argument is capable of showing that one person's freedom ought to be exercised at the expense of another's' (145). The Principle of Immanence states that 'no universal end value exists' (169). Together with certain descriptive elements (e.g., 'human beings are free, i.e. their actions can affect the course of events'), prescriptive rules are derived. It is left, Caws concludes, to history and experiment to verify the theory.

Any systematic discrimination whatever or any insistence on transcendent principles will inevitably reduce the probability of the achievement of value for everyone. The verification of this claim is not easy — it would require a large-scale human experiment — but without waiting for that we are free to follow the strategy for scientific theory and adhere to the principles until they are falsified by evidence. (173)

The appendices are devoted in the first case to a short discussion of various cinematic representations of The Seven Deadly Sins (publicity stills of which

spice up the text) and in the second case to a selection of thought experiments including 'The Pedro Case', 'The Case of the Scrupulous Lover', 'The Baby Test Case' and 'The Unexpected Paternity Case'. As Caws himself puts it early on: 'An ethics course based on this book will not be a standard introduction to the subject, either historical or systematic or topical. It will be something more interesting, the working through of a robust and livable moral position, testable against individual experiences and intuitions and suited to an age of science, technology and communication' (xi). Despite its title and the aims of its author, I found *Ethics from Experience* quixotic and unsettling. In what follows, I consider two general problems with the work. The first is stylistic, the second philosophical.

As I noted above, Caws states that the book is aimed at professionals and the general public and university undergraduates. We learn that he has developed its content under the conditions of teaching ethics to university students, and that, in the course of this teaching, he realized that traditional moral philosophers lacked currency and contemporary moral philosophers lacked methodology. The first deficit can hardly be corrected but the second one can. Caws assigns the latter problem to contemporary moral philosophy's 'misconceived' rejection of science and scientific method. Without a proper method, the study of ethics becomes an empty, frivolous diversion at best. In order to correct this situation, Caws returns scientific method to moral thought (an action which I will consider below). In doing so, Caws expects that even the uninitiated general public will recognize the usefulness of moral thought and be able to benefit from it.

Whether or not, on reflection, these aims are laudable, Caws's attempt to secure them seems destined to fail. Instead of striking a stylistically consistent and moderately challenging tone throughout — a tone which in my experience does tend to please a wide and diverse audience — he gives us a grab bag of perspectives and approaches nervously held together by the content and, of course, seven photographs from various film versions of 'The Seven Deadly Sins'. We get 'thumbnail' bios: '*Samuel Johnson*, English writer and critic. He was known for his pithy sayings, many of which have the form of philosophical arguments in miniature ... *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel*, German Philosopher. He is known for his Absolute Idealism, according to which the history of the universe is the history of Mind coming to know itself by the dialectical overcoming of contradictions' (28 & 46), as well as unfathomable arguments such as:

One of the most useful contemporary philosophical contributions to the debate about human nature has been the existentialist's assertion that there is no such thing — nothing compels me to be one way or another just because I am human. I still want to know what being the kind of animal I am makes it likely that I will become in the absence of self-determination, so the work of psychologists and sociobiologists is essential. [sic] (37)

Caws helps himself to scholastic, analytic, post-analytic, phenomenological and existentialist perspectives as he goes without much attention to how these perspectives connect up with one another or slip into the mold of science. The effect of this potpourri was deep uncertainty at every page about just who this book was *really* for. His 'thumbnail' definition of 'phenomenology', for example, describes it as 'a theoretical approach to appearances as such, freed from the prejudgements to which language and culture unthinkingly subject them in experience' (49). I cannot imagine that anyone who has not spent some time studying phenomenology would have the slightest idea what it was about from that definition and yet as far as I can tell, Caws entirely depends upon it to do that work.

In short, I found myself either slightly bored by the material and thinking that a novice *might* appreciate the simplicity, or exasperatingly challenged and worried that undergraduates and the general public would probably be lost. On occasion, I was mystified or stunned or both by some of his claims. While quotable, I am altogether uncertain as to how to respond to this quip: 'People who are at a loss for anything to do do not need moral instruction; they need love or vitamins or psychoanalysis' (143). If only on the basis of stylistic concern, I would not recommend this text as a teaching tool.

Might the book nonetheless be of some interest to the professional philosopher? In order to answer this question, allow me to place the work in an older context — the context of the 19th-century moral debate between the Intuitionists and the Utilitarians. According to most 19th-century Utilitarians, science and scientific methodology rather than consultation with 'common sense' or a moral sense was held as the best means of determining the ends of morality. Nevertheless, there were Utilitarian empiricists who had a slightly different view. John Stuart Mill, for example, was prepared to grant that scientific methodology could be adapted to serve the political and social sciences. Yet while he was no Intuitionist, on the grounds that science could not deal with individuals, he doubted that its adaptation to moral philosophy was as easily warranted. Scientific method, Mill thought, must be limited to the determination of means only and once and only once moral theory itself had determined the proper ends of human conduct according to the method of 'Art' in the archaic sense of the term, i.e. practice or craft.

Caws says that 'the aim of this book is to present a moral theory based on the experiences of individuals' (1). As such, it would seem as if Caws is following in Mill's footsteps. For in basing the ends of morality in the experience of individuals, Mill for one might argue that he has proceeded according to the artistic method. But Caws's emphasis on experience in this case is clearly amplified in the context of an attempt to install *scientific* method to pride of place in moral philosophy rather than artistic method. That emphasis must therefore be understood as an attempt to extend the jurisdiction of scientific method beyond the point Mill considered it wise to do so. One might infer, then, that Caws's consequentialist value theory is not as individualistic as Mill's was. But it is clear that when it comes to Caws's views about 'self-knowledge', he abhors collectivism with as much if not more

zeal than Mill did. For example, Caws presents a set of recommendations for reform in the direction of increasing the potential for individual self-knowledge and then admits that it is 'a utopian recipe indeed, given that what is taught and practiced in most parts of the world, if not by the official establishment then by the family, religion, and popular custom and opinion, involves the exploitation of others, including family members and members of subordinated genders, classes races, hostility to outsiders, the settlement of disputes by violence, mindless consumption accompanied by a wildly inegalitarian distribution of resources, unreflective and often self-destructive habitual behavior, massive ignorance and a general absence of self-critical understanding' (196). If we cannot infer that Caws's theory is less individualistic than Mill's then we must assume that his view of science's shortcomings is less breathtaking than Mill's was.

Indeed, while Caws admits that it is 'no longer so obvious' that science is 'the best example of how to get knowledge out of experience', he laments that state of affairs since it is his view that 'the critics of science have misunderstood what science is and does' (2-3). As if to fall directly into Paul Feyerabend's lap, Caws presses his methodological point by calling the reader's attention to the impressive, widely accepted results of scientific activity. 'There is an obvious parallel between moral theory and scientific theory ... in the last few hundred years it has become possible for ordinary individuals, suitably instructed, to see how science is validated on the basis of their own experience. The same development is possible in the case of moral theory' (1). In short, Caws appears to be claiming against its critics, that while science may indeed claim for itself the best or most reliable method of fact collection based upon the remarkable degree of consensus which continuously grows from its application, this further fact about it does not imply that science is an ideology. I was not persuaded by Caws's arguments to this conclusion. At least part of what worries late 20th-century critics of Classical Science is its appeal to the confirming force of its results and while Caws, as I noted, is not ignorant of such criticism, I think he is less sensitive to it than he ought to have been.

In conclusion, I am actually quite sympathetic to Caws's estimate of the Principle of Indifference and the Principle of Immanence. But I cannot say with any confidence that my own experimental confirmation is of much use to him. He needs the sympathy of most people, people with strong religious beliefs, for example — in short, a good portion of his intended audience. Given this 'scientific' requirement, the many distances which he has placed between himself and that audience become even more perplexing from a philosophical point of view than they were from a stylistic one. Finally, I should add that these two principles do not appear to advance the case for a consequentialist moral theory beyond the points where Mill and Henry Sidgwick left it. Mill barely rates a mention in the text and Sidgwick's name does not appear at all.

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Jean-Pierre Changeux and Alain Connes
*Conversations on Mind, Matter, and
Mathematics.* Trans M.B. DeBevoise.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1995. Pp. xii + 260.
US \$24.95. ISBN 0-691-08759-8.

This is a fun book, although those who expect to uncover profound insights will be disappointed. Jean-Pierre Changeux, a French neuroscientist, and Alain Connes, a French mathematician, engage in a conversation regarding the nature of mathematical objects. (I mention that they are both French because their way of parsing up the intellectual landscape differs from most English speakers.) Discussing this topic also leads them to discuss brain organization, artificial intelligence, Darwinism, and ethics. Since each of these topics comprise whole disciplines in philosophy to which many people devote their entire professional careers to understanding and explicating, it should not surprise anyone that what Changeux and Connes have to say about these matters is rather abbreviated and superficial. (Indeed, in some cases, what they have to say is downright misleading; their perfunctory dismissals of functionalism [166-7] and utilitarianism [224] portray deep misunderstandings of what these two -isms are about.) Nevertheless, what they do have to say is interesting in its own right and just about anyone who reads this book will walk away having gained some new insight into some aspect of mind/brain functioning.

For most of the book, Connes appears to be a strict Platonist, and Changeux believes that mathematical objects are nothing but higher-ordered brain states. Neither view is terribly satisfactory, and unfortunately, neither Changeux nor Connes really grapple with the serious philosophical difficulties. The penultimate chapter, though, is different. It was added to the English edition and does not appear in the original. Too bad, for in this chapter Connes explains a bit more about how he views mathematical objects and it turns out that he is not a Platonist at all, subscribing to some mysterious nether-world of perfect Forms; instead, he thinks that mathematics comprises the very root of this universe. This is a very provocative idea and I regret that it was not spelled out at the beginning of the text so that it could form the basis of the ensuing dialogue.

The other high points of the book include chapter 4, in which Changeux explains his view of epigenesis in very clear and easy to understand terms, and chapter 5, in which Connes suggests how topology theory might be used to map isomorphisms among higher levels of order across brains. (Changeux's Darwinian approach to neural development is better developed [and more plausible] than Gerald Edelman's; his description here is worth the price of the book alone.) The low point of the book is chapter 6, 'Thinking Machines'; Changeux and Connes just don't understand the issues being debated by philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists.

Finally, a note regarding an unfortunate editorial decision. The translator opted not to include most of the notes and references from the original, claiming that they were incomplete. I wish instead he had worked to complete them, for they would have been a valuable resource. He is quite wrong when he writes that 'specialists will know where to look in the scientific literature; lay readers by and large will not care' (vii). There will be few who are specialists in both mathematics and neuroscience, and it would have been nice to have references or additional readings for those who are expert in one field, but not (yet) in the other.

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Murray Code

Myths of Reason.

Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press

1995. Pp. xii + 244.

US \$55.00. ISBN 0-391-03901-6.

This is a book about the nature of reason and rationality, and about philosophical conceptions of what it means to be rational. The principal purpose of the book is to dethrone a certain image of the truly rational person. In particular, Code challenges the idea that 'rational man' is being most himself when conceived as a 'systematic understander' following clear lights of logic, precise mathematical methods, or rigorous forms of argumentation (x). In Code's opinion, this image of the rational person is ultimately based on myths, in the derogatory sense of the term.

One such myth, we are told in the preface, 'is that the more precise and systematic thought can become, the more it is likely to exemplify rationality' (ix). By way of exposing this myth, Code examines some of the writings of a few prominent analytic philosophers, who manifest their acceptance of the myth by displaying 'an intolerant attitude toward the phenomenon of vagueness' (xi). The first of these philosophers to be examined is Gottlob Frege. For Code writes that 'in view of the supreme importance of generality in philosophical discourse, there are few issues more crucial to an evaluation of logicistic interpretations of rationality than Frege's treatment of generality' (27). However, one paragraph later, Code asserts that '[Frege's] position does not appear to be based on explicit arguments, but rather on an acritical assumption that the endemic vagueness in natural languages is actually strong proof of their defectiveness' (27). He therefore concludes that 'Frege's

solution to the problem of generality is nothing more than a solution by fiat' (33).

Code's cursory treatment of Frege is unlikely to persuade even the most sympathetic reader. For not only does he fail to explain what Frege's analysis of generality is, he is also unclear on how this analysis relates to the issues of vagueness and rationality. What Code does say is that 'in a perfected Fregean language, all vague and ambiguous expressions of concepts and relations, which normally enlist vague generalities that call on intuition for their understanding, will finally be eliminated' (27). However, while Frege did yearn for a language whose concepts were clear and unambiguous, it is not at all clear what this has to do with his treatment of generality. What Frege's analysis of generality did help to clarify — and this is relatively uncontroversial — is the logical relations amongst sentences containing expressions of quantification.

Following the discussion of Frege, Code briefly considers Bertrand Russell, the father of logical atomism. Here we are told that 'the chief aim of the theory of logical atomism is to combat vagueness and, in particular, the vagueness of general terms' (39). We are then told that '[Russell's] convoluted assault on the vagueness of generalities collapses, in the end, into a declaration of faith in the relevance of exact science to philosophy' (39). In the third chapter, Code considers the idea, espoused by W.V. Quine, that a reconstituted science can dispense with the vague notion of causality. Once again, the conclusion is swift and negative. Code writes that 'Quine's treatment of fundamental concepts thus adds to, instead of alleviating, doubts about the importance of logic for philosophy' (68).

Subsequent to these critical remarks, some gestures are made in the direction of a positive account of rationality. Thus, in the fourth chapter, Code applauds Alfred Whitehead for suggesting that 'creative imaginations informed by aesthetic feelings are at the bottom of successful connections between human knowers and reality' (90). And in the fifth chapter, C.S. Peirce is praised for claiming that abductive reasoning is essential to cognition. According to Peirce, abductive reasoning is akin to guessing, but it is not mere guessing; it refers to the process by which one first arrives at a hypothesis, and typically involves some instinctive guess-work. Code claims that 'if Peirce is right that abductive processes inform all cognition, he all but shouts the conclusion that something like rational instincts *must* lie behind the genesis and growth of human knowledge' (125). However, Peirce does not shout this conclusion, and in fact is rather reluctant to subsume these instincts under the rubric of reason. In the remainder of the chapter, Code attempts to convince the reader that Peirce should not have hesitated on this last point.

In general, I think this book leaves much to be desired. In the first place, Code's discussion of vagueness, and the relation between vague concepts and systematic thought, is plagued by an unjustifiable vagueness all its own. It is simply not clear how the reality of fuzzy concepts spells trouble for systematic thought. For it is evident that one can think clearly and system-

atically while employing fuzzy concepts. I do not know if every person is decidedly male or female, and the concept of manhood is in this sense fuzzy, but this ambiguity in no way affects the clarity of the thought that if Socrates is a man, and all men are mortal, then Socrates is mortal. Secondly, while one could argue that fuzzy concepts expose some of the limitations of formal methods, one should consider at least some of the developments in the field of fuzzy logic before drawing this conclusion. Thus, Code's failure to discuss these developments strikes me as a rather glaring omission.

The intention of *Myths of Reason* is to show not only that a certain image of rationality is unjustified, but that it is also sexist. And Code concludes the book with the provocative suggestion that what underpins common views of reason in Western philosophy is the 'masculinist imaginary,' which supports not only 'combative assaults on vagueness and ambiguity,' but also 'a rejection of putatively soft or feminine traits of thought' (215). However, rather than exposing sexism within the discipline, I think that Code basically demonstrates it. For it is he who suggests that there is something soft or non-systematic about 'feminine traits of thought.' Elsewhere in the text, Code writes that 'it is certainly a tendency among self-consciously rigorous thinkers to characterize certain areas of philosophy as "soft," with the implication that softness is a mark of femininity' (10). But on the contrary, I think that philosophers use the terms 'soft' and 'hard' to characterize types of philosophy just as they do to characterize types of science. The 'hard' sciences are the physical sciences, and are contrasted with the social or human sciences. The idea that these terms, in this context, have implications for gender is the product, I think, of Code's imagination.

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**S. Marc Cohen, Patricia Curd, and
C.D.C. Reeve, eds.**

*Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy
From Thales to Aristotle.*

Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1995. Pp. 799.

US \$42.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-313-1);

US \$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-312-3).

In teaching undergraduates the history of ancient and medieval philosophy, I have used seven different books just for the Ancient Greek period (pre-Socratics through Aristotle), none of them satisfactory, either because of cost, quality of translation, or content. None satisfactory, that is, until now with

Cohen, Curd, and Reeve's *Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy From Thales to Aristotle* (hereafter RAGP).

RAGP devotes 73 pages to pre-Socratic fragments and testimonia (and another 9 pages to Sophists), of which about 15 pages are introductory to the period or to specific thinkers. Curd is primarily responsible for the selections in this section. The period as a whole is given a 7 page introduction, and each thinker is introduced with a paragraph on his life, works, and thought. The translations are those recently done by R.D. McKirahan, Jr. (in *Philosophy Before Socrates*, Hackett, 1994). Each fragment and testimony is immediately followed by its ancient source and its Diels-Kranz number. Students learn the distinction between quotation and paraphrase or reporting. They can attempt to reconstruct the thought of these thinkers, and wonder about whether, for example, Parmenides read Heraclitus, or Heraclitus read Pythagoreans and Xenophanes. Students are amazed at the general reasonableness of Leucippus and Democritus. There are, to be sure, many details for the teacher to introduce. But that is left to the teacher, not a task completed by the editors.

The Plato section was the primary responsibility of Reeve. References to Plato's works are given the Stephanus numbers. The section begins with an informative introduction to Socrates and Plato, in which I see clear influence of Vlastos and many scholars who were influenced in various ways by Vlastos' study of Socrates and Plato. On p. 86 is a discussion of four claims that show the puzzling character of Socrates regarding: his method and mission, his claim to ignorance, his disavowal of teaching, and the role of irony in understanding him. This page provides in short space what would otherwise take much longer for students to grasp. All the translations of Plato's writings have been previously published by Hackett, or are forthcoming from Hackett (in the case of Gill & Ryan's translation of the selection from the *Parmenides* 127b-135d on the theory of forms and Parmenides' criticism of it), or were specifically commissioned by Hackett (in the case of Zeyl's translation of the selection from the *Timaeus* 27e-58c on the creation of the universe). The translations include the complete *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, *Meno*; selections from *Protagoras* 317e-334c (Protagoras on the teachability of virtue and Socrates' 'small' problems with it) and 348c-362a (on pleasure and good, weakness of will, and motivating knowledge); *Gorgias* 462a-481b (the Polus section); *Phaedo* 72d-107d (on various arguments for immortality, but *not* the myth of the afterlife nor the death scene!); *Symposium* 201d-212c (Diotima's speech on love); most of the *Republic* (large portions of I-II, little of III, much of IV, all of V-VII, none of VIII, all of IX, and a little of X); and the selections from *Parmenides* and *Timaeus* mentioned above.

The Aristotle section was the primary responsibility of Cohen. References to Aristotle's works are given the Bekker numbers. The translations are those of Fine and Irwin, except *Categories* 1-5 (Cohen and Matthews), *Meteorologica* IV.12 (Cohen), *NE* (Irwin), and *On the Heavens* I.2; III.3-6 (Guthrie). All of these translations have been previously published by Hackett or were forthcoming by Hackett except Guthrie's Loeb translation of *On*

the Heavens. There is a 10-page introduction on Aristotle, and at the end of the book a 20-page glossary for Aristotle (very helpful for students). No complete works of Aristotle are contained here (even the very idea of a complete work of Aristotle is a bit of a misnomer). The selections include: *Categories* 1-5; *De Interpretatione* 1-4,7,9; *Topics* I.1-2,5; *Posterior Analytics* I.1-6,10, II.8-10,19; *Physics* I.1,5-9, II, III.1-3, VIII.6; *On Generation and Corruption* I.1,3-4, II.2-5; *On the Heavens* I.2, III.3-6; *Meteorologica* IV.12; *Parts of Animals* I.1,5; *Metaphysics*, parts of I, IV, VII, VIII, XII; *De Anima* I.1, II.1-6,11-12, III.3-5,10-11; *Nicomachean Ethics*, parts of I, II, III, V, VI, VII, X; and *Politics*, parts of I, II, III, VII.

The book contains a very good and up to date 5-page bibliography of material for further reading on various of the pre-Socratics and Sophists, on Plato, and on Aristotle. There is also an 11 page concordance on the sources for the pre-Socratics, which perhaps should have been placed directly after that section of the book rather than at the end. These features, together with standard methods of referencing the works (D-K, Stephanus, Bekker), consistent and high quality translations for each (McKirahan, Grube et al., and Fine/Irwin et al.), and philosophically relevant selections, make this the best available textbook on the period.

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Daniel Goleman

Emotional Intelligence.

New York: Bantam Books 1995. Pp. xiv + 352.

US \$23.95. ISBN 0-553-09503-X.

Daniel Goleman brings to light some of the recent research in the fields of psychology and neuroscience which support the view that emotions have cognitive import. In fact, he suggests that what the common IQ test measures tells us less about how well a person, adult or child, will function and flourish than what has been traditionally ignored — that individual's emotional intelligence.

Among the characteristics of emotional intelligence, according to Goleman, are the abilities to control impulse and to motivate oneself, to be tenacious and approach life's tasks with zeal and optimism, and to have hope and confidence in one's abilities to overcome challenges. Emotional intelligence is not fixed but can be learned. For this reason, Goleman wants educators and parents to be aware of its importance. He claims, and numer-

ous studies he cites help to prove, that high IQ test results and SAT scores do not have the predictive force formerly believed; they, alone, cannot tell us who most likely will reach a high level of achievement in education, business, finance, or any of life's other paths. Far more likely to inform us of the names on the Who's Who lists of the future are those features of character which comprise emotional intelligence.

Goleman goes beyond just urging that we reevaluate the old dichotomy of reason versus the passions. Many of the well-controlled studies he cites give supporting evidence of the interconnectedness between cognition and emotion.

Goleman begins with a summary of some of the recent discoveries in the biological sciences pertaining to the neurophysiological and structural functions of the brain. For one, we know that the neocortex evolved from the emotional centres. These centres thread through numerous circuits to every area of the neocortex. For another, it seems likely that the key role in emotional function is played by the amygdala.

Goleman gives credit to Joseph LeDoux, a neuroscientist at the Center for Neural Science at New York University, for having discovered a link between the amygdala and our ability to place meaning or value upon an event or object. Should the connection between the amygdala and the neocortex be severed, or should a lesion develop on the amygdala requiring surgical removal, the results for the patient are distressing — or more to the point, for the patient, they are not distressing at all. The person loses his or her ability to determine which events have import and which do not, which should be preferred, and which should be avoided; the patient acquires the condition known as 'affective blindness'.

LeDoux discovered, Goleman reports, a neuronal path running directly from the thalamus to the amygdala, in addition to the larger path of neurons leading to the cortex. The thalamus-amygdala route enables the amygdala to receive data directly from the senses, thus allowing it to begin a response before the neocortex registers the same sensory input. This can account for studies showing that people will respond emotionally, as can be determined by galvanic skin response, to percepts which have not reached their conscious awareness.

The amygdala-thalamus 'back alley', as well as the identification of the amygdala as the prime role-player in our emotional life, helps to explain a familiar experience. As Goleman points out, many potent emotional memories pertain to our earliest years. But the hippocampus, 'which is crucial for narrative memories,' and the neocortex have yet to become fully developed. The amygdala, on the other hand, is much closer to fully formed at birth, and it matures very quickly. One reason why we experience baffling emotional outbursts 'is that they often date from a time early in our lives when things were bewildering and we did not yet have words for comprehending events. We may have the chaotic feelings, but not the words for the memories that formed them.'

According to Goleman, 'the realm of the emotions extends ... beyond the reach of language and cognition.' But it affects them both. Goleman regrets that much of cognitive research places its emphasis on cognitions *about* feeling, rather than on the role feeling itself plays in intelligence. And he thinks that some cognitive scientists, 'seduced by the computer as the operative model of mind,' fail to consider that the brain's wetware 'is awash in a messy, pulsating puddle of neurochemicals.'

Observations like these, backed up by some convincing studies, show that Goleman may be right in urging us to review our beliefs about the links between feeling and emotion, and rational thinking.

Another interesting consequence of the scientific data Goleman presents is the confirmation of many folk psychological theories. But refutation of common sense notions results as well. For example, the newest data confirms that early childhood trauma leaves lifelong emotional scarring. Goleman argues, however, that much of the damage can be reversed. Another common notion, that venting anger is always the best course receives a definite denial. It seems that, in most cases, venting anger only escalates and prolongs the episode; the problem which initiated the anger appears worse than ever, and more fuel sparks more anger. All this is explained, in part, in terms of the neurochemical reactions occurring in the brain.

Many such phenomena receive treatment in *Emotional Intelligence*. At times, Goleman introduces some quite technical material. His technique, however, makes understanding it seem easy. Each chapter, and most sections within the chapters, introduce the reader to the subject with an everyday example. Other examples follow, interspersed with more technical language, and scientific terms are defined.

Emotional Intelligence cannot be considered primarily, or even secondarily, a self-help book. It contains information about the emotions we have never known before, much of which is significant for several areas of philosophy and education. For example, that emotions have a role in our apprehension of beauty and art has received consensus among most aestheticians. But what that role is, and how emotions perform it is less clear. *Emotional Intelligence* points a way to perhaps solving that conundrum.

Much in the book is applicable to ethics and its subfields. A good indicator of this is Goleman's choice for an opening quote from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*: 'Anyone can become angry — that is easy. But to be angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way — that is not easy.' He refers to Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean indirectly throughout the book. In a chapter devoted to finding the roots of empathy, Goleman considers the impact of empathy on ethics; and later, he shows how emotional learning in the classroom could improve children's future ability to weigh ethical issues.

Such considerations lead to discussions of education. Given some of the discoveries that Goleman reports, philosophers of education might want to ask if society's strict emphasis on learning the three Rs, at the expense of encouraging the development of emotional skills, has not limited the domain

of the humanly knowable. This question prompts others related to epistemology, the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and so on.

Emotional Intelligence could prove a useful source book for many new philosophical investigations.

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Alfonso Gómez-Lobo

The Foundations of Socratic Ethics.

Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 1994. Pp. 149.

US \$29.95. ISBN 0-87220-174-0.

Gregory Vlastos, ed. Myles Burnyeat

Socratic Studies.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1994.

Pp. xiii + 152.

US \$44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-44213-3);

US \$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-44735-6).

Greek Philosophy has become an even more exciting field for study during the second half of the twentieth century due to the emergence of a new philosopher whose views concerning the moral life are increasingly a subject for scholarship. This philosopher is Socrates. While Socrates has always been with us as a teacher who had a profound — but indefinable — influence on Plato, a character in Plato's dialogues, a sage referred to by Aristotle, a subject of works by Xenophon and a comic character in the plays of Aristophanes, two forces have prohibited his direct study as a moral philosopher: first, the contention that there was no systematic or disinterested way to separate the historical Socrates from the character of Socrates in Plato's dialogues; second, the impression that in those dialogues which are most readily assumed to have a strong Socratic influence, the overall strategy is negative (*aporetic*). On this second view the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues harbors no philosophically noteworthy views of his own; he merely engages in a method which is designed to dismantle the misguided moral sentiments of his interlocutor.

In the last twenty-five years the volume of books and articles in which scholars either assume or try to prove that the two above forces should be quelled has snow-balled. Two recent contributions are Gregory Vlastos' posthumously edited and published *Socratic Studies* (SS) and Alfonso

Gómez-Lobo's *The Foundations of Socratic Ethics (SE)*. Both books serve the dual purpose of increasing the content of Socratic Scholarship while extending its limits. Both not only argue plausibly that specific moral beliefs should be attributed to the historical Socrates; they also propose well-reasoned standards for making attributions to Socrates rather than Plato and for adhering to the Platonic as opposed to the Xenophonic account of Socrates.

While Vlastos was clearly planning to publish *SS* as a book, the fact that it was left unfinished and was edited by another gives it the character of a collection of papers, some of which are inter-related and some of which are not, but each of which can stand alone. *SE*, by contrast, is a sustained and extended argument from start to finish. While the chapters might have some independent interest, Gómez-Lobo's intention is to make one unified argument by moving from important passages within several dialogues to a few foundational ethical principles that governed Socrates' moral philosophy. The two books address claims and arguments found in the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Gorgias*, *Protagoras* and *Laches* in depth.

On the way to arguing for his foundational principles, Gómez-Lobo makes several interesting meta-theoretical claims concerning Socratic ethics: Socrates held that virtue is constitutive of happiness and not merely instrumentally related to it. Also, Socrates' *eudemonism* defies the presupposition of such dichotomies as egoism/altruism and consequentialism/deontology. Among the most important claims concerning the foundation of Socratic Ethics made in *SE* are those that can be compiled into the statement that Socrates held prudence to be the cornerstone of moral behavior, where prudence is to be understood as that which is directed by the *sophrosunē* that structures a perfectly ordered soul. For Socrates, on this view, the perfectly good man is the one with this well-ordered soul; such a man will be both prudent and moral because he will only find that which is morally right to be in his own best interest.

It is worth noting that *SE* was originally written in 1986, but has only recently appeared in English. A Socrates of a similar flavor to Gómez-Lobo's has emerged independently in some more recent English articles that the Spanish *SE* must be credited with anticipating. However, while Gómez-Lobo argues that Plato contrived a continuity between descriptive theses (what behavior is most prudent) and moral ones (what is the best life for a man) for Socrates *post hoc*, these more recent authors find Socrates to be denying a distinction between fact and value altogether. Given that Gómez-Lobo actually takes Callicles to accuse Socrates of abusing the *nomos/physis* distinction in the *Gorgias* (92), the hypothesis that Socrates rejects this distinction might have deserved some consideration within his text as well. This criticism receives support from Vlastos who, in his own chapter 5, resists interpretations that might import the fact/value distinction into the text anachronistically.

SS consists of five chapters and an epilogue. In the first chapter Vlastos describes and resolves the 'problem of the elenchus.' The problem: Socrates claims to have proven his interlocuter wrong in several places in the early

dialogues; however, the elenctic method does not substantiate valid and sound *proof* of the truth or falsity of any proposition. Vlastos approaches resolution by elaborating the details of the elenctic method to show that there is strong inductive evidence for Socrates' conviction that whosoever holds a false moral belief will always, simultaneously, hold true beliefs that entail the negation of that false belief. This is proposed as a Platonic invigoration of Socrates' efforts as a moral philosopher who was out of his depth as a logician. Vlastos speculates that it was the necessity of this latent moral knowledge to the success of Socrates' elenchus that set the stage for Plato's introduction of recollection. This chapter also gives the details of Vlastos' rejection of the legacies of Grote and Zeller to which he alludes in the beginning of his earlier *Socrates*.

In Chapter 2 the problem of Socrates' disavowal of knowledge is discussed and resolved. The problem is that Socrates' disavowal is wedged among several epistemological claims. It is proposed that Socrates uses the term 'knowledge' in two ways: infallible knowledge (which he disavows) and elenctic knowledge (which is as justified as it needs to be by the elenctic method discussed in chapter one). Vlastos handles what he takes to be the two greatest objections to this thesis (61-4), but those objections seem superficial and his replies are not altogether satisfying. Also, there are further controversies created by his proposal which are not addressed. First, Socrates' attribution of knowledge to others (craftspersons, poets) would necessitate a third category (as would the 'technical knowledge' that Vlastos himself introduces in chapter 5). Second, Vlastos supposes that, had Socrates possessed epistemological savvy, he would have dismissed infallible knowledge as an unnecessary relic — yet he still has Socrates consider it a *superior* brand of knowledge (the only kind worthy of the gods) (62-3). By far the most controversial result of Vlastos' proposal is that it completely changes the nature of Socratic ignorance. If Socrates truly has all that he needs of the only useful brand of knowledge, then his motives for refraining from offering opinions and actions on a great range of both historical and fictional occasions is harder to understand and explain. The third chapter seeks to strengthen the claims made in chapter two by showing that it can clear Socrates of the Socratic Fallacy. This fallacy states that if you don't know what F is (where F is a moral term) then you cannot know that anything is F. Vlastos employs his distinction between different kinds of knowledge to show that so universal a claim never appears in the dialogues. On the way, Vlastos states that Socrates must have been searching for the meanings of moral terms rather than that to which they refer (83). This should be perplexing for anyone engaged in the study of Socrates the *moral philosopher*; can a great *moralist* hold that one discovers what virtue is simply by coming to know the way the word is used in the common language?

In chapter 4, the thesis that, in his own time, Socrates was widely — but incorrectly — held to be a crypto-oligarch is defended. Chapter 5 presents an argument that implies that the *Laches* should be dated after the *Protagoras* as philosophical progress concerning technical, as opposed to moral, knowl-

edge has been made in the *Laches* demonstrating that Plato now sees that Socrates found virtue to be tied to moral insight rather than technical skill. It is disconcerting to see Vlastos open a wide chasm between the two; if technical wisdom is irrelevant to happiness then why is it that technical wisdom *used in accordance with virtue* is advantageous? The epilogue, an autobiographical comment originally written as a graduation address, is a soothing and fatherly reminder that we as scholars must emulate Socrates' message rather than his actions. There are moments, such as the Vietnam war, military interventions in Central America (and, one might wonder if Vlastos would have added a few others to his list had he lived to the present day) when even the most serious, productive and insightful scholar must turn away from books and computers to take political action, as Socrates on several historically documentable occasions did not. Here we see a further effect of the epistemological revolution which Vlastos develops in Chapter two: only a scholar who has reinterpreted Socrates' professions of ignorance in moral matters to concern a kind of knowledge which is unimportant in any practical way could see Socrates' political restraint as produced by a preoccupation with philosophical discussion rather than his philosophical opposition to such engagement.

Both books show the *Gorgias* to be importantly transitional — a place where Plato put in some of the metaphysical and logical underpinnings that he noticed to be absent in Socrates' purely moral approach to questions that had epistemological and metaphysical facets as well. Those interested in the historical Socrates as a philosopher will find both of these books absorbing. Those who think that, although Socrates must be understood within the environs of ancient Athens he has much to discuss with the contemporary ethicist, will want to engage with the foundational and meta-theoretical theses argued for in *SE*. Those who wish to argue that this ancient Athenian used irony and other forms of indirect expression in order to enhance his communication of internally consistent and cogent philosophical theories that can endure examination by the contemporary analytic philosopher will enjoy sinking their teeth into *SS*.

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Roberta Imboden

The Church: A Demon Lover.

Calgary: University of Calgary Press 1995.

Pp. xiv + 152.

Cdn \$19.95. ISBN 1-895176-55-7.

Roberta Imboden's *The Church: A Demon Lover* employs Jean-Paul Sartre's dialectical social philosophy to argue that the Roman Catholic Church is an institution of human praxis that does not reflect the Gospel message of love. While the Church claims to preach this message, its actions are not those of love. It is Imboden's aim to investigate the development of the Church as an institution by using the conceptual framework found in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, *Search for a Method*, and *Critique of Dialectical Reason*.

Imboden begins by chronicling the sadistic actions of the Church both during the Inquisition and in this century. Specifically, she points out that the Church either directly sanctioned or indirectly condoned the silencing of heretics, Jews, and women during the Middle Ages, she exposes how the Church continues to repress intellectual dissidents and women and overlooked the persecution of the Jews during World War II. These actions demonstrate the Church's failure to live up to the Gospel message of love.

The middle three chapters of the book contain Imboden's Sartrean analysis of the Church as a sadistic institution. She first presents an account of Sartre's analysis of the development of sadistic and masochistic relationships from a healthy relationship based on mutual love. Similarly, the Church started as a group-in-fusion where each person is sovereign and has developed into an institution characterized by domination. She then presents a concise summary of Sartre's concepts and ideas of the development of institutions. These concepts and ideas are applied to the current structure of the Church and the historical development of this institution in order to explain why the Church has become an institution based on domination and power.

Chapters seven through nine explain why the institution of the Church is able to sustain itself and contain a proposal for restoring the Gospel message of love in the actions of the Church. Based on the Sartrean concepts of deviation and circularity, Imboden argues that the establishment of the elder-presbyter system which was intended to secure the continuation of the message of love have deviated from this aim and created a hierarchy in the Church which led to the institutionalized relations of domination which exist today. To overcome this domination Imboden turns to Leonardo Boff's conception of the Trinity and proposes that the power of the Church should be similarly decentralized in order to destroy the domination institutionalized in the Church hierarchy.

Imboden's work provides excellent explanations of some of the lesser known ideas in Sartre's later works; it also demonstrates how one can come to understand how the Church has evolved into one of the most daunting institutions in the world. One may still question 1) whether it is the individu-

als or the relationships in the institution which ensure the continued institutionalized domination by the Church and 2) what is necessary to bring about the decentralization of the Church hierarchy. Imboden, following Sartre, does not address these, but her work clearly and effectively demonstrates the value of Sartre's social philosophy.

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Terence Irwin and Gail Fine, trans.

Aristotle: Selections.

Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. 1995.

Pp. xxiii + 627.

US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-915145-68-5);

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-915145-67-7).

Ackrill's *A New Aristotle Reader* is excellent, but Irwin and Fine's newer reader is superior pedagogically. This superiority stems chiefly from the difference in the translations. The translations in Ackrill's reader 'have tried to keep close to the text in order to put the Greekless reader as nearly as possible in the position of a reader of Greek; they have tried not to incorporate too much interpretation into their renderings' (Ackrill, xi-xii). This style of translation turns the classroom into a second translation session; the teacher translates from the English that is Greek to the students into English they can understand.

Irwin and Fine assume much of this burden, bless them. They sometimes choose readings that do not require interpretation. Thus, instead of rendering the second sentence of *Categories* as 'both a man and a picture are animals,' they translate, 'both a man and a painted animal ... are animals homonymously,' thereby eliminating the first English to English translation lesson for students. A note explains that translation in enough detail so that you could construct Ackrill's alternative and make sense of it; indeed notes on every page are a second pedagogical advantage, for they often contain paraphrases to clarify Aristotle's meaning or make conclusions explicit which Aristotle thought too obvious to state. A third advantage is that the translators often fill out Aristotle's ellipses in their text, marking their interpolations with brackets. A fourth is their use of descriptive headings for the chapters and divisions within chapters, giving direction to the student's reading. To see the value of this feature, look at their chapter 13 of Book VII of *Metaphysics*. The chapter's divisions correspond to W.D. Ross's analysis in

his great commentary. The paragraphing reinforces the analysis. A fifth advantage is a 58-page glossary. Notes or asterisks mark words in the text that are explained in the glossary. This glossary also comes close to incorporating the virtues of the one pedagogically helpful feature of Ackrill's reader, his list of topics and topic references. A sixth advantage is that Irwin and Fine's translations do not conflict with one another in choice of English renderings.

I have not found them making many quirky choices; their work seems authoritative, as you would expect from Irwin and Fine. Specialists in Aristotle will find the translations embody numerous new and subtle points of interpretation to argue about, for example, *Metaph* 1036b28-9, where they are not obviously right. Did Aristotle say that an animal contrasts with a circle by its being a perceiver, or by its being an object of perception? If you can see the 'ik' in the Greek that only Irwin and Fine see, you too will pick the former alternative. Concise notes tip off the knowledgeable reader to such disputable items without disturbing the Greekless students.

Irwin and Fine's selections and Ackrill's overlap extensively, but not perfectly. Irwin and Fine select from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *On Ideas*, which Ackrill omits; but they omit selections from biological, meteorological, and psychological books that Ackrill includes, such as *On Memory and Recollection*. Anyone giving priority to coverage will choose Barnes's two-volume *Complete Works of Aristotle* over either of these readers. But the works that Irwin and Fine do translate provide ample coverage of Aristotle's thought.

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Paolo Leonardi and
Marco Santambrogio, eds.

On Quine: New Essays.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.

Pp. vi + 361.

US \$64.95. ISBN 0-521-47091-9.

This volume collects revisions of 19 papers from a 1990 conference at the University of San Marino, along with 14 pages of replies by Quine to selected essays. Characterized as essays on the foundation of cognitive and semiotic studies, the papers range widely over issues of interpretation, naturalized epistemology, ontology, propositional attitudes, modality, analyticity, quotation, mathematical truth, and natural deduction systems. (The other way to

phrase this is to say that what the essays have in common is having been given at the conference; traces of interaction are rare.) Their authors include both the usual suspects and European philosophers quite possibly unknown to a North American audience. Part of the point of the conference from which the papers derive was indeed to bring together philosophers in the so-called analytic and Continental traditions, based on the idea that, as the editors put it, many of Quine's ideas, 'utterly familiar to any reader of Quine, ought to ring more than one bell in the ears of Continental philosophers' (4), though they 'will be surprised to see how, starting from tenets rather close to their own, Quine yields quite different conclusions' (5). As I'm sure the editors would agree, this volume is not the place to look for such an exchange between traditions however; fewer Continental philosophers than expected attended the conference, and aside from Eco, 'Continental' as it occurs in 'Continental philosopher contributing to this volume' is a geographical adjective.

Although there is no unifying theme, there are some interesting connections among the essays. Here is but one. Davidson applauds Quine for coming to identify the sameness or relevant similarity involved in the idea that understanding a speaker of another language comes when one can 'systematically match up his own sentences with those of the alien speaker on the basis of the same or similar causes' not with the firing of the same (or close enough) nerve endings, assuming we can map sameness of nerve endings intersubjectively, but rather in terms of shared external circumstances: the rabbit, not shared patterns of stimulation. Stroud chides Quine for not doing so. Føllesdal joins them in arguing for the primacy of publicly observable objects and events. Quine *seems* to decline the praise or blame in his remarks. In one of the sections he indicates was prompted by Davidson's remarks, he characterizes the perceptual equivalence of two observation sentences in terms of association with the same range of neural intakes, where these in turn are defined in terms of a temporally ordered set of the firings of the subject's exteroceptors (349). On the other hand, proxy functions notwithstanding, he says that observations sentences 'remain linked to the original ranges of neural intakes,' and adds this: "The sentence "Gavagai," or "Lo, a rabbit," remains associated with the fluffy, hopping intrusion into the scene, and proxies to the winds' (351). Neural hits or rabbits, in the end?

Davidson traces various aspects of and changes in Quine's disquotational view of the truth predicate, to determine 'the extent to which disquotational truth is enmeshed, through the medium of translation, with untidy matters of meaning' (18). Eco chases the notion of interpretable content via some maps of Vanville 1953 and 1990, with little in common save the street layout and the famous brick house on Elm Street. Stroud worries whether the notion of working from within one's own language, conceptual scheme, etc., so central to so many of Quine's doctrines, can really be reconciled with Quine's claims concerning the indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference. Føllesdal touches on propositional attitudes among other topics, and continues to advocate the utility of what he calls genuine singular terms. van Fraassen comes to bury Quine's naturalized epistemology, though not

an interesting version of empiricism, while Gibson comes to praise it. Gibson's remarks are also relevant to the issues Davidson, Stroud, and Føllesdal raise. Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara and Giuliano Toraldo di Francia recommend an intensional semantics over Quine's preferred treatment of the nature of physical objects. Quantified modal logic and essentialism are treated by Castañeda and Mondadori.

A number of papers touch on or are wholly about propositional attitudes; Føllesdal's, Higgenbotham's, Andrea Bonomi's, Lepore and Loewer's, and Salmon's all concern these matters. I find these the most interesting papers in the book, and the issues they raise receive the lengthiest treatment in Quine's replies.

Leonardi and Ernesto Napoli question the theoretical utility of Quine's inclination to eliminate proper names, arguing that he has misunderstood their semantic role and that any account of the linguistic role of variables will be parasitic on that of names. Putnam reconsiders mathematical necessity, or Quine's view of it, voicing some doubts about Quine's view, and some sympathy for the Kantian doctrine that logic is prior to all rational activity. Boolos offers some delightful surprises concerning quotation (due to one of his former undergraduate students), and suggests a remedy that Quine seems to decline. This paper has the best jokes in the volume. Charles Parsons compares Quine and Gödel on analyticity, drawing on recently published texts of the latter. He suggests that aside from antipathy to the Vienna Circle's views, they share little on this matter. Carlo Cellucci finds fault with Quine's approach to natural deduction, relative to certain goals, though he also calls Quine's work a turning point in the history of natural deduction. Dirk Koppelberg argues that Quine and Wittgenstein (or at least Kripkenstein) have very different starting points and destinations, though both are skeptical of semantic facts.

Quine's replies are organized into sections on empathy and neural intake, ontological relativity, logical and mathematical truth, truth, quotation, propositional attitudes, and sets and classes. This last concerns a paper of Cocchiarella's published in *Synthese* in 1992 rather than in this volume — one Quine finds wrongheaded in some ways and bewildering in others. More often than not, the replies discuss the issues various papers raise rather than specific papers. The sections provide an opportunity for Quine to restate and to that extent clarify his views.

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Peter Loptson

Theories of Human Nature.

Peterborough: Broadview Press 1995.

Pp. x + 262.

Cdn \$14.95. ISBN 1-55111-061-X.

As its preface implies, *Theories of Human Nature* is best conceived as a university textbook. It describes eleven theories as responses to a standard philosophical question, 'what, if anything, is most deeply and generically true of human beings?' (1), which underlies many of the more specific questions students face in contemporary issues courses. To what extent, for example, is my identity bound up with my ethnicity or gender? Can we conceive humanity as different in kind from non-human species? Are advances in the science and technology of artificial intelligence running up against an unchangeable core of humanity? It is often difficult to get students to see that these questions can be discussed more profoundly by understanding the background theory or 'image' of humanity, as Loptson often puts it, from which answers are given. His approach, therefore, is well worth considering.

It works best in the last set of chapters, especially 9, 10 and 12 ('Darwin and Some Biological Successors,' 'Freud,' and 'Feminism'). These theories are internally diverse but Loptson maintains a clear line of thought by emphasizing the conceptual simplicity of Darwin's original theory and pure force of Freud's 'vision', and deftly exploiting the distinction between equality and difference feminists. There is nothing characteristic of an original essay which might attract Darwinian, Freudian or feminist scholars, though the introduction promised 'an essay on the idea adumbrated' as well as an exposition of a theory's 'fundamental components' and 'objections and criticisms' to it (10). Still, exposition comes closest here to providing a framework within which the distinctive 'coloration' or 'emotional tone' (12) of the world embodied in the relevant theory can be sensed. Although theoretical explication is his main point, moreover, it is easy to see how these chapters could enrich classroom discussion of Philip Rushton's racial theories, the concept of repressed memory, or the pornography and free speech issue.

Including Marvin Harris' theory of cultural materialism (chapter 13) in a set of eleven modern theories which excludes Hume and Nietzsche, might seem idiosyncratic to philosophers, and Loptson's account only deepens suspicion about the narrowness of Harris' image of humanity. Nevertheless, the book is also directed at Humanities courses and this chapter might connect with sociology and anthropology students. Chapter 11 ('Non-Self Theories') presents a different problem of choice. 'Non-self' theories, that is, are attributed to a wide range of thinkers (Hume, LaMettrie, J.B. Watson, Hans Vaihinger, Ryle, Daniel Dennett, etc.), but the commonality boils down to their all having participated in a radical critique of the notion of an abiding, unitary ego. Making this point is not worth the cost because exposition requires parachuting into dense metaphysical arguments at diverse historical junctures and obscures the strikingly contemporary, cybernetic image of

humanity mentioned in the chapter. Shifting from the more diffuse 'non-self' theory and focusing more sharply on the way Dennett and other connectionists have expressed (and John Searle has criticized) this specific theory might have been a better pedagogical strategy.

Unfortunately, subordinating manageable theories to slippery, generic ones mars much of the first part of the book. In chapter 4 ('Christian Philosophy of Human Nature'), Loftson's interpretation of Locke as 'a good early example of the modern Christian' (51) is interesting and plausible. His choice of theories (Christian, not Lockean), however, means dropping the insights into Locke and moving quickly to two pages on Butler, and then Kant. The latter is sufficient to show that 'the Kantian heart is deeply Christian,' but far too skimpy to support the existence of 'the modern Christian view of human beings' (63) which is supposed to unite them, especially when the conventional position that Locke and Kant hold deeply *divergent* theories of human nature is ignored. Chapter 5 ('Liberalism') and 6 ('Conservative Individualism') also never resolve the conflict between a desire to imbue the terms 'liberal' or 'conservative' with functional meaning, and the need to root them in the theories of a range of major thinkers who resist categorization.

Yet problems remain in the first half when theories *are* identified with specific thinkers. With Loftson's only pre-modern choice (chapter 3), 'a theory of human nature must be pieced together from scattered parts' of Aristotle's works (10). He identifies the thematic possibilities of friendship but this excellent idea is a last paragraph tag-on which leaves the body of the chapter looking like a tired set of textbook pros and cons for Aristotle's philosophy as a whole. Chapters 7 and 8 ('Rousseau' and 'Marx') fit more comfortably with the main criterion for inclusion, namely, theories formulated after Newton's *Principia* had made a science of human nature a defining Enlightenment project. By contrast with the accounts of Darwin, Freud and feminism, however, the more one probes, the more the exposition itself becomes suspect. One example is that the difference between the rustic communal harmony which Rousseau does conceive in the *Second Discourse* as 'a sort of Eden' (102) is consistently conflated with the solitary, natural condition which precedes it. Another is the heavy emphasis on Marx (and Hegel's) 'organicism' without even mentioning the *dialectical* thinking which both thinkers use to criticize organic development.

The conclusion, and jargon-ridden preliminary chapter 2 make clear that Loftson's method is taxonomical: 'we might say ... that the so-called materialists (cultural/historical materialists) and the so-called idealists (also of cultural/historical stripe) are really both of them operational or methodological dualists' (26). But the technical tools for classifying theories (such as emic/etic and synchronic/diachronic) are rarely used, and some are vaguely defined (Apollinian/Dionysian) or plain puzzling (Californian/New England) to begin with. Ironically, the eleven theories were chosen partly because they could engage a contemporary audience. Yet the taxonomical method undermines what is living in them, and convoluted style often complicates modest

claims: 'There is strength, always, in numbers, and seeing others whom you respect and take seriously in like case with yourself can — clearly for many does — consolidate and fortify a continuing Christian perspective in the contemporary world' (64). Although good teachers might vivify these theories, the book is not likely to send undergraduates on the 'odyssey of self-exploration' (258) Loftson earnestly intends for them.

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**Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff,
eds. and trans.**

Plato's Phaedrus.

Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company
1995. Pp. xlii + 94.

US \$27.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-221-6);

US \$5.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-220-8).

This is a welcome book for everyone from seasoned scholars to college freshmen. The centerpiece is a superb translation that captures the rhetorical brilliance of the Greek. The book has the same admirable physical presentation and reasonable price that one expects of Hackett volumes. (Nehamas and Woodruff also collaborated on an edition of *Plato's Symposium*, published previously by Hackett.)

The translation is faithful in the very best sense: it reflects both the meaning and the beauty of the Greek text. This is a great achievement: even other good translations sound stilted by comparison. Peculiarities of the Greek which cannot be captured in the translation itself without violence to the English are explained in footnotes.

The footnotes are always helpful, never obtrusive. A one-page outline is useful since there are no editorial additions to mark major divisions in the dialogue. An appendix containing fragments of early Greek love poetry helps the reader appreciate the rich, and perhaps elusive, meaning of *erōs*, the topic of the brilliant speeches of the first half of the dialogue. The bibliography provides a good brief summary of scholarship on the *Phaedrus*.

The thirty-eight page introduction gives a reasonably comprehensive background to the dialogue. The entire introduction is crisply written, and the authors' erudition shines throughout, without a trace of pedantry. The authors address many of the major interpretative questions raised by the dialogue. They convincingly argue that rhetoric is the linchpin of the dialogue's thematic unity, and they indicate several ways in which the speeches

on *erōs* contribute to this central theme. Thus it is surprising that the *Gorgias*, the other great dialogue on rhetoric, is virtually ignored in the introduction (the footnotes do a better job of relating the two works). The authors also claim that when he wrote the dialogue Plato did not accept key theses of Socrates Great Speech (243e-57b). The case here is far less convincing. They weakly suggest that the visual metaphors in the Great Speech indicate a theory incompatible with the method of collection and division later in the dialogue. Much of their case rests on the contents of the *Parmenides* and other later dialogues, but they do not explain why one should read these later thoughts back into the *Phaedrus*. Finally, they suggest (xlv) that the theory of Forms led Plato to philosophy. Plato's own dialogues seem to suggest the reverse: Socrates led Plato to a life of philosophy wherein he developed the theory of Forms.

Overall this is an excellent book that deservedly should find wide circulation for many years to come.

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Adam Zachary Newton

Narrative Ethics.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

1995. Pp. xi + 335.

US \$39.95. ISBN 0-764-60087-8.

Narrative Ethics undertakes an important and compelling project: not to study ethics in narrative, or to investigate the ethics of narrative, but to regard narrative itself as a mode of ethical relation, and thereby to see 'the ethical consequences of narrating story and fictionalizing person, and the reciprocal claims binding teller, listener, witness, and reader in that process' (11). In short, Adam Newton proposes to examine the ethical consequences of the act of narrative telling. His allies are an unlikely trio of thinkers: Stanley Cavell, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Emmanuel Levinas. Cavell provides Newton with a rich thematics of acknowledgment as an ethical response to the limits of cognitive claims asserted with respect to other persons. Bakhtin lends nuance to the notion of intersubjectivity as a domain of ethical relations, carried out through a very innovative discussion of the 'dialogics' of the utterance. And Levinas contributes a distinctive understanding of the ethical implications of what it means, given the finitude of our condition, to 'face' others and texts.

These resources are marshalled as alternatives to the competing projects of deconstruction, narratology, and neo-humanism. Newton argues that narratology remains caught in a formalism that deprives it of the opportunity to establish alliances between narrative's categorical properties and the ethical domain of life. Neo-humanism, as a response to deconstruction, is attached to an unjustifiable notion of subjectivity as an interior space that is opaque to theoretical analysis. (The question Newton poses is how one can advance an ethics of intersubjectivity that avoids this fate.) Deconstruction is seen as an act of 'bad faith' where arrogance masquerades as rigor. Operating with these tools, Newton reads texts by Conrad, Anderson, James, Crane, Melville, Wright, Dickens, Barnes, and Ishiguro. The readings are subtle. They demonstrate the increasingly rare virtue of critical 'tact' and show a sometimes remarkable critical intelligence. The conceptual basis of this book is somewhat more problematic.

As far as narrative is concerned, Newton concentrates on the problem of telling ('saying'). Though Newton does not theorize it in these terms, this results in an understanding of narrative as a mode of articulation that is fundamentally dramatic in nature. (Not surprising, then, to find that Bakhtin and Cavell both work so well in this book.) As far as philosophy is concerned, Newton says that the intent of his book is to show how the literary text can extend and develop a philosophical problem by placing it in a new light (67), but he also wants to show how texts perform these problems by locating narratively embedded performances. Here his own stance comes remarkably close to the deconstructive posture he rejects. But if a narrative ethics is principally a matter of dialogic or dramatic intersubjectivity, if the problems of intersubjectivity are foregrounded in the performance of narrative, then how can it also be said that the relationship between literature and ethics is thematic? Newton wants to claim both. Other difficulties arise. For instance, the analysis of the ethics of narrative in terms of reading is allowed to displace the more powerful and convincing conceptions of 'voice' and 'face,' without any sustained discussion of how reading involves or avoids performance. At one point narrative ethics is characterized in terms of 'the sheer fact of limit, of separateness, of boundary' (26), but in the very next paragraph we are told that ethics is a matter of representational frames held in common. These things may both be true, but how? Elsewhere, the view that ethics is a matter of (intersubjective) relation is betrayed by the introduction of the notion of force, which Newton finds himself obliged to invite into his readings. And given that in one case 'force is ethics' (114) and that ethics is 'coercion,' 'desperation,' and 'interruption,' it remains unclear just what mode of relationship could not be qualified as ethical.

Newton's gambit in this project is indeed to say what ethics does not involve, but in a methodological rather than a qualitative sense. 'Ethics' excludes both practical problem-solving and exemplification (Aristotle and humanism), and a normative conception of human agency based upon freely willed action (Kant). But in the process of situating ethics in the realm of 'recursive, contingent, and interactive dramas of encounter and recognition'

(12), it becomes apparent that there is a crucial text on ethics that Newton neglects to read: Hegel on recognition in the desire-driven dialectic of 'master' and 'slave.' Dealing with Hegel might have allowed Newton to introduce the psychological considerations that Cavell brings to bear upon the drama of acknowledgment and avoidance. In its absence, who can say whether any conception of the contingency of ethical relations could resist being drawn toward the empty formalism of narratology or the thematics of neo-humanism?

Herein lies what I regard as the principal challenge posed by this wide-ranging and often subtle work: to characterize ethics in relation to narrative in such a way that it would neither yield an empty formalism nor be so bound to theme or style that its particularities could not be generalized. Newton rightly rejects both narratology and neo-humanism. This leaves a wide range of deconstructive and anti-foundational stances that he cannot quite manage to distinguish from his own project. This is fortunate enough, for together they invite a mapping of the indeterminacy of their own conception of the ethical with respect to categories like 'form' and 'theme.' Respecting the contingency of ethics demands the same deconstruction of these categories that Newton undertakes. What attention to the performance of narrative can show is how to avoid a premature foreclosure of the contingency or indeterminacy of these relations. Newton's remarks in the 'Conclusion' on interruption and the demand to think the infinite help make this point. Indeed, the challenge of thinking of 'ethics' as Newton does lies in sustaining sufficient resistance to the categories through which literature is customarily theorized. Not surprisingly in this light, the power of this work lies in its descriptions of acts of telling in particular texts more than in its theoretical armature. But since Newton sits squarely on one side of the division that Lukács characterized in the essay 'Narrate or Describe?' it is not surprising to find that description remains an under-theorized category in this work.

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Kai Nielsen

On Transforming Philosophy: A Metaphilosophical Inquiry.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc. 1995. Pp. xiv + 289.
US \$65.00. ISBN 0-8133-0666-3.

It's appropriate that a distinguished polymath philosopher should, at the emeritus stage of his career, write a book on 'metaphilosophy': on what philosophy can and should do. The book jacket announces this as an important contribution to the 'end of philosophy debate,' and so it is. I'm sorry to see Nielsen encouraging the lynch-mob, however.

Part I is an attack on the possibility of speculative metaphysics, conceived as general *a priori* synthetic claims: there's a moderate neo-Quinian attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction, and some reasonable doubts about philosophers' abilities to say anything true about the necessary structure of everything. Part II offers a Moorean common-sense defense against skepticism, and an attack on traditional epistemological foundationalism. Nielsen concludes that metaphysics and epistemology should no longer be taken to be the dominant core of philosophy. Perhaps he's right that they can't be the basis of *everything* philosophical, but the ep/met positions he dismisses are not all there is to these fields. Over the past thirty years, almost nobody in epistemology or metaphysics has been doing anything like the narrow sorts of things Nielsen criticizes; and almost everyone has already taken to heart the general morals Nielsen offers (e.g.: beware of the simpleminded and rigid fact/value, fact/theory, and fact/meaning distinctions). Most epistemologists and metaphysicians agree with Nielsen that there is no synthetic *a priori*, and that knowledge is not based on incorrigible sense-data statements; but few will buy his conclusion that therefore ep/met should be consigned to the trash bin. And it surely does not follow that once one has gotten rid of ep/met, all that's left is 'moral-social-political' philosophy.

In Part III, Nielsen treats political/moral philosophy, and advises us to concentrate on 'the problems of our time' (pollution, nationalism, exploitation, the failure of educational institutions, etc.) and to ignore the foundations here too. He argues that we should abandon meta-ethics and normative theory in favour of a 'modest Dewian contextualism.' The approach he advocates and gives some small samples of seems to me to amount to no more than what every smart non-philosopher does when discussing ethics and politics. Of course this is a valuable activity; but where's the *philosophy*?

Nielsen's view, in general, is that philosophy as second-order inquiry is worthless. One reason advanced at various points is that it does not seem to make any progress: fads come and go, but no permanent consensus is reached. I think this impression may be to some degree false, arising because philosophers debate only what is debatable. Nielsen points out that there is no permanent philosophical methodology for deciding second-order questions. But this is true in every area of inquiry; and it does not follow that there is no methodology worth pursuing. (The changing nature of philosophical methodology is more visible in philosophy than elsewhere because the

methodology of anything is a second-order topic, so philosophers discuss it more than others.) Another argument he frequently advances is that second-order matters are irrelevant to first-order discussions. Often, of course, they are, but not always. Even in practical ethics (the area in which Nielsen argues at length about this issue) I think there are sometimes first-order consequences to second-order considerations; but perhaps more often in other areas, in mathematics, science, linguistics, politics, art, literature ...

In the preface, Nielsen states that he's aiming this book at middle-level undergraduates and up. Though the writing style is appropriate for undergraduates — very clear and repetitive — I'd think it would be a mistake to use this in an undergraduate class, because students need to do a whole lot of philosophy before they're equipped to deal critically with a wholesale rejection of most of its traditional areas. Besides, this book would be preaching to the mostly converted. His position is not unheard of. Many students are nowadays all too willing to consign large segments of the traditional philosophical study to the flames, and to concentrate instead on anti-theoretical treatment of the 'problems of our times.' This book will only reinforce that view.

Maybe that is a good thing. There are days when I think too that most of philosophy is not a suitable activity for adults. On other days I think that philosophy may be of some use, either for its practical effects on the first-order disciplines which it meta-considers, or else merely as the treatment of the higher-order questions which the most reflective people inevitably ask. The kind of first-order, non-theoretical treatment of 'moral-social-political' questions Nielsen thinks is the only worthwhile philosophical activity is what good journalists with no philosophical training do. If Nielsen is right, then my beginning undergraduates are right too when they confidently assure me that everyone's got their own philosophy. If he's right, then the hard parts of philosophy — the parts it takes years to learn how to do — the theoretical and technical parts — are useless. The only use Nielsen seems to allow the practice of traditional philosophy is its encouragement of habits of clarity and perspicuity; but a look at the turgid swamp in philosophy journals (Nielsen constantly advocates empirical study!) casts grave doubts on this. Then it might as well die.

Finally, some trivialities. Nielsen has a tendency to write awkward comma-infested sentences, e.g., 'Cultures, under modern conditions, need, or at least seem to need, states reflecting their interests, but often that is impossible and, where possible, it is *sometimes* (where, for example, there is a considerable mix of cultures living together in a given territory), all things considered, undesirable.' Westview's copy-editor should have suggested changes here, and should have noticed lots of little things like 'visa-versa' (24), 'Riemanian and Lobachevakian' (66), 'prolegemna' (146), 'therapy' (195), 'rubble' (198), 'limpidity' where the opposite is meant (61), 'demure' for 'demur' (45), and on and on. A good copy-editor is hard to find these days.

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W. Gunther Plaut

Asylum: A Moral Dilemma.

Westport, CT: Praeger 1995. Pp. 151.

US \$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-275-95195-2);

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-275-95196-0).

In 1984, the Canadian government asked Rabbi Plaut to make a study of refugee problems. Ten years later, authorized by the Centre for Refugee Studies at York University in Toronto, Plaut's history, current practices, and conceptual dilemmas of asylum cannot be overestimated in its brilliance, insights, common sense, and moral sensitivity.

Historically, grounds for offering or withholding asylum have generally been political, with religious undercurrents where the latter are construed as unpopular or disruptive. Normally, an individual or a well-defined minority suffers persecution or expulsion. Catholic/Protestant hatred, wars, and non-tolerance decrees in the 16th century furnish the modern enormity we are familiar with. Asylum and extradition reciprocities have roots in ancient Hittite treaties. Greek and Hebrew civilizations practiced sanctuary for the runaway slave, the accused criminal, the stranger run afoul of inhospitable abuse. No fewer than 30 Biblical references attest to the importance of asylum to the Hebrew's conscience, later adopted by Christians and paralleled in Islam. Hospitality to the outsider or the innocently accused 'finds its overriding principles enunciated by or ascribed to the Divinity' (18). But asylum is important for practical reasons as well: to save a wanderer from the misfortunes of the desert is to invite reciprocity should the unhappy condition fall, later on, to one's own lot.

Today, though, refugee destitution is no longer limited to identifiable victims of political dislike. '...after World War II, refugee movements became worldwide' — and after the Holocaust, intolerance for genocidal cruelties became paramount.

Besides his wide-ranging survey of the issues defining asylum and its central ramifications, Plaut examines special problems resulting from internal displacements (the right not to become a refugee, that is, to be forced to leave one's home or to sacrifice the protection of one's own government). He devotes separate sections to asylum in the Americas, the Asiatic nations, Africa, the Near and Middle East, Europe, and Central America. He examines the historical and current ideas of the major religions on the plight of the homeless wayfarer, the issue of settlement versus integration, the still viable sanctuary movement of the 80s in the United States and Canada, civil initiative (disobedience), and the paradoxical explanation for why poor nations, notably the African, show deeper sentiment and more liberal attitudes to rescue than rich nations.

Without bias or utopianism, Plaut sets out the facts that dismiss solutions born more of impulsive sympathy than of careful reflection, but with hope and vision for moral solutions to moral problems. Both practical and moral responses to unprecedented worldwide homelessness tax our century. Plaut

holds that a root contradiction endemic to the refugee problem is this: Universal morality dictates that suffering must where possible be relieved. Yet this command is starkly contradicted by jurisdictional sovereignty whose border logic, all else being equal, is to exclude.

This is because communities have inalienable rights to self-definition and the integrity of their culture. Moreover, if the first duty of governments is to their citizenry, the right to refuse entry cannot be seen, *prima facie*, as inefficacious or immoral. Reinforcing this collective right is xenophobia, a human propensity to distrust the outsider, the one who doesn't belong: '...refugee acceptance runs against ingrained human structures...Spreading out the welcome mat is something we have to learn, similar to accepting the restrictive demands of religions, which run counter to biological impulses' (68-9). Hence if the right to leave is self-evident despite irrational exceptions such as the East German Communist murders of Berlin Wall escapees, the right to return is a bit less so, and the right to immigrate must be open to case-by-case examination of the willingness of nations to receive.

National or community rights are exacerbated at any given time by prejudices and by citizens' perceptions that, say, their resources and territory are limited, their employment or income is jeopardized, populations are too large, or a fear that civic disorders may result from too rapid an influx of those who are different. These reasonable concerns can be dealt with, Plaut convinces us, by calling upon moral and religious traditions and directives to influence, upon the natural sympathy of human nature, and especially upon vigorous and sustained education. Moral persuasion regarding refugee facilitation is further enhanced by recognizing that because of today's global interdependence, any one nation's refugee problem is ultimately every nation's problem. Its proportions are such that the international community cannot blink it away, even though a solution to any single refugee perplexity may best be directed to a specific nation. The idea is to show that often higher principles can combat the inexorable logic of national sovereignty that may willfully exclude.

Hence even while challenged by internal hardships that certain nations face, the scope of *nonrefoulement* — the generally accepted imperative not to return an exile or escapee to his place of persecution — has, today, been enlarged. Basic human rights are understood to furnish morally sufficient grounds for serious consideration of sanctuary to any exiled or displaced person, or indeed, as today, to huge masses of the homeless. Humanity's response to the suffering of the expelled, the unwanted, the stateless, the threatened — stands firmly on the universal rights that natural law has spawned. Such rights are not violated only by transgressions of political or religious freedom. International and national legislation and legal decisions on refugee policy now more generously look at natural disasters, wars, ethnic hostilities, economic hardship, and even gender abuse as grounds for refugee admissions. Nevertheless, while the definition of asylum widens, regulations in many areas are tightening or closing. (Germany, for example, has recently made a wide arc from a nearly exceptionless permission to enter, to a strict

curtailment of entry.) In the West, public opinion is becoming ambiguous. In the East and Middle East, cultural or religious homogeneity is seen as threatened.

The metaphor of the 'global village' that Plaut suggests is a dangerous one, however, and really is not necessary. Even as nations take on an international orientation, the slogan fosters misleading implementations that nations may never be ready for. Plaut does not argue for a centrist solution to the problem of alien dislocation, but users of 'global village' often mean so to argue. That a problem is ubiquitous or 'international' does not imply that its resolutions or their assumptions must be collectively resolved. To think of ourselves as a *global* village merely blows up the notion of a community to unmanageable — indeed, bizarre — proportions. It distorts our innate and evolutionary kinship preferences for living with our own kind, and our apparent evolved tendency to group ourselves in small units that can without contention share values, projects, and goals. The slogan contradicts essential and salutary loyalties to one's traditions and nation. The compromises and concessions that real village members make to each other on behalf of unity, peace, order, and security cannot be realized globally. Fraternity, easy camaraderie, good will, language, and customs distinct and homogeneous to a culture and natural to village life should not be expected to prevail in the large urban culture where aliens generally flood in.

There are other ways to encourage hospitality to the displaced than through the falsehood that an equal loyalty to anyone is morally no different from loyalty to one's family, friends, and compatriots. Surely there is no reason why individuals cannot have both a national and ethnic or religious preference, even a strong one, and still carry a cosmopolitan outlook on what one owes to the stranger. The key is never to forget how important it is that the individual always matters. In being human, we owe at least minimum civility and succor to anyone in distress.

Plaut is surely correct in reminding us what history attests to: the intercultural pluralism resulting from migrant admission and hospitality is good for most groups that have the foresight, toleration, and confidence to foster it. Temporary inconveniences are the 'small evil' that great, large, and lasting goods must endure. The best solutions, as Plaut recommends, are to end the primary causes of wandering peoples: the gross abuses of rights in their home countries. Who has his rights respected cannot want to leave. Who respects the rights of another cannot want to force him to leave. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 1993, writes, '...safeguarding human rights is the best way to prevent conditions that force people to become refugees; respect for human rights is a key element in the protection of refugees in their country of asylum; and improved observance of human rights standards is often critical for the solution of refugee problems by enabling refugees to return safely home...' (88).

The disposition of the British citizens of Chinese extraction will, in 1997 when Beijing assumes control of Hong Kong, tax our moral ingenuity. Quebec

separatists and the voluntary leavings or feared potential expulsions are taxing it right now. There is much ahead to think about, much to engage.

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C.G. Prado

Starting With Foucault:

An Introduction to Genealogy.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1995.

Pp. ix + 181.

US \$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-1790-8);

US \$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-1791-6).

'Not another book on Foucault!' — so titles Rudi Visker's preface to the recent translation (1995, Verso) of his first published *Genealogie als Kritik: Michel Foucault* (1991, Verlag). And indeed, there is yet another still.

We can now add Carlos G. Prado's latest effort to the already extensive array of works wherein intellectuals engage the complex and delicate task of critically over-viewing Foucault's life's work. Prado's book is no doubt a continuation of ideas first developed in his engaging introductory text, *Descartes and Foucault: A Contrastive Introduction* (1992, Ottawa). But, while many writers (G. Gutting [1989], H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow [1983], J. Bernauer [1990], and Rudi Visker [1990] — to name but a very few) attempt to understand Foucault's penetrating analysis by disassembling his often ambiguous legacies in quasi-chronological assessments of early archaeologies, only thus contextualizing a ground for understanding the later, closely linked, genealogical method, Prado distinguishes his own book by beginning precisely with the genealogical. He does this by engaging '... [Foucault's] central and most productive ideas' (11) which, Prado claims, come to full prominence in *Discipline and Punish (DP)* (1975) and *Volume One — The History of Sexuality (HS)* (1976). Written during the (unfortunately termed) 'middle stage' of Foucault's career, these volumes are arguably his finest full-length studies, and together constitute a water-mark in 20th-century intellectual *askesis*. Foucault's uniquely prescribed 'genealogical analytic' (11) (Prado's term is much better than 'interpretive analytics', a term used in the seminal 1983 study by Dreyfus and Rabinow, the latter of which smacks too much of an hermeneutical approach attributable to Foucault) constructs an investigation '... concerned with how the development of discursive practices and interactive conventions produce truth and knowledge and so shape and define subjects and subjectivity' (11).

Although many would benefit from its lucid and untrammelled exposition, Prado has not engaged his task for theorists already immersed in contemporary critical studies and continental philosophy. Prado has specifically pledged his effort to ‘... those who have not read or have only dipped into Foucault’s writings’ (4). As such, he attempts ‘... both to provide an introduction to [Foucault’s] genealogy and to dispel — misconceptions and misinterpretations’ (5). It is the inspired strength of Prado’s work that it locates Foucault’s philosophic import through an exegesis of *DP* and *HS*, rather than through *The Order of Things* or *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. The latter texts, centred as they are around linguistic and epistemological topics, are often considered by many analytic philosophers, to be closer to a proper theoretical ‘hygiene’ than those texts whose value resides in an apparently conspicuous alterity. It is Prado’s aim to overturn this misconception by introducing analytic philosophy to the important challenges of the central Foucauldian, genealogical critique. ‘The point of Foucault’s work is to provide productive genealogies of accepted conclusions, assumptions, methods, and objectives, and of any established system of truth and knowledge in order to understand how the elements of such systems ... developed and came to constitute truth and knowledge’ (111).

Of the seven chapters that make up this book, chapters one and two contextualize Foucault’s critical reception within the analytic world, particularly with respect to the ossified debate between analytic and continental traditions. An avowed Nietzschean (and Heideggerian), Foucault is often dismissed, in a rather facile manner, as a postmodern thinker in league with the likes of Derrida and Lyotard. His thorough going historicism is taken as a sign of historical skill rather than an engaged philosophic seriousness. Together with his apparent relativism and subordination of truth, knowledge and rationality to specific historical practices and discursive constructions, his work is rejected for abandoning governing standards for intellectual inquiry (18).

By foregrounding genealogy, and the critique that a genealogical analytics substantiates, Prado attempts to introduce how and why Foucault questioned these supposedly indubitable ‘governing standards’, and provides Foucault’s analysis of the question: how is it that we have come to take truth, knowledge and rationality, in some specific forms rather than others, as universally secure and proper criteria for governing our engagement with the world?

The concept of genealogy begins to be unpacked in the latter stages of the second chapter, and more fully in the third, wherein Prado discusses Foucault’s famous methodological transition from archaeology to genealogy. Genealogy’s priority to archaeology resides in its capacity to constantly render attempts at objectivity and the determination of constant and universal criteria subject to the historical contingency of practical and discursive formation. Archaeology was the primary method by which Foucault was able to reject structuralism’s atomistic distillation of essential discursive elements from which a whole was to be constructed. For Foucault, ‘... [a]rchae-

ology goes wrong when it turns into a theory about how things are and pretends to transcend its historical situatedness and discover hidden determinants underlying phenomena' (28). Archaeology does, however, become entangled in many of the same problems that Foucault claimed plagued structuralism. Too often, archaeology results in an '... ill conceived objectivization of discourse as a holistic determinant of cognitive and social practices, and an ultimately ruinous "neglect of the way discursive practices are themselves affected by the social practices in which they and the investigator are embedded"' (28). Genealogy differs from archaeology in its investigation of that which conditions, limits and institutionalizes discursive formations (30). 'Genealogy must analyze the descent and emergence of morals, ideals and metaphysical concepts in order to show them and their like to be neither discovered truths, nor pre-ordained developments, but rather the conglomeration of blind forces' (38).

Prado's third chapter develops the 'core of genealogical analytics' through an examination of Foucault's important essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', wherein Foucault acknowledges his intellectual debt to Nietzsche. Like Nietzsche, Foucault reconfigures how history, reason and truth should be thought. '[R]ather than providing synthesis and discernment of unity, history is only the painstaking tracking of complexity and disparity' (34). Foucault's nihilism is significant and not to be overlooked in North American tendencies to 'proffer positive interpretations' (39). It is from his nihilist, Nietzschean reading of history that Foucault constructs a picture of '... intellectual inquiry as essentially practices, the governing standards of which are thoroughly historical and the actual workings of which are masked from their participants' (43). And it is from this practice oriented historicity of inquiry that the positive, conditioning, and relational concept of power finds its generative applicability.

Chapters four and five deal specifically with *DP* and *HS* and concentrate on how power constructs how we understand subjectivity, truth and knowledge structures. Each contains excellent exegetical discussions of '... how power forms subjects by disciplining individuals to believe themselves to be persons having a certain nature' (88). The ethico-genealogical impetus behind *DP* and *HS* is appropriated within genealogy's intent to provide an enriched, empowered and amplified alterity through the problematization of accepted knowledge and truth (114). Prado also emphasizes the constellation, or *dispositif*, of power, knowledge, and truth, and reveals how relations between historically contingent constructions are constituted by, and continually reconstitute, discursive praxis with respect to how we view ourselves as subjects and agents.

Foucault's important contributions to theorizing the concept of truth are especially useful for philosophers of language and epistemology. Prado develops in generous detail five interactive 'faces' of truth developed in Foucault's work. Relativist, constructivist, perspectival, experiential and semi-objectivist (common-sense) notions of truth are each explained and interrelated in distinct sections. That truth, for Foucault, is relative to

discourse, produced in discourse by power-relations (122), and defines how we understand epistemic agency, is not a foreign notion for most readers. That it is given more due than furtive dismissal is another matter.

Foucault's discourse-relativism is given careful attention in the first three sections on truth in an attempt to emphasize truth's criterial function in generating and sustaining discourse (134). Prado's welcome reading of an experiential notion of truth illuminates the important ethical subtext in *DP* and *HS*, and provides a useful bridge to considering the post-'76 ethical writings. 'When we try to grasp what it is that makes sentences true, we get a hold of discourses, power and subjectivity defining experiences' (150).

Prado's final chapter touches upon the motivating ethos within Foucault's work. In reading these final few pages, it is clear that Prado has informed his exegesis of Foucault in light of an attempt to bring to his intended audience an awareness of the profound ethico-critical impact Foucault's work has for a tradition all too often unreflectively aware of its own exclusionary and edifying practices. *Starting with Foucault* interprets, in a wonderfully instructive and clear voice, one of the most profound and challenging critiques of an accepted tradition.

Criticisms? While Prado's exegesis of Foucauldian genealogy is to be admired and studied, one flaw with the text may be its often unstated generalization of exactly just what falls under the rubric 'analytic philosophy.' Prado seemingly generalizes that analytic philosophy can adequately be characterized as foundationalist, correspondence theorist, realist, non-contextualist, and always reductionist. For example — '... [t]he contrast [between analytics and Foucault] is ... between those who conceive of themselves as employing a methodology governed by objective standards, and a thinker who considered every appeal to an objective standard to be a constitutive move in the production of a set of norm setting practices' (19); or again, '... [a]nalytic philosophy is characterized by a conception of rationality as necessarily prior to all intellectual inquiry and as transcending historical, disciplinary, and cultural contexts' (18). Well yes, ... and no. This needs cashing out, and in the end is perhaps a little unfair to the Davidsons, Quines, Deweys, Wittgensteins, and, perhaps, even Habermas' of this world.

A sufficiently subtle exegesis of the many forms the analytic approach takes (ex. naturalist epistemology, pragmatism, feminist epistemology, etc ...) appears to be necessary in selling the seemingly 'radical' (12) constructivism of Foucault, especially since the avowed aim of Prado's book is to critically engage an analytic methodology. Prado's intended audience might read with interest his Foucauldian analysis, and yet leave it thinking that the book over-generalizes and oversimplifies analytic philosophy, and therefore wouldn't apply to them. Such a reaction would be characteristic and unfortunate. Herein lies one great problem of how we can create an effective dialogue between two distinct conceptual traditions, and yet maintain an authenticity and integrity in our critical appraisal of respective conceptualizations. It is no longer enough to simply refer (even though we all do, perhaps because our present vocabulary may not provide us with much choice) to the

now semantically vague generalizations of analytic or continental. Perhaps we can look forward to a future Prado volume that sufficiently addresses this apparent shortcoming with the subtlety and integrity brought to his study of Foucault.

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Michael Redhead

From Physics to Metaphysics.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.

Pp. xiii + 92.

US \$29.95. ISBN 0-521-47405-1.

In 1916 George Edward Turner gave Trinity College, Cambridge funds to establish 'a lectureship on the philosophy of the sciences and the relations or want of relations between the different departments of knowledge.' Alfred North Whitehead delivered the inaugural course of Turner Lectures in the autumn of 1919 and published those lectures in *The Concept of Nature* (1920). His concern was to develop a unified philosophy of the natural sciences made urgent by Einstein's theory of relativity.

Now at the near close of the twentieth century, the question of the relation between the different departments of knowledge, specifically physics and philosophy, is addressed again in Michael Redhead's Turner Lectures, *From Physics to Metaphysics*. Redhead sees his task as twofold: to defend a rational and realist view of science, and to assess the prospects for a Theory of Everything, or TOE, just beyond the quest for Grand Unification Theories. In this manner, he attempts to provide a non-technical discursive account of the interrelatedness of physics and metaphysics. He says that he wants 'to approach the philosophy of physics in an even-handed way, recognizing elements of truth in the reciprocal caricatures, but mainly in an attempt to remove the deep-seated misunderstandings between scientists and philosophers' (2).

In his first chapter, Redhead weaves his discussion of various 'isms and schisms' around the theory of quantum chromodynamics, or QCD. As a typical example of modern theoretical physics, Redhead claims (8) that physicists do not accept QCD or the theory of quarks as true in any final sense. There are too many problems associated with the general interpretation of quantum mechanics and the infinite renormalizations required in the QCD theory. As for quarks themselves, physicists realize the general problem

of indirect observation in particle physics and the special problem of quark confinement (since unlike other particles, quarks cannot be experimentally separated from the nucleon). QCD is only proposed for the purposes of theoretical modelling of phenomena. Yet at the same time, physicists, in their unreflective and intuitive attitude towards their work, are realists about quarks and their interactions; the conjecture allows them to get a 'handle on reality.'

Redhead then moves to the various positions of contemporary philosophy to demonstrate how the actual practice of physicists supports the realist against the 'incoherent absurdities' of the relativists, irrationalists and social constructivists. He rejects foundationalism on the basis that no candidate for a foundation of knowledge has survived philosophical scrutiny, yet he accepts a minimalist version of the correspondence theory of truth since it is presupposed in the physicist's attempt to determine how experimental evidence provides degrees of support or confirmation for our conjectures. Redhead finds that Popper had the right approach to what the physicist actually does with the exception that Popper emphasized the negative control of experimentation with his theory of falsifiability rather than verifiability or confirmation.

In his defense of a realist metaphysics, Redhead attempts to disabuse the reader of the idea that references to the observer in relativity theory, statistical mechanics or quantum mechanics have anything to do with any subjective awareness of human perceivers. Interpretations to the contrary have sought to demonstrate that the realist position in physics is undermined from within physics itself because the observer is brought into the central role of creating his own reality. Redhead attempts to avoid the epistemological quandaries of modern philosophy, i.e., solipsism, skepticism, by showing that registration of pointer readings and the like should not be confused with self-conscious subjective awareness. He then examines in some detail how findings in quantum mechanics support his realist thesis.

The fashionable but rather naive hopes for a Theory of Everything occupy Redhead for the remainder of this book. Since the 1960s, Grand Unification Theories have waxed and waned, from unification of all particles and forces to the latest proposal of superstrings. Redhead compares the search for the final theory, the TOE, with the search for the Holy Grail. The claim that physics is nearing the end has been made by the leading luminaries in physics for the past hundred years. But the end of physics, he claims (86), 'is a receding horizon.' On this issue, Redhead says that he dares to turn to the philosophers of science for the more sensible view of scientific progress. His arguments for his skeptical conclusion involve problems with the inherent indeterminism of quantum mechanics, reductionism, underdetermination of theory, and practical considerations of limited resources required to maintain the exploration of space in high-energy physics.

Redhead recognizes problems with the realist position but does not address these problems or engage opponents in any thorough manner. This present book is far too brief to explore fully these kinds of issues. What I

found particularly rewarding about Redhead's treatment of his subject is his defense of what is sometimes called a 'naturalized' metaphysics, that the most plausible form of metaphysics is one that grows out of direct acquaintance with the natural sciences — in this case, the complexities of theoretical physics.

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*Aesthetic Criteria: Gombrich and the
Philosophies of Science of Popper and Polanyi.*
Atlanta, GA: Editions Rodopi BV 1994. Pp. 152.
US \$50.00. ISBN 90-5183-618-X.

This book is based on Richmond's doctoral dissertation. Its declared purpose is to 'evaluate E.H. Gombrich's critique of aesthetics from the standpoint of Karl Popper's epistemology as developed in his *Logic of Scientific Discovery*.' Richmond argues that despite there being analogies between Popper and Gombrich's history and psychology of art, there is a disanalogy when it comes to aesthetics which may be turned into an analogy with Polanyi's critique of the methodology of science. As Polanyi may be subjected to a critique from a Popperian standpoint, so may Gombrich's critique of aesthetics. Thus a Popperian aesthetics is possible. Consequently, Joseph Agassi, on the back cover of the book, declares that although 'in the psychology of art and related matters Gombrich is an avowed follower of the rationalist philosophy of science of Sir Karl Popper, in aesthetics proper he follows ideas first propounded in the irrationalist philosophy of science of Michael Polanyi.'

The book is ostensibly methodical in its approach, making point by point analogies and disanalogies between Popper and Gombrich in the key areas of 'methodological individualism', the 'zero method' and 'situational logic'. All of these concepts were, of course, rehearsed by Gombrich in 'The Logic of Vanity Fair: Alternatives to Historicism in the Study of Fashions, Style and Taste' (*LVF*). Richmond also brings to bear other remarks and observations scattered across a variety of writings: he finds a Popperian history of art in *The Story of Art*, a Popperian theory of the psychology of pictorial representation in *Art and Illusion*, but an unPopperian account of the psychology of stylistic change in *LVF*.

The thought doesn't seem to have occurred to him that as *LVF* was a contribution to Popper's festschrift, it would be the last place to find Gom-

brich proposing unPopperian doctrines. He doesn't recognise *LVF* for what it is: a Popperian account of the (fortunately limited) workings of fashion in the history of art. He also doesn't see the contradiction between his own claims for *The Story of Art* and the claims he makes for *LVF*. By implication, Richmond not only misunderstands *LVF*, but gets *The Story of Art* wrong as well.

He believes that Gombrich's 'theory of the rise and fall of styles as due to the logic of fashion, hints at a pessimistic tone about public and arguable standards of aesthetic merit; and hence, his view of fashion in art is a good bridge for the discussion of his general critique of aesthetics' (32). This effectively ignores all the *caveats* in *LVF* to the effect that there are objective standards in the history of art, otherwise how could Popper be invited to restore them at the end of it?: 'I ... hope that ... [my observations] may provoke Sir Karl Popper to a critical reaction to ... [the "flimsy premises of Vanity Fair"] that will restore the independence of art from social pressures and vindicate the objectivity of its values' (*LVF* in E.H. Gombrich, *Ideals and Idols* [Oxford 1979] [*LVFO*], 92). Gombrich's general critique of aesthetics is, in fact, logically separate from his exposé of the workings of fashion.

Richmond's remark, in the context of a discussion of 'The Renaissance standard of artistic merit' that '[t]he standard of aesthetic excellence is *progress towards making lifelike pictures and statues*' (55) may be rebutted by Gombrich's own statement that it is a 'rash assumption that a book on the rise of illusionist art must want to set up fidelity to nature as the standard of artistic perfection' (*Art and Illusion* [Oxford 1986], xi). It is not clear that Richmond understands Gombrich's views on aesthetic values.

Gombrich is not alone, and certainly not irrationalist, in believing that aesthetic value judgements are not *provable*; neither, by the way, on Popper's account are scientific laws. He subscribes to the well known idea of the particularity of the work of art. One cannot *prove* the excellence of the *Madonna della Sedia* or *The Last Judgement*, either by description or by showing that they observe certain rules. The idea of 'the grace beyond the reach of art' was invented to cope with the last problem.

Gombrich's difficulty with aesthetic theories is that there is no such thing as a universal category of *Art*. He once remarked 'I am ... somewhat uneasy when I am confronted with disquisitions about "the artist" or "the work of art" without being told whether I am expected to think of the Temple of Abu Simbel or of a screenprint by Andy Warhol' (*Tributes* [Oxford 1984], 185).

One can talk about scientific progress in terms of the refutation of false theories, but the history of art does not quite work in that way. Great, or excellent, works of art are those that continue to have a value. However good the phlogiston theory might have been in its day, it is now redundant; Rembrandt lives on. Good for what? — and there is the rub as far as aesthetic values are concerned. Aesthetic values are different from purely instrumental values. This results in the paradox that 'those arts which are no longer engaged in practical functions will be most easily drawn into this giddy movement [of Vanity Fair]' (*LVFO*, 92). In science every gain is a pure gain

towards truth; in art, every gain entails some kind of loss. Michelangelo might have been better than Fra Angelico in depicting the anatomy of the human form, but who is better at capturing the idea of Christian piety?

Richmond's tabulation of analogies and disanalogies (142-5) gets Gombrich seriously wrong. The artist *can* be critical. To appreciate a work of art *is* to engage in a form of testing process, in which good art succeeds and the bad fails. The non-connoisseur *can* discuss works of art with the connoisseur, though the connoisseur is not in a position to *prove* anything. And artists *can* discuss their work, subject to a recognition of the limitations of what can be *said*.

The book has not been properly proofread. There are too many errors of every variety. On p. 51 there are no footnote numbers. And it is a real art-historical howler to suggest that Caravaggio and the Carracci were Mannerists (87); see *The Story of Art* (Oxford 1989), 304!

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Michael S. Roth

The Ironist's Cage: Memory, Trauma, and the Construction of History.

New York: Columbia University Press 1995.

Pp. ix + 240.

US \$49.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-231-10244-5);

US \$15.50 (paper: ISBN 0-231-10245-3).

In *The Ironist's Cage*, Roth, an historian who moves freely between disciplines, collects a number of his previously-published articles, many originally reviews. Consequently, there is some repetition and these essays do not always flow smoothly; the overall project provided by the Introduction would have been better served by more rewriting of the subsequent chapters. This is unfortunate, as Roth's thought represents a significant attempt to maintain the humanist tradition and its concerns while not merely presupposing them.

The Ironist's Cage revolves around two poles: French Hegelian historicism and Freudian psychoanalysis, and two tensions: between the demands of the present and the claims of the past, and between historical consciousness and an often anti-historical modernity.

These themes are not surprising in the light of Roth's earlier books. *Psycho-Analysis as History: Negation and Freedom in Freud* (1987) viewed

Freudian Interpretation as the construction of an individual history via the 'negation' of one's past — negation in the Hegelian sense of *aufhebung*, preserving the past in a present into which it has disappeared. Interpretation frees us from the weight of the past by reconciling us with whom we have become, leaving us with the freedom to choose in the present, rather than the necessity of repeating the past. Retreating from the political, Freud understood this as an individual freedom; Roth strives to extend such an understanding to the group level.

Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France (1988) examined the French Hegelianism of the period 1930-55 in order to understand the downgrading of the role of historical consciousness within the subsequent generations of French thinkers. Roth finds the flight from historical consciousness underway among these Hegelians themselves by the 1950s, reflecting a loss of faith in historical understanding's ability to further a meaningful sense of freedom.

Tracing such flights from historical consciousness is the heart of Roth's critical project; advocating the necessity of historical consciousness, as self-consciousness, for meaningful participation in community, is at the core of his normative thinking. *The Ironist's Cage* presents that agenda within numerous contexts, addressing both the tension between the demands of past and present and the tendency for modernity to turn its back on historical consciousness.

The tension between past and present is a clash between the imperative for fidelity to the past as it was (the empirical dimension of historical work) and the necessity of realizing that any historical account will be tied to the perspectives and interests of the historian (the pragmatic dimension). Roth does not want to resolve this tension; he wants to preserve both dimensions in their tension, and to supplement them with a dimension of piety, a relationship with the otherness and absence of the past, with its having been, but being no more.

Similarly, Roth does not want to resolve the tension between historical consciousness and the anti-historical tendencies of modernity by dismissing the latter. He attempts to show how those anti-historical impulses call for the necessity of an historical understanding: anti-historicism is inevitably presented as a radical challenge to existing understandings and political structures. But those anti-historicisms see all knowledge as being constrained by the culture that produces it, undercutting the ability to find a position from which to criticize that culture as a whole. Hence, the situation that Roth dubs 'the Ironist's Cage': 'the prison of cultural critics who realize that they have no position from which to make their criticism' (8).

The Ironist's Cage is organized into three sections. The first examines three historians, Novick, Hughes, and Schorske (a teacher of Roth's), addressing the guiding tensions by asking each: what to do about the fragmentation of historical knowledge? Novick applauds fragmentation and takes an ironic distance from normative issues; Hughes desires to reconstruct a consensus among historians via contextualization; Schorske sought to pre-

serve the tension between modernity and history in the context of *fin-de-siècle* Vienna.

The second section extends this questioning about fragmentation and history to a number of philosophers/theorists. Strauss and Kojève debated over the character of a higher unity that would lend meaning to the multiplicity of historical events. Foucault accepted fragmentation as the precondition for our ability to 'think otherwise', but Roth sees Foucault's genealogy as an exemplar of the Ironist's Cage: the inability to specify an outside to the powers that he challenged left Foucault, normatively, mute. Rorty and White are two other 'ironists' who receive respectful but ultimately negative treatment, while Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* comes in for rough treatment as being a simplistic romp through the Great Figures in Western Thought.

Probably the most powerful of these essays are to be found in the final section. In Yerushalmi's mourning for the loss of Jewish Memory, Freud's relationship to his own past, and the films *Hiroshima Mon Amour* and *Shoah*, we find sustained reflections on the relationship between memory, trauma, and mourning. Here is where Roth's own historical dimension of the pious, which is what can move us beyond irony, is fleshed out: each chapter concerns the tension between the necessity to make sense of our own pasts and the silent demand of a past that *was*, but is no more.

Perhaps we could hope for a more concrete account of how change is to result from the self-consciousness for which Roth never tires of calling; perhaps Roth's sensitivity to anti-historicism is a bit more cosmetic than he would like it to seem; still, his reflections on the connections between psychoanalysis and history provide a perspective on both that is novel. This volume serves to point back toward Roth's earlier, more weighty engagements with Freud and the French Hegelians, and its final section reveals much about the existential context from which Roth's perspective arises.

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Crispin Sartwell

*The Art of Living: Aesthetics of the Ordinary
in World Spiritual Traditions.*

Albany: State University of New York Press
1995. Pp. xiv + 163.

US \$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2359-X);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2360-3).

In *The Art of Living*, Crispin Sartwell challenges the leading theories of art — institutional and historical — in two ways. First, he treats certain features of the *process* of making as necessary conditions for being a work of art. Second, products and activities from every area of life, high *and* low, are works of art. 'A work of art is an intersubjectively available product which (1) is the product of a process in which, to an exemplary degree, some aspects of the process itself are pursued for their own sake, and not merely for the sake of the end for which the process is undertaken, and (2) is of a kind, members of which are themselves suited to play a role in such processes' (13). Art is not for art's sake alone.

Sartwell identifies a central flaw in modern Western thought. '[W]e attempt to impose a distance between ourselves and the world by "representing" the world pictorially, and ... a distance between ourselves and pictures by representing pictures aesthetically (for example in the philosophy of art)' (153). 'This notion is characterised by the claim that works of art have no practical purpose, and that they are to be contrasted with, rather than integrated into, the everyday life of the culture' (122). The same flaw appears in modernist epistemology. 'As against the modernist conception of human experience — on which ... to experience the external world is to examine one's internal representation, as if one was watching a movie — we need to develop a conception in which experience is a dynamic participation in existence' (123).

The twin themes — of being absorbed in a process, and of that absorption dissolving the distinction between agent and object — guide the remaining chapters.

In chapter 2, 'Zen and the Art of Living', the participants' absorption in making and drinking tea is taken as a model for the absorption necessary for achieving such goals in life as being successful and authentic as a philosopher and a father (31). In chapter 7, Sartwell applies this account to education.

In chapter 3, 'Art and War: Paradox of the *Bhagavad-Gita*', Sartwell concludes that 'when one acts in a consecration of means ... one loses the *illusion* that one is the agent of one's actions; one acts as part of the world-order' (53). '[A]ny human activity can be undertaken as an art in this sense,' even war. This is also his solution, in chapter 7, to the problem of technology.

Chapter 4, is a brilliant *reductio-by-acceptance* of Arthur Danto's report on the end of art (66). '[I]n the ideology of modernism ... the artist ... is pitted against the culture of the average people on the street ... misunderstood by

his contemporaries ... and incomprehensible to them' (103). Avant-garde art of this century can be seen as an attempt to attack these elite institutions and 'destroy aesthetic differentiation.' Alas, 'every effort by avant-garde artists from Duchamp to Barbara Kruger to merge art and life has been effortlessly co-opted by the institutions of avant-garde art, institutions which thrive on the alienated self-consciousness that is reflected most intensely in its attempt to destroy itself' (77).

Chapter 5 identifies blues and country music as traditional arts, like Chinese calligraphy, where 'the artist is engaged in a universally (or at any rate, universally within a certain class) comprehensible mode of communication' (103).

Worth noting. Sartwell's definition has several advantages over institutional and historical definitions of art.

[1] Unlike those definitions Sartwell's yields an account of what makes art worthwhile. '[T]o devote oneself to the means for achieving an end ... both increases the effectiveness with which the end is realised and embeds one more deeply in the process of achieving it' (11, 17).

[2] He suggests that certain processes and materials become the 'accredited vehicles of art because they are inherently satisfying to work, and because, worked, they are inherently satisfying to employ in various capacities. They are recalcitrant ... they do not immediately or easily assume the shape one desires them to' (15).

[3] This thought may account both for the distinction between popular and fine arts *and* for why it is blurred in many cases. Pop tunes in general are both less absorbing and easier to fashion than string quartets. However, *some* pop tunes (e.g., the Beatles) are thoroughly absorbing to chamber music lovers.

[4] Sartwell's definition yields an explanation for *why* we treat so many products of non-Western cultures as art, even though those cultures have no word for art in the Western aesthetic sense (9, ch. 2).

Worth asking for: [1] Sartwell's definition says that works of art are things well suited to play a role in absorbing processes. He does not tell us much about what these processes are. Since acts of making are preeminently absorbing, well-made tools will be exemplary works of art. But what about Michelangelo's *David* and Beethoven's Opus 131? They each play a central role in processes of aesthetic contemplation, but Sartwell does not tell us how such processes avoid the modernist aestheticism he criticises.

[2] What about 'the art of Auschwitz'? Is the same kind of value really to be found in the process of attempting to exterminate the Jewish race and in 'the task of learning to make and drink tea'? It feels obscene even to ask this question, but Sartwell (knows he) must answer it (see ch.3, VI).

[3] Does *The Art of Living* simply represent a conservative holding action, advocating that people immerse themselves in and devote themselves to whatever life has set in store for them, no matter how nasty, brutish, or unjust? Of course, some people *have* created value by living in concentration camps, ghettos, and famines with dignity and integrity, and Sartwell (like

Aristotle) has an account of how this is possible. Can his theory account for any *difference* in value between such lives and lives in better circumstances?

This book is, by Sartwell's definition, a work of art. It is thoroughly absorbing and deeply challenging. It deserves a wide audience and sustained criticism. For it begins to answer some of the deepest questions about art and life in a serious, philosophical way. It is no criticism to say that there is more work to be done.

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Stephen Savitt, ed.

Time's Arrow Today: Recent Physical and Philosophical Work on the Direction of Time.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. 330.
US \$49.95. ISBN 0-521-46111-1.

This collection contains 11 essays plus an editorial introduction devoted to various issues associated with the direction of time. 8 of the essays are based on papers presented at the *Time's Arrow Today* Conference held at the University of British Columbia in 1992. The papers are divided into 4 sections: 2 papers related to cosmology, 4 on quantum theory, 3 on thermodynamics and 2 on time travel. The authors are fairly evenly divided between practising physicists and philosophers, and most are eminent scholars in their respective fields. The book aims at a non-technical presentation of each author's ideas, and on the whole, succeeds quite well in this task. With the exception of the paper by Douglas, most philosophers should be able to get through the book without much trouble. However, this is not a popularization of work on time's arrow. The articles are rigorous contributions to the literature, and one must be scientifically literate to understand them.

Most of the papers are excellent, and I suspect many will become standard reading in the literature on time's arrow. The noted physicist Unruh puts forth a bold proposal for quantum gravity in 'Time, Gravity, and Quantum Mechanics', a paper which also contains a useful discussion of the time *a*/symmetry of quantum mechanics. Earman's paper 'Recent Work on Time Travel' is characteristically excellent and sure to excite those interested in the prospects for time travel in a generally relativistic spacetime. With a nice companion piece by Horwich ('Closed Causal Chains'), the collection contains

two of the better papers written on time travel. Sklar, the foremost thinker on the topic of time's arrow, gives us two thought-provoking essays.

As is well-known, the second law of thermodynamics (that entropy remains constant or increases monotonically with time) conflicts with the underlying laws of classical mechanics. In terms of classical statistical mechanics the second law states that for all systems in nonequilibrium, it is overwhelmingly probable that their Newtonian time development will take them to states with higher entropy. But as Loshmidt famously pointed out, statistical mechanics also implies that it is overwhelmingly likely that systems in nonequilibrium *came from* states with higher entropy. This plainly conflicts with experience, for we know entropy doesn't increase toward the past. Regardless of how we refer to the different times, we know entropy doesn't increase in both directions. The problem of time's arrow, in the context of thermodynamics, is not to explain entropy increase per se, but to explain why entropy increases in only one temporal direction. Wherein lies the asymmetry?

Price's 'Cosmology, Time's Arrow and That Old Double Standard' and Sklar's 'The Elusive Object of Desire' are overdue examinations of some popular answers to this question. Price's paper concentrates on cosmological answers to this problem. Since at least the 1950s, physicists have sought to ground the increase of entropy in one direction (and not the other) in various cosmological phenomena, e.g., expansion, gravitation. Work by Penrose, Hawking and Davies are recent examples of this general approach. Each offers some cosmological constraint that will drive entropy increase. For instance, Davies claims the rapid period of initial inflation and the lack of similar deflation in the future explains why entropy increases with time. Sklar's essay focuses on proposed explanations of the second law in the foundations of statistical mechanics proper. So, for example, he examines the popular theory of 'interventionism', the idea that random perturbations from the environment drive entropy increase.

What immediately strikes (or should strike) the philosopher is that these sorts of answer conspicuously beg the question. If there is reason to accept the proposed constraint in one direction of time there must be equal reason to accept it in the opposite direction, unless one is illicitly importing a time asymmetry. If environmental perturbations work in one direction, then they will work in the other direction too. If there is reason to suppose inflation occurs at the initial singularity then there is reason to suppose 'deflation' occurs at the final singularity, since, after all, from the reversed-time perspective, deflation *does* occur toward one singularity. Sklar calls this problem the 'parity of reasoning' difficulty and Price dubs it the 'double standard' problem, and both do a marvelous job of displaying the double-thinking prevalent in so much of the discussion of time's arrow. In my opinion, both of these papers should be required reading for anyone interested in the problem of the direction of time.

Particularly valuable is the long section on quantum theory and time's arrow. The problem of the direction of time has for too long been conceived

solely from a classical perspective. Given the surprising consequences quantum mechanics has elsewhere, the relationship between that theory and time's arrow seems a worthwhile area of study. The results in the four papers on quantum theory are mixed, but I think this is largely due to the poor state of the field regarding the interpretation of the theory. One disappointing feature is that none of the papers mention what many consider to be the most promising interpretations of quantum mechanics, Bohm's causal theory and Ghilardi-Rimini-Weber's spontaneous localization theory. One suspects that these interpretations put a quite different spin on the origin of entropy increase. Even so, I am sure a few of the papers, especially Stamp's 'Time, Decoherence and "Reversible" Measurements', will be quite useful for those working in the field.

In their paper 'When and Why Does Entropy Increase?' Barrett and Sober seek an alternative explanation of entropy increase within physics, since they view the standard one as not generalizing well enough to situations outside of physics. Although I haven't space for a full discussion, let me voice two worries about their treatment. First, why should the physical explanation of entropy increase generalize outside of physics? Other physical explanations are germane only to physics, and we are happy to leave them there, so why should the explanations of statistical mechanics generalize? Second, and more important, Barrett and Sober treat entropy as 'a property of probability distributions' (231), yet the thermodynamic entropy — the Boltzmann entropy — is a property of individual systems. There is a big difference between the two, and it is far from obvious that what can be proved for one is thereby true of the other. Until this question is addressed, they have not shown why the entropy we care about, the thermodynamic one, increases (or why it increases only toward the future).

In conclusion, I heartily recommend this collection to anyone, philosopher or scientist, interested in the direction of time. Many of the papers make significant contributions to the field, and I found almost all of them quite interesting. I am confident this book will emerge as a standard text in the philosophy of time.

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Frederick F. Schmitt, ed.

Socializing Epistemology:

The Social Dimensions of Knowledge.

Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield 1994.

Pp. 310.

US \$56.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7958-6);

US \$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-7959-4).

This anthology is uneven in places and cannot always fulfil its potential, but it is saved by the presence of a number of first-rate essays and a strong (although incomplete) bibliography. The collection is weakened slightly by an overall lack of cohesion. The stated topic is an exceptionally broad one, and although diversity in a collection can be inviting, here there is no clear central idea, nor even a loose set of ideas, to tie the essays together. This gives the text a disjointed quality at times, which could perhaps have been avoided by dividing the book into small sections. The editor's introduction, while providing a very useful historical overview of the topic of knowledge as a social phenomenon, goes on to take a chaotic approach to the numerous issues one might discuss under this heading. Some of the contributions (e.g., those by Feldman and Gilbert) are neither compelling nor germane. Other essays are engaging, but their relevance is diminished by their quirkiness. C.A.J. Coady's exploration of the epistemic value of the testimony of ghosts, for example, is at best premature. The most pressing questions about the possibility of a social epistemology are often raised, but the reader is occasionally frustrated when these questions are left underexplored. This is sometimes true even of those authors (e.g., Alston and Foley) who otherwise demonstrate a good command of the subject.

There are minor quibbles as well. The editor correctly identifies sociology of knowledge, feminist philosophy, and naturalized epistemology as the primary inspirations for recent social epistemologies, but sociology and much significant feminist philosophy are omitted from the bibliography. The bibliography is billed as covering 'works by philosophers on social epistemology,' so the exclusion of sociological perspectives can be overlooked, perhaps even commended, but feminist epistemologists are philosophers who write about social epistemology, and their work should not have been neglected. The editor also adopts the irritating practice, which appears to be on the rise, of using the most recent date of re-issue or re-translation to cite authors like Descartes (1984), Reid (1969), Locke (1959) and Hume (1975). Students of philosophy, especially history of philosophy, can and do find this habit confusing.

Any examination of social epistemology will be well served by keeping two key points in the foreground. First, such an approach to knowledge ought to be about the function of justificatory practices in a community, and not about the content of a community's many diverse and often contradictory beliefs. This means that appeal to the content of an individual belief will be a less reliable guide to its acceptability than is the case in an individualistic

epistemology. An explanation of the relationship between group practices and the beliefs of individuals is thus a crucial objective for a social epistemology. Second, it ought to be recognized that socializing epistemology (i.e., examining the conceptual and normative consequences of treating knowledge as a property of groups) is not the same thing as socializing truth (i.e., making the truth of one's beliefs a property of group practices). The tendency to conflate these two projects, as some sociologists currently do, is a source of annoyance to many philosophers.

The most superior essays in this volume are those which handle these potential perils smoothly and explicitly. The papers by Kornblith, Longino, Solomon, Cox and Goldman, and to a considerable extent Kitcher, meet this challenge. Kornblith's 'conservative' approach to social epistemology neatly demonstrates why epistemological naturalists should long ago have recognized the inadequacies of individualism, and why the sociologist's opposition of the true and the social rings false. Longino's work forms a nice fit with Kornblith's, refining his sensible rejection of the sociological project for philosophy of science, and showing that some philosophers have surrendered the chance to examine the explicitly philosophical impact of social epistemology too quickly. (Longino also continues her ongoing debate with Kitcher, begun in a 1991 symposium, about just how radical a social epistemology can or need be without collapsing into relativism. Longino here offers the more convincing position, but the contest itself is made less urgent by the quick but very sophisticated treatment found in Solomon's paper.)

The essay by Cox and Goldman is particularly interesting in that it demonstrates the practical value and relevance of socialized epistemology, using the language and formulae of economists to talk about the objectivity of journalists and the expectations of media consumers. Studies of science as a social process of knowledge-seeking, which are by far more familiar in this context, will benefit from following up on some of the striking parallels suggested by Cox and Goldman's innovative work. Scientists, like reporters, are faced with market pressures to produce original information, may encounter incentives for fabricating data, and the extent to which they may participate in critical exchange can rise and fall with the fortunes of elite figures. The alleged impartiality of journalists, which is increasingly under attack, coincides with the supposed neutrality of scientists, with similar results. It would be fruitful to think about how far Cox and Goldman's recommendations for journalism can or should be extended to science.

Solomon's 'A More Social Epistemology' is the gem of the lot. In just sixteen pages including notes, she offers a strong and creative discussion which comprises an historical and conceptual summary and evaluation of philosophical (and other) approaches to social epistemology, a critique of epistemological individualism using illustrative cases from the history of science, and an original thesis for treating knowledge as more genuinely and indispensably social. She points out that the appearance of consensus in science is not enough by itself to motivate a shift to a new style or focus for epistemology. Empirical success is also required, and Solomon makes this

demand as forcefully as possible. The two factors do not, however, work to advance science in any simple, straightforward way. Her case studies of plate tectonics and genetics show that the distribution of epistemic commitments (including success and bias) within a research community, both impairs and facilitates progress. It is part of epistemology's normative task to identify and encourage distributions that are progress-enhancing. Solomon's assessment of the role of individuals in science is somewhat less persuasive, but is at least more thoughtful than other treatments in the field.

These latter five essays are excellent. They have significant philosophical and instructional value, and they are far from being variations on the same theme. These essays are likely to become essential to future philosophical work in this area, although the collection as a whole is less likely to achieve such status.

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Barry Smith

Austrian Philosophy:

The Legacy of Franz Brentano.

Chicago: Open Court 1994. Pp. xii + 381.

US \$36.95. ISBN 0-8126-9256-X.

That Franz Brentano has been a serious influence on a number of philosophers is not controversial. Typically, however, his influence is taken to end on the eastern shores of the Atlantic. There have been a few acknowledgments of a more extensive influence beyond this, however, and Barry Smith has placed himself among the champions of this latter view of Brentano, and indeed of Austrian philosophy generally.

Instead of simply echoing Dummett and others by pointing out that Logical Positivism owes a debt to Brentano, Smith's concern is to show how it is that Brentano laid a foundation for a wide range of philosophical, psychological, and economic endeavors. A part of this foundation did, naturally, affect Logical Positivism, but the story does not end there. Nor does the story, as some might suggest, end with Husserl.

Smith explicates Brentano's treatment of intentionality with great care, showing that it is properly married to a metaphysics whereby a substance is taken to be the bearer of accidents, where 'accidents' is taken 'to embrace all of Aristotle's categories of *quantity, quality, where, when, action, reaction,*

affection, position and state' (62). While this view is reminiscent of Aristotle's view, Smith is careful to point out where it is that Brentano and Aristotle part company. Indeed, Smith carefully illustrates how and where Brentano attempts, in his departures from Aristotle, to address thorny problems inherent in Aristotle's metaphysics.

Smith's treatment of Brentano's relationship to Aristotle is fundamental to the remainder of the book. By explicating Brentano in this manner Smith is able to set up Brentano in contrast to various philosophers whose work rose in reaction to Brentano. In a sense, Smith's efforts might be viewed as an explication of the influence of Aristotle, viewed through the eyes of Brentano, on early Twentieth Century philosophy and all that developed out of that.

This makes Smith's effort unique for a number of reasons. First, it is atypical for a treatment of Brentano to attend to his notion of substance in so careful a manner. Second, through this explication, often overlooked connections between Brentano and later thinkers becomes visible. Beyond this, Smith's careful explication of Brentano's metaphysics positions Brentano as an important contributor to the Aristotelian tradition.

It would not be an overstatement to suggest that Smith's effort here is worthy of attention simply because of his careful treatment of Brentano's metaphysics. By explicitly placing Brentano in the Aristotelian tradition, Smith has illustrated that Brentano deserves a careful look by those among us who are interested in a substance based metaphysics. Of course, Smith's effort does not end there. Brentano is ultimately shown to be a vital link in the prehistory of twentieth-century philosophy, psychology, and economic theory.

Smith clearly lays out the influence of Brentano on several philosophers and philosophical movements. Included in this effort are Marty, Stumpf, Cantor, Meinong, Witasek, Twardowski, Kotarbinski, von Ehrenfels and Menger. The inclusion of Menger in this list is perhaps the most interesting inclusion. This is because a connection between Brentano and other philosophers is not terribly surprising. The same might be said of the connection between Brentano and von Ehrenfels who, while noted as a founder of Gestalt psychology, did concern himself with philosophical issues directly. In the case of Menger, the founder of the Austrian school of economics, one might be a little surprised. After all, one does not typically think that there is a direct connection between philosophical speculation and mathematical models of economics. Smith clearly and carefully lays out these connections and illustrates the debt owed to philosophy by economists.

By vividly calling our attention to the often indirect connections between Brentano and these other intellectual movements Smith clearly places Brentano as the centre of contemporary philosophy. This connection to contemporary philosophy is further emphasized when one realizes that Brentano and his progeny grappled with many of the issues which presently lay at the heart of cognitive science research.

For Smith, the issue at hand reaches much further than the simple claim that Brentano ought be given his place in history. While this is certainly a part of the equation, Smith is concerned to point out that we have a good deal to learn from Brentano and his progeny. This is particularly evident in the numerous places where Smith's efforts far exceed those of other commentators by including careful analyses of oft-neglected passages and works.

The upshot of Smith's efforts is, at the very least, a valuable contribution to the history of philosophy. Beyond this, however, Smith has offered the humanistic community a work which anyone interested in the development of analytical philosophy, phenomenology, Gestalt psychology, or Austrian economics would do well to read. Further, Smith has managed to do what only a few philosophers ever do. That is, Smith has illustrated how it is that the work of a philosopher concerned with such abstract issues as metaphysics can, ultimately, have great effects on the lives of individuals who elect to ignore philosophy. In this last sense, Smith has offered the philosophical community an example of how to relate philosophy to an audience broader than just other professional philosophers. That he has done this without sacrificing the rigor of scholarship is an achievement worth applauding.

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Jordan Howard Sobel

Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1994.

Pp. x + 376.

US \$59.95. ISBN 0-521-41635-3.

For over a quarter of a century now, Howard Sobel has regularly been publishing groundbreaking articles on decision theory, game theory, and utilitarianism — articles which are distinguished by their ingenuity and erudition, formal rigour, and exceptional clarity of thought and expression. *Taking Chances* is a welcome representative compilation of sixteen of Sobel's (slightly revised) essays on rational choice. Three quarters of the essays span the period from 1983-1992, and all but two have been published previously. Most of the essays are extremely technical. All are conceptually demanding. None are for beginners.

Sobel's overarching concern is with articulating a defensible account of practical rationality. Newcomb problems and prisoners' dilemmas figure prominently in this project. Essays 2-5 treat the reader to a dizzying array

of dozens of Newcomblike problems which are designed to establish exactly how these problems differ from prisoners' dilemmas and, most importantly, that evidential decision theories are flawed for making no appeal to causality — precisely what Richard Jeffrey takes to be the 'principal virtue' of these theories! Jeffrey regards Newcomb problems as 'prisoners' dilemmas for space cadets'. Sobel argues persuasively that, given a proper understanding of the role of causality in the generation of choices and the formation of character and beliefs, Newcomb problems need to be taken seriously as distinct problems with which an ideally rational agent might conceivably be faced.

Sobel is a two-boxer in Newcomb problems and, more generally, a causal decision theorist. Crudely, this means that rational actors will choose actions on the basis of their causal power to produce valued outcomes, rather than on the potential of an action's performance to count as evidence for some valued outcome (whether, that is, the action could be viewed as good or bad news). In the standard Predictor paradox, what matters is that one cannot causally affect the prediction, which has already been made. Causal decision theory is therefore constructed upon causal 'practical conditionals' rather than conditional probabilities. Essays 8-9 work out the subtle formal complexities of this view in great detail. Conditional expected utility is defined as the weighted average of the values of outcomes, where the weight of a particular outcome is given by the probability of one of the aforementioned causal conditionals. (Considerable attention is paid, in clarifying these notions, to the proof of various partition theorems.)

This leads eventually to the familiar Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected utility. Essays 10-11 refine this idea in a number of ways, most significantly by arguing that expected utility maximization is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of rationality. In addition, an action is rational only if a decision for it would be ideally stable. That is, the act must continue to maximize expected utility, conditional upon the decision to perform it. Rational actions cannot, if you will, immediately undermine themselves. This concern with self-defeatingness and related paradoxes of rationality is carried into essays 7 and 12 wherein Sobel argues that ideally rational agents may have good reason to perform irrational acts and even to make themselves irrational. The notion of rational irrationality, associated with the familiar toxin puzzle for example, is only superficially paradoxical.

It is easy, while reading this book, to get lost in the rich detail and intricacies of the Popcorn problem; the cognitive challenges of Russian roulette; the perils of magical bootstrapping; the disambiguation of the discourse of rational intention; and the relative merits of stability vs. ratifiability, or hyperrationality vs. resilient rationality. It is easy, that is, to become distracted by these intriguing local debates, and to forget that there is a grand philosophical vision underlying Sobel's work which is of interest to all philosophers. Sobel sees practical rationality first and foremost as an intrinsic value. 'I think (as Plato did) that [being rational] is of great intrinsic importance to us in our inner beings.' 'The main reason for being rational in

both theoretical and practical ways is ... to be found in ... certain intrinsic and profoundly *personal* considerations' (135-6).

At least two things are going on here. First, Sobel is arguing that rationality is 'not perfectly plastic.' Rationality 'has at all levels a fixed form.' Rationality 'consists of a certain definite way of making up one's mind' (127). Causal decision theory gives a descriptive-explanatory (227) account of what that way is. Second, the value that inheres in making up one's mind in this manner is not (principally) instrumental. Rationality, *pace* Gauthier for example, is not simply what works, or pays well.

In fact, much of Sobel's technical work is devoted to demonstrating that practical rationality often does *not* pay well. Essays 13-16, for example, repeatedly show that ideally rational utility maximizers will not fare well in a variety of interactive games. Most famously, they will, to their mutual disadvantage, be trapped in defection strategies in prisoners' dilemmas of either finite or indefinite length. Similarly, causal utility maximizers may reap lesser financial rewards than (irrational) evidential maximizers in Newcomb problems. Overall, rational agents may be expected to fare less well than irrational agents. Rational agents are simply not able to cope with certain games, they are often faced with poorer options, they are often precluded from establishing and therefore benefiting from trusting, cooperative relations, and so finally rationality may not be enough (in the absence of coercive institutions) to establish communal life and social order. '[R]eason may *not* conquer all' (339).

Nonetheless, Sobel insists, it is a mistake to dismiss a theory of rationality on these grounds. Our lives simply may not go best by making decisions that conform to that theory of rationality which is supported by the best arguments. Rational agents may be seriously disadvantaged by their rationality (132). It does not follow that there is anything *wrong* with these agents (324). There is surely something inspiring in Sobel's unwavering conviction that the intrinsic attraction of Reason should 'prove powerful enough to counter-balance even considerable penalties ... and great temptations' (136).

Spotting a rational choice is sometimes mercifully easy. Read this book. I guarantee a hefty payoff. Taking a chance on *Taking Chances* is taking no chance at all.

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Lynne Spellman

Substance and Separation in Aristotle.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.

Pp. x + 131.

US \$49.95. ISBN 0-521-47147-8.

Trying to give a coherent account of Aristotle's theory of substance is like trying to smooth out an old carpet which, after years of stretching, has become too big for the room. No sooner is one wrinkle down than another pops up. In a sense, Aristotle says too much about substance: he criticizes Plato for separating the Forms, then seems to argue that form is substance, and then asserts that substance must be separate. The difficulties in his discussion in the *Metaphysics* have led some of our best commentators to throw up their hands in defeat. Not Spellman — she believes that we can reconcile Aristotle's claims if we attend more carefully to what he says about the separation of substance. Though not wholly successful, her account deserves our consideration.

The book's jacket advertises that 'the central argument is that Aristotle's views on substance are a direct response to Plato's Theory of Forms,' but this hardly captures what is distinctive about Spellman's book. Her central argument, rather, is that Aristotle agrees with virtually everything Plato says about Forms *except* his claim that they are separate from the sensible world. As she tells us in her Introduction, 'I would go so far as to say that Aristotle can be seen as attempting to offer a defensible version of Platonism' (1). More specifically, Spellman thinks that Aristotle accepts all the features of Platonic Forms — their epistemological and ontological priority, their eternal and unchanging nature — but avoids Plato's problematic two-world view by arguing that forms, though ontologically and epistemologically distinct from sensibles, are not 'numerically distinct' (2). Aristotle's criticism of Plato, then, is not as sweeping as we might first have imagined. Indeed, if Spellman is right, Aristotle's response is more a fine-tuning of Plato's view than a general overhaul.

Chapter I argues that Aristotle's objection to Plato's separation of the Forms (cf. *Metaphysics* XIII 9, 1086b2-7) is not a complaint about the notion that Forms could exist even if no sensible instantiations of them existed. Gail Fine has argued that what Aristotle means by 'separation' in these anti-Platonic passages is a 'capacity for independent existence' (IE), but Spellman points out that the text does not warrant such a conclusion. Moreover, she argues, Fine's reading makes Plato into a lousy philosopher, since Aristotle tells us that Plato's reason for separating the Forms is the flux (and hence unknowability) of the sensible world. But IE clearly goes too far in avoiding flux. All Plato should say is that Forms are objects *distinct* from the sensible world and this is what Spellman thinks Aristotle means by 'separate' (8-9).

Spellman does not, however, clarify what she means by 'numerically distinct'. She says it implies IE (8) and later remarks that Aristotle seems to assume that it implies particularity (14). But such an important concept,

which on Spellman's view is meant to help us understand a host of otherwise confusing moves that Aristotle makes, needs to be more clearly articulated. The problem is that it won't do to say that 'numerically distinct' means simply a 'discrete object' — something to be counted when giving an inventory of items in the world — because form on Aristotle's own view (Spellman and I agree) enjoys just such an ontological status. Hence this interpretation leaves Aristotle with no objection at all against Plato. Will 'spatially distinct' do? Not on Spellman's reading. She thinks Aristotle's objections to Plato revolve around epistemological issues, e.g., how we can come to *know* forms if they are separate from sensible objects, but spatial separation has no bearing on that sort of question. Fine's IE begins to look quite attractive at this point, so Spellman's argument would be more compelling if she distinguished her notion of numerical distinctness from IE.

Chapter II takes up the interesting question of why, if Aristotle denies that forms are distinct from sensible objects, he insists that many things truly predicated of the form are not true of the object. Spellman solves this problem of referential opacity by distinguishing 'numerical sameness' from 'identity,' thus allowing Aristotle to hold that substance or form (which on Spellman's view turns out to be a 'specimen of a kind') is numerically the same as the sensible object, but not identical with it. The idea is developed further in Chapter III. However, it remains unclear whether two things which are non-identical and yet numerically the same (e.g., Socrates and the musical man) are ultimately *two* objects or only one. In spite of an excellent discussion of epistemological issues in Chapter IV, the problem continues to rear its head in Chapter V, where Spellman attempts to explain the sense in which substance on Aristotle's view *is* separate. Here she suggests that the separation of substance should be understood as the 'ontological correlate of separation in definition' which she calls 'independent being' (86). This is a strange move indeed. Aristotle speaks of things as separate in definition (*en logōi*) precisely when he thinks there is *no* ontological distinction to be found (e.g., the convex and concave, the parts of the soul). Given this, it makes no sense to talk about an ontological correlate to separation in definition. Chapter VI, which draws an illuminating parallel between Aristotle's view and Danto's distinction between the work of art and the material object, provides no help since Danto's distinction is highly psychologistic (determined by the 'art-world' of interpretations) and amounts to what I think Aristotle would label a separation in definition.

Minor problems with the book are [1] the omission from the bibliography of Frede and Patzig's (1988) German commentary on *Metaphysics Z* which Spellman alludes to in a footnote (53), but never cites; [2] frequently incomplete passage citations, where she gives Bekker numbers without book or chapter numbers; and [3] a repetitive tendency to recap her views after virtually every stretch of argument.

The strengths of the book are many and my criticisms in no way diminish them. Spellman offers a highly readable discussion of an extremely ramified, but absolutely crucial, area of Aristotle's philosophy. She excels in her

coverage of the current scholarship and advances several original interpretations of her own, the most significant of which is her proposal that substances are 'specimens of natural kinds,' making them particulars which 'mimic the universal' (51). Spellman's book is both a solid contribution to the field and a superb introduction to Aristotelian metaphysics.

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Suzanne Uniacke

Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justification of Homicide.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1994.

Pp. ix + 244.

US \$49.95. ISBN 0-521-45408-5.

The doctrine of self-defence is important to criminal law practice, legal theory, philosophy of law, practical ethics, and moral theology. Self-defence is not only intrinsically interesting; a successful account promises to illuminate the normative aspects of such diverse topics as capital punishment, abortion, just war, and claims of necessity or duress. *Permissible Killing* is a good contribution to a full account of self-defence.

Uniacke describes self-defence as the use of force by one person (the 'defender') against another identifiable person (the 'aggressor'), where the defender's force resists, repels, or wards off an 'unjust immediate threat' posed by the aggressor to the defender or another person, and the defender's force is reasonably 'necessary' and 'proportional' to the harm prevented, considered from the defender's perspective in the circumstances (219, 227, 106). Uniacke's account is 'unitary', applying to self-defence and defence of others, and to resistance to a variety of threats — actual or putative, active or passive, culpable or non-culpable (4, 157, 172). Her focus throughout is on the commission of homicide in self-defence. She develops her argument through sustained discussions of 'natural law' and double-effect theories of self-defence.

For Uniacke, the moral legitimacy of self-defence is constituted in tension between persons' 'right to life' and the general prohibition against homicide (182). Self-defence draws its legitimacy from its defensive nature: since persons are generally entitled to life, a defender should be entitled to resist actions which threaten life — his or her own, or others' (184). The right to defend others, then, is not derived from the threatened person's right of self-defence, but from that person's right not to be killed (178). Uniacke

alludes to, but does not pursue, the vexing issue of whether the defence of others is not only a right, but a duty (180 fn. 29).

The right to life does not authorize unqualified defensive action. Defensive action must be 'necessary', or indispensable or unavoidable in the circumstances (32), and 'proportional' to the threat, so that the harm caused does not exceed the harm avoided (158). Even so, one might wonder, how may homicide in self-defence be permissible, since the aggressor too has a right to life?

If the right to life were absolute, homicide in self-defence would necessarily be wrong (230). Uniacke argues, however, that the right to life is 'conditional' on conduct. Persons maintain the right to life only so long as they do not pose 'unjust immediate threats' to others (197, 201, 217). 'Threat' refers to acts that are dangerous or harmful (162, 165). Uniacke indicates, without elaboration, that normative criteria may be required to identify threats (171). She also leaves 'immediacy' largely unanalyzed, ignoring issues arising in battered spouse syndrome cases. She does not fully explicate the qualifier 'unjust' (226-7), although she argues that 'unjust' threats include not only voluntary, intentional, culpable attacks, but involuntary, unintentional, non-culpable threats, such as those posed by children, the mentally disordered, sleepwalkers, or innocent persons hurled as missiles (165, 229). Persons who pose 'unjust immediate threats' may be resisted by necessary, proportional action. In consequence, homicide in self-defence does not also require that the defender not intend the aggressor's death, a condition imposed by double-effect theorists (184).

Uniacke devotes considerable effort to classifying self-defence claims. She distinguishes excuses (the act was wrong, but the agent is not responsible), justifications (the act is normally wrong, but was not in the circumstances), and exceptions (the act was not wrong because it violated no rule) (23, 26). If a defender duly resisted an actual 'unjust immediate threat', because the aggressor's right to life was forfeit, the defender did not infringe the prohibition against homicide but engaged an exception to the prohibition; the act was rightful, and neither justified nor excused (26, 30, 157). If a defender duly resisted a wrongly but reasonably perceived threat, the act's classification depends on the perspective of evaluation. From the agent's perspective, the act is justified; objectively, the act is excused (16, 25). Uniacke queries whether a putative defender's belief must be reasonable, and not merely honestly held, but does not pursue the analysis (42-3). If a defender killed, not (directly) in self-defence, but in the course of, as a means to, or as an incidental effect of self-defence, and the victim was not an 'unjust immediate threat', the homicide may or may not be justified or excused, depending on (*inter alia*) the culpability of the victim (73, 187).

Uniacke distinguishes strong and weak senses of justification. An act may be justified from the agent's perspective (weak sense), but may still be the wrong act, all things considered (strong sense) (14). Self-defence, then, may be morally permissible, but still not morally correct, all things considered (143, 182). Beyond the permissibility of self-defence may lie the obligation to turn the other cheek.

Despite its useful development of the foregoing points, Uniacke's book has organizational, substantive, and research-base weaknesses. The book's main argument is somewhat diffuse, and requires tracking through the lengthy discussions of 'natural law' and double-effect theories. More importantly, Uniacke does not outline the theory supporting persons' right to life or its 'forfeiture'. She does argue that the principles of self-defence cannot be supplied by contractarian or 'two-level optimality' (consequentialist) theories (220-6), although the brevity of these arguments undercuts their cogency. She does not explicate the notions of 'rights' or 'human rights' on which she depends or refer to analyses she accepts. Moreover, she makes no reference to issues of gender and power which beset self-defence cases. Finally, while Uniacke does make occasional legal references, particularly in Chapter 2, she offers no sustained treatment of statutory, common law, or law reform materials. To make a serious contribution to our understanding of self-defence (particularly in a book billed as a study 'in *Philosophy and Law*'), some significant legal exposition and analysis is required. In any event, as J.L. Austin reminded us, the value of legal research to ethical investigations should not be underestimated.

Permissible Killing discusses many important philosophical aspects of self-defence. It will be most useful to researchers in practical ethics, but less useful to those concerned with 'ethical foundations' and those who toil in Faculties of Law.

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Enrique Villanueva, ed.
Naturalism and Normativity.
Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company 1993. Pp. 318.
US \$42.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-924922-67-2);
US \$25.00 (paper: ISBN 0-924922-17-6).

Naturalism and Normativity is a collection of 26 papers held at the fifth conference of the Sociedad Filosófica Ibero Americana at Gainesville. It comes complete with a brief introduction by the editor that highlights the central topics.

What can naturalists do about normativity? That question establishes the thematic link between the various essays. All papers focus to a greater or lesser degree on naturalist attempts to come to terms with the problem of how to accommodate an apparently nonnatural phenomenon like normativ-

ity. The scope of the contributions is broad, and the discussion leaves the confines of moral philosophy well behind. True, normativity figures most prominently in ethics, but not only in naturalist contexts epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language deserve their share of the attention, too. The essays in this collection are ample evidence for this.

Two large sections of *Naturalism and Normativity* are dedicated to the discussion of recent monographs. One of these books is Allan Gibbard's stimulating *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings*, the other Jerrold Katz's *The Metaphysics of Meaning*, both of 1990.

Gibbard's starting question is: 'What do normative terms — terms like "rational" and "morally wrong" — mean?' (33). He shapes his answer to cover three kinds of facts which are, in his opinion, essentially connected in this respect. These are naturalistic facts, normative facts, and facts of meaning respectively.

As Peter Railton points out in his commentary, Gibbard's account has one consequence of primary interest, namely that his theory 'involves no asymmetry between the moral and the rational, or between practical and theoretical reason' (37). The fact that Gibbard's all-purpose normative term is 'rational' — 'I'm proposing that we can render meanings in a pared down, dualistic language: a language of pure facts, along with a single, pure normative element' (53) — brings two positions in close contact with each other which are commonly thought to be quite disparate. These are, of course, the theories of Hume and Kant. That connecting the two might be not only an historically rewarding enterprise had already been pointed out by Richard Hare in the very first essay of the collection. He contended that in order to be able to populate the universe of naturalist morals with *objective* prescriptions at all, naturalists should help themselves to a large portion of Kantian theory.

While Railton focuses principally on the costs of Gibbard's account, maintaining that 'meaning itself [has to be added] to the list of normative notions' (43) and cautioning that Gibbard's theory in its current form might 'need some rethinking' (44) on that account, another commentator, Simon Blackburn, puts his linguistic worries somewhat differently. He wants to know how well Gibbard's theory stands up under the Frege-Geach objection. Gibbard in his reply elaborates the notion of '*normative attitudes*' which 'aren't representations of fact' (69). How would this help with normative judgements and silence worries of the Frege-Geach kind? Well, if we adopted a view like his, suggests Gibbard, we would be able to exploit a parallel between normative and factual judgements in order to get an explanatory hold on the former; i.e., we could exploit the fact that '[n]ormative judgments are to attitudes as factual judgments are to apprehendings' (70).

Jerrold Katz's *The Metaphysics of Meaning* is designed to challenge naturalist complacency. With a nice sense of irony Katz chooses a Humean strategy to disturb the naturalists' peace of mind. First, demolish basic arguments *pro* naturalism — i.e., Quine and Wittgenstein and, in the wake

of these philosophers, Davidson, Lewis, Putnam — then to deliver a direct blow, and to outline the alternative.

After the preliminaries about the history of philosophy, the reader learns more about Katz's post-Fregean 'new intensionalism' and 'D' (cf. 131). 'D' is the core of his new and improved version of 'sense'. A solution to Kripkensteinian rule-scepticism seems also to be part of the new intensionalist parcel. In a way, as Paul Boghossian points out in his commentary, '[t]he key ... to the new intensionalism is the rejection of the claim that sense determines reference' (136). In Katz's reply to Boghossian, we get a clearer view of the way in which he wants this to be understood. Katz stresses that '(D) makes senses independent of any *intrinsic* connection with reference' (145, my emphasis), and we learn that 'sense *mediates* reference: sense is necessary but not sufficient for reference' (146). Provided the position can be validated, this is an interesting approach, indeed. Especially as it seems not only to block Putnam's twin-earth cases but might also allow Katz to take a new line on the well known rule-following challenge. In what way would Katz's new intensionalism provide us with an answer to this problem? If we embrace his theory we are able to 'grasp' finite senses, because it is not reference alone but reference *and* context which together fix senses (cf. pp. 151) so that 'projection never enters the picture' (152). Kripkenstein's sceptic cannot get off the ground in the first place.

Of the various other discussions let me briefly mention two. First there is a paper by Colin McGinn in which classical psychologism gets an unusual twist. Traditional psychologism holds that logic is 'derived' from psychology. This is getting matters the wrong way round, says McGinn, 'psychological predictions can be "derived" from logical principles' (112). He believes that this is so because 'God first created logic and then ensured ... that our minds fitted its patterns' (112). This certainly is an unusual approach to the old question. Alas, there is not nearly enough space for McGinn to argue the case conclusively.

A different matter altogether is the Loar/Schiffer debate. In 'Can We Confirm Supervenient Properties' Brian Loar reminds us that the issue of supervenient properties is still far from settled, and he makes a strong case against the irreducibility-claim in its traditional form. Should he be right his argument entailed — as Stephen Schiffer points out in his reply — that we either go eliminativist or else throw out much of the standard view (cf. 94).

There only was space to zoom in on some of the topics under discussion. I hope this nevertheless offered a first impression of the many faces of (present day) naturalism. As the collection brings together these different approaches it certainly is stimulating. The work-in-progress style — essays, objections, replies — is an invitation to take part.

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Law in Civil Society.

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Winfield's philosophy of law is an appropriate advance on the four books he has published during the last eight years. Their common study is the normative rationale for modern political society. Their common means is the Hegelian philosophy of right.

This book advances the project in two new respects, as its title makes clear: it stresses that legal institutions are its frame of reference; and it concentrates on civil society as the locale for law. This is not the first time Winfield has done either, but previously the emphasis had been different. Civil society had been taken as the locale for institutionally normative principles. Now these are recast assertively as law; and the claim that the state is the sole home for anything deserving the name of law is repeatedly disavowed.

The Hegelian character must be taken aright. Hegel is his first, best and nearly sole expositor of institutional rationality. Property, morality, family, and economy follow the order and arguments from Hegel's philosophy of right, up to its treatment of the state. But Hegel appears mostly in endnotes, along with all the current jurists of note, and there he is criticized for his own failures to live up to his demand for rationality.

The rationality Hegel both leads and loses is self-determination, 'freedom from extraneous determination,' 'categorical immanence' (28). Being no other than itself, reason neither deduces from fact nor prescribes indispensable preconditions. Rejection of these two foundations today, naturalist and transcendental, drives Winfield to Hegel for a third way. From cognition to conduct, reason rectifies its own deficiencies.

Not only had Winfield done this well already in the ten essays 1983-88 in *Overcoming Foundations* (Columbia 1989), but also in the fourteen articles 1975-91 in *Reason and Modernity* (SUNY 1991), plus the two new studies in each. While there as in *Reason and Justice* (SUNY 1988) his argument moved from current anti-foundationalism, through this new work's treatment of justice in civil society, and on to some attention toward law in the state, his *Just Economy* (Routledge 1988) remained more deeply focused upon market, Hegel's eight pages on the 'System of Needs'.

Law in Civil Society devotes its three newest chapters to Hegel's ten pages on the 'Administration of Justice'. In preface to them, after first reviewing the anti-foundationalist problematic in the context now of jurisprudence, and then reprising the rational norms of property, family and economy, Winfield poses in his third chapter the question than which there is 'no question more central to legal philosophy: does legality fall exclusively within the scope of politics, or is there law in civil society?' (70)

The heuristic for answering that is to discover whether the minimum specifications of legality can be determined within these rational social

norms but without yet any political ingredients (71). Elsewhere, Winfield discusses what these latter are. Here, the legal minima are objectivity, or a particular positing by will; and universality, or rules available for knowing and willing (76). Authoritative promulgation achieves these, but not judicial precedent, says chapter four. Legal codes are its suitable form, but not separate statutes, says chapter five. And inquisitorial court procedures, but not adversarial processes nor untutored juries, are its proper exercise, says the last.

That brings Hegel's continental theory to fruition in Winfield's continental practice. This is debatable, and Winfield rehearses all sides of the debate. The trouble with precedent is that 'determination of law is relegated to particular judges' assurances of the authority of particular past decisions' (118). That is not less true of the particular promulgator of law in civil society whom Winfield recommends. The trouble with adversarial process is that it would 'license bias and deception in place of an objective scrutiny' (163). Inquisitorial practice does not escape deception, he realizes; it just doesn't licence the deceptions. Rational consistency requires also dissipating the rights of the accused, unprivileging confessions, and requiring testimony against oneself. Obtaining universal legal aid is hardly an adequate recompense.

Consistency may be the hobgoblin of reason, legal detail is surely its bane. Along with Hegel, Winfield relieves reason from offering more detail than rational structure (96). This is despite the large amount of detail he does reason out, on legal procedures and on the substance of enforceable property, family, fraud, and economic right in his final chapters. But detail can be peculiar. A repeated example in family law, that gender and sex are variables extrinsic to it, leaves one quizzical at how much simple actuality can be dropped on the way to rational reality. Are what is named with ordinary legal names still the same legal institutions we wanted to philosophize about?

Recognition (*Anerkennung*) drives right for Winfield. In his argument, it never loses the reciprocity it received from Kant. Its Hegelian possibilities, however, include also inequality and work (A. Kojève, *Interpretation I* [1970] 21, at 30-3). These lead to a different Hegelian jurisprudence.

A way back from the allergy towards nature and natural law which pervades every page can be lightened by showing that 'rational freedom is based on the proposition that human "natural being" must be overcome precisely in order to realize the "nature" of man in the sense of his essence' (D. Maletz, *Interpretation* 13 [1985] 67, at 75, from Hegel). The nineteenth century's greatest Aristotelian, Hegel knew form not as fixed prior pattern or future unfilled capacity only, but as present act, a dynamic Winfield seeks, but is scared from by the anti-foundationalist critiques he accepts.

Winfield's response to them, nonetheless, is so far among the most developed and penetrating jurisprudence that we have. It carries the case for liberating law into pre-political society.

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Richard Wolin

The Terms of Cultural Criticism: The Frankfurt School, Existentialism, and Poststructuralism.

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With the call of '*Aude sapere*', or 'Dare to know', Kant epitomised the rejection of tradition and authority characteristic of the Enlightenment era. A new maturity would be built on the potential of Reason to break the chains of social and philosophical illusion. But that potential for emancipation veiled a capacity for domination, and the new rational morality and political structure handed down a legacy of instrumental rationalism and bureaucratic capitalism under which the human species was anything but free. We cannot, then, ignore the formidable challenges posed by twentieth-century criticism to the cultural legacies of the Enlightenment. And yet if Enlightenment ideals and Reason itself have come to appear dangerous (and all claims to truth, justice, and right simply masks for interest and power), nevertheless without *some* basis on which to oppose and replace them a nightmare world threatens in which might makes right, and that's *all right*. It is justified fear of such a worst-case scenario that provokes Richard Wolin's book. Written 'in the spirit of enlightenment about Enlightenment' (xviii), he aims to preserve against the perils of anti-intellectualism by promoting, instead, the program of achieving a *positive* notion of enlightenment out of the critique of Enlightenment.

The text consists of a series of 'portraits and studies' (xvii), divided into three parts corresponding to the three theoretical movements announced in the subtitle: the Frankfurt School, Existentialism, and Poststructuralism. Five of the nine chapters are reprints, originally published as essays, and since no concluding chapter is supplied to pull the threads of the collection together, the Introduction functions more as a manifesto than as opening a debate. Here Wolin proclaims his conviction that 'the shortcomings of Enlightenment must be attributed not, as we are so often told today, to a *surfeit* of reason, but to a *dearth* thereof ...' (4-5). It is therefore clear that the heroes of Wolin's tale will be the Critical Theorists. They take pride of place in Part One, which chronicles the development of the Frankfurt School with admirable lucidity, highlighting their ambivalence towards the legacy of western rationalism and closing with an account of Adorno's championing the redemptive power of art.

If Wolin is comfortably at home with the history and theory of the Frankfurt School, however, this leads him to be overly dismissive of the other theoretical positions examined in the book with which he lacks, perhaps, such close familiarity. These are dealt with in Part Two, which considers the various 'existentialisms' of Carl Schmitt, Heidegger, and Sartre — including a worthy discussion of Merleau-Ponty's 'Weberian Marxism' — and in Part

Three, where he surveys the 'poststructuralist' writings of Rorty, Foucault and Derrida. Observing that the reception of these traditions has tended to polarize into warring camps, Wolin early on declares his intention to steer wisely between the two extremes of unhesitating enthusiastic embrace, on the one hand, and wilful incomprehension, on the other, by offering 'constructive, immanent criticisms of the various movements of thought at issue' (xvii). Yet much of what follows belies this 'constructive' intention.

In his chapter on Heidegger, for example, Wolin criticises the French reception of Heidegger's thought for failing to adequately take account of his alleged political commitments. Rehearsing a now familiar theme, he attacks the 'delusion' of the 'French Heideggerians' that 'the eternal verities of (Heideggerian) philosophy could bear no affinities with the sordid actualities of world history ...' (104). It is not only 'naive', on his view, but 'intellectually dishonest' (104) to imagine that theoretical positions can be 'innocently lifted out of the socio-historical context in which they originated' (104), and Heidegger's thinking is thus condemned. Wolin's treatment of Heidegger, here as elsewhere, is hardly 'constructive', and lacks any real discussion of the complexities of these issues. Moreover, such declarations sit uncomfortably with his affirmation of 'a quasi-autonomous logic of ideas' (196) in his defence of Derrida against ill-willed detractors who fail to recognize that 'the claim that the circulation of ideas has its origins in a less exalted, material institutional sphere can tell us little or nothing about the intrinsic content of the ideas themselves' (196). There's one rule for one, it seems, and another for all the rest.

The fine line Wolin walks is evident, too, in his scathing account of Richard Rorty's work. Portraying Rorty as little more than a self-satisfied socialite, Wolin pours scorn on his writing as 'profoundly neoconservative', 'extremely resigned and quietistic' (151), and — worse still — 'teeming with dinner-party metaphors' (158). The complacency and superficial sophistication of Rorty's writing, we are told, betrays a 'calculated strategy of pursuing the line of least resistance' (152) in fighting only the ghosts of long-dead metaphysicians. However, in focusing his critique on Rorty's early *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* — and consigning his later discussions of Habermas, for example, to the footnotes — Wolin surely falls vulnerable to his own charge.

Furthermore it's not clear that Rorty fits the role of defender of the status quo that Wolin assigns to him here. It's not even clear, in fact, that the proposals of the two writers differ in essentials at all. Indeed, rather than advocating a radical program of cultural criticism in *opposition* to Rorty's, Wolin's own sentiments seem to stem from the same dinner-party conversation (only Wolin imagines himself, presumably, to be sitting somewhat further to the left). For like Rorty, Wolin insists that our norms and ideals 'must be legitimated immanently and democratically ... by the mutual approbation and consent of those potentially affected by a given norm' (18-19). Like Rorty, again, he believes that such 'processes of mutual understanding' will always be rooted in 'determinate forms of life' and 'cultural contexts' (19). And like Rorty, once more, he suggests that those ends must

be 'achieved via language as a medium of human intersubjectivity' by which we will 'reforge relations of solidarity and trust among women and men' (19). In yearning after 'a modest utopian vision according to which illegitimate relations of authority, domination, and force will be replaced by those of human mutuality' (19) Wolin speaks not only for Rorty but also for Kant and the vast majority inhabiting the liberal West. But talk is cheap, some would say, unless it tells us something new. Does Wolin's 'enlightenment about Enlightenment', then, repeat only what Kant dared to know?

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