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■ **Note from the Editors and the Publisher**

Beginning with Volume 17 (1997), *Canadian Philosophical Reviews / Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie* will change its name to

Philosophy in Review

Comptes rendus philosophiques

We believe that this change will better reflect the international character of our panel of reviewers and of the authorship of the books reviewed in our pages.

■ **Note de la direction et de l'éditeur**

Dès le volume 17 (1997) la *Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie / Canadian Philosophical Reviews* changera de nom et s'appelera désormais

Comptes rendus philosophiques

Philosophy in Review

Nous croyons que ce nouveau nom témoigne mieux du caractère international des contributions et des ouvrages recensés dans notre revue.

Susan E. Babbitt
Impossible Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1996.
Pp. xii + 242.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-2639-7);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-2640-0).

In this wide-ranging book, Susan Babbitt articulates a vision about the nature of personal transformations, and the important role they should be allotted in our understanding of topics as apparently diverse as political change, theories of rationality, integrity, epistemology, and the interpretation of literature. Babbitt looks at the way in which actions which seem unjustifiable or irrational may be necessary to overcome the limitations societies place on their members' ways of being.

One method used frequently by Babbitt involves the examination of tales told by people about particular incidents in their lives, and/or of incidents depicted in literature or film. These incidents tend to be ones in which a member of a traditionally oppressed group (e.g., particularly women, lesbians, or North Americans of African descent) performs an action which would normally be considered wrong, or crazy, by the prevailing standards of morality or rationality. We are encouraged to see these actions as challenges to the existing oppressive structures, and ways for these individuals to transform themselves, and make possible at least a vision of a more desirable situation. Such actions are said to require 'moral imagination', and the courage to dream 'impossible dreams'. Even if the actions themselves cannot be entirely endorsed (e.g., acts of theft and homicide), and do not even have any good consequences, we may come to appreciate the courage and integrity which made such actions possible once we see the role they play in transforming the individual, or in opening a vision of the injustice of society. Furthermore, we are to recognize that our existing framework of morality and rationality may be inadequate for evaluating these actions, and acknowledge that the actions may bring into existence themselves more appropriate frameworks for evaluation.

The first chapter of the book revolves around the work of Drucilla Cornell on identity and difference, and on retelling myths as a way of overcoming systemic restraints on our understanding and moral vision. Babbitt argues that Cornell's work on the use of myths does not go far enough, however, in that she does not explain why some prevailing myths might be thought relevant to an incident in the first place, nor why some particular alternative explanations might be helpful in gaining a better picture of what is really going on. Babbitt claims that 'such alternative visions cannot properly be formulated or implicitly presupposed without relying on general beliefs and theories about what such things as humanity, respect, and dignity really are — that is, on the presupposition of the discoverability of moral truths' (26). This leads Babbitt to considerations of what sort of justification might be

offered for actions which do not fit into the conventional framework. She believes questions of justification must ultimately be answered in terms of paths of development and individual identity/integrity, but that questions about identity must be answered in terms of the structure of society in general, and the real needs which must be satisfied for individuals to flourish as human beings.

Babbitt has a concern which recurs throughout the book stemming from this need for a vision of the discoverability of moral truth, and the identifiability of real conditions of human flourishing. If the starting point of the discussion is that our conceptual framework has been limited by society, then one cannot simply assume that one's understanding of morality or of the conditions of human well-being is correct. Indeed, Babbitt wants to endorse the general feminist (and others) critique of foundationalism. Nevertheless, she believes some sort of realism is required, and at various points in the book, following the work in naturalistic epistemology of Philip Kitcher and Richard Boyd, she argues against nominalist positions. She believes that the naturalistic understanding of reliability in terms of the existence of 'causal mechanisms that bring it about over time that what is predicated by the theory is true of what the theory is about' (101) can be applied to social groups and social systems. As long as we do not require complete theory independence for objectivity, Babbitt believes that there can be the needed sort of objective truth about morality, human flourishing, and social systems.

The second and third chapters contain the core of Babbitt's critique of a popular view of rationality which she attributes to the liberal tradition, and Rawls and Brandt in particular. Babbitt argues that this account is flawed in two major (and related) ways. One of these is that it takes 'relevant information' to refer to propositional knowledge only, thereby excluding 'knowledge people possess in the form of intuitions, attitudes, ways of behaving, orientation and so on' (50). This sort of knowledge becomes particularly important, she claims, when one becomes aware that there is something wrong with the way one has been taught to think, but one cannot quite articulate the problem.

The other major flaw in the common theory of rationality has to do with the definition of rationality in terms of an agent's current desires and interests. Since these desires and interests may well have been formed by an oppressive system, they may fail to reflect the individual's real interests. Indeed, oppressive systems may prevent people from identifying themselves as persons with the sort of self needed for flourishing. Accordingly, Babbitt thinks an account of rationality must accommodate 'conversion experiences', since sometimes actions can be seen as rational only in light of the transformations they bring about in who the person is. Babbitt concentrates on people who have been oppressed and need to achieve a sense of self, but she claims that her account of rationality can be extended, not merely to the converse process by which traditionally advantaged individuals come to see things in a more complex and 'humane' way, but indeed to a general conception of rationality.

Chapter 3 examines what Babbitt considers a more sophisticated development of the traditional model of rationality — that offered by Peter Railton. Although Railton does allow some role for non-propositional understanding, and for looking beyond an individual's current desires, Babbitt claims his approach is still flawed because it assumes an objective end for an individual must be traceable to some idealized version of the existing person's interests. It too thereby fails to appreciate the full importance of psychological transformations. Babbitt states, 'it is not an individual's objective interest that explains the rationality of particular choices; rather, it appears to be the individual rationality of particular choices that explains the possibility of an individual's objective interest.'

Babbitt is aware that her suggestion of defining rationality in terms of what a person would do after experiencing a conversion experience might seem to leave the door open to indeterminacy or, worse, totalitarianism. This is because one could subject people to *any* treatment, and claim that they would choose it if provided with the proper 'conversion' (or 'transformation') first. Babbitt attempts to stave off this criticism by asserting 'that some types of processes *are* conducive to moral progress and that others are not, that there are indeed facts about this matter' (77).

The fourth chapter of the book focuses on Will Kymlicka's attempts to rescue liberalism by assigning to the state the role of ensuring a variety of meaningful options from which individuals may choose, including recognizing the importance of cultural groups, and by offering an account of state neutrality which allows the state to take positive steps to combat inequalities such as racism and sexism. Babbitt argues that Kymlicka still relies on options and cultural groups which have been shaped by the often oppressive forces of history, and that political neutrality merely protects the arbitrary unjustified state coercion imposed through prevailing norms and values.

In Chapter 5, Babbitt expands her discussion of liberalism and rationality to the concept of personal integrity. Personal integrity is here linked to the concept of identity, which is in turn linked to the capacity of deliberate about oneself. Integrity is taken to include a normative element, such that it can 'be defined in terms of paths of development, where the determination of the right sorts of paths of development depends on moral imagination, on general beliefs about what *ought* to be possible for human beings in terms of autonomy, self-respect, and dignity' (105). The chapter concludes with a few remarks about the moral importance of emotions, focusing on bitterness and vindictiveness in particular. She claims that such emotions can be appropriate responses to unjust social systems, and constitute part of the 'path of development' an individual must take to maintain personal integrity.

The sixth and seventh chapters connect the account Babbitt has been developing to some specific elements of feminist philosophy. An examination of the feminist critique of essentialism, and the work of Donna Haraway in particular, is capped by the claim, again grounded in the possibility of a naturalistic conception of knowledge, that the critics have mistakenly assumed that essentialism is committed to principle of a priori justification.

Babbitt also comments on the personal experience/universal principles debate, and seeks a sort of compromise. She argues 'Personal relations and commitments are sometimes significant in explaining the *bringing about* of possibilities that are not imaginable in current terms but that make sense in terms of a more humane social vision' (174).

In her final chapter, entitled 'Philosophy and Literature: Recalling the Archangel', Babbitt tries to draw some of the elements of the book together. She is here largely interested in Martha Nussbaum's treatment of R.M. Hare's metaphors of the Archangel (critical thinking) and the Prole (intuition) in her work on Aristotle. Babbitt sees Aristotle as problematically content with the intuitions of the individual as he or she is at the moment, again ignoring the forces which shaped who that person must be. Babbitt seeks a position in which critical thinking may have a slight priority, but intuition and particularity play a prominent role as well. '[I]n many cases, rational standards *do* require...scanning a situation from a distance and being able to see the larger picture for what it is morally. The possibility of such scanning, however, often requires the development of alternative norms and values; moreover, it often requires personal and social transformation' (204-5).

A brief epilogue contains, among other things, the suggestion that the difference between Cuba and liberal democracies is not about whether the state imposes limits on what people can think and do (which Babbitt claims both kinds of states do), but rather about whether this imposition is acknowledged openly, and a case made for its direction.

In sum, Babbitt's book offers a variety of approaches to some of its central ideas, and explores their application in a variety of contexts. The book is not always easy to follow, but it does raise a number of important questions, and offers provocative attempts at answering those questions.

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Marcia W. Baron
Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1995.
Pp. xiii + 244. US$37.50. ISBN 0-8014-2829-7.

In this book, Baron attempts to defend Kant's ethical theory against the charge that he has overemphasized the role that duty must play in an ethical theory. To do so, she reviews a large number of objections to Kant's emphasis on duty, and argues that those objections (with one possible exception) either misconstrue Kant's position or are based on assumptions which it is not clear we should make.

Baron begins by breaking the objections she will consider into two main categories: those which argue that Kant has drawn the boundaries of duty too widely for us to include the desirable category of supererogatory actions, and those which argue that Kant overemphasizes the value of following duty as a *motive* (and thereby diminishes the value of motives such as friendship, loyalty or love). Part One of her book deals with objections of the first type, while part two tackles the second.

In Part One, Baron argues (contrary to some interpreters of Kant) that, indeed, Kant has no room in his theory for the category of the supererogatory — Kant has drawn the lines of ethics in such a way that there could not be actions which are morally desirable but do not count toward the fulfillment of a duty. But although Kant did not make room for such a category, and his theory cannot be easily modified to add it, this is not a fault, because no such category is needed. Baron argues persuasively that Kant *can* accept what seems to be right about the supererogationist theories, without also falling into their errors. She argues that many of the supererogationists approach Kant using a set of assumptions antithetical to Kant's project, and these assumptions are seldom articulated or defended. Kantian ethics offers a desirable *alternative* to supererogationist theory.

Crucial to her arguments in this section is the notion of Imperfect duties. She argues that many critics of Kant have failed to do justice to this notion, which allows us to avoid holding that one must at every moment perform the action that would maximize goodness (making duty too strict, according to some critics), while also eliminating the necessity of the concept of supererogatory actions, which threaten to make the realm of duty too small.

In Part Two, Baron deals with another common family of objectors. These objectors hold that Kant's demand that any action which is to have moral worth must be done from the motive of duty is too extreme, because it prohibits actions done from desirable motives such as love or friendship from having moral worth. Further, such an emphasis would lead to a picture of a morally good agent who is cold and uncaring, moved only by the abstract idea of duty and alienated from genuine human feeling. Baron argues that such objections misconstrue Kant's position — he does not actually demand that duty be the primary [or only] motive for moral actions, and he does not disparage motives of love or fellow-feeling. On the contrary, she points out that

Kant actually *requires* us to encourage such feelings for others, and holds that it helps us to live as we should. She does admit that some of Kant's passages are troubling (particularly one in which Kant seems to endorse shutting off one's feelings for others when they are not efficacious in producing some desirable result — hence the 'Almost' in her title), but she does not take these passages to be representative of a serious flaw in the basic structure of Kant's ethics.

Baron's book is an extremely valuable and refreshing look at Kantian ethical theory. Unlike many contemporary 'Kantians', Baron takes Kant's own positions very seriously, without going to the opposite extreme of uncritical acceptance. She notes that many of the criticisms levelled at Kant are based on either very cursory and inadequate readings of Kant, or on unwarranted assumptions. In particular, many critics of Kant tend to ignore his arguments regarding the importance of imperfect duties, a concept which Baron uses with considerable force in refuting many misguided objections.

Baron's book, while very good overall, does suffer from some flaws. Baron argues that critics of Kant often misunderstand his position regarding the status of duty as a 'motive', because they are working within the framework of an action theory which is not Kantian. That is, they use a concept of 'motive of duty' which Kant did not accept, and would not have accepted: the idea of motives as causes of actions. Use of this motive-as-cause framework 'a familiar picture of agency from the empiricist tradition', leads to a very misleading picture of Kant's ethics, and produces objections to Kant based on fundamental misunderstandings of his view. This is a crucial point, but unfortunately Baron develops it in a somewhat limited fashion (an 'Interlude' of only six pages), while devoting 77 pages to careful consideration of those very objections which are fundamentally misguided. This is potentially misleading, but, more important, it tends to obscure the significance of the more important general point about Kant's theory of agency, and to prevent her from having the space to develop it more fully.

Baron also has a tendency to follow her diverse critics onto points which are quite tangential to her main themes (as when she questions the use of Mother Teresa as a moral exemplar due to her stand on abortion and birth control in a footnote on p.53), and to take too seriously objections to Kant which are based on basic misinterpretations of his position. Nevertheless, Baron performs two very important functions with this book, first by taking Kant's own unmodified (or, perhaps 'almost' unmodified) theory as a viable one and trying to show that many common objections to it are unfounded, and second by placing under careful scrutiny the arguments and assumptions of the proponents of supererogationist theories. Her book is accessible to readers who do not have extensive knowledge of Kant's work, and is generally well-written and valuable.

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David Braybrooke, Bryson Brown, and **Peter Schotch** (with two chapters by **Laura Byrne**)
Logic on the Track of Social Change.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1995. Pp. xix + 273.
Cdn$94.50: US$56.00. ISBN 0-19-823530-5.

In this book the authors articulate a fairly simple logical vocabulary in terms of which (along with empirical predicates) descriptive social rules can be formulated. By examining several historical accounts of social change, the authors argue that formulating social/historical hypotheses in this language will typically provide a deeper level of precision in the statement of the hypotheses and also bring to light important new questions. This logical vocabulary thus promises to be of value to social scientists and historians, as well as to philosophers working in the philosophy of social science or in action theory broadly construed.

The book has a number of virtues. It is extremely well written, and the authors do an excellent job of minimizing the obtrusiveness of the logical notation by giving very effective intuitive glosses. In addition, the case studies used to illustrate the power of their approach are both enlightening and quite interesting in their own right. The cases they examine include: changes in parental authority in determining marriage partners in Britain during 1500-1800, changes from peasant to capitalist ownership in England 1500-1800, Foucault's theory of the rise of clinical medicine in France (with the sick becoming objects of study), the development of the U.S. Constitution with respect to political factions and parties, and the debate about the abolition of British slave trade in 1788-1807.

The authors rightly and usefully focus on rules as systems of prohibitions, with other sorts of normative relations held to be reducible to prohibitions of some sort. (This is, of course, controversial, and although the authors do not provide a full defense of this view, they do discuss and motivate the claim.) The authors highlight the role of quandaries in social change. Quandaries are situations in which every course of action is prohibited by some rule in force. Quandaries involve no contradiction (e.g., Pp & ~Pp); they are simply cases where nothing is permissible (~Pp & ~P~p). Although it is controversial that the latter does not entail the former, the authors rightly deny (although without much discussion) the entailment. With their case studies, they argue that with changing circumstances and changing rules, quandaries often arise, that their elimination is an important force for change in the prevailing rules. Although quandaries are not contradictions, they play, roughly speaking, the sort of role that 'contradictions' play in Hegelian/Marxist theories of history.

The authors offer an account of what a rule is in terms of the notion of a blocking operation. Roughly, a blocking operation against a given action type is an activity that tends to prevent, or reduce the frequency of, the perform-

ance of actions of that type. Examples of blocking operations include physical prevention, verbal discouragement and blame, punishment, and modeling behavior. The authors define a rule (for a group of people) as a system of blocking operations targeting specifiable action types (under specifiable conditions). They argue that this is more enlightening than definitions given by previous authors (such as Philip Pettit). I leave it to experts in this area to assess this claim.

The big question about this book concerns how important the logical vocabulary is for the formulation of hypotheses about social rules. The approach of the book (which builds upon the work of C. Hamblin, G.H. von Wright, K. Segerberg, and others) has rules specified by three components: a **volk** component, which specifies who is governed by the rule; a **wenn** component, which specifies the conditions under which the specified action type is prohibited; and a **nono** (for 'No! No!') component, which specifies the prohibited action type. Thus, the specification of rule F5.6 in their analysis of rules governing marriage has the following form (where the initial universal quantifiers are omitted):

Volk (F5.6) = ENGLISH

Wenn (F5.6) = PARENT (a,b) & ELIGIBLE (b,c) & $aft(r)$MARRIED(b,c) & COMM(a,b,r) & VETO(b,c)

Nono (F5.6) = $aft(r)$MARRIED(b,c)

This says that the English people (of some implicitly specified period) are governed by the rule. The rule prohibits any routine (course of action) r that ends (aft) with b being married to c, under the conditions specified in **Wenn**. These conditions are that b is eligible to marry c, one of his/her parents has commanded that b marry c, but b has vetoed the command. Simplifying, this rule says that children have the right to veto their parents' choice of marriage partners for them.

How useful is this approach to rule specification? There are two distinct audiences: philosophers (and others) interested in formal action theory, and practicing social scientists and historians. The former will find some of the technical discussion (e.g., on the nature of routines and on blocking) interesting, but because the logic has been wisely kept to a minimum, the benefit they get from the book will probably be minimal. Social scientists and historians, on the other hand, will benefit, I think, from seeing how in the case studies the systematic and explicit specification of hypotheses in a simple canonical language helps remove unclarity, and uncovers interesting and important questions that might be masked by a less rigorous statement. But it is not clear that the logical apparatus is needed for this purpose. Most of the benefits, it seems to me, could be obtained simply by explicitly formulating hypotheses in a canonical natural language vocabulary (e.g., limited vocabulary with suitable precision and conciseness).

In sum, the book is beautifully written, with interesting case studies, and a simple and promising logical vocabulary for the formulation of social rules. The book does a superb job of showing the importance of formulating hypotheses about social rules in an explicit canonical form. What is less clear,

but I claim no special expertise here, is the importance of the specific logical vocabulary advocated by the authors. Philosophers of action theory and social scientists will be the judge of that.

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Sandra Burt and **Lorraine Code, eds.**
Changing Methods: Feminists Transforming Practice.
Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press 1995.
Pp. 384. Cdn$26.95. ISBN 1-55111-033-4.

Each essay in this interesting interdisciplinary collection evaluates or formulates new methodologies in research on women. The diversity of the articles, from sport to occupational health to religious studies, shows the advances feminist research has made, while the articles themselves suggest how much there is left to be done. In her opening essay, Lorraine Code discusses the switch most of the authors make to an interactive methodology, that is, methodology that is informed by experience and changes with the subjects' responses. The new methodologies vary significantly, leading Code to argue that 'the most viable strategy for feminist research is, evidently, to abandon any quest for one true method, or for a universalism that would replicate the worst excesses of the older, hegemonic theories' (42). Many of the authors make clear that research once considered objective simply ignores the work that women do or the pain that women suffer.

While the authors survey the research methodologies in their field, making the articles fairly general, some sophisticated analyses of the relation between theory and practice evolve. Brenda O'Neill shows trends in the gender gap in political polling, Sandra Burt gives an overview of feminist criticism of policy analysis, and Kristin Colwell surveys the status of child care workers. Randi R. Warne traces the historical development of feminist work in religious studies and relates this to the roadblocks she confronted as a female student pursuing feminist religious studies. M. Ann Hall suggests adopting a political agenda for sports research that focuses on issues of sexuality, noting that sport organizations are unlikely to accept women leaders. Susan Ehrlich's discussion of critical linguistics encompasses the delegitimization by dominant ideologies of terms such as sexual harassment and date rape as well as interactional speech patterns which invalidate women's experiences and knowledge.

Most of the articles do not focus on race, however, two obvious exceptions are Linda Archibald and Mary Crnkovich's research on an Inuit justice project and Arun P. Mukherjee's critique of feminist literary theory. In their study undertaken for the Inuit women's non-profit Pauktuuit in response to concerns about policing services in Labrador, Archibald and Crnkovich cultivate a reciprocal, collaborative relationship with those they research, reject value neutrality for reflexive understanding between the researcher and the researched, and tie research to political action. The Inuit women accomplished many of their goals, however, the impact the research itself had for them could be commented on in more detail.

Mukherjee argues that white feminist literary critics reclaim historical feminist classics without attending to racist and imperialist attitudes in those works. A new methodology will not solve the problem; rather, critics must attune themselves to historical questions of race, ferret out racist and classist beliefs, and comment on them in their criticism. Otherwise feminist scholars will be in collusion with the texts that they call emancipatory but that are actually hurtful to nonwhite women.

Lorraine Greaves argues that smoking, the leading cause of death of Canadian women, is not only a public health issue but is related to women's overall political inequality. Women smoke to control or adapt to social situations of inequality, and Greaves notes that nonwhite and lower income women are more likely to smoke. Changing the design of the typical public health study, Greaves asked 'What does smoking mean to women smokers?' She found that women use smoking to suppress their emotions and screen their discontent, to change the dynamics of social situations, to create a self-image, and to lose weight. Greaves maintains that public policy measures to increase taxation on cigarettes have been ineffective in decreasing consumption, and fail to address the problems or situations which encourage women's smoking.

Issues of health and social inequality also come to the fore when Greaves, Alison Wylie, and the staff of the Battered Women's Advocacy Centre (BWAC) discuss their 1982 to 1991 use of an intake form. BWAC is not a crisis center, but provides on-going support, and consequently, results from the intake form differ from suppositions garnered from research at crisis centers. For example, in 1988 44% of women involved with BWAC were still living with abusive partner and many 'reported hoping not to leave but to change these relationships' (304). The extensive questions on the intake form not only provided an information-gathering tool, but also helped women confront denial, reduce isolation and generally discover the extent of their abuse. Eventually BWAC stopped using the form as it was used against clients in court cases, an interesting comment on the problem of conducting research.

Articles by Karen Messing and Nettie Wiebe show that women's work is not adequately represented in social science research. Messing argues that occupational health studies are biased by not taking women's complaints seriously. Stress, for example, is considered a peripheral issue by funding agencies although it is the concern most often cited by women workers.

Research on women is not usually funded when proposed, which leads scientists to characterize women's health problems, such as dysmenorrhea, as incomprehensible, and to fail to study significant risks such as women's cancers.

Wiebe discusses women's farm work and its invisibility in standard census data and random surveys. Women rarely identify themselves as farmers, in part because of the ingrained belief that 'farmer' is a masculine referent. In addition, until 1991 the Census Canada form allowed only one name under farm operator, making it difficult for couples to claim joint operator status. Wiebe suggests that more progress could be made against deeply based patriarchal assumptions in farming, and in gathering more data on women farmers.

The articles provide a lively discussion of sex equality in Canada and propose a variety of research agendas and political action platforms. This is a good collection for introductory women's studies courses or for any reader who wants to explore the breadth of feminist research. The interactional methodologies' main benefit is that they disallow using men as the explicit or implicit norm, therefore disregarding women's experiences. Such research uncovers real inequities in public life because it refuses to hide the relation between knowledge and power.

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Peter Carruthers and **Peter K. Smith, eds.**
Theories of Theories of Mind.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. xv + 390.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-55110-2);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-55916-2).

Our skills at predicting and interpreting others are quite remarkable. By the age of four we are able to understand the concept of 'false belief' in others, and as adults we are able to interpret and predict what others think and do to such an extent that we are able to organize sophisticated social systems. But what explains our skills at understanding and predicting others? Theory-theorists believe that we possess and utilize a tacit theory of psychology: a 'folk-psychology'. Simulationists believe that our understanding of others' mental states and behavior rest upon our ability to simulate others' mental states and behavioral dispositions; whether through empathy, pretense,

imaginative projection, or by taking our own cognitive systems 'off-line', (thereby exploiting the psychological similarity between individuals: you will reason and act as I do). *Theories of Theories of Mind* (TTM) brings together a superb collection of papers from renown authors in the field. But given the complexity of the issues, I shall limit myself in this review to an account of the contents of TTM. In-depth critical attention to the numerous and subtle issues raised by the text has to be saved for another occasion.

TTM is an interdisciplinary text in philosophy, cognitive science of development and the evolution of cognition. There are four sections to the text. In section one, the philosophical debate between simulationists and theory-theorists is developed. Much work is done here at clarifying what the differences between the two approaches are (see the papers by Stone and Davies [119]; Nichols and Stich et al). Gordon (11) and Heal (75) offer defenses of simulationism and Perner (90), defends a simulation-theory mix. Carruthers (22) and Botterill (105) offer criticisms of Gordon and Heal respectively. Of particular importance in this debate is figuring out what empirical predictions we should expect from these differing approaches (see Baron-Cohen and Swettenham [158]). However, as the reader quickly discovers, this is no easy task, since versions of each approach can be easily modified to accommodate the empirical data.

In section two the debate between modularists (those who believe that our folk theory is an innate cognitive module) and more environmentalist approaches is explored. Segal (141) argues for the modularist approach while Gopnik (169) argues for a developmentalist approach in which the tacit theory of folk-psychology is held to be analogous to a scientific theory and the child analogous to the scientist. Astington (184) takes a broadly Vygoskian perspective on the development of the child's understanding of mind, arguing that there is a positive correlation between parental conversation about mental states with children, and relative success at passing the false-belief test, thus supporting the Vygoskian perspective. Harris (200) looks to the conversational environment of the child in order to explain the curious empirical data indicating that children's competence at desire-attribution develops prior to their competence in belief-attribution.

In part three of TTM the debate between simulationists and theory-theorists is directed towards the relative success or failure of each approach to explain autism. The simple and compelling idea in this regard is that children who are autistic have an impoverished theory of mind. If true, this hypothesis would explain the difficulties autistic children have understanding others' mental states. On the other hand, the simulation account of our 'mind-reading' abilities could also account for autism. People with autism not only have troubles with mind-reading, they also have difficulties in creative pretense and imaginative role-playing. A simulationist might explain autism by noting that damage to the mechanisms that allow for empathy, imagination, or the ability to pretend would bring about such deficits. In this context, Carruthers (257) advocates the theory-theory approach, arguing that an intact mind-module is a necessary condition for success at imaginative play,

pretense, and understanding others' mental states. Currie (242) argues that the simulationist approach can better handle the empirical data.

However, as Boucher (223) points out, whether autism is a syndrome or not is crucial to the debate. If autism is a syndrome, then, Boucher argues, like other syndromes it is likely to have one or two primary deficits linked to some physical cause, responsible for its appearance. She reviews arguments and evidence to suggest that autism is not a syndrome. This is important, for if autism is not a syndrome, then it is a set of dissociable impairments each of which may have a relatively independent explanation. She also notes that children below the age of three and some severely learning disabled people lack a theory of mind, yet do not count as autistic, thus indicating that a lack of a theory of mind cannot be the primary cause for autism.

In section four TTM explores recent studies of primates to see whether we can make sense of primate theories of mind. We read here how the 'trends' in the experimental research on primates have changed considerably since the early years (the 1970s). Whiten (277) asks us when 'behavior-reading' becomes 'mind-reading'. Povinelli (293) then reports some of his experimental findings regarding what chimpanzees 'know' about seeing. Sadly, it seems they know fairly little, since the chimpanzees would request food from trainers that were evidently blindfolded. However, the chimpanzees did appear to be using the orientation of the face as a cue for who to ask for food. Chimpanzees appear to be face-readers rather than mind-readers and perhaps this indicates that they are indeed merely behavior-readers generally and lack any deep theory of mind. Gomez (330), however reports his experimental findings regarding primates arguing that they were sensitive to others' focus of attention or others' seeing. He notes, sensibly enough, that the primate theory of mind that we are searching for will be a theory of primate minds and this fact has to be kept in mind when the chimpanzees in question are being tested by their recognition of attention in human beings. Finally, Smith (344) reviews the primate studies and argues that without language we will fail to show that animals have a theory of mind at their disposal.

Reading TTM I found myself back with Davidson's 'Thought and Talk'. If the 'pessimistic' results of the empirical studies are correct, then perhaps as Smith and others have remarked, some form of linguistic context or predisposition is required for a creature to have the concept of belief. This was one claim that Davidson appears to have made, his next: that the concept of belief is necessary for a creature to have beliefs, is not however likely to be confirmed. However, as the reflections on the empirical results have indicated, what is for some a conceptual truth may be an empirical discovery for others. One last point. No philosopher here discussed the Language of Thought hypothesis in connection with the debate over mind-reading. For those inclined towards an account that requires language in the development of a theory of mind, this omission seems curious, for the properties of language necessary for the development of a theory of mind may, if the LoT hypothesis is correct, be already available to the creatures. However, the LoT hypothesis has its best defense in the human context: creatures who already

have systematic and combinatorial abilities illustrated in their linguistic skills.

Theories of Theories of Mind is an excellent collection of papers and will be of interest to cognitive scientists, philosophers and ethologists. However, those looking for some consensus on the issues will be disappointed. This is interdisciplinary research 'as it happens' but the final word will be a long time coming.

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Nancy Cartwright, Jordi Cat, Lola Fleck and **Thomas Uebel**
Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. xii + 288.
US$59.95. ISBN 0-521-451744.

In the 1970s and '80s, a number of contemporary philosophers of science (Giedymin, Feyerabend, Worrall, Cartwright, van Fraassen, Zahar) rediscovered and reworked the thought of their discipline's major turn-of-the-century figures: Ernst Mach, Pierre Duhem, Henri Poincaré, and Émile Meyerson. In the 1990s, the project has moved on to resuscitating the reputations of Logical Positivists. This book is the latest chapter in an ongoing attempt to re-present and reinterpret the doctrines of certain members of the Vienna Circle.

What most of us think we know about Otto Neurath probably comprises something like the following: that he held a coherence theory of truth, that he originated the boat metaphor which Quine deploys, that he endorsed some version of 'physicalism', that his was the voice in the Vienna Circle raised most loudly against 'metaphysics' and in favour of the 'unity of science', and that he was a socialist, perhaps even a Marxist. This book is an attempt to convey an accurate impression of Neurath's life, his political thinking, and his 'anti-philosophy' which shows which of these rumours are well-founded and which are hallucinations. Among the surprises in store are: that Neurath did not think of himself as a philosopher and that his work was in no way narrowly philosophical; that he opposed epistemology as vigorously as he opposed metaphysics; that he did not hold a coherence theory of truth; that the work of a Logical Positivist should contain an argument for naturalism,

an argument against the analytic/synthetic distinction, and an attack on the idea of scientific method; and that Neurath's thesis of the 'unity of science' is in fact a succession of theses, each of them less demanding than the last, culminating in what is presented nowadays as the thesis of the *dis*unity of science.

The authors (henceforth 'CCFU') are at pains to stress that Neurath's views on science intertwine with his political thought (176-7). The latter, dealt with in the book's first part, is an epitome of socialist planning. Drawing on his experience of the Balkan war (during which he conducted a comparative study of war economies) and the First World War (during which he served in the military), Neurath came to see war as an opportunity for society to make the transition to an 'economy in kind', i.e., a barter economy. His contribution to the socialisation debate of the 1920s was to argue for 'full socialisation', i.e., the transformation of the entire economic structure into one unified system of collective economic action, controlled by a centralised planning authority.

Presumably because they suspect that their readers will realise it anyway, CCFU fail to mention that this kind of thinking is totally discredited. Neurath's is just the sort of socialist planning so successfully demolished by Friedrich Hayek's 1944 book *The Road to Serfdom*. Neurath actually wrote a review of this book, but hardly came to grips with it, complaining that planning for freedom *must* be possible: he apparently never saw the incompatibility between large-scale centralised economic planning and political freedom. CCFU, on the other hand, do recognise that '[a]n economy in kind requires an economic plan — and this is a measure alien to free market economics. An economic plan implies that decisions are made by a central institution overseeing the whole economy' (17-18). But their reassurances that Neurath did not approve of censorship of the free press (50, 246), did not think of his plans as antithetical to the untidy freedom and diversity of Oxford life which he came to appreciate so much (87), and held 'finely nuanced' attitudes towards Marxist politics (145), are hardly enough to eradicate Hayek's worry that centralised economic planning must lead to totalitarianism.

What of Neurath's thoughts on science, to which the two subsequent parts of this book are devoted? Certainly the rise of naturalism and coherentism in the interim period are good reasons for looking at Neurath again.

CCFU (inadvertently) expose a problem with the argument for naturalism. They point out that Neurath was heavily influenced by 'the French conventionalists' Duhem and Poincaré. But their account of these thinkers is problematic in several respects. First, following Milic Capek, they ascribe to Poincaré the biological theory of knowledge which Mach tentatively endorsed (100). Poincaré, however, did not consistently interpret 'convenience' as biological usefulness. The fact that he sometimes took the products of experience to be products not just of the individual's experience, but of that of the race, does not mean that he took them to be biological. CCFU then claim that Duhem and Poincaré failed to provide a satisfactory account of

the functioning of abstract principles in science. The solution to this problem they represent as follows: 'Neurath "naturalised" conventions by transposing Mach's pragmatism from the evolutionary dimension to the domain of social practice. To avoid the trappings of biologistic shortcuts and instead represent conventions as decisions taken by theorists, naturalism had to reject the reduction of cognitive to biological norms. The conventions of science were to be "naturalised" in a discourse theory of science' (100). Whether or not this view counts as fully naturalistic, it hardly goes beyond Poincaré's conventionalism in any important way.

Second, taking conventionalism literally does not, *pace* CCFU (162), mean placing voluntarism at the centre of one's theory of science. Neurath's attempt to extend fallibilism from empirical statements to statements which give the *meaning* of our expressions, thereby portraying them as *hypotheses*, is misguided. The authors' opinion that Neurath's argument from the social nature of language to this generalised fallibilism 'works against both Schlick and Carnap' (158) is also wrong: to think that the social nature of language entails that meanings are never fixed is a fallacy. That meanings can always change doesn't mean they always do. Meanings can be, temporarily, 'fixed' by correct use. Therefore semantic relations *can* be described. For this, neither 'clean-cut' meanings nor 'definite, once-and-for-all fixed meanings' (157) are necessary. Schlick, Carnap and Wittgenstein saw this; Neurath, Quine and Putnam apparently didn't. It renders the attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction and the naturalism which Neurath's work contained, both later pressed by Quine, problematic.

Despite reservations about a somewhat uncritical attitude toward its material, this fascinating book, which also contains thought-provoking sketches of the views of Mach (102-4), Duhem (116-8), Carnap (149-52), and Weber (213-19) and an important (if familiar) criticism of the views of Popper (201), can justifiably be recommended to anyone with an interest in the history of twentieth-century philosophy.

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Simone Chambers
Reasonable Democracy: Jürgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996.
Pp. x + 250.
US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2668-5);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8330-1).

Habermas is notable as both an outstanding social theorist and a fervently engaged citizen. His first book in English, *Toward a Democratic Society*, was a philosophical contribution to political reform in the 1960s and his effective advocacy of democracy continues unabated. Chambers' study illustrates the powerful positive force he represents in contrast to ironic observers of the 'post-modern condition'. Adding her voice to a growing chorus of praise for public discourse, she furthers its cause, nicely expounding Habermas's theories, ably resolving most of their obscurities and persuasively restating his vision of non-coercive debate for resolving important political issues.

The guiding proposition of Chambers' study is that formal procedures rather than metaphysical realities are needed for testing the validity of moral principles. Her main examples of contemporary philosophers who advocate this view are Habermas and John Rawls. (She also discusses Thomas Scanlon, but his contribution is more an interlude than an independent theme.) Rawls's failing is that his theory of justice is less able than Habermas's more comprehensive views to justify universalist moral intuitions as against the local prejudices of 20th-century liberal academics. In particular, Chambers argues that Habermas's 'ideal speech situation' better represents discursive freedom and equality than Rawls's 'original position', which precludes choosing principles of justice by building them into the theory. Only by letting actual citizens determine through actual discussion what counts as a public issue and a convincing argument can an effective and morally valid consensus be determined.

Chambers clearly explicates the 'quasi-transcendental' argument in which Habermas proposes that communication presupposes three 'validity claims', namely that one's statements are true, sincere and consistent with the social rules entitling one to make them. Critics have been sceptical of the ensuing account of communicative rationality and after some resistance Chambers finds the objections impossible to refute. However, she notes that while Habermas himself recognizes elements of truth in the position that rationality is a myth of modern society he defends himself subtly and powerfully through a tenable view of modernity as an advanced stage of human development. Communicative rationality then serves as a reliable foundation for a theory of democratic legitimacy, supporting a practice of discourse in which no one may be excluded, anything may be said and force (except that of argument) must be avoided. One result is a universal moral principle, roughly that a norm is valid when all affected can accept the effects of its general observance for the satisfaction of everyone's interests.

The resulting discourse ethics and democratic politics do not require a discursive utopia that demands so much time and virtue from the average citizen that nothing would ever get done. The rules of practical discourse need not cover all social interactions but only the disputed norms that preclude a consensually governed society until they are resolved. Discourse is thus a procedure suitable for issues of fundamental justice that can be addressed over the long term. It is of course an important question why consensus should be privileged over disagreement at possible expense to pluralism and non-conformity. The answer is part of the account of rationality and social development that distinguishes the demand for agreement from a mask for domination. In a post-conventional society, norms that cannot withstand the critical force of pluralism, diversity and difference will pass away, leaving only principles that are generalizable within pluralism and despite difference. There remains two awkward facts: rational agents will subvert generally useful rules and the views of well-intentioned agents may not converge. Chambers has disappointingly little to say about the former, stressing rather the difficulty of people maintaining a commitment to justice while pursuing divergent ways of life. She argues that liberal neutrality is not a neutral position and that any workable conception of the good of justice must inform one's private beliefs as well as one's political ideals. However, I doubt that these theses necessarily go together. One can agree that citizens should embrace fairness and impartiality without subscribing to the view that these qualities figure deeply in private lives. Hence it is not clear that it will ever be the case that 'The *formation* of individual interests, beliefs and values has replaced the *competition* among individual interests, beliefs and values as a central theme in liberal theory' (183).

To illustrate the importance of discourse for democratic legitimacy and the possibility of consensus on controversial questions, Chambers explores the debate about language rights in Quebec. She finds that the French and English sides have progressed far towards a new consensus on the fundamental terms of their continued political association. Although the account leaves out the other nation in Quebec and sets aside the unsatisfactory conversation between Quebec and the rest of Canada, it still provides a severe test of the contemporary realizability of discourse. This book was completed before controversy over language legislation emerged anew to suggest that either Habermas's ideal is utopian or we have yet to see a satisfactory example of democratic discourse. The latter possibility is suggested by the effect of a U.N. Human Rights Commission decision unfavourable to Bill 101 'in turning the tide' (224), since it appears more as the force of authority than of argument. The former resides in suspicion that 'One cannot imagine social interaction that is completely free from authority, conflict, and coercion' (230). Chambers wrestles with this problem in her conclusion, but it is clear that the conversation with Habermas's post-modern critics must continue.

Published work is often confronted by new events. The rapid appearance of works by Habermas makes it challenging to provide a state-of-the-art account. A case in point is *Between Facts and Norms* (Cambridge, MA: MIT

Press 1996), where Habermas asks again how social integration is possible in pluralistic society and, rather than diminishing distinctions between political and personal values, answers that laws satisfy this organizational need. Publishing also includes perils of another kind. Chambers' printed text is marred by at least a dozen typographical or orthographical errors. This will not prevent it from being a stimulating text for courses on Habermas and his critics.

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Frédéric Cossutta (sous la direction de)
Descartes et l'argumentation philosophique.
Paris: PUF (coll. L'interrogation philosophique) 1996. Pp. 241. n.p.
ISBN 2-13-047493-4.

À l'heure où l'Association des Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française s'apprête à célébrer en grande pompe le quatrième centenaire de naissance du plus illustre des philosophes de langue française, voici qu'avec une audace novatrice, semblable, dira-t-on, à celle de *l'esprit cartésien* (thème rassembleur du grand congrès international de la Sorbonne), l'ouvrage qui paraît sous la direction de Frédéric Cossutta vient ouvrir un chantier tout neuf alors qu'on aurait cru épuisé toutes les sources possibles d'exploitation de cette pensée, décidément intarissable. Beaucoup plus excitant qu'une synthèse ou un grand bilan de l'œuvre cartésienne, on trouvera ici un examen serré qui analyse, sur pièces, les dimensions spécifiquement langagières et discursives des différents écrits de Descartes, à l'horizon des modèles théoriques actuels de l'argumentation philosophique.

Le grand mérite de ces diverses contributions, toutes également riches et stimulantes, est de former ensemble; qui, plus est, un ensemble dynamique où les divers auteurs réussissent à faire converger vers le foyer central les ressources disciplinaires différentes (sémiotique, sociologie cognitive, histoire de la philosophie, analyse du discours) auxquelles ils font appel avec une maîtrise contrôlée. Au fil des chapitres le lecteur, même non familier de ces approches spécialisées, et souvent assez « pointues », suit, avec un intérêt constant, comment, tel est le propos unitaire, les contraintes logiques et les stratégies argumentatives d'une doctrine peuvent être reliées avec celles expressives, énonciatives et narratives dans l'institution et la mise en œuvre d'une pensée. Mais, attention, il ne s'agit pas de n'importe quelle pensée, ni

de n'importe quelle mise en œuvre. Les auteurs se confrontent ici avec une patience et une rigueur exemplaires à l'un des systèmes parmi les plus complexes de l'histoire de la philosophie, et en même temps la pensée la plus subtile qui soit, précisément par la clarté et la distinction auxquelles elle s'efforce. Un discours qui, c'est la marque proprement cartésienne, prétend se confondre à celui de la raison argumentative même pour en valider ses enjeux théoriques et emporter la bataille.

Les auteurs, chacun suivant l'approche choisie mais sans perdre de vue l'objectif de la recherche collective, ciblent tous la langue, les modes d'exposition, les genres, les formes adoptés par Descartes dans sa recherche de la vérité et la légitimation de ses thèses.

La substantielle introduction par le directeur de la publication, Frédéric Cossuta, établit avec rigueur les conditions de possibilité d'une théorie de l'argumentation philosophique ainsi que les enjeux très actuels de son intérêt pour la connaissance d'une œuvre, et de celle de Descartes, en particulier (1-42). Elle se prolonge dans une brillante étude qui dégage les relations qui se tissent dans l'œuvre cartésienne entre argumentation, ordre des raisons et mode d'exposition (111-86).

Alban Bouvier, en sociologue cognitiviste, examine les effets paradoxals de l'argumentation cartésienne dirigée contre le scepticisme et en donne quelques exemples paradigmatiques à la lumière de la perspective qu'il a choisie: chercher à renouveler certains aspects du programme de recherche de Perelman en théorie de l'argumentation philosophique tout en empruntant un certain nombre de ses instruments à la linguistique (43-84).

Dominique Maingueneau traite des relations entre éthos et argumentation philosophique en démontant avec soin le cas du *Discours de la méthode* (85-109).

Christophe Giolito exploitant de façon très précise et très originale la lecture de Leibniz des *Passions de l'âme*, dans une remarquable confrontation des deux écrits qui s'attache à en scruter les trames textuelles, montre les cadres discursifs dans lesquels s'instaurent la solidarité entre les deux ensembles théoriques en question et les moyens de validation que Leibniz et Descartes se donnent respectivement (187-216).

Enfin la contribution de Jean-François Bordron (217-41) sur laquelle se termine l'ouvrage, tente de déterminer, à partir de l'exemple caractéristique des preuves cartésiennes de l'existence de Dieu dans les *Méditations métaphysiques*, les contraintes génériques d'une argumentation philosophique.

Cette recherche qui semble rassembler, en même temps, comme en un faisceau, les résultats que visaient à dégager l'entreprise collective, en relève, à son terme, le défi: définir un type précis de discours, celui qui est constitutif de l'argumentation philosophique, en analysant les facettes multiples qu'offre un de ses exemples historiques le plus achevé: le discours de Descartes.

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Jacques Derrida
Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning & the New International.
trans. Peggy Kamuf.
New York and London: Routledge 1994.
Pp. xx + 198.
US$69.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-91044-7);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-91045-5).

This book is not just about the ghostly rhetoric in which Marx indulges, nor just about his inclination to attack idealistic believers in Spirit for believing in spirits and spooks. Ghosts are about *anachrony*, the reappearance of ideas, persons, movements, conflicts, or trends that were thought to be finally consigned to the past.

The first chapter introduces anachronism in a hurry, with the observation that *Hamlet* and the *Communist Manifesto* both open with ghosts — 'A specter is haunting Europe — the specter of communism'. Compared with the specter of communism in 1848, the spirit of Marxism in the 1990s is less commonly feared than ridiculed. Yet a suspicious degree of effort and even ceremony surround the ridicule. Derrida suggests that the death certificates that keep appearing in corporate media should be understood as performatives, conjuring away the troublesome spirit of Marxism. Academics contribute by steadfastly ignoring the practical imperatives that Marx represented: 'People would be ready to accept the return of Marx or the return to Marx, on the condition that a silence is maintained about Marx's injunction not just to decipher but to act and to make the deciphering [the interpretation] into a transformation that "changes the world" ' (32).

Of course, this raises a question. Why *should* anyone remember a revolutionary imperative, considering that more than a century of effort by movements of millions to realize it has apparently ended in failure — and, in the process, has given rise to no little abuse? Derrida usefully points out the double standard that is invoked in the dances of elites on these movements' graves, especially the lightweight dance of Francis Fukuyama, who seems to acknowledge only the evidence that there is no socialist threat to liberal market states; the threat from new fascist movements, and the failures of these market states as well, are conjured away.

Derrida's readers have learned not to expect argument so much as *aperçu*; however, in response to liberal triumphalism, he reminds us of some simple but solid reasoning, a reminder that, measured by any humane scale, it is markets and democracies that have failed. Western liberal democracy is fully installed in only a minority of states, and, even there, it is dysfunctional. The new world order means unemployment, social exclusion (especially of the homeless), ruthless economic war between countries, resulting inconsistencies between international norms and national self-seeking, starvation of millions through debt and imposed debt-reduction schemes, arms industry

expansion, nuclear proliferation, inter-ethnic wars, increased power for drug cartels and mafia of all nationalities, and undemocratic domination of international institutions by a few nations (78-9). 'It must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as the end of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected so many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity. ... no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, never have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth' (85).

As Marx sought to relieve the 'specter of communism' of its spectral shadiness, not only by raising awareness of it but by activating it, Derrida too seeks to usher in a new movement — even if only by drawing attention to it. He calls it 'the new international', including everyone who can see the suffering and abuse within the world capitalist economy as violations of international, human norms, as forms of suffering and abuse to be eliminated by global counter-movements and, ultimately, international law. 'The "New International" is not only that which is seeking a new international law through these crimes. It is a link of affinity, suffering, and hope, a still discreet, almost secret link, as it was around 1848, but more and more visible, we have more than one sign of it. ... The name of new International is given here to what calls to the friendship of an alliance without institution among those who, even if they no longer believe or never believed in the socialist-Marxist International ... continue to be inspired by at least one of the spirits of Marx or of Marxism ... and ... ally themselves, in a new, concrete, and real way, even if this alliance no longer takes the form of a party or of a workers' international ... ' (85-6).

In his final chapter, Derrida deploys the nuances of ghost talk which he has developed in the previous chapters to elucidate Marx's commentary and polemic on the Young Hegelian and egoist Max Stirner. Many readers will find Stirner's sludgy thought too thick for any mortal to illuminate; both Marx and Derrida end up acquiring more of Stirner's murk than they dispel. An ascent from these depths to Marx's discussion of the 'fetishism of commodities' — meaning that commodities seem to carry their values and prices as natural properties, mystifying their origins as functions of social relations — is offered as a final piece of evidence that the conjuring-away of ghosts was not incidental but central to Marx's conception of critique.

Derrida turns this back interestingly towards internationalism. He suggests that Marx may have played the ghost-slaying critic at least once too often. From the vantage-point of a twentieth century that has already unravelled, he suggests that the spirit of humanism should have been addressed rather than conjured away. 'What costs humanity very dearly is doubtless to believe that one can have done in history with a general essence of Man, on the pretext that it represents only a *Hauptgespenst*, arch-ghost, but also, what comes down to the same thing — *at bottom* — to still believe,

no doubt, in this capital ghost. To believe in it as do the credulous or the dogmatic.' The alternative?

'Thou art a scholar; speak to it, Horatio. ... Question it.'

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William Desmond
Being and the Between.
Albany: State University of New York Press 1995.
Pp. xviii + 557.
US$74.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2271-2);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2272-0).

Being and the Between is a contemporary work of metaphysics, taking on the traditional problem of the relations of identity and difference much in the line of Hegel, though with striking reminiscences of the Heidegger of *Being and Time*. The interaction of thought and being presumed in all metaphysical and scientific thinking is characterized by relations of identity and difference, for in cognition, a being must be thought as identified in certain categories without being strictly identical to them. Desmond's question is what form of thinking can avoid closing itself off into either of the opposed poles of the absolute identity or absolute difference of being and thought, as in the alternatives of idealism and solipsism. In other words, what is required to 'think the between?' Heidegger's influence shows itself in the application of a hermeneutic-existential perspective to revamping Hegel. However, Desmond has few references, mentioned mainly in criticism of his history of Western metaphysics as yet another closure in a certain kind of metaphysical thinking. The major names are Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle, and Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche.

The starting point is familiar: the questions 'what is being?' and 'what is the nature of the metaphysical thinking necessary to answer the question of being?' Desmond's first move is to remark on the double mediation between being and thought, since our thinking of being is premised on a primordial givenness of being which opens thought to being. Thought is aware of being through a dialectical transcending, a *self-transcending* in an awareness of being's difference from thought and an *originary transcendence* that gives thought an ontological intimacy with being (thus recalling the double sense of 'clearing' in *Being and Time*). Metaphysical thinking, Desmond claims, must articulate the 'tense togetherness' of being and thought in a mindful-

ness that allows for their difference and their identity. This mindfulness is characterized by two attitudes: *erotic perplexity* and *agapeic astonishment.* Thought experiences its difference from being as a lack, and out of perplexity at this, seeks to transcend itself toward a being fully determinable and determined by thought. Erotic perplexity represents the drive toward total comprehension, to the imposition of a final set of categories. But in this subsuming movement towards being, thought is dependent upon the prior givenness of being as an excess, an unconditional originary transcendence that gives thought's self-transcending movement its object, ground and impetus. Likewise, erotic perplexity is dependent on agapeic astonishment, the mind's sense of the overwhelming gift of being. Desmond proposes a metaphysical thinking of the between in which the co-dependence of perplexity and astonishment is recognized, striking a balance between the totalized determinate thinking of eros and the indefinite communion of agape.

This thinking of the between is possible by means of an interplay among a fourfold of fundamental senses of being, which are differentiated by their stance with respect to identity and difference. The *univocal* understanding of being stresses the unity of thought and being: the *equivocal*, their difference and diversion. The *dialectical* sense mediates the two by integrating difference to the same, which corresponds to the self-mediation of thought's perplexity in its lack of identity with being. The *metaxological* sense seems more properly the thought of the between, for Desmond describes it as a 'pluralized mediation' that keeps open all the previous senses of being and intermediates their relations of identity and difference. Thus, the fourfold senses work together to allow thought a systematic, categorial understanding of being that does not close off a dynamic interaction with being's difference at the boundaries of the system.

Part one of Desmond's book re-describes metaphysical thinking in light of the fourfold understanding of being, and reconsiders various moments of it's history. Part two goes on to do metaphysics from this point of view, applying the fourfold as a conceptual structure to many basic metaphysical themes, spanning from the notions of 'origin' and 'creation' to the ultimate end of a metaphysical 'good.' This notion of the 'good beyond goods,' of the ultimate value of being, seems to encapsulate all other metaphysical themes considered here, from origin and creation, to thinghood, the self, the intelligible and truth. Awareness of this good beyond goods supports the intelligibility and integrity of the whole of our understanding of being. To remain between identity and difference, to remain open to transcendence, is to find oneself in a community with being, caught in the dialectic of intimacy and estrangement. This sense of community requires a transcending with the goal of being true to the whole of being, without fragmentation or one-sidedness. 'Being good,' the metaphysical ground of all value, is just this ontological fidelity to the whole truth of being, Desmond claims. Appreciating this sense of goodness is necessary for thought to fulfil its potential for agapeic community with being.

Part of the central claim of *Being and the Between* is that metaphysical thinking is unavoidably metaphorical. Metaphor is necessary to express metaphysical truth as conceived in the between, for as Desmond would have it, a metaphysical thinking appropriate to the double mediation of thought and being must be simultaneously determinate and indeterminate. The figures of metaphor are better suited to this task than literal speech. But notice, 'metaphysical *truth*'. Desmond is not from the line of thinkers who announce the inevitability of metaphor, and pitch themselves headlong into it, happily abandoning any claims to truth. Rather he is careful to emphasize the necessity to illuminate the matter at hand, to think through the happening of being to the extent of intelligibility. Metaphysics in the between may be devoted to an indeterminate opening of truth, but it is devoted to truth.

Being and the Between presents a comprehensive and systematic exposition of the issues and ideas that have animated Desmond's extensive previous work on Hegel, metaphysics and difference. As such, it succeeds in engaging with positions familiar to continental philosophers, but advancing beyond the recent stagnation of post-modern or post-structuralist thought. Such a promise of greater rewards than have been so far forthcoming by itself provides a reason for analytic philosophers to re-invest their energies in these positions.

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Lorne Falkenstein
Kant's Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1995.
Pp. xxiii + 465. Cdn$70.00. ISBN 0-8020-2973-6.

In the Afterword, Falkenstein claims that 'the burden of this work has been to establish that what Kant refers to as "sense intuition" is not a psychic, but rather a physiological phenomenon' (359). With this odd claim in mind, I extrapolate the following from the 'Summary and Conclusions' sections with which Falkenstein ends each division of the book. Here is what Falkenstein says he is doing in this work:

PART I: There is a distinction between a higher and a lower cognitive faculty: the lower, sense, receives data; the higher, intellect (*Verstand*), processes the data. The data that sense provides are 'blind' prior to intellectual processing. Nevertheless, Kant believes it possible to argue back from

experience to what must be present in unprocessed sense intuitions. The 'original deliverances' of sense are complex, an array, whose parts occur in a spatiotemporal order as they are presented. Kant rejects the claim that spatiotemporal order is constructed by a synthetic process. Rather, in the 'formal intuitionist' position Kant holds, the matter is the elements of sense received, while the form is the order in which those elements are received. Kant claims that the distinction between sense and intellect (*Verstand*) is the distinction between the physiological and the psychic. Sensations, the material components of intuitions, are physiological states of the body, and the lower cognitive faculty, sense, is exercised by bodily organs.

PART II: The Expositions contain Kant's arguments for his views that 1) The representations delivered by sense result from our being affected by objects; 2) The spatiotemporal order in which intuitions are received results from the nature of the subject. Given that intuitions are 'blind', it is impossible to argue these positions by isolating intuitions (since, as blind, they are not objects of knowledge). The Metaphysical Expositions establish therefore that no intellectual operation could generate concepts of space and time. This conclusion, however, leaves open the question as to whether spatiotemporal form is independent of our being affected by objects or whether it might, along with the matter of appearance, be equally an effect of objects upon us. The Transcendental Expositions, on the other hand, claim that there is no way of account for our synthetic a priori judgments about space and time, other than by supposing that space and time lie a priori in the mind.

PART III: The space and time of things-in-themselves, if there is one, would have to be an order of internal properties, whereas the space and time of our experience is an order of 'impressed effects', an order in which we are affected by objects. Consequently, the Metaphysical and Transcendental Expositions establish that, if things-in-themselves are in space or time, it is in a radically different sense from that in which the matters of appearance are in space and time. This is a 'mitigated' version of the thesis that things-in-themselves are not in space or time. On the other hand, Kant's 'subjectivity' thesis, the idea that space and time are grounded in the receptive constitution of the subject, and his 'affection' thesis, the idea that the matter of intuition results from the subject's being affected by an object (a thing-in-itself), are 'empty claims (since we cannot know what the subject is in itself or what things are in themselves or whether the two are distinct).' They are best forgotten as 'unnecessary and needlessly confusing' (357).

Of the major problems in this book, let me detail only two. First, Falkenstein is not clear about what he's arguing, whether he's: 1) Giving the 'real' reading of Kant; or 2) Taking Kant's premises and arguing to a different, supposedly more tenable conclusion.

We find evidence for the *first* reading in Falkenstein's claim that the distinction between sense and intellect is the distinction between the physiological and the mental. Here Falkenstein gives us an account of what Kant is *really* saying, as opposed to the 'extravagant' position readers usually attribute to him. Evidence for the *second* reading is found in Falkenstein's

acknowledgement that Kant argued for the 'subjectivity' of space and time and for the non-spatiotemporality of things-in-themselves. These claims, Falkenstein says, are insupportable, and so we are left with a *modified* version of Kant.

However, these two readings contradict one another. To claim that Kantian sensations are 'physical states of the nervous system in the sensing subject' (123) is to take a transcendental realist position and beg the whole issue of the nature of space and time. Consequently, to go on to claim that Kant does in fact argue that space and time are parts of the way the mind informs experience a priori is contradictory. In a move apparently to reconcile the two positions, Falkenstein claims that Kant's discussions about intuition (apparently the entire Aesthetic, and by implication, the rest of the *Critique* as well) have only to do with the subject as appearance. This of course ignores the transcendental/empirical distinction and turns the *Critique* into a work of empirical psychology. To take the structuring of intuitions in space and time to occur in appearance, and to take the syntheses detailed in the Transcendental Logic to be acts the phenomenal subject performs, is to misunderstand these as empirical rather than transcendental elements and syntheses, and it is to misunderstand Kant's project, which is to explain the way our (phenomenal) experience is constructed in the first place.

This leads me to the second major problem with the work: Falkenstein's reading of Kant is insupportable. Throughout, Falkenstein assumes a transcendental realist position that is clearly at odds with the critical philosophy. For example, when he claims that sense is a physiological function, he takes this as a rejection of immaterialism, and he takes the resulting mind/body dualism to be perfectly in line with the Kantian project. However, the very posing of the questions shows a realist outlook. Materialism/immaterialism as well as mind/body dualism fall outside the critical philosophy. In making the transcendental/empirical distinction, Kant made it very clear that he is not doing an empirical study; he is going behind appearance, behind experience, to lay out the a priori structures that make experience possible in the first place. Falkenstein fundamentally misunderstands this.

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Frederick Ferré
Being and Value: Toward a Constructive Postmodern Metaphysics.
Albany: State of New York Press 1996. Pp. xviii + 406.
US$74.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2775-2);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2756-0).

Being and Value is a long and complicated work that is intended to be read at various levels by a large variety of readers. Ferré states that he is more interested in graduate students than the current generation of professional philosophers. As a postmodern text, he hopes that it will be influential in the twenty-first century (xii). In addition, Ferré tries to accommodate general readers (or simply 'readers') by including historical information about most of the philosophers discussed, apparently in an attempt to help the views come alive. The purpose of the book is threefold: (1) the rehabilitation of metaphysics, (2) the construction of a new postmodern metaphysics for the next major period of Western intellectual history, and (3) an examination of the relationship of metaphysics and value theory. Because the book is the beginning of a three-book series, a 'trilogy' (15), that will be followed by a second book called *Knowing and Value* and a third called *Living and Value* (314), the current volume may later require additional assessment in light of its role in the larger work.

The book begins with an introductory chapter about the nature of metaphysics. Ferré apologizes for the word 'metaphysics,' but insists that there is no alternative to it, since the word is used too extensively in the professional literature to be avoided. He defines 'metaphysics' as 'nothing more or less than the theory of reality in general' (1). The aim of a metaphysician, like that of a detective, is to provide more understanding about a problematic subject. According to Ferré, metaphysical theorizing is 'familiar' in that it must meet a set of general standards: the internal requirements of consistency and coherence and the external requirements of applicability and adequacy. Metaphysical theorizing is made difficult by the tensions between these internal and the external requirements (3). Ferré applies two of these standards (specifically, coherence and adequacy) to his own theory in a short final chapter in which he defends his reconstructed postmodern metaphysics, which he refers to as '*personalistic organicism*, resting on a foundation of *evolutionary panexperientalist kalogenic naturalism*' (372).

The reasons why Ferré focuses on coherence and adequacy are given in his introductory discussion of 'How Metaphysical Theories are Strange' (4-10). Metaphysics is 'strange' because it aims at complete or unlimited comprehensiveness (4-5). Consistency is not very important because it 'is "merely" a minimal threshold requirement to allow thinking to proceed without self-cancellation.' Coherence is 'far more demanding' in that it 'mandates that ideas used for understanding any subject matter fit together' (5). Although metaphysical thought should be tied to 'the empirical standard of applicability' (7), applicability 'is only a minimal standard compared to

adequacy. The former only requires *some* bearing on relevant data; the latter calls for consideration, ideally, of *all*' (8).

Ferré's third principal concern is how metaphysics relates to value (10-15). In some respects, value considerations constitute an additional standard for the evaluation of metaphysical theory since 'metaphysics and values intertwine' (10). Modern metaphysics, specifically, as it relates to the 'mechanical worldview', has 'inherited the metaphysical difficulty of accounting for its own value and for value in general.' A major concern throughout the book is the existence of 'value in nature', which places Ferré alongside Whitehead in mainstream philosophy and Holmes Rolston, III, in environmental philosophy. Ferré embraces a wide range of values: 'beauty, love, courage, loyalty, creativity, fairness, friendship, and hope.' He warns that if beauty is in the eye of the beholder, then 'all values are literally figments of mentality' (11). In addition, like Rolston, he wants to get beyond mere instrumental value and establish the presence of objective nonanthropocentric intrinsic value independent of mind. Although Ferré is inspired by Whitehead and valiantly tries to explain Whitehead's views in a short section, he admits that the terminology employed is a serious obstacle: 'Unfortunately, when there are too many new words and not enough motivation to learn a new vocabulary, the result will be no understanding at all' (261). Thus, once again like Rolston, his aim is to produce a process-style metaphysics without its often mind-numbing terminology.

The main body of the book is a discussion of the history of philosophy as it pertains to metaphysical theory. Part one deals with premodern metaphysics, which includes ancient through medieval philosophy. It is divided into three chapters. The first is devoted to the pre-Socratics, the second to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and the third to pre-Socratic and Hellenistic influences on medieval philosophy, which are the 'transition' to modern metaphysics. Part two, which deals with modern metaphysics, is divided into four chapters. It begins with a chapter on the origins of modernism, culminating in the views of Descartes. The second chapter focuses on materialism from Malebranch to Einstein, the third on idealism from Leibniz and Berkeley to Bradley, and the fourth on process philosophy, from Marx and Darwin to Whitehead. Part three deals with postmodern metaphysics. It too has four chapters. The first defines postmodernism through discussions of poststructuralism, liberationism, feminism, and environmentalism. The second presents an ecological world model as the basis for Ferré's own metaphysics. The third introduces value into the model in terms of beauty. The final chapter is a somewhat tentative defense of the theory 'toward' which Ferré is moving.

Because Ferré elects to discuss the entire history of Western philosophy, the history sections cannot, of course, be equally effective for every reader. For some readers, there will be too much information, for others too little. Although the biographical information provides some interesting insights, it will be distracting to professional philosophers who are trying to assess the relevancy of the material to Ferré's general argument. Nevertheless, it will probably be helpful to students reading the book in a metaphysics class,

providing them with regular relief from the more abstract philosophical discussion. Moreover, the discussions are open-ended enough to provide teachers with many opportunities to amplify, complement, and dispute for classroom purposes.

Because it is not possible to cover all of Western philosophy in one volume, Ferré must, therefore, for the most part, be forgiven for omissions that do not contribute to the themes that he is pursuing. However, one glaring omission seems to be the absence of any discussion of the metaphysical or perhaps anti-metaphysic views of Hume, who insisted in his analysis of necessary connexion in the *Enquiry* that when we engage in metaphysical reasoning, 'so remote from common life and experience,' 'We are got into fairy land, long ere we have reached the last steps of our theory...' Hume's critique, which Kant avoided only by redefining experience, but still acknowledged in many respects, deserved, I think, to be taken into account in this book, especially since Ferré eventually argues that experience is supposed to play a fundamental role in his metaphysics: 'Just as it is rational for theory to remain open to experience, so it is rational for experience to be put into illuminating context and thus altered in significance by theory' (318). It is to be hoped that this deficiency can be resolved in the next volume on epistemology.

One important difficulty for Ferré and other postmodernists is the transition from the modern to the postmodern. Ferré reports that he found his personal inspiration in reading Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World*: 'It seemed to me Whitehead showed both the need for and the possibility of moving beyond the once-triumphant (but now atrophying) conceptual commitments of the modern world, and that a step in that direction would be ... "post modern" ' (278). Is Whitehead the first postmodern or the last modern or an abhorrent subtheme that suggests a new direction? Whatever eventually comes to be postmodernism will not appear magically out of nothing. Ferré is convinced that postmodernism will be based on a new ecological world model. Nevertheless, he himself traces ecology as a science back first to Ernest Haeckel in the nineteenth century and ultimately, citing Gene Odum, to Antoni van Leeuwenhoek in the seventeenth (309). I would personally label ecology as one of the contemporary products of natural history science, which, despite the alleged superiority of physics and chemistry, has a pedigree as long, old, and distinguished as those more famous modern sciences. If indeed ecology becomes the world model for the twenty-first century, future generations could easily consider the change to be a minor adjustment rather than the beginning of a new age.

I find Ferré's attempt to define postmodernism through discussions of poststructuralism, liberationism, feminism, and environmentalism largely unsuccessful. However, someone using the book in a class may find it an exciting chapter to bring up a myriad of relationships. Ferré promises a fuller discussion of these positions in volume three (373).

Much more interesting and successful is Ferré's discussion of ecology as a world model. This chapter begins with a very useful discussion of ecology as a science, relying heavily on the writings of Gene Odum and Frank Golley,

two colleagues at the University of Georgia's Institute of Ecology. Arguing that ecosystems are not superorganisms, Ferré embraces Golley's position, that they are 'weak wholes' without clear boundaries: 'They have no organs of sensation or reproduction. They have no nervous system, though chemical and other information paths can be traced, often involving feedback loops of great importance. They have no equivalent of skins to make a neat boundary' (315). The chapter concludes with an exploration of the nature of ecological entities. To his credit, Ferré stresses that what counts as an entity depends on human perception of what is essential and accidental. Especially problematic are mountains, which he decides are aggregate entities: 'They are obvious, enduring, made up of many lesser things, capable of supporting many properties of their own, but are for the most part externally related to their components and their surroundings' (326). Ecosystems as systematic entities differ from mountains in that they have 'a property of resiliency that is not simply attributed but found' and which 'is manifested on a number of levels such as energy flow, biological productivity, and species diversity' (327). Ferré has considerable difficulty with species, which he ultimately decides, with bows to Whitehead and Rolston, are temporal formal entities rather than Whiteheadian eternal entities (329).

In the penultimate chapter, 'Toward a Kalogenic Universe', a universe in which beauty is generated by natural process, Ferré begins with a long discussion of fundamental entities, especially their interiority, which is best expressed in terms of subjective experience that extends beyond human consciousness. In a manner reminiscent of Whitehead, who finds value in the achievement of complex form, Ferré finds value or beauty in the achievement of subjective harmony (358), which, because 'loss of subjective immediacy is the transition to objectivity,' makes possible the objective achievement of beauty (360), the nonanthropocentric objective intrinsic value that such environmental ethicists as Rolston are searching for. To provide a simple example, 'on this theory, it is no coincidence that [butterflies and bees] are attracted to flowers that are beautiful to them in hue and fragrance. The living world is kalogenic at a much higher order than is the world of physics' (361). While I basically agree with such conclusions, I have reached them in a less objective and more anthropocentric manner in my own book *Foundations of Environmental Ethics* (reprint ed., 1989; Denton, TX: Environmental Ethics Books, 1996), which nevertheless treats the living and nonliving generation of beauty as basically the same process.

In the ultimate and final chapter, Ferré announces that his position is really 'personalistic organicism', which will be fully explained and defined in the final volume, *Living and Value*, and which will more fully 'respond to the concerns of environmentalists, feminists, and liberationists in a postmodern age' (373). As a result, final judgment on this interesting book must await the publication of the rest of the 'trilogy'.

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John Martin Fischer
The Metaphysics of Free Will.
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1994. Pp. ix + 273.
US$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-55786-155-2);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 1-55786-857-3).

Fischer's concern in this book is with two perennially puzzling issues: the relation between causal determinism, freedom, and moral responsibility, and the relation between divine omniscience, freedom, and moral responsibility. In each case he is keenly aware of what's at stake and is both tenacious and undogmatic in his pursuit of a solution. The result is a book that is clear, insightful, original, and very elegant.

The book is composed of nine chapters, each leading naturally to the next. In the first chapter, Fischer explains how it is that our conception of ourselves as persons who are morally responsible for what we do is imperiled by two propositions whose truth it would seem very difficult to disprove. The first proposition is that causal determinism is true; the second is that God exists eternally and is essentially omniscient.

Fischer understands causal determinism as the thesis that, for any given time, a complete statement of the facts about that time, together with a complete statement of the laws of nature, entails every truth as to what happens after that time. This threatens our freedom of action in that it seems that we lack control both over the past and over the laws of nature. If we assume the truth of what Fischer calls the 'Principle of the Transfer of Powerlessness' — let's just call it '(TP)' — it follows (in a manner that Fischer spells out in detail) that, if causal determinism is true, we have no control over our present actions.

What (TP) says is this (where 'N$s,t(p)$' stands for 'It is power necessary for agent S at time t that p — that is, p obtains and S is not free at t to perform any action such that if S were to perform it, p would not obtain'): If N$s,t(p)$ and Ns,t(If p, then q), then N$s,t(q)$. It's a principle which, Fischer rightly says, seems very plausible, and he goes on to employ it to construct a very similar argument to the effect that God's being eternally existent and essentially omniscient is likewise incompatible with our having control over our actions. But just *how* plausible is (TP)? It is not universally accepted. In Chapter 2 Fischer defends it against certain well-known criticisms. He then proceeds in Chapter 3 to explore an argument according to which (TP) can generate the conclusion that we rarely enjoy freedom of action even when it's not coupled with the relevant assumptions about causal determinism or divine omniscience. He rejects this argument and, in so doing, defends the claim that we are frequently free to act in an irrational manner.

Fischer recognizes that, in defending (TP) against counterarguments, he has not thereby provided a positive argument for it, and he declares himself unable to provide such an argument. He therefore finds it noteworthy that one can argue for the incompatibility of causal determinism and freedom of action without invoking this principle. One can do so by relying instead on

two other principles, couched in terms of subjunctive conditionals, which directly concern the fixity of the past and the fixity of the laws of nature. In Chapter 4 Fischer investigates certain arguments against these principles. The investigation is detailed but inconclusive; in each case it results in what he calls a 'Dialectical Stalemate.' Fischer then turns in Chapter 5 to yet another principle on the basis of which one may argue for the incompatibility of causal determinism or divine omniscience with freedom of action. He calls the argument that results the 'Basic Version' of the argument for incompatibilism. The principle in question is this (Fischer gives it no name, but we can call it the 'Extension Principle' or '(EP)'): An agent *S* can do *X* only if *S*'s doing *X* can be an extension of the actual past, holding the laws of nature fixed. It follows straightforwardly from this that, if causal determinism is true and *S* doesn't do *X* at *t2*, then *S* cannot do *X* at *t2*. It also apparently follows that, if God is essentially omniscient and believes at *t1* that *S* won't do *X* at *t2*, then *S* cannot do *X* at *t2*.

Because (EP) utilizes the notion of the 'actual past,' it's important to ask just what this notion amounts to. In particular, are God's beliefs at *t1* part of the actual past relative to *t2*? Fischer examines this question in Chapter 6, distinguishing not only, as is customary, between 'hard facts' and 'soft facts', but also between those soft facts that have a hard 'kernel' and those that don't. The actual past, he claims, comprises all those facts that are either hard or soft with a hard kernel. God's beliefs, he argues, constitute facts of the latter sort.

Given his endorsement of the Basic Version of the argument for incompatibilism and also his acceptance of the claim that moral responsibility requires control, one might well expect Fischer to endorse the claim that causal determinism or divine omniscience is incompatible with moral responsibility. But in Chapter 7 he resists this by making a crucial distinction between two types of control. The control that's at issue in the argument for incompatibilism is what Fischer calls 'regulative control', involving the freedom to choose or do otherwise. But Harry Frankfurt has famously argued — and Fischer accepts his argument — that such control isn't necessary for moral responsibility. Yet, even in Frankfurt-type cases, where the agent lacks alternative possibilities of choice or action but bears moral responsibility for the choice or action nonetheless, the agent exhibits what Fischer calls 'guidance control', in that the choice or action is in some sense to be traced to the agent rather than to that factor of the case that forecloses the agent's having alternative possibilities. Fischer recognizes that some have claimed that there are still certain 'flickers of freedom' in such scenarios, involving alternative possibilities of one sort or another (having to do with whether or not the agent 'triggers' the foreclosure of options), but, he argues, none of these, even if they do exist (and he's noncommittal on this), is sufficiently 'robust' to ground the relevant attributions of responsibility. He also recognizes that some may still wish to claim that causal determinism or divine omniscience is incompatible with moral responsibility even if moral responsibility doesn't presuppose that the agent has alternative possibilities of any

sort, but he declares himself unable to find any rationale for this claim, which he dubs 'hyper-incompatibilism.' Thus Fischer is prepared to embrace what he calls 'semicompatibilism,' which is the view that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism and divine omniscience, even though regulative control is not.

In Chapter 8 Fischer attempts to provide the beginnings of a fuller account of the key notion of guidance control. He analyses the notion in terms of what he calls 'reasons-responsiveness'. He distinguishes two types of such responsiveness. Roughly, 'strong reasons-responsiveness' obtains when the 'mechanism' of deliberation that actually issues in the agent's action is such that, if there were sufficient reason for the agent to do otherwise and the mechanism were to operate, the agent would do otherwise; 'weak reasons-responsiveness' obtains when, even if the agent *would* not do otherwise, still there is *some* possible world, with the same natural laws as those in the actual world, in which the agent does do otherwise. Fischer argues that strong reasons-responsiveness, while sufficient, is not necessary for moral responsibility (for reasons having to do with weakness of will), while weak reasons-responsiveness is both necessary and sufficient (sufficient, that is, to satisfy the freedom-relevant requirement for moral responsibility).

Finally, in Chapter 9 Fischer gives a useful recapitulation of the foregoing chapters and provides, in addition, a comparison of his view with those of some others. He ends by embracing this 'new paradigm': '[E]ven if there is just one available path into the future ... I may be held accountable for *how I walk down this path*' (216).

Much has of course been omitted in this brief exposition of Fischer's book, which is uniformly sensitive and sophisticated. Everything he says has a high degree of plausibility. There are certain areas, however, where I find his discussion wanting in one respect or another. For lack of space I restrict my comments to the following.

First, Fischer claims that his moving from (TP), via a discussion of the principles concerning the fixity of the past and the fixity of the laws of nature, to (EP) constitutes a way to escape a certain Dialectical Stalemate. But this is problematic. I grant that (EP) does indeed capture a very basic incompatibilist intuition. But inasmuch as incompatibilism follows immediately from it, anyone who is inclined towards compatibilism will surely be moved to reject it outright. This would seem simply to constitute a new Dialectical Stalemate. While I think that Fischer has made real progress in identifying clearly just where the basic differences between compatibilists and incompatibilists lie, I doubt that he's made as much progress in resolving these differences.

Secondly, Fischer's advocacy of semicompatibilism seems to me under-motivated, even if one is willing to grant (as I am) the cogency of Frankfurt-type cases. His dismissal of hyper-incompatibilism is too hasty. He rightly asks why someone who grants the cogency of Frankfurt-type cases should still insist on the incompatibility of causal determinism and divine omniscience

with moral responsibility. With respect to causal determinism, at least, I have an answer.

In response to Fischer's question, the hyper-incompatibilist may at first be tempted simply to invoke a version of (TP) — call it (TP*) — where 'Ns,$t(p)$' is interpreted not in terms of regulative control but in terms of guidance control as follows: p obtains and S lacks guidance control at t with respect to p's obtaining. But this won't in fact do; for (TP*) is invalid, as an example given by Fischer himself (241, n. 17) in effect demonstrates. While he never says so explicitly, it may be that it is the failure of (TP*) that prompts Fischer to embrace semicompatibilism. But the hyper-incompatibilist can resist this by contending that the sort of necessitation that occurs in Frankfurt-type cases is merely 'passive' (operating in the alternative sequence) and thus non-threatening to freedom, whereas that which occurs under causal determinism is 'active' (operating in the actual sequence) and thus threatening to freedom. Actually this requires refinement, since (although Fischer doesn't mention this) there can be Frankfurt-type cases where the necessitation operates in the actual sequence. (Think of an actually operating, imperceptible, impenetrable force-field — I owe this sort of illustration to David Hunt — that happens to contour itself perfectly to an agent's self-motivated choices and actions without influencing them at all.) Thus, a hyper-incompatibilist must in fact say that causal determinism involves not just 'active' but 'intrusive' necessitation, necessitation of the sort that takes matters out of the agent's hands and is thus incompatible not just with regulative but also with guidance control. The compatibilist clearly concedes that such necessitation is not just possible but actually occurs on occasion, since agents sometimes do act unfreely. The hyper-incompatibilist simply claims that causal determinism itself involves such necessitation and can thus respond to Fischer's question by appealing to yet another version of (TP) — call it (TP**) — that goes as follows (where 'Ns,$t(p)$' is still interpreted in terms of guidance control): If Ns,$t(p)$ and p's obtaining intrusively necessitates q's obtaining for S at t, then Ns,$t(q)$. Pending further clarification of the notions of guidance control and intrusive necessitation, the application of (TP**) to causal determinism would seem to have strong intuitive appeal.

Thirdly, Fischer's analysis of guidance control in terms of reasons-responsiveness seems problematic. First, there's reason to think that neither weak nor strong reasons-responsiveness can be sufficient for moral responsibility (that is, sufficient to satisfy the freedom-relevant requirement for moral responsibility). This is because they seem vulnerable to the sort of artificial inducement and manipulation that undermines such freedom. Second, weak reasons-responsiveness would also seem not to suffice for moral responsibility because it is just too weak. After all, all that such reasons-responsiveness requires is that there be *some* possible world (with the same natural laws as those in the actual world) in which the relevant mechanism issues in the agent's doing other than that which is done in the actual world. Fischer of course doesn't require that this world be *accessible* to the agent, for that would simply re-introduce alternative possibilities all over again. But surely

some further restriction is required. It seems quite consistent to say that someone who is moved by a literally irresistible impulse to steal (and hence is not morally responsible for stealing) is such that there's *some* possible world (with the same natural laws as ours, but otherwise presumably quite different) in which the mechanism that issues in his (or her) stealing in our world issues in his not stealing in that world.

Fourthly, Fischer's dismissal of the 'flicker of freedom' strategy is a bit quick. His claim that whatever alternative possibilities may exist in Frankfurt-type cases are insufficiently 'robust' to ground the relevant attributions of responsibility is both important and problematic. It is important because (if I understand him correctly) what he's saying is that Frankfurt-type cases appear to indicate that, even if there remain alternative possibilities of some sort in such cases, it's not *because* of these that the agent acts freely. This seems to me absolutely right (although somewhat obscure). But notice that the hyper-incompatibilist can accept this as easily as the semicompatibilist. Indeed, the semicompatibilist has a special worry here, and this is what renders Fischer's claim about robustness problematic. For, we must not overlook an important point that Fischer himself emphasizes elsewhere (135, 145), namely, that, if causal determinism rules out the agent's having alternative possibilities of *any* sort (consistent with the actual past and the laws of nature), then, if no Frankfurt-type case can be found that involves no such alternative possibilities, no Frankfurt-type case can be found that clearly supports semicompatibilism. I think that Fischer would be better advised here to consider Frankfurt-type cases (such as the force-field cases mentioned above) where the necessitation operates in the actual sequence, since there's arguably less reason to think that there must be alternative possibilities of some sort in such cases, in that no 'triggering' is required to actualize the necessitation at issue.

The fact is that semicompatibilism requires cases where an agent is morally responsible and yet lacks alternative possibilities of *any* sort. In light of this, I think that Fischer's final rendition of his 'new paradigm' would be improved if slightly reworded. To say that, even if there is just one path available into the future, I may be held accountable for how I walk down this path, suggests (to me, at least) that I have alternative ways of walking down the path open to me. One wonders, then, whether we should be talking of one path or two; even if we stick to talking of just one path, that there are alternative ways of walking down it is something that the semicompatibilist must declare unnecessary. What I think Fischer should have said is this: even if there is just one available path into the future and just one available way of walking down it, I may be held accountable for walking down it in that way.

In sum, this is an important book — a 'must-read' for anyone interested in the issues with which it deals.

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Kevin L. Flannery, S.J.
Ways into the logic of Alexander of Aphrodisias.
Leiden: Brill 1995. Pp. xxiv + 170.
US$81.75. ISBN 90-04-09998-0.

Flannery's book begins, after a standard table of contents, with a ten pages 'analytical' table to contents, and a 'general introduction' (xix-xxiv). There are three main chapters: *Ecthesis, The contents of 'On mixed premisses'*, and *Logical matter*, followed by a bibliography (primary and secondary), an appendix on logical symbols and conventions, and various scholarly indices.

The general introduction highlights Alexander's biography, writings, influence as well as influences on Alexander. Also, the reader learns that Flannery's original plan of a general study of Alexander's logic was narrowed down to the discussion of three themes, 'one from each of the main areas of traditional logic: the assertoric syllogistic, the modal syllogistic, and the area of metalogical concerns', which yielded the above mentioned three chapters.

Chapter 1 focuses on Alexander's extended discussion of the issues involved by Aristotle's brief proof (25 a, 14-17) of the convertibility of the universal negative ('no B are A' entails 'No A are B'). Flannery writes that 'criticisms of Alexander have missed their mark insofar as they fail to distinguish among the various types of Alexandrian ecthesis', of which there are three types: definitional, perceptual, and syllogistic, although the first of these is only 'improperly' ecthetic. Noteworthy for the position of Alexander in the history of Aristotelianism is the title of one of the sections: *Alexander the Theophrastan*.

Chapter 2 studies Alexander's attitude toward Aristotle's contention that a first figure syllogism containing an apodeictic major and an assertoric minor has an apodeictic conclusion. If necessarily A belongs to all B, and B belongs to all C (*without* requiring that this be necessary), then — so Aristotle says — necessarily A belongs to all C. Such a claim was already questioned by Aristotle's own pupil, Theophrastus, who defended the 'peiorem rule', i.e., 'the conclusion always follows the lesser part': if there is no guarantee that B and C cannot be separated (as it happens with the minor premise 'B belongs to all C'), then there cannot be any guarantee either that A and C cannot be separated: the conclusion should simply be 'A belongs to all C', without 'necessarily'. In fact, there were two parties in this issue: those 'who joined ranks with the philosopher [Aristotle]' and the opponents, who included, in addition to Theophrastus, Eudemus 'and the Platonists' (60).

In discussing this problem Alexander refers to a work of his: *On mixed* [i.e., both necessary and assertoric] *premisses*, now perished ('it is not inconceivable that an Arabic translation ... might some day turn up', 57, fn.). Flannery's task in Chapter 2 is to 'reconstruct the contents of this work, that we might better understand Alexander's modal logic, which (as is little realized nowadays) went far beyond Aristotle's own in sophistication' (55). To achieve this task, Flannery relies on six sources: remarks in Alexander's commentary on the *Prior Analytics*, a possible fragment of Alexander's lost

piece *On mixed premisses* itself, Philoponus, Pseudo-Ammonius, Al-Farabi, Averroes. In the *Conclusion* of Chapter 2, Flannery claims to have shown that Philoponus is 'largely accurate', that pseudo-Ammonius is 'not very accurate', and that the 'possible fragment' is indeed a 'genuine fragment from *On mixed premisses*, providing important information especially about Alexander's understanding of necessity'. Two further conclusions from Chapter 2, highlighted by the author, are that 'as in Chapter 1, we learn here that Alexander was more of a Theophrastan than is commonly acknowledged' and that he 'was quite loyal to his own more immediate master, Sosigenes'.

From a theoretical point of view, prominent and crucial in Chapter 3 is the notion of *relative* necessity, in several varieties (hypothetical, limited, etc.), by means of which Aristotle's friends tried to rescue their master's above mentioned claim. The views of Philoponus, Pseudo-Ammonius, Sosigenes (Alexander's teacher), Alexander, on necessities that are weaker than absolute necessity are examined and contrasted.

In Chapter 3, on 'logical matter', Flannery discusses Alexander's commentary on Aristotle's well-known procedure, in the syllogistic, to reject non-conclusive forms. In order to understand and evaluate Flannery's point, Aristotle's procedure must be kept in mind. Basically, Aristotle uses interpretations, or models, that show that the alleged syllogistic form can have true premisses and false conclusion. Aristotle's procedure is both economical and elegant. Since for any alleged syllogistic form four conclusions are possible (A, E, I, O), one would expect that Aristotle produces four interpretations in order to reject each non-valid form. However, he gives just two interpretations, which, moreover, differ in only one of their three terms. Both interpretations make the premisses true, but one generates a true A connection between major and minor term, while the other generates a true E connection between them. Obviously, this is a *virtuoso*'s way of showing, on the tacit assumption of some of the logical square laws, that while the given premisses are true, each of the four possible conclusions is false.

Now, the Aristotelian procedure is, in my view, misleadingly described by Alexander as follows: 'in some material instances a universal affirmative can be deduced, in others a universal negative can be deduced'; the Greek for 'deduced' is '*sunagesthai*'. Flannery wants to see in this '*sunagesthai*' a subtle kind of implication or inference or derivation — not logical or formal or necessary, but only 'material'. From the premisses ['All men are living beings', 'No horse is man'] one 'derives' — albeit not formally, but just materially — the conclusion 'All horses are living beings'. Again, from the premisses ['All men are living beings', 'No stone is man'] one 'derives' — albeit not formally, but just materially — the conclusion 'No stones are living beings'. This is what Flannery means, or one of the main things he means by the title of his third chapter: 'logical matter'.

By way of critical remarks, the following may be said. In Chapter 1, the presence of Lemmon is perhaps a bit excessive, correct as it may be; general references to standard notions of natural deduction would have sufficed. In Chapter 2, one misses, especially at the end, a clear, comprehensive state-

ment of the various conceptions of relative necessity that have emerged in the ancient debate. In Chapter 3, Flannery's efforts in the direction of taking seriously Alexander's word '*sunagesthai*' are not convincing. *Pace* Flannery, matter matters, in logic, only as a mere source of counterexamples to alleged logical implications — not as a genuine source of implications. The relation between the alleged premisses {'All men are living beings', 'No horse is man'} and the alleged conclusion 'All horses are living beings', or between the alleged premisses {'All men are living beings', 'No stone is man'} and the alleged conclusion 'No stones are living beings', does not deserve being called 'derivation', or 'implication'. Surely, the phrase 'material implication' has been coined in logic, but then it only means that it is not the case that the first sentence or set of sentences is true and the second false.

Finally, towards the end of the appendix (155-6) Flannery touches upon the perennial problem of the existential import of the Aristotelian propositions, especially A and E, in a questionable way. First of all, in good post-Fregean logic the existential condition should not be conjunctively attached, as Flannery suggests, to A or to E: this would ruin the logical square, since A and O, or E and I would not be contradictory any more (they could be both false!); the existential condition must be presupposed or 'presumed', just as Flannery seems to prefer. Secondly, the author's objection to the conjunctive addition of the existential condition (that the conjuncts 'all men are animals' and 'there are men' may refer to different sets of individuals) appears to depend on Flannery's being attracted, unfortunately, by recent endeavours, sponsored by the 'linguistic turn in logic' and surely anti-Fregean, towards developing a semantics for quantificational phrases such as 'all men' and 'some men'. Such a semantics is not only non-Fregean, but it is not Aristotelian either — it rather emerges in the earlier algebraic logicians and in some forms of scholasticism (cf. the notion of '*aliquis homo*' as referring to an (the?) *individuum vagum*).

There are some misprints practically harmless; as they are obvious, it should suffice to list the pages in which they are found: 4, 15, 54, 80, 83, 99, 155, 156.

This monograph is an important addition to logical historiography. Flannery has proceeded with utmost care in all his textual analyses. Future work on Alexander's logic will have to start with the consideration of Flannery's results — agreeing or disagreeing. Also logicians in general should profit from a reading of this book, and should not feel intimated by the Greek texts everywhere, since normally they are translated. Logic, as a foundational discipline, cannot neglect its origins.

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Kent Greenawalt
Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1995. Pp. ix + 189.
US$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-03638-1);
US$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-02600-9).

Fighting Words examines a number of difficult issues for freedom of speech, from flag burning, racially and sexually abusive speech, and obscenity, to work place harassment, campus speech codes, and freedom of religion. Greenawalt moves beyond simple discussions of cases in two ways. First, he extends the scope of his concern past the borders of the United States into Canada and considers differences between Canadian and American treatment of free speech questions. Second, he moves beyond the standard liberal framework used to address free speech questions and considers free speech controversies in both countries in light of the competing claims of individuals and communities. Greenawalt examines the concerns of communitarians, feminists, and civic republicans who would have concern for communities play a larger role in legal deliberations.

This book began as four lectures given by Greenawalt at various universities between 1990 and 1992. Four of these lectures form four of the eight chapters of Greenawalt's book. To these he has added a substantial amount of new material. As a result of its origins as a series of lectures, the chapters are somewhat uneven in their approach. *Fighting Words* is not a passionate defense of free speech although its author ends up defending freedom of speech in almost every case he discusses. Rather, this book is a close, careful, scholarly study of a range of interesting and difficult questions about freedom of speech and its limits.

Greenawalt begins with three questions: 1. What counts as speech?, 2. How stringently should courts review government actions that interfere with speech?, and 3. What constitutes interference with speech? Greenawalt contrasts two approaches to speech questions, the balancing approach versus the conceptual approach. While the balancing approach suggests weighing a number of factors of varying degrees of importance, the conceptual approach mandates categorical analysis. The 'compelling interest' test is an example of balancing, while the constitutional protection given to those who defame public officials is an example of categorical analysis.

Broadly speaking, the Canadian approach to speech questions follows the balancing approach, while Americans favor categorical analysis. It is a treat to find a work in legal philosophy on this subject which covers the legal treatment speech questions have received in both Canada and the United States. But while Greenawalt's discussion of speech questions in Canada is interesting, I suspect it will be of more use to American scholars than the section on the account of freedom of speech issues in the United States will be to Canadians. As Greenawalt notes, the history of questions of speech in

the United States is well known to Canadians, while few Americans are familiar with the Canadian history (12).

Greenawalt treats the rival approaches fairly and evenhandedly, presenting alternatives in a way which makes clear the advantages and disadvantages of each. With regards to the censorship of obscenity, for example, Greenawalt concludes that 'it is hard to not be attracted by the flexible and intelligent evaluation of the Canadian Supreme Court; that seems so much more sensible than the categorical boxes and blindness to nuance of dominant American approaches' (123). Greenawalt notes the similarities between the theory behind the Canadian Supreme Court's acceptance of the censorship of pornography, and the claim made by feminists that obscenity is a major obstacle to women's equality. The Canadian Supreme Court saw free speech and equality as values to be balanced. Yet, Greenawalt goes on to say that the danger of the Canadian balancing approach is that it would reduce protection for expression and its force could not easily be limited to obscenity and hate speech.

The most interesting chapter of Greenawalt's book concerns the relationship between freedom of speech, individuals, and communities. Greenawalt asks how constitutional decisions might be different if courts paid more attention to the role played by communities in human life. Greenawalt begins his examination by looking at two different sorts of defenses of freedom of speech. According to a consequentialist defense of free speech, various freedoms of speech are justified because they are essential for a just and peaceful society, while according to a rights-based defense of free speech the state would be violating individual rights were it to legislate expression. The U.S. Supreme Court has tended in the past to use the rights-based defense, but individual rights have been under attack from both the intellectual left, from the critical legal studies movement, and the political right, with the Reagan and Bush Supreme Court appointments. Greenawalt denies the claim that the recent tendency of the U.S. Supreme Court to accept legislative decisions shows an acceptance of a version of communitarianism. Instead, Greenawalt argues that *statism* — the acceptance of government decisions even if they infringe rights — might be grounded in communitarian thinking but is more likely to have as its source judicial deference. But suppose that the courts were to pay greater attention to communities? What would be the result? Greenawalt considers six cases, including campaign financing, flag burning, and campus speech codes. His analysis is subtle and detailed, showing that concern for communities does not automatically lead to a denial of freedoms of speech and that concern for individuals does not automatically lead to a defense of freedoms of speech. For example, in the case of abusive speech arguments based on community line up on both sides of the issue. Paying attention to the harm caused to members of disadvantaged groups points towards regulation, yet these regulations may end up suppressing the political activities of disadvantaged groups (145). He concludes that 'communal and individualist perspectives should temper each other in sensitive constitutional adjudication' (149).

In his discussions of Canadian approaches to speech issues, Greenawalt does not mention what is perhaps a greater threat to freedom of speech in Canada, not the enforcement of obscenity laws within Canada, but rather the seizure by Canadian customs officials at the border of books and magazines being imported to Canada. A recent challenge of this practice heard by the British Columbia Supreme Court nicely illustrates Greenawalt's point that concern for equality and minorities does not always favor prohibiting speech. A significant percentage of seized materials are headed to gay and lesbian bookstores in Canada. The plaintiffs, Little Sister's Book and Art Emporium, unsuccessfully challenged Canadian customs laws under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms' section 2(b) and charged that the targeting of gay and lesbian bookstores violated the right to equal treatment found in section 15 of the Charter.

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Van A. Harvey
Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. x + 309.
US$59.95. ISBN 0-521-47049-8.

In resurrecting Feuerbach Van Harvey has done a service to those interested in the philosophy of religion, 19th-century history of philosophy or critiques of religion. Harvey presents a 'rational reconstruction' (16) of an all too often overlooked critic of religion, thereby attempting to move Feuerbach from his usual place as a 'bookmark between Hegel and Marx', to his rightful status as a 'master of suspicion' along with Marx, Neitszche and Freud.

After an introduction where he gives his readers an overview of his argument as well as his reasons for writing the book, Harvey sets forth his work in three movements. The first three chapters situate Feuerbach within the context of the post-Hegelian milieu in which he wrote, as well as provide Feuerbach's intellectual history. The middle two chapters are devoted to developing Harvey's argument that there is not simply one Feuerbach — the Feuerbach of *The Essence of Christianity* — but two, an early and late. This should not be taken to mean that Feuerbach repudiated his earlier work but, as Harvey traces out in perhaps the most interesting section of the book, that in a significant refinement of his thinking, Feuerbach changes his emphases with respect to the argument of *The Essence*, leaving behind the spurious

Hegelian idealisms such as the *species*, in favour of an inchoate existentialist theme. The final two chapters bring Feuerbach into conversation with modern theories of projection as well as with several modern social scientific theorists of religion.

Harvey borrows the term 'rational reconstruction' from Rorty who, distinguishing it from orthodox historical reconstructions, characterises it as aiming not so much to reconstruct the past in its own terms but to conduct a profitable dialogue with it (16). Rational reconstructions are also usually confined to a small section of a thinker's work, dominated by questions which have come to prominence in recent philosophical discussions, tend to the view that the historical thinker had some excellent ideas but these were entangled with some very bad ones, and set about the task of restating these ideas in a more fruitful way (18). To this end Harvey does an admirable job. The small section of Feuerbach's work he is interested in is that produced between 1842 and 1848, from *The Essence of Christianity* to Feuerbach's *Lectures on the Essence of Religion*, and among the questions Harvey addresses are issues in hermeneutics such as the role of religion in the formation of the self, as well as sociological and psychological theories of projection or 'transference'. Feuerbach's critique of religion is championed as both penetrating and broadly relevant as Harvey shows Feuerbach's affinities to Kierkegaard and even Luther as well as his foreshadowing some of the insights later so forcefully made by Nietzsche and, of course, Marx. An 'existentialist paradigm', overshadowed by Feuerbach's theory of projection and inversion of Hegel (through the famous 'transformative method' so influential to Marx) in *Essence*, is shown to come to the fore in the *Lectures* and is defended as Feuerbach's *real* contribution to the history of critiques of religion.

Feuerbach's existentialist/naturalist paradigm focuses on one's confrontation with the Otherness of Nature — both physical nature in all its terrible splendour, as well as the nature of one's own frail and contingent being — and the particularly human burden of the knowledge of one's own mortality. Out of this confrontation, allied with the biological rage to live and a 'drive to happiness' (*Glückseligkeitstrieb*), 'the self, driven by feeling, anxiety and desire, abstracts certain qualities from nature and personifies them or, in the case of monotheism, unifies all the abstractions into one and personifies it' (191). Thus Feuerbach's critique of religion as a *misinterpretation* of (inner and outer) Nature is, as Harvey argues, a sophisticated analysis of what religious abstraction and objectification actually consists in, as well as a response to the question of why religion persists — a question inadequately dealt with by the other masters of suspicion. This reconstructed Feuerbach is a far cry from his usual caricature as merely the student of Hegel, the author of the notorious, clever, though not genuinely creative *Essence of Christianity*, and an important influence on Marx. Harvey shows that Feuerbach's continual revisitations to the question of religion were not simply his obsessively flogging dead horses, but the incremental development of a complex re-construal of theology as anthropology.

Harvey brings the reconstructed Feuerbach into the present through a 'conversation' with two sorts of projection theories: those based on a cinematic metaphor or 'beam theories'; and those conceiving projection as the creation of a sort of 'grid' or conceptual framework with which to organise the world. Exemplifying the prior is the Dutch anthropologist and psychologist Fokke Sierksma, and the latter the American sociologist of religion Peter Berger. Feuerbach is also brought into dialogue with neo-Tylorian theories of religion — that is, those that see religion simply as anthropomorphism — and the work of Stuart Guthrie and Ernest Becker are considered in this context. Since a proper consideration of these various 'conversations' is beyond the scope of this review, I shall simply add that, while interesting and well executed, this section is slightly tangential to the rest of the book. It does not carry on the analysis of Feuerbach's thought so much as hold Feuerbach up to the stream of some current discussions. This is indeed an essential element of rational reconstruction, and perhaps it is asking too much of a couple of chapters, but one would have expected, through these conversations, to learn as much about Feuerbach as about his dialogue partner(s). The focus in these chapters seems at times to have shifted too much on the side of contemporary theories and one is left waiting for Harvey to reflect these discussions back on his reconstructed view of Feuerbach. To be fair, Harvey does acknowledge that the task of bringing Feuerbach to bear on current questions is a large and complex one and would require other books. Perhaps, then, other scholars building on Harvey's work, or even Harvey himself, will apply Feuerbach's 'real' critique to other questions in theology and religious studies. But this is really a minor criticism of a generally fine book. To be sure, Harvey's work makes clear that one can no longer afford to 'avoid [Feuerbach's] society, or bypass him with superficial irony' (24).

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Oliver Johnson
The Mind of David Hume: A Companion to Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1995. Pp. xi + 375.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-252-02156-8);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-252-06456-9).

Another book on Hume, but, as the subtitle suggests, of a different kind. This is not a further contribution to that vast and ever expanding literature which offers still newer angles on the Scottish philosopher. Rather Johnson's work seeks out the more modest, and less frequently attempted, task of providing, section by section, and at times paragraph by paragraph, a full and reliable commentary on the *Treatise*'s opening book. Clarification of the argument is the main aim, with evaluation, as Johnson acknowledges, taking second place.

And so the structure holds no surprises. After the usual preliminaries, and a discussion of background material, the seventeen chapters which comprise the bulk of the book trail Hume closely. Nothing is omitted. Nothing — including the unrewarding material on space and time — treated in a cursory fashion. (Or almost nothing. Johnson makes only passing reference to Hume's own introduction. That is a pity, for these seven pages are rich, both in information about background, and in gesturing, usefully, at the shape of things to come. Strictly, of course, this introduction isn't part of Book I, but to neglect it on those grounds would be churlish.) The book ends with a short conclusion.

What, and who is it for? Presumably it is to be read alongside, and not in place of Hume's text. And Johnson states explicitly that it isn't for beginners. But this raises questions about the best use of space in this long book (about half as long again, on my reckoning, as the work on which it comments). There's a straightforward test. Pick some section of the *Treatise* and read it carefully. Then turn to Johnson. You'll find lots that is true, but not, I think, a great deal that you haven't already discovered. Who needs to be told how many paragraphs certain sections contain? Who, expert or beginner, will benefit from this? 'Hume begins his positive theory of mind and its relation to perceptions with a series of statements about perceptions themselves. "All [our particular perceptions] are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately consider'd, and may exist separately, and have no need of anything to support their existence." The central point these statements convey is that of the independence of perceptions. They are independent in two ways. (1) They are different, distinguishable and separable from each other and (2) they do not need anything to support their existence' (287).

That is a glaring, but not untypical example. Unfortunately, the greater the distance the less reliable, often, the commentary becomes. As is well known, and evident from the text, Hume distinguishes between simple and complex ideas. Only the former derive directly from impressions. Johnson

certainly makes this point, but belatedly. Or take a later example. Hume briskly dismisses, via use of the copy thesis, the quasi-Cartesian idea of the simple indivisible self. Johnson has him ridding us here of a much more general notion. This sits ill (in ways which are unacknowledged) with what is described as Hume's positive account of the self, to which both writers devote considerable space.

Some of this is injudiciousness. Some results from a surfeit of sympathy for, or at least reluctance to pass judgement upon, what might appear to be Hume's position. Thus Johnson is, I think, too willing to suggest that Hume reinterprets various everyday terms, and then uses them in a technical manner. This gets him off various hooks. On Johnson's account, Hume's technical term 'memory' has no close connection with accessing the past. I say there is this connection, and if Hume's account severs it, so much the worse. And he is perhaps too willing to summarise without comment. He claims, for example, that Hume believes 'most of the time we think in pictures' (43). Setting aside the question of accuracy, we cannot but wonder, is this then a *reductio*?

There's a further, though related, concern. Go back to the difference between this and other books. Johnson claims that many recent critics have imposed their own theories on Hume. They have, he says, adopted a pre-textual view. His will be post-textual, following the argument where it will, without preconceived ideas. Now this is in certain respects unfair, and in other respects, constraining. My guess is that many of those with a line on Hume develop that line, in part, through careful reading. Their books represent that reading's fruit. Johnson makes great play of being open-minded (note his introduction — you could almost believe he wrote it before beginning the book, indeed before reading Hume, so strongly does he suggest we'll just have to see what turns up) but this pre-textual account is in key respects disappointing. As Hume himself recognised (and hence the *Enquiries*) there is in this youthful work rather too much tree. Faithful and ever close to Hume, Johnson never attains a perspective from which we can see the wood. His conclusion, a mere six pages, is peremptory, and the overall impression is one of having following a detective story, only to find it ends before the mystery is solved.

That said, *The Mind of David Hume* is a sound contribution to the literature. It is refreshingly sane. Johnson has no axe to grind, is never glib, and is quite unafraid to admit his bafflement at the intricacies of Hume's text. Those new to Hume will find comfort in learning that interpretative difficulties are not theirs alone. Scholars and specialists may find that Johnson provides a corrective to the hasty, or too tidy reading. These are merits. However, I do have doubts as to how useful the book will prove. What passes for valuable explication in the classroom cannot so easily translate into cold print, and time spent here might more profitably be transferred back to Hume himself.

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Jeff Jordan and **Daniel Howards-Snyder, eds.**
Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, Philosophy of Religion Today.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 1996.
Pp. xiv + 287.
US$58.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8152-1);
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8153-X).

This collection is dedicated to William Rowe, who has gained wide respect and admiration for his work in philosophy of religion. It is subtitled, 'Philosophy of Religion Today', and described on the back cover as written by 'twelve distinguished philosophers of religion'. However, some of the essays are not on philosophy of religion, several are unrelated to philosophy of religion *today*, and several contributors are not philosophers of religion. Don't judge a book by its cover.

In the section on 'Faith', William Alston leads off with a seminal distinction between 'accepting' and 'believing', and claims that Christianity requires only 'acceptance'. A person who merely 'accepts' p judges it to be reasonable enough for her to use as a premiss in her thinking, to respond affirmatively if queried if p, to act in ways appropriate if p were true, and the like, but does not 'feel' p is true. Next, Phillip Quinn gives a defense of Kierkegaard's position that an ethics of love is *commanded*.

The section on 'Freedom' starts with an excellent, ambitious study of free agency and materialism by J.A. Cover and John O'Leary-Hawthorne, followed by a thoughtful essay by Eleanore Stump replying to David Widerker's critique of Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the 'Principle of Alternative Possibilities' for decisions. In a theological soliloquy, James Ross combats a common understanding of 'free will' with a theologically motivated alternative, but it is never clear why the former competes with the latter and why the latter is better. William Wainwright then debates Rowe over whether there is a 'morally perfect being' if there is no unsurpassable possible world. Rowe thinks there can't be. But how does Rowe know this? Just by thinking of the words 'morally perfect'? But that phrase gives no clear intuitions on the matter independent of the theological contexts in which it has its home and where the intentions of its use are to be discovered. Those contexts have to be examined for an answer. Otherwise, there isn't much to discuss, except charges of misleading language.

Peter van Inwangen begins the 'Rationality' section with a fine piece that questions the singular application of W.K. Clifford's principle of evidence to religion. Robert Audi follows with an essay on the implications from contemporary philosophy of mind for the belief that God is a non-physical, personal being. Martin Curd criticizes recent attempts, by Rowe, Smart, and Swinburne, to defend the coherence of the notion of a miracle as a 'violation of a law of nature'. Curd argues against Swinburne that Swinburne's concept of 'law of nature', which allows there to be non-repeatable counterinstances, is

not the usual one. But this is irrelevant. The question is whether we have better reason to think 'laws of nature' in the regular sense exist than do 'laws of nature' in Swinburne's sense. Curd never addresses this. Norman Kretzmann follows with a defence of a proof for God's existence 'buried' in *Summa Contra Gentiles*. In this essay Kretzmann explains only why Aquinas proves an ultimate universal explanatory principle (187), but promises a sequel in which it will be shown that this is God.

The last essay is by George Nakhnikian, against Alvin Plantinga's arguments for epistemic parity between belief in God on the one hand, and belief in other minds and physical objects, respectively. While Nakhnikian has some good points to make, this is a puzzling essay. Inexplicably, Nakhnikian takes 'proper basicality' to have to do with incorrigibility (218) and thus gives (217) a 'real explicit definition', 'FP', of a 'properly basic' belief as an indefeasibly justified belief. Nakhnikian also says FP is self-evident, and so counts as properly basic by FP's own lights. But all this can't be correct. For one thing, 'properly basic' is a term of Plantinga's invention, and Plantinga's own definition is that p is properly basic iff: not based on any propositional content, no epistemic duties are violated in believing p, and one's noetic structure is not rendered defective as the result of believing p. So FP is not a 'real explicit definition' of proper basicality. Second, on Plantinga's definition, a properly basic belief can well be defeasible. (This is in fact Plantinga's view.) Third, even if FP were self-evident it would not be properly basic by FP's own lights. A self-evident proposition is simply not indefeasibly justified. Nakhnikian says (226) that self-evident propositions are *in principle indefeasible*, independently of metaphysical presuppositions and empirical constraints. But this is mistaken. Think of set-theory paradoxes which have shown some self-evident propositions to be logically false.

Nakhnikian surveys (219) two proposed principles for 'specifying' propositions which fulfill FP. One says p is basic iff self-evident or evident to the senses, and the second: iff self-evident or incorrigible. He claims that the conjunction of these two together with FP entails Plantinga's definition of classical foundationalism as recognizing a properly basic proposition to be either self-evident or incorrigible or evident to the senses. Nakhnikian seems to be unaware that this latter claim is indeed true, but only because the two principles are inconsistent with one another, since they are each iff and no proposition can be more than one of either evident to the senses, incorrigible, or self-evident.

Finally, Nakhnikian insists (232-3) that intersubjective agreement among cognitively sophisticated and competent people is a necessary condition for apparent experiences of God counting in favor of God's actual presence. His examples of such agreement are on the order of 'counting the cookies in a jar'. Anyone cognitively sophisticated and competent can pull the cookies out and verify the count. But no such agreement is available for apparent experiences of God. True enough. But some agreement does exist in the case of experiences of God, and counting cookies in a jar is the most congenial kind of example Nakhnikian could have picked. What about seeing a quick wink

from a friend in a crowded room or a brief, shooting star in a far away galaxy? How is the fact that there is not the same degree of the required type of agreement for experiences of God as for counting cookies in a jar supposed to show that the degree of agreement that does exist for experiences of God is not evidentially serious?

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Charles Larmore
The Morals of Modernity.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. 226
US$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-49717-5);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-49772-8).

In *The Morals of Modernity*, Charles Larmore attempts to 'defin[e] the way distinctive forms of modern experience should orient our moral thinking' (1). He concludes that neither moral transcendentalism nor moral naturalism can account for 'the distinctive forms of modern experience' which characterize the present. Since it is Larmore's view that both attitudes are nevertheless part of 'the historical situation' in which philosophy operates, representing the 'historically conditioned character' of moral thinking is the first step towards that conclusion. Analysing the development of moral theorizing as it responds to changes in the methods and objects per se of philosophical enquiry over the course of the modern period thus plays a key role in the execution of Larmore's main task.

In the course of his analysis, Larmore is much harder on the naturalist turn than he is on transcendentalism. While crediting both Kant and Plato, absent their metaphysical commitments, with having gotten things 'basically right', he levies Locke's charge against Hobbes and David Gauthier (*Morals by Agreement*) that '"an Hobbist will not easily admit a great many of the plain duties of morality"' (50). The outcome of his historical study together with his epistemologically contextualist view 'that no existing belief stands as such in need of justification ... [and that] the need arises only when we have uncovered some positive reason, based on other things we believe, for thinking that the belief might be false' (11) is that the transcendental-naturalist dichotomy and the dialectical method in which it is historically situated should be abandoned in favor of some other method of inquiry. It is important to note, however, that Larmore's criticisms do not take him in the direction,

say, of virtue ethics or the likes of Alasdair MacIntyre who no doubt shares Larmore's disenchantment with both the transcendentalist and naturalist traditions and with the dichotomy which has thusfar shaped moral philosophy. This leaves us with the obvious question of Larmore's positive methodological commitments and regrettably, it is a question which is not easily answered in the text.

Larmore argues that due to a series of events in the history of moral philosophy, the modern moral theorist faces a serious philosophical dilemma. 'We need, but lack,' he writes, 'a general understanding of the nature of morality that could replace both the ancient perspective and the Judeo-Christian perspective, which, in often hidden ways, has shaped so much of modern ethics' (40).

To presume that there is a nature of or a core to morality is unavoidable, by Larmore's reckoning, since it is no longer open to us to reasonably dispute the claim that the right is prior to the good. By that reckoning, 'our interest in morality is empirically conditioned: we develop it only through our experience in society. But in another sense ... this interest remains empirically unconditioned. It is an intrinsic interest in morality ...' (33). The intrinsic, unconditioned aspect of our interest in morality to which Larmore refers is our inescapable interest in normativity or the sense that there are things 'we ought to do regardless of what we may want' (33).

Larmore then moves on to a more detailed defense of the claim, advanced initially and for the most part on credit, that the normative essence of morality cannot be naturalized. Considering Nietzsche's moral outlook, Larmore writes that 'far from being cozy, such an outlook boggles the mind. Imagine thinking that even so basic a rule of reasoning as the avoidance of contradiction has no more authority than what we choose to give it ... Has anyone the slightest idea of what it would be like really to believe this?' (87).

Given practically universal agreement that *there is* normativity, the widespread modern commitment to the view that normativity is phenomenal and Larmore's quasi-positivist conviction that understanding normativity is nevertheless beyond the ken of science, naturalism's ontology which only recognizes 'the physical and psychological phenomena that are the object of the modern natural sciences' (89) is arguably incomplete. As such, naturalism must be deeply mistaken about that upon which it presumes to be correct. Most important, Larmore argues, is the direction in which the naturalist ontology takes moral philosophy — to where there can be no such thing as 'moral knowledge'; no such thing as beliefs of a moral sort which are correctable given something about the way the world is. 'We ought indeed', Larmore writes, 'to adopt the anti-naturalist vision of the world Plato represents' (88).

On the surface of his resolution of the dilemma, Larmore appears to be counselling a return to an ancient moral orientation which he initially argues must be replaced by some other understanding of morality. Yet as it happens, it is not a return to the Ancients per se that Larmore is against but rather a

return to the Aristotelian tradition and the 'nostalgia for "virtue-ethics" *ancien style*' (11).

Clearly, Larmore is no naturalist. And while he is sympathetic to Kant's deontological commitment, he is not a Kantian moral transcendentalist. Further, since Larmore believes that the existence of moral value is entirely dependent on human social life, it is equally clear, even in the face of his view that 'moral values are something real' that he is no Platonic moral realist. Further, in spite of some sympathy with Husserl's handling of normativity, Larmore finds his phenomenological method 'peculiar'. Just where we are left on the question of methodology — a question that must be answered in light of Larmore's rejection of the so-called naturalist idea that it is not possible to have moral knowledge — is a mystery reminiscent of the one left by Moore's intuitionist legacy. As such, I must conclude that the promise, however implicit, to deliver on this most important positive conviction, is left unperformed.

Larmore goes on in the final part (five chapters/essays) of the book to argue that philosophical case for social and political liberalism and the leap, however excellent the discussion, is jarring. What holds the material together is Larmore's contention that what distinguishes the modern world is the belief that perfectly reasonable people may disagree fundamentally about matters which have serious impact — even 'life and death' impact — on one another's lives. In terms evocative of Rorty (but not too evocative since Larmore is careful to reject Rorty's virulent anti-Platonism), Larmore accepts the truth of contextualism. Larmore's contextualism implies that beliefs held by persons are only and necessarily justified by other beliefs they hold simultaneously. As such, legitimate demands for justification of those beliefs must originate internally. This contextualist constraint on demands for justification prohibits us from demanding reasons from one another for our respective and deeply opposing views. Because they rest on a foundationalist fiction, such demands go nowhere and tend only to the increasing alienation of persons from one another.

Liberal toleration takes on a new meaning here. It is not merely the avoidance of excluding from equal legal and political consideration those who disagree with us for that reason alone but also, it seems, the avoidance of confrontation at every level. There is *something* appealing about this principle of moral charity — 'live and let live' or something else to that effect. But surely such appeal is of dubious value in the real modern moral world Larmore is concerned to explore. If this is where Larmore's theorizing is taking him, then he is closer to the communitarian than he thinks. For, in spite of Larmore's assertion that it does not, this direction suggests that moral philosophy understood as 'the search for principles' (208) is nothing but an obsolete historical curiosity.

At first blush, Larmore's liberal convictions do not sit well with his commitment to the generalizable core morality he argues on behalf of in the first part of the book. As a result one reaches the end with the feeling that this is at least two books — the beginning of one and the end of another. The

only way which I find on reflection of smoothing the incommensurability is to assume that in spite of his terminology in the first half of the book, Larmore is not really interested in doing moral *philosophy* at all. The study of morality or the good, in this case, however much a 'search for principles', ought to be taken up by psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists and ethnologists leaving the study of normativity or the right now understood as completely detachable from morality to the ontologists and epistemologists.

In conclusion, it is only on the basis of what I judge to be Larmore's sometimes unfair representation of naturalism as well as his hasty dismissal of Utilitarianism that I feel the sentence not yet pronounced against moral philosophy understood as the arena set aside for considering the possibility of a naturalized transcultural conception of 'what we ought to do regardless of what we want to do'. Can the right be reconciled to the good without being beheaded? Can the good be reconciled to the right without being disembodied?' 'Tis hard to pass between the points of both unwounded' but as Hobbes also remarked in a slightly different context, 'me thinks the endeavor ... should not be ... condemned.'

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Sandra B. Lubarsky and **David Ray Griffin, eds.**
Jewish Theology and Process Thought.
Albany: State University of New York Press 1996.
Pp. xii + 316.
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US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2810-9).

'Process theology' — drawing on the 'process philosophy' of Whitehead and Hartshorne — is already long entrenched in Christian, particularly Protestant, thought. *Jewish Theology and Process Thought (JTPT)* seeks to make process theology more ecumenical, by exploring possible applications of it within Judaism. (That being the stated aim, it is odd that half the book is devoted to 'Jewish-Christian Dialogue on Process Thought' — and that some of that features exclusively Christian reflections.) The treatment of 'process philosophy' in itself is very brief and confined to Lubarsky's Introduction; it won't satisfy those interested in exploring the philosophical merits of the doctrine itself. Nor, I fear, will the Jewish lay reader find the book really satisfying. Its market is rather those professional theologians and philoso-

phers of religion willing to take the philosophical merits of process thought on trust.

Most valuable in the encounter of process thought and the two monotheistic religions considered is the querying of standard theological assumptions about the immutability and omnipotence of God. The explosive medieval encounter of both religions (and Islam) with Greek thought left its mark in a conception of God as the Prime Mover, a perfect and changeless Aristotelian substance, which remained in peculiar tension with the personal, often angered and grieving God of the Hebrew Bible (for Christians, the Old Testament). Both Whitehead and Hartshorne were concerned to allow God participation in becoming as well as being, reconciling divine perfection and historical action by affirming that God's nature could grow to surpass itself in perfection. The main impulse for such self-surpassing is God's participation in relationships with humans and (debatably) with other animate and inanimate beings. Hans Jonas' contribution to *JTPT* is a free-spirited myth exploring this idea.

Questioning the relationship between the Aristotelian God-substance of changeless perfection and the Hebrew God of history is long overdue, and process thought does tackle some of the hard issues at the heart of this disaggregation. Yet in replacing God-as-substance with God-as-process, the personal aspects of the divine presence so important in Jewish thought are still neglected. Even the astringent negative theology of Maimonides, ridding Judaism as it did of any anthropomorphic conception of God's essence, left room for a notion of God's loving and just activity in the world which process thought risks blurring into pantheism. Various authors in this collection insist that process thought is not tantamount to pantheism, citing a verbal distinction of Hartshorne between 'pantheism' and 'panentheism', but skeptical readers may not be reassured by this reiteration.

As represented in the central essay by Griffin on Christianity, process theology seeks to topple more than just immutability. Griffin considers omnipotence, creation ex nihilo, redemption and covenant as equally erroneous hangovers of the orthodox commitment to substance above process. Omnipotence has long been reconciled, by both Jewish and Christian thinkers, with some version of free will, and Griffin's well-argued case for the necessity of free will on a process perspective does not fundamentally diverge from traditional strategies. Where he is idiosyncratic is in insisting that 'coercive' (which he distinguishes from 'persuasive') omnipotence depends crucially on the doctrine of creation ex nihilo; he thus devotes much of his essay to arguing that a process view need not and indeed cannot accept this doctrine. Yet in the context of this volume, the point is oddly irrelevant: Jewish philosophy has never rooted divine power in a strict insistence on creation ex-absolutely-nihilo, as Samuelson's excellent essay on Gersonides points out.

Indeed, Gersonides worked this into his own, pre-process refutation of divine omnipotence: since future events are contingent, God's knowledge of them would be imperfect; hence God does not know them at all. This suggests

that individual Jewish (or Christian) theologies deserve attention in a way that a globalising process approach can obscure; and conversely, that these theologies may themselves have resources for solving problems without recourse to process thought. Unfortunately, none of the other essays — with the exception of Ochs' dense essay on 'rabbinic text process theology', partially illuminated by Cobb, Jr.'s, comment — pay close attention to a single thinker in either religion. They are instead a heterogeneous bunch, ranging from Kushner's short and personal contribution to Reines' aggressively idiosyncratic and global 'hylotheism' which seems not to bear on Judaism at all. The value of the book is most of all in Jonas' mystical reflections and the central debate between Griffin and Samuelson. That is perhaps enough to get a debate about Judaism and process off the ground, but unlikely to be of interest to a wider audience beyond those already committed to process thought.

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Terry Nardin, ed.
The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1996. Pp. x + 286.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-691-03713-2.

This book is the product of a 1993 conference on the ethics of war and peace. It is the first in a series of Ethikon Institute studies to be published by Princeton University Press, in which scholars representing a diversity of ethical perspectives are brought together to discuss their moral views on an important issue of public life. The participants are asked to address a common set of questions in their presentations, and then to revise their papers for publication in light of the conference discussions. The objective is to create a set of chapters representing particular ethical perspectives in conversation with each other over common questions.

The authors respond to each other's claims and criticisms explicitly and directly, giving the reader a sense of participation in real dialogue. However, there is serious disagreement among the writers whether the common set of questions chosen by the editor really are the primary issues in the ethics of war and peace. And while the aim of the book is to create conversation and

broadened understanding across ideological, religious, and gender boundaries, a significant number of the authors articulate their views in ways that seriously question the possibility of such cross-boundary understanding.

The questions form three clusters, familiar to students of classical 'just war' theory: (1) Questions about how the tradition conceptualizes war and peace. (2) Questions about the justifying reasons for waging war (*jus ad bellum*) and the role of motive and intention in the morality of war. And (3) questions about the conduct of war (*jus in bello*). Are there limitations on the means? Are these limitations absolute?

These questions are addressed (or challenged) by two writers from each of the perspectives represented in the debate. John Finnis and Joseph Boyle, representing the Catholic Natural Law tradition, address the cluster of questions most systematically, for, as becomes evident as the conversation develops, it is their tradition that defines these as the central ethical questions about warfare. David Mapel and Jeff McMahan represent two variants of the realist perspective, both arguing for 'moderate' versions of realism that recognize moral limits on state behaviour in war, but also recognize moral justifications for the violation of those limits.

Interestingly, these two realists find greater comfort addressing the 'central questions' posed by the natural lawyers than do the representatives of the other, more strongly moralistic, perspectives in the debate. For example, the representatives of both the Jewish (Michael Walzer and Aviezer Ravitzky) and the Islamic (Bassam Tibi and Sohail Hashmi) perspectives have trouble addressing distinctions like that between just and unjust 'cause'. The Jewish tradition, Walzer claims, distinguishes instead between 'obligatory' wars (those commanded by God), and 'permissible' ones (allowed by God as a concession to monarchic privilege). Further, most Jewish discussion of war has taken place under conditions of exile and statelessness for the Jewish people, so that the question of morally justified *state* action was not urgent. Stateless people do little theorizing about the universal principles that should govern the conduct of states. In this respect Jewish theory has much in common with sectarian religious pacifism, represented in this volume by Mennonite Theodore Koontz, which sees individual and community virtue rather than the behaviour of nation states as the proper focus of an ethic of violence.

Islamic ethics expresses a similar discomfort with the natural lawyers' 'central questions'. This tradition also challenges the assumptions of natural lawyers and realists that nation-states are the primary actors and that their preservation takes moral primacy. Not the state, but the 'community of believers' is the focus of the theory of war in Islam, according to Tibi. War is the inevitable result of the resistance of the 'house of war' (the non-Islamic world) to the divine imperative to extend the 'home of peace' (the Islamic faith). Thus, the morality of war is not a matter of agreement of universal principles for the conduct of states at war, as envisaged in both natural law and (moderate) realist theories, but rather a matter of preserving and extend-

ing a community of faith (the 'jihad') in the face of inevitable opposition, with a readiness to use the necessary means.

The arguments of the sectarian Christian pacifists, the Jewish rabbis, and the Islamic theorists all challenge another fundamental premise underlying this book — the premise that by establishing conversation among different traditions understanding can be broadened. Islamic ethics starts with the assumption of a cosmic struggle between the 'house of war' and the 'home of peace' with no possibility of accommodation, and war as the inevitable consequence. The sectarian pacifist Koontz invokes precisely the same dualism between 'the house of fear' (the community that lives by the rule of violence) and the 'house of love' (the community of Christian nonviolence). Like the Islamic writers, he despairs of finding any common ground for dialogue with those who do not already live in his 'house'. For both, conversion to the faith precedes conversation and understanding. They appear to differ primarily in their view of the role violence should play in effecting the conversion. Michael Cartwright, the second pacifist author, finds Koontz's sectarian pacifism problematic, however, arguing that the viewpoint has far more in common with the moral assumptions of both natural lawyers and realists than Koontz recognizes.

Jean Bethke Elstain and Sarah Tobias reflect a similar skepticism about the possibility of cross-boundary dialogue in feminist thought on violence and war, but across gender rather than ideological boundaries. This skepticism has two sources in feminist thought. One is the dualism of radical feminism, which assumes a constant state of war between the sexes. The other is the dualism of 'different voice' ethics, which views war as the product of masculine ways of thinking about morality, in contrast to the 'maternal ethic of care' inherent in the feminine consciousness, which eschews abstract principles of justice and right in favour of immediate caring for the needs of individuals in particular circumstances. Elstain argues that there is no distinct feminist tradition on the ethics of war and peace, and that feminist writing throughout history wavers between two contradictory ideals of womanly virtue — the 'Spartan Mother' (the civic militant who bears children to die for Sparta) and the 'Beautiful Soul' (the non-violent, self-sacrificing, nurturing mother). Tobias takes strong issue with Elstain, claiming that feminist writings on peace and war, especially the recent focus upon the 'ethics of care,' constitute a radical critique of the natural law/realism tradition. The conversation among these writers is nicely summarized and evaluated in concluding chapters by the editor and Richard Miller, which insightfully map out the conceptual chasms dividing these perspectives, but also identify potential bridges between them.

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Anthony O'Hear, ed.
Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. iv + 297.
US$22.95. ISBN 0-521-55815-8.

This collection of fifteen essays on Popper's thought is based on a series of lectures given in London in 1994 and 1995, shortly after his death. They are meant to provide an account of his ideas which is both comprehensive and critical. The editor observes in this regard that, despite the sense of regret shared by those involved in the series, the lectures 'are neither eulogistic nor valedictory, but testify to the sense that, whether Popper himself is alive or dead, his ideas continue to pose problems, to have consequences still to be fully explored and so to bear intellectual fruit' (1). The papers deal with P.'s view of science, his propensity theory of probability and commitment to indeterminism, the application of Popperian theses to specific areas of science (quantum mechanics and biology) and to the theory of evolution, and his social and political philosophy. The final essay takes into account the ethical foundations of P.'s philosophy.

All contributions contain useful insights. In this context, however, only a few of them can be mentioned. In his paper 'Popper, Science and Rationality' W.H. Newton-Smith argues that falsifiability is not a specifically scientific virtue, since 'empirical falsifiability and the absence of dogmatism is a good thing in general but it is not exclusively a mark of scientific rationality' (21). He goes on noting that the descriptions of scientific rationality fail to provide an account of something that is *specifically* scientific; no doubt science has progressed because it is willing to posit unobserved entities in order to explain what we observe. But this is not in any way uniquely scientific: 'It is just part of good epistemic practice. We all use inference to the best explanation all the time' (23).

The fact is that N.-S. not only wonders, like many other critics, whether P. can really dispense with induction in his account of science, but also doubts that the task of the philosophy of science is to defend a particular method. He then distinguishes the so-called 'Great Methodologists', i.e., those philosophers of science who provide highly abstract and general characterizations of scientific methodology, from the 'little methodologists', who offer instead specific characterizations of work in specific areas of science. It is N.-S.'s opinion that philosophers' characterizations of scientific rationality (including that of P.) are parts of the general story of good epistemic practice. As such they cannot be the crucial ingredient in any account of the success of science in achieving its manifest aim. It follows that we should advocate a 'social epistemic' study of science in which one tries to identify those aspects of the social practice of science which contribute to its achievement of its epistemic end. N.-S. fully recognizes the importance of P.'s stand on rationality and his stress on criticism. However, in his view criticism itself works in so far as it is based on beliefs for which we have positive grounds, and this

means that induction cannot be dispensed with. He states in fact that 'We simply have not the time and energy to consider every objection. We proceed by attaching weight to those criticisms for which there are grounds ... grounds which can only by inductive' (29). Therefore an inductivist ideal community is likely to have more to offer us than a Popperian one.

Let us now turn the attention to P.'s social and political philosophy. Although P. has given us some illuminating analyses in this field, there are several shortcomings that G. Macdonald cleverly points out in his paper 'The Grounds for Anti-Historicism'. He observes that P. deployed a number of arguments to reject the pretensions of those who think they are in possession of knowledge of the political and social future. P. gave the term 'historicism' a new sense, according to which it should be intended as the belief in broad-scale laws of historical development, like the ones that may be found in speculative systems of history such as those of Hegel, Marx and Spengler. P. individuated in these systems the foundations of modern totalitarian ideologies, and claimed that the future course of history cannot be predicted.

M. then notes that 'the boldness of the historicists' hypotheses, according to P., consisted in a *disregard* for their testability. Historicists freely admitted that their predictions could not be as precise as those of physics, and seemed to glory in the freedom this gave them. They were wont to indulge in large-scale forecasts based on evidence culled primarily from history ... Such a procedure embodied the anti-critical attitude which P. felt to be the hallmark of bad science' (245). In P.'s thought, besides this methodological concern we find the so-called 'misery argument', i.e., the fact that there is a serious potential for an increase of human misery due to failed social experiments. Since no one can estimate precisely what the *real* consequences of large-scale social experiments might be, small-scale social and political change should be preferred.

M. thinks that the aforementioned fears are based on both P.'s anti-inductivism and his thesis about the uncertainty of all empirical predictions. However, he also observes that if the ignorance claim is based on a general scepticism with regard to knowledge of the future, then P.'s methodological argument fails. Small-scale social changes mean changes whose consequences are *reversible*, and this requires some knowledge of *which* changes are small-scale in this sense. That is, 'it requires knowledge of the reversibility of the consequences of those changes, and this is knowledge of the future' (247). On the other hand, a revolution need not be caused by large-scale changes. M. notes in fact that the seventeenth-century crisis in England was due to 'a series of "small scale" changes that provoked the state of crisis' (257). Therefore even a conservative government can be the victim of the unintended revolutionary consequences of his actions, and this means that the Popperian simplified model fails to deal with an extremely complex reality.

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W.V. Quine
From Stimulus to Science.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1995. Pp. 114.
US$22.95. ISBN 0-674-32635-0.

Readers of Quine will not be surprised to learn that this book contains few surprises. Quine's aim is to give, in outline, a 'rational reconstruction' of how we humans come to know what we do about the external world. To do this, he assembles various aspects of his philosophy familiar from his writings on epistemology, translation, reference and logic. Quine demarcates his position by comparing it to Carnap's in *The Logical Structure of the World.* Where Carnap was a foundationalist and likely a dualist, Quine prefers a physicalistic, holistic approach: the only objects he recognizes are material objects and mathematical objects, but he does not preclude that our epistemological account of the more 'basic' of these may depend on our account of the less so (15, 16). Still, insofar as he takes epistemology to be concerned with the problem of error (1), he presumably resembles more traditional epistemologists in taking epistemology to be a normative enterprise. For skeptics about Quinean epistemology, the sketch which ensues is of interest as much for what Quine does not deem necessary to discuss, as for what he does.

The first step of Quine's rational reconstruction is an account of the stimuli which are at the foot of the path to science. On analogy to Carnap's 'elementary experiences', Quine defines, in terms of sets of triggered neural receptors, what he calls 'global stimuli', and then 'perceptual similarity' as a certain relation between these stimuli. He thus constructs a fairly direct physical analogue of Carnap's version of the traditional empiricists' sense-data. Considering the programmatic character of this book, Quine devotes substantial space to setting out the details of this construction. Interestingly, though, he is content a few paragraphs later to make the claim, without further comment, that 'our propensity to expect perceptually similar stimulations to have sequels perceptually similar to each other ... is primitive induction' (19). This is an important, though not obvious claim: whereas ordinarily, we think of inductive inferences as being justified or not (and so *normatively* evaluable), it is not obvious that propensities to expect this or that — especially when these are construed as mere dispositions, as Quine apparently intends — are similarly evaluable. The same difficulty arises a few pages later. Building on his notion of perceptual similarity, Quine introduces in his familiar way his notion of *observation sentences* — roughly, sentences triggered by perceptually similar global stimuli — and then the logical connectives by means of these. He then says, again without elaboration, that a child who has learned the use of 'not' and 'and' has learned some logic, since to make a claim of the form '*p* and not-*p*' is to have *mislearned* the particles (23). If learning is a matter merely of having the strengths of one's neural connections in a certain way changed, as appears to be Quine's view, then it is not obvious how *mis*learning should be understood. Mislearnings are evidently a subclass of learnings, and are prima facie distinguished

by normative criteria — they are cases in which the learner has gone *wrong*. But how are we to make sense of a mere physical system's getting things wrong? Quine doesn't say.

Chapters IV, V and VI, on the advent of reification, empirical content, and the advent of logic, respectively, are, like the foregoing chapters, ingenious and engaging. Once again, though, they are addressed to the reader already sold on naturalistic epistemology, and concerned merely with certain of its details. Thus, for example, Quine is content to say that observation sentences require 'unhesitating concurrence by all qualified witnesses' (44), without addressing his doubters' inevitable qualms about whether 'qualified witness' is really a physicalistic predicate.

The final three chapters are on denotation and truth, semantic agreement, and on 'things of the mind', respectively. In the chapter on truth, Quine is content to present his disquotational position as unproblematic, and to remain silent concerning what seem to be attention-worthy criticisms. Quine suggests that there is nothing more to truth than is captured by the disquotational schema,

'*p*' is true iff *p*.

But, of course, instances of this will be true in general only if the sentence quoted is of the same language as the disquoted sentence, and it is precisely the notion of 'same language' which Quine is famous for having undermined with his argument for the indeterminacy of translation. The same concern arises when Quine says that the semantics of 'true' require that we treat pairs of scientific statements such as the Newtonian's 'Energy and mass are distinct' and the Relativity theorist's 'Energy and mass are not distinct' (the example is mine), as mutually contradictory, and not as belong to different languages. Why? (That is, what licenses Quine to say this, given his views?)

My complaint, generally, is that although he is surely aware of them, Quine is content to steer clear of certain philosophically interesting questions, and to focus instead on the relatively fine details of his project. This is borne home by what little he says about whether his epistemology can accommodate normative notions. He maintains that he does 'not see how the shift from phenomenalism [i.e., old-style empiricism] to naturalism would conflict with [normative epistemology]' (50), and goes on to compare the correction of the betting behaviour of individuals prone to the gambler's fallacy to the surgical correction of hernias. Surely, though, the comparison is inapt. In taking a gambler to be a rational agent, we hold her accountable to a certain standard of behaviour — to norms. It is this which makes her deviant bets *errors*, and our interventions *corrections*. A person with a hernia, by contrast, has not done anything wrong. Because we all value life, it is expedient to think of our surgical interventions as 'corrections', but this way of thinking when doing science is dispensible in a way that conceiving of our fellows as rational is not dispensible when doing epistemology. Quine does not address this difference.

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T.A. Robinson
Aristotle in Outline.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 1995.
Pp. 134.
US$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-315-8);
US$6.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-314-X).

Over the last decade or so the academic community has been favored with a number of survey presentations of Aristotle's ideas ranging from the long and scholarly, such as Rist's *The Mind of Aristotle*, down through the medium length, such as Lear's *Aristotle: the Desire to Understand*, and even to the truly pocket book size such as Barnes' *Aristotle*. The current work by Robinson creates somewhat a category of its own both in terms of length as well as of approach. It is longer and more detailed than Barnes, shorter and less scholarly than Lear. Its true advantage for the teacher is that it has a pedagogic value the others lack: it is just what the professor ordered (or can order) as the supplement to reading the original text in a course, especially an undergraduate one.

One of the most interesting summaries in the book occurs right in the introduction. Robinson begins by enumerating the reasons that make Aristotle a worthwhile author to study. The separate reasons he lists can be brought together in one sentence: Aristotle is a systematic thinker who constantly exhibits his methodological skill on issues of enduring importance, leaving on history influential traces of his great mind. Many of us who have taught Aristotle to students who have just finished reading Plato, know the need to justify to these students the value of the Aristotelian enterprise which lacks the dramatic luster and appeal of the dialogues. I found Robinson providing a very clear formulation of the reasons I have often put forward to students in a less systematic fashion.

The body of the text is divided into three sections: the first is entitled 'Wisdom and Science', the second 'Aristotle's Ethics', and the third 'Politics'. The reader might at first question whether this division adequately reflects the complexity of Aristotle's corpus. What about the biological works, the physical works (the *Meteorologica*, for instance), and what of the *de Anima* and finally, the *Poetica* or *Rhetorica*? However, given the size of the book, Robinson's tactic can be justified. Some things he simply does not discuss, such as the last two works noted. However, under the first section he includes not only a discussion of logic, theory of demonstration, and the four causes, but he also includes, in the discussion of wisdom, things that are 'most valuable' and here comes to discuss the soul and 'the gods'. Robinson begins by providing a clear analysis of the four causes, carefully distinguishing how they are operative in the cases of natural and artificial objects and how form functions in both. His definition of nature as 'an agent cause internal to the thing moved' and his speaking of nature as 'only part of the form of a thing' are provocative. Robinson's reflections here are certainly interesting and worthy of more development. His discussion of logic, both 'formal' and 'ap-

plied' is quite good. He provides an accessible description of validity by calling it a 'tightness of fit' between the premises and conclusion. Having done this, he proceeds to examine the categories, the form of the syllogism, and the nature of demonstrative syllogism. His outline of this last topic is especially notable since most authors bypass this topic which is seen as a bit more esoteric. Robinson does a fine job in trying to show how the notions of causality, proof, explanation, principles, and middle term come together in a demonstration; he even provides an extended example to show how a demonstration should work. He concludes his discussion of the logic by touching on the derivation of first principles and with mention of the remaining works in the *Organon* such as the *Topics* and the *Sophistical Refutations*. The section of the text dealing with the *Metaphysics* is somewhat more eclectic in its treatment of topics. His discussion of the soul in this subdivision seems justified by his treatment of the principles of potentiality and actuality — principles which easily allow for the subsumption of the definition of the soul and the constitution of man. In the treatment he raises the problem of how the soul could be immortal while being the form of the body. His proposal that the soul in its rational operation (whether in its active side or passive side) is not a form of the body does still leave the reader with questions about how consistent Aristotle's position is on this point. His final consideration about actuality at its highest levels leads him to discuss the role of the unmoved movers in Aristotle or as Robinson prefers to say 'the gods.' Robinson does leave out of consideration the seemingly singular role of the Prime Mover and thereby omits looking at Aristotle's remarks about the unity of the cosmos and the singularity of its Mover — ideas that exerted an enormous influence in Western thought. These pages may prove a bit misleading for new students of Aristotle.

Man's attempt to participate in the activity of these minds leads Robinson to turn his investigation to the nature of ethics in Aristotle in the second main section of the book. He finds a good focus for this in the notion of virtue and virtue ethics which he proceeds to illustrate in examining our intuitive evaluation of good and bad acts, our approval of actions of a hero, and our reflective decision on courses of action. Robinson uses some movie illustrations to make his point that ethics deals not so much with instruction in good behaviour as it does in the inculcation of a tendency to experience the right feelings in the right circumstances in the right degree — effectively, the inculcation of virtue. This explanation of virtue is a rubber-meets-the-road one for students and a good encapsulation of Aristotle's doctrine in modern language. It shows that Aristotle does not conceive ethical behaviour under the Kant-like guise of the repression of desires, although Robinson admits that Aristotle does give some rules that are universal for human action. Robinson concludes his consideration with the inevitable link of this virtuous life to happiness, but does not set up the life of practical virtue and that of intellectual virtue into any sort of irreconcilable antithesis as has some of the recent literature. The chapter closes with definitions and a brief list of the virtues.

In the third main subdivision of his work, Robinson discusses Aristotle's political theory. After a few remarks about the size of the Greek polis, Robinson locates Aristotle's discussion of its nature against the backdrop of the teleology of Aristotle's thought. Since the state is the association which can supply whatever might be needed for man's happiness, i.e., since the state is the only association which is sufficient for making this provision, the state can be seen as a natural association and man can be seen as a political animal. He also examines, of course, the various types of governments catalogued by Aristotle. In his examination, Robinson raises, in greater or lesser detail, such issues as would be of concern to contemporary students: the value of city over village, the role of money and political power, the welfare state vs. a libertarian state, and the role of 'second class "citizens"', e.g., slaves, in the state.

The very last section of the book contains some helpful indicators about English translations/editions of Aristotle as well as some brief critical remarks about introductory books to Aristotle's thought that would be helpful to a reader who has just read this book. In addition, there are a few brief subsections — each correlated with subdivisions of the above reviewed chapters — noting the sources he used from Aristotle to arrive at his own interpretation.

Robinson's work is clearly written and provides students, bewildered by a first confrontation with Aristotle, with a key that will open the door to many of the chief ideas of the philosopher. I would also recommend it as a refreshing read to the more advanced philosopher.

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Paul Russell
Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1995. Pp. 200.
Cdn$66.95: US$45.00. ISBN 0-19-509501-4.

Paul Russell fills a significant gap in the Hume literature by examining Hume's account of freedom and responsibility from the perspective of Hume's naturalism. Russell shows that Hume's remarks on freedom and moral responsibility make the most sense when read in the context of his naturalist account of causal beliefs and moral judgements, which is not how philosophers have usually approached them. He also makes a good case for the claim

that Hume's views on these issues, when rightly understood, remain relevant to the issue of moral responsibility.

Hume pursues two related but very different projects in his philosophical works. His empiricist project is the one that gets the most press. In his other, naturalist project, Hume shows how we come to hold our beliefs despite the fact that they do not count as justified according to Hume's empiricism. He does this by explaining how the belief is generated by the various principles of human nature discoverable by empirical investigation, such as the principles of association and the principles which describe the production of the passions. Hume applies his naturalist approach not only in examining our beliefs in things like causal powers, but also in examining our moral judgements. Russell's book is a result of the increasing awareness of the importance of Hume's naturalist project for understanding both what Hume said and what makes Hume's works interesting and important.

The book has two parts. The first is devoted primarily to examining Hume's remarks on free will and determinism. Russell argues that the common reading (the 'classical interpretation') misrepresents Hume's compatibilist position in several ways. Perhaps the most important of these is that, on the classical interpretation, 'Hume's views concerning freedom and responsibility are [seen as] largely independent of *his particular understanding* of causation and necessity' (12, emphasis Russell's). Contrary to this assumption of the classical interpretation, Russell shows that Hume's particular understanding of causation and necessity is important because Hume thinks that 'Necessity, properly understood, is the constant conjunction of objects and the inference of the mind from one object to the other' (11) and is thus not inconsistent with freedom in the way that necessity understood in other ways can be.

This part of Russell's book helps us to understand more clearly what the section 'Of liberty and necessity' is doing lurking about in the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* rather than in the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*. It is in the first *Enquiry* because Hume's naturalist account of causation is key in understanding his compatibilism. The classical interpretation, in focussing so intently on Hume's distinctions between different sorts of liberty, fails to make sense of the placement of this important discussion in the first *Enquiry*.

Supporters of the classical interpretation tend to forget that Hume's conclusions about moral responsibility are, like the facts about our response to constant conjunctions in billiard balls, just findings of Hume's naturalist, empirical science of human nature. Russell writes (67) 'For Hume, it is a contingent fact about human nature that our moral sentiments are aroused by the mental qualities or characters of people.' The classical interpretation goes wrong from the start by seeing Hume's discussion of free will as an armchair exercise in applying conceptual analysis to the concepts of freedom and responsibility (this is what Russell later calls 'the rationalistic approach' [172]).

Russell does an excellent job of offering both a critique of the classical interpretation of Hume's compatibilism and a reading that makes more sense. This reading has applications much wider than Hume's ethics, however, which gives Russell's interpretation force which could have been marshalled to greater effect had he drawn the connection between Hume's naturalistic compatibilism and his naturalist conclusions in other areas more fully.

The second section of the book concerns the more specific issue of Hume's account of when we are responsible for our actions. This involves issues of character assessment, involuntary actions, etc. Russell opens the section with a brief account of Hume's theory of the passions (including the moral sentiments). He describes sentiments not as simple feelings attached to representative ideas, but as 'cognitive-evaluative' (90) thoughts. This account is sophisticated and interesting, but too brief and could use further support from Hume's texts. Russell's main argument does not suffer from this brevity, but even those readers otherwise quite familiar with Hume may need to seek professional help with this discussion.

Each of the two parts of the book ends with an interesting discussion of the contemporary relevance of Hume's positions. This is one of the great strengths of the book, especially given that the account of freedom and responsibility that Russell describes is one that many readers will not have considered. This discussion of the contemporary interest of Hume's position, like the suggestion that Hume's ethical naturalism is of one cloth with his naturalist approach to our judgements in other realms, is much less than comprehensive. It is, however, very suggestive.

In the very last chapter, Russell argues that Hume's naturalism obviates the sorts of scepticism likely to result from the 'rationalistic' approach to the problem of free will, which is the approach that the classical interpretation attributes to Hume. The naturalist avoids scepticism because 'the naturalistic philosopher proceeds to evaluate *critically* the rationale of responsibility as already embodied in moral life' (174, emphasis Russell's). Given that we in fact hold people morally responsible in our everyday lives, the naturalist will not come to the sceptical conclusion that we are never responsible for our actions. In evaluating our moral life critically, however, the naturalist can identify inconsistencies in our everyday lives and suggest corrections. The attractions of naturalism in the ethics of responsibility are thus very much like the attractions of naturalism in epistemology, and naturalism is of growing interest in both epistemology and ethics. 'For this reason, therefore,' as Russell remarks, 'the time may be ripe for a better appreciation of the naturalistic aspects of Hume's approach to responsibility' (175).

Freedom and Moral Sentiment offers much that will be of interest both to Hume scholars and to those concerned with issues of free will and responsibility. It takes an appropriately critical approach to Hume's positions, which it shows to be of both historical and continuing importance.

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Tom Sorell, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes.
Cambridge, New York and Melbourne:
Cambridge University Press 1996.
Pp. xii + 404.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-41019-3);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-42244-2).

The *Companion* contains fourteen papers, each by a different author on some aspect of Hobbes's thought: a biography (Noel Malcolm), taxonomy of the sciences (Tom Sorell), first philosophy (Yves Charles Zarka), natural science (Douglas Jesseph), mathematics (Hardy Grant), optics (Jan Prins), psychology (Bernard Gert), ethics (Richard Tuck), politics (Alan Ryan, Johann Sommerville), law (M.M. Goldsmith), history (Luc Borot), rhetoric (Victoria Silver), and religion (Patricia Springborg). The papers are directed at the non-specialist, although some papers (Grant, Zarka, Prins, Springborg) require fairly extensive background knowledge to follow. On the whole, specialists will find little that is novel.

The papers vary in quality. Prins, Ryan, Grant, Goldsmith, and (to a lesser extent) Zarka give clear and comprehensive expositions. Gert, Borot, Silver, and Springborg are less satisfactory: they are sometimes hard to follow, with choppy organization and blurry upshot. Silver, oddly, does not discuss Quentin Skinner's landmark work on Hobbes on rhetoric. Borot spends little time on the content of *Behemoth*, preferring Hobbes's general views on the place of history to his more interesting practice as a historian. Gert repeats, without new defence, his familiar Aristotelian, anti-egoist interpretation.

Sommerville's 'Lofty science and local politics' is much better. His technique — displayed at greater length in *Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context* (London: St. Martin's, 1992) — is to explain Hobbes's positions as responses to political issues of the time rather than as deductions within a science of civil philosophy. Some positions could, of course, be both. Often the local politics, such as the Engagement controversy or Charles II's alliance with the Scots, simply sets the agenda for the lofty science. But Sommerville is sensitive to places where the science is shaky. For example, the claim that all covenants are void outside civil society requires more argument than Hobbes offers — in the reply to the Foole in *Leviathan* chapter fifteen, Hobbes himself makes a good case against this claim. The claim remains, it seems, because it is needed for Hobbes to show that property rights require a sovereign, and so cannot be held against a sovereign, contrary to what opponents of Charles I's 'ship money' tax thought. Sommerville does not spend much time trying reconstructions that would make explanations relying on local politics unnecessary. But he so convincingly shows how Hobbes responds to the details of the views of the local opponents that it sometimes becomes hard to see the reconstructions as serious history.

Tuck's essay deepens the interpretation of Hobbes he has developed in numerous works. The basic view remains: Hobbes is replying to relativists

such as Montaigne; he claims universal agreement that self-defence is justifiable; he notes an absence of agreement concerning precisely when self-defence is justifiable; agreement is reached here by adopting the sovereign's standards. The *Companion* essay does not address critics who see little evidence of a concern with relativism or who note Hobbes's explicit contempt for common opinion. Nor does it address the worry that Hobbes grants a right of private judgment to citizens that concerns not only their self-preservation, but their claim to a decent standard of living. But it does make two neat connections: (i) the appeal to agreement rather than moral facts is linked with Hobbes's non-standard view of rhetoric as manipulating given opinions rather than procuring truth; (ii) the possibility of adopting the sovereign's standards is linked with scepticism about moral facts — the scepticism leaves our moral beliefs unconstrained by the world, and so open for the needed change.

Jesseph's paper on empirical science is a model of clarity and scholarship. But in one respect it (perhaps unavoidably) fails. Jesseph insists that for Hobbes, empirical science concerns the discovery of causes. At one point he notes the great puzzle here: Hobbes also sees empirical science as a purely conventionalist enterprise, devoted to unpacking the meanings of premisses and hence capable of certainty. Hobbes's dislike of experimentation and reliance on a conventional 'right reason' to settle even arithmetic disputes also support the conventionalist reading. Jesseph resolves the puzzle by simply not taking these claims seriously: perhaps, he suggests, Hobbes meant only that our choice of words is conventional. One would prefer a better reconciliation, or at least a deeper explanation of how these opposing views of science could coexist.

Overall, the *Companion* differs from most works on Hobbes by the attention it pays to Hobbes's less famous pursuits. This is a mixed blessing. It is welcome to see explanations of Hobbes's attempts to square the circle or include Moses in the Trinity. But one comes away convinced that the less famous pursuits are deservedly less famous, and that attention is paid to them here only because they happen to be the pursuits of a deservedly famous moral and political philosopher. One also sees less of the moral and political philosophy than seems appropriate. In particular, the recent analytic reconstructions of Hobbes given by Gregory Kavka, David Gauthier, Jean Hampton, and David Boonin-Vail are largely ignored. Indeed, sympathetic reconstructions of Hobbes's arguments are uncommon here, even when their absence is not justified by a convincing historical explanation. Rather often, as in Sorell's paper, a quick review of the texts reveals that Hobbes is confused, and no further moves are made.

Minor complaints: The index does not cover the often extensive notes. Different contributors refer to three different editions of *Leviathan*. Borot refers to his own French edition of *Behemoth*. The format makes for much repetition; in particular, many contributors are keen on recounting the same details of Hobbes's life.

The *Companion* is most appropriate for advanced non-specialists whose primary interest is not morals and politics. Those most interested in these fields would do better by reading Sommerville's book, Hampton's *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1986), or Edwin Curley's 'Reflections on Hobbes: Recent Work on his Moral and Political Philosophy' (*Journal of Philosophical Research* 15 [1990] 169-250).

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Robert J. Stainton
Philosophical Perspectives on Language.
Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press 1996.
Pp. 218.
Cdn$26.95. ISBN 1-55111-086-5.

This volume is intended to serve as a textbook in the philosophy of language for upper-class students with some background in philosophy. Stainton claims that a virtue of the text is that, unlike most such texts, it is organized around a central theme, viz., that 'language is a system of symbols we know and use,' rather than a collection of rather disparate articles and views. He also acknowledges its vice: that it provides somewhat sketchy treatment of the more difficult and contentious issues.

Stainton begins with an introductory chapter, and organizes the book into three categories reflecting the central theme: A section on language as a system of symbols; a section on language as something we know; and a section on language as something we use. The first section, called 'The System Perspective', consists of four chapters on, in order, syntax (as a system), direct reference (including Russell), indirect reference (including Frege and possible world theory) and truth-theoretic semantics. The second section, called 'The Language Perspective', consists of three chapters on, in order, the idea theory of meaning, the language of thought issue, and issues of innateness and radical translation. The third section, called 'The Use Perspective', consists of three chapters on, in order, use/meaning and speech act theory, non-literal uses of language (conversational implicatures, metaphors, etc.), and issues of language and community (including the need for conventions, the private language argument, and Davidson on the limits of convention). The book then concludes with a summation and a reprise of the organizing theme.

Chapter 2 provides a (very) brief introduction to syntax, contrasting two different approaches to providing a description of a given language's syntax, namely, what Stainton calls the 'rules' approach and the 'principles and parameters approach'. The first approach consists of generating a set of rules which specify what the various syntactic components of a language are, from simplest to most complex. The second consists in attempting to provide more than a bare description of a language's syntax: the effort is to provide *explanations* for there being just these syntactical components rather than others. Stainton then concludes the chapter with a brief discussion of two different conceptions of language as a system of symbols: an extensional conception, according to which languages are sets of expressions, and an intensional one, according to which languages are sets of rules for generating sets of expressions and cites as a virtue of the latter approach that it provides explanatory power that the former does not.

The other three chapters in Section One are devoted to issues in semantic theory, among them a consideration of three different conceptions of meaning, namely, the 'thing' theory of meaning (meaning is a function of a relation between a symbol and a feature of the world), the 'idea' theory of meaning (meaning comes to symbols from the mind), and the 'use' theory of meaning (meaning is a function of the manner in which a speaker *exploits* or uses a symbol). Stainton goes on to invoke a principle of 'semantic productivity,' namely, that any satisfactory semantic theory must account for the meaningfulness of an unlimited number of expressions of a language.

He then considers various approaches to reference, considering the claims advanced variously by Frege, Russell, and others, with rather extended treatment of definite and indefinite descriptions and the introduction of the notion of a proposition. This leads Stainton into treatment of Frege's puzzle over identity and the substitutivity of equivalents, possible worlds semantics, and, finally, truth theoretic semantics. All of this leads him to Section 2, in which Stainton provides sustained and useful treatment of the leading competitors of theories of meaning, Fodor's 'Language of Thought' hypothesis, Dennett's 'intentional stance' hypothesis, and questions of the innateness of language.

Finally, Section 3 is devoted to discussion of issues surrounding the fact that language is a system that is used: Speech act theory; Quine on semantic nihilism; the private language argument; conventional rules for communities of language users; and various nonliteral uses of language.

The text does, as Stainton claims, have an organizing theme around which the various discussions center. And Stainton does treat virtually all of the central issues in the philosophy of language, some more extensively and in more detail than others. Of special value are his introductory discussion of syntactic theory, his treatment of semantic issues, namely, competing theories of meaning, competing theories of reference, the relation of truth to the various approaches, the relation of speech act theory to theories of reference and meaning, and the important role the private language argument has played in reaching clarification of all these issues. And his treatment of the

various issues does flesh out his conception of language as a system of rules we know and use.

But the goal of the textbook is sufficiently ambitious and its length sufficiently short that many issues are treated in at best a perfunctory manner. For this reason the text should almost certainly be supplemented by either an in-print good collection of primary sources or a teacher-compiled set to be placed on reserve in the university library.

The book is generally clear and the organization fits with the theme. Mild irritants include the book's being liberally sprinkled with sentence fragments and some unpredictable shifts from relatively formal to overly informal writing. And its chatty tone seems sometimes to be almost patronizing.

But the real question is this: Would the book be a good text to use in a course in the philosophy of language? The answer is an equivocal 'yes'.

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Gregory Vlastos
Studies in Greek Philosophy.
Daniel W. Graham, ed.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1995. *Volume I: The Presocratics.*
Pp. xxiv + 389.
US$49.50. ISBN 0-691-03311-0.
Volume II: Socrates, Plato, and Their Tradition. Pp. xiii + 349.
US$49.50. ISBN 0-691-03311-2.

In his Introduction to this two-volume collection of Gregory Vlastos' papers, Daniel Graham refers to him as 'Byzantium's last gift to us' (I, xxiv). While much deserved, the epithet is not quite accurate. Vlastos, the son of a Greek father and a Scottish mother, was born, long after it ceased to be Byzantium, in Ottoman Istanbul in 1907, which he left in 1925 to study at the Chicago Divinity School. His remarkable life and career took him to many places. After receiving his Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1931, he accepted a teaching position in Canada, where he later became a citizen. Although he was primarily a professor of philosophy, throughout his eventful life he wore many other hats. Among other things, he was an ordained minister, a soldier in the Royal Canadian Air Force in World War II, and an outspoken activist against the Vietnam War. By the time he died an American citizen in 1991, he had taught at various schools from Cornell to

Princeton Universities, ending up at Berkeley. If he was a gift to us, then, he was a gift of many places and currents.

Vlastos was first and foremost a philosopher, but he was also an accomplished classicist and philologist. Before interdisciplinary studies were fashionable in higher education, Vlastos was already at the forefront of scholarship that combined philosophy, history, literature and language. Though he was personally interested in contemporary social and political issues, and as an active Christian socialist, wrote extensively about the role of religion in democracy, he will be remembered best for his contributions to ancient philosophy. It is for that reason that these two volumes are a welcome addition to what already is an impressive array of collections and anthologies.

Vlastos became a household name in ancient philosophy circles in the last decade of his life. His now classic piece, 'The Socratic Elenchus' on the Socratic method of argument published in 1983, unleashed a storm of response which still refuses to die down. Reactions to this piece and others that followed continue to sustain a robust industry of Socratic scholarship. His trend-setting stature became evident especially after the publication of his *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* in 1991 and *Socratic Studies*, posthumously published in 1994 as a companion to the *Ironist*. Judging from the continuing interest in his work and the issues he raised, it is clear that Vlastos has singlehandedly set the agenda for Socratic philosophy, and created a spirited debate among scholars about Socratic epistemology, religion, and politics.

Studies in Greek Philosophy features none of Vlastos' work pertaining to that debate. Of his 120 and some works listed here, these two volumes contain about forty. The first volume contains all Vlastos' major discussion of presocratic philosophy, published from the early 40s through the 60s. The second volume features his articles on Socrates and Plato, spread from 1938 to 1989, which have not appeared elsewhere. Although representative of the breadth of Vlastos' contributions in ancient philosophy, the weight of these two volumes is uneven. While those interested in Vlastos' earlier work in the presocratics will make great use of the first volume, those who want to study Vlastos' later contribution to Socratic studies will find the second volume of limited help. In addition, much of Vlastos' previously anthologized work — not featured here — is out of print, and so this *kleine Schriften* collection, as the editor calls it, by itself will not fill that lacuna.

Entitled 'The Presocratics', the first volume contains seventeen articles, among them some of Vlastos' seminal work in early Greek philosophy such as 'Theology and Philosophy in Early Greek Thought' and 'Isonomia'. In addition to these general articles, there are papers specifically on Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, six on Zeno, and some of Vlastos' more obscure works such as the one on Diodorus. Much of the papers on the presocratics are technical and narrow. They contain Vlastos' specific and exacting criticisms of the work of the previous generation of scholars such as Burnet, Jaeger, Fränkel, Kirk, and Raven on these figures. While it is important that we keep for posterity the way in which Vlastos attempted to demolish some of the earlier assumptions made by these and other scholars, how much

appeal this will have for the new generation of scholars, for whom the research appeal of these old names is but a distant curiosity, remains an open question.

The second volume, 'Socrates, Plato, and Their Tradition', is larger in scope. It features nineteen papers, among them his popular 'Was Plato a Feminist?' and his more abstract yet equally renown 'The Third Man Argument in the *Parmenides*'. Also contained here are Vlastos' three addenda to the original Parmenides piece by way of his responses to the critiques of Sellars and Geach. Happily, we find in this volume Vlastos' very first paper in ancient philosophy published in 1939: 'Disorderly Motion in Plato's *Timaeus*', in which he vigorously criticized his own mentor F.M. Cornford for his allegorical reading of the dialogue. In his follow-up essay of twenty-five years later, 'Creation in the *Timaeus*: Is it a Fiction?', also published here, Vlastos provided further support to his thesis that Plato was attempting to give a scientific account. One of the reasons Vlastos was able to argue for that thesis was that he was a scholar ahead of his time. Before *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* became a common tool for scholars to generate quick research on the use of terminology in ancient texts, Vlastos was at work analyzing the implications of such research that he did by hand. Even in his 1939 paper, for example, by counting the number of times Plato used the word 'probability' and noting the frequency of its association with the word '*logos*', Vlastos was trying to make the case that the notion of probability in the *Timaeus* was scientific, not mythological (II, 249).

The second volume also contains some of Vlastos' characteristically deferential yet devastating critiques. One such is his review of Brickhouse and Smith's *Socrates on Trial*. In this piece, attacking their notion that Socrates appealed to his *daimonion* as a source of knowledge, Vlastos argued that the status of Socrates' inner voice is secondary to that of rational argument. It is here that we can best see how deceptively paternal his brutal assessments can be, as he writes: 'Despite errors of judgement, like those I have pointed out, they have written a good book. If their scholarship had been less exact ... their mistakes would have been harder to nail down' (II, 29). Also in this volume is Vlastos' critical review of *Plato's Moral Theory* by one of his most renown students, Terence Irwin, whose writing style, Vlastos complained, was 'flat, repetitious, and thick with technical terms of his own invention' (II, 126).

As anyone who is familiar with his writings knows, Vlastos was a consummate essayist. His essays were informed by a vast knowledge not only of history, but also of contemporary developments and arguments in political theory and psychology. He read extensively in many fields, had a keen sense of literature as well as a sharp ear for religious history and theological controversy. He wrote with great vigor and flare making copious use of metaphor. Here he is writing about what he claims is the unprecedented feminism of Plato:

> Female excellence, [Aristotle] assumes, could be no better than male mediocrity. If Plato had shared that premise, he could not have composed Book 5 of the *Republic*, even if he had written everything else in that work. He did not share it because he derived from Socrates the conviction that human excellence, intellectual and moral, is unisex. So when he designed a state where that kind of excellence would be the passport to dictatorial authority, he had to make the tenure of political power also unisex (II, 140).

As much as he wrote with elegance and wit, Vlastos chronically suffered from overstatement. In fact, one severe criticism of Vlastos's work is that his papers presented highly sanitized versions of what is otherwise quite messy in the text. Despite Vlastos' denials to the contrary, for example, there is a great deal of religious fervor to Socratic thinking. In the second volume, we get a good sense of Vlastos' resistance to such an idea. It is here that we see him insisting on Socrates' fundamental rationalism. It is also here that we see Vlastos campaigning for, despite textual evidence to the contrary, the interpretation that Socrates refutes his interlocutors solely by the power of logic, and not by the power of his personality (II, 60-4).

Although he was a champion of exacting analysis of textual evidence and a critic of large interpretive schemes, when the text failed him, Vlastos was given to writing as if he was Plato's private muse privy to things of which Plato himself was unaware. Here is an example of Vlastos speculating on why Plato fails to use the word 'equality' even when he exemplifies the notion in the *Republic*: 'Plato knows his own mind well and manages to speak it forcefully in spite of a defective vocabulary, though the message would have been clearer with the right words than it is now' (II, 85). As we see in these two volumes, appealing to his trademark of myriad of distinctions Vlastos always seemed to have at hand a conceptual scheme to explain away what is textually recalcitrant or obtuse.

While the essays here give an excellent sense of Vlastos' style and interests, there are two editorial weaknesses in this two-volume endeavor. One is that, for reasons that are not clear, the complete works of Vlastos is listed only at the end of volume II. This means that someone interested only in the first volume will be unable to have access to the bibliography printed in the second. While these volumes are mostly for research scholars, and it is unlikely that they will purchase one without the other, the omission of a bibliography from the first volume ill serves the academic community. The other weakness has to do with textual conventions. Each article is reprinted with pagination from the original publication with the original page numbers enclosed in brackets indicating the end of the page. Other conventions consist in angle brackets with or without asterisks, double brackets, and braces, each signaling an amendment in the article. Keeping all such conventions in mind while reading the text is a major feat in itself, let alone the aesthetic challenge of passages like this one: 'In the *Laws* [[the meaning of the premises must have changed, else the conclusion could not have been contradicted, as it is in]] {the soul is

still the *archê kinêseôs* (e.g., 896b3), but the same conclusion is *not* drawn, as is clear from] the frequent references of the Laws to the soul as generated (see [[above, n.55]] <my "Creation in the *Timaeus*" <**275n.34>)' (II, 263, n.74).

Another minor quibble is the aesthetic poverty of the jacket covers of what is otherwise a quite handsome production. In addition to the busy arabesque frames on the covers, the loud colors of green against purple on Volume I, and pink against blue on Volume II, belie the thoughtful and subtle mind featured inside. Aside from these small complaints, however, this is a noble attempt to collect for posterity all that Vlastos has contributed to the study of Greek philosophy. What is still sorely needed, however, is a follow-up project, a collection of responses to these historically important pieces to present a balanced picture of the controversies some of these works created and thus do justice to the extent of the influence Vlastos wielded in ancient philosophy.

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Free Expression.
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The liberal orthodoxies of free expression remain central to the ideology that goes with free trade and economic competition. They appear inadequate, however, to cope with current developments arising out of the costs of mass communication and the problems of racial strife and oppression. These inadequacies are well illustrated by the many reform strategies suggested for the development of a jurisprudence of free speech more relevant to contemporary concerns. This collection of essays contributes helpfully to these debates, specifically by casting doubt on the special philosophical status of free expression. In this review I concentrate on the implications of this approach for hate propaganda laws, a topic which is dealt with in six of the eight essays. However there are also impressive and valuable essays by Roger Shiner on 'Freedom of Commercial Expression' and Leslie Green on 'Freedom of Expression and the Choice of Language'.

A major obstacle to clarity in free expression debates is the hypnotic effect of the 'absolute' priority given to free expression as an inviolable principle.

This rhetorical stance is, of course, empty in so far as it is applied to a principle of free speech which incorporates a substantial list of circumscribing qualifications. But it still dominates much of the debate by implying that there is something 'different' about free expression, thus motivating a hopeless search for its unique distinctiveness as the basis for its privileged political position.

Joseph Raz's essay in this collection moves away from this mistake by identifying the major arguments for freedom of expression as matters of public good rather than individual right, although he does suggest giving special institutional protection to freedom of expression as a device for protecting the public goods arising from free speech against transient political pressures by placing its custody in the hands of judiciaries. The central theme of the essay is a boldly articulated and novel 'core case' for free expression which he derives from 'the fact that public portrayal and expression of forms of life validate the styles of life portrayed' (10). The development of this theme relates free expression to characteristics of contemporary life, namely 'urban anonymity' and 'cultural and ethical pluralism': which 'mean that people depend more than ever on public communication to establish common understanding of the ways of life, range of experiences, attitudes and thinking which are common and acceptable in their society' (12). In this he makes a convincing if overstated case for yet another important instrumental reason for protecting expression which has particular bearing on contemporary societies.

In contrast, David Richards is locked into the presupposition of U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence to the effect that there is a heartland of peculiar inviolability for free speech, a presupposition which he requires in order to dismiss utilitarian and political process arguments as insufficiently unyielding, so preparing the ground for his preferred interpretation of free speech as toleration which, in his view, explains why the state should permit racist speech, thereby affirming the overriding importance of toleration. This is an heroic liberal position which comes up against the unpleasant political reality that official tolerance of racist speech is routinely interpreted as licensing racialism.

Jan Narveson directly addresses the matter of the 'very special' place of free speech and expression in the pantheon of liberal principles. His thesis is that free expression is simply one manifestation of a general principle of liberty, distinguished by the fact that speech itself rarely causes harm (defined as a detriment to the liberty of another) although, like other liberties, it may be restricted when it does so. While this lacks conviction in its underplaying of the abuses to which pure libertarianism gives rise and its tendency to exclude political values other than liberty, it has a refreshing openness to the questions of the possible limitations on free expression arising from the interpersonal nature of communication. He concludes, for instance, that it is right to hold people responsible for the harmful acts of others for which their speech is the trigger.

The instrumental theme is carried through into those contributions which address the controversial pioneering but little used hate propaganda laws in Canada which criminalise the promotion of hatred against groups identified by 'colour, race, religion or ethnic origin', subject to a number of defences, such as the truth of the assertions in question. L.W. Sumner bases his analysis on his theory of rights and his examination of the jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court which has interpreted its role as balancing freedom of expression against the harm caused to social equality by hate speech. Sumner records his conversion to favouring the Canadian laws as a result of his awareness of the depth of racial feeling and the harm its expression causes.

In a long and compelling essay which draws on U.S. free speech history James Weinstein points to the problem of identifying what is distinctively offensive or harmful about hate propaganda of the sort that the Canadian Court is prepared to exclude from Charter protection. He argues that, in the absence of powerful evidence for grievous social harm it is unclear that there is anything distinctively significant about the psychic harm caused by hate speech. Only a combination of a substantive judgment about the lack of inherent value in hate speech could lead to an acceptance of it being outlawed on the basis of the limited evidence that it is distinctively harmful. A similar assessment is provided by Joseph Magnet who points to the absence of empirical evidence in the analysis of the Cohen Committee whose recommendations in 1966 initiated the Canadian legislation.

The hypothesis which could be drawn from these various contributions is the unexpected one that it is likely to be on a priori rather than instrumental grounds that hate speech legislation can best be defended. Yet, while it might be thought that an instrumentalist approach to freedom of expression would open up the way for increasing exceptions to the general prohibition on state limitations on speech, the lack of evidence for the consequential benefits of hate propaganda legislation must turn those who support it back to arguments which are directly content based and relate to the profound repudiation of respect for humanity that hate speech represents. This in turn takes us back to equally strong and incommensurable commitments to the inherent dignity of freedom of expression. This means that there is very little that courts can do by way of a rational balancing of those two fundamentals of democratic society, protecting minorities and liberating speech.

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