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**Thomas C. Anderson**
*Sartre's Two Ethics: From Authenticity to Integral Humanity.*
La Salle, IL: Open Court 1993. Pp. 229.
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In this work, Anderson argues that (1) Sartre has three 'ethics' of which, in classical psychoanalytical pattern, the third is ultimately an affirmation of the first. Anderson focuses on the first and the second (which implicitly incorporates all three by virtue of the first). (2) He treats Sartre as progressing from an abstract phenomenological philosophy to a more concrete one, and consequently from an abstract (and untenable) ethics to a concrete and 'human' one. In effect, the earlier Sartrean ethics is rejected for reasons similar to the standard critique of Kant's (and to that matter, Hegel's): it is occupied by no human being. Anderson's conclusion is that Sartre's second ethics stands as a significant advance over the first, in that it provides a place for the human being.

In effect, then, the point of this book is threefold. First, it makes an argument on an issue of concern among Sartre scholars, which is the scholarly issue of situating the later works' relation to the earlier works. After all, for the general reader, who cares whether Sartre's later ethics is an advance over the first? Second, there is a more philosophical point, which depends on the nature of the 'advance' itself, and that is whether, given Sartre's arguments, ethics itself is any longer possible. In effect, the advance is an ethics itself. And third, legitimation of the project of ethics is clearly a hoped-for consequence.

In terms of the first point, Anderson first advances concrete human reality as the primary assumption against which any system of ethics is to be judged, and then he compares what, in orthodox Sartre scholarship, are known as Sartre's two major periods signalled by two major works on 'human reality' — *L'Etre et le Néant* (1943)/*Being and Nothingness* (1956) and *Critique de la raison dialectique*, tome I (1960; vol. II, 1985)/*Critique of Dialectical Reason*, vol. I (1976; vol. II, 1991). Correlated with these works are unfinished explorations on ethics, as seen primarily in Sartre's *Notebooks for an Ethics* in the case of the former and his unpublished *Rome Lecture Notes* and his published though unfinished *L'Idiot de la famille: Gustave Flaubert de 1821 à 1857* (1971)/*The Family Idiot* (4 vols.: 1981, 1987, 1989, 1991). (Anderson's bibliography provides citations for these works, but see also Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, *Les ecrits de Sartre* [Paris: Gallimard 1993].) Anderson issues a discussion of the philosophical anthropology in each period and how they lead to the conception of ethics articulated.

Anderson's assessment of the early period is vehemently negative (with many exclamatory marks on what are supposed to be ridiculous conclusions that follow from Sartre's premises). There are too many instances to mention in a short review. The primary one, however, rests on what Anderson regards

as Sartre's conception of specific acts of freedom ('choices') versus his structural conception of freedom ('human reality'), the latter of which is 'a dubious one at best, since it does not involve the ability to freely select among genuine alternatives' (84). The specificity of the first at least signals the direction of concrete situations, and Anderson argues that in the *Notebooks*, Sartre makes concrete some of his more radically abstract claims and concedes at least some of the social conditions necessary for an ethics, but still, in that text, Sartre repeats *'Being and Nothingness*'s identification of man with consciousness and freedom and minimizes the power of circumstances by speaking of human freedom as total, absolute, and unlimited' (85).

Anderson's assessment of the second period has already been conceded. It should be noted here that Anderson's discussion of this second stage is a feature of *Sartre's Two Ethics* that makes it a text well worth reading. Quite a number of the sources drawn upon in this section aren't published. As such, it will serve as a valuable guide toward understanding the richness of Sartre's thought, which is still locked in the minds of most readers, to a great degree, in its early published formulations.

In the *Critique*, the structural context of human reality is understood through the 'social conditioning of human reality' by way of 'emphasizing how the economic, political, and social structures that humans create "make" human beings' (86). Instead of freedom and choice, however, there is now focus on project and praxis (88). The broader context in which projects are effected is one of scarcity and need. In such a context, ethics emerges, fundamentally, through questions of justifying praxis itself. For example, violence can be justified if it is ' "humanized" terror, meaning, as in the *Critique*, it [is] rooted in fraternity, not just imposed by some authority. That is, it must be founded in a group whose members have pledged themselves to remain together to achieve liberation' (123). Anderson concludes that a strength in the second ethics is that it grounds ethics 'in common human needs', which

> offers a viable alternative between discredited attempts to locate morality in absolute, eternal essences, on the one hand, and, on the other, rampant particularity and relativism, which offer humans no universal moral norms and goals at all. At a time when so many political, ethnic, racial, and gender groups (as well as some postmodern philosophers) seem to exhibit a perverse delight in emphasizing the numerous and obvious differences among human beings and the problems in understanding, communication, and cooperation that result from such diversity, I welcome the later Sartre's focus on the common humanity that unites us. ... Sartre's efforts to construct a second ethics that roots its values in the existential structures, especially the needs, common to *all* members of the human species avoids such tribalisms. (159-60)

I must admit that there are tones in this passage that provided a great deal of concern for me. It is clear that the 'advance' which was mentioned

earlier was rooted in more than a demand for concrete social claims in one's moral anthropology. Advancement is situated in the moral preference, and ethical presumption, of similarity and universality. It is, however, ironic that the very conditions that Anderson lauds are those which gnawed at Sartre's conscience enough to be of influence in his decisions to re-evaluate his various projects of constructing an ethics. It is no accident, for instance, that oppression — particularly in its race and class dimensions — was a primary concern in Sartre's writings from such works as *Being and Nothingness, Anti-Semite and Jew*, 'Retour des etats-unis: Ce que j'ai appris du problème noir' (in *Le Figaro*), 'Black Presence', and 'Black Orpheus' on the one hand, to the *Critique*, the *Rome Lecture Notes*, and his preface to Fanon's *Les damnés de la terre / The Wretched of the Earth*, among others. It is also crucial that Fanon's criticisms of Sartre in 1952 (*Black Skin, White Masks*) and his (for the French) infamous *Sociologie d'une révolution (L'an V de la Révolution algérienne) / A Dying Colonialism* raised political challenges to the very project of ethics in the West, criticisms which brought to the fore a serious challenge to the humanistic claim that has now been approvingly reformulated by Anderson. (Full citation for Fanon's works are *Peau Noire, Masques Blancs* [Paris: Editions de Seuil 1952] / *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann [New York: Grove Press 1967]; *Sociologie d'une révolution (L'an V de la Révolution algérienne)* [Paris: François Maspero 1978; originally published in 1959] / *A Dying Colonialism*, trans. Haakon Chevalier [New York: Grove Press 1965]; *Pour la Révolution Africaine: Écrits Politiques* [Paris: François Maspero 1979; originally published 1964] / *Toward the African Revolution*, trans. Haakon Chevalier [New York: Grove Press 1967]; *Les Damnés de la Terre* [Paris: François Maspero éditeur S.A.R.L. 1961; Paris: Editions Gallimard 1991] / *The Wretched of the Earth*, preface by Jean-Paul Sartre, trans. Constance Farrington [New York: Grove Press 1963].)

In Sartre's preface to *The Wretched of the Earth*, which interestingly stands as a text written during the period of the 'second' ethics, Sartre writes,

> You know well enough that we are exploiters. ... This was not without excellent results, as witness our palaces, our cathedrals, and our great industrial cities; and then when there was the threat of a slump, the colonial markets were there to soften the blow or to divert it. Crammed with riches, Europe accorded the human status *de jure* to its inhabitants. With us, to be a man is to be an accomplice of colonialism, since all of us without exception have profited by colonial exploitation. This fat, pale continent ends by falling into what Fanon rightly calls narcissism. ... And that super-European monstrosity, North America? Chatter, chatter: liberty, equality, fraternity, love, honor, patriotism, and what have you. All this did not prevent us from making anti-racial speeches about dirty niggers, dirty Jews, and dirty Arabs. High-minded people, liberal or just softhearted, protest that they were shocked by such inconsistency; but they were either mistaken or dishonest, for

with us there is nothing more consistent than a racist humanism since the European has only been able to become a man through creating slaves and monsters (pp. 25-6).

It is not only Fanon's words in *The Wretched of the Earth* that signal this response, but also his assessment in an early essay, 'Racism and Culture' (1956), in *Toward the African Revolution*, in which Fanon declared that the racist in a racist society is 'normal'. It is at the heart of the normativity of Western humanity that humanity itself is skewed. Thus whatever the human being may be underneath, it cannot be justified by the prosthetic god that constitutes the historical moment of humanity in fact — that is, European man. It isn't the 'tribes' that have wrecked humanity but the hegemonic reality of a particular tribe. As long as that tribe is hegemonic, its ethical and humanistic appeals become 'chatter'. (For more discussion, see Lewis R. Gordon, *Fanon and the Crisis of European Man: An Essay on Philosophy and the Human Sciences* [New York: Routledge 1995].) Thus, Sartre concludes:

What a confession! Formerly our continent was buoyed up by other means: the parthenon, Chartres, the Rights of Man, or the swastika. Now we know what these are worth; and the only chance of our being saved from shipwreck is the very Christian sentiment of guilt. You can see it's the end; Europe is springing leaks everywhere. What then has happened? It simply is that in the past we made history and now it is being made of us. The ration of forces has been inverted; decolonization has begun; all that our hired soldiers can do is to delay its completion. (27)

I have argued elsewhere that a fundamental failure of Western ethics is its presumption of ethics' being premised upon a philosophical anthropology of similarity and eventually universality. Just as Sartre's discussion of bad faith involves an understanding both of transcendence and facticity, an ethics that fails to articulate difference as well as similarity is a perversion of human reality; it fails to account for the human ability to develop ethical respect for an absolute Other. (See Lewis R. Gordon, *Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism* [Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1995], Part IV.) The argument advanced there is premised upon very different reasons of each of the stages of Sartre's thought. In fact, I argue that the 'divides' aren't as divided as orthodox Sartre scholarship suggests. Of particular note is the distinction between the argument I advance in *Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism* and the argument advanced in Anderson's text with regard to the Sartrean treatment of the body. For Anderson, the body is factical, and hence poses a problem in the work of the early Sartre because of Sartre's discussion of the human being as consciousness. But, I argue, Sartre also speaks of the body as consciousness in the flesh. In fact, the lived-body (a phenomenological term) is consciousness. The consequence is that ethical life must deal simultaneously with the 'anonymity' of similarity and the specificity of embodied consciousness — consciousness in the flesh. (See *BFAR*, chap. 7, and *FCEM*, chap. 3.) Now, although there is an agreement here with Anderson on the

need for specificity in ethics, there is clear disagreement both on (1) the status of specificity in the early Sartre and (2) the nature of the 'advance' in ethics to which that specificity contributes. All of this leads to the question of ethics itself today and our conclusion of this review.

Given Sartre's discussion in *The Wretched of the Earth*, and, by the way, key sections of the *Rome Lecture Notes*, and even such essays as 'Black Presence', it is safe to conclude that Sartre's early meta-ethical reflections persisted throughout his thought. The meta-ethical problem is whether the project of ethics can any longer justify itself in a world in which it relies on anthropological features that are *philosophical* instead of politically or socially actual. Ethics, in such a context, carries a peculiarly conservative consequence. It becomes, in the most concrete form, the question of what a person or persons in power can, *qua* the powerful, *say* without reservation to people who are not powerful. Both Sartre's biography and the 'unfinished' dimensions of these works provide Sartre's answer, which is, ultimately, like Fanon's, a tragic one. (See *FCEM*, chap. 4.)

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The principal argument of this book is unremarkable. However, when Baudouin moves to demonstrate Popper's innovative and creative contribution to modern political philosophy, B's work becomes lively, absorbing and interesting. Certainly B's thorough and complete study of Karl Popper's political philosophy deserves the attention of philosophers and political scientists alike.

B. starts with the truism that most commentators view Karl Popper's political philosophy as a minor extension of his epistemology and philosophy of science. Consequently Popper's contribution to political philosophy has been under explored and under appreciated. B., however, proposes a counterthesis that Popper's political philosophy has its own depth and richness that deserves a close critical reading independent of his philosophy of science. This does not mean that B. ignores the relationship of Popper's epistemology to his political philosophy, only that B. successfully demonstrates that

Popper's political philosophy is certainly more than a simple extension of his work in other areas. In the process, B. corrects several myths and misapprehensions about Popper, as, for example, the common belief that Popper was a logical positivist (148-9, 165). B's close attention to such details is only one aspect that makes this an exceptional one.

The book is divided into two sections organized around the theme of 'the political problem' which B. defines as justifying coercive political and social institutions. Those familiar with Popper's basic position on the liberty of the individual know that Popper's argument for an 'open society' places him in a particularly difficult position with regard to the problem of justification. B. tries to show the care with which Popper considered the relationship of institutions and individuals and the significance of public discourse as providing the formal rules of formal political action that secures the maximum liberty for the individual within political-collective institutions. While B. does not address Popper's solution to the 'political problem' until the last chapter, he leaves no doubt that Popper does in fact address the problem intentionally, consistently, and conscientiously.

In the first part of the book, B. develops the intellectual foundations of Popper's critical rationalism. This section alone makes the book well worth reading. It is a superb introduction to the basic elements of the Popperian system, easily accessible to the non-specialist but providing substantial depth for the specialist. B.'s presentation shows Popper's deep debt to the political philosophies of Kant and J.S. Mill, but he is careful to underscore the manner in which Popper redevelops his sources to produce an original contribution to political philosophy.

In the second part, B. develops the practical implications of Popper's critical rationalism in dialogue with critical theory and liberalism. This section is weaker than the first largely because B. paints with too broad a brush to substantiate his thesis that Popper's position anticipates more recent developments in political philosophy, notably critical theory as found in Habermas.

In the conclusion, B. takes a critical stance towards Popper's political philosophy. His criticism is well-grounded by his thorough presentation of Popper's position that has preceded it. B. finds three critical weaknesses: the priority given deliberation over decision, Popper's passing consideration of the relationship of economics and social structures, and the problems of any political philosophy grounded by a commitment to radical individualism. B. shows, however, how respect for a Popperian position can at least address such criticisms.

B. characterizes Popper's political philosophy as modest which is in keeping with Popper's opinion of himself as a 'simple citizen' reflecting critically on public and social life. Certainly B. does not claim more for Popper than Popper claims for himself as a philosopher. B.'s modest presentation of modest work is refreshing.

B. models how a work of intellectual history ought to be written. He is careful to lay out the various influences that contributed to Popper's political

reflection. But he also shows that the manner in which Popper appropriated his sources, including Kant, Mill, Darwin, and Tarski, was critical and not imitative. B. also carefully locates Popper within modern discourse on political theory and social philosophy. Likewise B. is critical of his own sources and submits his judgments about Popper's work to careful critical scrutiny.

The most arresting, but least satisfying, argument of the book is B.'s contention that Popper anticipates current development in the 'dialogical turn' in ethics and social philosophy. The manner in which B. opens this argument (83-4) and subsequently develops it (151-86) leads one to expect a more substantive comparison with not only critical theorists like Apel and Habermas, but other contributors to this discussion like Rawls, MacIntyre, or Ricoeur, but B. does not follow through on his promise. His treatment of this important debate about the moral justification of social institutions is superficial and cursory. B. frequently alludes to the work of Habermas but his presentation of communicational action is passing and lacks the depth that he brings to Popper's own position. He also misses an important connection between Popper and Habermas through M. Weber's value decisionalism, which given the Kantian heritage for both philosophers is a vein worth mining. Given B.'s skills as a writer and interpreter, this weak comparative effort was a disappointment. The book also contains numerous irritating errors. For example, Thomas Kuhn is mis-cited on p. 154 as H. Kuhn. B. also has a tendency to shift terminology from place to place with no obvious reason for the changes.

However, given the substantial and creative work that B. has produced, such criticism appears mean spirited. The book is easily accessible to advanced undergraduates and yet contains thoughtful reflection for the specialist. Such books are rare and worth reading if only for their being the 'best' exemplar of a philosophical genre. B. offers scholars and students a rare gift and important work on a major contemporary figure in philosophy.

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**Kenneth Blackwell** and **Harry Ruja**
*A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell.*
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1994. Three Volumes.
Pp. lvi+611, xiv+575, xi+305.
US $455.00. ISBN 0-415-10487-4 (I);
0-415-10913-2 (II); 0-415-11086-6 (III);
0-415-11644-9 (set).

Bertrand Russell was surely the best-known and most prolific English-speaking philosopher of the twentieth century. Precisely how well-known and how prolific he actually was would probably surpass the imaginations even of most of his admirers, at least until they had found themselves admiring Blackwell and Ruja's truly monumental *A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell*. Even allowing for the conveniences involved in working with an English-language author of excellent memory who was still living when the project began, in the early sixties, Blackwell, Ruja and their collaborators had an extraordinarily formidable task, the more so since Russell himself could not or would not keep up, bibliographically, with the furious pace of his own pen.

As Blackwell and Ruja explain: 'We began our work when less than 600 different writings were known. This bibliography sets out the record of 181 books, pamphlets and leaflets in Parts A and AA, 228 in Part B, 62 in Part G, 339 in Part H, and c. 3,550 serial publications in Volume II; follows each text through its various editions, impressions, reprints and translations; cites related prepublication documents; and indexes the whole' (xix). Although in 'writing the bibliography of a still active author,' they 'witnessed the publication of many dozens of the items described here,' they were, in the decades following Russell's death in 1970, 'astonished at how much else he had published under our noses' (li). Russell read and Russell wrote, but the recording was left to others — and such were the habits of a very long life. Russell, it should be remembered, was literally the godson of John Stuart Mill.

For the interested scholar and/or bibliophile, *A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell* is the realization of a dream. Comprehensive, yet exact, authoritative, yet beautiful, the only plausible complaints one can make about this work are the obvious ones concerning its exorbitant price and its excessively modest title, for there can be no question that, when it comes to articles, this both is the genuine and merits the definite.

That the finished product is a massive success should come as little surprise, given that there could not have been a better choice of bibliographers. Blackwell has long been associated with the Bertrand Russell Editorial Project, which has for over a decade now been producing one handsome volume after another of Russell's collected papers. And of course, he has skillfully directed the Bertrand Russell Archives, at McMaster University, from the very beginning, in 1968. Ruja, for his part, has had an equally longstanding interest in Russell studies; his first bibliography, 'Bertrand Russell: A Classified Bibliography 1929-1967' was published in the *Bulletin of Bibliography* in 1968. They

have been ably assisted in this particular effort by Bernd Frohmann, John G. Slater, and Sheila Turcon, all of whom — but especially Slater — are well known for their work on the Editorial Project. In fact, Slater, as most members of the Bertrand Russell Society are well aware, is something of a Russell archive in himself, having accumulated what is, by all accounts, the biggest private collection of Russell material in existence. His recent introduction to Russell, *Bertrand Russell* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press 1994), reveals a familiarity with the entire range of Russell's intellectual interests that is as impressive as it is unique, and his introductions to various of the Routledge reprints of Russell's works are unfailingly informative.

The three volumes themselves are happily organized, though with a number of twists in the alphabetical ordering. The main introductory and explanatory remarks are at the beginning of the first and largest volume, which also contains a listing of the 'Principal Public Sources for a Bibliography of Bertrand Russell', and a previously unpublished, witty little paper by Russell on 'The Use of Books'. The body of the text includes Part A, 'Books, Pamphlets and Leaflets', Part AA, 'Collected Works', Part B, 'Contributions to Books, Pamphlets and Leaflets', Part G, 'Original Blurbs on Books, Pamphlets and Leaflets', Part H, 'Original Quotations in Books, Pamphlets and Leaflets', and Part L, 'Minor Anthologies, Chiefly in Foreign Languages'. The second volume holds Part C, 'Articles, Reviews, Statements, Letters to the Editor and Approved Interviews', Part D, 'Reports of Speeches', Part E, 'Interviews', Part F, 'Multiple-Signatory Publications', Part Gg, 'Original Blurbs', Part Hh, 'Contributions in Serial Articles by Others', Part J, 'Extracts in Booksellers' and Auctioneers' Catalogues', Part K, 'Audio Recordings', Part M, 'Films', and Part S, 'Spurious Publications'. The third volume is entirely given over, after a brief introduction, to the indexes.

With such exceptional scope in its coverage, this is an unusually enjoyable bibliography to browse through, especially in those sections, such as H and Hh, where the descriptions of the entries often contain a remark or two by Russell. Thus, the listing for *William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury: His Life and Letters*, in the 'Original Quotations in Books' section, notes that 'Temple recalled saying to Russell: "I believe in it [immortality] far more than the evidence warrants." Russell replied: "And I *dis*believe far more" ' (i, 486). A deliciously obscure entry in 'Contributions in Serial Articles by Others' reads '[ANIMALS]. *California Daily Bruin*, 26 Feb. 1940, p. 3. Remark presented under subtitle "Faculty Sparklers" by Ralph Scheinholtz, presumably from a class lecture at UCLA: "Animals observed by Germans behave differently than when observed by us. To Germans they sit still and think" ' (ii, 491-2).

The actual presentation of the entries combines the skills of the scholar with those of the antiquarian book collector. Unlike a good many bibliographies produced for academic use, this one provides all of the information required by a collector for identifying and authenticating the works in question. Thus, in addition to all of the basic reference information, there are detailed accounts of the actual physical appearance of the works in question, the type, paper and binding, various jackets or covers, and so forth. Moreover, this bibliography

has the great and unusual advantage of indicating, where appropriate, the physical location of the items cited.

But this is not only a work for the collector of Russelliana; it is also an essential reference work for anyone with a scholarly interest in Russell's intellectual life. It is probably correct that those primarily interested in Russell's logical and more purely analytical work in philosophy will have the least to gain from this resource, since the most important of these writings, the basis for his (academic) philosophical reputation, have long been known and appreciated, and in this region there was less superfluity of occasional or popular production. Still, not only is it enormously helpful to have an authoritative listing of them, but it is also very difficult to believe that even the most dedicated of Russell's analytical philosophical admirers could not find material of interest in this resource, such is the extraordinary wealth of its listings. One finds, for example, a remarkable number of reviews, some unsigned and some in foreign languages, of works by key figures in Russell's philosophical development. Thus, in opening volume two to the year 1912, when the second volume of *Principia Mathematica* appeared, one meets such noteworthy items as unsigned reviews, for *The Nation*, of James Ward's *The Realm of Ends*, Macran's translation of Hegel, *Hegel's Doctrine of Formal Logic*, and Bosanquet's *The Principle of Individuality and Value*. And these entries are given with a feast of philosophical tidbits: thus, on Ward, 'Russell's letters to Lady Ottoline [Morrell] in mid-December 1911 reveal him reading "poor old Ward — he is dull and antiquated" ' (ii, 22), and on Bosanquet, 'he remarked to Lady Ottoline that "I think it is the worst book of philosophy I ever read" ' (ii, 23). Although these pieces are included in volume six of the *Collected Papers*, that only appeared in 1992, and it is safe to say that even the better recent works on Russell's philosophical development, such as Peter Hylton's *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy* or Nicholas Griffin's *Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship*, fail to do justice to the full array of Russell's relevant philosophical commentary. Still, this, it may seem, is really only to praise with faint damnation.

For those interested in the wider reaches of Russell's intellect, say, his social and political criticisms, this bibliography is indispensable. Oddly enough, given the vast body of his writings on such subjects, there is a pervasive tendency to dismiss Russell as nothing more than the caricature of positivism advanced by its critics. Perhaps this is partly due to his enthusiasm for Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* and his enduring hostility to Marxism, bolshevism, and, after his early idealist phase, Hegelianism. But those who would dismiss Russell's radicalism lightly have largely failed to appreciate just how much he drew from the radical tradition and how remarkably insightful he was in anticipating many of the themes of critical theory. For him, *The Monthly Review* was a more reliable guide to American society than any of the dailies, but he went much further than the traditional Marxists in bringing out the insidious, repressive aspects of ideological control associated with technocracy. Thus, for example, his blurb for Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, which 'depicts, with very great power, the horrors of a well-established totalitarian regime of whatever type. It is important that the western world

should be aware of these dangers, and not only in the somewhat narrow form of fear of Russia' (i, 444).

Indeed, a full exposure to Russell's (seemingly endless) radical writings can scarcely help but lead one to think that, as both Alan Ryan and Louis Greenspan have cogently urged, Russell the godson of Mill only came into his own politically in the activism of the 1960s. The radical students may have turned on Adorno, but can anyone imagine an English-speaking equivalent chanting 'Russell as an institution is dead'? Russell had always done far too much to undo institutions, even the ones he created. And he was such an irrepressible agitator, never missing a chance to show his support for those who refused to follow a multitude to do evil. It was characteristic of him to write supportive letters to John Lennon and Muhammad Ali, for their opposition to the war in Vietnam — and to dryly observe, in a letter in support of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, that he was 'very deeply impressed by the Free Speech Movement' which he thought 'a development of great importance for the United States' (i, 540).

Surely one of the chief merits of the Blackwell and Ruja bibliography is that it will help correct many of the misconceptions of Russell's thought and life. It should also further enhance his reputation as a social critic — in Noam Chomsky's view, the most truly honorable intellectual of the twentieth century. For all his waywardness, Russell turned out to be consistently Green when nearly everyone else from earlier waves of socialist leftism was unmasked as Grue.

Russell's reputation deserves to be so enhanced, but perhaps not as unequivocally as Chomsky would have it. Russell had his failings, to be sure. Being insufficiently attuned to feminism was one, being slow to grasp the threat of Hitler was another. One of the more intriguing entries, under 'Original Quotations in Books', lists a book by William Clark entitled *From Three Worlds*, with the following description: 'Quoted remarks from an after-dinner argument about Hitler between Russell and Aldous Huxley, Gerald Heard, Groucho Marx and Harpo Marx, 28 July 1939' (i, 579). On the basis of Russell's other writings at this time, especially his least satisfactory book, *Which Way to Peace?*, it seems eminently likely that when it came to Hitler, the Marxian view was the more prescient.

Still, he thought and wrote so marvelously, and was so courageous and so right about so much, that even today, twenty-five years after his death, his words seem more freshly subversive than most of what now passes for radical critique. He believed that the world had grown much worse during his lifetime, and he made a compelling case, for which he was often rewarded with obloquy. But the writer for the *South Wales Echo* got it right when he reported a speech by Russell on nuclear disarmament under the title: 'No Cranks Here — Just Very Worried People' (ii, 366). *A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell* stands as a magnificent testimonial to just how much one worried, if effervescently brilliant, person can do, even in a world gone mad.

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**Robert B. Brandom**
*Making It Explicit.*
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1994.
Pp. xv + 741.
US $49.95. ISBN 0-674-54319-X.

The philosophy of language of the present century can be seen as dominated by two contrary tendencies. The first of them is to take language to be a kind of *nomenclature*, to take the word-meaning relation to be a basic and irreducible fact (either of the causal kind, or of a specific kind peculiar to 'intentional' mediae of representation). The second is the tendency to view language rather as a *toolbox*, and to take the 'intentional', representational capacities of words to be parasitic upon their involvement with human activities. According to this second view, 'to have meaning' is to play a certain role within the structure of human conduct and within the social institutions which regulate it.

This second strategy, which has been made central especially by the late Wittgenstein, seems promising: it undertakes to show how we could see the otherwise mysterious 'intentional' phenomena, which are characteristic of language, as arising out of (and hence then 'supervening' on) straightforward facts about human behaviour. The problem is that although Wittgenstein and other philosophers working in the similar vein (e.g., Dummett or Davidson) showed the attractiveness of such an approach, they have not offered more than a couple of hints as to how to develop it into a genuine theory. No one has yet really shown how to carry the alleged reduction in a really systematic way. And it is precisely this challenge which is taken up by Brandom — the task he sets himself is precisely to show how we can reduce particular intentional phenomena to phenomena of human conduct and how to translate talk about truth and reference into the language of natural science and sociology. Brandom's project is really magnificent — more than seven hundred pages of his book are devoted to careful analyses of the character of language and to the meticulous effort of showing how to explain the meanings of expressions in terms of their use. In the first chapter of the book, Brandom surveys the motivations of his work, and he specifies the kind of vocabulary which he is going to employ in describing the use of expressions (an important point, for should he, for example, allow for vocabulary permitting some — even covert — kind of talk about meaning, then his project of reducing meaning to use would turn out to be trivial). The vocabulary which he employs is the *normative* one: it is the vocabulary which allows us to speak about the socially *correct* ways of how to use expressions, about the *appropriate* consequences of linguistic performances and about the *commitments* and *entitlements* which the performances bring with themselves.

Brandom's basic method is that of analyzing the pragmatic significance of performances, which he understands to consist in their potential to change the commitments and entitlements of their protagonists. In Chapter 2 he argues that to analyze the discursive practice which produces 'propositional

content', we must focus our attention on a specific kind of social practices, namely on drawing *inferences*. 'Propositions,' as he puts it (xiv), 'are what can serve as premises and conclusions of inferences, that is, can serve as and stand in need of *reasons*.' And to have propositional content is to be *explicit*; hence bringing something to the form which licenses its taking part within the enterprise of inferencing — the very core of our discursive practices — consists in *making it explicit*. In Chapter 3 Brandom then extends this account to an account of *intentionality* in general; in Chapter 4 he carries out a further generalization, allowing him to extend his account to *perception and action*.

The second part of the book concentrates on the task of the translation from the 'representational' idiom into the 'inferential' idiom. In Chapter 5 he deals with the most basic pieces of the traditional representational vocabulary, namely with the words 'true' and 'to refer'. In Chapter 6 he introduces the notion of *substitution* and that of *substitutional inference*; this allows him to assign inferential roles to subsentential expressions such as singular terms and predicates by way of singling out the contribution which such an expression brings to the inferential potential of the sentences in which it occurs. In Chapter 7 he gives an account of *anaphora*, and he shows how we can account for the role of demonstratives — in terms of what he calls the 'anaphoric inheritance of substitutional commitment'.

In Chapter 8 he turns to the general concept of *aboutness* or *intentionality* — his conclusion is that we can interpret intentional locutions in terms of what he calls 'deontic scorekeeping', i.e. in terms of keeping track of attributing and acknowledging deontic statuses of commitment and entitlement. 'In summary,' as he puts it (xvii), 'in the theoretical place usually occupied by the notion of *intentional states*, the pragmatics presented here elaborates a conception of *normative statuses*; in the place usually occupied by the notion of *intentional interpretation*, it puts *deontic scorekeeping*.' Chapter 9, the concluding chapter of the book, summarizes the results reached; Brandom closes his book by expressing the opinion that his account of human discursive practises discloses the very nature of human beings — *homo sapiens* — as essentially *expressive* beings (650): 'We not only make *it* explicit, we make *ourselves* explicit *as* making it explicit.'

To be able to really understand and appreciate Brandom's magnificent project, it is important to realize what it is not: it is not a kind of a revelation of some 'true nature of language'; it is rather an elaboration of a certain, philosophically extremely interesting, view of language, which does not exclude alternative views. Brandom succeeds in showing that we can eliminate intentionality in favour of social norms; thus he gives a decisive answer to the traditional riddle of the possibility of systematic behaviourism: if we understand the term *behaviour* in a sense wide enough (to include not only facts of behaviour, but rather also norms of behaviour), then behaviourism with respect to meaning indeed is not only possible, but also illuminating. Brandom's book, which hardly has an analogue within the analytico-philo-

sophical literature, is not easy to read (both for its width and for its depth), but it is surely worth the effort.

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**Jules L. Coleman** and **Allen Buchanan, eds.**
*In Harm's Way: Essays in Honor of Joel Feinberg.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. x + 359. US $64.95. ISBN 0-521-45410-7.

*In Harm's Way* is an excellent book. I will get to it anon, though more than usually it defies summary in a short review. First, some generalities. The *Festschrift* as a genre has in recent times fallen somewhat on hard times. The currency has become devalued by over-use (the production of such a volume as early as the honoree's fiftieth birthday, for example), and the volumes have developed a reputation as a place where less than interesting work is sent. But if one reflects on the past twenty-five years or so, such scepticism was never justified for *Festschrifts* for the gods. *Words and Objections* (W.V. Quine, 1969); *Exegesis and Argument* (Gregory Vlastos, 1973); *Law, Morality and Society* (H.L.A. Hart, 1977); *Language and Logos* (Gwilym Owen, 1982); *Truth and Interpretation* (Donald Davidson, 1986) — all of these are still among the fundamental literature in their fields, increasing their citation index as every cycle of journal and book publication goes by. I confidently predict that *In Harm's Way* will come in this latter category. The status of its honoree, Joel Feinberg, in contemporary legal and social theory is Olympian, and the book's quality is appropriate.

As is well recognized, the major figures in current theorizing about the foundations of liberal thought are distinct among themselves, and each has distinctive historical roots. John Rawls and David Gauthier in different ways revive the Hobbesian contractarian tradition. Robert Nozick owes much to Lockean ideas of political union. Joseph Raz presents the foundation for a more social-democratic form of liberalism in the spirit of Rousseau rather than Hobbes or Locke. As soon, however, as one descends a small degree of abstraction from the issue of the foundations of liberal civil society as such, one is faced with the specific and tangible issue of the relation between the citizen and the dominant institution of civil society, the legal system. The historical figure who transfigured discussion of this issue is John Stuart Mill.

Which of us teaching a course such as (to quote the University of Alberta catalogue) 'Philosophy of Law — Social Issues' has not presented early on the famous passage from *On Liberty*, chapter 1, where Mill enunciates 'one very simple principle,' the so-called Harm Principle? 'The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.'

Western democratic liberal culture — the culture of nearly all readers of this journal — is based on, in Feinberg's own famous phrase, 'a presumption in favour of liberty,' and Mill provides the primal articulation of that presumption.

Joel Feinberg's own huge contribution to contemporary legal and social thought is, one might say, to do for Millian liberalism what Rawls has done for contractarian liberalism — that is: to make the viewpoint come alive and into the political theory and practice of a whole new generation of scholars and students; to subject the theory to detailed and exhaustive examination, acknowledging its weaknesses and supplementing it with original work to reassert its strengths; to take the theory where its history could never have taken it. The bibliography of Feinberg's writings in *In Harm's Way* contains 101 items up to 1992. Many of them are staples of the classroom — *Reason and Responsibility* (8th edition, 1992); *Moral Concepts* (1970); *Social Philosophy* (1973, translated into Portuguese, Japanese and Chinese); *The Problem of Abortion* (1983); (with Hymn Gross) *Philosophy of Law* (5th edition, 1994). There are the important collections of his own papers, *Doing and Deserving* (and edition, 1974) and *Freedom and Fulfilment* (1992).

Pride of place, however, must go to the massive four-volume *The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law* (1984-88). As Feinberg relates in the preface to the first volume, with characteristic wry self-deprecation, the project began as the task of writing a short paper on the philosophical aspect of the problem of victimless crimes for an interdisciplinary volume, a paper Feinberg promised to provide within a month or so. The first sentence of Volume I states the controlling question, 'What sorts of conduct may the state rightly make criminal?' Mill makes his first appearance in the next sentence, although Feinberg points out that the restriction of the project to the criminal law is his, not Mill's. By p.12 we are told that Mill's Harm Principle must be examined in relation to 'the difficult and controversial areas case by case, [to] try to determine to what extent, if any, it must be modified or supplemented to achieve moral adequacy,' and thus the train rolls out of the terminal. The four separate volumes focus on four separate themes in what turns out to be, *pace* its originator, not at all a 'very simple principle' — *Harm to Others, Offense to Others, Harm to Self,* and *Harmless Wrongdoing.* The project ends 1397 pages later with a piece of self-styled 'dogmatism' about the value of human diversity. It is hard to imagine any relevant stone left unturned, or

any relevant thought or argument without its place in the whole. A *magnum opus* in all possible senses.

Having thus explained the title of the book under review, I shall now turn to it. The fifteen contributors are among the leading figures in contemporary legal and social theory, and that brings out another way in which Feinberg has dominated his field. Almost a half of them (to my knowledge) are former students of Feinberg's from the University of Arizona and earlier at the Rockefeller University. There have in fact been a steady stream of first-class philosophers, attracted to and flourishing under Feinberg's intellect, emerging from Tucson and New York to carry on a tradition of intellectual curiosity and rigour. We tend to judge a person's influence on a field by their publications, for those reach a wider audience. But the effect on the field of their students is deeper and longer-lasting, and by that criterion too the field would have been greatly impoverished without Feinberg's work.

I have of course no room to discuss individual papers; but then I never did, in any meaningful way. But for the record — Allen Buchanan contributes a continuation of his work on group rights, defending their value for the protection of indigenous peoples and other minorities. Shelly Kagan argues that libertarianism cannot be defended as the best way to respect the value of liberty in social arrangements. Richard Arneson argues that a theory which identifies human welfare with rational preference satisfaction is not refuted by its failure to register the value of autonomy. David Lyons continues his familiar focus on the moral justification for legal decision-making by examining the latter in the context of Critical Legal Studies and the supposed indeterminacy of legal discourse. David Richards repudiates the idea that remedying injustices to women and minorities requires such limitations on freedom of speech as group libel laws. Thomas Morawetz discusses the relation between anti-foundationalism and liberalism. Jules Coleman argues that many aspects of tort law which are intuitively attractive morally cannot be explained by principles of corrective justice, and thus that morality may learn from law. Jean Hampton in an important piece of 'respect through disagreement' argues that Feinberg's reconstruction of the principles behind our current practices of criminalization does not face some of the hard questions about whether such practices are defensible. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza discuss some of the conceptual tangles which envelop the idea of being responsible for the consequences of one's actions. Jeffrie Murphy brings his well-known retributivist perspective to ruminations about women and criminal violence, especially rape and self-defence. Joan McGregor argues for the dropping of the requirement of force in the conceptualization of rape, leaving only a definition in terms of unconsented-to sexual intercourse. Robert Schopp reviews the notion of self-defence and traces its origins in fundamental principles of liberal political morality. Sanford Kadish discusses a number of aspects of the morality of letting patients die, including the doing/allowing distinction, prior vs. contemporary choice, and subjective vs. objective

determinations of the patient's best interests. Holly Smith considers the situation of pregnant women who behave in ways which negatively affect the fetus, and argues that the key notion is not so much causing harm but failing to exercise an appropriate level of care. Hyman Gross urges that eulogies for punishment are as great a moral mistake as praise for the virtues of war.

It should be clear both that Feinbergian themes pervade this collection, and that the issues discussed are at the cutting edge of legal and social theory. Even if you buy only one hardbound book a year, think about making it this one. And even if you normally never buy hardbound books, think about buying *In Harm's Way*. You won't regret it.

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**Jean-François Courtine, et. al.**
*Of The Sublime: Presence in Question.* Trans. Jeffrey S. Librett.
Albany: State University of New York Press 1993. Pp. xiii + 255.
US $59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1379-9);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1380-2).

These wonderfully translated essays offer a variety of analyses of the sublime as well as a glimpse of a number of French philosophers who are not well known in North America. Covering a lot of ground — the Greeks, Boileau, Kant, German Idealism, and Heidegger — these eight papers cannot be done justice here. I shall focus on the five central papers which treat the Kantian sublime (four of them with a distinctly Heideggerian bent).

What unites these five essays is their insistence that the *Critique of Judgment* does not bridge the gap between the sensible and supersensible as Kant suggests in both introductions but ruptures the very structure of the critical system. On this view, reflective judgment's *aesthetic* way of presentation (*Vorstellen*) is no mere supplement to determinative judgment under the categories of the understanding, but precedes or even supplants determinative judgment.

Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's 'Sublime Truth' is the most interesting and the most far-ranging. Following Heidegger, he argues that the *Critique of Judgment* does not provide an aesthetic theory: 'what is at stake in the sublime ... [is] the presentation of the meta-physical as such' (72). Aesthetics, for Heidegger, means *metaphysical* reflection on art and the beautiful. Greek aesthetics,

had there been such a thing, would have reflected on beauty as the 'splendor of the true' (see Heidegger's 'Origin of the Work of Art'). Modern aesthetics treats beauty as something which has *nothing to do with truth*. If Kant is not seen as engaged in aesthetics, this is because the third *Critique* presents, *pace* Kant, an understanding of beauty (and/or sublimity) which concerns truth. Lacoue-Labarthe suggests that the disinterestedness of the judgment of taste is 'the letting-be and letting-come-forth of the object' (78). No one can fail to recognize here the Greco-Heideggerian notion of *truth (alētheia)*. Kant's 'relinquishment of aesthetics' (83) is clearest in the sublime. For it is there that we find 'the beautiful seeking to complete itself. ... the essence of the sublime is nothing other than the beautiful' (86). Furthermore, the sublime speaks the truth about truth: that truth is an always incomplete *revelation*. Finally, the third *Critique's* treatment of the sublime is not about *mere* aesthetic presentation; it concerns the presentation *in sensibility* of the unpresentable. This is why the plastic arts cannot adequately present the sublime and why even the elemental forces of nature can do so only by subreption.

Éliane Escoubas expresses this sense of the sublime in different terms. Insisting on the importance of the imagination — which leads us to ask why Heidegger's *Kantbuch* mentions the third *Critique* but once in passing — she describes it as '... the faculty of the production of the *unimaginable*' (66), that is, the sublime. The sublime, for Escoubas, entails taking things as they *appear* without submitting them to concepts. 'It is the feeling one has in the face of "raw nature" (*rohe Natur*) and when one gazes at the starry sky, the ocean, or even the human form, simply "as one sees them," according to the *Augenschein ...*' (69). The sublime, as the beginning of the appearing of what appears gives us a 'distant and intermediate glimpse of the ontological difference' (70).

The Kantian imagination is capable of two syntheses: one, following the schematism of the understanding, gives rise to cognition; the other, in which the faculties play freely, yields aesthetic pleasure. Jacob Rogozinski shows how the sublime disrupts *both* of these syntheses and thus, contrary to Kant's claim that the sublime makes us aware of how we transcend the world, the sublime, for Rogozinski, marks the way in which the *world* transcends *us*. The sublime, in its chaos (discovered in our failure to comprehend it) 'is precisely what *happens*, the pure occurrence of the event' (137). Thus the schematic synthesis of the first *Critique is not* the imagination's primary synthesis. The 'initial bond of the world' (140) lies somewhere else. If the reproductive synthesis of the imagination — which happens within time as *produced* — were originary, then the happening of the sublime — in which the imagination fails for lack of time — would be impossible. The sublime is the failure of the imagination's attempt to comprehend the infinite and thus offers 'the sign that the ultimate link of the world is not the work of imagination' (154). The world exists as a *gift* which can never be fully grasped.

Jean-Luc Nancy and Jean-François Lyotard both address rifts that the sublime creates in the fabric of Kant's text by taking up the issue of freedom. Beauty, according to Kant, is the symbol of (free) morality. Through this symbolization, aesthetic presentation is to bridge the gap between nature

and freedom. For Nancy, however, the sublime disrupts this process: 'At the limit of the sublime, there is neither aesthetics nor ethics' (49). What there is instead is the presentation of presentation without presenting *anything*. The sublime 'presents the nonpresentable' or *'the* nothing' (47). (That is, as Escoubas suggests, Heideggerian ontological difference or, as in Lacoue-Labarthe, the presentation of the unpresentable.)

For Lyotard, the sublime marks the moment when the Kantian system comes apart at the seams. Presenting arguments found at greater length in his *Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime* (Stanford University Press 1994), Lyotard argues that the sublime interrupts the transition from the sensible to the supersensible — a transition which is the 'whole point,' as it were, of the *Critique of Judgment*: 'The sublime does not even heed this sidelong gesture toward the ethical which is permitted by the aesthetics of nature, and which law seems to require for its realization' (126). The sublime fails to disclose nature as purposive (or even open to purpose): its sublimity flows from its counterpurposiveness and the pain it can cause you. The transition, it turns out, cannot be carried out.

Unfortunately space does not permit discussion of Jean-François Courtine's fascinating treatment of Schelling and tragedy as well as Michel Deguy's essay on the 'discoverer' of the sublime: Longinus. Louis Marin's biblically inspired treatment of a Poussin painting as well as Librett's 'Afterword' are less interesting and, indeed, have less to say about the *sublime* as such.

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**Bradley H. Dowden**
*Logical Reasoning.*
Belmont CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1993.
Pp. xiii + 404 + appendices 89.
CDN $47.95 (paper: ISBN 0-534-17688-7).

Adopting the scoring values — one to four stars ['*'] — used by Leonard Maltin for assessing films, this textbook in critical thinking earns ***$\frac{1}{2}$, a scant half-point shy of the highest possible rating. The full four-point rating ('exceptional,' 'outstanding') is held in reserve for the next, the eventual second, edition.

Immediately in chapter 1, 'Making Logical Choices', one sees that this book is different from an overabundance of virtually indistinguishable and

undistinguished competitors. The very first example is not an argument to a truth-valued conclusion but a case of practical reasoning to the making of a choice between alternative courses of action. Far too many authors of contemporary texts in informal logic — keeping an eye on the sorts of arguments found in books on formal logic — forget, or underplay, how much of our daily reasoning is concerned not with arguments leading to truth-valued conclusions but with making choices, assessing reasons, seeking advice, etc. Dowden gets the balance and the emphasis right. The earlier part of the book (chapters 1-8) is situated squarely within the 'new' rhetoric, invoking the core concepts in reasoning conceived as a dialogical rather than a strictly logical (read 'formal') exercise. This first half of the book is given over to developing such concepts as deception, persuasion, misleading reports, rules of discourse, ambiguity, vagueness, imprecision, pseudoprecision, burden of proof, description, explanation, argumentation, and (the tension between) principles of fidelity and charity, etc. The more traditional fare, with the introduction of familiar logical terminology — e.g., 'premise', 'consistency', 'implication', 'validity', etc. — is postponed until later in the book (chapters 9-11). The last part of the book (chapters 12-14) — which is, incidentally, a quantum jump in difficulty — introduces more technical notions, viz., concerning statistical reasoning, causal connections, and scientific theorizing. There is ample material in the first 11 chapters for a one-semester course; one can, if pressed for time, omit chapters 12-14. The apparatus of the sentential calculus is relegated to the appendices. Dowden clearly sees this as a book about *reasoning*, not as an introduction to formal logic or to symbol manipulation.

Dowden adopts a conversational style, a style fraught with hazard, and succeeds brilliantly. A year ago, in a wide-ranging Introduction to Philosophy course, I adopted a textbook also written in a conversational style. I thought the style of that earlier book entertaining; some of my students did not: they thought it condescending and banal. But there were no such complaints about Dowden's book which I have just used in a Critical Thinking course taught to more than 300 students. Their end-of-the-semester critiques of *Logical Reasoning* are laudatory to an extent that I have never before seen in nearly 30 years of teaching. Virtually without exception, every student in the course gave the text rave reviews, many of them writing that they read it in their spare time just for sheer pleasure!

There is, however, a downside to the conversational style. Students for whom English is a second language, more exactly, students whose grasp of oral prose is not that of native speakers, will find some of this book hard to understand. They are likely not to catch the irony of some sentences and the playfulness of others. Instructors should be aware of this problem at the outset.

In one way the book is deceptive. Its relaxed style belies the breadth of its content. I was amazed at the end of chapter 1 where Dowden reviews the major points of the chapter: he has managed painlessly to introduce some 23 important concepts. By the way, the frequent 'Concept Checks', 'Reviews of

Major Points', etc. are well done and a boon for students. (If, as the Reverend Colton claimed, imitation is the sincerest flattery, then the graphic designer of the third edition of Moore and Parker's *Critical Thinking* is complimented: Wadsworth has to a large extent mimicked his design. [One must suppose that copyright does not extend to layout.]) There are many aptly-chosen delightful cartoons throughout. I found the picture on p. 115 especially funny.

This book has been a long time in development. It was honed over a period of 18 semesters before being published. And what one gets when one adopts this text is not just a textbook; there are three bonuses: a Teacher's Manual (far better than most), an MSDOS software package for constructing multiple-choice examinations drawn from a database of questions provided (it should be relatively easy to move the database of questions to a Macintosh platform since the files are pure ASCII), and access to the author himself via the Internet. The latter proved especially valuable to me. Dowden and I engaged in numerous and lengthy discussions about the material in this book.

The exam-creating software, Trilogy, is handy but not essential. Indeed I found it easier to read the provided files of sample exam questions directly into my word-processor and to 'massage' them there into the format I favor for examinations. (Dowden promises to have greatly enlarged the database of sample questions by summer of '94.)

It should be possible to design several different styles of course around this text. Having so many students, I had to forgo assigning practically all of the longer 'writing-exercises' in the book and had to make do with the many multiple-choice homework assignments. Instructors with (enviably) smaller classes will be able to utilize the writing-exercises.

There is a perennial problem with treating the 'classical' fallacies. Discussing them and assigning homework exercises on them tends to give students a false sense of security and accomplishment. (The number of fallacies one runs across in newspapers, advertising, conversation, etc. defies our abilities to codify.) In chapter 6, Dowden has elected to discuss a sampling of fallacies (a sampling that strikes me as rather arbitrarily selected) while he consigns a residue to Appendix A. The division between the two lists is artificial and instructors will probably want to assign Appendix A if they assign chapter 6.

Assign chapter 7, 'Argumentative Writing', with caution. My guess is (I haven't asked Dowden) that it was included because the publisher wanted to 'touch all bases.' While everything it says is alright, it is just too brief to do the job needed. When I next use this text, I will skip chapter 7.

Here and there in the text there are a few explications offered that some professional philosophers will surely dispute, viz. about the concepts of knowledge, presupposition and enthymematic arguments, logical necessity and impossibility, inductive arguments, and competing accounts of validity. Students, however, are unlikely to find any problems with the analyses offered, and indeed the analyses are not dissimilar to those in many other introductory books. However, they are slated for revision in the second

edition which, then, will surely merit an unqualified ****-rating. In the meantime, one should not forebear adopting this book. Even now, it sets a new high standard. Its US origin, with its preponderance of US examples, should not deter Canadian instructors. Its excellence in other ways offsets its lack of significant Canadian content.

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**Stephen Everson, ed.**
*Language. Companions to Ancient Thought 3.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 1994.
Pp. vii + 280.
US $64.95 (cloth: ISBN 0 521 35538 9);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0 521 35795 0).

This book contains eleven essays: an 'Introduction' by Stephen Everson, 'Plato on understanding language' by David Bostock, 'Cratylus' theory of names and its refutation' by Bernard Williams (previously published in the 1982 G.E.L. Owen Festschrift *Language and Logos*), 'Aristotle on names and their signification' by David Charles, 'Epicurus on mind and language' by Everson, 'The Stoic notion of a *lekton*' by Michael Frede, 'Parrots, Pyrrhonists and native speakers' by David K. Glidden, 'Analogy, anomaly and Apollonius Dyscolus' by David Blank, 'Usage and abusage: Galen on language' by R.J. Hankinson, 'Augustine on the nature of speech' by Christopher Kirwan, and 'The verb "to be" in Greek philosophy: some remarks' by Lesley Brown.

The volume is directed especially at those reading the ancient material in translation but 'with the analytical skills of modern philosophy and with an eye to their contemporary as well as their historical significance' (iv). The bibliography lists 538 items in such categories as, under 'Aristotle', 'Essentialism' and 'Names and Reference.' 65 items from Frege 1894 to Dummett 1991 are under 'Modern Works.'

Everson's introduction (9 pp), citing Dummett, takes analytical philosophy to rest on the view that language has explanatory priority over thought. It notices one strand of theory in antiquity like a current view that studying language is a 'precondition at least for being able to say true things about the world', a strand which is 'an early attempt to explain how language is meaningful without seeing it simply as a code for thought.' It finds this a predecessor to Frege. Ancient philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics were interested in language structure, meaningfulness, speaker un-

derstanding, and the connection between world and mind. Their questions and methods will interest the contemporary analytical philosopher.

Bostock (18 pp) gives a sweeping developmental view of Plato as holding in the middle dialogues three views about meaning, the second of which Plato later rejected: first, words get meaning by standing for forms; second, forms are unambiguous instances of themselves; third, we come to understand the words by grasping the forms stood for. The essay proceeds by allusion to, rather than close analysis of, any actual words of Plato's. The essay's sweep is appealing and impressive, but the overall picture of Plato's middle period is pretty heavy-handed (though it is of course useful to see such a picture tried out). For the intended readers it would seem fairer to have acknowledged more controversy, e.g. over what the middle views actually are and over the (alleged) absurdity of self-instantiation. P. 19 implausibly cites *Parmenides* 139c-e as reduction to absurdity of the view that the form the F is an example of F-ness but of no other characteristic whatsoever. But Meinwald's *Plato's 'Parmenides'* (1991) has convincingly argued that 139c-e makes the perfectly sound point, in a *pros heauto* section, that sameness and otherness do not figure in the definition of the one (though they are, as we'd say, necessary attributes of everything, including any form).

Charles (36 pp) offers to avoid a dilemma for previous interpretations: either Aristotle lacked interest in the topic of meaning or he had a view of meaning similar to recent ones; either way, we learn nothing new about meaning from Aristotle. Charles proposes instead that Aristotle had a distinctive account of the meaning of names, worth study. He concludes that 'Aristotle's account represents an interesting and unoccupied mid-position between Fregean and direct reference theorists' (72). The essay, quoting many striking texts, gives the impression of a live subject.

Everson on Epicurus (35pp) asks whether Epicurus' semantic theory is psychologistic in a bad way, and concludes (108) that 'Epicurus, unlike later semantic psychologists, was not forced into an account of language which rendered meaning irremediably subjective.'

Glidden (20pp) compares a problem which interested Sextus — how is language-learning possible? — to a problem which interested Wittgenstein, as interpreted by Kripke; Glidden finds Sextus' response similar to Wittgenstein's.

Blank (17pp) resists a picture of the history of grammar which sharply contrasts a Stoic philosophical view that language has no real rules, i.e., is full of anomaly, with the Alexandrian grammarians' thought that analogy governs. A fuller understanding of the debate places it 'into a well-attested wider debate between empiricists and rationalists.' We can understand the grammarian Appollonius only if we look at his use of Stoic philosophical theory.

Frede (20 pp) in a spare understated way traces some history of the Stoic notion of what is said — a *lekton* — and finds greater complexity in it than had previously been noted, finding, e.g., that a passage Mates took as evidence that the Stoics distinguished between the sense and the reference of an expression is not sufficient evidence.

Hankinson (22pp) examines Galen's views on the relation between language and thought and about the proper use of scientific terms, quoting, in passing, Galen's stirring plaint, 'I wish I could learn and teach … without making use of names, so we might avoid the useless fuss over language' (173), and concluding that Galen's philosophy of language is part of his epistemological and metaphysical realism.

Kirwan (24 pp) sets out Augustine's explicit views on language as eight propositions, such as 'Every word is a sign' and then from these draws consequences which he discusses critically and ingeniously. He takes up many particular issues, such as Augustine on the speech of God (Who does not use language) and Augustine's view that all thought is inner speech not in any language. I was informed by his use of many arresting passages from Augustine, whom he relates to the Stoics and to Wittgenstein.

Brown (24 pp) urges, for the study of ancient texts, that 'when we try to understand the arguments which seem to depend crucially on the verb "to be," we should beware of seeking to impose or to discern our currently favored distinctions' (236) among an 'is' of existence, an 'is' of identity, and an 'is' of predication. The lucid and thought-provoking essay argues that certain passages in Plato and Aristotle which seem to make such distinctions do not. It goes beyond earlier work (such as Kahn's).

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**Robert Fiengo** and **Robert May**
*Indices and Identity.*
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1994. Pp. 355.
US $45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-06166-X);
US $22.50 (paper: ISBN 0-262-56076-3).

Fiengo and May (F and M) have put together the most complete theory to date of the use of indices in the representation of structure in natural language. The value of this work for philosophers, and it is considerable, is in its probing attempt at a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between indices and structural dependency, the latter going to the very core of the linguist's conception of 'logical form' (LF).

Chapter One addresses *inter alia* the relation of coindexation as indicative of coreference. Indices here are regarded as 'numerals appended to elements of structure' (1). Topics discussed include the relation of indices across sentence boundaries, discourse anaphora; identity statements and their

bearing on such issues as the Evans/Lasnik controversy over the latter's 'noncoreference rule'; predication, where the use of indices is used to distinguish symmetrical identity statements and asymmetrical predicational forms; and split antecedents, where the problem is how in sentences such as 'John told Mary that they should leave' the index associated with the reference of 'they' is related to the indices attached to 'John' and 'Mary', respectively. All these matters are treated with admirable thoroughness and clarity. However, the authors' remarks on indices and discourse are particularly illuminating of the interface between linguistic and philosophical interests in coindexation.

What the authors have to say on the matter of discourse and coindexation is closely tied to a puzzle raised by Mark Richard ([1983]. 'Direct Reference and Ascription of Belief.' *Journal of Philosophical Logic*. 12: 425-52.) This puzzle involves discourse within the following set of circumstances: A man, A, is talking to a woman, B. He reports that a woman he sees is in danger; he doesn't know this woman is B. Furthermore B sees A watching her. Consider then the two sentence report A gives B: I don't believe you are in danger; I believe she$_i$ is in danger. Next consider B's report to A: The man watching me$_i$ believes that I am in danger. A then reports to B: The man watching you$_i$ believes that you$_i$ are in danger. But now since the speaker of this last sentence *is* the man watching you$_i$, a further report may follow: I believe you$_i$ are in danger. But this taken together with the first sentence of A's first report is a contradiction. F and M's way around this seeming contradiction is interesting in that it does not involve constraints on substitution.

The problem, according to F and M, is one of circularity. The two sentences 'I believe that you$_i$ are in danger' and 'I believe that she$_i$ is in danger' are identical: '…all that changes is the person of the pronouns, to reflect the shift in point of view' (19). The problem here is that this 'shift in point of view' marks a difference in the propositions expressed, and it is this difference that fuels the problem of direct reference Richard's puzzle brings to light.

The treatment of indices in identity statements is driven by a need to explain the informativeness of identity statements. It is argued that in identity statements the noun phrases flanking the identity must not be coindexed. Moreover they claim that noncoindexation will provide the mechanism for explaining the difference between 'Hume believes that he is Hume' and 'Hume believes that Hume is Hume.' Noncoindexation of elements in an identity statement also allows us, in their view, to preserve the integrity of certain binding principles in linguistics.

Although there may be demonstrable advantages to accepting the principle that noncoindexation does not entail identity, the authors do not properly address the question of what the actual semantic import of indices is in cases of identity statements. If the indices do not indicate reference or noncoreference then what, here, is their function? This is a nagging question throughout, and the reader attuned to such issues is provided a plethora of data and arguments for pursuing it. Of special interest here is the notion of 'fused'

indices introduced by the authors in the treatment of so called 'split' anaphora.

Perhaps the most innovative maneuver F and M make is distinguishing in Chapter Two between binding theory and dependency theory. The former is concerned to account for how indices are distributed; the latter with how they may be dependent on each other. The point is that sometimes coindexed expressions are dependent on one another and sometimes not, and we need a way of signalling when there is dependency. This leads to a suggested revision in the way we think of indices: indices are complex objects consisting of an indexical type indicator and an indexical value indicator. Indexical types are either independent (alpha occurrences) or dependent (beta occurrences). The difference between these two is at the core of the theory. It consists in beta occurrences being dependent on other linguistic expressions and the alpha occurrences being independent in the way terms acquiring their reference by ostension or demonstratives are independent.

With this distinction at their disposal F and M go on to define an 'indexical dependency' as an ordered triple consisting of a sequence of elements in a structure, an index, and a structural description. Beta occurrences, unlike alpha occurrences, must be licensed; this by being suitable elements of a realized indexical dependency. Alpha occurrences establish 'context', being expressions that 'directly refer' (71). Thus the linguistic theory being offered depends crucially on the concept of direct reference. How the authors rule out alpha occurrences of 'himself' in sentences such as 'He likes himself' is unclear.

The theory of dependency here is related to issues raised by Gareth Evans and taken up with interesting results by James Higginbotham. Chapter Two contains a very interesting and worthwhile discussion of Higginbotham's views on dependency.

Chapter Three is largely devoted to identifying the conditions of indexical dependency. The most significant technical innovation here is the introduction of the notion of an 'i-copy.' If in comparing indexical dependencies (ordered triples of the sort described above) we find a difference only in index, then such dependencies are i-copies. Using this device F and M propose a theory of the difference between strict and sloppy identity in cases of elision. Here what is at issue is the difference between two reading of sentences such as 'John loves his mother and Bill does, too.' We may read it as sloppy identity — in which case Bill loves Bill's mother — or as strict identity — where Bill loves John's mother.

The theory is extended to accommodate a problem raised by Geach as to the difference between 'Only Satan loves himself' and 'Only Satan loves Satan.' In addition, there is a discussion of quantificational sentences and *de se* belief reports in the context of natural language inference.

Chapter Four sets its sights on solving what F and M call the 'eliminative puzzles of ellipsis', of which there are three: the *many pronouns puzzle*, the *many clauses puzzle*, and *Dahl's* puzzle. The many pronouns puzzle arises from the following consideration: There is one reading sentences such as 'Max

said he saw his mother, and Oscar did, too' lack which corresponding sentences such as 'Max said he saw his mother, and Oscar said he saw his mother' do not lack. The reading that the elliptical sentence excludes is the one in which Oscar said Max saw Oscar's mother. The many clauses puzzle arises from the fact that in elliptical sentences such as 'Max saw his mother, Oscar did, too, but Sam didn't' the ellipsis is relative to a single pronoun, i.e., there can only be an across the board sloppy or strict reading — other readings made explicit in the sentence 'Max saw Max's mother, Oscar saw Oscar's mother, but Sam didn't see Max's mother' are not available. Finally, the Dahl puzzle amounts to the curiosity that in sentences where mixed readings *are* allowed some readings are excluded, nonetheless. Thus in a sentence such as 'Max thinks he is strong, Oscar does, too, but his father doesn't' there is the reading where Max thinks Max is strong, Oscar thinks Oscar is strong, but Oscar's father doesn't believe Oscar is strong. However, some readings are barred, such as 'Max thinks that Max is strong, Oscar thinks that Oscar is strong', but Oscar's father doesn't think that Max is strong.' F and M attempt to show that predicational accounts will not account for these eliminative facts. The explanation of such facts depends crucially on our previously defined notion of an i-copy.

Solving these puzzles crucially requires that the elided verb phrases and their antecedents be i-copies. It is argued in the case of the many pronouns puzzle that the elided constituents fail to meet this requirement, and so are not allowed. The details here are interesting and engaging. In the case of the many clauses puzzle, the essential point is that an elided clause must be a reconstruction ('structural carbon copy … up to indexical type' [165]) of its antecedent; consequently, in mixed readings, alpha occurrences would be reconstructed as beta occurrences, an illicit 'reconstruction.' Getting at the root of Dahl's problem requires the introduction of another innovation: a third way of reconstructing beta occurrences.

F and M observe that whereas a strict reading of an index may be correlated with an independent, alpha, occurrence of an antecedent index, and while a sloppy reading may correlate with a dependent, beta, occurrence of an index, there is a third reading where a strict reading is correlated with a dependent occurrence. Thus in the sentence 'Max thinks he is strong, Oscar does too, but his father doesn't' the first elision contains an instance of sloppy identity, Oscar thinks Oscar is strong, while the second a strict reading of the preceding dependent occurrence, Oscar's father doesn't think that Oscar is strong. It is failure to recognize this third manner of reconstruction that excludes competing approaches to Dahl's puzzle. The chapter concludes with a brief but illuminating discussion of ellipsis and discourse.

Chapter Five is primarily of concern to linguists. Ellipsis and reconstruction are carefully distinguished, though they are related. In the sentence 'Max left, Oscar did, too, but Sam didn't' there are many ellipses but only one reconstruction, whereas in the sentence 'Max's mother left, and Oscar's did, too' there is one ellipsis but many reconstructions. While reconstruction is 'an identity relation over phrase markers' (236), it is allowed that indexical

values may differ. This chapter contains a great deal of discussion of 'vehicle change' and how E pronouns are distributed over reconstructed expressions.

The sixth and final chapter, 'Logical Form and Reconstruction', is concerned with what is probably the most difficult set of problems in the book: problems of antecedent contained deletion. Here is the main problem. Consider a sentence such as 'Dulles suspected everyone that Angleton did'. If we include reference to the elided material using brackets, this sentence becomes 'Dulles suspected everyone that Angleton [suspected e],' where 'e' is an empty category. Now what is the antecedent of material in brackets? It can't be the entire verb phrase of the sentence because the ellipsis would then be contained in its own antecedent. The suggested solution to this problem is to raise the quantificational part of the main verb, leaving a proper antecedent: 'Everyone that Angleton [suspected e] Dulles suspected e.' The main point here is that by invoking quantifier raising the level of 'logical form' we arrive at the solution of an otherwise intractable problem.

This book is both thorough and technically accurate. It explores numerous problems of current interest to specialists in philosophy of language. It is obviously a work several years in the making, and is to be highly recommended.

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**Antony Flew**
*Atheistic Humanism.*
Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. Pp. 302.
US $32.95. ISBN 0-87975-847-3.

Antony Flew made his name, while he was a young lecturer in the 1950s, through his editorial missionary work for Ordinary Language. In *Logic and Language* I and II he established saints of informal analysis. In his next volume, *Essays in Conceptual Analysis*, he added a sermon of his own, his exalted 'argument from smiling bridegrooms,' against hard determinism. Next, in his especially useful *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* (co-edited with Alistair MacIntyre), he took it that during his long celebrated essay on theology and falsification he'd terminally roasted all dreams of pure spirits and of Cartesian dualism at the stake. Flew went on, in a blessed, but bloated pilgrimage of publications, to preach the glories of Locke and Hume, parapsychology's rise and decline, reflection or 'brainwashing', Skinner-bashing,

Marx-baiting, proper punishment, affirmative action, Adam Smith and *laissez-faire* economics for today, etc., etc.

Flew's present book *Atheistic Humanism*, rumbles away at sounding many such *leitmotifs* from his widely scattered past. It reads almost as if Flew has written one great Götterdämmerungous funeral symphony for the themes of his entire career.

The first 105 pages make up Part One, 'The Fundamentals of Unbelief'. Its four chapters are entitled: 'A Defeasible Atheism'; 'Theism Indefeasible and Unsupportable'; 'Evidencing Naturally Impossible Occurrences'; 'Can We Survive Our Own Deaths?' If these were rewritten and recast as a separate little textbook for introducing undergraduates to the analytical philosophy of religion, then Part One might be rendered more co-functional. Here it tends to resemble an allegedly merging dangle. But it might tend to compete weakly for such a market with several of Flew's earlier products. At any rate, there seems to be little here to help advanced readers.

Five quick points are worth brandishing at these four chapters. *First*, there is no longer reason for Flew, Kai Nielsen, C.B. Martin and others to query *all* thoughts of non-spatial agents. Utopitrons, etc., do bear mental conception. (Compare a review of Nielsen in *Dialogue*, 1995). *Second*, Quine at least began reteaching us about human rationality in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'. *Openness* to altering our concepts and terms in flexible responses to fresh scientific and mathematical results keeps our reason on the track. But so do many forms of cultural and ideological openness, which Flew's neo-positivism bans outright.

*Third*, for over forty years Flew has been warmly saluting, but also trying to pull rugs out from under that great philosopher of religion, John Wisdom, author of 'Gods.' (See *Philosophy and Psychoanalysis*.) Wisdom's classic of agnosticism stirs the mind to be casting out Logical Positivism's Eliminations of Metaphysics. Flew half-recognized the importance of Wisdom's achievements, then turned around to call Wisdom's sketches of spirit-talk, in effect, nonsensical. If Wisdom just howlerishly achieved no such goal, why did Flew bother to anthologize him? And why, then, has he kept on sniping at 'Gods' for over four decades?

*Fourth*, Flew has, also, long been striking at Wisdom and at Biblical religions, alleging that the Problem of Evil traps believers in hopeless contradictions. But broad and sincere interest in various cultures' accounts of the afterlife can reduce or dissolve most such complaints of inconsistency. (See my *The Challenge of Religion Today*, and *Faith and the Life of Reason* on these fourth and fifth points.)

*Fifth*, Flew affects to propel daggers at those who, following some traditions of Pascal and William James, hope to *gamble* on Faith in an intellectually respectable way. But, once Viennese restrictions on meanings are withdrawn, and once philosophers reflect on certain modern ideas of Maximizing Expected Utility, Flew's case against such wagering seems to lack much spine.

Part Two, 'Defending Knowledge and Responsibility', consists of another three chapters, partly given to quite joltingly different material, compared to that of Part One: 'Must Naturalism Self-Destruct?'; 'Sociology of or against Knowledge'; 'Mental Health, Mental Disease, Mental Illness.' The latter two might usefully be replaced under one cover with most of Part Three, '*Scientific* Socialism?' and Part Four 'Applied Philosophy.' I do not jest or mock when I suggest that such a collection could be handily entitled *Conservative Philosophy / For Right-Wing Discussion Groups*. This could be aimed much less at academic classes, more at self-programming, broadly Conservative, Reform, or Republican groups in the English-speaking world. It might be offered for well-educated or well-read laymen of a somewhat bull-doggishly anti-Keynesian bent. Flew's lively, readable style, even his touches of preachiness, could be ladled over such popular topics to please and stimulate immutable right-wingers. Such a separate book would strike me as making better sense. Imposing this heap of republished stuff on research libraries would be to exploit his good name.

The present compilation lacks cohesion and novelty. But Antony Flew has done so much for the enjoyment of philosophy that I took pleasure in reading all of this volume. And who should try to fault a learned philosopher for confronting more popular issues?

All the same, any whiffs, suggested by Flew's title, of *necessary* connections between atheistic humanism and jungle capitalism reek not of Flew's Marx scholarship, but of Ayn Rand's colossal obsessions.

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**R. Douglas Geivett**
*Evil and the Evidence for God: The Challenge of Hick's Theodicy.*
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1994.
Pp. xii + 276. US $44.95. ISBN 1-56639-094-X.

The central claim of this book is that 'the significance of the problem of evil and possibility of constructing an adequate theodicy both depend upon the fortunes of natural theology' (9). Beyond merely critiquing John Hick's 'soul-making' theodicy, Geivett uses it, and the religious epistemology that underlies it, as a foil in articulating his own account of natural theology and its relation to a traditional Augustinian theodicy. The book is divided into twelve chapters, which in turn are grouped into three parts. Part I is

expository, discussing the problem of evil in general, as well as both the traditional and Hickian theodicies. Part II, entitled 'Religious Epistemology', defends natural theology as both possible in its own right and indispensable to a successful theodicy. The centerpiece of this section, in chapters six, and seven, is a 'cumulative case'-type argument for theism. Geivett finds a major fault in Hick's rejection of natural theology, understood as the project of demonstrating God's existence and inferring His nature via natural reason, and with Hick's alternative, experience-oriented account of religious rationality. Without grounds for theistic belief independent of private experience, Geivett claims the problem of evil is a nearly decisive defeater against the reliability of religious experience, and thus a decisive objection to Hick's primary grounds for religious belief (76-7). The problem of evil does not similarly vitiate the cosmological considerations Geivett offers because '[t]he presence of evil in the world does nothing to attenuate the apparent need to explain why there is something rather than nothing in terms of the existence of God' (81). Finally, in Part III, Geivett turns to the topic of theodicy proper, contrasting traditional and Hickian views of God's purposes for humanity and evil, free will and the afterlife. A somewhat unusual feature is an Afterword by John Hick (229-37). The endnotes are extensive, and there is a useful index, but no separate bibliography.

On the whole, the book is well worth reading, especially if one is interested in natural theology or Hick's theodicy. Geivett's writing is lucid and informative, but his arguments, although provocative, are not always persuasive. He gets more mileage out of the cosmological argument than anyone since William Lane Craig, putting forward a devastating rebuttal to J.L. Mackie's critique of the cosmological argument (105-12), and arguing not only that the best explanation of the Big Bang must involve a non-natural First Cause, but also that, since no other concept for an initializing cause is available, it is most reasonable to conceive of this First Cause in terms of personal agency (114-22). Unfortunately, Geivett is less than exhaustive in canvassing the non-theistic alternatives. Geivett devotes all his critical attention to the idea that the universe spontaneously exploded into being, either *ex nihilo* or from some prior, eternally quiescent state. He dismisses the oscillating universe theory with a footnote (253n35), and does not so much as mention Hawking's 'No Boundary' theory wherein the universe, although temporally finite, is nevertheless without beginning. (See Stephen J. Hawking, *A Brief History of Time* [Toronto: Bantam Books 1988]. These are serious, but not necessarily fatal omissions. For a theistic response to Hawking, see Craig, 'What place, then, for a creator?': Hawking on God and Creation', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 41 [1990] 473-91.)

From this point on, Geivett's cumulative argument grows still less convincing. If the problem of evil is without attenuating effect on Geivett's cosmological argument for God's existence, there is no reason to assume with Geivett that moral arguments concerning God's nature are similarly immune. Yet that is apparently what Geivett does assume without discussion. Queerly, at the end of the section on moral arguments, Geivett admits,

'... there is reason to doubt that evil really is the prima facie evidence against God's existence that Hick takes it to be' (146). One of Geivett's reasons for doubt stems from the allegation that, apart from theistic presuppositions, we lack any objective grounds on which to base the moral judgment that there is evil in the universe. This point should have been addressed first, as a prolegomenon to the whole topic of theodicy. For if evil does not, in fact, even count as *prima facie* evidence against theism, then there is no problem of evil for the theodicist to solve. Not that such a simple gambit against the atheist will necessarily succeed — the atheist has at least two options open to her at this point. She may, following J.L. Mackie's lead, turn the charge of inconsistency back against the theist by pointing out that atheism, unlike theism, need not be committed to the objectivity of moral judgments at all. Or, if she finds the pricetag of moral skepticism too high, she may argue for a non-theistic moral objectivism of some sort.

Two other topics Geivett treats in a less than wholly satisfactory manner are gratuitous evil and free will. When articulating the classical Augustinian position on evil and free will, Geivett states, 'evil is not a necessary means to an end but a consequence of human freedom, which is a necessary means to an end. Furthermore, evil is not a necessary consequence of human freedom but only a realized possibility' (167). But he then attempts to reject the possibility of gratuitous evil, defined as, 'evil that serves either no purpose at all or no purpose in God's plan that could not be served without that particular instance or degree of evil' (178). This seems inconsistent on Geivett's part. Rather than being, as Geivett submits, 'the sort of state of affairs that could exclude the existence of God' (180), gratuitous evil is exactly what the free will theodicist ought to expect, given his account of evil's origins. Nor does this compromise Geivett's cherished doctrine of 'meticulous providence' (178). Instead, the free will theodicist can insist that although actualized evils play no indispensable role in God's plans, the latter are so undefeatable as to incorporate the former into the ultimate demonstration of God's grace.

Similarly, while Geivett's treatment of Hick's conception of free will is insightful, his reservations concerning Plantinga's response to what he calls the 'Flew-Mackie Principle', or FMP (195), are misdirected. Geivett worries about Plantinga's contention that 'the actualization of any world with free creatures is never up to God alone', on the grounds that '[a]ctualizing one world from a variety of possible worlds [is] God's prerogative alone' (196). But here Geivett errs, albeit on the side of pious caution. Possible worlds are simply different ways the real world might be, and so to actualize some world is no more than to actualize some particular possibility, a feat for which we hold one another accountable all the time. If human beings are genuinely responsible for some states of affairs, then there must be a very real sense in which they participate in the on-going actualization of the world.

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**David Goicoechea, ed.**
*The Nature and Pursuit of Love: The*
*Philosophy of Irving Singer.*
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books 1995.
Pp. 364. US $39.95. ISBN 0-87975-912-7.

If, as Cicero reminds us, love is the attempt to form a friendship inspired by beauty, then what of that love which sees and creates value in the non-beautiful but nevertheless beloved other? Crudely put, this is the dilemma which the twentieth-century's great philosopher of love, Irving Singer, has tried throughout his career to come to grips with. This volume of essays, the fruit of a colloquium on Singer's philosophy at Brock University in 1991, further elaborates this question and related themes in the philosophy of love. Singer sees two strands of thought coming out of the history of philosophical reflection on love. The first, what he identifies as 'appraisal', describes the broadly Christian-Augustinian approach to love. Here, the beloved is judged and idealized as bearing a purposive, transpersonal value like the Beautiful or the Good. The other strand, emerging chiefly from the Lutheran-Kantian tradition of thinking, Singer terms 'bestowal.' This refers to the spontaneous creation of value in the beloved, the attempt to see the latter as inherently worthy even in spite of that person's possible failure to reflect a transpersonal ideal. Now, if these two values come into raw, unmediated contact it is obvious that they at least appear to be mutually incommensurable. Nevertheless, it is no exaggeration to say that Singer has over the years been almost exclusively concerned with trying to effect such a mediation.

Early in his career, Singer saw bestowal as the value of seminal importance in love between persons as such. The chief problem with the tradition of appraisal is precisely that it cannot articulate this kind of human, all too human type of love and so it is, for example, incapable of reflecting deeply on the intricacies of the marriage relationship. In reading the history of love in Western thought, therefore, Singer has tried to detect the slow growth of a progressive humanism. As he sees it, in the historical transformation of appraisal into agapeic bestowal, we are witnessing the downward movement of thought as it slips the calculative clutches of love's Guardians and settles back into the cave. Although Singer later came to a more charitable understanding of appraisal through his reading of Freud, he has never abandoned the idea that appraisal is not a sufficient value in the overall economy of love. This is the core of his humanistic pluralism.

As a contribution to the development of Singer's own thinking, this volume is invaluable. The first two sections trace the origin and history of the appraisal/bestowal distinction, the third focuses on some of its contemporary formulations, and the fourth explores some more technical problems surrounding the distinction. Finally, and this is the chief pleasure of the book, there is an unusually lengthy and detailed concluding section containing Singer's replies to the papers. On the whole, though, the volume is somewhat cumbersome. There are two television interviews with Singer which are

entirely too rough and lacking in appreciable content. The same can be said for at least five of the essays. Not all of the contributors are philosophers and one gets the feeling while reading of a palpable inconsistency of quality amongst the papers. It is like passing from deep and spacious pools to shallow, rocky flats and back again. This may be an inevitable shortcoming of a book of essays by different writers with diverging styles and concerns, but it could have been mitigated by the work of a keener editorial eye.

Still, with a little patience the rougher waters can be negotiated and for anyone interested in the philosophy of Irving Singer or, more generally, in the philosophy of love, this is an indispensable book.

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Everybody enjoys good gossip, especially if it's about something bad. But isn't all gossip essentially bad, or are the moral prohibitions against gossip nothing more than unfounded idealism ignored by virtually everyone?

The age-old aphorism 'If you don't have anything good to say, don't say it' is soundly attacked in Ben-Ze'ev and Goodman's *Good Gossip*. Although, as William Langland wrote in *Piers the Ploughman*, the subject matter of gossip varies from 'love and hate, accord and strife' to 'tempests and ... Zephyrs mild' (145), the condemnation of gossip has remained steadfast throughout history. Yet, in light of the Christian and Jewish condemnations of gossip and the 'trivialization' of gossip by philosophers such as Martin Heidegger (14), the articles presented in *Good Gossip* reconsider the reputation of phatic conversation. In often emotional terms, many of *Good Gossip*'s contributors argue for the liberation of intrinsically-virtuous and often egalitarian gossip from the bonds of moral repression. Although the conclusions reached by these authors are as varied and ambiguous as their definitions of 'gossip', this book's intent is not to settle conclusively the contentious issues that it raises. Rather, its purpose is to serve as a springboard for a nascent discussion of the ethical implications of gossip. *Good Gossip* superbly achieves this goal.

*Good Gossip* is a compilation of fifteen articles by philosophers, psychologists, a doctor, a historian, and a lawyer. The book is divided into three sections: 'Gossip as a Moral problem'; 'Gossip and Knowledge'; and 'Empirical Studies of Gossip.' On the whole, the authors cite the positive implications of gossip. Ronald de Sousa goes so far as to say, 'to refrain from gossip is to be discreet, and according to common prejudice, discretion is a virtue. Certainly discretion is often prudent as well as kind. But this makes it only an ordinary virtue. Indiscretion, by contrast, is a superior virtue, indeed a saintly one' (31). He postulates that gossip helps reveal truth, and that if 'all truths became public, we would approach utopia .... Worldwide disarmament would soon follow, and enormous resources would be liberated to the benefit of humankind' (32). Although a few scholars, such as Oxford's Gabriele Taylor, enunciate some of the faults of gossip, most of the contributors agree with de Sousa's when he writes, 'although the dissemination of private information may make some people uncomfortable, its importance must, as a matter of public policy, be deemed to outweigh that discomfort' (30) — a view upheld legally by the California Supreme Court in *Melvin v. Reid* (67).

Although most of *Good Gossip*'s contributors acknowledge the positive psychological effects of gossip, they seem to avoid its consequences. Ben-Ze'ev argues that gossip is cognitively prototypical. He then distinguishes between two prototypical cognitive activities: 1) those that are extrinsically beneficial with regard to cost-benefit analysis, and 2) those that are intrinsically beneficial (similar to Aristotle's *poesis* and *praxis*) (12). Even though this distinction is not very edifying, most of the contributors follow Ben-Ze'ev's example of condemning teleological uses of gossip (where there are 'bad' motives) and supporting the ontological practice of gossip (where there are no 'bad' intentions). It seems as if they tacitly dismiss the potential efficacy of these actions. As Taylor writes, 'gossipers trivialize experience by ignoring the impact with which the author of the experience will in some way have to cope' (46). De Sousa offers a utilitarian justification for this by saying that one cannot infer that 'gossiping was worse in its consequences than refraining from gossip' (although he admits that his utilitarianism presupposes the existence of objective values) (27). Similarly, Maryann Ayim argues that the instrumentality of gossip-as-inquiry is epistemologically virtuous (85-99). She justifies the toleration of gossip-as-inquiry by quoting C.S. Pierce, who says that we ought 'not block the way of inquiry' (88). The universality of this statement is certainly debatable, as is the absolute virtue of intrinsically beneficial gossip.

Several interesting feminist defences of gossip are also presented in *Good Gossip*. In her article, 'Gossip: A Feminine Defense', Louise Collins defends the triviality of gossip by writing that we must allow the 'trivial' to play a constitutive part in the Good Life, so that we do not end up with an elitist, dull, insincere, or episodic moral philosophy (109). Finally, John Morreall defends gossip by stating that the community atmosphere within which gossip flourishes produces an intimacy and solidarity similar to that produced by the Bergsonian community atmosphere of laughter (62). Although

the philosophical defences of gossip given in *Good Gossip* are, at times, compelling, they avoid the consequences of potentially damaging, non-paradigmatic, examples.

After the sections dealing with ethics and epistemology, *Good Gossip* contains a section devoted to empirical studies of the psychological nature of gossip. The studies in this section show, for instance, that humans, whose neocortexes are extremely well-developed, spend a considerable amount of time talking, 80 to 90 percent of which is about 'specific names and known individuals' (131). Likewise, a study conducted at a college sorority shows that gossipers tend to need less social approval than their non-gossiping counterparts, and that, on the whole, they are less liked (160-3). Finally, Ofra Nevo and her associates attempt to eradicate one misogynistic conception of gossip by showing that men gossip as much as women, although the content of their conversations differs (188).

The opinions of most of *Good Gossip*'s contributors can be summed up by Ronald de Sousa's statement that appears on the book's back cover: 'Gossip is inherently democratic, concerned with private life rather than public issues ..., [and] it can serve to expand our understanding of life in ways that other modes of inquiry cannot' (25). Although some contributors condemn gossip, on the whole, *Good Gossip* portrays everyday gossip in a radically new, and extremely positive, manner. While the book's contributors sometimes present arguments that are debatable, they do an excellent job of opening the door to a dialogue based upon different perspectives of gossip — a tantalizing prospect indeed. For this reason, *Good Gossip* is a book well worth reading by all individuals interested in the ethics of everyday life.

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**E.J. Hundert**
*The Enlightenment's Fable — Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 1994.
Pp. xi + 284.
US $54.95. ISBN 0-521-46082-4.

Bernard Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees* published in 1723, with its argument that private vices conduce to public benefits and that a hypocritical face may underlie the achievements of modernity, has been a key text in western thought at least since Keynes's invocation of him in 1936 as one of the 'brave army of heretics' who praised consumerism (247) and F.B. Kayes' magisterial edition of the *Fable* in 1924 (245). Mandeville challenged his contemporaries

in ways famously crucial for the Enlightenment project, and his text has been seen as a template for the Smithian conjuncture as conceived by the ensuing tradition of classical economics. We have had no systematic analysis of its influence until this timely and welcome study by E.J. Hundert. For Joan Robinson the *Fable* had 'never been answered' (236), and the tone of this commentary is to substantiate that claim. The question opened is whether a claim thus obvious to the present era could meaningfully have been fathomed in the past.

Fairly Pocockian in inspiration (his sources evoke the History of Ideas bloodline of King's College, Cambridge), Hundert's style then can suffer from a certain ellipsis typical of the genre. 'Mandeville conceived the goal of this project as the explanation of sociability, and thus of moral standards, in a vocabulary shorn of moralized concepts. His reduction of society to the action of individual agents — which was only ideal and morally normative in modern natural law — came to be accepted as methodologically prescriptive for an entire program of social enquiry' (60-1). This sort of opacity is happily rare but it crops up throughout. Usually his comments illuminate, once one has taken the conventions of linguistic contextualism on board, as when he characterizes Locke's approach as a 'philosophically prophylactic stance' (96).

Such recondite infelicities are the price the lay reader pays for genuine advance in this refurrowed, Skinnerian field of the History of Ideas. There are six times as many references in the index to 'virtue' as there are to 'utility', which would be eccentric, even unthinkable, in a similar work published as recently as twenty years ago, reflecting the seismic shift in *dix-huitièmiste* studies. While the bargain may be wholesome the pay off is that the figure of the author's *intentionality* often fades into the ground of the *discourses* which avail him — Mandeville is a little lost in the context of languages civic, Epicurean, Lucretian, iatromechanic, dramaturgical, or even proto-feminist which may well have bounded his meaning, but which, *prima facie*, are not always transparently utterances of a milieu to which Mandeville himself could realistically, self-consciously have had an attitude.

Equally there is but a single explicit discussion of providential design (77-8) essential to an understanding of the eighteenth-century mental picture. There is quoted the well known letter from Hume to Hutcheson about natural and artificial virtues (83), but Hundert's presumption that it relates to Mandeville is strained and far fetched, and he simply will not conjecture what all of these thinkers may actually have *believed* about final causes. The significant penultimate chapter (219-36) reads off Smith intelligently as a problematic adversary of Mandeville — as a Newtonian enthusiast for unintended consequences, a seeker after predictive principles in the moral world akin to the Law of Gravitation, and *ipso facto* an ethical stalwart against hedonism. Today we muse that Smith should have been shaken by Hundert's hero. He palpably was not. The *Fable* and its ilk were offensive to Smith and his professorial colleagues (chemists, doctors, geologists) precisely in downplaying the subtle beneficence of Nature by glorying in the fleeting frippery of mortal vanity. They were mainstream. Mandeville may well have

been original. Hundert does not convince us that they profoundly examined or engaged with his doctrine except to dismiss him as a bogeyman, the virulent spawn of Hobbes, or worse, a superfluous man of straw.

This study comprehensively places Mandeville in both his British and European contexts — Condillac, Rousseau, Helvétius, Bishop Butler, Henry Fielding, the Scots, and many others are discussed at length. The range of Hundert's themes is huge — Machiavellian virtue, Pride, Augustan sociability, *luxe*. His interesting observations on theatrum mundi (116-74) strangely make no acknowledgment to Richard Sennett's perspectives and perhaps should have remained where they were originally published, along with other sections that seem tangential to the purpose of instating Mandeville as a plausible player in the emergence of modern social theory. Despite the immense erudition and urbanity Mandeville's text sometimes serves as a pretext for Hundert's diverting forays. This is spirited history of great culture and learning that delights on every page but, without disparaging its frequent helpfulness and solid elucidations, it is an object lesson in how keenly perilous studies of influence are.

As Keynes and Robinson opined Mandeville did indeed pose the searching question about modernity and Georg Simmel may well have written in 'a distinctively Mandevillian mode' (246). Bentham, Sir James Mackintosh, and J.S. Mill may well have felt obliged to strike a pose vis-à-vis the *Fable* (240-2), but that is a far cry from saying that they were seriously exercised by its argumentation. Presumably the vast spate of radical pamphleteering in England in the 1790s in the wake of the French Revolution should, if Hundert's thesis is correct, have exhibited a robust response to Mandeville in critiquing commercial society and foreshadowing individualist, communalist, or cooperative strategies and alternatives that would blossom in the nineteenth century age of ideology. In fact references to him there as a disreputable, even bawdy, satirist are sparse, incidental, and dismissive. In terms of serious dispute the *Fable*, for radicals no less than conservatives, featured in their canon less with the *Wealth of Nations* and more with *Gulliver's Travels*. Clearly Hundert would want to take issue here and certainly his meticulous retrieval of Mandeville's enduring notoriety is a fluent, provocative, and exciting tour de force.

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**Francis Hutcheson**
*On Human Nature*, Thomas Mautner, ed.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1993.
Pp. xiv + 194.
US $49.95. ISBN 0-521-43089-5.

Thomas Mautner has performed an important service to students of eighteenth-century philosophy by providing a very usable edition of two little-known works of the Scottish Enlightenment moralist and aesthetician, Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746). Hutcheson's major works are *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1725) and *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections With Illustrations on the Moral Sense* (1728). Prior to the publication of the *Inquiry*, Hutcheson published a short essay in the *London Journal* (November, 1724) which amounts to a preface and advertisement for the *Inquiry*. That work, *Reflections on the Common Systems of Morality*, is the first of the two pieces published here. Mautner notes that it was not included in Hutcheson's *Collected Works* (91), so this is its first reprint.

In *Reflections*, Hutcheson defends the position that morality follows from exciting affections of love toward the deity and our fellow creatures (97). Hutcheson is really advancing two theses. First, systems of morality which depend on calculated self-interest or moral authority are refuted by their effects. Those who act according to such systems are capable of non-virtuous actions, and we know that their actions are non-virtuous by the affections they produce. So affections are prior to rules or authority. We validate rules by affections. Second, producing affections is the way to produce virtue. Affections are not just the signs of virtue. Convincing someone that God exists or that He will punish transgressors will not excite love; affections follow from different qualities — the image of God as father, of universal brotherhood, etc. Hutcheson seeks the affections themselves, and the means to them must be qualities in others that produce those affections. So morality is a product of qualities which stimulate affections. An effective moralist will look for and promote those qualities and depend on the affections they produce. Hutcheson places himself firmly in the camp of sentimentalists such as the Third Earl of Shaftesbury.

The second piece presented by Mautner in this volume is Hutcheson's inaugural lecture when he assumed the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow in 1730. It was presented and published in Latin and is here translated for the first time. Mautner renders the title as *Inaugural Lecture on the Social Nature of Man*. In it, Hutcheson defends civil society not as a necessary evil or an imposed condition but as a product of human nature and benevolence. Hutcheson's evidence is fundamentally introspective and teleological. When we examine our own responses, we discover that we are moved by others and drawn to others. Our natural ends are evident to us by self-examination, and they are social. We are natural beings designed for social living, and we take pleasure in

it. Instead of attacking Hobbes on the ground that selfishness is morally bad, Hutcheson seeks to show that we do not even want such a state. The kind of isolated freedom that Hobbes imagined is not only not virtuous; it is unnatural. The counter-evidence is that men are naturally vicious, weak, and selfish. Hutcheson's reply is that vices seem natural, but so is their remedy. Both teleology and reason are natural and work to restrain vicious impulses: 'God has given us a sense of what is becoming and beautiful; conjoined with it is a sense of shame, by which all the more lowly pleasures are restrained' (141). Hutcheson also defends a different sense of 'innate ideas' from the scholastic and rationalist claim to innate conceptions accessible to logic or memory. For Hutcheson, innate ideas are natural ideas, those which are produced in us by our natural senses, including a moral sense and a sense of beauty.

Neither of these pieces is going to change our view of Hutcheson substantially. Mautner reads them as confrontations with psychological egoism and what he calls theological positivism — the view that God's will itself is what makes actions right or wrong. He does not emphasize their connection with the *Inquiry* and the *Essay*. However, Hutcheson is committed throughout his early work to the view that our affections and passions are themselves moral stimuli and moral evidence. He objects that other systems ignore the most basic aspect of our moral nature which is that we feel before we believe or act. These pieces show him continuing to work out that position in two somewhat different contexts.

The pieces by Hutcheson occupy only 34 of the 194 pages of this volume. Mautner provides an extended introduction and appendices. The introduction has the virtue of considering the context, intellectual environment and reaction to Hutcheson's works. Some of the responses are from quite obscure writers, and it is useful to have our attention drawn to them. The appendices provide extended notes on some special points of interest including the identity of Hutcheson's first reviewer in the *London Journal*. Mautner has a tendency to read Hutcheson in terms of isolated arguments, however; in the process he loses sight of the connecting themes. For example, he focuses on the way the texts argue against the thesis that virtue is ultimately either self-interest (prudential egoism) or dependent on one's own pleasure as the sole motive for action (hedonistic egoism). He denies that these texts have much to do with a moral sense. But it is evident that in these texts as elsewhere, Hutcheson sees a moral sense as the result of affections and passions produced by qualities in actions and objects, and that the existence of a moral sense is simply one more part of a defense of a kind of natural affective nature implanted in us by a benevolent deity.

There are a number of annoying slips in detail in the editing. One has to dig back through the introduction to find the actual dates of the *London Journal* issues in which Hutcheson's *Reflections* appeared. The editorial remarks on the *Inaugural Lecture* contain a garbled account which says that quotation marks have been preserved (123), but there are no quotation marks in the text. There are also a number of proof-reading errors.

However, we are fortunate to have these texts readily available. The volume will be of interest to both eighteenth-century specialists and those concerned with the history of moral philosophy.

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**Douglas M. Jesseph**
*Berkeley's Philosophy of Mathematics.*
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1993.
Pp. xii + 322.
US $57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-39897-6);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-39898-6).

Douglas Jesseph's study of Berkeley's philosophy of mathematics focuses our attention on the relation of science and philosophy, producing a work that is important not only to philosophers and historians of mathematics, but also to those working in the history of modern philosophy. Unfortunately, I suspect that many people working in the philosophy of mathematics still do not recognize the value of the historical study of their field. Jesseph himself admits that he himself once held the common view that nothing of importance existed in the philosophy of mathematics before Frege. Likewise, it is unlikely that Jesseph's work will provide a larger place for Berkeley than he has generally been allocated in the history of mathematics, partly due to the fact that Berkeley cannot be considered a mathematician, but also because many in the history of mathematics are likely to maintain a prejudice against any historical view which did not lead to contemporary theories, a natural position for historians who look for precursors. I hope that this book will have a profound impact on historians of philosophy and that here it will find the audience that it truly deserves. It is remarkable how often developments in mathematics have had a profound influence on philosophy. Indeed, modern and contemporary philosophy are full of cases of philosophers being proven wrong by a new mathematical theory, Kant's claim that Euclidean geometry is necessary perhaps being the most famous.

There are two important issues concerning the relation of science to philosophy which are developed in Jesseph's book, the first dealing with the reaction of historical philosophers to new sciences and the second dealing with our current attitude towards historical philosophers. Since Berkeley's critique of the calculus is often considered one of the worse examples of a philosopher criticizing a new scientific theory on the basis of (bad) epistemo-

logical or metaphysical commitments, Jesseph's reassessment of his philosophy of mathematics is a profitable addition to an important literature on the relationship of philosophy to science. While Berkeley cannot be considered a mathematician, Jesseph correctly argues that disciplinary boundaries were much less clear in the eighteenth century and that Berkeley's critique of the calculus did have a major impact on British mathematics of his time. Even though Jesseph shows that Berkeley knew quite a lot of mathematics, Berkeley was still criticizing the calculus as an outsider and doing so for philosophical (perhaps even theological) reasons.

The issue of which came first, Berkeley's general epistemological and metaphysical commitments or his reaction to mathematics, is more subtle than first appears. It is true that Berkeley's interest in the philosophy of mathematics arises from his rejection of abstract ideas. As Jesseph lucidly explains, most philosophers prior to Berkeley considered mathematical objects to be abstract ideas. Berkeley's opposition to abstract ideas therefore led him to oppose the accepted philosophy of mathematics of his day. Nevertheless, Berkeley's general critique of abstract ideas is focused on a single mathematical example, Locke's abstract triangle that is supposed to be neither acute, nor right, nor obtuse. His critique shows that philosophical understanding of mathematical objects had a great impact on the debate over abstract ideas. Jesseph demonstrates how Berkeley, through the use of carefully selected quotations, gained great rhetorical force by making Locke look inconsistent. Berkeley developed his own alternative to abstraction in which a particular concrete idea is presented to the mind but certain features of the idea are ignored, a view that Jesseph calls 'representative generalization.'

Berkeley maintains the traditional view that there is a difference between geometry and arithmetic. While geometry is treated as empirical and approximate, arithmetic is treated 'formally', i.e., nominalistically. Berkeley's treatment of geometry provides evidence that his rejection of abstract ideas is primary, since he sought ways to make his understanding of geometry consistent with his opposition to abstract ideas, first by advocating a rejection of classical geometry and later by adopting a weak form of instrumentalism about geometry. Berkeley's rejection of classical geometry in his early writings is quite radical and should be of interest to historians of mathematics. (He denies that magnitudes are infinitely divisible, which implies that the ratio of the circumference to the diameter of a circle varies according to its area, that some squares do not exist because the square root must be rational, and that the Pythagorean theorem is false.) His shifting epistemology of mathematics will be of obvious interest to historians of philosophy.

Jesseph provides the reader with the background necessary for understanding Berkeley's critique of the calculus and covers material that has only rarely been discussed in the history of mathematics, thus providing a valuable and accessible digest of some rather arcane material. Jesseph argues persuasively that on two central points, Berkeley was correct: first, despite the claims of the British mathematicians, Newton's version of the calculus

was no more rigorous than Leibniz's; second, Newton's supporters did not understand the calculus very well. The fact that Berkeley was right raises the second issue concerning the relation of science to philosophy, that is, our response to a valid criticism of a theory. The calculus has since developed in a way that clearly meets Berkeley's challenge. Arguing against both the critical and the laudatory normative judgements of contemporary philosophers of mathematics, Jesseph demands that we see Berkeley's work in its context, criticizing those philosophers who evaluate Berkeley according to their own philosophical commitments. Ironically, current philosophers of science may be committing the same error in judging Berkeley's work as Berkeley is accused of committing in criticizing the calculus, letting their philosophical commitments override whatever arguments apply in a particular case.

Jesseph has shown convincingly that issues in mathematics are central to Berkeley's philosophy and helped to put together mathematical and philosophical issues that have been artificially isolated in current academe. The only weakness of the book is that Jesseph fails to make as strong a case for the importance of Berkeley's philosophical work to historians and philosophers of mathematics. Perhaps one can only expect a historical work to appeal to those who already see some value in history. For those who do, Jesseph's book will be richly satisfying.

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**Victoria Kahn**
*Machiavellian Rhetoric: From the*
*Counter-Reformation to Milton.*
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1994. Pp. xiv + 314.
US $29.95. ISBN 0-691-03491-5.

This densely written book discusses and theorizes about the reception and interpretation of the political and social thought of Niccolo Machiavelli by Renaissance thinkers, primarily English Renaissance thinkers. Machiavelli's name has made its way into infamy and has long been an eponym for political ruthlessness and cynicism. Yet, Machiavelli remains one of the most puzzling and paradoxical of social theorists, admired by some for his combination of unflinching realism and republican idealism, and reviled by others for his supposed amoralism, cynicism, and apologetics for tyranny. Indeed,

what makes Machiavelli such a perennially intriguing figure are the antinomies of interpretative response that drift out of the wake of his own startling reflections on the nature of political power and his controversial prescriptions for the 'successful' ruler.

Victoria Kahn's learned and detailed work attempts not only to unravel some of the particularly subtle and paradoxical dimensions of Machiavelli's insights into the human political condition but to show how Machiavelli's rhetoric was greeted and interpreted by Renaissance thinkers ranging from Giovanni Botero, one of the earliest influential commentators on Machiavelli, to the great Puritan poet and polemicist John Milton. The Renaissance readers, as Kahn notes, in their encounters with Machiavelli's works found their own humanist rhetorical tradition under the assault of a master rhetorician. Yet Machiavelli, Kahn argues, was much more than a cynical destructive critic of Renaissance humanism. Machiavelli, she writes (59), 'attempted to forge a new rhetoric of politics that was simultaneously descriptive and prescriptive — a rhetoric that would generate compelling political arguments for republicanism from within a critical analysis of the status quo.' In this simultaneity of description and prescription is the source of Machiavelli's rare ability to render his prescriptions for political success, at the same time, so compelling and so infuriating. 'Machiavelli', Kahn writes (58), 'wanted to devise a political ethic that was capable of responding to the particular without losing its critical force.'

The book is comprised of three main parts. Part One is simply entitled 'Machiavelli' and provides an interpretation of *The Prince* and the *Discourses* as well as an account of Botero's grappling with the reception of Machiavelli in his *Ragion di stato* (1589). What Kahn attempts to reveal is a fundamental and relentless ambiguity in Machiavelli's writing that is reflected in his hostility to the humanist culture of his time yet carried out with humanist rhetorical strategies. Machiavelli's genius is manifest in the profoundly dialectical nature of his writings that speaks to each generation of readers as they attempt to grapple with the complexities of appearance-versus-reality in the political rhetoric they encounter. This protean, dialectical feature of Machiavelli's thought is a persistent theme throughout the book.

Part Two is entitled 'English Machiavellism' and covers Machiavelli's reception in England from 1530 through the Restoration in 1660. In England, as elsewhere, Machiavelli was reviled as a cynical atheist and apologist for tyranny, and also valued for his insight, and hence the term 'English Machiavellism' is consistent, appropriate, and suggestive. The ambivalence of reception in England runs very deep, and, as Kahn argues, is evidence of the potency of his rhetorical approach to politics as it speaks in a relentlessly unsettling way to the moral and religious dimensions of political power: '[W]hile it was common in the seventeenth century to distinguish between religion and government in terms of persuasion and force, the Machiavellian dyad of force and fraud also constantly reappears within the sphere of religious persuasion' (155-6). Machiavelli thus not only subverts classical conceptions of political morality, but discovers the workings of 'this-world'

political ambition behind the lofty proclamations of human spirituality. Machiavelli has shown that what Kahn calls the 'indeterminacy of rhetoric' applies to religion as well as politics.

Part Three, entitled simply 'Milton', is a study of Milton's own artful rendering of Machiavelli and an attempt to counter the received view of Milton's reading of Machiavelli. In Machiavelli, Milton finds not simply the theorist of republicanism but a rhetorician who helped him grapple with the metaphysical notions that hide behind his politics with all of their deeply moral and theological ramifications. 'Milton', writes Kahn (172), 'does not read Machiavelli simply as a secular theorist; rather, he sees the *Discourses* as compatible with his own argument against "forcing religion." ' Machiavelli's discovery of force and fraud in religion is inspiration for Milton's own theatrical staging of Satan's revolt against God. Milton's encounter with Machiavelli enables him to consider human freedom in a multiplicity of aspects — as a dimension of political society and as an ultimate moral and metaphysical condition of choice and decision. More importantly, Machiavelli's lesson is another instance of the 'indeterminacy' of rhetoric itself; that is, Machiavelli's rhetorical method is an instrument of freedom that frees him to function as both a critic and an idealist.

Kahn's style is, unfortunately, often opaque. She says, for example (220), of Milton's Satan: 'Precisely because Satan's narcissistic identification with the allegorical figure of Sin precludes genuine recognition of otherness, allegory in relation to Satan figures the danger of seduction by and idolatry of literature rather than as it was traditionally presumed to do, providing armor against it.' Well, perhaps, but the task of deciphering such turgid prose might discourage all but the most determined or specialized readers. Actually, the reader of this work would be advised to read the Coda, 'Rhetoric and the Critique of Ideology', before reading the book, for in it Kahn briefly sketches a broader theoretical platform, via Ricoeur, Gadamer and Habermas, for her own hermeneutical endeavors. It is this hermeneutical tradition that sets Kahn on her course throughout the book as she attempts to examine Machiavellism as a meditation of ideology, always moving between legitimate authority and coercion and domination.

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**Anthony Kenny**
*Aquinas on Mind*, John Marenbon, ed.
New York: Routledge 1993. Pp. viii + 182.
Cdn $43.95: US $35.00. ISBN 0-415-04415-4.

Turning over the well-worn pages of 'premodern' codices is a practice eyed with suspicion in this so-called 'poststructuralist' or 'postmodern' age. Few today would question the validity of such time-honoured practices and yet traces of mistrust remain, even in the mind touched by what Paul Ricoeur calls a postcritical 'second naïveté'. It is no accident that Sir Anthony Kenny begins this his most recent effort with a chapter entitled, 'Why read Aquinas?' Why, indeed.

There is much to be said for the standpoint which is only, at best, half convinced of the legitimacy of such an endeavour. For one, the sheer volume of Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* alone — approximately a million and a half words long, twice as long as the surviving Peripatetic corpus — is enough to dishearten any potentially serious reader. However, this quantitative setback is hardly the reason for blunted presentations of Aquinas's thought. Better is Kenny's alternative suggestion of qualitative deterrents spawned by the ecclesial trappings that are traditionally associated with the interpretative task. Kenny curbs these largely academic apprehensions, the progeny of crumbling Enlightenment sureties all of them, by noting that Aquinas 'is careful to make a distinction between his beliefs as a theologian and his beliefs as a philosopher' (12). Additionally, the diminished, often exaggerated role of Aquinas as the Church's official philosopher since 1965 (Vatican II) ought to quell, according to Kenny, needless anxiety poured over an imagined 'spokesman for a party line' (13). All this to say in effect that, as a philosopher, Aquinas can be 'more agnostic than Aristotle' (12).

With these preliminaries out of the way, Kenny proceeds to investigate various notions dear to the philosophy of mind in the light of Aristotelian-Thomist (Aquinas's) categories, for example, *potentiae* ('powers'), *phantasia/phantasm* ('imagination'/'image') (chap. 3), *intellectus* ('intellect') (chap. 4), *appetitus* ('appetite' or 'tendency'), so-called *libera voluntas* ('free will') (chaps. 5-6), *universalis* (the 'universal') (chap. 8), *singularitas* (the 'particular') (chap. 9), self-knowledge (chap. 10), *anima* (the 'soul') (chap. 11), and so on. There is nothing new here that will startle the seasoned interpreter of Thomas. Indeed, much of Kenny's insight into Aquinas has been unearthed, for instance, by Canadian philosopher-theologian Bernard Lonergan in his famous 'Verbum' articles (1946-49), the importance of which is acknowledged in Kenny's Preface (vii). The real contribution, however, is Kenny's assimilation of the Aristotelian notion of mind (*nous/intellectus*) with the anti-Cartesian stance of Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein, the pioneers of 'analytic' philosophy of mind.

Kenny, in the early pages of the book, is rather upfront with regard to his position: 'I believe, as a matter of fact, that the clearest insight into the nature of mind is to be obtained from the Aristotelian viewpoint. The mind is to be identified with the intellect, that is the capacity for acquiring linguistic and

symbolic abilities' (19). Much to the regret of his renowned MIT interlocutor, Noam Chomsky, who is, mildly put, unfavourably disposed toward the identification of an innate 'language-faculty' and mental 'abilities' (*potentiae*), Kenny resumes the philosophical exorcizing of the 'ghost in the machine' by positing the non-hypostatical activity of the human mind (cf. 155-9). This he relates closely to an *actus voluntatis*, 'a volition, as being an *inclinatio*, a tendency or disposition rather than an episode [of conscious awareness]' (85).

The 'linguistic turn', particularly Wittgenstein's version of it (though not stated explicitly in this book), is taken with utter seriousness, so much so that Kenny has to admit that 'Aquinas does not emphasize,' as he does, 'the importance of language in connection with human willing' (83). Even though Kenny is less hesitant in attributing to Aquinas the view that intellectual activity (*actu intelligere*) may be defined in terms of language use, he is careful not to collapse the distinction between what he calls 'capacities' of intellect (*intelligere* proper) and their specification by means of their actual 'exercises' (cf. 47-8). Contentious notions of so-called prelinguistic acts of meaning take on the ostensibly less troublesome guise of 'capacity' or 'ability' to use language in a way that is inseparable from the reason-giving activity ('language use') itself. This is an intriguing, linguistically sensitive understanding of the traditional quandary of simultaneity in rational being (act-content).

There is, of course, much to be had from this little book apart from this noted linguistic innovation. In addition to certain provocative elements that are guaranteed to inspire lively debate — Aquinas's notion of a self-subsistent, non-decomposable soul being among the most notable examples (chaps. 11-12) — *Aquinas on Mind* is an excellent introduction to the initially strange 'medieval' pursuit of the understanding of understanding. Seeing that significant parts of the book were the result of reflection (on questions seventy-five to eighty-nine of the First Part of the *Summa Theologiae*) intended for classroom use at Oxford, the work serves well as a pedagogical vehicle for teaching Aquinas to undergraduate students of philosophy and theology. A good number of Aquinas's quoted texts is given in the original Latin in endnotes for the more advanced student, with a modest bibliography (and index) for further research into the topic.

While keeping an indispensable critical distance, Kenny successfully shows how a qualified understanding of an ancient thinker like Aquinas need not be viewed as irredeemably 'ancient'. More often than not, and in spite of our supposed 'superannuated' state (3), all that is required to dispel feelings of epochal supremacy is the 'horrifying' experience of radical ideational dependency. *Aquinas on Mind*, then, is a valuable contribution or, more accurately, is to be accepted as such by those who are open to '[Aquinas's] massive philosophical genius' (13).

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Does it maximize one's expected utility to make the Bayesian calculation about which of two acts maximizes one's expected utility? It might not, in which case I should forgo it. But what if, missing the insight the calculation would bring, I prefer the act that does not maximize my expected utility? If I calculate, I'm not maximizing my expected utility; if I don't, I'm still not maximizing my expected utility. Shortly after Maher's book begins, such nasty delights as this one start flowing our way. Maher's solution is that decision theory does tell what act will maximize my expected utility, although sometimes it cannot tell me which act to choose by having me do the calculations.

But Maher is a sensible person, not a mere paradoxer. He defends a decision theory that is mainstream for contemporary philosophers, namely a causal decision theory that allows for people who do not have preferences or indifferences between all possibilities.

An example of Maher's good sense is his treatment of alleged intransitivities in our indifferences between acts. Given two cups of coffee, I cannot discriminate between their tastes, although one has no sugar in it and the other has ten grains of sugar. Similarly for another two cups, one with ten grains, the other with twenty grains, of sugar. Yet I prefer the cup with twenty grains of sugar over the cup with no sugar in it, just because it tastes sweeter. Have I violated the transitivity of indifference? Perhaps not. I may yet prefer the cup with ten grains of sugar over the one with no sugar in it simply on the basis of their taste, for I can discriminate between them on the basis of taste alone. Have I contradicted myself? No! Bring in the third cup for an indirect taste comparison between the first two. I can tell the sugarless cup apart from the cup with twenty grains, even if I can't tell the cup with ten grains apart from either. And that indirect comparison of the ten grained cup over the sugarless cup may be the basis for my preferring the former over the latter on the basis of taste alone. Mainstream opinion wins out; transitivity is vindicated.

Maher exploits the principle of equivalent decision trees to dispel the appeal of violations of independence (usually called the sure-thing principle) concocted by Allais and Ellsburg. Surprisingly, the aberrant intuitions disappear when we present these problems in decision-tree format. Mainstream opinion wins again.

Yet mainstream readers will come to feel that reading Maher is somewhat like Little Red Riding Hood visiting Grandma. We are eventually told that all Dutch book arguments are fallacious, whether they be for the rationality of conforming to the axioms of probability theory, for conditionalizing, or for anything else; fallacious also is the money pump argument for the transitiv-

ity of preference. Their conclusions are true, however, except for the Dutch book argument that claims the principle of reflection (also known as Miller's Principle) is a requirement of rationality. Further, we are told that Maher assumes that scientists have probabilities for their scientific hypotheses, but it eventually becomes clear that these are not degrees of belief.

Maher's treatment of the principle of reflection is persuasive, but his critique of the other Dutch book arguments is not. I reacted to it as a scientist would react to a charge of fallacy leveled at her generalizing of a scientific law from its test conditions to all applicable cases. The Dutch books of use in our arguments are limited to conditions in which a person's bets will reveal her probabilities to us, but these limitations on bet-making do not invalidate our extrapolating our conclusions about probability beyond them, since they result when the bettor's utility relates non-linearly to the money being bet. Maher is not above mounting a Dutch book argument of his own as an ad hominem against someone who accepts such arguments (199); yet who but his readers could he be trying to persuade?

'Grandma' Maher strikes deep, however, when he refuses to identify acceptance of a theory with a high degree of confidence in its truth, which mainstreamers identify with degree of belief. He defines the acceptance of a theory as a mental state that would naturally be expressed by a categorical assertion of the theory. Rational acceptance, a normative notion, maximizes the acceptor's expected cognitive utility, which is not reducible to the practical utility used in general decision theory. Maher defines a scientific cognitive utility function (144 and 239), from which, together with probability, he computes the expected cognitive utility of acceptance. The function relates three items: a measure of a theory's content from 1 (most informative) to 0 (empty or tautologous), a measure of distance from being true, from 0 (true) to 1 (off the wall), and a weighting factor expressing how important informativeness is as compared with avoidance of error, from 1 — informativeness is all — to 0 — avoidance of error is all. The last chapter elaborates on these concepts and offers an elegant formula for verisimilitude (240) in terms of them.

Science aims to maximize directly only our expected cognitive utility, and only indirectly our health, wealth, and biological fitness. Our personal acceptances may not be reflected in our actions, in our willingness to bet, or even in what we are willing to assert categorically in some circumstances. The book's title is odd in view of its main claim; in fact Maher imagines Einstein betting against relativity theory while accepting it (137). Cognitive utility and the preferences that reveal it are disconcertingly disconnected from behavior. Yet Maher claims to explain some scientific practices with his concept of acceptance that mainstreamers cannot explain: scientists rarely express their probabilities; they do not abandon theories that have come to be disconfirmed until they have replacements; and they serve their scientific goals by collecting evidence. Will mainstream Little Red Riding Hood defend herself? Stay tuned.

Maher's book is wonderfully clear and accessible to readers with little mathematical sophistication. Readers are expected to read simple formulas using the notation of probability theory or set theory, rarely to work through calculations. The heavy guns are confined to 45 pages of appendices. Even there his proof of his representation theorem is more accessible than those written by and for mathematicians.

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**Gareth B. Matthews**
*The Philosophy of Childhood.*
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1994. US $18.95. ISBN 0-674-66480-9.

In *The Philosophy of Childhood*, Gareth Matthews offers us a prospectus for what he argues is an area of inquiry worthy of serious philosophical attention. That prospectus presents a theory of childhood as first philosophy which runs against prevailing 'pre-operational' views of children's rational and moral powers. Such views, Matthews argues, are based on a dubious belief in maturation as a teleological process towards an ideal rational or moral type where later superior stages replace earlier inferior ones. In so far as this belief is implicated in, for example, Piaget's theory of child psychology, Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development and education, as well as Laura Purdy's Utilitarian arguments against children's rights, their conclusions, Matthews argues, demand radical criticism.

Matthews's 'informally researched' view of childhood alternatively proposes that 'spontaneous excursions into philosophy are not at all unusual for children between the ages of three and seven' (5). But, he adds, 'in somewhat older children ... even eight and nine year olds, they become rare, or at least rarely reported' (ibid). This, Matthews argues, is at least prima facie evidence for the claim that children *lose* the capacity for philosophical activity rather than lack it. In other words, he believes that although human beings come into the world with a natural or untutored sense of philosophical wonder they learn to train this tendency away from all but its most 'useful' ends, breaking it in the process (ibid). 'Once children become well settled in school,' Matthews writes, 'they learn that only "useful" questioning is expected of them. Philosophy then either goes underground, to be pursued privately, perhaps, and not shared with others, or else becomes totally dormant' (ibid).

In addition to discussing our childhood taste for first metaphysics, morals and epistemology, Matthews goes on to consider the merits of children's art in light of his first philosophy thesis as well as the importance of writing for

children. Given his conclusion that children start off on a philosophical path but are soon persuaded to give it up, Matthews's thesis faces two practical challenges. One is the challenge of re-orienting adult attitudes in the first place regarding the philosophical status of children's utterances and other behaviors. The second is the task of establishing 'that somewhat older children can, if deliberately provoked, still respond imaginatively and re-sourcefully to philosophical questions' (5).

The first task is made difficult in part by what Matthews calls 'childhood amnesia' (Chapter 7), where 'much of childhood is lost to direct recall' (87) as well as by the belief that the collective alienation of children serves certain social and political ends. On the one hand, Matthews argues that childhood amnesia 'shouldn't make me think of my childhood self as an alien creature' (ibid), implying that the task of re-orienting their attitudes towards children is made less difficult for adults by an increase in their sympathy with their own childhood.

On the other hand, Matthews criticizes views such as those advanced by Laura Purdy where 'children's liberation will tend to undermine the author-ity of parents and teachers' (77). It must be noted that Matthews is very careful throughout this work to contain the scope of his theory to a particular facet of childhood in order to stave off Utilitarian criticism that he has not considered its implications for the general welfare of children adequately. And so he does not deny that parental authority is an important instrument of children's welfare and social justice. Nevertheless, Matthews does attack the idea that such authority could ever be rational without the 'possibility of review' (ibid) — a possibility which he argues requires assuming the child-hood as first philosophy standpoint. Presumably, if our rationally justified social and political ends require the existence of a sphere in which irrational authority is justified, then as a society we have bigger problems than the one which has Purdy worried.

With respect to the second practical task his project faces, Matthews reports that results from his technique of 'writing story beginnings in which characters, mostly children, stumble … on some philosophical issue or problem' (5) confirm that given opportunity, older children do 'respond imaginatively and resourcefully to philosophical questions.' In addition, he tells us that using children's literature to introduce his university students to philosophy has assisted him in the aim of convincing them 'that philosophy is a natural activity, quite as natural as making music and playing games' (4).

Deciding whether or not Matthews's evidence for these conclusions is good evidence for them is part of what approaching *The Philosophy of Childhood* from the critical standpoint requires. Yet such a decision appears to rest on whether or not one is prepared to accept that philosophical ability is native to human beings and that in certain of its aspects requires no training. Matthews admits that from the prevailing point of view, such preparedness involves a leap of faith. But, he urges, there are two very good reasons for taking the plunge. The first is that while 'philosophical thinking is far from

the most prominent feature of childhood' (12), the tendency towards 'leaving it out encourages undeserved condescension toward children' (12-13).

The second reason for being open to the possibility that childhood as first philosophy is a plausible account of one aspect of early human being is that being open to childhood in this way 'helps us understand philosophy' (13). Matthews suggests throughout that a part of what philosophy does is ask the participant to habituate herself to 'giving up adult pretensions to know' (ibid). Recalling Descartes's project in the *Meditations*, Matthews writes that this 'is hard for adults. It is unnecessary for children' (18). As long as we accept that finding our way to some untutored, unpretentious, pre-trained point of view is indeed an important part of what philosophical activity demands, then philosophically listening to children, to their questions and comments, gives adults a perfect opportunity to access that point of view in a manner of speaking.

Leaving aside the question of whether or not condescension towards children is undeserved, if one were to object to Matthews's second reason for taking the childhood as first philosophy plunge, it would presumably be on the grounds that the unpretentious point of view which this reason celebrates is an atomist illusion. Just in virtue, the objection might go, of using this or that language to express herself, no child questions the world in an untrained way — in a way which presumes that she has not already been corrupted, let's say, by the suppositions of her culture or era. Thinking that her questions or comments might offer the adult special help in seeing through these murky suppositions to that all important 'suppositionless' ground is itself a product of muddled thought; thinking of childhood in terms of first philosophy is equally suspect.

Matthews's case for childhood as first philosophy is not as vulnerable to this charge as it might seem. Nevertheless, it is resting on claims about what is epistemologically possible and morally desirable which not all philosophers accept and so which are controversial. As far as I can tell, Matthews offers no argument in support of these claims and as such, we must conclude that he is not aiming to persuade those who hold against them that they are mistaken.

In fact, *The Philosophy of Childhood*, at least in the terms which Matthews draws its prospectus, is deeply entrenched within liberal individualism. This might invite the criticism that it preaches to the converted. But since controversies and tensions are nonetheless rife within that tradition, there is plenty of reason to expect fireworks as Matthews's project establishes itself within the mainstream of liberal individualist thought. In conclusion, I think that the intriguing and elegant points that Matthews makes in the process of advancing the claim that *some* 'children are little philosophers' *sometimes* (12 & 18) speak strongly in support of this end.

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**David Miller**
*Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence.*
La Salle, IL: Open Court 1994. Pp. xiii + 264.
US $44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9197-0);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9198-9).

David Miller is an associate of Karl Popper's who collaborated with him over many years. In this volume — a work of creative recycling that merits a Greenpeace award — Miller has put together material from several of his papers and new material to form a first-rate exposition and defence of critical rationalism.

After a brief outline of his interpretation of Popper's approach to the philosophy of science, Miller offers a systematic response to a bevy of criticisms. There then follow more extended treatments of the idea of 'good reasons', and of Bartley's 'comprehensively critical rationalism' and the debate that has taken place about it. Miller then develops a suggestive parallel between Hume's critique of empiricism and Gödel's critique of Hilbert, discussing why various responses to Hume look implausible if one considers their analogs in the philosophy of mathematics. Finally, Miller offers an extended critique of Bayesianism, and discussions of objective theories of probability, and of verisimilitude and truth. All told, Miller's treatment is both sustained and comprehensive, and he offers an engagement with alternative views, and with critics of critical rationalism, of a kind which one does not find in the work of Popper himself.

Miller's interpretation of critical rationalism is severely non-justificationist. It has a starkness to it that reminded me of *A Mathematician's Apology*. Miller announces at the outset of the volume that 'the task of empirical science ... is to separate as thoroughly and efficiently as it can the true statements about the world from those that are false, and to retain the truths' (1). After distinguishing between this aim, and that of knowing that this aim has been achieved, Miller says, 'the mission is to classify truths, not to certify them.' As his argument develops, his criticism is extended to all positive forms of certification. For example, Miller argues in chapter 3 that good reasons cannot be obtained; that if they could, they would not be of any use; and that they are also not necessary. Further, he claims that if our concern is with truth, probable truth is not an acceptable substitute. The austerity of his approach is further brought out by way of engagements with fellow Popperians, Musgrave and Watkins, whom he criticizes for their departures from his straight but narrow path.

There is much in Miller's book that would merit discussion. Here, I will consider not Miller's criticism of other views, but a feature of his own. For on the face of it, one reason why other philosophers pursue justificatory concerns that Miller finds so unfruitful is that they do not find his own position satisfactory. A key difficulty arises in respect of Miller's response to Goodman's 'new riddle of induction' (if one interprets this as involving alternative claims about the possible character of the world).

Miller commences by saying that a hypothesis 'must not be admitted to empirical science unless there are tests that can eliminate it' (35), and that

'conflicting hypotheses must not be admitted ... unless there are crucial tests that can eliminate at least one of them.' He then asks, of a regular hypothesis and its Goodmanesque alternative, 'which of the hypotheses shall we admit' (36), suggesting that in *this* case it is (obviously) 'all emeralds are green.' For this preference, he stresses, there is no *justification*. He is, however, willing to suggest that our preference for 'greenness' may be *explained* in terms of our evolutionary history, behind which lies a process of or akin to conjectures and refutations. Miller claims that 'the present situation' (including, presumably, this preference) 'is ill described as completely arbitrary or as "an historical accident" ' (36). However, while Miller is dismissive of the specific artificial example of 'grue', he does say (37), 'I fully accept the possibility of more realistic examples of testable theories, empirically indistinguishable here and now but diverging in remote regions of space and time, that have identical claims to scientific status.' To this, he finally offers the 'falsificationist response': 'we must guess which of the competing theories is true, and do our best ... to falsify that guess' (37-8).

This seems to me an inadequate response. For we are presumably naturalistically predisposed to make a preference for one or other such theory. But *what* our preference here is would seem accidental, in the sense that, as Goodman's argument suggests, we might well have had one of many other such predispositions, which would have led us to choose other theories that would have been equally successful, to date. As a result, the content of a strictly falsificationist science would seem in danger of being arbitrary. For *which* conjectures it contains would seem to be pre-determined by the epistemologically arbitrary point from which we happened to start — for example, the way in which we happen to be predisposed to interpret the world, or to find particular hypotheses simple or appealing.

Miller may be right that justificationists have been unsuccessful and that justificationism is unpromising, to say the least. But it seems to me unsurprising that they should still be seeking for some way in which to explain how a preference for one or another of such alternatives is rational, whether in the light of experience or by some other means. For, without this, the content of our knowledge looks unacceptably a matter of pot luck, and rationality an underachiever that declares that the choice of any one of various mutually incompatible theories would be equally acceptable. In short, the problem would seem to be that our choice is between an unpromising justificationism and a position that is unacceptably skeptical.

Be all this as it may, Miller presents a particularly useful and stimulating account of critical rationalism. His work is both interesting and controversial. It contains much that should be of interest to anyone with concerns in epistemology or the philosophy of science, and it would make for provocative reading in a graduate seminar.

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**Jitendra Nath Mohanty**
*Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking.*
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1992. Pp. x + 306.
Cdn $101.50: US $65.00. ISBN 0-19-823960-2.

Mohanty has provided us with an interesting and important contribution to the scholarship of Indian philosophy, not only because it gives philosophers trained in the Western tradition access to these concepts, but in that it shows that 'Eastern' philosophies are concerned with the same kinds of problems and have the same exasperations as those of 'the West.' One might expect that this text be like a host of others that attempts some kind of cross-cultural examination of basic concepts and shows the deep seated differences or similarities. Not so. Mohanty's main concern was 'not to capture the common features which were rather superficial, but to conceptualise and articulate the deep and significant differences should there be any, after the clichés had been exposed' (2). He goes on to say that 'it is not historical answers that I have been looking for, but rather conceptual and structural ones' (3). So, this does not turn out to be anthropology, but philosophy, after all.

The book takes us through a number of the most important areas of philosophy: consciousness, language and meaning, logic, theories of truth, ontology, and time. Throughout the chapters, the overarching concern is to the explanation of Indian concepts in such a way as the Western philosopher could understand and relate to them. Rather than dwelling upon how different or similar the two 'systems' are, Mohanty provides a set of conceptual touchstones on both sides and a sense that not dissimilar goals are at issue. As he points out, '[t]here is both a historical and a suprahistorical aspect to philosophy. I would say the same of cultural relativism. Not all philosophical concerns are culture-bound' (4).

The effects of tradition and modernity in philosophy have been discussed before as a problem and is addressed by Mohanty to attempt to distance Indian philosophy from the idea that it is far from the mainstream and of interest only to anthropologists and historians of ideas. To do this, he provides a convincing argument to show that in Indian philosophy, and presumably other non-Western philosophical traditions, the modern and the traditional need not be separated by a gulf: '...[W]ho can ask me questions, challenge my convictions, question my arguments, excepting one who is a contemporary? While this appears to me to be unexceptionable, I must add, however, that it does not exclude tradition from being a dialogical partner. My tradition can be contemporaneous with me' (12). Interestingly enough, in the Western tradition we rarely characterise our dialogues as dialogues with the 'Tradition.' When it happens, nothing is thought of it. When critical of other traditions, it is typical to treat that other tradition as less than one that is alive: '[W]e still need to reject the attempt to fossilize that tradition

into such a self-sufficient, autonomous whole as to render it immune to radical (as distinguished from internal) criticism' (15).

The critical discussion of the similarities and contrasts goes deep into the most familiar sub-divisions of philosophy and, in so doing, tends to get very deep into the Indian concepts that Mohanty is attempting to make accessible. To his credit, he does, for the most part, an admirable job. However, sometimes the discussion becomes so terse that the point of it all is sometimes lost. For example, in the chapter discussing language and meaning, he attempts to show that the Fregean distinction between sense and reference has no direct analog in Indian philosophical discourse. The ensuing pages discuss a great deal of Indian thought on the subject. What is lost is exactly what this says about the concepts of meaning in Indian thought. For my part, I have a lot of questions about just what is going on in the Indian tradition. While this does not really detract from the project to the point that it is unintelligible, it does make the going more difficult.

In contrast to the meat of the text, the final chapter, which deals with the question of the nature of Indian philosophical thinking, is clear and crisp. Even though you need to have read the rest of the book to see the point Mohanty makes, it is by far the most interesting part of the book. In attempting to tie everything together, Mohanty poses the question: 'Are Indian and Western philosophies radically different?' In the discussion, three responses are examined. Mohanty claims that they all lead to the same conclusion, that the Western conception of philosophy is in fact categorically different than the Indian philosophical tradition. In response, Mohanty tries to tie together all of the discussion to this point in the text and show that, in fact, there is little or no discontinuity between Western and Indian philosophy by examining the alleged primacies of logic in the West and intuition in India.

As for the success of the project of the text, I believe the book has made an excellent case for treating Indian philosophy as philosophy. I do think that there can be more said regarding the way all of these concepts are translated and the roles they play in their respective systems, and there should also be a more complete examination of the whole of Indian philosophy. But as for the importance of the book itself, I feel that it is required reading for anyone in the Western tradition concerned with Indian philosophy, and for anyone interested in pursuing the thesis of an incompatibility of Western and Indian philosophical thought.

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**Vance G. Morgan**
*Foundations of Cartesian Ethics.*
Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1994.
Pp. xii + 237.
US $45.00. ISBN 0-391-03804-4.

If the recent trend in Cartesian scholarship is to present a more sympathetic portrait of Descartes, Vance Morgan's well-written and insightful book, *Foundations of Cartesian Ethics*, furthers the cause.

Morgan challenges the traditional characterization of Descartes as Rationalist *par excellence* and rejects the notion that Descartes 'helped lay the metaphysical foundations of modern science by excluding from its scope the practical aims of the human organism' (6). Instead, Morgan holds that Descartes's 'lifelong desire' was that his philosophical enterprise result in 'the practical improvement of people's lives' (5). Thus, Morgan contends that one *can* glean a 'working ethic' from Descartes's published works and *Correspondence*, and that this ethic is not only consistent with, but also arises from, Descartes's metaphysical and physical principles (4).

Consideration of Cartesian ethics reveals a 'tension' constantly felt by Descartes in applying his philosophy to life: '... Descartes constantly found himself pulled between metaphysical and moral certainty, between the realm of thought and the realm of action, between the limited power of reason and the infinite capacity of the will' (5). According to Morgan, Descartes's tension presents us a dilemma: 'How is one to live one's life morally under the Cartesian directive of certainty in a world that does not lend itself to the pure application of reason and derivation of metaphysical certainty' (5)?

From the perspective of this dilemma, the traditional characterization of Descartes is ineffective. It suggests that Descartes attempted 'to apply pure reason and the demand for absolute certainty universally to metaphysics, mathematics, natural science, and ethics' (4). Cartesian mortality, however, reveals an area of thought in which Descartes did *not* require absolute certainty. Against the charge that Descartes advances a more lenient requirement for morality than for metaphysics, Morgan argues:

> Moral certainty cannot be seen as 'second best' in the sphere of ethics, because due to the metaphysical composition of the human being, it is the *only* certainty proper to action in our world. We cannot expect certainty in Cartesian morals to arise from absolute, inviolable norms that are to be followed in an unwavering fashion, because such norms would, in Descartes's terminology, be metaphysically certain. These are precisely the types of norms or principles that are *not* available in the sphere of morals, as determined by the metaphysical roots of philosophy. Descartes must seek to ensure certainty in morals with a foundation other than definitive, absolute norms. (86)

Thus certainty in one's actions *can* be found, but it is found elsewhere than pure reason, i.e., in what Morgan refers to as a 'psychological source'. This

source, 'the psychological conviction that one is always using one's will to carry out whatever the intellect identifies as the proper action, based on the best knowledge available' (5), is fully explored in the second half of Morgan's book which examines the *Passions* and *Correspondence*.

The success of Morgan's argument rests on the distinction between metaphysical certainty (which requires evidence and indubitability), and moral certainty (which requires 'using one's reason in the best manner possible' and 'the inner resolve of the will'). This distinction, which neatly parallels the opposition between the realm of thought and the realm of action, the limited power of reason and the infinite power of the will, is ultimately founded on the distinction between the incorruptible mind and the corruptible body. This dual composition of the human being is in fact the metaphysical principle from which Cartesian morality arises.

By resting his argument on Cartesian Dualism, Morgan must address the problem of the substantial union of mind and body. Morgan concentrates on the account of this union that Descartes offered to Princess Elizabeth of Sweden during the Spring and Summer of 1643. Instead of offering a causal *explanation*, Descartes offers a *description* of how it is that we can *conceive* of this union through *experience*: 'I must admit ... that the fact that the mind is closely conjoined with the body [is] experience[d] constantly through our senses' (*A Letter for Arnauld*, 29 July 1648). Morgan draws on this description to establish the distinction between metaphysical and moral certainty: 'Metaphysical certainty is to be expected and demanded in the realm of the pure intellect [which can conceive of the nature of the mind and body separately] but is inappropriate in the realm of the human composite, a realm that includes the activity of that composite in the world' (86).

Descartes's description of the substantial union between mind and body based in experience will certainly trouble scholars who steadfastly cling to Descartes's Rationalism; Princess Elizabeth herself found it unsatisfying. His description is useful, however, in terms of introducing a more relaxed requirement for certainty, which Descartes was ultimately forced to admit into his system:

> If Descartes ever optimistically hoped in his early years that metaphysical, absolute certainty would be the hallmark of his entire philosophical system from metaphysics through ethics, the unique construction of the human being — an incorruptible mind in substantial union with a corruptible body — has made this impossible. (85)

Thus, Morgan is able to resolve some of the 'tension of Cartesian ethics'. The substantial union of incorruptible mind and corruptible body, which allows the distinction between metaphysical and moral certainty, results in 'what Descartes knew all along' — namely, 'the highest and most perfect moral system' must necessarily derive its certainty from a psychological source rather than one that is metaphysically certain' (6).

In his *Introduction*, Morgan promises that 'serious investigation of Descartes's ethics will serve to balance the characterization of Descartes as a

rationalist par excellence' (5). Later, however, Morgan suggests, 'the value of a serious investigation of Cartesian ethics goes beyond an attempt to balance [such a] portrayal' (6). Although Morgan's book does go beyond this issue in many important ways, it never addresses this issue directly. How *is* one to understand the relaxed Cartesian directive of certainty in a world that will not, unfortunately, lend itself easily to Morgan's portrayal of Descartes? Perhaps this perplexity merely reflects deeply felt prejudices concerning Descartes — Rationalist *par excellence* — the very portrait Morgan calls into question.

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**Jean-Luc Nancy**
*The Experience of Freedom*. Bridget McDonald, Trans.
Stanford: Stanford University Press 1993.
Pp. xxxi + 210.
US $37.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-2175-0);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-2190-4).

Bridget McDonald maintains the flavor and rhythm of Nancy's *L'expérience de la liberté*, clearly rendering into English this interesting and demanding work. Nancy analyzes the position of freedom in current philosophical debates, rigorously pursuing the question of what freedom can possibly mean when linked to regulation in political discourse and necessity in philosophy. In politics since the eighteenth century, as Nancy points out, rights as freedoms are increasingly prescribed and proscribed by law, and philosophy is expected to provide the grounds and intellectual defense of this legal and ethical project. Philosophy has concurrently postulated freedom in such a way that it 'has been thoroughly subordinated to the determination of an ontology of subjectivity' (4). However, there is a remarkable inadequacy of both the definition of freedom and its mobilization, a lack which is marked by the very subordination of freedom to these projects of freedoms in the law on one hand, and to an ontology of subjectivity in philosophy on the other. For Nancy, freedom itself stands in need of being freed from these twin forms of domination.

Nancy locates his own project at a specific historical moment marked by circumstances which belong to the history of philosophy as the self-proclaimed search for grounds (of existence, of thought, etc.). This moment is that of the emergence of Dasein in the history of thought — the moment when

existence is no longer investigated for its grounds, but is interrogated as a phenomenon, or as Nancy puts it, as a fact (10). For Nancy, this movement counts as a liberation; it 'gives existence back to itself and only to itself' (10). Nancy argues that the historico-philosophical freeing of being requires an inquiry into the position and nature of the freedom which made this move possible.

In line with Kant and Heidegger, Nancy argues that 'before' there is either being or existence, at the moment of their emergence, there is nothing determining that emergence: 'To use the terms that haunt all of Kant's thought, there is no reason that there should not be chaos and no reason that anything should appear. If something appears, it is therefore not through "reason", but through its freely coming' (94). Freedom is the agent of possibility for this birth, which is always one of self-surprise, irruption, unpredictability. Freedom is in this sense the ultimate contingency, but a contingency which is formative and necessary to existence itself.

For Nancy, freedom is inextricably tied to both existence and thought, not as foundation, but as modality and motor. Freedom is, like being, a fact — the fact — of existence; it is marked by the withdrawal of being for the coming of existence; it forms the limit of existence as such. It also 'makes itself understood, at the limit of comprehension, as what does not originate in comprehension' (49). 'Above all, freedom is what expends: freedom is primarily prodigal liberality that endlessly expends and dispenses thinking. ... [F]reedom ... gives thinking, it gives something to be thought about, yet it also simultaneously gives itself to be thought about in every thinking' (53). Thus, 'thinking is nothing other than the being-delivered to [freedom's] generosity. ... [F]reedom offers itself in thinking as what is more intimate and originary to it than every object of thought and every faculty of thinking' (55). For this reason, there is a structural problem in the task given to philosophy by the liberal political tradition — to define and defend freedom.

As a special kind of thinking, 'philosophy does not produce or construct any "freedom," [as the freedom to or from] it does not guarantee any freedom, and it would not as such be able to defend any freedom (regardless of the mediating role it can play ... in actual struggles)' because thought cannot possess and define freedom; thinking is rather defined by it (64). For this reason, however, as a practice, philosophy 'keeps open the access to the essence of logos. ... In this way it must henceforth keep the access open — freedom — beyond the philosophical or metaphysical closure of freedom' (64, Nancy's italics).

For those interested in the history of philosophy, Nancy's analysis of Heidegger's treatment of freedom is noteworthy. He traces the development and virtual disappearance of this concept in Heidegger's work, a trajectory which has intriguing implications for Heidegger's involvement with Nazism and its relation to his thought. It would be difficult not to identify Nancy's own discussion of evil and the problem of freedom with an intellectually and politically important concern with both Heidegger's past and the events of

the post-Auschwitz world (as Adorno would call it), a concern which strongly marks Nancy's generation of French intellectuals.

The major paradox of the text is present from the beginning, when Nancy states his concern that freedom is subordinated in both philosophy and politics to other concerns — that freedom is enslaved. However, he argues that the essence of freedom is its generosity, its constant rendering of itself without question (55). In this sense, by its being what it is, freedom is always free to be given over without question, a problem Nancy begins to address in the chapter 'Evil: Decision'. Freedom gives itself for good as much as for evil, in his estimation: 'evil belongs to the essence or structure of freedom such as it has been freed and surprised, in our history, as our history. This justifies nothing' (129). It requires, however, 'that a thought of freedom must keep its eyes fixed on the hatred that delivers itself at the heart of freedom' (129). This constant vigilance is not only the warning which the text gives; it is its motivation.

On the whole, *The Experience of Freedom* is equal to Nancy's other works, thought provoking and intriguing, as usual. However, it can be a difficult read for those not familiar with his arguments in *The Inoperative Community*, or for those who are not well-versed in Kantian or Heideggerian thought. One need not be a specialist, though, to understand and enjoy the work, or to find it useful.

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**Nicholas Phillipson** and **Quentin Skinner, eds.**
*Political discourse in early modern Britain.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 1993.
Pp. 444.
US $59.95. ISBN 0-521-39242-X.

This twenty-fourth volume of Cambridge's successful *Ideas in Context* series has a dual aim: to explore the political ideologies of Britain from the end of the sixteenth to the close of the eighteenth century, and to honour intellectual historian J.G.A. Pocock with whose trail-blazing work in this era all sixteen contributors connect in their essays. The book closes with Pocock's response in sufficient space (377-428) to allow for interesting engagement with some of the contributions.

Pocock's comments on the relationships of the various essays to his work are sometimes critical, on occasion amusing, typically intriguing. He expresses strong disagreement with Jonathan Scott's position (in 'The rapture of motion: James Harrington's republicanism') that 'Harrington's utopia ceases altogether to be a republic and becomes a Hobbesian experiment in the control and mechanisation of human speech and action' (404). Richard Tuck's 'The civil religion of Thomas Hobbes' presents an interpretation of *Leviathan* which, says Pocock, Tuck 'generously associates with my writings [of] more than twenty years ago,' before he had in fact published or even written on Tuck's theme (399). Pocock identifies with James Tully ('Placing the *Two Treatises*') particularly when Tully associates Lockean images with Canadian confederation and its relation to 'first nations' rights, which Pocock connects with New Zealand's *tangata whenua* (Maori first nations). Intriguing is Pocock's assessment that 'Tully and I both find ourselves in post-modern historical situations to which ... the issue of aboriginal sovereignty raises the question of pre-agricultural human ecology' (420-1), but this comment remains disappointingly allusive. Is resolution of such issues feasible for post-modernity with its dislocated selves and the relativism precluding conceivably overarching moral possibilities as conditions for negotiation between disparate political postures?

These responses offer stimulating Pocockean pronouncements: 'It is the function of utopia to depict men as other than they are, but it is the aim of revolution to make them so' (405); and 'Platonists ... ploughed under by Bacon at the Restoration and Locke at the Revolution ... [believed] in a God of reason, incarnate more in the human mind than in Christ's person' (407). Less stimulating is the statement that the 'concept of revolution in our sense of the term' is 'a drastic change in historical conditions constituting a process' (394). Its vagueness is exceeded only by the copious footnotes in which Pocock characteristically names entire books for corroboration of a point which is often only a sub-theme in them.

Each individual contribution links with others through connecting themes which give the collection a unity beyond that imposed through historical period or association with Pocock's work. Although all these contributions are worthy of attention, it is impossible to focus on each; hence I shall highlight two of the themes, that of royal power in its relation to society and church, and of the character of Whig thought — a strategy which allows introduction of a good cross-section.

J.H. Burns' 'George Buchanan and the anti-monarchomachs' takes us into sixteenth-century Scotland in the light of Queen Mary's deposition debating the issue which became crucial for seventeenth-century England. If the basis of governmental power lies in society which has 'institutional means of expressing [and] of executing its corporate will' (21), institutional means nevertheless 'subject always to the king's overriding authority' (22) the issue is the dilemma 'for the theory of monarchy' of this period: does placing governmental authority in society threaten monarchical government as such (5) or does monarchical government preclude the effectiveness of social

institutions by making their very existence subject to 'royal summons' (22)? The problem of the origin of governmental power was in part rooted in views of revelation, and the Reformation's *sola scriptura* theology' (7) threatened hierarchical powers of both state and church. The latter point is taken up in Richard Tuck's 'The civil religion of Thomas Hobbes'. Hobbes' allocating interpretation of Scriptural meanings to the civil sovereign 'with the same autonomy as he possessed in the interpretation of all other meanings,' denudes 'apostolic succession of all significance' (128) and removes one of the two hierarchies from the contest. Tuck's new perspective is the suggestion that Hobbes was led to this *Leviathan* position as a response 'to the debates among the French and English Catholic writers' who argued that current theological dogma was more the result of the Greek philosophical mind's corrupt reading of Christian texts than of what these texts were intended to say (133-4).

Removing one hierarchy does little for those who want to see power in society's hands or in a balance between society and king. Condren's 'Casuistry to Newcastle' portrays forces at work advising Charles II before the Restoration to continue Hobbes' tack: once king, the church must be in his hands, for papacy 'would replace him with an alien monarch' and presbytery would 'destroy monarchy' (177). Mediation of both Scriptural and secular meanings must remain royal prerogative, lest 'priest will expound God's will in his own interest' and lawyer will proclaim that kings must be obeyed but not against the law — a law then expounded to the lawyer's own 'best advantage to Rule' (177-9). Schochet's 'Between Lambeth and Leviathan' takes this argument to the brink of the Revolution's outbreak in Samuel Parker's (advisor of James II) distrust of the 'common people' (194) coupled with advocacy of strong public power settled in the king — power divinely ordained hence requiring 'the necessity of subjection and obedience,' for 'the duty to obey the orders of superiors is part of the duty that is owed to God' (200, 204). This is one perspective permeating early modern Britain. Its tension with Whig thought made for late seventeenth-century revolutionary conflict.

For, as Mark Goldie argues ('Priestcraft and the birth of Whiggism'), Whiggism originated in a struggle to overcome the hierarchical powers of both church and court, hence was 'born as much in anticlericalism as in constitutionalism ... a vision in which the temporal sphere ... gradually asserted its rights against the pretensions of a usurping clergy' (214). It was a struggle which resulted in 'the transformation of the Puritan into the Whig' (215). Underlying Whig action was the shift to the primacy of the individual. Hence (as Lois Schwoerer illustrates in 'The right to resist') 'All Whig statements about resistance were derived from some form of a theory of contract' (238) whose 'underlying argument was that of the right of self-preservation' which 'sanction[s] resistance to an erring prince' whose error jeopardizes preservation of law and private property (250-1). This line of argument culminates in Lawrence Klein's 'Shaftesbury, politeness and the politics of religion', which demonstrates that the Third Earl's advocacy of

'politeness' 'projected a culture of, for and by gentlemen' — 'a deeply political proposition since it involved a transfer of authority from state and church to the arena of public gentlemanly discourse' (289), a transfer signifying 'the new political prominence of the English gentleman' as a 'Whiggish triumph' (283).

This volume of *Ideas in Context* ably continues reexamination of familiar texts and themes in the light of Pocockean insistence on the relevance of surrounding debates. Although the context of some of the essays remains insularly British, as a contribution to contextual understanding the volume as a whole is an apt and well-deserved tribute to J.G.A. Pocock.

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**Louis A. Sass**
*The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein,*
*Schreber, and the Schizophrenic Mind.*
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1994.
US $25.95. ISBN 0-8014-2210-8.

This fascinating and suggestive book by the author of *Madness and Modernism* (Basic Books, 1992) is 'an essay on madness as akin to philosophy, on philosophy as a kind of madness' (ix). The kinship of madness and philosophy, Sass argues, is that both are entanglements in paradoxes of self-inclusion (82f). By 'philosophy' Sass especially means the writings of modern philosophers, for instance, Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant. By 'madness' he means the intense awareness of and captivation by one's own mental experience exemplified in Daniel Schreber's *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* (Harvard University Press, 1988). By 'paradox of self-inclusion' is meant the consequences of thinking about the set of all sets. If it is not a member of itself, it is not the set of ALL sets — itself being left out; and if it is a member of itself, then it is a member rather than the SET of all sets.

Sass' first task is to show that Schreber's delusions, which Freud and other psychiatric writers regarded as schizophrenia, are paradoxical distortions, contradictions, and transformations of the structures of space, time, identity, and consciousness of certain philosophical writings. Citing and discussing many examples, he says that Schreber and others like him:

1) begin their madness by experiencing or observing their experience.

2) find their experience of certain perceptions or events to be extremely but inexpressibly and inexplicably meaningful.

3) have no sense of owning or controlling their actions, sensations, and thoughts but acknowledge them as their own.

4) suspect but don't believe that other people are phantoms, clever machines, or deceptive appearances of some other sort.

5) have a sense of the universe responding to, say, every movement of their intestines.

6) fear a dissolution of self and the universe.

7) feel the self to be the creator or inventor of all that is encountered, e.g., the stars.

8) elaborate their delusions and hallucinations with a degree of detail and specificity that rivals the actual world.

9) experience both the actual and delusional worlds as devitalized, derealized, and unauthentic.

While one would expect Sass to develop his claim that madness and philosophy are akin by citing the philosophical writings to which schizophrenic delusions are to be compared, he does not. Instead, he undertakes a showing that Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* and *Blue and Brown Books* illumine Schreber's schizophrenic *Memoirs* and vice versa: 'I would argue that what Wittgenstein most feared was something akin to the madness that afflicted Schreber and that his philosophy is motivated, at least in part, by a strenuous attempt to ward off such a mode of existence' (74).

It is important to understand that Sass does not mean to open Wittgenstein's work to criticism. Schreber's madness, he argues, did not consist in perceiving things that do not exist and believing things that are not true nor in a regression toward primitive or infantile thinking. For Schreber and others like him maintain an irony and distance in speaking of their delusions. The kinship between Schreber's madness and the mode of philosophical existence which Wittgenstein feared, Sass thinks, is that both arise from the paradox of self-inclusion.

To experience or observe one's experience is the starting point of both philosophy and 'schizophrenia ... a Socratic illness: a matter of the mind's perverse triumph over the body, the emotions, and the external world' (117). To find one's experience of certain perceptions or events extremely but inexplicably and inexpressibly meaningful is an early symptom of paradox; it is both the verge of madness and the glimpse of a meaning or essence behind phenomena that draws the philosopher on.

To have no sense of owning or controlling one's own actions, sensations, and thoughts but to acknowledge them as one's own is precisely the paradox of self-inclusion: if one has made oneself the object of one's own observation, then one can not but must be the self which one observes.

One who continues in this state of self-observation will suspect but not believe that other people are phantoms, clever machines, or some other sort of deceptive appearances. Other people are not immediately present to the

self observing itself experiencing the world, and it doubts the evidence of the others' existence; but to the observed self, which is experiencing the world, other people are immediately present, and it can not doubt them.

Moreover, the self experiencing its experience of the world will develop a sense of the universe responding to, say, every movement of its own intestines. For to the self experiencing itself's experience, any change in experience is necessarily a change in the world. But the self which only experiences can distinguish between an experience of itself and an experience of the world. Thus the madman regards his delusion with a certain irony.

The hyperconscious self will fear a dissolution of the self and the universe because its life and organization is dependent on the life and organization of the conscious self which experiences the world; should this conscious self cease, both the hyperconscious self and its world will cease. Thus the hyperconscious self feels the self which experiences that world to be the creator or inventor of all that it encounters, e.g., the stars. For nothing can exist for a self observing itself except through the agency of the self which observes the world.

Sass makes good use of the details of Wittgenstein's investigations of the ways in which paradox is generated and philosophical confusions arise in explicating Schreber's account of his delusions, and he makes equally good use of the details of Schreber's accounts of his mental states in explicating the mode of existence against which Wittgenstein fought. Just as Schreber elaborated his delusions and hallucinations with a degree of detail and specificity that rivaled the actual world, so the modern philosophers observed and elaborated their observations of experience with a degree of detail and specificity that rivaled scientific observations and elaborations of the nature of the world. And, just as Schreber came to experience both the actual and delusional worlds as devitalized, derealized, and unauthentic, so Wittgenstein came to view philosophy as an illness in which abstract and contemplative thought are reified and overvalued, and contact with the sources of wisdom in engagement and activity are lost.

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In his book *Privacy and Social Freedom*, Ferdinand David Schoeman advances and explores several theses about individuals, groups, and the relation between the two, with an eye towards a discussion of the nature of privacy and the meaning of social freedom. He explores the cultural and anthropological history of the notion of privacy, and has a fascinating chapter on how morality differs in the public and private spheres, which uses literary works for examples. There is a scholarly treatment of Mill's work in these areas also. Overall, the book is thorough in scope and contains a very interesting discussion.

Unfortunately, several of Schoeman's main arguments depend on glossing fine distinctions and drawing overly broad conclusions. With regards to individuals, for example, Schoeman argues that 'the prospect and desirability of a moral stance independent of cultural influence [is] questionable.' It is not nitpicking to notice the calculated ambivalence built into the use of the word 'influence'. Is this supposed to mean that we cannot separate ourselves totally and completely from the circumstances of our upbringing and the history of our thoughts and discussions? Or is it intended to mean that we cannot rise above our prejudices and strive for an operative degree of objectivity about our moral judgements? The former may very well be the case, but isn't as interesting a thesis as the latter, which is surely not the case, and which in any event doesn't follow from the former.

I pick out this one instance as an example of the 'having it both ways' approach that characterizes the work. Individual freedom is said to be a value, but groups are said to require 'freedom' as well, in the form of 'social control mechanisms'. Privacy is continually praised throughout the book, but life in a group 'must be the central element' of our understanding of freedom. One is never exactly sure what degree of liberty Schoeman thinks is 'appropriate'.

Schoeman argues that social freedom consists not in being left alone, but in 'having opportunities to pursue significant ends without enduring unfair or unreasonable social sacrifices.' Again, though, how are we to interpret vague terms like 'significant' and 'unreasonable'? Who determines significance? Is it unreasonable to require that I forbear from consuming pornography, or red meat? Is my desire to study the Marquis de Sade a significant end? The usual liberal response is that the decision about what counts as a significant end is left to the individual, but the social control mechanisms kick in just when the person's ends cause harm to others. That's not a self-evident truth, but it offers a possible algorithm for delineating the realm of privacy. A police officer who gets drunk on the job, to use Mill's example, is out of the realm of the private, but the same lawman sitting at home off-duty is fully within that realm.

Distinguishing between the individual and the group is a worthwhile task as long as we remain concerned about the ability of the individual to grow

and flourish. But how useful is it to say that 'individuals are dependent on groups to be effective social agents'? Here, Schoeman is presumably trying to establish a relationship between the individual and the group, but this is straightforwardly circular. Of course being effective in society is dependent on society. But what sort of theoretical justification of social control mechanisms could that provide?

Schoeman's interest is in the relationship between privacy and 'the associative dimensions of life.' Privacy, he says, limits the social control others have over us. That seems to be quite right, conceptually. But if, as Schoeman says, life in a group is to be the 'central element' of our understanding of freedom, then what is the point of having those limits? This seems confused, although I do not think Schoeman is confused. Cambridge is not in the habit of publishing confused monographs. Rather it seems that Schoeman is trying to have it both ways, presenting a thesis that is acceptable to liberals, by praising privacy and speaking of individuals, and at the same time satisfying communitarian concerns about the reified 'society', which now becomes an entity not only with 'interests', but actually with a need for freedom. Whether this ambiguity is a deliberate attempt to position the author as a moderate, or is an unartified and genuine conclusion, is beyond my ability to know, and ultimately not important, since motivations should not be a concern. The conclusion is what is most important, and the argument itself a close second. Unfortunately the conclusion here is unclear, and the reason might be muddled argumentation. The explicit conclusion is clear enough, that we can become more complete persons through social controls. What is unclear is where the lines get drawn. Schoeman distinguishes between political freedom and social freedom, and placates the liberal and the communitarian by saying that there are cases where political control would be inappropriate where nevertheless social control is legitimate. No explicit examples are given after this distinction has been made. From the central chapter 'Cultural Authority', though, one infers that what he has in mind is moral concept-formation generally. We certainly wouldn't want *governments* to determine moral norms, but it is a good thing (perhaps an inevitable thing) that *cultures* or *societies* determine moral norms: 'These paradigms of social learning ... and *thereby* of moral being, are ... indispensable to moral judgement' (emphasis added).

By claiming that belonging to a society is an end in itself, not merely a means to an end, while still championing privacy within the context of a communitarian conception of moral reasoning, Schoeman hopes to be striking the delicate balance between the individual and society that has eluded so many for so long. But as his attempts to demarcate these separate spheres break down into broad generalizations, we see that this just may not be possible.

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**Paul Schollmeier**
*Other Selves: Aristotle on Personal and
Political Friendship.*
Albany: State University of New York Press
1994. Pp. 222.
US $49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1683-6);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1684-4).

*Other Selves* provides a thorough account of Aristotle's theory of friendship.
It connects the discussion in *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII-IX with passages on
justice and political relationships in NE V and the *Politics*. Appendices on
Lawrence Blum and John Rawls contrast Aristotle's view with contemporary
work on friendship and political philosophy. There are copious notes, consist-
ing almost entirely of Schollmeier defining his differences with other com-
mentators on Aristotelian friendship, as well as bibliography, subject index
and author index. Critical apparatus and appendices take up 100 pages of
the 222 printed.

After a summary Introduction, Aristotle's notions of happiness and other
selves are presented (Ch.II) as the basis of the analysis to follow. Specifically,
'Aristotle's principle of happiness defines the qualities (viz. our moral and
intellectual virtues) that constitute the cultural identity of other selves' (29).
Friendship is defined (Ch.III) as good will and good wishes, reciprocated and
recognized, for the sake of the friend's goodness, usefulness, or pleasantness.
The Aristotelian concept-pair essence/accidents then provides structure for
distinguishing the three species of Aristotelian friendship — good friendship
is essential friendship, useful and pleasant friendships are accidental friend-
ships (i.e., friendships only by dint of their resemblance to genuine, viz. good,
friendship) — as well as a framework for arguing that good friendship is
essentially altruistic and only accidentally egoistic, while useful and pleasant
friendships are accidentally altruistic and essentially egoistic. Good friend-
ship is a virtue because it is a habit (resulting from choice, arising over time,
and concerned with stable character), it lies on a mean (of equality), and it
concerns emotion (viz., loving and being loved). This alone would explain its
inclusion in the *Ethics*, but Schollmeier argues as well that Aristotelian
happiness integrates friendship into ethics by providing the end of friendship
— seeking each other's good.

Friendship is motivated (Ch.IV) by the choiceworthiness of the friend's
happiness. This makes friendship pluralistic, since happiness can come in
either primary (based on theoretical wisdom) or secondary (moral virtue)
varieties. This, in turn, opens the way for political friendship (Ch.V) which,
while paralleling personal friendship closely, differs in the conception of
happiness which unites the friends. In political friendship, this happiness
may now be defined politically, indeed may encompass a whole city. Chapter
VI connects friendship and justice: the latter is a 'mark' of, and necessary
condition for, political friendship. They have the same motive — the 'pleasant
apperception' derived from the other's happiness — but concern different

emotions — for justice, good will, for friendship, love. Schollmeier closes by noting that the Aristotelian notion of friendship could benefit political philosophy (meaning, not that philosophy gains from it, but that it would be nice if political entities were actually characterized by it), offering a model of citizenship which is stable, altruistic, active, controls emotions, and limits acquisition of external goods (116). In addition, because it is pluralistic, it would allow states to concentrate on secondary happiness, i.e., moral virtue, which, avers Schollmeier, they dearly need because of material inequities and the population explosion (120).

The book is written entirely from within the Aristotelian universe. Schollmeier has completely ingested Aristotle's conceptual world, and has adopted Aristotle's style of presentation as well, down to sentence fragments and a paucity of examples. The book that results from such immersion has its merits. Schollmeier presents Aristotle's theory in great detail and richly supported by texts. Arguments are traced in painstaking detail. The connections drawn between personal friendship, political friendship, and justice, though somewhat facile, do yield a broad, coherent theory.

However, Schollmeier's immersion in Aristotle is so complete that overall perspective is lost. The most jaw-dropping example comes when Schollmeier owns up to his methodological assumptions: 'I shall assume what Aristotle himself espouses in the *Logic*. These assumptions include the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, of course, as well as the schemata of the syllogism and other derivative schemata, among them induction, enthymeme, and example' (31). Did this need to be said? Are there philosophers anywhere, outside of three-valued-logic experimenters, from whom Schollmeier distinguishes himself here?

More importantly, this total immersion keeps Schollmeier from seeing the seriousness of certain challenges to Aristotle's theory of friendship, and thus from responding to them effectively. In playing Aristotle's view of friendship off against the views of Blum and Rawls, Schollmeier defends Aristotle's view entirely from within Aristotle's world. For example, Schollmeier notes that Blum's theory of friendship resembles Aristotle's except that Blum says that the things we like about other people are not necessarily grounded in their moral virtue: 'Blum thus fails to see that we are our moral virtues and their activities' (127). However, Schollmeier gives no defense of this proposition — other than the exposition of Aristotle already given — apparently unaware that it does indeed need defense: consider a 'lovable rascal' whom we love for his smile. Such a person could be, on Aristotle/Schollmeier's view, only a pleasant friend. But it is surely conceivable that we would form an affection which would lead us to promote the rascal's happiness for his own sake, even if we never saw him smile again. Many of us have been or are friends with someone whose morals we disapproved of, yet we dealt with them altruistically nonetheless.

Schollmeier again takes Aristotle to be gospel when he criticizes Rawls's agents as egoistic, while Aristotle's political friends behave altruistically (140). Schollmeier claims the same altruism for political friends as for

personal friends, even though they recognize each other as other selves to a lesser degree. But is this plausible? Why should friends' motivation be labelled *either* essentially altruistic *or* essentially egoistic while their shared identity differs *by degree*? Perhaps the problem lies in Schollmeier's reliance on the opposition altruism/egoism itself. His criticism of Rawls's agents as participating in the social union for their own sake misses the point that in the social union Rawls has found a concept which seems to transcend the usual opposition of altruism and egoism. By contrast, Schollmeier's altruistic ideal is so pure it exposes itself easily to criticism by ethical egoists as unrealistic.

The book's strength is its exposition of Aristotle; its weakness is its lack of extra-Aristotelian perspective.

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In the dozen essays in this collection, Elliott Sober brings a biological point of view to a variety of philosophical problems. Because this book approaches philosophical problems from perspectives in biology, it will probably appeal more to philosophers than scientists. And because the science that is brought to bear on the philosophy is not technical or extensive, it will appeal to philosophers in general and not just to philosophers of science. In general, these essays differ from their Quineian namesake because they are decidedly empirical in their problem-solving approach. The biological point of view is an *approach*, too; Sober does not claim that biology is a global elixir for tired old philosophical problems. Instead, the tone of the essays is experimental.

The philosophical vistas Sober views from biology are wide-ranging. The first five essays are what one would expect from the title of the collection. In these, a philosophical problem is stated, and then the approach from biology is made. Sober considers evolutionary ethics generally, egoism and altruism, solipsism, learning and *a priori* prejudice, and the ethics of lying — all with one question in mind: 'What would evolutionary biology tell us about these?'

What it tells us about this well-trodden territory is sometimes unexpected. For example, the first essay shows that there are no evolutionary grounds for thinking that psychological egoism is the preferred hypothesis in explaining our altruistic acts. This conclusion probably runs contrary to what most philosophers would expect of natural selection and fitness. In the fourth essay, Sober draws on an analysis of butterfly mimicry to show that the relationship between lying and truth-telling is not asymmetrical as Kant, Lewis and Davidson have supposed. Instead, a biological perspective should lead us to think that between lying and truth-telling there will be a history of an unstable equilibrium of their relative frequencies depending upon what local advantages can be accrued by each.

The second major group of essays addresses themes familiar in Sober's work. In essay nine, Sober discusses how explanations have causal presuppositions structurally embedded in them. Our standards for explanatory relevance, for example, often mirror standards of causal relevance. The theme of causal relevance is continued differently in the tenth essay, where Sober considers when a cause might be necessary for its effects, and when proximity is an important factor in apportioning differences in causal responsibility for those effects. These two essays hearken back to Sober's Lakatos Prize winning work, *Reconstructing the Past* (1988), which dealt with parsimony and inferences to common causes, and essays seven and eight in this volume take up these issues respectively. In essay seven, Sober considers cladistic parsimony and G.C. Williams' group selection to show that, on a Bayesian analysis, considerations of parsimony can either affect prior probabilities or likelihoods. In essay eight, Sober shows that correlations do not always require explanations from a common cause, and that common cause explanations cannot always be formulated if distal causes screen off their proximate counterparts.

Essays seven and eight together show that the principles of the common cause and of parsimony need to be emended with the idea that '*only in the context of a background theory do observations have evidential meaning*' (171). Obviously, then, these are not methodological principles alone. Sober had made this point in his 1988 book, but it was then made in a largely critical vein. In this collection, the principles are discussed in the context of a general epistemological framework presented in essay six. Here, Sober offers a position he calls 'contrastive empiricism'. Sober's intention is to winnow off the chaff of empiricism *and* scientific realism and to combine the good grains of each. The resultant synthesis is a problems-oriented empiricism which 'derives its realist credentials from the fact that it imposes no restrictions on the vocabulary that may figure in testable *propositions*; but it retains an important empiricist element in its claim that science cannot solve discrimination *problems* in which experience makes no difference' (131-2). It is with this epistemological backdrop that Sober argues against methodological *apriorism* in favour of parsimony and common causes.

In essay eleven, Sober shows that a proper consideration of essentialist explanations of variation should lead to the rejection of essentialism in

science. The development of population thinking out of evolutionary theory — and in particular the fact that populations are now thought of as real entities — has provided a superior account of variation. However, essentialism should be given its due since it was, on the whole, a respectable scientific working hypothesis. The last essay, like the essays in the second group, concerns causation. Here, Sober asks why we favour explanations involving laws that are future-oriented. His answer is that common causes may easily form conjunctive forks with their effects, but that common effects rarely form conjunctive forks with their causes. This asymmetry means that we are more likely to be able to state the probabilities of events given their causes than we are the probabilities causes given the events. Given our choice of descriptors, Sober concludes that this is an objective fact of the world.

This collection is an excellent flagship for the new series Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology, for it ranges over topics of genuine philosophical interest with perspectives gained from contemporary biology. As my groupings indicate, the papers vary in philosophical or biological emphasis, but in each, Sober is consistently innovative in his thinking, and he articulates his positions with concision and cogency. *From a Biological Point of View* does not give an overview of the workings of philosophers of biology in general. It does, however, give a glimpse of the intellectual richness of the philosophy of biology from the view of one leading advocate. Anyone familiar with Sober's work will need no encouragement to read more of it. For those who are not familiar, this collection is highly recommended.

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**Charles E. Winquist**
*Desiring Theology.*
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995.
Pp. xii + 166.
US $30.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-90212-9);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-90213-7).

To read Winquist's *Desiring Theology* is to long for the clarity, rigor, and flowing prose of Giles of Rome. Although Winquist states that his intention is to be read by 'the restless ... [who] have noted an absence in their lives ... not ... readily filled by institutionalized religion' (1), in fact he writes for an extremely narrow and academic elite: only such readers would even consider wading into the 'new scholasticism' that is postmodern rhetoric.

Winquist's goal is to address the place and role of theology in a postmodern age. More often than not the piece reads as an *apologia* for theological thinking and writing. After all, we might think, if postmodernism means confronting the death of God, the disappearance and displacement of the self, the end of history, and the closure of the book (65), then what role is there for theology? What role can talk of God play when such talk has been relegated to the caves; what role for talk of persons after the disappearance of the self; what role for the 'historical moment' after history has ended; what role for sacred writings following the closure of the book?

Winquist takes his inspiration from Tillich's understanding of the desire for truth as the effect of having 'been disappointed with the surfaces, and [knowing] that the truth which does *not* disappoint dwells below the surfaces in the depth' (Tillich, 'The Depth of Existence', in *The Shaking of the Foundations*, 53). Equating 'the desire for a thinking which does not disappoint with a desire to think theologically' (ix), Winquist asserts that his 'theoretical' inquiry into the question 'if thinking has a heterological structure and no point of absolute reference, what does it mean to think theologically?' (xi) will yield a 'pragmatics' for theology. To uncover the role of theology in a postmodern age is to uncover a way of resolving the issue of depth.

The first few chapters of the book recount the now familiar postmodernist polemic against the Cartesian ills of modernism (also referred to as the 'onto-theological tradition', 'logocentrism' or sometimes, by implication, 'the dominant discourse'). Descartes' world, according to Winquist, is a world in which 'inner reality was valued over the external world' and in which 'subjectivity was the source and arbiter of reality' (10) (crasser misinterpretations of Descartes than anything Regius ever suggested). Cartesian subjectivity, it is proposed, grants eminence and privilege to the individual 'in the ethos of public life' (10), ignores the 'other', and buries difference.

Kantian transcendentalism serves as an alternative to the pitfalls of Cartesian subjectivity. Yet the best we can hope for in a postmodern age, Winquist suggests, is a 'quasi-transcendental interrogation of the rules that regulate the changing surface of the phenomenal world' (25). A 'quasi-transcendental' inquiry is one that does not seek to unveil 'ontological structures that regulate being-there in the world but rules that in any specific situation regulate the differential play of appearances' (25). Winquist's guide here is Nietzsche. Nietzsche 'dislodged truth from any absolute grounding by attacking the patriarchal hierarchy [!] of western metaphysics through enigmatic aphorisms and through a direct appropriation of Kant [!]' (30). Truth after Nietzsche is fiction 'imaginatively produced in a play of differences with specific genealogies' (31). Our only connection to the world is through the incorrigibility of the body, our 'facticity'. Realizing the other and the different in discourse is, then, the proper response to Cartesian subjectivity.

The key to this realization lies in what Deleuze calls 'singularities' (Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*), which pick out the uniqueness of all events and their inability to be reduced to a universal ground or perspective. By

focusing on singularities in experience and within our discursive practices, we can open ourselves to the experience of the other. Theology, in particular, opens us up to singularities, for example, in thinking the death of God or the name of God, 'a paradigmatic singularity' (86). This, in turn, leads to the recognition that there are always rents in the fabric of the dominant discourse, that, 'the text is never a totality' (126).

The force of the notion of singularities seems to turn on the fairly trivial recognition that in viewing the world in categories we ofttimes overlook the anomalous. So, in a lyrical burst, Winquist declares, '[i]t is possible that there are many lives, a gift of meaning, that slip by us because we don't know how to see and we don't know how to think' (46). It is not just possible but certain that this is so, but perhaps, like much in this book, a truth not worthy of the clothing it finds itself dressed in.

Regardless, we are informed that we are to think singularies in the doing of theology if we are to be true to the depths of our experience and thereby not fail to include the other and the different. The theoretical task of postmodern theology, Winquist concludes, is to work against the dominant discourse by exploiting singularities in order to insure that it never achieves completeness. It is a 'work against completeness' (126).

Practically, this conception of the theoretical role of theology leads Winquist to suggest that theology adopt the stance of what Deleuze and Guattari label a 'minor literature' (Deleuze & Guattari, *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*). A minor literature is one which works 'within, through, and against the strategies of dominant discursive practices' (128). The pragmatics of theological discourse is 'an applied recognition of the epistemic undecidability underlying all discourse' (137).

Finally, recognizing the role of theology, and acting accordingly, implicates us in a 'newly articulated community' (137). We come to recognize that, given epistemic undecidability, ethical truths must be made and not discovered. Love, then, somewhat mysteriously emerges as that upon which we place the highest positive valuation. A meaningful community, it is concluded, is a community of lovers, and the discourse of love, it turns out, has important affinities with postmodern theological discourse. Practicing theology rightly (i.e., as a minor literature), we are led to believe, is practicing love: 'There can be no real loving without thinking and there can be no real thinking without loving' (150).

Perhaps the fairest evaluation to make of *Desiring Theology* is that it is reassuringly postmodern. It fulfills one's expectations. If, then, one enjoys reading sloppy history of philosophy, conclusions based on little or no argument, trivialities posed as profundities, and Nietzsche and Sartre selectively interpreted and dressed out in impenetrable prose, one should enjoy this text.

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**Michael P. Zuckert**
*Natural Rights and the New Republicanism.*
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1994.
Pp. xx + 397.
US $39.50. ISBN 0-691-03463-X.

Zuckert has undertaken a richly detailed and exhaustive study of the theoretical antecedents to the American founding. He rejects both the claims for a classical or civic humanist republican component and also the argument that the natural rights and social contract theory of the American founders were simply extensions of English Whig or parliamentary thought. Specifically, the English Declaration of Rights and Bill of Rights of 1689 lacked five characteristics of the rights theory of the American Declaration of Independence. The latter document claims a natural human equality which precludes an implied right in some to rule others, a status for government as that of a human artifact, a concept of rights as natural and inalienable rather than stemming from a particular constitutional tradition, a reliance upon the consent of the governed as the ground for legitimate political authority, and a defense of the right to revolution as conditional on popular perception of the security of rights rather than on the ruler's conformity to established laws and liberties. Despite his support for the Glorious Revolution, Locke's political doctrine is much closer to that of the Declaration of Independence than to the earlier English documents. The book then focuses upon tracing these divergences.

Zuckert begins with Protestant thought, viewing divine right theory as a manifestation of the Reformation. The latter interprets Christianity as freeing humans from the law of the Old Testament but simultaneously as subjecting them utterly to God's sovereignty. Obedience owed to the ruler involves specific and knowable laws which replace the old law emanating directly from God. At the same time, parliamentary theory accords rights to subjects, but these issue from a constitution or political society which is natural in the Aristotelian sense, rather than the rights themselves being natural, equal, or prepolitical. Thus for the early contractarians, 'contract is perfectly open-ended. Human beings may as well establish an absolute monarchy as a limited and mixed constitution' (70). Milton, on the other hand, views liberty as natural and inalienable, but the end of liberty is obedience to God, as interpreted by the state's coercive authority in Milton's 'transconstitutional republicanism' (80).

Zuckert next turns to the Whigs, whose abandonment of the effort to discover 'the "one true Protestant politics" ' (97) is reminiscent of Rawls's contemporary definition of justice as political rather than metaphysical. For Whigs like Gilbert Burnet, liberty is natural but not inalienable under natural law, and 'the rights and duties of king and people depend entirely on what was actually established' under the positive constitution of a particular political entity (111). Hugo Grotius, whose influence dominated seventeenth-century Whiggism, holds that contract grounds political obligation, but 'his

clear and even strident affirmation of natural sociability distinguishes him from the later contractarianism' (137), precluding the universal rightness of resistance to threats to life and property. Grotius is a transitional figure, negotiating the tension between nature and convention by concluding that 'convention (agreement) is not contrary to nature, but it carries with it an obligation derived from nature' (147). Zuckert concludes that advocates of the republican synthesis such as Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and J.G.A. Pocock erect false oppositions between the classical republicanism of Whig political science and the liberalism of some Whig political philosophy, thus interfering with our understanding of developments to come, specifically 'the amalgamation of the Whig political science ... with a political philosophy of Lockean natural rights' (182).

Finally, Zuckert turns to Locke, beginning with Locke's *Questions Concerning the Law of Nature*. Locke departs from Grotius and others in rejecting the immanence of natural law. Knowledge of the law of nature is not acquired through the natural inclinations, but is divined through the use of our God-given human faculties. Thus natural law is transcendent. In the *Two Treatises*, insofar as natural law involves the right, interpreted as a liberty, to preserve oneself, individuals in the state of nature possess a natural executive power to execute the law. This executive power is also an 'emblem' of Locke's 'rejection of the central premise of the Thomist political philosophy — the naturalness of the political, and thus the direct provision for political authority by nature or natural law' (229). Individuals may alienate the object of an inalienable right to life, liberty, or property, but cannot alienate the inalienable right itself (83, 213, 244-5). The appropriating power of labor functions with respect to property like the executive power of the law of nature, 'a necessary inference from our fundamental right to life, because a necessary means to it' (254). Yet the limitations on property acquisition that express transcendent natural law gradually disappear in Locke; thus transcendent natural law is itself transcended (266, 272). In the end, Locke utilizes quasi-traditional foundations to support an untraditional building. But 'the building stands while the "foundation" crumbles, because the apparent foundation never was the basis on which the building was actually constructed' (288). Zuckert's final chapter demonstrates that *Cato's Letters*, by Trenchard and Gordon, endorse the same five Lockean doctrines that appear in the Declaration of Independence but not in the earlier non-Lockean Whig literature, resulting in 'the development of a genuine and immensely powerful synthesis between Lockean political philosophy and the earlier Whig political science' (299).

Zuckert has contributed to scholarship through his careful analysis of the similarities and differences among Locke's predecessors. He is especially strong in showing how each thinker diverges from his own predecessors yet simultaneously differs from Locke. Some may take issue with his interpretation of Locke. 'Readers who buy the theistic Locke,' suggests Zuckert, 'are victims of bait-and-switch marketing' (288), because his transcendent natural law argument is based on his prior understanding of rights as property,

even if we were to grant for purposes of argument that most readers fail to see this. Must limitations on the right to acquire property, however, be based on a theistic argument? Zuckert himself notes that for Locke a right is not a morally obligatory mandate, but a morally permissible liberty. Thus 'it would be perfectly permissible to renounce immediate self-interest for longer term self-interest, or even for the sake of the common good' (213). Thus rights may be property of which we individually or collectively renounce the use. More generally, Pocock observes, '[i]t is not the historian's business to go about with a pair of scales, weighing the importance of one "factor" against another; the problem is to study the relations between them' (Pocock, 'The Machiavellian Moment Revisited', *Journal of Modern History* 53 [1981], 54). In this effort Zuckert has succeeded admirably.

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