Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

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Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing & Publishing
P.O. Box 4218, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 4T2
Tel: (403) 435-5898 Fax: (403) 435-5852

Publications Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X

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Published six times a year

Volume XVI, No. 4
August • août 1996

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Mailed in November/December 1996.

J.E.J. Altham and **Ross Harrison eds.**
World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. viii + 229.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-36024-2);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-47930-4).

Bernard Williams
Making Sense of Humanity and other philosophical papers 1982-1993.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. xii + 251.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-47279-2);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-47868-5).

Western moral philosophy is nearing the end of its third millennium, from Homeric *atē* to Rawls' reflective equilibrium. Yet, moral theory proved pointless long before antiquity had died. The erudite Roman scholar Varro undertook a study in the first century B.C. of previous philosophical inquiry into the *summum bonnum*, the human *telos*, the quest for happiness. His analysis exposed 288 distinctive varietals of moral theory. Five hundred years later, Augustine invoked Varro's *On Philosophy* to argue that philosophy as a way of life had failed. Moral theories diverged with each new author. The casuists had taken over.

The great Commonwealth ethicists of the past half-century have all studiously avoided the kind of systematic theorizing which did in ancient moral philosophy. Not coincidentally, these same Commonwealth ethicists have also earned international reputations as leading intellectuals, literary and political figures famous for their contributions to society and culture. Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire, Iris Murdoch, Charles Taylor, and Bernard Williams have all avoided the philosophical vacuity Varro ridiculed. At the same time they've proven Augustine wrong. It is, indeed, still possible to live a moral life as a philosopher, provided you avoid the isms — especially the kind of parochialism for which United States' research factories are, unfortunately, now notorious.

It is instructive that academic moral theorists in the United States have had no such comparably visible impact on their government or world literature. Elsewhere, moral theorists of a systematic bent have even proven genocidal when empowered. The late, unlamented Pol Pot trained in France as a philosopher. The leader of Peru's Shining Path terrorists once had been a philosophy professor. And there are literally hundreds of living Marxist-Leninist emeriti as well as fascists with PhDs and dirty hands, implicated in the deaths of millions. There is something terribly dangerous and ill-conceived with what Williams calls 'the morality system,' even if its moralists do not practice what they preach and quietly write their papers, whether

their hands remain aseptic (like Rawls), uncalloused (like Marcuse), or saluting (like Heidegger).

Academic moral theorists often relegate the Commonwealth ethicists to the margins of philosophy, as figures whose reputations (like Wittgenstein's) command respect but also chagrin and pity — if only they had been better system builders and taken their profession seriously. Happily, the Commonwealth ethicists have readers. In *World, Mind, and Ethics* (WME), Altham and Harrison have brought together a feast of essays celebrating Williams' work, to which Williams has replied, in addition to providing yet another volume of his papers: *Making Sense of Humanity* (MSH).

The nine papers in the Festschrift focus on Williams' earlier *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (ELP). Papers by Elster and Sen, for example, address rational decision-making in light of Williams' expressed preference for '*ad hoc* pragmatism' (WME 13), respecting the 'kind of motivational complexity' (WME 31) Williams thinks we should defer to. Williams has often characterized philosophical attempts to rationalize the mind as indicative of moral theorists' larger ambitions to turn morality into a science. And so Jardine politely probes Williams' emphasis on divergent moral outlooks to express a wish Williams would discourage: 'we can coherently hope for precedent-guided convergence in ethics ... enough to make objective ethical knowledge possible' — even if the quest might prove unrealized (WME 42). Hookway follows up by exploring Peirce's philosophy of science, to suggest that even if an ideal final moral convergence proves impossible, some kind of unforced local consensus remains necessary for ethical communities to prosper into the future (WME 66). In response, Williams promises (WME 223) a future study dedicated to questions of perspectivism and scientific realism, in answer to those who have criticized his divorcing morality from scientific correctness.

In 1784 Kant lamented, 'Out of timber so crooked as that from which man is made nothing entirely straight can be built.' But why would one even want to try to make the crooked straight? Isaiah Berlin has often criticized such Procrustean inhumanity, and Williams has long pursued this charge against Kant, Utilitarians, and assorted moralists. But Williams' criticism generates problems of its own, in particular how it is human beings' internal motivations can respond to moral points of view which are not their own already. As McDowell's essay 'Might There Be External Reasons?' points out, 'we do not conceive our values as owing their authenticity, and their relevance to what we do, to our motivational makeup' (WME 81). Since we ordinarily do conceive our moral values as at least transcendent of our own particular circumstances, we need to know whether this is simply a form of self-deception, as the sophist Stanley Fish suggests. Or is there some instructive process of conversion by which our own internally reasoned motivations are susceptible of influence commanded by external reasons entirely outside the orbit of our lives? In other words, how is moral growth achieved, given who and what we are already?

Several authors take up this issue in the Williams Festschrift. Hollis concedes that 'there is a fine line between situating external reasons and nuancing internal ones' (WME 184). But he contends that 'a robust notion of a community, embodying a shared conception of the good and relating self to others through the expectations attached to roles [yields] reasons for action which are external to each of us, but internal to our collective handiwork' (WME 183). Nussbaum applies a similarly nuanced conception of community to an Aristotelian ethic which would reduce the psychological distance between internal motivations and external reasons, by understanding the latter as internal to the human community, though external to the would-be moral sage growing up into a world citizen.

Williams is not persuaded, despite a deep respect for Aristotle. He finds the richness of Aristotle's ethics too caught up within its historically confining details to serve as a contemporary foundation of ethics. Aristotle's moral concepts are too 'thick' to be imported. Consequently, Williams appears to offer little hope of appealing to some established, external moral order to save those who have been already brought up badly. Many experienced psychiatrists and social workers agree with this. Yet, Williams' effort to make sense of humanity is not entirely pessimistic, despite his acerbic scepticism toward 'the extraordinary lightness of philosophical theories' (MSH 69). Williams has no desire to turn his scepticism into 'a certain vulgar Wittgensteinianism which makes an academic philosophy out of denouncing academic philosophy' (WME 218). His interest lies in liberation.

In reflecting on the French Revolution, Burke often remarked that naked reason is better clothed with custom; better prejudice than reason's engineering. Williams does not share Burke's conservatism, though he shares Burke's view of reasoned folly. Williams' understanding of humanity is more like Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*, endorsing neither social prejudice nor naked reason, but embracing the ineffable interests of individual human beings, leading to what Williams calls 'the continuing possibility of a meaningful individual life ... enough unlike others, in its opacities and disorder as well as in its reasoned intentions, to make it *somebody's*' (ELP 201-2).

Much of Williams' latest batch of philosophical papers carry out this theme in more detail, across a range of topics from free will, social evolution, and psychology to more technical philosophical debates, even embracing general discussions of lawyers, politicians, medical and environmental ethics. Across this entire panoply of recent papers, Williams continually calls attention to complexity and diversity from within the fabric of the practiced, plastic polity, with Williams providing a mixture of homily and scepticism in homage to the wondrous mess of humanity, in lieu of classifying and theorizing baldly (cf. MSH 109).

The depth of human psychology, the breadth of human interests, the thickness of history thwart both anti-individualism and false egoism at every turn. Williams exhibits an almost Emersonian reverence toward individuality and its mysteries, as Williams seeks to disparage and dismiss impersonal facets of moral system-building. So, 'the will is as free as it needs to be' (MSH

19). Or, 'the agent lives with the truth that his character, what he is, is neither a deliberative construct of his, nor fully expressed in his deliberations' (MSH 32). Again, 'we need not to forget but to remind ourselves what a human life is, has been, and can be' (MSH 88).

The urgency of liberation comes especially to bear in Williams' inaugural lecture at Oxford, 'Saint-Just's Illusion'. Williams considers the execution of 'the Jacobin leader Saint-Just, who was famous not only for his ruthless conduct of the Terror, but for the intensity with which he urged ideals of civic virtue drawn from the ancient world' (MSH 135). Saint-Just failed to consider that social ambitions cannot transcend specific historical conditions. He would not differentiate between his Utopian vision and the world around him (MSH 139). So, he tried to make 18th century France fit his vision of ancient Rome and lost his head, as so many others also did thanks to such futile efforts. Williams argues that philosophers suffer from a similar delusion that they can provide 'the universal and ultimate basis of all ethical experience' (MSH 147). Instead, Williams claims we need no such 'ultimately objective answer' (MSH 147). Besides, philosophy is too impure to find one on its own (MSH 148). Philosophy cannot function independently of human history and other forms of knowledge.

In his contribution to the Festschrift, Charles Taylor explores the wider motivations for such moral theories as Kant's or Utilitarianism. Taylor seizes on Williams' recognition of a dislocation between 'the spirit that is supposedly justified and the spirit of the theory that supposedly justifies it' (MSH 165). Modern moral theories lack the resources to display their own ethical appeal. Following Williams, Taylor argues: 'The more one examines the motives — what Nietzsche would call the "genealogy" — of these theories of obligatory action, the stranger they appear. Because it seems that they are motivated by the strongest moral ideals, like freedom, altruism, universalism. These are among the central moral aspirations of modern culture, the overarching goods which are distinctive to it. And yet these ideals drive the theorist towards a denial of all such goods' (WME 151). This self-induced implosion of morality systems displays what Taylor calls 'the dead weight of enforced inarticulacy' (WME 153). What is needed, Taylor argues, is 'articulacy about the good.'

Taylor praises Williams for his effort 'to fight uphill to rediscover the obvious, to counteract the layers of suppression of modern ethical consciousness' (WME 153). All this is literally to the good, but interestingly enough Williams resists Taylor's advice about articulacy as 'very refined casuistry' (WME 205). And such resistance goes to the heart of Williams' own vulnerability, disconnecting heart from head. When all is said and done, Williams may also prove unable to display the source of his own ethical appeal, once his initial hope for liberation is washed in his own pessimism.

Williams is suspicious of any deeper ethical self-understanding that comes from eliciting some sort of 'power of the good,' the kind solicited in Taylor's writings, drawn from Platonic Christianity (cf. WME 203-5). When looking deeply enough into the self, Williams sees dense, oppressive, elementary,

everyday needs. He concedes some psychological mechanisms might require, in certain times and cultures, rather subtle sentiments and values — noble sentiments, in fact. Williams is no reductionist. But he remains sceptical of there being a rock-bottom ethical presence timelessly embedded deep within the motivational structures of humanity.

Where, then, is the appeal of his ethics-without-theory? Is there nothing more to human lives than this: acting out complicated histories and destinies always from within our own internally reasoned mechanisms, like ships at sea with no greater voyage being planned except for here today and gone tomorrow, hither and yon willy-nilly? Williams' sense of our humanity requires no deeply metaphysical conception of the soul. Indeed, he revels in its absence. His is a minimalist and naturalist psychology. And Williams finds this minimalist sense of self a source of liberation from the metaphysical inventions of moral theories. He says this sense of self is 'realist, naturalistic,' but could that be his pessimism talking?

Contrast Williams' pessimism with Iris Murdoch's sense of human goodness as a driving source of moral motivation from deep within the depths of human psychology: 'I certainly want to suggest that the spiritual pilgrimage (transformation-renewal-salvation) is the centre and essence of morality, upon whose success and well-being the health of other kinds of moral reaction and thinking are likely to depend' (*Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*: 367). One can display Murdoch's or Taylor's conceptions of the goodness latent in the self over against that of Williams. And one can see at first glance why ethics really matters for Murdoch or for Taylor. Activating the goodness in our hearts is necessary for articulating our humanity. But where is the spiritual source of Williams' own approach to ethics? Here his *ad hoc* pragmatism pales by comparison to those who find within themselves a truly spiritual grounding — without being too metaphysical about it, in the way that Murdoch and Taylor certainly are not, with their own considerable disdain of philosophers' contrivances.

Augustine wrote his entire *City of God* around the motto: '*eligite quem colatis*.' Pick out whom (or what) you would worship, or tend to. Augustine expressed this sentiment in Latin terms borrowed from agriculture — cultivating soil and plucking plants from it; whether they be crops or weeds, reap what you would sow. Following the Platonists, Augustine argued that philosophy had only proven able to pluck the love of wisdom. But that initial motivating yearning, to love wisdom in the first place, philosophy itself could not implant or explain, since philosophy did not know how to germinate the grounding of our being, the primal yearning within each person. Plato had called this inner yearning *erōs*, but wrongly took inclination toward beauty and goodness as a given. Augustine argued this motivational yearning required implanting, cultivation, husbandry. Otherwise the soil always could be turned, within the psyche, from cultivating salvation to merely a life of scholarship, perhaps, or even perfidy, for instance.

If we consider Williams' sense of humanity, his views seem vulnerable to Augustine's criticism of philosophy as being unable to induce human moti-

vation. For Augustine, the spiritual struggle of humanity consisted of germinating goodness out of this inner primal process engendering psychological direction. And so McDowell and other critics are right to seize upon the question of conversion to a different ethical outlook as a particular difficulty Williams' unconstructed moral psychology faces, since Williams would refuse to fathom souls more deeply than he does. Williams' ethics takes us deep enough into humanity to free us from the contrivances of simple-minded theories. But the source of Williams' inspiration for his ethics appears to be a heart of darkness to those who would prefer to be engaged on a spiritual pilgrimage in search of goodness, instead of pessimism.

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Karl Ameriks and **Dieter Sturma, eds.**
The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy.
Albany: SUNY Press 1995.
Pp. 224.
US$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2753-6);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2754-4).

This book will compel the interest of three sorts of readers: specialists in the history of philosophy and German idealism, generalists who teach a certain range of classes, and anyone interested in contemporary debate regarding the nature of subjectivity.

Many of the essays collected here easily stand alone as important contributions to our understanding of the figures and topics of German idealism. Indeed, one way to read this volume is as a kind of super-seminar in German idealism, one which brings together the current research of some of the most prominent and insightful scholars of this period. From this perspective alone, the volume, in that tired but truthful cliché of book reviews, is required reading for specialists and graduate students.

But not only specialists need read in this volume. Many of the essays will be helpful to anyone who teaches history of modern philosophy, ethics, and philosophy of religion — especially English-speaking scholars with otherwise limited access to many of the texts and authors discussed here (including the lesser-known but crucial figures of Reinhold, Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schelling). For example, Henry E. Allison persuasively clarifies some of the knotty difficulties surrounding Kant's central but problematic conceptions of the moral self. This topic is nicely complemented by Georg Mohr's tracing the historical and philosophical development of the conception of self and free-

dom, especially as these intersect notions of intersubjectivity, from Wolff through Kant and Fichte. Similarly, Véronique Zanetti provides helpful insight into Kant's argument for the existence of God as a postulate of practical reason: her exposition would be of value for both history and philosophy of religion courses. Fichte and Hegel are equally well represented in contributions by Günter Zöller, Daniel Breazeale, Ludwig Siep, and Robert Pippin: taken together, these help trace out the Fichtean and Hegelian expansion of subjectivity into cultural and political domains.

But this volume speaks to a still broader audience — namely, to anyone interested in contemporary debate regarding subjectivity and the on-going evolution of and dialogue between Continental and analytic philosophy.

As is well-known, not so long ago Continental philosophy and the analytic approaches favored in the Anglo-American world were largely hostile to one another. A characteristic estimate of earlier analytic philosophy from the Continental perspective is baldly noted here by Dieter Sturma: 'indifference towards the history of philosophy, which early analytic philosophy has made part of its approach, turns out to be methodological incompetence' (202). Sturma's target is Gilbert Ryle's attack on notions of the self and self-consciousness as irreducibly distinct from the physical order. But Sturma's critique is in fact intended as part of a larger dialogue on subjectivity *between* more contemporary analytic and Continental voices. As the editors note in their 'Introduction', more recent analytic work (Strawson, Castaneda, Rawls, Taylor, Nagel, Chisholm, and Nozick) has taken more careful notice of earlier philosophical argument, including that developed by the figures of German idealism (most notably, Kant). In their turn, the scholar/philosophers collected here contribute to this new dialogue between Continental and analytic approaches as they seek to articulate, extend, and defend notions of subjectivity, initially developed in the intensely rich philosophical field of German idealism, against contemporary critiques of subjectivity out of both early analytic and postmodern perspectives — in part, just as these notions are refined by recognizing the force of certain analytic critiques.

The Introduction spells out the project of the collection in these terms, and provides the expected summary of individual essays. Through careful exegesis and exemplary *reportage* of argumentation and historical development, the first essays (as described above) articulate and in some measure reconstruct important notions of subjectivity in classical German idealism, beginning with Wolff and Kant. Occasionally, one of the initial essays will explicitly address contemporary critiques of subjectivity from the position developed through this historically-oriented examination. But the final three essays most explicitly continue German idealism as a living philosophical tradition into contemporary critiques and defenses of subjectivity. Representing the Heidelberg school theory of subjectivity as grounded in German idealism (especially Fichte), Manfred Frank offers a strong defense of subjectivity as irreducible. Ameriks and Sturma then complete the circle as they connect Kant with these more contemporary defenses. In particular, Ameriks' closing essay offers a striking synthesis of the historical and the contemporary as it

seeks to improve on Frank's position by modestly revising Frank's views in light of insights drawn from Kant.

Indeed, beyond the individual insights of each essay, the essays taken together stake out a significant new position in the defense of modern conceptions of self. Their reconstruction of German idealism requires us to reconsider the usual characterization of classical German philosophy as especially optimistic regarding human reason and subjectivity. Over against this familiar characterization, the essays here lead rather to '... a recognition of the deep contextual dependence of human self-relations. In German idealism, speculative reflection leads to an uncovering of the finitude of human self-relations and not at all to the implication that human existence transcends its contexts and conditions. Here above all is where the contribution of classical German philosophy is to be recognized for its efforts to gain a more differentiated view of the project of modernity' (8). Especially as such simple characterizations of German idealism fuel efforts to reject 'modernity' in favor of some ostensibly postmodern alternative, the collective point of these essays can be put this way: such a simple characterization is a straw man.

In sum, the essays succeed not only as rich studies of important historical figures: more broadly, they brilliantly accomplish their ambitious project of reconstructing and rehabilitating German idealism for the sake of a substantive contemporary dialogue on subjectivity which brings together both Continental and analytic insight. Thanks to these essays, both individually and collectively, philosophical idealism has regained in this dialogue a clear, strong voice.

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John Arthur
Words That Bind: Judicial Review and the Grounds of Modern Constitutional Theory.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1995.
Pp. x + 236.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-2348-7);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-2349-5).

This book attempts to bridge gaps between legal theory and political philosophy. Arthur observes that legal scholars theorizing about constitutional interpretation rarely consider the philosophical assumptions behind their views, and that philosophers formulating theories of justice rarely explore their implications for judicial review and constitutional law (5). He tries to accomplish both tasks by analyzing five approaches to constitutional inter-

pretation (including interpretation according to original intent, democratic proceduralism inspired by the work of John Hart Ely, critical legal theory, a utilitarian jurisprudence, and his own version of contractarianism). Arthur evaluates these interpretive frameworks on practical legal and normative political grounds, considering whether each provides 'coherent and workable' guidance for judges actually deciding constitutional cases while at the same time successfully 'weaving together an attractive vision of constitutional interpretation, judicial review and democratic government' (5).

Arthur dismisses constitutional interpretation according to original intent as impractical (citing the difficulty of determining framers' original intentions, especially with respect to issues beyond their scope of consideration or prediction) and as philosophically incoherent. As he interprets them, original intent theories claim that citizens consent to constitutions as social contracts or covenants. But the obvious problem, at least with respect to the United States' constitution, is that no one now governed by the constitution actually consented to it — and Arthur persuasively contends that it is impossible for originalists to show that contemporary U.S. citizens have tacitly consented to live under the constitution as it may have been understood by its framers. He also makes a convincing case that democratic proceduralism (where judges are constrained to uphold the constitutional validity of any law enacted according to genuinely democratic processes) fails to adequately protect the rights of minorities, and thus does not present an attractive vision of democratic government.

Arthur's analysis of critical legal scholarship is disappointing. The chapter begins with insightful comparison of similarities between legal realism and contemporary critical legal theory. But Arthur seems to misinterpret the critical theorists' claim that legal concepts and arguments are indeterminate (in the sense that they are flexible, and capable of judicial manipulation to support a whole range of possible outcomes in a given case) as a claim that legal concepts and argument are ultimately incoherent. He goes on to equate this interpretation of legal indeterminacy with moral subjectivism, recites a familiar litany of philosophical arguments against skepticism, and ends with a plea for moral objectivity as a necessary underpinning of the rule of law. Having gone off down this track, Arthur never returns to address the critical theorists' central claim (shared by the legal realists) that legal decisions are political decisions, and that judges use legal concepts and argument to legitimate their exercise of political power.

Though the next chapter's title promises discussion of recent theories of 'Law and Economics', Arthur does not consider these in any depth. Instead, he builds his own model of utilitarian judicial review based on a lengthy textbook-like discussion of utilitarian moral theory. But the 'modified form of indirect utilitarianism' Arthur proposes (132-40) seems to be little more than a warmed-over theory of judicial restraint. Under indirect utilitarianism, judges are constrained from actually engaging in utilitarian deliberation about the consequences of the legal rules they apply, because they lack the resources and expertise necessary to make the required calculations. How-

ever, they have discretion to make 'direct' utilitarian calculations 'if the situation requires it' or 'where the legal issue is momentous' (139) (though presumably if judges lack the resources to make utilitarian calculations in ordinary cases, they will be even less prepared to do so in momentous ones).

Arthur is unwilling to accept this model of judicial review, not because it fails to provide practical guidance for judges, but because utilitarian jurisprudence with its focus on the common good does not adequately respect or protect individual dignity. For this, Arthur believes, a theory of rights is necessary. He defends the concept of rights against the attacks of critical legal scholars, feminists and others, and claims more ambitiously that natural human rights exist. In the final chapter, he combines this argument with ideas borrowed from James Madison and John Rawls to create his own theory of 'democratic contractarianism'.

Arthur interprets Madison to claim that a constitution is a social contract entered into by 'free and independent equals deliberating in a temperate moment' (154), then draws on Rawls' model of reasoning from behind a veil of ignorance to explain what sort of contract/constitution this temperate deliberation might produce. But Arthur understands the Rawlsian veil of ignorance to require participants in constitutional deliberations to 'ignore ... all the factors making them *not* equal' (155) — though it is arguable that reasoning from behind a veil of ignorance would actually require very careful consideration of differences amongst potential citizens. It is also unclear why Arthur feels the need to combine a theory of natural human rights with contractarianism, since natural human rights, if they do exist, are prior to any social contract, and a properly formed social contract is presumably sufficient in itself to establish individual rights as limitations on government power without appeals to natural human rights.

Arthur does not scrutinize his own position on either practical or normative grounds, suddenly distinguishing between constitutional interpretation and political philosophy. The primary task of a contractarian, he says, is to understand the U.S. constitution 'insofar as possible, as the result of an agreement among free and independent equals' (171). The goal is to justify, not to criticize — the central concerns of constitutional interpretation are 'discerning the meaning of the text, not describing the ideal constitution' (172). Arthur seems to take for granted that the current U.S. constitution, interpreted in contractarian terms, presents an attractive vision of democratic government.

Though judicial review and constitutional interpretation can be analyzed in general terms potentially applicable to all constitutional democracies, this book does not do so. Its central focus is on the U.S. constitution, and the American version of representative democracy is uncritically assumed as a paradigm structure of democratic government. *Words That Bind* may therefore be of limited interest to readers interested in considering these issues in a Canadian context.

Amy Ihlan
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Ronald Beiner and
William James Booth, eds.
Kant and Political Philosophy:
The Contemporary Legacy.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1993.
Pp. 380.
US$40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-300-05687-7);
US$18.00 (paper: ISBN 0-300-06641-4).

This book is a very fine collection of essays, some previously published, by leading political philosophers and Kant scholars, now reissued in paperback. It succeeds in establishing its two main goals: 1) to provide a reasonably comprehensive and rewarding set of perspectives on Kant's political philosophy and its recent reverberations; and 2) to dispel forever the notion that Kant belongs in anything but the class of the most rigorous, challenging and insightful political philosophers of all time. Kant, indeed, is a rarity: a major Continental European philosopher who is a committed liberal internationalist. In so many ways, some to be suggested in this brief review, Kant deserves to be at the heart of the political philosophy of our era.

It is quite difficult to do justice to 16 selections written by 16 very different minds. A short evaluative synopsis follows.

Beiner and Booth's introduction is a succinct and suggestive summary of Kant's core political commitments, notably individual autonomy. It also offers a savvy analysis of some conundrums and tensions in Kant's political thinking, for instance: 1) of the important yet problematic relation between prudence and morality/justice; and 2) of that between Kant's desire for progress and his insistence on the intrinsic dignity of all human beings (who might otherwise be seen as mere means to the end of such progress).

Patrick Riley's contribution is superb: eloquent and erudite. One could do much worse if one was looking for a clear, concise and comprehensive introduction to the basics of Kant's practical philosophy. Riley counters the pervasive tendency to view Kant through Rawlsian ('constructivist') lenses by stressing 3 elements in Kant: 1) Augustinian/Rousseauian good will; 2) Platonic moral rationalism; and 3) Aristotelian teleology, especially the notion of an intrinsic good/end-in-itself.

Lewis White Beck's classic paper on the political significance of Kant's distinction between *wille* and *willkur* is here, as is Mary Gregor's substantial contribution to our understanding of Kant's theory of rights. While Gregor veers off on tangents about Grotius and Pufendorf, she nevertheless returns to offer a compelling analysis of Kant's very suggestive doctrine of right, in which property plays an enormous role. Indeed, hers is one of the very few papers here which deals with Kant's most important political imperative, the Universal Principle of Right: 'Act externally in such a way that the free use of your will is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to a universal law.'

There are two excellent papers on the crucial link between reason and politics in Kant. Richard Velkley writes incisively about one of Kant's main philosophical ambitions being to overcome 'the crisis of the end of reason', which is to say modern science's inability to offer us an ultimate purpose in life, as the ancients had purported to do. Kant's response, following Rousseau, was to argue that science is devoid of rationale if it cannot be used to advance our moral progress. This is Kant's famous declaration that theoretical reason is subordinate to practical reason — and that it falls to reason itself (thus ordered) to posit the ultimate goal for rational beings like us, namely, freedom and autonomy. John Rawls, himself the main reason for the recent Kant renaissance, deals with related themes in the book's most challenging piece. Here Rawls exhibits his recent tendency to draw back from first-order moral/political principles and to emphasize terribly abstract and complicated issues of metaethics. His main focus is on the method of Kant's constructivism (*pace* Riley's rationalism) and the profound interconnections between reason and the demands of morality/justice. This still seems to be one of the most important, and surely the most enduring, elements of Kant's practical philosophy. And these two essays are must-reads for any who take this topic seriously.

There are a number of exegetical essays — by Dieter Henrich, Susan Shell and Joseph Knippenberg — which will be interesting probably only to hard-core Kant scholars. Shell's, for example, is a fascinating piece on the connection between Kant's pre- and postcritical writings on community and commerce. It is interesting stuff but the decision to include it in *this* collection, given its theme, seems rather odd.

A version of Michael Doyle's much-discussed thesis regarding the correctness of Kant's views on peace between liberal states and the gradual spread of rights-respecting cosmopolitanism is included. It seems to me that one of Kant's most relevant and original doctrines worthy of our attention is his liberal internationalism. It is unfortunate that, in addition to a piece on Kant's *descriptive* philosophy of history, there were no essays evaluating Kant's *prescriptions* in this regard — and/or recent Kantian essays, for instance by Onora O'Neill or Thomas Pogge — on various questions of international ethics, such as human rights, duties beyond borders, multinational federalism, famines, wars, refugees, economic disparities, sovereignty vs. cosmopolitanism, and so on. Surely, in the increasingly interdependent global context, these are, or will be, among the most pressing political issues we face in the foreseeable future.

The remaining essays focus on familiar, and topical, debates surrounding Kant's political philosophy and its legacy, such as: the right vs. the good; proceduralism and neutralism vs. the engaged promotion of the good life; liberal universalism vs. communitarian relativism; detached rationality vs. embedded commitments. William Galston, Bernard Yack, Booth, Beiner, Charles Taylor, Jurgen Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamer all have something worthwhile to say. Yack and Booth, I think, have the best criticisms of Kant: 1) that he assumes too great a commonality of interest/identity between human beings; and 2) that his pro-rights, proto-libertarianism ignores

socio-economic realities which can be just as serious threats to human enlightenment and emancipation as political coercion.

It is regrettable that no essay by a contemporary Kantian, like Christine Korsgaard, was included which responds explicitly to these manifold concerns. Rawls and Habermas, admittedly, are included as 'representatives of Kantianism' but Rawls' piece is exegetical and Habermas' is concerned with defending his own quasi-Kantian 'discourse ethics'. Neither piece defends Kant or Kantianism from the barrage of criticism contained in the other essays. The impression left by the two critical sections is thus overwhelmingly negative, despite the fact that a number of contemporary thinkers — like O'Neill, Pogge, Korsgaard, Charles Beitz — have offered skilled and powerful defences, in the face of such concerns, of the core of Kant's political claims.

Another glaring omission is an essay on the very tight, and tremendously important, relation between reason, freedom, the state and law for Kant. Kant's legal rigorism — his obsession with the very idea of law — is a central and inescapable feature of his enormous and enduring political legacy.

In summary, this collection is a very solid, important and handy compilation of recent, high-quality work on Kant's practical philosophy. The inclusion of some essays, however, seems eccentric and the exclusion of others leaves one with a somewhat lop-sided understanding and evaluation of Kant's heritage. But one still comes away from the book convinced of Kant's profound and substantive contribution to the political thought of his, and our, time.

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Gérard Bergeron
Tout était dans Montesquieu. Une relecture de L'Esprit des lois.
Paris-Montréal: L'Harmattan (coll. Logiques juridiques) 1996.
Pp. 266.
ISBN 9-782738-443304.

On pourrait renvoyer à l'A. les termes mêmes par lesquels il apprécie l'œuvre capitale de Montesquieu, pour les appliquer, à notre tour, à cette «lecture accompagnée» (12) de *L'Esprit des lois* que Bergeron nous propose: «il est peu de théoriciens à pouvoir faire à leurs lecteurs la première politesse d'une langue de conversation sans abstraction outrée et sachant rester de bonne compagnie — ce qui est bien le premier et constant charme du voyage» (180). En effet la première qualité de la petite étude que nous offre Bergeron, auteur

réputé de divers ouvrages sur l'État, est peut-être bien l'alacrité du style qui ne se dément guère tout au long des divers chapitres, meilleur témoin du plaisir évident avec lequel l'A. «revisite», pour notre bonheur aussi, Montesquieu.

Ceci étant, la «relecture» est orientée par un intérêt surtout thématique. Le lecteur trouvera davantage dans cette étude un regroupement méthodique et perspicace des principaux sujets de réflexion de Montesquieu, ce que l'A. appelle une «déconstruction-reconstruction» (12), qu'une mise au jour élaborée de leur signification philosophique ou de leur portée théorique ou politique. La mise en relation des contenus centraux de *L'Esprit des lois* est certes facilitée par cette stratégie mais ne remplace évidemment pas ni une analyse plus poussée ni une véritable problématisation. Au reste l'A. ne voulait pas faire davantage et la nature comme les limites de l'entreprise sont circonscrites soigneusement dès l'Avant-propos.

Les deux premiers chapitres sont consacrés à une courte mais vivante présentation de la vie de Montesquieu et des œuvres qui encadrent *L'Esprit des Lois*. Reprochons cependant à l'A. la petite négligence de la note 12 du second chapitre où il attribue à Rousseau un *Projet de paix perpétuelle* alors que celui-ci n'est l'auteur que d'un résumé et d'un *Jugement* (critique) sur celui de l'abbé de Saint-Pierre. Et puisque nous en sommes au chapitre des reproches, signalons, tout de même, une vétille due à la mise en pages: l'étrangeté typographique qui fait que certaines notes sont rejetées à la page qui suit celle où elles ont été appelées tout en signalant au lecteur, par exemple, à la p. 43 de, «lire la note 12 p. 44».

Le chapitre III présente et justifie la stratégie méthodologique originale de l'A. selon laquelle il a établi sa lecture de *L'Esprit des lois*. Son grand avantage est qu'elle lui permet de reconstruire le plan de cette œuvre, selon l'ordre des raisons, pour ainsi dire, et tout en regroupant les chapitres par thèmes apparentés, de faire apparaître, plus facilement à la compréhension du lecteur, l'économie de l'argumentation. Une table des concordances entre le plan original et le plan ainsi reconstruit est dressée aux pages 71-72. Les chapitres suivants rapportent alors selon cette thématique les thèses centrales de Montesquieu et leurs principaux développements. Parmi les exposés les plus stimulants, signalons ceux des chapitres huit à dix qui traitent de la philosophie politique de Montesquieu, et en particulier de l'analyse de la Constitution d'Angleterre. La méthode de lecture de l'A., en plus de cet avantage didactique certain, réussit à mettre en valeur, de surcroît, certains aspects méconnus ou, du moins, négligés de *L'Esprit des lois*: la philosophie économique, par exemple (chapitre V), ou surtout la section IV du chapitre X dans laquelle Bergeron, à la suite de Pierre Manent, attire notre attention sur la théorie des partis politiques qui pour être encore embryonnaire, chez Montesquieu, n'en est pas moins novatrice et on ne peut plus actuelle en regard du débat néo-libéral contemporain.

L'étude claire et agréable de Bergeron, très pédagogique aussi, est conduite d'une main sûre qui va à l'essentiel mais qui ne néglige pas, ici et là, d'ouvrir des aperçus stimulants sur les aspects un peu plus complexes ou

encore plus actuels de cet «Ancien parmi les Modernes», formule que l'A. reprend de Simone Goyard-Fabre, la spécialiste bien connue de Montesquieu. Elle aurait peut-être gagnée à contenir une bibliographie même très générale; quoiqu'il en soit elle sera utile, sur un double plan, à l'étudiant en sciences humaines ou tout simplement à «l'honnête homme», curieux de la pensée politique et juridique d'un des plus grands philosophes des Lumières: comme analyse thématique, elle met au fait, avec compétence, des grandes articulations de l'œuvre majeure de Montesquieu et elle permet, par sa vue cavalière, une mise en relief suggestive de ses centres de gravité.

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Christopher Biffle
A Guided Tour of Five Works by Plato. 2nd. edn.
Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company 1995. Pp. viii + 125.
US$9.95. ISBN 1-55934-356-7.

S.W. Emery
Plato's Euthyphro, Apology and Crito.
Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1995. Pp. viii + 79.
US$22.50. ISBN 0-7618-0170-7.

Two recent presentations of selected dialogues attempt to bridge the gap between Plato and his modern audience. In *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology and Crito*, S.W. Emery reorchestrates the Jowett translations, adding character sketches (prior to each dialogue), stage directions, and choruses commenting on the action. Her aim is to promote the dramatic element of Plato's writing; to make performance (real or imagined) a part of reading and learning about Plato. In *A Guided Tour of Five Works by Plato*, Christopher Biffle targets the novice, framing a slightly modified Jowett translation of the *Euthyphro*, the *Apology*, the *Crito*, the death scene from the *Phaedo*, and the allegory of the cave (*Republic* VII) with questions, marginal notes, and brief exercises designed to focus the reader in her/his engagement of Plato's arguments (for example, in the margin opposite some ironic remarks Socrates makes to Euthyphro [11], Biffle writes: 'Socrates wants Euthyphro to think_____, but, in fact, Socrates means_____. Therefore, this is another example of Socrates' irony.'). There are more detailed questions and exercises at the end of each dialogue.

Making Plato more accessible to the philosophical novice is, of course, a laudable undertaking. But both Emery and Biffle proceed on the basis of assumptions which might do more to undermine that project than to promote it. Emery's introduction of the choric voice, for example — setting the scene and summarizing the action, commenting on Socrates' fate from a distance — produces a new level of textual irony that diverts our attention from the irony of Socratic discourse and compromises its centrality in the text. Socrates differs from the tragic hero precisely by virtue of the control he exercises over his own destiny. The twists and reversals with which he is associated in Plato's text (whether in connection to the drama of his own life or to his teaching) do not descend on him from the outside. They are a function of his own design, his own mastery of language. Emery's attempt to tell the story of Socrates using the conventions of a tradition in which, tragically or comically, character's fates are beyond their control, risks undermining the revolution against that tradition — i.e., against surrender to the inscrutability of fate — that stands at the heart of Socratism itself. At the very least, teachers using this book would have to distinguish the textual distances opened up in Emery's choruses from those operative in the work itself; a detour many might prefer to avoid.

Biffle's offering represents a different species of the same problem. The workbook format of his *Guide* will strike many teachers as an imposition of unjustifiable limits on their own creativity as readers. The marginal notes and exercises themselves constitute an interpretation. They advise us about what is important in Socrates' argument, when he is being ironic, and so on. And they tell us how to work (i.e., what sorts of questions to ask, what form our notes ought to take). Yet a truly creative response to Plato's text (one which might seek to integrate it with other texts in reflecting on a wider fundamental theme, for example) will want to reserve these decisions for itself. The idea that what is at stake in the great works of our tradition is wholly separable from our attempts to engage it — to the point where we might imagine the rules of that engagement delivered to us in advance and readymade — seems to have currency among modern educators. Plato himself, on the other hand, warned against it repeatedly.

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Dana E. Bushnell, ed.
'Nagging' Questions: Feminist Ethics in Everyday Life.
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. 1995. Pp. x + 403.
US$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8006-1);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8007-X).

'Nagging' Questions has clearly been put together with the best of pedagogical intentions. The editor offers an introduction to the field, and the essays themselves are collected into four sections which exhibit reasonable breadth. Both theoretical and practical ethics are explored, with the emphasis on the latter, especially in the areas of workplace ethics, reproductive technology, pornography and the female body. There are few new essays, but each one, including the introduction, is accompanied by a set of questions for discussion and/or essay writing.

It is unfortunate, however, that despite its good intentions, this anthology aims in too many directions at once, and will thus require extensive supplementation as a teaching text. The introductory essay is not effective at drawing the reader in. Editor Dana Bushnell seems torn between offering a mere overview of the book, and delving more deeply and substantially into some of the philosophical and political issues current in contemporary feminism. In one brief paragraph she contrasts the ideas of the moral and the common sense cases for feminism, suggesting that she has an interesting and significant new understanding of how best to establish the feminist case, but this thread is not followed up. It is claimed that the book will focus on concrete ethical issues which 'uniquely' affect the lives of women, but no argument is offered as to why the issues presented here are unique in just that way. Additional assertions that problems affecting women also harm society appear to undermine the point about uniqueness. Important and well-known disputes about sex and gender as they relate to sameness, difference, and essentialism lurk in the background here, but they are not mentioned. Nor does Bushnell satisfactorily address the move from problems of concern to women (unique or otherwise), to a specifically *feminist* understanding of ethics. Since most of the essays adopt a straightforward analytic approach and do not dwell on the more well-known debates in feminist ethics as such (e.g., justice vs. care), it is not always clear why this should be thought of as an anthology of distinctively feminist ethics. Bushnell does say that, for example, dealing with demeaning workplace comments on one's clothing and appearance is a feminist issue because it is traditionally women who suffer such indignities. This move is standard if somewhat quick. To go on and claim that this feminist question *becomes philosophical* 'when it is considered objectively and rationally' (8) is both to overlook a vast body of feminist literature critical of philosophical objectivity, and to assume that rational, objective consideration are the hallmarks of philosophy but not of feminism. (The tension between these two positions is itself a subject of intensive

scrutiny among feminists, as early enthusiasm to abolish objectivity and rationality outright have been shown to suffer from No Baby, No Bathwater Syndrome.)

Further, although the discussion questions are occasionally very good, their tone is sometimes at odds with the level of sophistication of the essays they accompany. In the worst case, the fit of question to essay seems designed to encourage superficial student responses likely to drive an instructor mad: 'Explain what philosophy is', even when tempered with the further instruction to describe the ways in which philosophy and feminism might interact, fairly begs an overly hasty gloss. In addition, Bushnell declares that the book is global in scope at some level, but there is a decided lack of diversity among contributors and little effort to problematize race, culture, ethnicity, and class. Taken together, these criticisms leave the reader wondering the level of student to whom such a book may be pitched. It is clear that *'Nagging' Questions* would not stand well on its own as a primary course text.

It may still be worth an instructor's while to augment the book and use it as a secondary text. This is so simply because some of the essays included here are both exceptionally well written and important to a reasoned understanding of feminist ethics and/or 'women's' issues in ethics. The first, most theoretical section of the book deals with autonomy and responsibility, and includes superior essays by John Christman and Anita M. Superson, and an outstanding article by Susan Wendell. The essays by Wendell and Christman ('Oppression and Victimization: Choice and Responsibility' and 'Feminism and Autonomy', respectively) are also abundant sources of reference material which may be followed up to enrich a student reading list. Moreover, the issues of autonomy and responsibility connect this section of the book with wider debates especially among feminists, but in philosophy more broadly as well. While famous anti-feminists such as Christina Hoff Sommers, Katie Roiphe and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese misrepresent feminism as a crushing discourse of victimization and blame, Wendell in particular recognizes that victimization is only a starting point, and a very compassionate one, for thinking about oppression. Wendell's essay is so systematic, unflinching, and well argued that it should be required reading even in non-feminist classes, but one can rely on its original appearance in *Hypatia* if the Bushnell anthology fails to satisfy.

Sandra Lee Bartky's 'Feminine Masochism and the Politics of Personal Transformation' dovetails remarkably with Wendell's article. Wendell points out that even when one raises one's consciousness and changes one's beliefs, one's feelings are not always transformed into more 'appropriate' ones. Bartky shows how this failure of feeling plays out in the arena of sexual desire, and how a naive voluntarism sometimes distorts feminist consideration of pleasure and shame. Again, however, Bartky's outstanding contribution is even more impressive when read in the context of her 1990 book *Femininity and Domination*, from which this essay is reprinted. The strength of the anthology lies in presenting essays like Wendell's and Bartky's together.

There are other excellent essays here, especially Susan Sherwin's 'New Reproductive Technologies' and Kathryn Pauly Morgan's 'Women and the Knife: Cosmetic Surgery and the Colonization of Women's Bodies', about which much the same can be said. Their authors are well known for producing work of high calibre and the serious instructor is apt to prefer to use the Bushnell collection as a prelude to an ongoing exploration of that body of work. It is sometimes thought-provoking to read these essays side by side, and even the more muddled contributions, such as Edward Johnson's 'Beauty's Punishment: How Feminists Look at Pornography' benefit from their proximity to more clear-headed treatment of complex moral and practical dilemmas. The remainder of the book is composed of contributions which are at least adequate for students and instructors having some knowledge of feminism and sufficient philosophical and research skills.

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Thomas Dean, ed.
Religious Pluralism and Truth: Essays on Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion.
Albany: SUNY Press, 1995.
Pp. xi + 271
US$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2123-6);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN: 0-7914-2124-0).

Philosophy of religion in the Anglo-American tradition has been almost always 'Judaeo-Christian'—with the emphasis, implicitly or explicitly, on 'Christian'. It has also been of a rather etiolated variety; by concentrating on questions about the 'philosopher's God', it has tended to ignore many other issues that are involved in religious belief.

This volume recognises and attempts to redress this. Selected from papers delivered, during the 1970s and 1980s, at the Working Group on Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion of the American Academy of Religion, the essays in this collection discuss what is involved in pursuing the philosophy of religion—as distinct from 'comparative religion'—from a cross-cultural (i.e., multi-denominational) perspective. They rightly focus on what is the central, but also the most thorny, question—that of whether one can talk about religious truth.

The volume is divided into four parts: i) the definition and justification of cross-cultural philosophy of religion, ii) the possibility of establishing criteria

of cross-cultural truth, iii) models of truth in religion and, iv) hermeneutical issues involved in cross-cultural truth in religion. Some of the essays do not, however, fit easily under any of these headings, and those in the first part frequently address issues raised in other sections.

The 14 papers presented here, along with the Editor's own lengthy introduction, are generally thoughtful and show an understanding of the difficulties involved in establishing clear criteria for religious truth while, at the same time, retaining a respect for the 'truths' of different religions. It is evident that the authors wish to avoid proposing a notion of truth that is ultimately relativistic, but it is difficult to see how they can do this and still preserve such a pluralism.

As a general introduction to the themes and problems involved in the issue of religious pluralism and truth, this collection is useful. The Editor has provided a reasonably broad range of perspectives on the topic, and contributors include Ninian Smart and Mary Ann Stenger (each with 2 essays), William Wainwright, Raimundo Panikkar, Harold Coward, William Christian, Sr., Joseph DiNoia, Norbert Samuelson, Conrad Hyers, John Y. Fenton, Frederick Streng, and Ashok Gangadean. Several of the papers—particularly those of Smart, Wainwright and Stenger—are clear and well-written; others, such as Panikkar's (and those in the final section) show much less analytical rigour. One might wonder why some influential approaches (e.g., those of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and John Hick) are not included or are mentioned only briefly, (and then simply by way of attempted refutation), but these views are arguably already well represented in print.

Most of the essays, however, are beginning to show their age. Five have previously been published (between 1981 and 1987), and the others date from between 1975 and 1985. There are but two that refer to materials published after 1982; this is unfortunate since recent discussions in epistemology (and especially in the epistemology of religion) suggest ways in which those interested in cross-cultural philosophy of religion might better address the difficulties involved in preserving a coherent notion of truth while, at the same time, respecting religious diversity.

Despite the preceding reservations, this volume is to be commended both for the generally high quality of the contributions and for its attempt to deal with an issue that is all-too-frequently ignored in most Anglo-American studies in the philosophy of religion.

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André De Tienne
L'analytique de la représentation chez Peirce.
Bruxelles: Publications des Facultés
Universitaires Saint-Louis 1996.
Pp. 410.
ISBN 2-8028-0105-8.

Peirce s'intéresse très jeune à l'analytique transcendantale de Kant mais, insatisfait de la double liste kantienne des catégories et des jugements, qu'il estime redondante et insuffisamment fondée, s'efforce très tôt de refondre la table des catégories en une liste resserrée de «conceptions universelles» présentes dans *tous* les jugements parce que nécessairement impliquées dans leur formation. Après une étude rigoureuse de la *Critique* et plusieurs refontes insatisfaisantes, il conclut toutefois qu'un tel projet ne peut être couronné de succès que si la nouvelle liste repose sur une solide fondation logique qui, en outre, extrait la recherche catégorielle du carcan psychologique et empirique dans lequel elle est habituellement menée et dans lequel son résultat se trouve inévitablement confiné. *On a New List of Categories*, le premier résultat achevé de cette recherche catégorielle renouvelée, et la dernière oeuvre de jeunesse de l'auteur américain, constitue, de l'avis d'André De Tienne, «la pierre angulaire de tous les travaux de Peirce» (p. 17). *L'analytique de la représentation chez Peirce (ARP)* étudie en détail ce dernier des *juvenilia* peirciens, traduit et annexé à *ARP* sous le nom *«Une nouvelle liste de catégories»*, en ne cherchant pas tant à y retrouver l'origine des oeuvres de maturité du philosophe américain (un projet qui aurait tenté un chercheur moins avisé — celles-ci, prises globalement, ne constituant rien de moins que le fondement du courant américain en sémiotique et une source majeure du pragmatisme), mais bien plutôt en cherchant à dégager avec soin l'argument central qui la compose tout en retraçant sa genèse dans les écrits de Peirce.

Peirce estime au moment de la rédaction de la *Nouvelle Liste* qu'une reconstruction adéquate de la table catégorielle kantienne doit se fonder sur une solution au problème du mode de modification de la conscience, c'est-à-dire une solution au problème de la *représentation*: c'est en se «modifiant» que la conscience *crée* du sens et c'est en déterminant les modes de modification les plus fondamentaux de la conscience qu'on pourra fonder légitimement une table des conceptions universelles. De Tienne soutient, au terme d'une analyse serrée (et développée sur quatre chapitres) du *corpus* peircien datant de la période juvénile dite «kantienne» (1857-1863), que Peirce a découvert l'importance centrale de la question du mode de modification de la conscience en cherchant, guidé par une triade pronominale (JE, IL, TU) adaptée de Schiller (*Lettres sur l'éducation esthétique de l'homme*), à résoudre le problème du *mode d'acquisition* de la connaissance — problème préalablement distingué de celui des *limites* de la connaissance, dont l'analyse devait être guidée par une triade des stades catégoriels (simple/nul, positif, parfait) que Peirce dégageât, à la lecture de Kant, de la triade pronominale. Après

avoir retracé l'origine des problèmes général (refondre la liste des catégories kantiennes en une liste de conceptions universelles) et particulier (comprendre la structure logique du processus de représentation) traités au sein de la *Nouvelle Liste des Catégories*, *ARP* centrera son attention sur l'argument central de la *Nouvelle Liste*. Cette étude, qui couvre les trois plus important chapitres d'*ARP*, est organisée selon deux dimensions orthogonales, la première divisée selon les trois aspects traités l'argument central (soit épistémologique, méthodologique et catégoriel) et la seconde divisée selon la source textuelle des éléments d'analyse (soit le corpus contemporain à la composition de la *Nouvelle Liste* et la *Nouvelle Liste* elle-même).

L'exégèse ainsi menée fait en outre voir comment, chez Peirce, la recherche des conceptions universelles et la construction d'une théorie de la représentation se conditionnent mutuellement. Contrairement aux catégories kantiennes, les catégories peirciennes sont en effet les étapes logiques d'un processus de construction des représentations propositionnelles (car c'est cette forme de représentation qui est l'aboutissant du processus décrit par Peirce). Chercher les conceptions universelles c'est donc chercher les étapes logiques caractérisant tout processus de représentation propositionnelle. La découverte de ces étapes est mue, au plan logique, par l'opération de «prescision» (la séparation d'une hypothèse explicative de son *explicandum* par considération de la première et négligence du second), selon le principe «A est une étape logique de la construction de B si, et seulement si, A ne peut être prescindé de B alors que B peut l'être de A», et procède à rebours du processus de construction des représentations. Alors que ce dernier va de la substance (entendue comme représentation indifférenciée pure) à l'être, ce qui est, (entendu comme représentation unitaire différenciée) — la direction vaguement kantienne, et De Tienne insiste sur les différences, du processus de construction des représentations est donc claire: il s'agit de construire progressivement l'unité différenciée de l'être à partir du divers indifférencié de la substance — Peirce induit ses conceptions universelles de l'être à la substance. Par cette méthode, il identifie successivement les trois conceptions universelles intermédiaires de Qualité (référence à un fondement), Relation (référence à un corrélat), Représentation (référence à un interprétant).

L'intérêt d'une exégèse minutieuse et exhaustive du «dernier des *juvenilia*» d'un philosophe du XIX^{e} siècle aurait été très singulier si De Tienne n'avait pas su si admirablement nous y faire découvrir la théorie peircienne de la représentation et, par conséquent, vu la thèse kantienne à l'effet que la structure logique d'un acte de connaissance est celle d'un acte de représentation, thèse que Peirce ne rejettera jamais, un aspect fondamental de la théorie peircienne de la connaissance (l'autre étant l'attitude ontologique fidéiste au coeur du pragmatisme épistémologique de Peirce — attitude en partie adoptée par rejet du transcendantalisme). Par ce double intérêt thématique, *ARP* intéressera les chercheurs en sciences cognitives autant que les historiens spécialistes de Peirce, de la progéniture du texte kantien ou des origines de la philosophie anglo-saxonne contemporaine. Pour les

premiers, l'analytique de la représentation de Peirce, tout comme le livre d'André De Tienne qui la fait connaître, est éminemment rafraîchissante en cette époque où foisonnent ces théories des cooccurrences événementielles qu'on dit «de la représentation». Pour les seconds, ils seront l'occasion de découvrir ou de réévaluer l'importance d'une voie américaine négligée (au profit de l'allemande) menant, à sa façon, du criticisme kantien à la philosophie anglo-saxonne contemporaine.

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Louis Dupré
Passage to Modernity.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1993.
Pp. x + 300.
US$32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-300-05531-5);
US$15.00 (paper: ISBN 0-300-06501-9).

Passage to Modernity is an extremely important book, now reissued in paperback. A seminal study of the origins and philosophical significance of the modern age, it challenges theses advanced by Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and many others. Dupré's highly original claim is that modernity did not begin with either the Renaissance or the Enlightenment. Nor was it an inevitable outgrowth of ancient thought, as Nietzsche's followers would have it. Rather, modernity should be traced back to an intellectual revolution that occurred late in the fourteenth century. Before then, Western philosophers shared a common 'ontotheological' (3) vision: that meaning and value inhere in the cosmos, because a transcendent principle is directly present in the world. For the Greeks, this principle was form, and in it consisted 'both the essence of the real and our knowledge of it' (18). In early medieval thought, this principle mutated into the divine ideas transferred to the world through God's creative act. But by the late fourteenth century, Western philosophy no longer had the conceptual resources to support this ontotheological vision. Nominalist theology had banished universal forms from creation and given priority to the individual. Italian humanism, with its emphasis on earthly creativity, rushed in to fill the void. Together, these two movements led the West to see meaning and value as imposed on the cosmos by humanity, not features of the real itself. The result was the modern view of the subject. Radically detached from nature, this subject is less a part of the cosmos than its meaning-bestowing centre. Its appearance ushers in

wholly new ways of relating to the real. Freedom becomes unrestrained voluntarism; nature becomes an object for human exploitation; an ethics of virtue gives rise to one of obligations and rights. While Dupré does not see the shift to modernity as entirely negative, he does think it is 'difficult to avoid the conclusion that modern culture failed in morally justifying itself' (143). Whatever one makes of this claim, Dupré's defense of it is beautifully written, immensely learned, and convincingly argued.

Passage to Modernity has much to recommend it besides its central thesis. Dupré's wide-ranging discussions of early modern culture are generally excellent in their own right. His treatments of the novel and the natural law tradition are especially good. Another strength is that Dupré, despite his ambivalence to the modern project, refuses to condemn it in the name of naive philosophical nostalgia. 'Modern problems,' he points out, 'cannot be treated as errors to be corrected by a return to an earlier truth' (7), such as MacIntyre's neo-Thomism or Taylor's neo-Augustianism. Unfortunately, Dupré does not always apply this 'hermeneutic approach' (9) consistently. His discussions of Giordano Bruno and Baroque culture, for instance, betray a hint of nostalgia, a certain yearning for premodern roads not taken. But these inconsistencies do not detract from Dupré's considerable achievement. *Passage to Modernity* is a great book. It will become required reading for every philosopher interested in the modern condition.

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William A. Frank and **Allan B. Wolter**
Duns Scotus, Metaphysician.
West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press 1995.
Pp. ix + 224.
US$44.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-55753-071-8);
US$23.00 (paper: ISBN 1-55733-072-6).

John Duns Scotus was, by general agreement, one of the most influential and philosophically innovative of the late thirteenth century scholastic theologians. Through a series of excerpts from Scotus' works, given in both Latin and English translation, plus extensive commentary on these, the authors have endeavoured to introduce his thought to the modern student of philosophy. The center of attention is Scotus' metaphysical proof of the existence of an infinitely perfect first being, perhaps the most elaborate philosophical argument ever contrived to prove God's existence. Orbiting around this topic are

discussions of the subject matter of metaphysics, how we can have any concepts of God at all, the univocity of 'being', how 'being' is the primary object of the intellect, and how the mind can through its natural capacities arrive at certain knowledge. At the very end there are brief treatments of Scotus' views on universals, individuation and the will.

Both of the authors are well known scholars in the field of late medieval philosophy and what they have to say about Scotus, one of the most difficult of the scholastic philosopher-theologians, is almost always helpful and deserving of careful consideration by anyone interested in mastering his thought. Scholars have not yet produced a thorough and comprehensive assessment of Scotus' *opera*, so exactly what is significant and what is scholastic dross in his works remains very much a matter of debate. Frank and Wolter have chosen to focus on his philosophical theology, and this certainly has the merit of putting to the fore something which was a primary concern for Scotus himself. It has meant, however, that topics which less theologically minded philosophers find very interesting, for example, universals, first and second intentions, intelligible species, objective vs. formal existence, identity and distinctions, necessity and contingency, freedom and determinism, have received minimal attention, although these intersect more with current philosophical concerns than does Scotus' theology. Frank and Wolter say in their preface that it is their 'conviction that Scotus's metaphysical thoughts can stand above the historical contingencies in which he shaped them'; concentrating on a very dated philosophical theology hardly seems the way to demonstrate this to students.

The authors have also chosen in their commentaries to emphasize the logic of Scotus' arguments and positions rather than his place in the historical context of thirteenth century debates. This is not to say the latter is entirely missing; the discussion of Augustinian illuminationism and its chief protagonist at Paris, Henry of Ghent, is extensive and illuminating. Given the length and aims of the book, the choice is probably a wise one. Certainly the reader interested more in philosophy than in history will appreciate the authors' efforts to delve behind the scholastic format and vocabulary to reveal the philosophical ideas that have perennial interest.

Among these ideas of perennial interest which are treated in some detail is Scotus' doctrine of transcendental terms — roughly the concepts which find application no matter what sort of thing is under discussion; but here I think the beginning student will miss not having an explanation of Aristotle's doctrine of categories, for the significance and controversialness of Scotus' approach can hardly be understood without it. Another perennial idea which comes in for much discussion is 'infinity', and, although the authors have much of interest to say about Scotus' treatment of it, I felt they largely missed an excellent opportunity to show how in his defense of the logical possibility of an actual infinite Scotus was ahead of his time; that idea would not really be accepted until Cantor's work on transfinite numbers.

In analyzing Scotus' arguments it seemed to me the authors went too far in the direction of sympathetic interpretation and not enough in the direction

of critical appraisal. The multitude of arguments Scotus mobilizes as he moves relentlessly toward the conclusion that there is a single first being and it is infinite in power and perfection were sharply challenged in Scotus' own day and any critically minded student will see a host of holes that need filling. The authors are content, too much I think, to summarize the steps and catch the general drift of the reasoning. No doubt one should start from a position of some sympathy with Scotus' aims and a willingness to give the Subtle Doctor a chance to make his points, but in the final assessment the weaknesses in his reasoning cannot be overlooked.

One pleasant surprise in this volume is the choice of texts the authors have presented. There is quite a bit of material from the *Questions on the Metaphysics*, a work very little of which has ever been translated. Also Frank and Wolter have used extensively a version of the Parisian *Reportatio* which exists only in manuscript form. The version they give of Scotus' proof of the existence of God is from this work rather than from the well edited *Ordinatio* or his *De Primo Principio*. These choices seemed to me to be a very welcome contribution to Scotus scholarship. I was more ambivalent about the use of the *Lectura* version of Scotus' attack on Henry of Ghent's views on what we can know *ex puris naturalibus* instead of the *Ordinatio* version which Wolter has translated elsewhere. To make up for an omission in the former the authors end up translating (170-1) an extensive section of the latter anyway. The translations themselves are very readable and judicious in the rendering of the scholastic jargon of which Scotus is both a master and creator.

The work concludes with a select bibliography that does not burden the reader with much beyond the more recent studies in English, and indices of both names and subjects. All in all, this volume makes a valuable contribution to the restoration of Scotus' philosophical reputation and hopefully will encourage teachers of medieval philosophy to give greater prominence to a difficult but very rewarding thinker.

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Judith Genova
Wittgenstein: A way of seeing.
New York: Routledge 1995.
Pp. xvii + 226.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-91062-5);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-91063-3).

Que doit *faire* le professeur d'arithmétique face à l'élève ne sachant pas comment résoudre un problème? Il doit *changer la manière de voir* de son élève, changer, comme on dit, *sa vision* du problème. Le bon professeur saura reconnaître la vision fautive de l'élève, la lui montrer, lui faire voir comment elle est à l'origine de ses échecs, et enfin tracer un chemin vers une représentation du problème qui en permettra la résolution.

Tel est, selon Wittgenstein (W), le rôle du philosophe et l'étalon par lequel on évalue sa production. *Wittgenstein: A way of seeing (WWS)* de Judith Genova thématise cet aspect peu travaillé de la pensée de W. Cette dernière offre à cet effet un cas tout à fait unique à l'analyste: c'est un discours portant sur le changement des manières de voir qui est lui-même marqué, du *Tractatus* aux *Investigations*, par un important changement de manière de voir au sujet des manières de voir. Ce double aspect du texte wittgensteinien s'inscrit en filigrane dans *WWS*: le lecteur y est constamment porté d'un niveau à l'autre, du discours wittgensteinien *sur* le changement de la manière de voir au changement de manière de voir *montré par* le discours wittgensteinien.

Il faut donc lire *WWS* à deux niveaux. D'abord comme une oeuvre métaphilosophique explicitant ce que sont, pour W, le rôle du philosophe de même que la place et le statut de sa production au sein s'une culture où la science est fermement établie. Comme cet aspect de la pensée de W est informé en son fondement par le concept épistémologique de *manière de voir*, *WWS* est aussi au premier niveau une oeuvre épistémologique explicitant la nature de ce concept. Au second niveau, *WWS* est à proprement parler une étude wittgensteinienne analysant la source du changement de manière de voir marquant la pensée de W et l'état de sa pensée au terme de la transformation. Enfin, puisque, pour Genova, comme pour l'auteur qu'elle étudie, philosopher c'est agir, *changer* les manières de voir, il faut aussi lire *WWS* à ce second niveau comme un essai philosophique original visant à changer notre *manière de voir*, c'est-à-dire de *lire*, l'oeuvre de W.

WWS entreprend l'analyse épistémologique au moyen d'un examen de l'*évolution* du concept de manière de voir au sein de la pensée de W, examen portant successivement sur l'évolution respective des concepts de 'manière' et de 'voir'. L'évolution du premier concept s'explique au moyen de celle du concept de 'représentation globale' (*Übersichtliche Darstellung*), à savoir le passage d'un concept de représentation globale comme *forme*, mettant avant tout l'accent sur ses aspects structurels *statiques*, vus *sub specie æternitatis*, et sur sa fonction descriptive, à un concept de représentation globale comme image du monde (*Weltbilt*), mettant plutôt l'accent sur ses aspects structurels

dynamiques et sur sa fonction normative. L'évolution du concept de manière de voir s'explique ensuite par l'adoucissement progressif de la trichotomie classique opposant voir, penser et agir. Genova montre comment et pourquoi W préfère d'abord 'voir' à 'penser', comment il réduit ensuite l'écart sémantique entre l'un et l'autre, et comment enfin ce 'voir-penser' perd son opposition traditionelle à l'agir. Au terme de l'évolution, une manière de voir c'est désormais une image dynamique et normative du monde informée par un 'voir-penser-aigr', pris comme différentes facettes d'un acte épistémique identique.

C'est ici que l'analyse épistémologique vient instruire l'analyse métaphilosophique. Qui entend changer une manière de voir doit, comme le professeur d'arithmétique, *montrer*. Il doit faire voir le mal dont elle est la cause et la 'vitalité cognitive' d'une autre manière de voir. Et il doit montrer le chemin menant d'une à l'autre. Toutefois la *manière* qu'il montrera, son mode d'expression, dépendra de ce qu'il croit au sujet de la nature de ce qu'il entend changer. Et comme ce que W croit au sujet de la nature de ce qu'il entend changer a lui-même changé, le *voir* ayant notamment perdu son opposition traditionnelle au *montrer*, l'oeuvre de W est marquée par une évolution parallèle de sa conception de *la manière de montrer*. La seconde partie de *WWS* porte sur le mode d'expression philosophique approprié, selon W, pour changer les manières de voir de même que sur l'évolution du mode d'expression manifestée par le texte wittgensteinien. L'évolution du mode d'expression, de l'*élucidation* au *mémorandum*, dépend de l'abandon, parallèle à et en partie tributaire de l'évolution du concept de manière de voir, d'une conception de la nature du langage comme d'une conception de la fonction de la philosophie. Le premier abandon, le plus connu, amène le rejet de la conception de la nature du langage au coeur du *Tractatus*, à savoir du langage comme représentation, fondée dans l'intentionnalité de la structure dans laquelle s'inscrivent la proposition et l'état de choses. Avec l'adoucissement de l'opposition entre le *voir-penser* et l'*agir*, entre le *représenter* et le *dire*, cette conception du langage comme représentation, et uniquement comme représentation, est rejetée à la faveur d'une conception du langage comme *action* (inscrite, après l'adoucissement de la trichotomie classique, dans une opposition conceptuelle atténuée face au voir et au penser), fondée dans l'intentionnalité quotidienne des actes. L'évolution du mode d'expression s'explique ensuite par l'abandon d'une conception du rôle de la philosophie. Avec l'évolution de la notion de représentation globale, de la 'manière' dans la manière de voir, et de montrer, il y aura abandon de la conception de la fonction de la philosophie comme clarification et explication, actions visant à montrer la *forme* de la représentation globale (puis se taire); conception rejetée à la faveur d'une concepiton de la philosophie comme thérapeutique visant à *rappeler* notre connaissance immédiate de *notre* image du monde. Au terme de cette évolution de la conception de la manière de montrer, l'oeuvre philosophique, dépositaire du discours produit au moyen du nouveau mode d'expression, est désormais conçue comme un ensemble structuré de mémorandums, c'est-à-dire comme une mémoire, dont la fonction est de

restituer, en la montrant, notre connaissance quotidienne des formes de vies informant notre image du monde, connaissance qui, par sa quotidienneté, n'est désormais plus aperçue. La tâche du philosophe est d'apercevoir et de consigner le non-conscient quotidien, les *manières de voir*, dont l'oubli est la source des maux philosophiques, et, *par* ces actes, de le transformer.

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Hans Goetz
To Live is To Think: The Thought of Twentieth-Century German Philosopher Constantin Brunner. Trans. Graham Harrison.
Middletown, NJ: The Caslon Company Humanities Press 1995.
Pp. ix + 171.
US$45.00. ISBN 0-391-03946-6.

This translation provides the English reader with an introduction to Brunner's thought, and as such it is more than sufficient. Goetz outlines the architectonic framework of Brunner's system providing the reader with a simple structure within which to understand the more complex ideas presented. Human thought occurs primarily on a level Brunner calls 'the practical understanding,' a faculty that encompasses both the unreflective life-world and scientific abstraction, and which is common to all humanity. This faculty appears in three distinct shapes, or 'specificates of thought' (15), namely, *feeling, knowing* and *willing*. These forms together exhaust our ways of being in the real world, which for Brunner is a wholly relative reality, characterized foremost as 'thingly' and, scientifically, in terms of Motion. But humans also possess two other faculties where these three 'specificates' take characteristic forms in relation to the absolute. The first of these Brunner names 'spirit' and it consists of our ways of grasping the absolute through *art* (the spiritual modification of feeling), *philosophy* (knowing) and *love*, or sometimes *mysticism* (corresponding to willing). The second is the more common 'superstition' where the relative world is absolutized into the three forms of, respectively *religion, metaphysics* (including scientific materialism) and *morality*. Where the practical understanding is relatively true and spirit absolutely true, superstition is both relatively and absolutely false. Very few humans in history have succeeded in getting beyond superstition to a truly spiritual relationship to the absolute, a sharp distinction between 'the spiritual elite' and 'the multitude' that informs the entire body of Brunner's work.

Goetz originally wrote this work as his master's thesis and it occasionally shows. The commendable simplicity of the framework provided is sometimes offset by a repetitiveness that borders on the formulaic. In contrast Goetz is also prone to expounding Brunner's more complex ideas in equally complex terms, detracting from the ease of his presentation by the addition of a somewhat ponderous commentary. Goetz seems particularly anxious to place Brunner in a broader philosophical context but he does not quite succeed. Considerable space is devoted to comparing Brunner with other philosophers, notably Spinoza and Husserl, but these excursuses add little to our understanding of his philosophy and the effort falls short. In particular, Brunner's 'debt' to Spinoza is mentioned throughout but the exact nature of this 'debt' remains unclear for, as presented, the similarities are common to many thinkers with little obvious connection to Spinoza and the differences are some of the most fascinating and challenging aspects of Brunner's work. Still, these problems are little more than inconvenient distractions and this remains a very interesting book.

Goetz successfully conveys an image of Brunner as an original and high-calibre speculative philosopher who has not gained the recognition he deserves. This book is a useful introduction to a thought-provoking system of ideas and the architectonic Goetz gives provides a valuable entry point to Brunner's work. Moreover, Goetz stimulates the reader's interest in the original, which is, perhaps, the chief value of an introductory work such as this. In this aim it succeeds admirably.

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Blandine Kriegel
The State and the Rule of Law.
Trans. Marc A. LePain and Jeffrey Cohen.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1995.
Pp. xv + 173.
US$19.95. ISBN 0-691-03291-2.

Blandine Kriegel's analysis begins with the 'anti-statism' of liberals, Marxists, and libertarians. She seeks to challenge a range of widely shared beliefs that sustain anti-statist rhetoric: the belief that all states tend toward despotism or totalitarian excess; that all are reactive, or indeed parasitic upon economic or social forces; that oppressive power is the quintessence of the state. Linking these mistaken views to social science methodologies popular since Montesquieu and Tocqueville that neglect the study of law and

institutions, Kriegel suggests that an examination of the works of early modern jurists and natural law philosophers will identify various forms of states and the sources of differentiation among them.

Describing her approach as a 'speculative' political history, Kriegel draws together a wealth of material from the writings of jurists, philosophers, and historians to suggest that the early modern state — 'the state under the rule of law' — emerged as an alternative to feudalism and to the Roman imperial state. The central characteristics of this new mode of political life included a conception of sovereignty, a doctrine of individual rights, and a political morality of law.

According to Kriegel, sovereignty is a political innovation that transformed the conceptions of power (*imperium* and *dominium*) embedded in feudalism. As the totality of civil and military powers possessed by the Roman kings, *imperium* included the right to command the army, the right to wage war and make peace, and the right of life and death. *Dominium* involved subjugation, the 'appropriation by a master of a human being as if s/he were a thing' (24). Jurists in France and England in the thirteenth century took issue with feudalism's amalgamation of war, power, and property. They sought to secure the autonomy of politics, by devising a realm of power distinct from military force and property relations. Toward that end, they cultivated the idea of legitimacy, by linking the institution of the state to a principle of benevolent power. By envisioning the state as a creature of peace established through the negotiation of rights, the jurists pried politics loose from force and war. By insisting that public offices could not be possessed in the manner of private property, they suggested that relations among individuals could proceed according to rules that differed from the relations between masters and slaves. Drawing upon discourses on divine law and natural law, they advanced the argument that law could constrain arbitrary power. Indeed they suggested that sovereign power could be understood as absolute in function and duration, yet limited in that it must conform law to justice — a justice rooted in the recognition of the rights of subjects. Thus Kriegel suggests that the doctrine of sovereignty is a singular accomplishment for it envisions a sphere of political independence that encompasses both the independence of the state from foreign powers and the independence of political subjects through the elimination of intersubjective dependence among members of the body politic.

In contrast to those who suggest that the state is inherently despotic, Kriegel argues that 'the idea of individual liberty was the grand innovation of the state under the rule of law' (49). Two biblical notions provided the foundation for this crucial advance: the theological 'doctrine of humanity' (the recognition of the intrinsic value of each human being); and the Old Testament idea of a covenant establishing mutual consensual obligations between subjects and a sovereign power. Extrapolating from these conceptions, early modern jurists and political philosophers identified the social contract as the legal mechanism through which the body politic constituted itself and in the process set limits on the human uses of things and of other human beings.

These constraints defined individual liberty in terms of the right to life, to control of one's own body, and to personal security. Contrary to the assumptions of many liberals and libertarians, Kriegel points out that these rights were not originally individualist. They resulted from a relation between the political authority and the political subjects, not from some putative individual who pre-existed political society. Although neither liberal nor democratic, the early modern state under the rule of law protected each person's right to appropriate his/her life and in so doing liberated people from slavery and abject domination.

In the second half of her book, Kriegel identifies an array of theories that threaten an autonomous conception of politics with its concomitants, individual liberty and the morality of law. Liberalism's preoccupation with the individual's pursuit of private interest to the detriment of any conception of public good, its valorization of economic maximization under capitalism and its persistent efforts to curb the state constricts the appropriate sphere of law and state action. Democracy's ancient roots in slave society and its tendency to degenerate into demagoguery and tyranny taint its egalitarian claims, while its communitarian tendency to subordinate the rights of the individual to the power of the people undermines the classical notion of the body politic in which both sovereign power and individual rights play a role in the institution of political society. German romanticism's invocation of sentiment against reason, its dream of a nation developing through 'its soul', its forsaking of law for myths of 'the Volk', and its infatuation with the uses of force are fundamentally incompatible with the rule of law and the rights of citizens. Marx's economic determinism, his conception of the state as an 'illusion which must be destroyed' (138), his doctrine of right as a 'capital sin' (140), and his depiction of 'individualism as a mutilation to be overcome' (143) provide the theoretical justification for communism's descent into the gulag. Finally, Kriegel argues that both the nation-state and the party-state — modernity's 'arrogant forms of power' (144) — substitute the manipulation of public opinion for political action, gradually eroding the ethics of law.

With capitalism resurgent and neo-conservatives on the attack, Kriegel does a great service in defending a conception of the positive state and demonstrating that the most rudimentary rights of the individual are the result of state action. The first half of the book is an impressive exercise in philosophical erudition, contesting much that is taken for granted in contemporary Western political philosophy and identifying issues sorely in need of more systematic investigation. The second half of the volume, however, tends toward polemic rather than careful philosophical analysis. The villains are stock caricatures and as such seem at great remove from the forces threatening social democratic states at the close of the twentieth century.

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Remy Lestienne
The Children of Time: Causality, Entropy, Becoming. Trans. E.C. Neher.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1995.
Pp. xiii + 220.
US$45.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-252-01959-8);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-252-06427-5).

The publisher's subject classification on this book's back cover reads 'SCIENCE/PHILOSOPHY'. The book is neither. At best, it is a sort of low-calorie, low-fact tour of pop science devoid of such niceties as new insights, conceptual clarifications, or structured arguments. Lestienne offers something of an historical commentary on ideas about time, a bit about relativity, and several chapters on trendy topics like entropy and the origin of life. But having read the book cover to cover, I still am none the wiser as to whether it is intended to develop any themes or suggest any conclusions.

The Introduction, despite its name, offers no clues whatsoever about overall organisation or purpose, although it does include on p. ix a preliminary definition of time: *'time is a degree of freedom by use of which objects retain their identity while displacing themselves in a manner called "future"*, (emphasis original). Despite such obscurantism, 'time' at least fares better than the other terms which, given their appearance in the title, it's tempting to suspect might be put to some concrete use in the volume. 'Entropy', for instance, while sprinkled liberally throughout the text, gets no 'definition' until well beyond the middle of the book (115): *'that which truly changes when everything is apparently returning to the same form'* (emphasis original). What Lestienne means by 'causality' is never quite clear, although he bizarrely asserts without argument or elucidation that it 'derives from the conservation of energy' (xi; similarly on p. 86). 'Becoming' seems to be some sort of primitive which the reader is expected to understand naturally.

What passes for reasoning in the book is little better than what passes for definitions. A good example comes when Lestienne considers the enormous complexity of living things. 'Could the definition of life have something to do with this complexity?', he asks on p. 143, answering confidently in the next sentence, 'No, because complexity is not a synonym for life.'

Given that Lestienne is billed as an elementary particle physicist, we might hope that surely the physics in the book will be right, even if the definitions are a bit fuzzy and *non sequiturs* populate the reasoning. Yet, in discussing quantum nonseparability in the context of a two-arm interferometer experiment, we are told that 'the "decision" of the beam "in branch A" to behave like a particle is instantaneously understood by the beam in branch B as an order to "vanish" ' (93). This is worse than a confused approach to quantum mechanics; it eventually balloons into a full-blown assault on what Lestienne dubs the 'causal interpretation of time' (which, actually, like 'becoming', gets by without definition). Those interested in

the topic would do much better to read any of the classic texts on quantum theory or newer approaches such as Roland Omnès' rendition of consistent histories (*The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics*, Princeton University Press, 1994).

Later (121), Lestienne describes a resolution of the paradox of Maxwell's Daemon which is at least neither incoherent nor entirely unsupported. In fact, it is exactly the view expressed by physicist Leo Szilard in 1927, and my only criticism is that it happens to be wrong. Fans of the daemon will get the correct story from Charles Bennett ('Demons, Engines, and the Second Law', *Scientific American* 257(5): 88-96).

Chapter 19, on 'The Brain, the Mind, and Time', offers the worst examples of scientific silliness. Here, Lestienne happily suggests the brain is, straightforwardly, a computer — complete with binary neurons, one of whose 'principal functions as logical machine is to make a decision by comparing two pieces of information' (172). Apart from the inanity of the oversimplification itself, neither the computer science nor the neuroscience comes out right. Lestienne tells us (172) that the possible logical operations on two bits are 'generally' subsumed under 'and', 'or', 'exclusive or', and what he calls 'exclusion' (or what many call 'nor'). In fact, there are *sixteen* such operations, as is patently obvious from the number of ways of completing a truth table assigning a value to each of the four different combinations of two bits. Despite his eventual acknowledgement of the importance of neuronal spiking *frequency* (as distinct from simple on-off behaviour), and despite its well-rehearsed computational limitations (M. Minsky & S. Papert, *Perceptrons: An Introduction to Computational Geometry*, MIT Press, 1969) and utter biological implausibility, Lestienne's approach to 'neuroscience' is squarely grounded in the 1943 model of W.S. McCulloch & W. Pitts ('A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity', *Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics* 5: 115-33). Readers interested in a more current and scientifically respectable treatment will find it from the likes of Gerald Edelman (*Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection*, Oxford University Press, 1989).

Finally, the talk of information and entropy running through the volume is marred both by bizarre readings of probabilistic accounts of entropy — which Lestienne asserts (118-19) without argument is 'subjective' — and by singular reliance on (and poor interpretation of) the classic ensemble approach to information of C.E. Shannon and W. Weaver (*The Mathematical Theory of Communication*, University of Illinois Press, 1949). Large tracts of rolling confusion could be eliminated with just a tiny dose of modern algorithmic information theory (G.J. Chaitin, *Information Randomness & Incompleteness: Papers on Algorithmic Information Theory*, World Scientific, 1987; see also G.R. Mulhauser, *Mind Out of Matter: Topics in the Physical Foundations of Consciousness and Cognition*, forthcoming from Kluwer Academic Publishers).

Even if these troubles weren't just the tip of a huge iceberg of technical inaccuracy and philosophical incoherence — which they *are* — I could not

with clear conscience recommend this book to philosopher, scientist, or lay reader. I cannot think of a single reason why anyone should spend time or money on *The Children of Time*.

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Miles Little
Humane Medicine.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. xi + 195.
US$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-49513-X);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-49863-5).

This is not a book by a professional philosopher, but is nonetheless a valuable contribution in applied philosophy, specifically in the philosophy of medicine. Little is a Professor of Surgery, but one who is obviously widely read and aware of the contributions that philosophy and the other humanities, such as literature, make to medicine. This is not a radical book: do not look here for alternative models of medicine. Rather, it aims at improving the current medical model. In particular, Little examines the reasons why communication between patients and medical practitioners is often quite poor, and gives suggestions as to how this may be improved. He argues against a deterministic model of science, and argues for a more humane medicine, which recognises the limits of medical science.

The book comes across more as a collection of essays than as a unified thesis. The second chapter seeks to place the doctor/patient relationship in a framework dominated by Karl Popper's ideas; the third chapter looks at the epistemology of medical science; and the fourth chapter looks at the impact of authority in medicine, with a qualified plea for a return to some of the more positive aspects of the hermeneutic model of medicine. After a discussion of probability in medicine (Chapter 5) and a favourable discussion of a utilitarian style calculus of clinical benefit (Chapter 6), Little then turns to a discussion of professionalism and ethics (Chapters 7 and 8). In Chapter 9 Little returns to hermeneutics, in the context of the doctrines of autonomy and informed consent. Chapter 10 sees a return to some of the earlier themes about the problems of communication between doctors and patients, and in Chapter 11 Little sets out some of his ideas for the future development of medical practice and training.

Thus, the book tends to jump a bit from topic to topic, picking up themes further on in the book. This is a little disconcerting on a first reading, but several themes come through quite strongly by the end of the book.

The first theme is that we need to control the resources being allocated in medicine; life is limited and health care is expensive. Little sees the responsibility for control of costs as being that of politicians and government: 'If services are to be limited, the decision must be made by politicians. It cannot be made solely by the medical profession ... It is a government responsibility to decide what a country can and cannot afford' (11). This conclusion is hardly startling, except perhaps in the United States; it states a widely accepted and relatively uncontroversial position.

The second theme, and probably the dominant one of the book, is concerned with analysing the relationship between doctors and patients. In this, Little is fairly critical of the current practice of medicine and the ways in which doctors communicate with patients. He puts the view that there is a disjunction between the perceptions of doctors and patients, and that this accounts for many of the problems of modern medicine.

Little uses the fairly controversial model of Karl Popper's Worlds 1, 2 and 3 to illustrate this, where World 1 'is the world of objects, of things that have a material existence ... World 2 is the inner world of private thoughts ... World 3 is the world of concepts, theories and objective knowledge' (20). World 1 therefore is objectively verifiable data, which the clinician interprets using the theoretical bodies of knowledge of World 3; World 2 is the viewpoint of the patient. For Little, 'the patients' World 2 and the clinicians' World 3 may come into conflict ... This is a source of tension that is nearly impossible to resolve, because it runs so deeply and is so poorly acknowledged by either patients or clinicians. It is the underlying theme of this book' (23).

Little also defends the model of experimental medical science; he sees it as a sound model which is superior to that offered by alternative medicines. As part of this defence of medical science, he gives a very good exposition of probability: Little is, quite correctly, at pains to stress that medicine offers probabilities, not certainties, to patients. Thus he believes that medical science is widely misunderstood, especially in the community, and that this leads to disappointment and unreal expectations which rebound on medicine and its practitioners. Other sources of misunderstanding are also identified, such as politics and the media.

Following from all this there is a need to better educate doctors as communicators, so that they are better able to convey to patients what medicine can (and cannot) do. The book ends with an appendix entitled 'a humane medicine teaching package', in which suggestions are made as to cases with which to educate medical undergraduates to be better communicators and more humane doctors, able to better 'deal with ethical and hermeneutic problems' (186).

So, who is this book directed at? It is not aimed at professional philosophers: whilst it contains insights into philosophy of medicine, it does not contain any startling new concepts. Rather, it is a re-working of many themes which have already been discussed by others. It does, however, do philosophy of medicine a service by stressing the underlying relationship of ethical and

epistemological issues, which has been lost in recent times with the great emphasis placed on clinical ethics.

The book therefore seems aimed at the medical professional, medical students, and the educated layperson. Little is trying to persuade them to his viewpoint, so as to benefit medicine and humanity as a whole. The book, therefore, is not so much written as a text book, but rather as a book in which a certain vision is put forward. The vision is conservative — it is aimed at improving the current medical model, rather than replacing it. The book is therefore a solid contribution to philosophy of medicine, and should be a standard reference book in all medical libraries.

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Ray Monk
Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude.
London: Jonathan Cape 1996.
Pp. xx + 695.
n.p. ISBN 0-224-03026-4.

The reception of *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude* in the British daily press, weeklies and literary reviews has been remarkably generous. 'As a scholarly and literary production, *Bertrand Russell* is wholly admirable', says Alan Ryan in the *Times Literary Supplement*; 'an extraordinary full and fascinating account of the early phase', says Frank Kermode in the *London Review of Books*. In *The New Statesman* we are told that the book is 'likely to emerge as the definitive account', while in the *Spectator* Monk is declared to have provided a 'full and cogent account'. *The Independent* even went so far as to publish a fairly weighty essay by Monk expounding his views about Russell's loneliness and misanthropy, and *The Observer* dedicated a page to extracts from the book detailing Russell's relationship with Vivien Eliot, T.S. Eliot's wife. Few biographies, let alone biographies of philosophers, receive such attention and praise.

Much of this applause is undoubtedly well-deserved. Ray Monk has woven together the familiar facts of Russell's life into a compelling story and the book is an enjoyable read despite its extravagant length. Few will want or need to know more about Russell's upbringing, his life at Cambridge, his political activities during the First World War, or his notorious affairs. In particular Monk's picture of how English aristocrats like Russell, with their

brilliance and their snobbery, conducted themselves in the first two decades of the twentieth-century leaves a lasting impression. And never before has the darker side of Russell's character and the frenzy responsible for his prodigious feats of literary composition been so clearly portrayed.

Still as a biography of one of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century the book disappoints. It is only because Russell was so remarkable a thinker that he warrants such an enormous biography (the 600 pages of this volume take us up to 1921, leaving another 50 years of Russell's life for the second volume). Apart from the technical philosophical work, which was central to Russell's thinking up to 1913 and which continued to splutter during the rest of the period Monk covers, there is not much deserving detailed investigation. Philosophy was as important to Russell as physics to Einstein and music to Beethoven, and it is a strike against a biography of him, as Monk observes when criticizing his predecessor's efforts, that it 'suffer[s] from ... a more or less complete lack of interest in [his] philosophical work' (xviii).

Of course Monk does not ignore Russell's philosophical ideas, but neither does he show much interest in them. For the most part he focuses on the ups-and-downs of Russell's marriage with Alys, his rather fleeting relationships with Joseph Conrad and D.H. Lawrence, and his affairs with Lady Ottoline Morrell, Helen Dudley, Vivien Eliot, Lady Constance Malleson and Dora Black (who eventually became his second wife). While this is doubtless essential for understanding Russell's 'own particular forms of love and madness' (xvii), it does little to clarify his ideas or why he had them, still less illuminate what he achieved and why he has been so enormously influential. Someone actually asked me after reading Monk's book whether Russell was a major philosopher.

I was especially bothered by the cursory treatment of the programme inaugurated in *The Principles of Mathematics* and pursued with such dogged determination through the writing of *Principia Mathematica*. These two great works, on which much of Russell's lasting fame rests, get less consideration than the breakdown of Russell's marriage to Alys. Worse, they are discussed in a general and unhelpful way. 'By the time Russell left for Paris on 31 July 1900', Monk writes in a typical passage, '*The Principles of Mathematics* was already a large and impressive work, and at a fairly advanced stage of completion. Divided into seven parts, it sought to analyze the foundations of mathematics, beginning with the notions of number and of the analysis of wholes into parts, and showing how continuity, infinity, space and time, and matter and motion can be understood arithmetically, as relations between numbers' (128). What made the work 'impressive' and how Russell understood continuity, infinity and the rest 'as relations between numbers' (or even what this means) are left unexplained.

More surprisingly still, Russell's most important philosophical ideas and most accessible philosophical books are given short shrift. The theory of descriptions is accorded less than a page; all we are told is how 'The present King of France is bald' is paraphrased and how the theory might help solve

Russell's famous paradox about the classes that are not members of themselves (182-3). Even *The Problems of Philosophy* is dispatched with the observation that it 'concentrates for the most part on comparatively dry aspects of the subject' (228). For Monk the book seems worth mentioning mainly because its final chapter incorporates some of what Russell had said in 'Prisons', a work that was supposed to appeal to Ottoline Morrell (whose concerns were more spiritual than intellectual). We are never told why the theory of descriptions is widely regarded as a 'paradigm of philosophy' or why *The Problems of Philosophy* has been thought to be a good introduction to the subject for generations of students.

Making technical philosophy intelligible to the general public is not an impossible task. Physicists manage to explain more complicated theories, and there have been many attempts, not least by Russell himself, to explain logicism, the notion of an incomplete symbol, the nature of propositions and the like. The trouble is that Monk, like the earlier biographers he chastises, devotes far too much space to Russell's correspondence. I do not doubt that going through Russell's letters requires enormous dedication and stamina, but it is surely a huge mistake to let them dominate the discussion. It would not have been so bad had the letters reflected the full-range and depth of Russell's concerns and Monk had considered more closely his philosophical correspondence, of which there is apparently a fair amount. (Far better to dip into Nicholas Griffin's *The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell: The Private Years*.) Russell was no less evasive and prone to posturing in his letter-writing than anyone else, and his correspondence must, I think, be treated with the same scepticism that Monk treats Russell's *Autobiography*.

Reading *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude* I had the impression that Monk was more interested in cobbling together an account of the particular form of insanity that drove Russell than in figuring out his views and why he shifted from one philosophical position to another. Monk's attention to personal psychology marred his earlier biography of Wittgenstein but not so much (perhaps because Wittgenstein was more circumspect in what he wrote and his particular form of insanity took a less public form). Tracing Russell's achievement to 'the spirit of solitude' seems to me no more credible than tracing Wittgenstein's to 'the duty of genius'. Russell may have felt himself to be a ghost and his story 'Satan in the Suburbs' may be his 'most deeply personal and self-analytical piece of writing' (23), but I remain disinclined to believe that a complex life like Russell's can be reduced to a simple formula.

So while I cannot imagine a better treatment of Russell's state of mind as Russell reports it in some of his personal letters, I think that an intellectual biography of him still awaits to be written, one informed by the mountain of scholarly work that has been done on the sources of his ideas and the nature of his arguments. These days biographies which focus on the subject's personal quirks at the expense of what he or she accomplished are popular, and the English public seems to find its upper-class endlessly absorbing. Nonetheless I would have expected Monk, who is after all a philosopher himself, to have been more attentive to Russell's philosophy (and more alert

to the pitfalls of amateur psychologizing). Can there really be any doubt that the philosophical ideas of one of the greatest philosophical minds of our time are in the final analysis much more fascinating than the emotional tribulations of the future 3rd Earl of Russell?

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Edouard Morot-Sir
The Imagination of Reference II: Perceiving, Indicating, Naming.
Gainesville: University Press of Florida 1995.
Pp. viii + 218.
US$49.95. ISBN 0-8130-1406-9.

In this, his last book, the late Edouard Morot-Sir sets forth an exploration of the phenomenology of reference. The preceding volume, *The Imagination of Reference I: Meditating the Linguistic Condition* (Gainesville 1993), defended the necessary preliminary ground-clearing, setting aside all assumptions about the status and structure of the world and of our minds. He sought to stretch Husserl's *epochē* by abstaining from commitment not just to the objects of an external world, but also to our minds and to the structuring of both in terms of functions (assumptions he terms the R-postulate, the Psy-referent and the F-function respectively). This completed, he turns inwards to an investigation of the experience of reference within the practice of language. His ensuing meditations range over the interplay of reference with the activities of indicating, naming and defining, and crucially upon the significance of perception in these practices. This analysis is greatly enhanced by frequent and erudite consideration of the role such activities play in literature and poetry, the visual arts, music, science and religion, alongside reflections on the more familiar treatments offered by linguistics and philosophy. Morot-Sir also stresses the importance of considering the activity of reference in art as much as in language, consciously echoing Nelson Goodman's emphasis on the incorporation of aesthetics within epistemology, and emphasizes the intimate co-dependency of perception and language, a position commensurate with the indebtedness of his methodology to that of Merleau-Ponty. Finally, he asserts the primacy of naming as 'the inescapable condition of existence' (190).

Philosophers reared in the analytic tradition, wherein the topic of reference has been of enduring significance, may find Morot-Sir's emphasis

surprising. He does offer treatments of certain familiar works from the analytic canon: Frege's 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung', Russell's 'On Denoting' and Kripke's *Naming and Necessity* are all discussed. However, these are primarily assessed for compatibility with Morot-Sir's standards of phenomenological hygiene. Hence he finds himself in accord with Frege's anti-psychologism, in which he sees his rejection of the 'Psy-referent' reflected. This should not surprise, since the invention of phenomenology was triggered by Husserl's own rejection of psychologism. Frege's distinction of sense from reference is less favourably received; Morot-Sir criticizes it for making too sharp a divide between language and perception, and thereby paying insufficient attention to the subjectivity of reference. He is much more enthusiastic about the priority which Kripke gives to naming and the associated account of names as rigid designators in terms of 'a linguistic *de facto* generating an epistemological *de jure*' (126). However the more pragmatic and sociological aspects of Kripke's causal theory of reference are criticized by Morot-Sir as a disappointing turn away from phenomenological concerns.

Morot-Sir has provided us with a conscientious and eloquent exercise in the phenomenology of language. If the analytic reader is frustrated by the depth of consideration given to his own interests, nevertheless he cannot fail to appreciate the breadth of perspective into which they have been set.

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Frederick A. Olafson
What Is a Human Being? A Heideggerian View.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. 262.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-47395-0);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-47937-1).

Frederick Olafson's new book is an attempt to bring together two distinct lines of argument. On the one hand, he elaborates what he regards as the vitally important consequences of Heidegger's thought for the philosophical question concerning human nature, hence the title. At the same time, *What Is a Human Being?* launches an ambitious but oblique assault on the current state of Anglo-American philosophy of mind. Olafson has a number of very interesting things to say about traditional assumptions and current trends in epistemology and metaphysics. Unfortunately, the interpretation of Heidegger that informs the book is false. Moreover the polemic Olafson aims at contemporary philosophy of mind is so broad that it fails to hit home against any particular theory or text. In what follows I shall say more about

these shortcomings of the book — the one interpretive, the other systematic — while at the same time pointing out a few of the salient points of Olafson's otherwise ambitious and at times illuminating discussion.

Readers of Olafson's prior work will be familiar with his insistence that Heidegger understands being not in terms of the pragmatic intelligibility of everyday life, as many nowadays maintain, but as the 'presence' of things to us, paradigmatically in perception. I have explained elsewhere at some length why I think this interpretation is fundamentally mistaken. (See *Inquiry* June 1994 and December 1995.) Suffice it here to say that whenever Heidegger himself refers to 'presence', he is either talking about the traditional metaphysical interpretation (or misinterpretation) of being, which he wants to correct or at least resist, or else he is referring to what he takes to be the ontological condition of things showing up for us in the present either as available for use (*zuhanden*) or as objectively given (*vorhanden*). Olafson misconstrues Heidegger's critique of traditional metaphysics as a positive endorsement of the equation between being and presence. What Heidegger in fact says is that being is always in one way or another understood in terms of time, and that presence constitutes only one of the three horizons of temporality and so is inadequate to a proper interpretation of human existence, which is irreducibly historical. So, whereas hammers and nails and sticks and stones *are* by being merely present (or absent), human beings exist by projecting into a future from a background of already effective social traditions.

Olafson is departing from Heidegger dramatically, then, when he tells us that 'presence ... names what I take to be the principal notion in terms of which an ontological understanding of human being must be formulated' (14), and that 'the import and function of the verb "to be " ... is to bring presence itself to expression' (67). For Heidegger, on the contrary, a human being is precisely the sort of entity that cannot be understood in terms of presence, that is, in terms of the ontological condition of things appearing in the present as available or objective. This is no doubt why perception plays such a meager role in *Being and Time*, whereas for Olafson it figures prominently as 'the primordial form of presence' (46), thus our most basic intimation being.

What Olafson misses, I believe, is the specific connection Heidegger draws between presence and the present, as opposed to past and future. So, whereas Heidegger sought to narrow the application of the concept of presence by putting it in proper perspective in the full context of temporality, Olafson wants to widen it in such a way that it coincides with being completely. In Olafson's idiom, then, though certainly not in Heidegger's, presence goes beyond the present and embraces all three temporal ecstases. For example, 'What is expressed by the past tense — the "There was (or there has been) ..." — is ... a disclosure of a past state of the world to the person who remembers, and as such, it is a modality of presence' (89). The temporal generality of presence means that things can be 'present' to us even as no longer being and as not yet being, which is in turn because 'There is ... a recognized sense in which things can be present even when they are absent'

(87). Olafson acknowledges that this notion of 'presence in absence' is paradoxical on its face but maintains that it is preferable to the conceptual vocabulary it is meant to replace, namely the received conception of internal mental states representing an external world.

How can things be 'present' to us even in their absence? By being constituents of states of affairs rather than mere objects, Olafson argues. So, while 'the contrast between being and nonbeing is grounded in that between presence and absence,' so too 'having a world is possible only in terms of a contrast between what is and what is not the case' (90). Thus, 'states of affairs are the presence (and the presence in absence) of objects to us' (111). This scheme is supposed to have the advantage of preserving a strong conception of truth against alleged skeptical consequences of confining truth and meaning strictly to language, while at the same time avoiding any Platonist commitment to the existence of propositions, which Olafson dismisses as 'ghostly sentences' (110).

But is this approach a promising one? If things absent, which is to say past, future, thought of, and merely imagined entities, no less than perceived objects, are to count as 'present,' what did the term 'present' mean in the first place such that perception could figure as its 'primordial form'? And if we take seriously the primacy of perception as our primitive mode of access to the presence of things, then is not the expression 'presence in absence' a virtual admission of the inadequacy of the term to cover past, future, thought of, and imagined entities? The notion of presence, it seems to me, cannot do the work Olafson wants it to do without lapsing into paradox. Generalizing the concept of presence so that it covers *all* the ways in which things *are* (and are not) at best robs the term of the specific sense that motivated its adoption to begin with and at worst threatens to blur important ontological distinctions among past, present, and future.

The identification of presence with states of affairs strikes me as problematic, too, for surely states of affairs are implicated in language no less than propositions. Indeed, Olafson himself defines them with reference to language: 'states of affairs are what statements express and also what makes them true (or false)' (111). If propositions are no more than 'ghostly sentences', why not regard states of affairs themselves as at best, in Richard Rorty's words, 'sentence-shaped chunks of the world'? Moreover, it is unclear exactly how states of affairs are supposed to guarantee a place for truth and falsity in the world, as Olafson would like. Even admitting the existence of extra-linguistic states of affairs, surely truth has to do not with them alone but with their relation to our interpretations and representations. Olafson clearly departs from standard usage when he assigns truth to states of affairs as such. 'There is,' he suggests, 'a sense in which, simply by virtue of its character as presence, a state of affairs might itself be called "true" ' (111). I think I could make sense of the notion of a 'true' state of affairs only if I could make sense of a false one. But what is a 'false' state of affairs? And if 'there are' false states of affairs, what is their mode of being? Are there more false

ones than true ones? And again, how are true and false states of affairs supposed to be an improvement on true and false propositions?

Throughout the book, but especially in Chapter 4 on 'Individuation', Olafson tries to do what all Heideggerians would like to do, namely steer a discussion of the phenomenon of world between the Scylla of scientific or quasi-scientific accounts of things and their objective properties and relations on the one hand, and the Charybdis of subjective accounts of inner experience on the other. As examples of excess on either side Olafson mentions Leibnizian monads, subjects *par excellence*, and Strawsonian bodies, which he — wrongly, I think — takes to be physical in an impoverished sense. Human beings, unlike the minds and bodies of which they are supposedly composed, must rather be individuated in terms of what is and is not present to them, he proposes. A human being, then, in answer to the book's title, turns out to be 'a locus of presence' (141).

There is something right about this inasmuch as the concept of presence evokes a sense of our finitude and the transcendence of the world beyond what is revealed to us. But what is it that marks our particularity as individuals? For Olafson, it appears to be nothing more than modifications in what is present to a single point of view or perspective through time. Suppose, he says, a breeze stirs the leaves of a tree to reveal a bird's nest that I hadn't seen a moment ago. I come to recognize my perspective as limited with respect to what I now see to be present, and so I identify myself as only ever having a partial view of what there is. 'It is in some such way as this,' Olafson concludes, 'that a human being as an ek-sistent can be individuated' (140-1). But surely modifications such as this in what is present to a situated perspective can never be enough to individuate human beings, if indeed we are to understand them as something more than disembodied perspectives. What is it in the appearance of the nest, after all, that identifies this partial perspective as *mine*? It is difficult to see how Olafson has left himself any more room to individuate full-fledged human beings than Leibniz had by appeal to the representational states of monads.

Moreover, it seems to me that Olafson misses a good opportunity when he repudiates Strawson's argument in *Individuals*, ch. 3, for the priority of the concept of person to the distinction between mind and body. He seems to think that Strawson's insistence on the corporeity of persons amounts to individuating them in terms of their physical properties alone at the expense of their intentionality. Olafson is right that Strawson treats material bodies themselves as primitive in a way that Heidegger does not. But Strawson's point is that the concept of a person is primitive too, not just a compound of mind and body, so that 'predicates like "is in the drawing-room", "was hit by a stone" & c. ... mean one thing when applied to material objects and another when applied to persons' (*Individuals*, 105). Olafson is also right that Heidegger goes much farther than Strawson in exploring the conditions of our even having a concept of persons to begin with. But simply insisting that persons have bodies, indeed in a special sense of the word, is a far cry from reducing our identifying features to our purely physical properties.

Like his 1987 *Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind*, the present volume culminates in an extended criticism of what Olafson regards as reigning orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy, namely physicalism. He argues that physicalism thrives almost solely on the refutation of dualism and so inherits dualism's impoverished conception minds and bodies precisely as it reduces — or perhaps sacrifices — the former to the latter. Olafson therefore rejects what he rightly describes as 'the rigid way in which physicalism conceives the available alternatives in the philosophy of mind' (230). One could add, of course, that it was precisely the new concept of matter that emerged with the advent of mechanistic science that gave birth to the Cartesian concept of the mental in the first place.

Unfortunately, as I said, Olafson's indictment applies so widely to so many different contemporary figures and positions that it is difficult to measure its success. The discussion is unfocused largely owing to the vagueness of the term 'physicalism'. Olafson defines it as 'the view that the world is pretty much what the physical sciences say it is; and this means that there is no place in it for anything that lacks physical properties like location in space, movement, and certain causal properties' (229). Passages like this suggest that it is in fact the scientism of modern philosophy that Olafson deplores, not so much its specific ontological commitments. Indeed, dualists past and present have been just as guilty as materialists of deferring to the authority of the sciences just when they ought to be directing their attention to the phenomenological conditions of scientific knowledge itself.

But this is a methodological issue, not a metaphysical one, and in directing his arguments against the ontological claim that everything that is is physical, Olafson weakens his case. He advances two arguments. The first is a pragmatic one, namely, that the physicalist thesis is self-refuting because stating it or taking it to be true effectively undermines it: 'in the kind of world physicalism postulates, the lack of anything like presence means that there is nothing that can be called true' (237). The problem is supposed to be that 'the exponent of physicalism ... as an individual human being falls within the scope of his own theory' (238). Suppose someone utters the physicalist thesis.

> The question this raises is whether the fact that such an utterance is made can possibly be reconciled with the thesis expressed in it. That utterance is made, after all, by someone — a particular human being — who comes under the scope of what it says ... (ibid.).

Olafson concludes that physicalism is self-defeating and incoherent in the same way as the assertion, 'There's nobody in here but us chickens!'

But is it? Olafson is right when he says that physicalism gives no 'account of how it is itself, as one might say, "plugged into" the world and how its reference to actual human beings and their bodies is achieved' (ibid.), and that 'the physicalist is working on two levels — that of his own life as a human being and that of theory construction' (241). But this is true of all metaphysical theories, not just physicalism. Is it enough to refute such a theory simply

to say that it lacks an account of first-person reference and truth? Has any metaphysical theory ever managed to explain its own possibility as a theory, not to mention the possibility of truth itself? This strikes me as rather disingenuous test, and if physicalism fails it, then so does every other theory, scientific or philosophical. This is not to say that Olafson is wrong about physicalism, only that his point applies to metaphysical theories generally, not to one theory more than another. No doubt physicalists have some prior, non-physicalist understanding of themselves as human beings, which is what makes their physicalism itself possible. But it begs the question to insist that that prior understanding by itself amounts to a tacit admission of the inadequacy of physicalism.

Olafson's second argument against physicalism seems to me to rest on a fallacy. In this case, the physicalist's assertion of physicalism is supposed to reduce necessarily to 'a restatement of the body's identity with itself,' which 'would be as empty of extralogical content as "This stone is this stone" ' (243). Physicalism, if true, could be no more than 'a singularly barren truism' (ibid.). Whereas the first argument demanded that the theory say more than it possibly could, this one hardly gives it a chance to say anything. Olafson seems to suppose that the conclusion of any identity theory renders itself trivial, since all prior references to minds or persons could only be referring to bodies or brains. But the identity of a thing with itself says nothing about the content of the terms that made the identity statement informative in the first place. Even supposing some true identity statements to be true as a matter of metaphysical necessity, à la Kripke, doesn't prevent them from being epistemically informative. There may be fewer true, informative identity statements than philosophers would like to think, but surely there are some.

The conclusion of identity theories therefore no more renders them trivial than our prior understanding of ourselves as human beings renders them unassertable. However, I agree with Olafson that our understanding of ourselves is so unlike our understanding of physical objects and properties that no straightforward metaphysical identification or distinction between the two is likely to carry much conviction.

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John Papworth
Small is Powerful.
Westport, CT: Praeger 1995.
Pp. 232.
US$59.95. (cloth: ISBN 0-275-95424-2);
US$18.95. (paper: ISBN 0-275-95425-0).

According to *Scientific American*, the changing physical quality of human life on Earth shows significant worldwide *improvements* during the last 30-plus years (July 1996, 28). On the basis of life expectancy, rates of literacy and infant mortality, every region of the world has gotten better between 1960 and 1990. Preliminary data for the 1990s shows further gains except for the former Soviet Union and the AIDS ravaged countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Steady, global progress characterizes three things we treasure: longevity, literacy and little people.

John Papworth's *Small is Powerful* might as well be discussing a different planet. Papworth's Earth is in steep decline — morally, physically and spiritually. Collapse is imminent unless we change our ways. Key episodes in Papworth's story of decline include (a) the 16th-century repeal of usury laws, paving the way for rapacious capitalism, (b) the 18th-century defeat of the Luddites, and (c) the 20th-century replacement of rail travel with automobile travel. Currently, our greatest barrier to improvement is 'the nightmare of twentieth-century mass living,' which makes a mockery of democracy, encourages mindless consumption and undermines communities. Papworth finds a beacon of hope in the increasing number of small nations and of community-based movements.

Is the world improving or is it going to Hell? The question deserves a fuller answer than we find in Papworth's diatribe.

Papworth knew E.F. Schumacher and Papworth's title invites comparison of his book with Schumacher's *Small is Beautiful* (1973). Schumacher's book is much the better volume. Papworth's book should be entitled *Large is Ugly*. His jeremiad is similar in tone and underlying philosophy to Jacques Ellul's work (e.g., *The Technological Bluff* 1990). Ellul is the more engaging writer. Both Ellul and Papworth are priests who stress decline, put morality at the center of their social analysis, and are troubled by modernity.

Papworth is an Associate Editor of an excellent magazine, *The Ecologist*. What makes the *Ecologist* a must read for environmental philosophers is its timely, in depth, worldwide coverage of stories that are under-reported in the mainstream press. Papworth's book is certainly compatible with the spirit of the *Ecologist*, but the ratio of grandiose claims to concrete details is much less favorable in the book than in the magazine.

Papworth's praise of localism deserves qualification. Some problems are best addressed by the national government. For example, the U.S. Government has recently returned responsibility for welfare to the States which is likely to result in greater hunger and homelessness in many of the poorer or less generous States. Furthermore, Papworth's endorsement of the break-up

of large nation-states is overly optimistic. Though not without faults, Tito's firm hand in Yugoslavia was better than the deadly chaos among Serbs, Croats and Muslims when the country broke apart.

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Richard Patterson
Aristotle's Modal Logic.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. ix + 291.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-521-45168-X.

This book provides a full account of Aristotle's modal syllogistic. Patterson goes through *Prior Analytics* I 8-16 chapter by chapter in more or less detail. He discusses the modern secondary literature thoroughly, and makes frequent reference to the Greek commentators.

Patterson claims that the novelty in his approach lies in two things: first, in his tying Aristotle's logical theory more tightly to Aristotle's ontology than is usual today (2-3). Aristotle's metaphysics explains why he favors two-sided contingency over one-sided possibility (225-6). For Aristotle the necessary is the essential (38), and the accidental, taken broadly, the contingent (128-9). Patterson holds Aristotle's views on conversion to be motivated and justified by the Porphyrian tree structure detailed in the *Categories* (49-50). He also discusses the relation of the modal syllogistic and its doctrines to Aristotelian demonstration (102-6; 149-52).

Second, Patterson offers a new analysis of the modal proposition: the modalized copula. Take, e.g., 'S is necessarily P': 1) the *de re* reading is 'S is (necessary P)'; 2) the *de dicto* reading is 'necessary (S is P)'; 3) the modalized copula reading is 'S (is necessarily) P'. This reading does follow Aristotle literally. Patterson holds that it agrees with his ontology and syllogistic better too. He also distinguishes two readings of the modal copula — e.g., for 'every A is necessarily B', 1) the strong: being B is entailed by the essence of A; 2) the weak: every A is C, and being B is entailed by the essence of C (47-8; 11).

Patterson then applies his approach to what Aristotle says about modal syllogisms. He shows that a necessary conclusion does follow from an assertoric and a modal premise (INAANA) on a weak modal copula reading, but not a strong one (81). He continues to go through the text and explain many other claims that Aristotle makes about which syllogistic combinations

conclude. However, he also claims that Aristotle is mistaken at many points: e.g., the conversion of the one-sided possible (27), certain second- and third-figure syllogisms of mixed assertoric and modal premises (82; 85); the proof of Barbara from one assertoric, one contingent premise (161); the rule for Bocardo NAN in *Pr An* I 11 is wrong, with a weak modal copula (162); various syllogisms from two contingent premises (188; 192).

The general thrust of the book thus becomes unclear. Patterson says, 'my own aim has been to analyze Aristotle's modal proofs in a way that allows us to think them through as he did' (178). He criticizes other modern analyses for ignoring Aristotle's metaphysical foundations (2-3) and for not allowing for results that Aristotle does (118; 120). But then doesn't Patterson face the same criticism? He does not get the results that Aristotle does, not even on the basic level of conversion principles. If he has captured Aristotle's general perspective, he does so at a cost of having Aristotle err in many details, some logically obvious.

Logicians will find this book unclear too. The phrasing and organization is rather Byzantine (e.g., 11-12), and so the views propounded take digging out. Patterson makes little attempt to explain the modal copula in modern terms (225-6), except to insist that it differs radically from *de re* and *de dicto* necessity. I suppose he takes the modal copula as primitive. But it looks much like the *de dicto* reading, especially as the notion of entailment, which Patterson himself uses in defining the modal copulae, is currently defined by the *de dicto* reading. He offers proofs and inferences in ordinary language; I have learned from experience that I can't trust *my* ordinary intuitions in doing logic!

In sum, I find the book valuable in working through the texts and modern interpretations of Aristotle's modal syllogistic. I do not find it successful from either a historical or a logical perspective. But still it is a noble effort; perhaps the text is hopeless, as many commentators from Theophrastus onwards have said. I do agree with Patterson that we need to think in Aristotle's own terms. For me that would involve rethinking the structure of predication. But that is another story.

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Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller Jr.,
and **Jeffrey Paul eds.**
The Just Society.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. xiii + 329.
US$21.95. ISBN 0-521-55857-3.

The Just Society features twelve essays that previously appeared as a single number of the journal *Social Philosophy and Policy*. The work deserves the longer life-span and wider circulation it will undoubtedly enjoy in book form, and would be useful as a supplementary text for political philosophy courses, drawing students' attention to recent developments in the controversy engendered by the seminal works of John Rawls and Robert Nozick.

The collection stands as a testament to the continuing hold of Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* on political philosophy. The contributors return time and again to issues first raised in its pages. If there is any change from the criticisms of fifteen or twenty years ago, it is that there is now a greater tendency to question not only the notorious details of Rawls' theory but the approach to political philosophy that it exemplifies. Thomas Pogge observes that the era of Rawls has seen a 'drift' from an 'interactional' to an 'institutional' view of justice. Bargainers in the original position, as conceived by Rawls, would fail to respect vital distinctions between types of violence — state and non-state, calculated and accidental — and might well resolve to create political institutions that brutally punish those guilty of negligence and strict liability offences, on the ground that the state of the worst-off class would improve with the resulting decline in accidental injuries. Roderick Long also finds fault with the institutional emphasis. Rawlsian liberals, preoccupied with uncovering *implicit* mutual consent at the foundation of institutions of government, forget that liberalism requires equal concern with the establishment of *real* mutual consent in ordinary social relationships. The institutional emphasis has 'preserved the setting [of liberalism] only to lose the jewel' (12).

Other essays treat narrower but equally intriguing topics. Allen Buchanan argues that Rawlsian equal opportunity would allow, and perhaps *require*, genetic engineering. Dan Brock discusses the difficulties in determining whether the rationing of health care unfairly reduces the prospects of the disabled, arguably society's 'worst-off' group. Michael Gorr attempts to show that, despite his famous argument that natural endowments are a common asset, Rawls can accommodate a moderately strong doctrine of self-ownership. Baogang He makes the case that modern Chinese liberals can draw more of value from Machiavelli, Locke, and Madison than from Rawls because (as Rawls now acknowledges) justice as fairness applies only to societies with a tradition of constitutional democracy. Not all of the papers, it should be pointed out, concern Rawls. Among those that do not, we find arguments that charity is not a duty (Loren Lomasky), that sufficiency of wealth is more important than equality of wealth (Alexander Rosenberg),

and that David Gauthier has no solid answer to the problems of the application of equality across generations and national boundaries (Larry Temkin). Allen Wood adds an analysis of exploitation, the injustice of which he believes to be something more interesting than an analytic truth.

Daniel Farrell argues that acts aimed at deterring crime are best thought of in terms of distributive justice. An aggressor brings about a state of affairs such that either his intended victim will suffer harm, or the aggressor himself will, as a result of the victim's self-defence. The victim's threat that he will defend himself is a justified deterrent: if forced to carry through with it, he would merely be 'redistributing' the harm from the morally innocent to the morally culpable party. That seems 'fair', Farrell concludes. But Farrell ought to note that philosophers of the 'law and economics' school could account for this situation without referring to moral concepts like fairness and justice. In their view, nothing more need be said than that, in the two-person universe described, the objective (eliminating suffering) will be *most efficiently achieved* by imposing a burden, whether legal or moral, on the person who can most economically eliminate suffering. That person is the aggressor, who can reduce the possibility of harm to zero simply by altering his voluntary behaviour.

Elizabeth Anderson's discussion of academic free speech will interest many. Anderson, presupposing a social account of truth, argues that 'a knowledge claim gains objectivity and warrant to the degree that it is the product of exposure to the fullest range of criticisms and perspectives' (198). Since the university has 'knowledge-promoting aims', it ought to encourage a full range of criticism by admitting into its ranks students and faculty representing a full range of social experience. 'The academy', Anderson writes, 'must structure its communicative relations by norms that ensure that inquirers have their say' (198). The genius of her anti-libertarian argument is that it supports affirmative action and restrictions on offensive speech, not for the sake of *external* political goals, but on the basis of the university's *internal* purpose of promoting true belief.

Anderson rejects censorial 'speech codes' in favour of rules of conversational civility such as 'Don't interrupt'. Anticipating the objection that such rules are content-neutral and perfectly acceptable to libertarians, Anderson insists that 'Stay on topic' (another conversational-civility rule) *does* restrict the content of speech. But (it might be rejoined) this rule does not discourage the expression of any particular *viewpoint* on a given topic — and surely viewpoint-neutrality is what matters to most libertarians. Anderson responds with another rule — 'Don't contemptuously dismiss your opponents' — which (she asserts) effectively precludes 'conservative defenses of aristocratic hierarchies' because *all* expressions of *that* viewpoint are 'intimately connected to a contemptuous tone of voice toward those regarded as inferior' (209).

The reader may judge whether a defence of aristocratic privilege can be mounted without affecting the arrogance of a monocled archduke. Bearing in mind this talk of arrogance, the reader might also wish to reflect on

Anderson's treatment of *her* academic opponents. Anderson discerns four camps in 'political epistemology': 'nationalist communitarianism' (Richard Rorty), 'aristocratic' epistemology (Allan Bloom), 'libertarianism' (Nat Hentoff), and her own 'liberal democratic' view (192-3). Ignoring nationalist communitarians altogether, and preposterously characterizing 'aristocrats' as demanding mindless deference to the 'transcendent truth and supreme cognitive authority' of 'Great Books' (which apparently speak as one), Anderson bluntly declares (193) that only her views and those of the libertarians are 'serious contenders' worthy of attention. I am tempted to conclude that Anderson has underestimated by one the number of academics afflicted with the habit of suppressing 'alternative critical perspectives'.

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Kevin Robb
Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1994.
Pp. x + 310.
Cdn$66.95: US$45.00. ISBN 0-19-505905-0.

Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece is a return to the work Eric Havelock initiated with *Preface to Plato* (1963). Havelock's point of departure was the Parry-Lord thesis, which interprets the repetition of formulae and themes in Homeric verse as evidence that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were orally composed and transmitted for several generations before they were written down. Parry and Lord concluded that what we know as the work of Homer bears more resemblance to improvised tales sung by illiterate (or preliterate) bards than the written work of a single literary genius toiling until every nuance is irrevocably set in place. Havelock argued that the entire *Republic* is a critique of the Hellenic oral tradition as it was exemplified and culturally preserved in epic verse. Epic verse, at once rhythmic and didactic, constituted the Greek 'tribal encyclopedia', and Homer was being vilified as the source of all that Plato condemned in conventional education. According to Havelock, Plato's contemporaries did not simply listen to rhapsodes reciting Homer, they absorbed Homeric habits of thought; consequently, their cognitive lives were oriented paratactically around perceptible particulars.

Robb dates the inception of the Greek alphabet (based on the Phoenician model, adding a system of vowels) to the second half of the eighth century.

The motive was to record hexameter verse — not proprietary markings (60) or commercial documentation (44) — probably on votive offerings, and perhaps to intone dedications permanently (59). Examination of the earliest inscriptions leads Robb to conclude that Greek thought at that time was dominated by oral, epic verse (61-2). Furthermore, epic verse, as a mnemonic reservoir of approved forms of conduct, was the primary mechanism for education, enculturation and the transmission of values — the whole cache of connotations belonging to *paideia*. (In connection with this hypothesis, we might recall Marshall McLuhan's flippant encapsulation of similar remarks by Havelock: the Greek poets were Ann Landers in verse.)

700-400 BCE. was a transition period, during which literacy remained confined to relatively few artisans and never displaced oral ways of life and thought (even the Gortyn Code contains evidence of 'primary orality', ch. 4). The decisive turning point occurred in Athens, at the close of the fifth century, when Nicomachus oversaw the collection and inscription of Athenian laws (141-2). This project not only systematized the substance of oral law, it produced a new system of law in which oral customs came to have diminishing force. As a consequence, Robb argues, the meaning of *nomos* shifted from 'what is customary' to 'what is written' (139-41).

Plato, for Robb as for Havelock, is our hostile witness to the residual orality that bound the souls of individuals while the affairs of the city were being transformed by 'institutional' (not statistical) literacy. The dialogue form is portrayed as a relic of orality which Plato deployed to discredit the seductive and coercive influence of oral *paideia*'s most potent cognitive mechanism, poetic *mimesis* (194-5, 220-7, 234). In the *Ion*, both Socrates and Ion accept the Homeric rhapsode's didactic function; the issue is whether that function can be fulfilled in a rationally defensible manner (162-6). Euthyphro exemplifies someone who has thoroughly absorbed the traditional exempla from epic poetry and, thereby, cannot understand the *sorts* of questions asked by Plato's Socrates (172). The *Republic* is portrayed as setting the Forms and the divided soul against Homeric moral exempla and the oral institutions which transmitted values from one generation to the next (227). The oral educational institutions of 'association', choric dance and symposia could only perpetuate and reinforce the traditional but rationally indefensible system of values (183). 'The only practical solution was to create a new kind of association, a self-perpetuating institution of professional educators to house a radically new kind of paideia ... (232).' Plato, Isocrates and Aristotle founded the first organizations of higher learning in western history in response to this need.

Regarding Plato, Robb offers many insightful observations (particularly concerning the charges against Socrates, 205-7), but he is silent about a few texts on which one would expect comment. Given the weight placed upon Plato in the argument, it is surprising that he does not discuss the *Gorgias*, *Phaedrus* or Seventh Letter. The *Gorgias* suggests that Plato's attack on the discursive practices and intellectual pretensions of his contemporaries extends beyond poetry. Also, Plato expresses pointed misgivings about writing

in the *Phaedrus* (275-9) and the Seventh Letter (341). Even if the letter is spurious, the *Phaedrus* suggests that Plato's suspicions about graphically preserved and transmitted knowledge were comparable to the suspicions attributed to him by Robb and Havelock about oral knowledge. Finally, I am concerned that the understanding of Plato's rationalism here is too narrow, since it is explicated in terms of analysis, definition and deductive argument (167). Plato, it seems to me, has more respect for insight, even intuition, than Robb allows (see especially his dismissive treatment of that which comes by *theia moira*, 167).

This brief sketch of Robb's book cannot convey how well he commands a wide array of evidence (epigraphy, legal history, historical anthropology, etc). The historical account Havelock began in 1963 and returned to many times afterwards could not be given a better synoptic treatment.

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Stanley Rosen
The Mask of Enlightenment.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. xviii + 264.
US$59.95 (hardback: ISBN 0-521-49546-6);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-49889-9).

This is a detailed, provocative, and at times maddening study of Nietzsche's notoriously elusive work, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Although it will certainly help our understanding of *Zarathustra* as a text, a work of art, I fear that Rosen's combative style and his (typically Straussean) disdain for the homogeneously postmodern Nietzschean 'left' and other hoodwinked egalitarians will only ensure that his reading is dismissed on narrowly political, rather than philosophical, grounds. It seems, however, that this is Rosen's somewhat perverse goal, which is a shame, because it means that another chance for an important scholarly dialogue may yet again be missed.

The book itself is divided into five chapters, the first of which is devoted to the Preface, while the remaining four correspond to the four parts of *Zarathustra* respectively. But this division is quite deceptive. Over half of the discussion focuses on the Preface and Part One alone, as it is these crucial, early sections in which Rosen announces a number of interlocking, yet undoubtedly contentious, critical assumptions that organize his entire reading of the text. This means that the more poetic Part Three, and the more

ambiguous, subsequently completed Part Four receive less attention, and rightly so. Furthermore, the book does not offer a close textual reading of *every* speech or episode in any part; only those sections which significantly contribute, without redundancy, to our overall understanding of the text are included, and Rosen should be commended for the balance he strikes between economy and comprehensiveness.

The title's invocation of the mask is already a nod toward Rosen's reliance on Nietzsche's doctrine of esotericism to structure his textual interpretation. There is both an esoteric and an exoteric Nietzsche; the first a purveyor of 'dangerous truths,' the second a concealer of those truths with the appropriate masks of 'salutary myths' (xii). As a result, we can expect to find a 'double-rhetoric' both in *Zarathustra* and elsewhere such that mutually incompatible doctrines are espoused to different audiences, for different reasons. It is in this rhetorical-political sense that Nietzsche is a Platonist: the philosopher is first and foremost a 'profit and lawgiver' (x), and *Zarathustra* must accordingly be read as a 'handbook for revolution' (xiv).

For both Continental and Anglo-American philosophers who consider Nietzsche an aesthete, who identify ontological, epistemological, and ethical doctrines, or even a 'philosophy of creativity' in *Zarathustra*, the guiding claim that Nietzsche is above all a 'political thinker' (56) will probably require more sustained argument than Rosen is willing to provide. For example, he writes that 'all such "ontological" interpretations of Nietzsche, paramount among them Heidegger's, are very much in the spirit of scientific rationalism' (45), yet there is no attempt to explain or justify this equally reductive interpretation. This sort of lofty dismissal is frequent, and the reader cannot help but feel frustrated by Rosen's indifference to his fellow scholars and peers (assuming they exist).

That said, Rosen's positive contribution to *Zarathustra* scholarship lies precisely in the complex political dimensions of the text that he does manage to uncover. In addition to its fervent revolutionary pitch, *Zarathustra* is simultaneously a tragic 'confession that all revolutions must fail' (xiv), and therein Rosen finds the ultimate incoherence of Nietzsche's political philosophy, but also the source of its appeal to both the left and the right. Consequently, beyond Zarathustra's rather straightforward (and maskless) diagnosis of contemporary nihilism, a double-rhetoric is then required to quicken the destruction of decadent, European culture *and* call for a creative transvaluation of values whereby the ground is prepared for the 'superman' (Rosen's atavistic translation) to give meaning to the Earth. Rosen convincingly shows how the inconsistencies involved in this project manifest themselves on a number of doctrinal and dramatic levels in the text. In a more obvious example, the exoteric version of the will to power understood as a doctrine of creativity is vitiated by its esoteric articulation as chaos and thus the denial of those very wills and subjects who were otherwise enlisted to lead the revolution. Similarly, the incompatibility of the call to activism with the fatalism of the eternal return means that the publicly disseminated 'promise of the superman' turns out to be (the here again Platonic)

'Nietzsche's version of the noble lie' (183). Zarathustra himself cyclically ventures from the mountaintop to the city of Motley Cow, the site of politics, in order to effect his renewal of mankind, but the very task of transforming his disciples into supermen, or the few into the many, merely obliterates the aristocratic virtues Zarathustra was attempting to inculcate and prevents the realization of his prophesies.

For Rosen, the central tension, and the interpretive key to *Zarathustra*, resides in our grasping the consequences of the conflict between Zarathustra's 'Hyperborean' meta-perspective beyond good and evil, and his entrance into the temporal cycles of world history. Driven by his will to power to return to man in order to instantiate a new set of values, Zarathustra must continually attempt to reconcile these two conflicting forms of philosophical life. This is why, if we really want to understand *Nietzsche*'s authorial intentions, we must pay close attention to the dramatic context of Zarathustra's speeches. It is here that Rosen the Plato scholar is an invaluable guide. The significance of the animals, the importance of location, the symbolic meaning of Zarathustra's numerous interlocutors — including his own heart, soul and spirit, the veiled references to Plato and Jesus, and so on — in each case Rosen shows how these ostensibly marginal textual features are not merely the stuff of footnotes but rather inextricably linked to *Zarathustra*'s deepest philosophical sense. I found his readings of 'The Rope Dancer', 'On the Gift-Giving Virtue' and 'On the Blessed Isles' to be particularly impressive.

Overall, my main complaint is that Rosen himself assumes Zarathustra's Hyperborean stance and refuses to enter into the fray of secondary literature and engage with the readings of other scholars on important doctrinal matters. For this, and his sporadically churlish tone, we can only wait to see if other scholars are sufficiently Nietzschean to refrain from a campaign of revenge.

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Donald Rutherford
Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. xii + 297.
US$54.95. ISBN 0-521-46155-3.

Donald Rutherford is well-known to students of Leibniz for his articles and essays, including a superb contribution to the *Cambridge Companion to Leibniz* on Leibniz's theories of language. In *Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature*, he has assembled and reworked his earlier papers and added a new first section. The book is a sophisticated exposition — not for beginners — of Leibniz's ideas about God, matter, organisms, laws of nature, justice, and moral excellence. 'My own view,' Rutherford states, 'is that there is far more integrity to Leibniz's metaphysical vision than has often been recognized. The signature doctrines of his thought — the theodicy, the theory of monads, the pre-established harmony of soul and body, the infinite envelopment of organic creatures — hang together in interesting and subtle ways' (178).

The self-positioning is not altogether clear, for the idea that there are systematic lines of development and the gradual evolution of a mature metaphysics is still very much the received view. However, recent research has begun to question the older approaches and accounts, especially those which took Leibniz's subject-predicate logic as the basis of his metaphysics, and to place Leibniz's interests in physics and natural philosophy at the center. Commentators have attempted to become more sensitive to apparent shifts in his thought and the problems of interpretation posed by the sheer volume of Leibniz's writings, uncertainty about their date of composition, and ignorance of whether his many unpublished fragments and drafts represent provisional sketches, suppressed doctrines, or merely tentatives he came to consider fruitless and abandoned. In the process, the overall coherence of Leibniz's views has become more problematic. Rutherford's aim is to deal with the extended textual base provided by the last fifteen or so years of scholarship while at the same time restoring to us the 'systematic' Leibniz of yore. A further stated aim is to retrieve the theodicy — the idea that this is the best of all possible worlds and that nature is intelligible and orderly — from the neglect into which Rutherford believes it has fallen. Again, it is a little hard to understand the author's positioning. There has been substantial French and German scholarship as well as Anglophone scholarship on Leibniz's religious and ethical ideas. Baruzi's fascinating *Leibniz et l'organisation religieuse de la terre* is not cited, nor are Schmidt-Biggemann or Odo Marquand on the *Theodicy*. The neglect to which Rutherford refers is perhaps a form of critical distancing which he finds uncongenial.

Rutherford begins by describing the relationship between Leibniz's best of all possible worlds doctrine and his views about the mutually reinforcing relationships of happiness, virtue, and knowledge. The second section on

metaphysics covers the notions of substance, activity, sensation, and intellection, and goes over some familiar ground, though in greater detail than hitherto. There is a useful discussion of scholastic logic and its relation to Leibniz's ideas about subjects and predicates, and of the question of Leibniz's disputed nominalism. Part three discusses monads and their aggregation and pre-established harmony and claims to solve the problem which has vexed commentators ever since C.D. Broad wondered whether the Leibnizian monads were animals and animalcules, or invisible spiritual beings, and, if they were the latter, how the empirical world is grounded in or founded upon a non-spatio-temporal acausal monadic order. 'In my view,' Rutherford says, 'there is clearly no inconsistency between Leibniz's monadic and panorganic models' (230). This is exciting; but the solution disappointingly turns out to be a double-aspect theory, rather than an interpretation of the panorganic world of bodies in interaction in terms of monads and their perceptions. There is a useful discussion of the claim that Leibniz had an esoteric philosophy in addition to his exoteric philosophy, though this discussion somewhat undercuts the book's unity and integrity thesis. 'Whatever the underlying motivation,' the author concludes, 'there is no doubt that Leibniz was prepared to tailor his message to suit the needs and expectations of his audience' (282). In the end though this section will disappoint those who think of Leibniz as at least tempted by dangerous Spinozistic and cabbalistic ideas: the *discours acromatique* pertains not to God and the world but to the intertheological problems of composite substance, transsubstantiation and real union.

There are many good things to say about this book. It brings forward a number of new passages from the *Handschriften*, especially on the problems of corporeal substance; Rutherford's Latin skills are enviable. Its internalist methodology is successful in carrying the reader into the heart of Leibniz's problems and preoccupations — and his moral-theological-aesthetic enthusiasms. But there are problems. Stylistically the book suffers from an overabundance of adjectives and adverbs, from vague claims about what other commentators or 'many' people think, from misprints, and from the too encouraging use of the instructional 'we' throughout, as in the concluding sentence, 'When engaged in the effort to unravel the complex doctrines of his metaphysics, we must always keep in mind that it is this Christian-Platonic vision of moral perfection through the exercise of reason that gives life to his inquiry.' Rutherford frequently seems overconfident and patronizing. The reader who has grappled unsuccessfully with such problems as aggregation, corporeal substance, and well-foundedness, may be irritated by the frequently repeated claims that (a) Leibniz's thought on this topic is very deep; and (b) it can nevertheless be explained quite adequately, especially when the resulting explanations do not bear this confidence out. The book seems slightly out of kilter, in that a limiting methodology of textual reconciliation is combined with expansive approval for Leibniz's every utterance. This combination leads to some amazing statements — such as that in the notion of the possession of a complete linguistic concept

and the existence of a dynamical law of the series, the 'basic idea is the same' (154).

Like the face of the earth shown to him by Leibniz's guide in his 'Philosophical Dream', Leibniz's metaphysics appears to Rutherford as a source of secrets whose disclosure brings rapture and 'a chain of beauties and delights which go on growing into infinity' (290). However, these experiences stand in a problematic relation to rationalism; the notion of a 'Christian-Platonic' exercise of reason should hardly be taken at face value. Rutherford's well-researched and beautifully written individual essays have always been a pleasure to read and intellectually rewarding as well; despite my reservations about the methods and conclusions of this book, there is no question that he is an author to follow.

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Joan Wallach Scott
Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1996.
Pp. xiii + 229.
US$27.95. ISBN 0-674-63930-8.

Postmodernists have challenged many of the core assumptions that have shaped feminist inquiry in the twentieth century: ideas of an unfolding feminist tradition, conceptions of subjectivity and agency that fuel women's 'rebellions', and notions of women's interests or of an essential womanhood. In this work, Joan Scott demonstrates how feminist scholars may write women's history without recourse to a 'teleological story of cumulative progress' (1). Examining the discourses of French feminists from 1789 to 1944, Scott argues that 'feminist agency has a history; it is neither a fixed set of behaviors nor an essential attribute of women; rather it is an effect of ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions within particular epistemologies' (16). In each chapter, Scott traces the theoretical debates within French politics that engender the feminisms of Olympe de Gouges, Jeanne Deroin, Hubertine Auclert, Madeleine Pelletier and Louise Weiss. Exploring the historical specificity that creates the possibility for each of these remarkable women to engage political action despite the legal barriers to their participation, Scott also argues that these discontinuous feminisms share certain structural features. Feminism is produced by laws, institutions, and

practices that exclude women. Exclusion gives rise to a sense of commonality that constitutes 'women's difference'. To the extent that feminists appeal to this commonality either as a tactic to mobilize women or as an argument about what women could bring to politics, they replicate the terms of discourse that men have invoked to justify women's exclusion. 'This paradox — the need both to accept and to refuse "sexual difference" — was the constitutive condition of feminism as a political movement throughout its long history' (3-4).

Scott's analysis of the discursive practices of democratic politics suggests that paradox is the constitutive condition of far more than feminism. Indeed she notes that the 'power and danger of feminism' lies in its capacity to 'reveal the ideological fault lines' and to 'jam the theoretical machinery of republican political discourse, exposing its limits and disrupting its smooth functioning' (12, 165). Consider, for example, Scott's intricate analysis of the ambiguities entrenched in the conception of the individual. As the abstract prototype of the human, the individual is construed in terms of a common human essence that grounds claims for human rights and provides a foundation for political inclusion of all people regardless of race, gender, or sexuality. Yet the individual is also cast as a unique being who differs from all other members of the species. Individuality *qua* uniqueness then draws attention to the very idea of difference that the prototypical human individual was constructed to mask. Scott argues that 18th-century political discourses constructed the *political* individual as both universal and male, laying the groundwork for the constitutional exclusion of women from the polity. 'The female was not an individual, both because she was non-identical with the human prototype and because she was the other who confirmed the (male) individual's individuality' (8). Ambiguity in the conception of the individual gives rise to a legal guarantee of political equality riddled with paradoxes. 'Political equality ... necessarily ignor[es] the differences it must also recognize (in order to declare them irrelevant)' (8). Throughout this text, Scott demonstrates in very specific circumstances how gender is rendered invisible and deemed irrelevant by universalist discourses that are markedly exclusionary. In so doing, she illuminates why the language of liberty and equality have failed to secure women's full participation in political life.

Scott also traces how these contradictions empower some women to create themselves as political agents. For example, the Declaration of the Rights of Man proclaimed equal rights for all, yet the Constitution of the first French Republic excluded women, slaves and free men of color from the rights of citizens. Women were constituted as objects of legislative concern in the marriage law of 1791 and as subjects with civil rights when the divorce law of 1792 granted them the right to divorce. According to Scott, Olympe de Gouge's feminism grew out of the lived contradictions of a French revolutionary, who was subsequently denied citizenship, but made an object of regulation and a subject with legal standing in certain courts of law. Jeanne Deroin's emergence as a feminist grew out of participation

in the utopian socialist movements of the 1830s and 1840s, immersion in the revolution of 1848, and the unique contradictions that surfaced when politicians began to drive a wedge between workers rights and women's rights as a means of reconciling differences between formal rights and positive rights pertaining to work and property in the constitution of the Second Republic. In 40 years of activism for women's rights, Hubertine Auclert engaged shifting legitimations for women's exclusion from the politics of the Third Republic, constructing an image of women as logical, self-disciplined strategic agents in opposition to the contradictory claims that women (like *les Petroleuses* at the barricades of the Paris Commune) were revolutionaries devoid of reason or reactionaries prey to the manipulations of priests. Forged in debates concerning rationalism, mass democracy, and parliamentary reformism, Madeleine Pelletier's feminism anticipated constructions of gender as performativity and focused upon rights as a means by which autonomous subjects could be brought into being. Forecasting the imminent arrival of suffrage, peace activist Louise Weiss turned to feminism as a tactic, a means to sway male politicians concerned about their re-election prospects. Yet in so doing she sought to expose 'the incompetence of the government and the petrifaction of republican institutions' (166), resorting to the courts to reconcile the principles and practices of the law.

In so brief a review, it is impossible to do justice to the sophistication of Scott's analysis or the complexity of the issues she addresses in the context of these disparate feminisms. Those interested in feminism, postmodernism, historiography, and/or the fundamental assumptions that sustain contemporary political debates will find this book richly rewarding. Philosophers of science concerned with the methodological production of facticity will find this work exemplary of the contributions of postmodernism to the construction of the past.

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Arvind Sharma
The Philosophy of Religion; A Buddhist Perspective.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1995.
Pp. 213.
Cdn$34.50; US$21.95. ISBN 0-19-563346-6.

Arvind Sharma writes with a straightforward style on a topic where such clarity is sometimes lacking. His text begins, as such work should, by defining terms and outlining the relationship intended between Philosophy of Religion and Buddhism. His aim is to 'find the material from Buddhism relevant to the Western philosophy of religion' (5) rather than criticise one tradition by means of another. He introduces Buddhist thought to enrich both the depth and scope of a Western approach.

The broad title and medium length text demands that the reader possesses a working knowledge of western philosophy. Sharma wisely assumes less familiarity with Buddhist material, but does occasionally assume too much of the reader. For example, reference to 'a tension between the Bhaktic and the Gnostic approach to religion' (18) would be lost on most. Sharma also rashly assumes that the idea of goodness in Christianity is 'too well known to require elaboration' (20). There is the occasional lapse into unnecessary complexity, both in style and content, as when Sharma remarks that an 'interpretation of God's wrath is too close to the Buddhist idea of evil *karma* to require more comment than this, that according the one view, the whole paraphernalia of hell is set up by our own bad *karma* for its own expurgation, rather than the other way around' (23). These lapses are certainly the exception rather than the rule, and the text seems suitably clear for readers at the level of philosophy undergraduates and above.

Readers of Sharma's *A Hindu Perspective on the Philosophy of Religion* will recognise both the structure and much of the early material. He begins by examining the concept of God and grounds for belief or disbelief in God. The examination of the proofs is particularly focused and enriched by the relationship with Buddhist thought. The problem of evil also gains from this fresh perspective. Buddhist ideas challenge some of the basic concepts central to the western debate; the nature of man; free will; morality; the relationship between man and suffering; the suffering of non human animals.

The section titled Revelation and Faith includes Buddhist thought loosely related to the rationalist/empiricist debate. Propositional and non-propositional views are examined alongside those of James, Pascal, Tennant and Tillich. The treatment of revelation is less of a dialogue and more a critique from a Buddhist viewpoint. In his section on religious language, many theories are placed alongside relevant Buddhist thought. There is less interaction between traditions here, but there are still valuable insights to be gained through this comparison.

The chapter on Verification offers a competent tour of the debate over verification and falsification. The following chapter on the conflicting truth claims displays Sharma's method at its best. Popular positions are examined in the light of Buddhist thinking to their considerable enrichment. The range of Buddhist approaches to religious diversity demonstrates its fundamental difference to Christian thought. This range also highlights the value of such material to the philosopher examining religious diversity.

In his final chapters on human destiny we find immortality and resurrection treated independently from karma and reincarnation. Sharma correctly identifies the philosophical problem within both issues as that surrounding the nature of personal identity. He recognises that the difference between the conceptual framework of these traditions diminishes the value of any comparative study and sensibly examines the problem from two perspectives.

There are two related problems with this text. Firstly, Sharma relies on John Hick's *Philosophy of Religion* as his sole authority and source for the Western approach. This will not penalise readers unfamiliar with Hick as the content of *Philosophy of Religion* is amply quoted and paraphrased. It appears over 215 times in the footnotes, over one reference per page. Hick's introductory work, (similarly prominent in *A Hindu Perspective on the Philosophy of Religion*), does at least offer a clear framework into which Buddhist material can be neatly introduced. Inevitably, it also limits the interest in this work for those familiar with Hick. A more serious consequence of Sharma ignoring other works is a portrayal of Western thought which does not reflect its true diversity.

Sharma's reliance on limited sources is also at the root of the second basic problem with this work. Sharma introduces three major authorities on Buddhism and quotes them just as extensively as he does Hick. Some passages of text are empty of original argument. The section on natural evil (65-8) is four pages of quotations linked by only four contributing sentences. The text as a whole contains far more extended quotation and paraphrasing than original material.

These criticisms might not be too worrying were Sharma to convincingly display a complete grasp of the issues. He might simply prefer to present his thought as if it were a dialogue between others. This appears too charitable in the light of his treatment of Wittgensteinian perspectives (122-4). A Buddhist criticism of Wittgenstein is imported from the thoughts of Gunapala Dharmasili. This criticism lacks perception, treating 'language-game theory' as if separable from a Wittgensteinian view of meaning and 'forms of life'. This criticism is accepted unquestioningly by Sharma and quoted at length. It unfortunately constitutes Sharma's sole offering on Wittgenstein's thought.

The treatment of D.Z. Phillips (124-7) is better but is equally dependant on the opinion of others. Sharma uses quotations from Hick to both introduce Phillips and finally dismiss him. He also returns to Dharmasili, quoting criticism which manages to ignore the ontological implications of Phillips' work. Sharma fails the reader here both by ignoring the range of philosophi-

cal approaches to religious language and failing to deliver any first hand perspective on this material. It can only be hoped that such imported weakness is not apparent to the specialist in other areas.

Despite this criticism, Sharma does bring together authorities from different traditions with considerable skill. This interesting juxtaposition coupled with Sharma's clear style means that one could do worse if choosing an introductory work to Philosophy of Religion. The use of Buddhist material is welcome, and may provide sufficient enlightenment for the advanced reader to overcome any irritation over the devotion to Hick and extensive quotation.

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Barry Smith and **David Woodruff Smith, eds.**
The Cambridge Companion to Husserl.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. viii + 518.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-43023-2);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-43616-8).

The editors of the respective volumes in the *Cambridge Companion* series face the difficult task of meeting a number of competing and often opposing demands (some issuing from the large statement of purpose put forth in the propaganda for the series): produce a volume 'accessible to non-specialists' while also being of interest to scholars in the field; say something that places the thinker in question within a context without getting bogged down in historical survey or becoming too general; give a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of the philosophy of the thinker in question without being unfairly prejudicial to any one interpretative standpoint. The editors of the present volume have largely met these demands, though with somewhat less success in regard to the last one.

Without doubt, the editors have collected an impressive array of substantive essays dealing with many elements of Husserl's thought. Moreover, while avoiding any oversimplification of both the complexity and the development of Husserl's thought, the texts gathered together here do yield a certain unified and coherent picture of Husserl as a 'philosopher in his own right' (2). Indeed, Husserl appears as a 'seminal figure in the evolution from traditional philosophy to the characteristic philosophical concerns of the late twentieth century: concerns with representation and intentionality and with

problems at the borderlines of philosophy of mind, ontology, and cognitive science' (2). In three articles with a broad, survey-like scope, J.N. Mohanty gives an overview of the development of Husserl's work, J. Hintikka attempts to give a precis of the phenomenological dimension of Husserl's thought which sets him apart from other thinkers, and in an incredibly rich article of almost monograph length, H. Philipse treats Husserl's 'Transcendental idealism' and locates him clearly within the tradition of idealism in general. D.W. Smith uses the mind-body problem to promote a reading rather contrary to Philipse and even suggests that Husserl's transcendental idealism be renamed 'intentional perspectivism' (384). Touching upon many aspects of Husserl's work (indeed, showing the most philosophical breadth of all the essays) from a novel perspective is B. Smith's striking contribution on 'Common sense'. The essays by D. Willard, K. Mulligan, R. Tieszen and P. Simons deal respectively with traditional components of Husserl's thought, namely, knowledge, perception, mathematics, and meaning and language. Most noteworthy for students of logic is K. Fine's formal treatment of the 'Part-whole' dynamic in the third *Logical Investigation*.

The competence of each of the authors is well displayed in the various articles, and each piece should be considered a serious contribution to Husserl scholarship. At the same time, the editors' introduction does serve as a piece which could give students a thematic orientation within the Husserlian corpus. Nevertheless, there is a narrowness to the focus of this volume which is disturbing. The context of each piece is clearly set by the interests and problems of 'analytic' philosophy. There is a stress upon the work of the early Husserl, and the points of comparison to philosophical thought subsequent to Husserl are largely to the analytic tradition. Of course, for any volume of this type to be more than just another random collection of essays on an important philosopher, one approach must dominate. In this respect, the volume is much better conceived than the recent *Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (1993). The editors are also very up-front about their chosen orientation; for example, in the rather limited review of secondary literature, they explicitly state that the focus is on English language publication and on material that is 'of direct relevance to the problems and concerns of analytic philosophy' (493). Such a narrow focus is defensible in itself as *one* approach among many others and perhaps even laudable, given the lack of due attention paid by philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition to Husserl's work.

What remains disturbing, however, is that the editors seem to believe that this narrow approach alone is sufficient to show that the so-called rift between continental and analytic philosophy is an 'artificial construct' (2-3). The 'rift' does indeed disappear in this volume, but only through a similarly artificial and unilateral focus on the concerns of analytic philosophy and a complete lack of attention to those issues (often worked out against a Husserlian background) which seem to be of most interest to late twentieth century so-called 'continental thought' (e.g., history, textuality, subjectivity and selfhood, temporality, politics and power, the limits of cognitivism,

aesthetics, ethics, etc.), as well as virtually ignoring the tradition of French and German Husserlian scholarship (outside of those with an interest in what might be called the 'Brentano-school' or the 'Munich' phenomenologists). Not only is it disappointing that a volume meant to be 'cutting-edge' fails to note in its primary bibliography the most recent addition to the critical edition of Husserl's work (*Ergänzungsband zur Krisis*, ed. R.N. Smid, *Husserliana XXIX* [Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993]), but as later publications which do fit the tenor of this volume *are* included (e.g., D. Willard's excellent translation of Husserl's *Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics* [Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994]), one might be tempted to conclude that the concerns of analytic philosophy and the concentration on the early Husserl even condition the presentation of the primary literature! While the editors were undoubtedly wise to avoid a focus on Husserl's influence upon the various figures which have been associated — at least 'artificially' — with twentieth century 'continental' thought, could not space have been made for those Husserlians who work on some of the issues identified above as 'continental?' Could not more careful attention have been paid to places where Husserl himself addresses such issues (e.g.: 'imagination' in *Husserliana XXIII*; 'ethics' in *Husserliana XXVIII*; 'politics and culture' in *Husserliana XXVII*; 'selfhood and intersubjectivity' in *Husserliana XIII-XV*, etc.)?

The recognition that Husserl's thought arose in a context that was also the crucible for what has come to be called 'analytic' philosophy is a great service rendered by this volume. To imply, however, that the concerns central to analytic philosophy alone are 'characteristic' (2) of later twentieth-century thought not only is descriptively false, but also obscures something of the richness, breadth, and far-reaching fecundity of Husserl's thought. Put in terms of an issue of great concern to Husserl and one which weaves through many pieces in this volume: the editors at times seem to have mistaken certain 'parts' of Husserl's work for the 'whole'. It is perhaps by approaching the phenomenon of Husserl's thought from a more 'wholistic' perspective, and at the same time reflecting upon how what Husserl viewed as a uniform philosophical project has inspired such a variety of philosophical thought, that the editors' noble goal of addressing a facile and 'artificial' distinction between continental and analytic thought might best be served.

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Quentin Smith and **L. Nathan Oaklander**
Time, Change and Freedom: Introduction to Metaphysics.
New York: Routledge 1995.
Pp. vi + 218.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-10248-0);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-10249-9).

Time, Change and Freedom is primarily intended as a text for introductory courses, and will be reviewed as such here (though it would make a good starting point for any philosopher wanting to catch up with debates about time). It presents standard introductory topics from a novel perspective; issues such as personal identity and free will are approached through an investigation of the metaphysics of time. This is a nice idea; it provides thematic coherence, and intelligent students will be hooked as intuitive notions of time fall apart under philosophical scrutiny. The book has well thought out aims: chapters are short (mostly 10-15 pages) and focussed; they contain useful study questions; they have up-to-date, comprehensive bibliographies; they are written as dialogues, which give students models of (analytic) philosophy in action; the dialogues also avoid closing issues, encouraging students to continue them. Before commenting on how successfully these general principles are realized, I should outline the contents.

There are four parts, concerning the structure of time, change and identity, free will, and modern scientific conceptions of time. Part One, by Smith, contains four dialogues (between philosophy majors and professors). The first explains how time can have a beginning (doesn't a first moment require a contradictory 'time before time'?) and views on the composition of time (is it continuous, denumerably divisible, or perhaps 'quantized'?) The second dialogue explores, in an easy-going way, the mathematics of infinity as applied to temporal series. Next, the participants discuss substantivalist and relationist views of time; for instance, if time itself ticks along substantially, what justifies a belief that clocks tick along with it? The final dialogue of this section investigates the idea of an eternal deity, existing for all time but outside time. These dialogues contain some technical material presented in an elementary way that, with elucidation in class, should be no problem for students comfortable with, say, elementary algebra.

Oaklander takes over for Dialogues Five through Eleven. Part Two, on change and identity, opens with the basic challenge: change requires that a thing differ over time and yet remain the same. 'Easy' answers to this problem are seen off (for instance, if properties are temporal then an individual possesses all its properties at every instant, and nothing changes), and one is naturally lead to consider the passage of time in the following dialogue. Is time simply a 'string of beads' with all instants possessing equal reality, or is there also temporal becoming, so that only the present is real? That is, is time tenseless or tensed? Dialogue Seven deals with the nature of personal identity, contrasting Aristotelian substance views with Humean relationism. The final

dialogue of the section investigates the compatibility of opposing views on identity with the tensed and tenseless views of time. It presents an interesting argument that substantivalism about identity, and tenseless relationism about time are incompatible. Average students may have some trouble here, but it's a nice passage for more able students to get their teeth into.

The first dialogue of Part Three addresses the compatibility of the tenseless view of time and free will. Essentially, if propositions about the future are true now in virtue of the tenseless history of the world, then, because of the way things are at present, distinct futures are impossible. Dialogue Ten discusses the compatibility of free will with divine foreknowledge, and the final dialogue covers standard issues concerning free will and determinism.

The fourth part is an appendix by Smith, concerning time in relativity and contemporary cosmology. Section A outlines Einstein's special theory: the Michelson-Morley null result is explained, and, informally, the relativity of simultaneity and time dilation are deduced. Some ideas are presented in a rather complex way and the role of the constant speed of light is not easy to see (relativity of simultaneity appears to require only Galilean invariance). However, there are 1001 ways to introduce relativity; some will find Smith's approach to their tastes, others will want to present it in their own style anyhow, so this is probably not a major drawback. Section B is much easier to follow and highly informative on contemporary matters. Students with enquiring minds will learn much of interest.

How well does it all work? Many issues are well motivated for students with little philosophical background; just how could there be a 'boundary' to time? However, some could use more introduction; why should we be committed to an eternal deity, not just an infinite one? Is this an issue that will grab a class?

The dialogues generally move along at a reasonable pace, though leaving plenty for elaboration and discussion. Sometimes, however, average students may get left behind; for instance, Dialogue Seven is long and contains several complex positions that many will find impenetrable. The issues are important to the development of the book, but it could take serious effort to ensure that students were not put off here.

Different models of philosophical analysis and argument are presented in the book quite deliberately (once or twice overwhelming the content). Students will likely be unprepared for such an approach, and time in class would have to be set aside for discussion of argument forms and philosophical method.

On balance, there are many stimulating topics here, presented thoughtfully. However, for the reasons suggested here, less able students may find parts hard to penetrate. They will require either considerable self-motivation or very engaging class discussions to sustain their enthusiasm. A key goal of an introductory course is to impart a sense of the importance of philosophy, and an intelligent, well-motivated student could certainly learn such a lesson from this book.

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Jules Vuillemin
Necessity or Contingency: The Master Argument and Its Philosophical Solutions.
New York: Cambridge University Press (for CSLI) 1996.
Pp. 289.
US$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-881526-86-0);
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 1-881526-85-2)

In the book under review Vuillemin undertakes a reconstruction of the Master Argument. The Master Argument has three premises which are taken to generate an impossibility. The first premise (Premise A) is that all that is past and true is necessary; the second (Premise B) is that the impossible does not follow from the possible, and the third (Premise C) is that what neither is presently true nor will be so is possible. Vuillemin writes, 'the conjunction of C,B, A and of hypothetical necessity has thus a logical impossibility as consequence. Therefore it is not logically possible itself' (36).

Vuillemin's interpretation is roughly this: Diodorus puts the three premises of the argument together from Aristotle's own thinking, namely from *de Caelo* I, 283b6-17; Diodorus in effect shows that Aristotle does not have a coherent position since that position is in part composed of incompatible premises. (cf. 94) It is probable that Aristotle's response to Diodorus's argument and Aristotle's own resolution of the argument can be found in *de Interpretatione* 9.

Part I of Vuillemin's book takes up the question how to interpret and to reconstruct Diodorus's argument; Part II discusses the three possible forms of resolution, and Part III discusses issues essential to a resolution of the argument and, in particular, what Vuillemin calls the principle of conditional necessity.

Vuillemin keeps before the reader the possibility of making sense of contingency. The book moves with ease between an account of *de re* modalities — an account which grounds the modalities in nature — and an account of *de dicto* modalities which places them within a system of knowledge and ignorance. (As the book uses the concept of determination, however, it is not always easy to tell whether one should place the concept in an epistemic camp [making determination a close relative of certainty] or rather in a metaphysical camp [making the concept one of necessity].) In discussing Aristotle Vuillemin clearly wishes that Aristotle had made a wider opening in *On Interpretation* 9 for a theory of probability. But Aristotle's modalities are grounded in nature and are articulated in stating a general theory of nature and of change.

Three ways of resolving the impossibility generated by Diodorus's argument are discussed in detail. (I) Admitting the Premises A (that the past is necessary) and B (that the impossible does not follow from the possible) and refusing C (that what is not nor will be is possible): according to Epictetus, Diodorus used the plausibility of A and B to prove that nothing is possible

which is not presently true and is not to be so in the future. (II) Admitting Premises B and C and refusing A: Cleanthes held that there is a possible which neither is presently true nor will be so; the impossible does not logically follow from the possible; it is therefore not exact to say that every true proposition about the past is necessary. (III) Admitting Premises A and C and refusing B: Chrysippus admits A and C; he allows that the impossible follows logically from the possible.

Vuillemin takes up learned and logically acute studies of each of the three kinds of solutions. This review has room for only a few comments addressed to reasonable restrictions upon each of the three premises: (A) on Premise A and (B) on Premise B, and (C) on Premise C.

(A) A full discussion of Premise A articulates a *de re* / *de dicto* distinction (see section 4.1 of Vuillemin's book in connection with William of Ockham). The sense which Vuillemin gives the premise is that of irrevocability; put differently, no possible can now be realized in the past. 'If something is possible, we can have an effect on it; but we cannot have an effect on the past; therefore the past is not possible' (93).

Are we to suppose that the premise, thus understood, posits a limit on the power there is now for change? Or is it rather that the premise posits a limit on coherent discourse about change, namely that all change takes place during a time from earlier to later? Ruling out a concept of changing from later to earlier leaves untouched the question whether change actually following one path could follow another. In some such way Premise A can be limited and assigned the duty of guarding the coherence of the discourse of change: given coherent discourse, no limit of power for change is suggested.

(B) The principle of conditional necessity is that the actuality of p excludes the capacity of not-p while$p$ and the actuality of not-p excludes the capacity of p while not-p. The principle is authorized by Aristotle's texts (25).

It is granted that there is logical incompatibility between the non-realization of an event and its realization. But why does Aristotle suppose that the logical impossibility of Socrates sitting and not sitting at the same instant rules out a potentiality for standing at the moment Socrates is sitting?

We noticed above the plausibility of supposing that Premise A puts a limit upon intelligible discourse about change and may therefore be said to imply absolute impossibility. Here too the question arises whether the principle of conditional necessity posits absolute impossibility. To see to what extent this may be true consider the following sort of case.

Suppose an event E, at time T2, is contingent relative to a factor Fx of its causal basis at time T1 and therefore that its contrary, non-E, at time T2, is possible relative to Fx at T1. The interval must be long enough for a change to be possible for bringing about non-E, even though, as it turns out, an actual process brings about E. During some part of the interval between T1 and T2 it is allowed to be true that there is not sufficient time for a change to non-E; this impossibility would be relative impossibility; it follows that E is now inevitable. But at the instant T2 at which E first takes place the impossibility of non-E is absolute and concerns the discourse of change and not change

itself; for all change takes some time, however short the duration is. So like Premise A, the principle of conditional necessity limits the discourse of change but does not define the limits of time within which a change to an alternative outcome is possible or (relatively) impossible.

There are several respects, relative to which an event can be said to be necessary or contingent. For the sake of brevity let us consider only time and capacity. When Socrates is sitting, at T2, his standing at that time is impossible relative to some prior time; for during that time he would have had too little time in which to have stood up so that at T2 he would be standing; what was possible relative to an even earlier time becomes impossible relative to later time. Premise B therefore does not apply generally to *de re* contingency.

(C) Socrates's standing at T2 is contingent relative to capacity and strength. When Socrates decided at T1 to remain seated, it is presumed that at that time there was still time enough to have stood up so that at T2 he would be standing. Although his sitting is determined relative to the act of will, it is by no means clear whether his sitting is contingent or possible relative to the faculty of will. Duns Scotus argues that the 'will continues ... to exist as a power at the same moment in which it produces its act' (239f). If this is so, it is difficult to see how the act of will can be said to be determined by the faculty or the power of will (or, in an alternative formulation, can be said to be necessary relative to the power of will). In the case of human action it will be the case that the principle of conditional necessity will not limit application of the principle of relative contingency; for any action necessary relative to some factors will be contingent or possible relative to other factors.

The title of Vuillemin's book seems to suggest a choice between necessity and contingency; one hopes the 'or' is not an exclusive one. Taming the three premises of Diodorus's argument seems to leave us with both necessity and contingency: some events, past, present or yet to be are necessary relative to some productive factors and contingent relative to some supportive or sustaining factors.

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Ernest J. Weinrib
The Idea of Private Law.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1995.
Pp. 237.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-674-44212-1.

This book sets out to defend the thesis that private law should be regarded as an autonomous practice, with its own normative structure, its own rationality and its own 'repertoire of arguments' (2). These features distinguish private law from other types of law as well as from politics and economics.

Weinrib criticises the current 'standard-view' according to which law can be understood as an instrument to further (social, economic and political) purposes. This standard-view is wide-spread. According to the author even non-instrumentalists tend to reduce the role of law to that of a means to an end, as is shown by anti-utilitarian moral philosophers who deal with law as no more than a means to morality (49).

According to Weinrib the stress on purposes external to law, which are formulated independently of one another and are often seen as conflicting goals, fails to take into account the true nature of private law as a coherent body of theory and practice. In order to make sense of that coherence we should adopt the view that 'the purpose of private law is to be private law' (5).

The perspective on private law as a unifying structure of modes of thought and practices is elaborated by means of three theses, to be summarized under the following headings: 1) the method of legal formalism; 2) the Aristotelian distinction between distributive and corrective justice; 3) the Kantian notion of 'right'.

Ad 1) (The Weinribian version of) legal formalism focusses on the internal structure of private law, and tries to understand its various component elements as parts of a unifying and coherent whole. It is only on the basis of the assumption of coherence, that the essence of private law can be understood. And as soon as we distinguish its essential features from its inessential ones, we gain insight in the general class under which it falls (27). Form as 'unity, character and kind' enables us to understand private law from within (28). It presents us with a coherent picture of private law which is more than just the sum-total of its components.

Ad 2) Insight into the true nature of private law is further enhanced by Aristotle's distinction between distributive justice and corrective justice. Distributive justice deals with the (equal) distribution of shares by an agent among various persons. The criteria which are used in the determination of these shares are provided by external goals (and are as such topic for political debate). It is not possible to understand private law along this model. On the other hand 'corrective justice' does supply a convenient model for understanding private law: it deals with two parties, which are intrinsically related to one another. Gain of the one involves loss for the other. Compensation for the victim and deterrence for the wrongdoer cannot be seen apart. Aristotle shows the fundamental difference between these two types of justice as well as the different notions of equality pertaining to these two kinds of justice, and

helps us to understand the particular features of private law in contradistinction to other types of law.

Ad 3) The Kantian notion of 'right' serves to connect 'corrective justice to the institutions of a functioning legal order' (84) and makes this order intelligible as a normative one informed by (universal) reason. It is Kantian reason that pervades the legal realm as such and guarantees its coherence. The Kantian notion of man as an end in itself and his abstracting from particular, external and empirical purposes helps us to analyse and justify private law from within. Kant guarantees the primacy of law over morals by stressing the fact that it furnishes us with minimal (negative) requirements to be met before we may proceed to the (positive) injunctions of morality.

Having worked out this three-fold model of analysis, Weinrib proceeds to investigate more closely the bipolar, but unified relationship of rights and duties which is at the basis of private law. His claim is that the two parties are intricately and intrinsically connected, even in cases where the two parties appear at first sight to be only loosely related, as in the case of negligence liability of strict liability where the loss of the plaintiff is not intendedly or immediately caused by the acts of the defendant.

We may regard this book as the eloquent but somewhat desperate defense of a private lawyer who wants to save his favourite discipline from the undermining activities of sociologists, economists and moral philosophers. Weinrib's defense is a valiant one, but unfortunately rather outdated. His plea for an essentialist approach as well as his plea for unity reveal a complete lack of knowledge of modern analytic philosophy. The choice of Aristotle and Kant remains largely unargued for, a serious drawback in view of the problematic combination of these two theories.

This does not mean that Weinrib's enterprise is not an honourable one. There are good arguments to be found against an instrumentalist view on law. But the reader would like to know why there is no mention at all of Lon Fuller's discussion of law as an end in itself, and why exactly Hans Kelsen's legal formalism is not taken as a starting-point for analysis (Kelsen is now only scorned for his contempt of Aristotle).

Worse than that is the — equally outdated — epistemological assumption underlying his attempt. Weinrib pretends to unravel the truth and nothing but the truth about private law. He seems completely unaware of the possibility to adopt several perspectives on one and the same phenomenon. Weinrib is of course right in rejecting reductionism. Indeed, economic or social purposes are not deliberately intended by private lawyers (they have their own, more immanent aims), but that doesn't imply that private law as a practice might not yield some *unintended* consequences as well, which can not be fully grasped if one remains confined within the narrow boundaries of private law and if one refuses to adopt external perspectives on law as well.

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Michael A. Weinstein
Culture/Flesh: Explorations of Postcivilized Modernity.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 1995.
Pp. x + 119.
US$48.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8083-5);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8084-3).

In the context of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, Michael A. Weinstein's *Culture/Flesh* is highly unusual. Not only does it address a currently neglected field, the philosophy of life, but it takes the form of a personal quest for self-understanding on the part of a philosophical persona which Weinstein calls the civil savage. Academic readers are likely to feel most at ease with the first part of this quest, which develops Weinstein's diagnosis of what ails modernity. These same readers are likely to be disconcerted and even baffled by the second part, where Weinstein offers his prescription for this ailment.

Weinstein's central claim is that the distinctive predicament of contemporary Western society is best characterized not as postmodernity but as postcivilization. By 'civilization', he means a spiritual process of disconnecting the self from its community, revealing the self to itself as a weak and insignificant being, putting the self into contact with a transcendent reality which gives it significance, and reconnecting the self to its community in light of that reality (3). Weinstein sees modern civilization as distinguished by the search for a subjective rather than an objective ground for the self, as exemplified in Kant's the attempt to find an ethical imperative in practical reason itself (24-5). The civil savage recognizes with Nietzsche that human subjectivity and its cultural products fail to bestow significance on human life, and that happiness must be sought in the absence of a framework of civilization to direct that search (93-4).

Weinstein looks to two kinds of encounters between self and other, namely, work and love, to point the way forward out of this postcivilized predicament (35). In response to the absence of any transcendent reality to provide a suitable vocation for the civil savage, Weinstein embraces the maxim of the early Persian mystic Hallaj, 'I am the creative truth' (44). Weinstein interprets this to mean that the world is what it is in part because of the self and its activity, and this reassures him that our being is not wholly illusory and our work not wholly vain (46). Likewise, it is not possible for the civil savage to have contact with a transcendent reality which is good or lovable without qualification (64). But it is possible for him to love the concrete other precisely because of the other's limitations and imperfections, which give it uniqueness and particularity (66-9).

As justification for embracing the positive attitudes which underlie his prescriptions for work and love in postcivilized modernity, Weinstein appeals to the unfashionable last resort of intellectual intuition (46). As a result, he does not so much ask his readers to consider an argument for these prescrip-

tions as he invites them to embrace the civil savage's worldview as an experiment in living (14-15). Many will feel uncomfortable doing so, especially since Weinstein asserts that this worldview involves haughty contempt for a wide range of liberatory political movements (102-3). The fruits of Weinstein's labours are of uncertain quality, but the remarkable nature of his philosophical project is undeniable.

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Allison Weir
Sacrificial Logics: Feminist Theory and the Critique of Identity.
New York: Routledge 1996.
Pp. 216.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-90862-0);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-90863-9).

Allison Weir's book sets out to fill a vacuum in feminist theory left in part by Judith Butler's controversial book *Gender Trouble* (1990). Weir ambitiously sets out to confront a feeling of embarrassment, of confusion, which has overcome Anglo-American feminists in the 1990s, notably white middle-class professional theorists in academe. How is it possible to utter the word 'woman' and not only speak for oneself but also be in solidarity with others. Is 'speaking for others' tabu? Is identitarian thinking a logic of the past that has proven to be oppressive in particular to subaltern subjects? Weir promises to get us out of the impasse.

In her project of *Vernunftkritik* — which in some sense is similar to Habermas's resurrection of the project of modernity — she criticizes the 'difference' feminist knee-jerk reaction to blindly identify rationality with domination and identity with repression (of difference, etc.). Like Habermas, she argues that it is too facile to break with the Enlightenment ideals of the coherent autonomous subject and the concurrent notions of freedom and equality. Like Habermas, she advocates a (different) return to Hegel, and she calls on the feminist theorists to give up their detour of sacrificial logics. Weir's thesis is elegant and compelling: she states that relational feminists (Benjamin, Chodorow) and poststructuralist feminists (Irigaray, Butler) alike have relied uncritically on de Beauvoir's and Kojève's mis-reading of Hegel, which assumes that identity as self-assertion always occurs only through the struggle for domination between the self and the other; identity thus is always only postulated through erasure of the other and separation

from the other. However, a correct interpretation of Hegel is to see that identity formation is in fact an expression of difference, not a repression of it. The master-slave paradigm is Hegel's exemplification of the failure to recognize the other's universality, or the selves universality in the other. Hegel's dialectics proscribes that the stage of the 'unhappy consciousness' has to be sublated, so that the self succeeds in conceiving itself intersubjectively.

In her critique of the various feminist 'misreadings', Weir discusses the paradoxical nature of the conception of subjectivity, autonomy, and agency in Benjamin, Chodorow, Irigaray, Butler, and Rose. Yet only Jessica Benjamin acknowledges and explicitly endorses the paradox of the self as such.

In Nancy Chodorow's work, the paradox arises in the form of her need to affirm and reject autonomy at the same time. Weir states, that Chodorow lacks a notion of autonomy which can conceive a life-affirming notion of separation, i.e., that separation is not always already repressive, dominative, and that vice-versa, in certain situations, connection can also be abusive.

Jessica Benjamin's analysis draws on Chodorow's description of the development of gender identity and supplants it with her own categories of self-assertion and mutual recognition, which are always in conflict with each other because assertion is cast as domination. Even though Benjamin also draws on Habermas for her own theory of intersubjectivity, ultimately, she remains committed to an ideal which preserves the paradox (of postulating dominative autonomy and repressed connection).

Judith Butler's analysis of identities is less an occasion for a subversion of identity but an absolute denial, an abstract negation of identity. Like Irigaray and Derrida, Butler reduces identity to repression. Since for Butler, language is also always already violent and deceptive, Weir sees little value in Butler's attempt to articulate how selves can resist the dominant order and critiques Butler for contributing to a subversion of solidarity.

Jacqueline Rose, a lacanian psychoanalyst, acknowledges the self's need for articulating resistance to a patriarchal culture; but in the end, Weir notes, Rose relies on a stoic/tragic model of the self (versus Butler's skeptical model) which simply acquiesces to the patriarchal reality in order to avoid psychosis. So, Rose, too misconstrues identity as repressive and as something which one can neither escape nor overcome.

So it comes somewhat as a surprise that another lacanian theorist, Julia Kristeva, is offered up by Weir to provide a 'way out' of the paradoxical morass of identity. Kristeva, after all, as Weir also acknowledges, has been variously critiqued as providing a negative theory of subjectivity and as lacking any theory of resistance. What Kristeva offers is a dialectics between the acceptance of structure (in language) and the possible transgression of it. So, Kristeva recognizes the violence of separation which marks identity formation, but she uses the notion of abjection to invoke the affect of pleasure that is concomitant in this process of developing a social identity.

Weir's 'interpretative turn' enables us to shed the sacrificial logics that have led the contemporary feminist theory of identity and difference into a

dead end, and instead we need to look for new models of identities which are intersubjectively posited. Thus instead of reducing identity to the logic of domination and repression, she affirms the need for a logic of inclusion and a normative ideal of self-identity. Weir insists — contra Benjamin — that the internalization of norms are not always internalization of processes of domination, and she holds — contra Butler — that the use of abstraction ought not to be vilified. Although the feminist ethic that Weir hints at in her critique of the lacanian and derridean feminists expresses a need for connection, affinity, it is not informed by the ideals of an ethic of care; rather, Weir endorses the (habermasian) ethic of justice and rights because it avoids the particularism and the maternalism of Gilligan's approach; furthermore his ethic allows for an expression of different moral choices.

Allison Weir offers an insightful analysis of the paradoxical argumentation of identity and difference that she unearths in her selection of contemporary theorists; what is fascinating is that we can easily extend Weir's insights to many other theorists who are equally afflicted with the desire to cling on to a sacrificial logic. Weir has addressed an important dilemma in feminist theory, and I consider her book to be indispensable for any philosopher and psychoanalyst working on the problem of identity and for those who need an impetus for rereading Hegel's Phenomenology — with pleasure.

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