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Theodor W. Adorno
The Stars Down to Earth and Other Essays on the Irrational in Culture. Edited with an introduction by Stephen Crook.
New York: Routledge 1994. Pp. 176.
US $55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-10567-6);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-10568-4).

Nearly everything about this book, from its title to its existence, is wrong. The first part of the title of this collection is innocuous enough since it merely repeats a portion of the title of the Adorno essay reproduced here — written in English in 1952-3 and published in the journal *Telos* in 1974, (though Stephen Crook, the editor of the collection, neglects to inform us that the essay first appeared in 1957 in the *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* under its complete title: 'The Stars Down to Earth: The *Los Angeles Times* Astrology Column; A Study in Secondary Superstition'). But the latter part of the title of the collection, *and Other Essays on the Irrational in Culture* is false *and* misleading, for there are no other essays here nor is what does appear here appropriately described as concerning the irrational in culture.

There are four items in this collection. The first is the above-mentioned 90-page essay. The second is a five-page extract (not an essay) with the heading 'Theses Against Occultism' from Adorno's *Minima Moralia; Reflections from Damaged Life*. The third is a piece more honestly described as a research grant proposal than an essay, entitled 'Research Project on Anti-Semitism: Idea of the Project,' originally published *anonymously* in 1941 in a volume of the house journal for the Institute of Social Research, *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, and which Crook neglects to inform us appears there under the heading 'Notes on Institute Activities' after a three-page introduction signed by Max Horkheimer. Crook concedes that according to Rolf Wiggershaus (author of the monumental study *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance*) the research project was 'drafted and re-drafted since 1939 by Adorno and Max Horkheimer, with inputs from Leo Lowenthal and Franz Neumann' (28). Presumably, had Adorno considered the piece to have been authored by himself, he would have allowed it to appear under his name (perhaps yet more telling is that the piece fails to appear in Adorno's *Gesammelte Schriften*). The fourth and final item reprinted here is a nine-page piece entitled 'Anti-Semitism and Fascist Propaganda' which Adorno prepared as a précis of his essay 'The Psychological Technique of Martin Luther Thomas' Radio Addresses' and that itself only appeared posthumously in 1975 in volume nine of the *Gesammelte Schriften*. The précis here was previously published in 1946 as a contribution to Ernst Simmel's collection *Anti-Semitism: A Social Disease*. That the final item in this collection does not qualify as an essay — though perhaps a reader of this volume nonetheless should be grateful that *this* piece was in fact authored by Adorno — is apparent in Adorno's opening paragraph: 'Facts and interpretations, generally known to those familiar with psycho-

analysis have been omitted. The goal has been, rather, to point out some findings, which, however preliminary and fragmentary, may suggest further psychoanalytic evaluation' (162).

Crook seems wholly unaware that Adorno elaborated — in one of his best-known writings, 'The Essay as Form' — a very precise philosophy of the essay, and that by Adorno's own criteria not one of the four writings reproduced here would qualify as such.

If we turn to Crook's introduction to the collection for an explanation of, and justification for, the items selected here for republication we encounter on both counts a tissue of muddleheadedness. Since two of the items collected here concern themselves with anti-Semitism, and one of these directly concerns itself with fascism, it is not encouraging to read the following by Crook: 'The account of Nazi anti-Semitism offered in the "Research Project" is curiously thin, superficial and unconvincing. ... Paradoxical as it may seem, Adorno's most important insights into fascism and anti-Semitism arise out of the study of non-fascist societies' (5-6). If the editor of this collection believes this, and since his attempt to explicate the items reproduced here occurs only by way of extensive reference to the 'important insights' contained *elsewhere* in Adorno's writings, why should any rational reader continue with this collection?

Further, Crook complains that 'Adorno was blind to gender issues and to questions of sexuality. For all his insistence on the "libidinal" character of the tie between fascist leader and follower he does not explore the most obvious questions about the implication of gendered forms of eroticism in fascist politics' (21). Note first the qualification which admits that Adorno does in fact insist on the libidinal nature of fascist relations; note also that Crook gives no indication whatsoever as to what the 'most obvious questions' actually might be (I guess that is what it means to be obvious). If Adorno was 'blind' to questions of gender and sexuality (and I believe he was not), pray tell who in the 1940s had such vision?

Crook also complains that 'the spirit of Adorno's project for a critical theory of authoritarianism and its relationship with the wider culture requires a closer attention than he himself gave to the rhetorical, persuasive, dimension of authoritarian discourse' (20). This is a patently silly complaint to make in regard to the author of *The Jargon of Authenticity* and nearly all of whose writings display an unrelenting struggle against the authoritarian command of language. This complaint becomes quaintly ironic when one hears within Crook's own language the finely tuned hum of a well administered division of labor: 'More positively, an assessment must identify core themes in Adorno's analysis which continue to merit attention and to warrant further development' (18). Can't you hear the memo in the phrases 'must identify', 'continue to merit attention' and 'warrant further development'? And speaking of silly, when Crook writes that there is in Adorno's work 'a little that is frankly silly' (2) doesn't he owe us some indication of what he has in mind?

To turn to what is misleading in Crook's title on the irrational in culture one need only cite a statement that Crook himself quotes from Adorno's study

of Martin Luther Thomas's radio addresses: 'Thomas' radio speeches offer an excellent example for one of the basic characteristics of fascist and anti-Semitic propaganda, namely, the entirely calculated, highly rationalistic nature of its irrationalism' (17). What's irrational about a culture with a thriving, productive barbarism? And what to make of this book? Kindling.

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Margaret Atherton, ed.
Women Philosophers of the Early Modern Period.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company
1994. Pp. x + 166.
US $29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-260-7);
US $6.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-359-3).

The work in this collection originally appeared in the sixty-three year span 1643-1705, with one later selection from 1827. It is a very useful collection, welcome both for the intrinsic merit and historical significance of the ideas and arguments the volume contains, and for its pedagogical potential. With most of the work from the seventeenth century (or just after its end), and since the book is short, it lends itself for use as a text for a course in seventeenth-century philosophy, alongside the better known classics.

Even with the development of attention to early women thinkers and writers over the past few decades, largely under feminist impetus, these philosophers will not be well-known. Not one of the seven has an entry in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*; only one of them (Mary Astell) appears in Chambers' recent (1990) *Biographical Dictionary*, which has articles on some 20,000 men and women, including plenty of philosophers. Mary Astell has received more attention than the others because some see her as an early feminist — largely due to the fact that she advocated education for women and championed women's intellectual capacities. This seems insufficient ground for a feminist ascription. She was also a political conservative and of rather rigid theological commitments; and philosophically, as Margaret Atherton's excerpt shows, a Cartesian.

The focus of Atherton's collection is, wisely, on a single set of philosophical topics (even though some of these writers also engaged other themes, philosophical and non-philosophical). All seven writers discuss issues in metaphysics and epistemology; they are also engaged in critiques of the ideas of famous philosophers of the period: Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Leib-

niz, and Berkeley. Lady Masham (Damaris Cudworth) also gives some attention to the defence of the ideas of her father, the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth. The seven women philosophers are Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia; Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle; Anne, Viscountess Conway; Damaris, Lady Masham; Mary Astell; Catharine Cockburn; and Lady Mary Shepherd. One will be struck by the plethora of titles. Five of the seven are by birth or marriage (or both) members of royal or aristocratic families. This clearly reflects a sociocultural world where philosophical and other intellectual activity is chiefly available for those with leisure, and in the case of women, surely also the protection and encouragement elevated status in a hierarchically ordered society would give. It would be a mistake though to assume that the aristocratic background of most of these women points to dilettantish or superficial engagement with philosophy. One finds here several first-rate philosophical minds: intelligent, inquisitive, intellectually alive persons, engaged with major topics in metaphysics and epistemology in their day.

They vary in their acuity, originality, and interest for a twentieth-century philosophical reader. Conway is, I think, the most original of the group, with her theory of a common essence all individual created substances share, and a gradation of degree among more and less material and mental substances. Atherton includes the central passages in Conway's *Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy* which set these views out, together with some of her critique of Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza.

Also original are some of the ideas of the Duchess of Newcastle. Newcastle was, by her own account, poorly educated, and intellectually undisciplined. These traits show in her attempts to revise Cartesian natural philosophy. There is still something interesting here. Newcastle is an Aristotelian in metaphysics. That is, she thinks individual countable substances have primary ontological status, and makes some efforts to reduce motion and causal interaction to states of particulars.

Conway aside, the most impressive of the seven represented in Atherton's book is Catharine Cockburn. The excerpt in this case is from a defence of Locke on personal identity and the nature of mind published when its author was twenty-two (not twenty, as Atherton says). It is excellent work, clear, well-argued, penetrating: it reads almost like a journal article of an earlier day (one might think of a spirited defender of Davidson replying in *Philosophical Studies*, or *Analysis*, to what was taken to be scurrilous, anyway inept, criticism of the great man). Locke has seldom had an abler advocate. Locke thought so too. He read the 70-page monograph in which this defence appeared, and was so impressed with it that he made inquiries about its author, and sent her a letter of appreciation, a shipment of books, and some money.

Princess Elisabeth and Lady Masham are also good philosophers. Their work appears here in selections from their correspondence, with Descartes and Leibniz, respectively. Elisabeth's correspondence with Descartes provides one of the classic occasions and sites of Descartes' articulation of his

dualist treatment of mind, and Elisabeth is an astute inquirer, seeking to push him to what never do become fully clear or satisfactory accounts of his views. Masham writes to Leibniz both to seek enlargement of her understanding of his account of mind and matter, and as defender of Locke, and to some degree of her father. This correspondence has an important place within the wider web of Leibniz's *New Essays* (and Locke's *Essay*, its formal stimulus). Locke spent his last years as a guest at Masham's house, so there is a specially personal dimension to these interchanges.

Least satisfactory of the seven is Mary Astell. Pious, hectoring, unconvincing, Astell largely recapitulates Cartesian philosophy: she restates the theories of clear and distinct ideas, and of error, and the limitations of our cognitive reach. She is infused with the spirit of the *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, with Astell's additional precepts about as trite as most of the Cartesian originals. One does get a sense of Astell's clarity of mind, and certainly of her intellectual resolve. But if a case for female philosophical talent in the early modern period had to rest solely on her, it would be a somewhat dim one.

Lady Mary Shepherd writes as critic of Berkeley. Her prose is filled with italics, and somewhat tortuous sentences. She writes as a proponent of Scottish common sense philosophy, endorsing, but also criticizing, arguments of Reid's. On the whole, she disposes effectively of Berkeleyan idealism, though the common sense claim she makes that the existence of external physical objects is as certain and demonstrable as that of our sensations will only persuade some. She also fails to see that a Berkeleyan can claim immediate acquaintance with ourselves as causal agents, with the causal powers of external bodies only able to be postulated inferentially, justifying an asymmetry in the cases of spirits and bodies that Shepherd denies.

The text, or Atherton's introductions, contain some mostly minor infelicities. Contrary to Atherton's claim on p. 5, Conway was not an idealist. That is, she did not hold that the one substance individual substances are composed of 'is incorporeal in nature'. The reader should, I think, not just be told (22) the Duchess of Newcastle's married surname. Her original surname was Lucas. On p. 64 the Greek word ταξία is transcribed unintelligibly. On p. 92 (three lines from the bottom) 'with' should be 'what'.

In sum: this is a fine, accessible, useful collection, which deserves a wide readership. And it may be hoped that it may serve to lead to new and more extensive work on these thinkers (especially Catharine Cockburn!).

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Jody Azzouni
Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1994.
Pp. 249.
US $54.95. ISBN 0-521-44223-0.

This book grapples with two difficult problems in the philosophy of mathematics. The implicit problem, hitherto largely unnoticed according to the author, is the epistemic role puzzle: 'Given standard mathematical practice, there seems to be *no* epistemic role for mathematical objects' (55). The explicit problem, widely discussed in the literature, is Benacerraf's puzzle: assuming a causal theory of knowledge, and given the apparent metaphysical inertness of mathematical objects, it seems that we cannot know anything about such objects. Azzouni's strategy does not lie in resolving these problems within their received contexts; rather, it consists in pre-empting them. He defends a version of linguistic realism — the thesis that there is a correspondence between the work done by mathematical semantics and that done by natural language semantics.

By reconceptualizing both the ontology of mathematical objects and the epistemology of mathematical process, Azzouni seeks to undercut the traditional difficulties associated with reference to mathematical objects (the ontological puzzle) and understanding of mathematical objects (the epistemological puzzle). In so doing, he charts a course between the Scylla of platonism and the Charybdis of nominalism, charging that both schools fail to explain use/mention errors that pervade the annals of mathematical practice.

This concise but dense book — really a longish essay — is divided into three segments. Part One ('Mathematical Practice and its Puzzles') sets up the problems; Part Two ('The Stuff of Mathematics') treats chiefly the ontological issues; part three ('The Geography of the A Priori') addresses epistemological ones.

In Part One, Azzouni recasts the referential access puzzle by distinguishing 'ontologically conservative' and 'ontologically radical' strategies (7) for solving it. The former class of strategies claims that the traditional description of the problem simply overlooks referential resources extant; the latter, that the putative objects themselves have been improperly described, and when properly described they turn out to be referentially accessible after all. Azzouni's primary focus is on the conservative class. By cataloguing a number of significant referential mishaps and innovations alike, he makes a persuasive case for the efficacy of 'semantic intuitions' in the absence of axiomatic frameworks. He adapts and extends the Quinean position, namely that by regarding mathematical objects as 'thin' epistemological posits, we denecessitate telling a referential (causal) story about them. Azzouni's extension consists in viewing them as thinner-than-thin: 'Mathematical posits could be valuable for organizing mathematics, and here the epistemic justification will devolve on how the posits enable us to do more and better

mathematics. On the other hand, perhaps posits in the mathematical context need no theoretical virtues at all. Perhaps virtue ... is a matter entirely of the isolated mathematical theory and not of its application in any sense. I will describe such posits as *ultrathin* posits' (74).

In Part Two, Azzouni resurrects the positivistic spirit (but not the flesh) of the conventionalist doctrine of truth. In embellishing his portraiture of the mathematician as a truth-prover, Azzouni defends the claim that we can have not only 'truth by convention', but also 'ontology by convention as well' (80). He views mathematical practice as an accumulation of somewhat arbitrary algorithmic systems, which require recursive postulates but can abide syntactic inconsistencies. The ontological commitments of such systems are clearly tentative; that is, their posits are context-dependent. Azzouni addresses the inevitable problems (posed largely by Quine) arising from this analogy between mathematical systems and rule-governed games. Azzouni concedes that while intersystemic (i.e., co-referential) connections do obtain, they do so by *stipulation*. He argues that neither cross-reference nor meta-reference need be inscrutable, for (in light of ultrathinness) 'there is nothing out there to scrute' (147).

In Part Three, Azzouni accepts Quine's demolition of the analytic/synthetic distinction but endeavours to avoid both traditionalist adherence to a priori truths and assimilationist wedding of mathematics to empirical science. He conceives a genus of a priori truths that 'are neither incorrigible, obvious, nor independent (in any sense) of empirical experience' — but which are nonetheless 'independent of empirical *science*' (154). This conceptual high-wire cannot be walked, for instance, by computer-generated but mathematically unverifiable proofs (e.g., that of the four-colour map theorem). Azzouni regards such artifacts as 'empirical existence claims' for mathematical proofs, rather than proofs *per se*. Azzouni then substitutes 'co-empiricalness' for a prioricity. For instance, he notes that the obvious mathematical truth of the proposition '1 + 1 = 2', readily obtainable in his conventionalist bazaar of Part Two, is 'a very cheap commodity' (175). Recognizing that such truths also have apparently sound empirical applications, he calls them 'co-empirical'. Although their obviousness evokes an intuition of incorrigibility, Azzouni claims that there are *no* incorrigible co-empirical truths. In effect, he revises Quine's repudiation of a priori truth by asserting, for example, that Putnam's weak principle of non-contradiction ('Not every statement is both true and false') is *not* incorrigibly co-empirical (193). Azzouni's proposed revision is somewhat encumbered with disclaimers, caveats and analogies, which make for an apologetic defense. A strong objection (by Davidson) is only mentioned in a footnote (194). Ultimately, Azzouni tries to reconcile his position with both platonism and nominalism, describing it as 'platonism without puzzles' and 'nominalism on the cheap' (213).

Azzouni relies heavily on the continued relevance of Benacerraf's puzzle, for much of his work is aimed at undercutting it. He counters the obvious objection — that since causal theories of knowledge are obsolete, Benacer-

raf's puzzle is defunct — by asserting that it re-emerges under rival epistemologies. This latter assertion lacks Azzouni's usual argumentative rigour, and is supported only by citation. Perhaps more could have been done to defend this central claim.

Although Azzouni assumes and requires a distinction between pure and applied mathematics, he seems unconcerned that mathematical languages, when used by physicists in describing the world, can sometimes predict or otherwise (perhaps by synthetic a prioricity) refer to hitherto uncognized but retrospectively incorrigible brute facts. Such applied mathematical posits appear 'ultrathick', and their provenance begs questions that may prove intractable to linguistic realists of ontologically conservative and radical stripes alike.

Metaphysical predispositions aside, Azzouni's book is a well-conceived and worthwhile contribution. It filters and reinterprets some of Quine's and Putnam's substantive views, among others, and introduces original ones. Its disposition toward and recasting of philosophy of mathematics might provoke objections from nominalists (e.g., Field), platonists (e.g., Bigelow) and subjective empiricists (e.g., van Fraassen) alike. But it is altogether closely argued, and stimulates serious reflection.

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Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, and **Nancy Fraser, with an introduction by Linda Nicholson.**
Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange.
New York: Routledge 1995. Pp. 176.
US $45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-91085-4);
US $14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-91086-2).

In the very informative introduction, Nicholson explains that the first three essays by Benhabib, Butler, and Fraser were originally presented as papers in a symposium on 'Feminism and Postmodernism'. Nancy Fraser's paper is a reply to both Benhabib and Butler's positions. Drucilla Cornell's paper on Ethical Feminism was added later, presumably, for purposes of adding an ethico-psychoanalytic angle to the discussion. First published as a book in German (*Der Streit um Differenz: Feminismus und Postmoderne in der Gegenwart*, 1993), this collection is unique and is fascinating reading because all four authors respond in a separate section on what they individually perceive

as intellectual disagreements with each other (although the Butler-Cornell exchange displays very little of that and is mostly aligned on poststructuralist grounds). However, the debate seems not to focus so much on usefulness of postmodern theory to feminism, but rather it turns into a defense of poststructuralism (Butler, Cornell) and of Critical Theory (Benhabib).

In her forceful attack on postmodern theory, Benhabib makes use of Jane Flax's (1990) tripartite theses of postmodernism: death of History, death of man, and death of metaphysics. Benhabib rejects what she calls a 'strong version' of this abstract negation of the terms (history, man, metaphysics) but holds that a 'weak version' could be defensible and useful for feminist analysis. For instance, she rejects 'grand narratives' of linear historicizing but endorses a certain emancipatory notion of historiography: she stresses the need for historical narratives about dominated groups. Benhabib critiques certain postmodernists (e.g., Lyotard) for engaging in a facile rejection of 'totalizing' narratives which leads to a 'retreat from utopia'. This retreat undermines feminist normative principles, so that even if one adopts a 'weak sense' of postmodernist feminist theory, it fails to articulate the emancipatory interests of women. In the end, her argument is bewildering: Benhabib disavows fetishistically postmodernism in all versions, and at the same time she tries to sneak in some feminist poststructuralist ideas in her own project of Critical Theory.

In her paper (published under the same title in *Feminists Theorize the Political*, 1992) Butler probes the contingent foundations of subjectivity. Rather than celebrating the 'death of the subject', Butler questions the foundations of a subject that pretends to be stable, coherent and apparently endorses a progressive inclusivist agenda. She notes that the political activist needs to speak on behalf of women, yet she also has to be open for contestations of the very notion of 'woman' she invokes for the political purpose. It is however disappointing that Butler never spells out the boundaries of contestations, particularly vis-à-vis class and class struggle. Instead she gestures towards a rather empty concept of radical democracy.

Nancy Fraser proposes to resolve the Benhabib-Butler impasse by postulating that Benhabib too categorically rejects some postmodernist claims. Fraser is troubled by Benhabib's unequivocal approval of philosophy, as a transcendent discourse is quite undesirable for Fraser, who (with Nicholson) claims that a social criticism does a much better job than a transcendent discourse. Fraser adopts Butler's point that subjects are constituted, not only situated, and that the idea of the subject can still be criticized. Nevertheless, Fraser faults Butler for using the ambiguous term 're-signification' where she should speak about 'critique'. Fraser thinks that the Foucauldian framework Butler employs (to argue for re-signification and against foundationalist theories of subjectivities) is too schematic, since some foundationalism is not exclusionary but has emancipatory effects. She calls on Butler to differentiate positive and negative aspect of re-signification in order to conceptualize a politics of liberation. Fraser contends that the differences between Benhabib and Butler are 'false antitheses' and notes that the former is

operating at a macro-level and the latter at a micro-level of analysis. However, Benhabib and Butler's replies indicate that the differences are real and won't be resolved in a hermeneutic fusion of horizons.

Drucilla Cornell delineates the value of an ethical attitude in poststructuralist feminist discourse. She argues for a non-foundationalist ethics by invoking the idea of the self to be open to a 'nonviolent relationality' with the Other and rejects an attitude that is fixated on certain rational principles. She finds Charles Peirce's notions of fallibilism and musement helpful in characterizing this ethical attitude. Cornell turns to Lacanian analysis of sexual difference to critique the way in which identity claims are made and (white/male) privilege is invoked. Lacan advanced the notion that there is no fixed signifier for 'Woman' in the (male) symbolic Order and hence for Cornell this means that feminists should make positive use of that difference and challenge any totalizing trope of Woman. However, Lacan's theory is unhelpful for a resymbolization of the feminine, of the bar (appropriating the phallus to end the 'lack' is not good enough). Through a mimetic enactment of the dominant fantasies of femininity, a feminist resignification can disrupt the symbolic order and provide an analysis of the real lived experiences of women.

While Fraser thinks that Cornell integrates some of the (good) aspects of Benhabib and Butler's theories, she holds that Cornell's position needs to be developed further. What is ultimately needed to overcome the 'gap' of poststructuralism and Critical Theory is a fallibilistic pragmatic account of subjectivity. Feminists need both deconstruction and reconstruction, destabilization of meaning and projection of utopian hope.

In her rejoinder, Butler addresses the issue whether the modern/postmodern debate is relevant for feminist projects. What's missing in this collection is a discussion of racial difference, ethics of reproductive technologies, political interrogations of the discourse of victimization (of MacKinnon, etc.). Also to presuppose that poststructuralism as a theory matters, is misleading: more fruitful would be discussions of the tension between theory and empiricism and whether theoretical activism is a possible political stance. What needs to be explored further is the problem whether terms (the subject, history, normativity) 'can serve as "grounds", or whether their continuing volatility is a sure sign that they have lost their ground, but retained their force with ambivalent consequences'. Butler does not adopt a quietistic stance vis-à-vis the contingent foundations she invokes here; on the contrary, her analysis points toward progressive feminist politics which collide with the Enlightenment project of Benhabib.

While the reader won't find a systematic feminist analysis of the poststructuralist and critical theory debate, this book should stimulate interest in investigating these issues further. It is particularly useful for a feminist scholar who is familiar with most of the authors' important works, and who wants to take a look at the 'style' of the exchange of their projects.

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Michael Bradie
The Secret Chain: Evolution and Ethics.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1994. Pp. xi + 198.
US $44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2105-8);
US $14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2106-6).

This is a small book with big aims. In it, Bradie sets out to defend two theses. The first, an historical thesis, 'concerns the place of Darwin's evolutionary analysis of the moral sense in the history of moral theory.' The second is an analytical thesis concerning the 'ramifications of a Darwinian analysis for our understanding of morality' (163). The method he has chosen is a careful analysis of the work of several representative writers, with his own position laid out in responses to, and criticisms of, each author. This is an approach with some advantages, but more drawbacks. In its favor is the steady chronological development of the argument and the breadth of writers covered, but this has to be weighed against the lack of a depth that could be provided by the sustained development of a position.

It is part of Bradie's historical thesis that ethical discussion among eighteenth-century British moralists focused on two issues. The first, in response to Hobbes's assertion that benevolence was effectively disguised self-interest, was the relationship between the two motive forces. The consensus view that developed was that the two were distinct, but that benevolence was a weaker impulse than self-interest. This gave rise to the second issue; why did human beings often act benevolently when faced with strong motivations towards self interest? As Francis Hutcheson said, 'whence this secret chain between each person and mankind? How is my interest connected with the most distant parts of it?' The consensus view that developed over this question was that an essential coincidence, derived from human nature, existed between the two motivations. The other part of Bradie's historical thesis is that Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection provided a new and wholly different account of how that coincidence came to be, with the 'forces of natural selection acting to determine human sociality' (164).

Bradie's analytical thesis concentrates on the turns taken in the discussion after Darwin and the implications of Darwinian theory for ethics. He concludes that 'the evolutionary perspective has clarified and reshaped the problem but has not resolved it' (164). There is a distinction to be drawn, Bradie points out, between the contribution made by evolutionary theory to understanding the development of our moral mechanisms, those parts of our physical brains that allow us to perform such actions as reflection and evaluation, and the contribution made by evolutionary theory to understanding moral theses, certain specific beliefs about the importance and worth of certain sorts of actions. This latter position can be further broken down. It could be claiming that evolutionary theory can explain why we hold certain moral theories or axioms to be true or, more radically, it could be

claiming that the fact of evolution by natural selection can be used as one plank in an argument justifying a normative ethical position.

Bradie's conclusion is that the evidence for the evolution of moral mechanisms is beyond doubt; 'if human beings are moral creatures at all, it is a result of evolution' (167). However, this does not mean that evolutionary theory can explain why we should have adopted certain normative principles or predict what principles would be adopted by other moral species, although 'it does seem as if an appeal to evolutionary arguments can help to explain the general shape of moral principles' (165). Evolutionary theory also cannot be used to support specific ethical propositions; the gap between fact and value remains unbridged.

While I am in agreement with the thrust of Bradie's argument, and admire his breadth of reading, I have several difficulties with this book. The first is the decision to hang the argument on an almost text-book like progression through classic sources. The works are interesting and relevant, but I suspect most of them are well known to those who are interested in this subject. The historical argument suffers from the lack of further sustaining evidence and the philosophical argument suffers from brevity. The approach gives the whole a compartmentalized effect; so much time is taken up in exegesis that the development of a sustained argument, philosophical or historical, suffers.

The second concerns the bibliography where there is a dearth of books written after 1988 and the articles cited stop around 1990. There are some exceptions, but few. This means that some very relevant considerations are not included. It seems incredible, for instance, that there is no discussion of Richard Dawkins's account of the evolution of altruism, in particular the computer simulation involving the 'Tit-For-Tat' program. Dawkins argues that organisms involved in iterated prisoner's dilemmas evolve 'evolutionarily stable strategies', complex patterns of behavior that have benefits in terms of the long term survival of genetic material. Citing evidence from biological fieldwork and computer simulations, Dawkins argues that the most stable of the strategies is 'tit-for-tat' in which an organism confronted with a prisoner's dilemma will initially cooperate and will continue to cooperate unless the other organism reneges. This produces a biologically altruistic behavior pattern from an egoistic organism, an essential coincidence between self interest and benevolence.

Thirdly, although Bradie has a whole chapter on human nature in which he discusses the anti-essentialist import of Darwin's argument, there is no mention of evolutionary psychology. Although the arguments in this field are less central to Bradie's argument, the work of such people as Martin Daly and Margo Wilson is clearly relevant to Bradie's assertion that 'the time has come to mount an interdisciplinary effort drawing on the talents and expertise of philosophers, biologists, anthropologists, psychologists and other like minded Darwinians to explore the complicated nuances of human morality' (147).

Ultimately this is a book that aims very high and doesn't quite make the jump. However, books that seriously engage with the implications of evolution for ethical theory are few, and Bradie's text is a useful guide to the historical context and some of the complexities of the area.

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Richard A. Cohen
Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994.
Pp. ix + 342.
US $44.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-11274-8);
US $17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-11275-6).

In these times, when moral commentary is pervasive and moral performance nearly invisible, the thought of Emmanuel Levinas is receiving a good deal of deserved attention. Richard Cohen's book makes a significant contribution to this growing literature. Cohen gives a careful and important reading of Levinas's claim that our basic orientation to the world is ethical — even the search for truth is permeated by ethical responsibility. Cohen argues that the germination of this idea and some of the conceptual apparatus required for its articulation can be found in the religious thought of the Jewish thinker Franz Rosenzweig. Thus, the book contains discussions of Levinas's debt to Rosenzweig and other elements of the Judaic tradition in addition to a comprehensive discussion of philosophical sources.

It would appear on the surface that, apart from their interest in and commitment to Judaism, Levinas and Rosenzweig have little in common. Levinas writes within the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Heidegger while Rosenzweig is concerned with the historical role of Jewish election and the Christian mission. Yet, in Cohen's view, these quite distinct intellectual roots generate similar insights. Levinas and Rosenzweig share a view on the main characteristics of the history of Western thought, one that has become rather familiar in some philosophical circles. Western thought seeks universal knowledge by showing that disparate particulars are part of a larger unity graspable by human reason; but this universalizing tendency is blind to what cannot fit easily within that unity. However, Levinas and Rosenzweig are distinguished from this familiar view by three claims: (1) the

domain of ethical responsibility transcends and disrupts this unity; (2) ethical responsibility is more fundamental, of greater significance, and in fact conditions our comprehension of reality; and (3) ethical responsibility cannot be grasped through reason alone. Cohen's agenda is to explain the emergence of these three claims in the work of Levinas and Rosenzweig, to mark the conceptual affinities between their work and trace Rosenzweig's influence on Levinas, and to situate Levinas and Rosenzweig in the context of 19th- and 20th-century thought.

The book is divided into three parts. The first is devoted to Rosenzweig's claim that God's love (expressed in Jewish election) conditions the authentic self, the I-Thou relationship, and the finality of history expressed in terms of the Christian mission. Cohen casts Rosenzweig's views on the self and history as an alternative to Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Buber. Part Two explicates Levinas's central claim that the intersubjective relationship imposes a moral imperative on us that conditions all modes of comprehension including that of temporality and God. This section closes with an insightful discussion of the use of controversial gendered metaphors in Levinas's metaphysics. Part Three continues the explication of Levinas's thought by tracing its debt to Husserl and Rosenzweig, its transcendence of Husserl and Heidegger, and its resistance to Derrida's deconstructive reading.

Cohen succeeds admirably in explaining Levinas's challenging thought and its connection to contemporary thinkers. He provides the clearest and most readable account I have seen of Levinas's debt to phenomenology and his transcendence of it. This is especially true of the discussions of Heidegger. Readers of Levinas who have a primarily secular interest in his work should not be put off by the extensive discussions of religion in Cohen's book. He does a masterful job of appropriately joining and separating the philosophical and religious discussions while clarifying the significance of Levinas's religious perspective on his philosophical work.

Ultimately, however, Cohen's thesis that Levinas's thought is closely allied with that of Rosenzweig is less than convincing. Rosenzweig's notion that the Christian mission (supported by the ethical example of the Jewish community) represents the end of history seems beholden to the Hegelian totalization of history that Rosenzweig purports to escape. This is utterly incompatible with Levinas's substitution of infinity for totality. The infinite fecundity of the future cannot be reduced to any finality even one that takes the moral imperative expressed in the face of the Other as an example. The elevation of the good is not a *telos* in Levinas's view but an ungrounded, gratuitous appeal. This difference suggests that Levinas and Rosenzweig are in conflict over a fundamental question — the degree to which ethics is teleological. Cohen briefly mentions their differing views on holy history (162) but fails to explain why this does not seriously impact the claimed similarities in their views on ethics.

Despite this reservation, Cohen's book significantly advances the important process of bringing Levinas's work into the mainstream of contemporary

thought. It is essential reading for anyone interested in rethinking standard philosophical approaches to ethics.

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Kathy Davis
Reshaping the Female Body: The Dilemma of Plastic Surgery.
New York: Routledge 1995. Pp. viii + 211.
US $55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-90631-8);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-90632-6).

The 'dilemma of plastic surgery' is presented by Kathy Davis as a feminist dilemma. Her conclusions are based principally on interviews with female plastic surgery recipients and members of the medical establishment, including extensive biographical interviews with ten recipients. Her inquiry spanned several years and included an exploratory study, a clinical study, and field work. The study was limited to surgery for cosmetic reasons, and was conducted in the Netherlands, where plastic surgery is covered by national health insurance not only for health reasons or psychological suffering, but if a 'physical imperfection' falls 'outside a normal degree of variation in appearance' (35). As a result, twenty thousand cosmetic operations are performed in the Netherlands per year, more per capita than in the U.S.

As a feminist, Davis is well aware of the role plastic surgery can play in oppressing and exploiting women. In a culture which links beauty to a host of positive social characteristics, and values physical attractiveness more highly in women than in men, many women come to be preoccupied with personal appearance. Further, the culture tends to inferiorize the female body, suggesting it is never good enough; women consistently have lower body images than men, and even beautiful women fear they may lose their beauty or be valued only for their bodies. Davis discusses beauty in relation to psychoanalytic concepts of narcissism, sociological concepts of the body as a site of determining how power works, and as an artifact of consumer capitalism. Women's preoccupation with appearance has been described as part of a 'beauty system' of structured social practices, a system that articulates social hierarchies based on class, race and ethnicity, that sets up dichotomies of Otherness and power hierarchies among women, and that serves as a means for creating and maintaining gender difference.

Plastic surgery is the most invasive and one of the most dangerous aspects of the beauty system. In the case of breast enlargement, implants can become hard, may become surrounded with fibroid tissue, may cause infection and have to be removed, may leak or rupture, and have been linked in some studies to cancer and autoimmune disease. In many cases, Davis found that patients were often not warned of these risks before the surgery. Yet it was Davis's impression that most women who seek plastic surgery are willing to proceed even when they are fully aware of the risks. Some women interviewed had scores of operations on one area, obsessively determined to get things right in spite of medical problems. In 1987, American women had 94,000 breast reconstructions, 82,000 nose jobs, 73,230 liposuctions and 67,000 face lifts, and nine times more operations than men did (21). The actress Cher has spent over seventy five thousand dollars on dozens of operations, including the removal of two ribs.

In view of the dangers of plastic surgery, why is it that so many women submit to the knife? Some feminists have proposed a 'cultural dope' theory, argued that women have unwittingly had the ideological wool pulled over their eyes and know not what they do. Yet Davis stresses it is important to hear what the women involved have to say, and that their responses raise issues of identity, agency, and morality. *Morality* is at issue because many women resort to plastic surgery only after years of what for them is unbearable suffering. (A teacher, for example, is repeatedly called 'Bugs Bunny' by her students, bringing back painful memories of childhood teasing.) Although some feminists would admonish these women that they look fine the way they are or that it doesn't matter what they look like, even intellectual acceptance of these beliefs may not be strong enough to diminish suffering that has been experienced, unabated, over a lifetime. *Identity* is at issue because many women come to loathe their bodies or a body part so much that their bodies come to seem like disembodied objects, foreign to their concepts of self. Correcting what they regard as the deficiency allows them to claim their bodies, to develop a more fully embodied self. (This embodied self is likely to include the self concept before, during, and after the surgery.) Finally, *agency* is at issue because most of these women saw their surgery as a courageous or even a defiant act, as a way to take their lives into their own hands. In many cases, women who were miserable, shy and retiring before their surgeries blossomed into more outgoing and decisive individuals after the surgeries. Davis points out that many of the women who opted for plastic surgery made their decisions over the objections of partners, friends and family, that many developed their own critique of plastic surgery, and that more than a few were feminists. In view of the cultural pressures that women are likely to experience, agency in such matters is always limited. Yet the individuals involved should be regarded as 'active and knowledgeable agents who negotiate their lives in a context where their awareness is partial and the options limited by circumstances which are not of their making' (170).

Davis concludes that instead of a 'politically correct' position that regards women who have plastic surgery as 'Robowomen' or 'Stepford Wives', our

stance should be ambivalent and empathetic; we should be 'critical of plastic surgery without uncritically undermining the women who see it as a solution to their suffering' (160). Davis's charge of 'politically correct' to diminish the more uncompromising positions of other feminists is unfortunate; the term is often used to have a silencing effect on those who are working hard, against considerable odds, to fight oppression. Yet her call for empathy is compelling, and she is persuasive in arguing that plastic surgery presents a dilemma, even for feminists, in at least some cases. Ambivalence increasingly seems the only option in considering a myriad of feminist problems and social problems in general. Still, ambivalence must be held in the psyche with caution. In the case of an actual individual having to make major life decisions, too much of a rupture between competing ideologies or between ideology and practice can be emotionally or psychologically harmful. One can only hope that we can learn to live with the conflicts and ambiguities which seem increasingly typical of contemporary thought.

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John Earman, Allen I. Janis, Gerald J. Massey, and **Nicholas Rescher, eds.**
Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds: Essays on the Philosophy of Adolf Grünbaum.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 1993.
Pp. xi + 628.
US $75.00. ISBN 0-8229-3738-7.

This is a collection of 24 papers organised into five main sections: space, time, and cosmology; scientific rationality and methodology; philosophy of psychiatry; freedom and determinism, science and religion; and moral problems. The wealth of issues covered by these sections indicates the range of Grünbaum's thought, and the high standard of the volume's papers is a fitting testimony to the eminence and quality of Grünbaum's own writings. I will consider a representative selection of papers from each section.

In the first section Carrier (7-10) discusses the difficulty of measuring geometric relations in the presence of perturbations, such as temperature or gravitational variations. Thus, to measure the spacetime metric reliably, we have to carry out corrections about, e.g., the length of rigid bodies, that themselves make assumptions about the metric. Carrier argues that this is

not viciously circular. We can reach reasoned views about the values of these quantities by making successive approximations by a process of refining results based on the geometry in our correcting theory and the geometry obtained by measurements with corrected rods (10-11). Or we can follow a method of selecting undisturbed instances, e.g., the local congruence of rigid rods can be established without making assumptions about the metric in the absence of deformational disturbances (13-15). Although these methods are not generally applicable, the second shows that physical geometry can be tested in isolation from correction laws (18).

Earman and Norton have famously argued that spacetime substantivalism is a metaphysical thesis, and that, if substantivalism were true, any generally covariant theory would be indeterministic. But since the determinism/indeterminism dispute concerns an empirical matter, it should not be settled on metaphysical grounds and so substantivalism is unacceptable. In a joint paper Hoefer and Cartwright contend that the empirical nature of that dispute does not warrant the rejection of substantivalism, only agnosticism about it (23, 34-7), and that Earman's and Norton's characterisation of determinism fails to carry their argument (24, 37-41). A paper by Stachel also considers this issue, and papers by Earman, Mittelstrass, and Redhead complete the section. The section of methodology is begun by Butts who attempts to demarcate science from pseudoscience. He claims that 'the texts of the natural sciences permit only one or very few interpretations, whereas those of the pseudosciences can ... [fit] many more legitimate interpretations' (174). In particular, he contends that the meanings of technical scientific terms are highly stable (174-6), and that metaphor is absent from science (181). Objections posed by Kuhn's work on meaning variance through theory-change, and Hesse's work on the role of models and analogies in science are not addressed. Furthermore, to take some of Butts's own examples (163), it is not evident that there is any metaphor or significant scope for interpretation in the claims of flat earthers or those who seek to build perpetuum mobile machines. And, as Butts admits (182), pseudoscientific claims about Big Foot or the Loch Ness Monster are empirically testable.

Feyerabend assesses Laudan's *Science and Relativism*. Laudan holds (191) that science establishes which standards of theory-assessment and theory-choice are acceptable by reference to the degree of success of theories selected by given standards. Feyerabend objects that theories may be successful in one area but not in another (191); that the success of theories is frequently achieved by incentives and correctives, and, if these are formulated as standards, science will accept mutually incompatible standards (192-3); and that science accepts standards according to circumstances and without acknowledging that an important choice has occurred (195-6). Whereas Laudan maintains that epistemology is required to explain scientific success, Feyerabend is sceptical. He claims (197-8) that there is no single entity 'science', that only a few particular theories are successful, and that scientific success can be explained solely by science, and without invoking epistemology.

Humphreys rebuts Kuhn's claims about the status and workings of thought experiments, and Kuhn's twin conclusions that scientific definitions are functionally similar to laws, and that thought experiments lead to conceptual reorganisation. Humphreys persuasively argues (218-20) that thought experiments explore and refine the theoretical models on which they are based. This provides new understanding, and the further a thought experiment is grounded in an explicitly formulated model, and the closer it is to a well-posed problem, the better it is.

Salmon addresses Grünbaum's challenge of why subsequent events cannot explain earlier ones, given the time-symmetry of most fundamental laws. Hempel has suggested that geometrical optics provides just such explanations. Salmon replies (236) that the wave theory of light accounts for the same phenomena, does not explain events in terms of subsequent events, and provides a mechanistic, and so better, explanation. However, since Salmon (237) does not take this to impugn geometrical optics, the most this establishes is that different explanations of the same phenomena are available. Hempel's example stands.

Drawing on Reichenbach, Salmon's answer to Grünbaum's challenge runs (212-4): causation is indispensable in explaining particular events; events can be explained by common causes, but not by common effects; the direction of time is fixed by the direction of causation; so causes preceded their effects; and therefore later events cannot (causally) explain earlier ones. Waiving doubts about the first premiss, this schematic argument seems extremely promising.

Woodward traces the connections between causal capacities, invariance, and manipulability. According to Woodward, causation can be distinguished from mere correlation because causation alone can be exploited for manipulation and control. Invariance is the stability of a relationship under a class of changes. If C causes E, then the relation between C and E remains invariant under certain kinds of intervention. Thus, the ideal gas law (311) states an invariant relationship between the pressure, temperature, and volume of a gas, because the relationship would continue to hold even if various sorts of intervantions were to occur to gas samples. By contrast, the Philips's curve between inflation and unemployment is not invariant. It is variant depending on the exploitations of agents.

One possible difficulty here is that even in the case of laws, the relations in question may be invariant only within some range of changes. But then it is unclear how large that range must be for the relation in question to figure in a law, rather than an accidental correlation. What rationale can be offered? Another apparent difficulty is that two properties may not be causally connected although they stand in an invariant relationship, because there is some third property underlying them. E.g., the thermal and electrical conductivity of metals are distinct, causally unconnected properties which stand in an invariance (the Franz-Wiedemann law) and which are brought about by the same underlying quantum-mechanical structure.

Papers by Scheibe, Skyrms, and Worrall complete this section. In the section on the philosophy of psychiatry, Erwin presents a lengthy and masterly defence of Grünbaum's *The Foundations of Psychoanalysis* against criticisms by a raft of philosophers. Erwin cogently argues that Grünbaum's twin original conclusions stand: that outcome studies have not shown that psychoanalysis is superior to other treatments, and it is reasonable to interpret its therapeutic achievements as placebo effects.

Glymour carries this deflationary treatment of Freud further. According to Glymour, by the fall of 1897 Freud realised the falsity of his hypothesis that hysterics and obsessives were seduced as children. Freud then suspected that his psychoanalytic methods were unreliable, and that the seduction tales resulted from his own promptings to his patients. To save his professional reputation, and for personal psychological reasons, Freud gradually abandoned the seduction hypothesis and, by a form of self-deception (466, 486), rejected his own doubts about the unreliability of his methods. Accordingly, with time Freud was able to abandon this central hypothesis without undermining the entire psychoanalytic project. Other papers in this section are by Eagle, Hobson, Millon, and Sand.

In the section on freewill, Fine argues that libertarianism is incoherent. He also suggests (552) that attributions of responsibility do not require such philosophical accounts: our social practices of assigning and judging responsibility can lack metaphysical foundations. First, Fine defends 'Grünbaum's conditional' (556): if freewill is incompatible with determinism, it is also incompatible with indeterminism. The argument for the consequent (556-61) is that if indeterminism figures at any stage of the chain of deliberation from the options to the decision, then the agent cannot be responsible for the outcome. The outcome was not his doing, but mere chance. Second, Fine argues (564-9) that if there were an adequate indeterminist account of an agent's behaviour, there would be an equally adequate determinist account, because the statistics of an indeterminist theory of behaviour are reducible to those of a deterministic base. But then, if determinism is incompatible with freedom, then so too is indeterminism.

By contrast, Watkins argues for libertarianism. He maintains (580) that determinism renders mind-body interaction 'virtually indistinguishable' from epiphenomenalism. A scenario whereby causal antecedents cause mental states which in turn cause behaviour is 'empirically indiscernible' (579) from a scenario whereby causal antecedents cause both mental states and behaviour, and where the mental states are epiphenomenal.

But the same indiscernibility arises with indeterminism. Perhaps mental states are probabilistic causes of behaviour, or perhaps they are epiphenomenal, and, together with behaviour, are effects of a common probabilistic cause. Moreover, since Watkins assumes that causal connections are unobservable, the original problem generalises. A world with causal connections between any number of events could be 'empirically indiscernible' from a 'Hume world' at which there are no causal connections, only fluke concatenations, of the same events. But then there is no special argument against

determinism, or its implications for freewill. Lastly, if the indistinguishability is merely epistemic, it does not entail that there is no factual difference between the two situations Watkins considers.

Watkins further contends (583-5) that human inventiveness shows that not all behaviour is scientifically explicable. But determinism does not entail that nothing can come into existence ex nihilo (584). Waiving this, mixing paints is a deterministic process, and yet the resulting colour can be novel and surprising. Lastly, Watkins argues (585-7) that determinism requires pre-established harmony in order that bodily behaviour, such as talk, has the meaning that it does. But no attention is given to Gricean or Davidsonian accounts of how meaning may be part of the causal order.

The section is completed by a paper by Quinn which argues that big bang models of cosmology are consistent with divine creation, and that these models leave open the question whether the universe is inexplicable or can be theologically explained.

The section on moral problems consists in a single paper by Rescher on refugees' special obligation of good citizenship to the country in which they are refugees.

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G.R. Evans
Philosophy & Theology in the Middle Ages.
New York: Routledge 1993. Pp. 139 + x.
US $49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-08908-5);
US $14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-08909-3).

In this book, Evans surveys the changing role philosophy played in the development of Western Christian theological doctrine from the time of Augustine until the 16th century. It hardly need be said that a book of this brevity can treat a topic of such enormity only at the price of many omissions and glib generalizations. Nevertheless, the idea of a combined treatment of medieval developments in both philosophy and theology is basically sound and promising, for in fact the two endeavors interacted in fascinating ways with results for both that were hardly predictable in the fourth century when the church began to see its need for a systematic account of dogma and the role pagan philosophy could play in this. But there was also a conflict there at the beginning, a conflict which, despite all attempts to make philosophy a

'handmaiden' for theology, kept re-surfacing and was perhaps even more evident at the end of the middle ages than it had been at the beginning. It is a sense of this persistent and essential conflict that I find largely missing in the book.

Evans does at the very beginning make quite clear that what ancient figures like Augustine and Boethius considered philosophy to be was very different from what thinkers of the high Middle Ages held. The former saw it as a way of life in competition with religious cults, but one that could largely be incorporated within Christianity; the latter saw it as an academic discipline with results that theologians needed to take seriously for their own work. What Evans's account leaves out, however, or at least does not sufficiently emphasize, is the way in the high Middle Ages philosophy came to have a kind of authority akin to what science has today and invaded theology to the extent that the treatment of theological questions often became itself a full scale philosophical inquiry. By the time of Aquinas a theologian had to be a philosopher in the academic sense to do his job.

Part of the problem here is that Evans has chosen to omit almost entirely from the book any description of the work done by the late 13th century scholastics after Aquinas as well as just about everybody in the 14th and 15th centuries except Nicholas of Cusa. This means that many of the towering figures of scholasticism like Duns Scotus, William Ockham, Robert Holkot, Gregory of Rimini, as well as all the later realist vs. nominalist controversies, are almost totally neglected. Arguably this was the golden age of scholasticism and certainly a period in which the tensions between theology and philosophy were most in evidence and most productive of both heat and light.

Another part of the problem is that Evans does not make his readers sufficiently aware of the way Christian dogma as defined by the church in its first five centuries had adopted positions squarely in opposition to the main stream of the ancient Greek philosophical tradition. Indeed, doctrines like the Trinity, the free creation of the world, the incarnation, original sin, etc. were absurd within that framework of thought. It was only with a great deal of obfuscation and logical sleight of hand that these fundamental oppositions were sufficiently glossed over to allow philosophy to play a role in Christian apologetics. This makes the story of philosophy's near total conquest of theology in the 13th century and the later reassertion of theology's independence in the 14th century the most amazing and dramatic of the tales to be told about philosophy and theology in the Middle Ages. Not even a survey of this brevity should ignore it.

Readers should be warned, too, that the discussion of the controversy over universals on pp. 41-2 badly distorts the issues, that the remark on p. 56 that Avicenna said that metaphysics cannot prove that God exists is the opposite of what is fact, and that the discussion on p. 59 of Aquinas's views on how God can be described leaves out his central doctrine, viz. how words can be said analogically of both God and creatures. Near the end Evans presents a comparatively long discussion of views on the Eucharist but fails to make evident what havoc this topic raised with philosophy. Experiments in deny-

ing what philosophers would call self-evident principles in order to salvage bizarre eucharistic dogmas ultimately called into question the scientific status of philosophy and led to scepticism like that of Nicholas of Autrecourt (another fascinating figure Evans leaves out).

While Evans's book does provide the uninitiated with a quick and reasonable guide to the topics and figures that dominated western philosophical theology from the time of Augustine to the condemnations of the 1270s, readers are advised that the reality of the philosophy/theology interaction in the Middle Ages was both much stranger and more dramatic than this survey lets on.

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K.W.M. Fulford, Grant R. Gillett and **Janet Martin Soskice, eds.**
Medicine and Moral Reasoning.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1994.
Pp. ix + 207.
US $59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-45325-9);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-45946-X).

The editors of this book eschew the customary paean to medical ethics as a growth industry; it was, they say, '... prompted ..., on the contrary, by a premonition of decline' (1). The editors' disenchantment with medical ethics results from their involvement in multi-disciplinary working parties. Rather than generating new ideas, advancing the subject, and fusing disciplines, the working parties, they report, produced frustration and incomprehension. Doctors found the preoccupation of philosophers with theory 'hopelessly inconclusive,' while the expectations of doctors for definite answers struck philosophers as 'unrealistic' (1). All participants knew they had to draft conclusions and reports, however, and the result was disappointing: '... an anodyne, an all too familiar compromise of a broadly consequentialist kind, unimpeachable yet often unsatisfying. It was neither sufficiently cognisant of the gritty details faced by professionals at the clinical coal-face, nor adequately addressed to the full interest and subtlety of the theoretical issues embodied by these same dilemmas' (1-2). This book aims to supplant 'unexciting compromise' and intellectual 'stagnation' in medical ethics by fomenting a 'creative tension' between medicine and philosophy and by getting doctors and philosophers to realize that their disciplines '... have more to offer each other in their differences than in their similarities ...' (2-3).

That provocative, candid introduction raises high hopes, hopes that unfortunately dissipate quickly. The more concrete lessons the editors draw

from their working party experiences are by now mundane: if philosophers want to contribute to medical ethics, they need to become better acquainted with the realities of clinical practice; doctors must acquire a deeper understanding of moral philosophy; and practical medical ethics is a clinical skill that involves communication as much as care. The editors' conception of 'the essence of philosophical practice' is similarly deflationary. The crux of philosophy, in their view, is diversity. They recognize that practically minded doctors would likely see the exaltation of philosophical diversity as 'a recipe for chaos' (4). Nevertheless, they insist that the task of philosophy is to expose the real nature of problems: '... philosophy helps us to make better decisions ... by denying us the spurious reassurance of one-sided, confused or otherwise inadequate solutions' (5). By fostering diversity, the editors believe, philosophy also can promote humility in the practice of medicine and prevent misuses of medical power and authority.

Although the fourteen essays in this book do not fulfil the high expectations engendered by the editors, there is much that is valuable. Urmson provides a clear, concise analysis of the competing positions that morality is discovered and morality is invented. His essay could nicely introduce a course on medical ethics, when everyone is initially wondering about the nature of morality. There are, as well, several good discussions of the nature of medical ethics. Murray lucidly describes deductivism and casuistry and argues for the role of interpretation and tradition in making moral judgments. May provides a strong defence of the virtues in professional ethics. Campbell claims that a principle of respect for dependency is more fundamental than a principle of respect for autonomy in medical ethics. Preoccupation with autonomy is, he suggests, the result of focusing on critical and acute care and ignoring chronic or long-term care. How incompatible his position is with orthodox medical ethics is unclear, though, because he concludes that the ethical challenge is to move people 'from an inappropriate and self-perpetuating dependency, to a restorative and releasing one' (191-2). Why is that not a way of helping people to regain lost autonomy? The essay that comes closest to melding medicine and philosophy is Gillett's philosophical defence of the cry, 'Women and children first!' Gillett argues that children are valuable in themselves and that to respond morally to afflicted infants is commendable — a position dear to the hearts of parents and pediatricians as well as many others — in terms of an account of moral reasoning that draws heavily from the later Wittgenstein, tinctured with Hume, Kant, and Strawson.

Two other intriguing essays deal with substantive issues in medical ethics. Oddie uses decision theory to challenge the view that experimenting on human embryos is morally justified. Crisp argues that the claim that decision making in health care ought to maximize quality-adjusted-life-years or QALYs, a view of which health economists are particularly enamoured, needs to be qualified and supplemented in important ways.

The other essays are less successful. On the philosophical side, Lockwood contends that questions of personal identity are central not only to the dispute about abortion but also to the allocation of scarce medical resources.

Fulford defends the role of linguistic or conceptual analysis in medical ethics with reference to the problem of involuntary psychiatric treatment. The arguments are hard to follow, however, perhaps because they are too compressed. Connections between medical ethics and theology and between medical ethics and public policy are explored by Soskice and Hare, respectively. But Soskice's attempt to relate a theology of creation to medical ethics is too superficial and insubstantial to be convincing, and Hare's account of the pertinence of moral principles to legislation and policy is likely to strike those who already believe that consequences are morally relevant as a contrived philosophical exercise. On the medical side, Brandt's empirical study of presymptomatic diagnosis of Huntington's disease contains interesting practical information and case materials but is short on ethical reflection. Ethical questions are identified and dealt with, he concludes, by blending 'a few more-or-less common-sense principles' with clinical judgment (58). Two essays, one by Midgley on Darwinism and ethics and one by Griffin on Roman suicide, have at most a tangential connection to medical ethics and do not belong in this volume.

One reason this book fails to achieve its avowed goal is that there is not enough medicine in it to suggest what medicine has to offer philosophy or to generate a 'creative tension' between the disciplines. How philosophy and medicine might be fruitfully combined consequently remains unclear. Can the stultifying consequentialist compromise that the editors rightly condemn as the all too common basis of resolutions of problems in medical ethics be avoided? Is medical ethics really in decline? Important questions, but ones that still need to be answered.

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Daniel Gordon
Citizens Without Sovereignty: Equality and Sociability in French Thought, 1670-1789.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1994.
Pp. viii + 270.
US $39.50. ISBN 0-691-05699-4.

The Enlightenment *philosophes*, in Gordon's interpretation, were generally committed to a limited form of social equality that did not imply political equality, republicanism, or revolutionary commitments. The form of equality they did maintain can be characterized as sociability, a term coined in the early eighteenth century. Sociability, as applied to members of a group, implied the partial rejection of social hierarchies (no light matter in that time and place) and

attendant snobbery that particularly characterized the French court. Salons were the (technically illegal) groups particularly embracing sociability; their membership included persons of socially disparate origins and rank. Within such a social group these differences were deemed irrelevant because the conversation promoted by the salon required equal reciprocity of exchange, without dominance, subservience, or otherwise unequal levels of active participation. Although the participants did represent an intellectual elite, compared with the rest of society, they were committed to a clarity of expression by which their ideas could readily be understood by all participants, including women whose education apart from the salons was severely restricted.

Gordon's research on linguistic usage shows the word 'social' to be rare in the seventeenth century and synonymous with 'sociable' in the eighteenth. Social virtues tended to be defined in terms of polite manners: pleasantness in company, openness without rudeness, and obligingness without flattery. Since sociability called for a high degree of courtesy, Gordon gives detailed attention to several books on the art of conversation that were widely read.

Sociability was supposed to preclude polemics against fellow philosophes. Diderot found fault with Morellet for the contentiousness of a published work, because he insultingly violated the principle of reciprocity. To be sure, Voltaire ridiculed Rousseau, but Rousseau's public attacks on Hume were regarded as scandalous. Jean-Baptiste Suard, a minor but popular *philosophe* known primarily as a translator and conversationalist, sided with Hume in this dispute because of Hume's gentle manners, moderation and lack of polemics. Hume also illustrated sociability in his use of the dialogue form to simulate learned conversations. Hume, who spent much time in Paris, well fits Gordon's image of the Enlightenment thinker as a skeptical conservative more interested in personal liberties 'than in dreaming about how civilized beings could construct a perfect regime' (172).

If Hobbes found insects, but not humans, to be sociable, in contrast, French defenders of Absolutism, such as Bossuet, saw sociability as inherently characteristic of humans, except for the perverse domination by passions that his Augustinian view interpreted as the result of original sin; royal authority, not a contract, was required to ensure civility. The Chevalier de Ramsay, a Scot who lived in Paris, entitled the third chapter of his *Essai philosophique sur le gouvernement civil* 'Man is Born Sociable', but this also represented an ideal rather than psychological reality, so he again appealed to authority. Nicolas Delamare, subject of Gordon's opening chapter, in *Traité de la police*, appealed to Seneca and found sociability prescribed by natural law but requiring government to actualize it, on account of human passions; Delamare was probably influenced by Pufendorf's *De Jure Naturae et Gentium*; the word '*sociabilité*' would appear to be a French translation of a Latin word Pufendorf used.

The *Encyclopédie* article on '*sociabilité*' derives it from natural law and makes it the basis for the golden rule, concern for the common good, and universal human equality based on similar interests and faculties, as well as

mutual dependence among persons. Under the entry '*Société*' the *Encyclopédie* affirms human equality but makes a utilitarian hedge in favor of political hierarchies. Holbach saw the basis of sociability in a rational perception that individual happiness requires cooperation or reciprocity with others in the pursuit of happiness. His views on equality resemble those of the *Encyclopédie*.

Montesquieu extended the notion of sociability to whole nations, such as France, in terms of manners and character. If a nation has a sociable temperament then the restraints of law become unnecessary, even unwise. D'Alembert also saw sociability as attributable to nations. The resulting perception of national superiority introduced a snobbish or elitist note which of course would undermine the notion of universal equality.

Gordon is particularly at pains, as an historian, to deny the dominant assumption, associated with Tocqueville and Marxist interpreters especially, that the French Revolution was the 'logical completion of everything egalitarian in the Enlightenment.' It is necessary, in other words, to conceptualize the prerevolutionary period as a dynamic yet self-sufficient culture' (25). In particular, Gordon argues that the prerevolutionary usage of 'sociability' did not have the radical or democratic significance often found in modern historical usage. Whatever the empirical merits of this claim, Gordon seems on fairly firm ground in claiming to provide 'conceptual alternatives' to the predominant view, but only if Rousseau is left out of account. Gordon does not offer an adequate discussion of Rousseau, although that dissenter appears briefly from time to time.

The most interesting part of this study is its account of the concept of sociability in relation to equality. Also of interest is an extended discussion of Jean-Baptiste Suard and the Scottish Enlightenment in France, which relates sociability to 'universal history', and a long concluding chapter on the late philosophe André Morellet, who lived through the French Revolution and disliked what he saw of its form of equality without civility.

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A.J. Hoover
Friedrich Nietzsche: His Life and Thought.
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers 1994. Pp. xiii + 211.
US $49.95. ISBN 0-275-94136-1.

Friedrich Nietzsche: His Life and Thought contains a biographical sketch (in two chapters 'A Brief Life' and 'Nietzsche's End'), an examination of Nietzsche's epistemology ('Our Meddling Intellect: The Problem of Knowl-

edge'), metaphysics ('Nietzsche's Universe', 'The Superman and Eternal Return'), theology ('God and His Shadow', 'Christ and Christendom'), ethics ('The Problem of Morality') and politics ('Nietzsche's Politics'). Hoover reads Nietzsche as a positive philosopher, that is Nietzsche takes up the 'eternal and irresolvable' problems that occupied his predecessors, challenges their answers, and sets forth a new, improved theory. Hoover's animated description of Nietzsche is of a soul on fire, whose guts are eternally spilled on paper, where blood drips from every word. (This rather popular vision should be dubbed 'Sam Peckinpah's Nietzsche'.)

Undergirding the entire book is Hoover's thesis that Nietzsche's thought experiment, his 'Dionysian epistemology', was the proximate cause of Nietzsche's breakdown and ensuing insanity. Hoover likens Nietzsche to the Columbus of a 'strange new labyrinth of nihilism', and asserts that madness is an occupational hazard of taking one's voyage of discovery so seriously. Hoover argues both that Nietzsche's thinking caused the disintegration of his nervous system (throughout, but primarily the chapter 'Nietzsche's End'), and that his nervous system affected his thinking (16). While it is certainly romantic to think that Nietzsche's philosophy was so powerful that it drove him mad, it remains more likely that his mental collapse was due to the advanced stages of syphilis than his (or anyone else's) theory of knowledge. (Columbus is more likely the one who died of a sexually transmitted disease acquired from an occupational hazard.)

Reading Nietzsche as essentially offering a positive philosophical system to supplant those of his predecessors — as Hoover interprets Nietzsche — is certainly one of several competing interpretations within contemporary Nietzsche scholarship. My central criticism of Hoover's book is that it could benefit by paying more attention to this scholarship. There are some helpful reminders to be assembled from this scholarship that will help in assessing *Friedrich Nietzsche: His Life and Thought*.

First, when reading Nietzsche, as when reading any thinker, the critic ought to pay close attention to style and form: is what the author writes in a personal letter, or in a novel, in a treatise, an aphorism, or poem? Depending on the form or style, the author may have different intentions for how it is to be read. Even if you are not a reader who thinks such intentions are important or accessible, certainly different forms and styles of writing require different ways of reading; e.g., it is often troublesome to conclude that an author personally holds the views expressed by the characters in her novel. In the case of Nietzsche, some of the most vitriolic words on women, for example, come not from Nietzsche's mouth, but from the characters in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

A second and related point is that a reader should be cautious of reading all the books of an author as a whole, unified, consistent text, as if the single proper-name stands for them all. There may be significant differences between earlier and later works that are ignored if the works are regarded as one, big, single book. In the case of Nietzsche, he changed his mind about a number of topics, as can be seen in his *Nachlass*.

Third, a reader should beware of too quickly ascribing a theory or system to a thinker. The two previous points count against such theory ascription. Such an ascription is too often a reification or oversimplification of the text. Of course, in order to assimilate a thinker's contribution, paraphrases and oversimplifications are quite helpful, if not crucial; but these caricatures can be mistaken too easily for positing a system or theory that can betray the author's intentions. One of Nietzsche's projects was to undermine popular systematic philosophical theories, so ascribing a systematic theory to him may be uncharitable.

Fourth, *The Will To Power*, is a non-book. It was not published by Nietzsche, but assembled by his sister and others from vast amount of notes that comprise Nietzsche's literary estate. Hoover pays lip service to the idea that Nietzsche's 'notes in the Nachlass, published under the title *The Will to Power*, ... should be used with care, inasmuch as they often represent ideas still in the process of formation' (xii). Indeed, some of the ideas in the process of formation become transformed into their opposite in later works. But this is not how Hoover uses the quotes from *The Will To Power*; instead they are used to explicate a philosophical system attributed to Nietzsche. Indeed, one-third (202 out of 650) of all the passages cited by Hoover in the effort to explain Nietzsche's positive contribution come from *The Will To Power*. This in itself is not surprising, since *The Will To Power* seems to be the text preferred by those who seek to make a foundationalist out of Nietzsche. (See Bernd Magnus, 'The Use and Abuse of the Will to Power' in Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins, Eds., *Reading Nietzsche*, for an excellent account of the ways this text has been misused.)

In short, as a general introduction to Nietzsche's life and thought, Hoover's book is problematic because it could benefit from greater attention paid to contemporary scholarship. Mainstream Anglo-American philosophy departments have been slow to grant philosophical legitimacy to Nietzsche scholarship for all sorts of stupid reasons. The tenacity of Kaufmann, Danto, Schacht, Magnus, and Solomon, among others (too numerous to mention) have brought Nietzsche scholarship legitimacy and respectability in the eyes of professional philosophy in the United States. The status of Nietzsche scholarship cannot be grasped if the contributions of these philosophers are ignored. Indeed, ignoring these contributions risks setting back Nietzsche scholarship thirty years.

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Daniel P. Jamros, SJ
The Human Shape of God: Religion in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.
New York: Paragon House 1994. Pp. 299.
US $29.95. ISBN 1-55778-703-4.

In terms of his religious writings, Hegel has usually been considered either a humanistic atheist or a Christian thinker, with but a few commentors finding some mid-ground. Considering his Idealism and his seeming anti-religious bent, the former seems to be the case to many commentors; considering his many references to God and Jesus (as well as his strictly Lutheran upbringing), the latter has been seized on by others. Jamros seeks to find a mid-point between these traditional views through a careful outline and analysis of pertinent sections of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* with (very) occasional reference to other works of Hegel, most notably the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*.

In Hegel, the absolute, universal essence, and divine essence can be read as one and the same. Human being is the full realization of this essence; thus, in Christian terms, we are God's highest development — God made manifest. However, this means that, in Hegel's system, any religion is an incomplete step in the development of Spirit as it comes not merely to know and to understand but also to return to union with the absolute. Christianity is an incomplete knowledge of God. The final step in the return to Absolute can only be made by the kind of reasoning embodied in philosophy. Religion believes, but Philosophy knows. This is so because religion cannot fully attain that which it most wishes to possess. Philosophy on the other hand, because of its reasoning, can attain that which religion cannot.

In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel relates religion to other forms of thought, in order to understand them as part of the historic-cultural development of human being. In this development, we find nine distinct stages: 1. consciousness of the inner being, 2. the unhappy consciousness, 3. religion of the underworld, 4. religion of heaven, 5. Kantian morality, 6. conscience, 7. natural religion, 8. religion of art, and finally, 9. manifest religion. Manifest religion develops into the final two stages, embodied in philosophy. In these moments, human being moves from bare consciousness of self, through awareness of self against other, to final re-subsumption within the absolute.

Religion is prior to philosophy because it attempts to look beyond self and world to some other which stands against and outside the self. Thus, for Hegel, faith is not yet in-itself and for-itself. Religion seeks a transcen(dent)(dence) which is impossible, because Self and Other are one and the same in the universal, i.e. divine, essence. The object of faith stands outside itself, when it is to be found within the faithful self.

This surely sounds like pan-theism of the sort found in Plotinus or Spinoza. One tends to think Hegel stands in the tradition of Spinoza, that God is the underlying substance of everything, but now in the guise of phenomenology. Christian Idealism does not make human being necessary,

while in the Hegelian system, the human-divine unity is necessary; God and human are inextricably woven together. 'God can be called a thinking that thinks itself' (10). This points, in a way, to later thought, that God is made in man's image: we construct a deity to our needs. In this sense, Hegel stands mid-way between Medieval theosophy (Man in God's image) and modern psychology (God made in Man's image). Jamros contends that such is really not the case for Hegel, but that human being is the divine essence made manifest. In Hegel, the divine is the objectivity of being developing into subjective being. The subjective thinks the absolute, conceives itself as part of the divine, in order to become one again with the essence of which it is and knows itself to be a part. Thus religion is at best only a partial fulfillment, an incomplete step, within the movement of human back to the absolute. Religion can only approach near without actually arriving.

The incomplete nature of religion results from its incomplete understanding of the divine essence. It conceives the human as separate from all other, from the world in which it finds itself as well as from the divine for which it yearns. Thus religion seeks transcendence from its caged existence. For Hegel, there is no question of the transcendent, there is the need only for understanding, renunciation, and reconciliation. Religion must but cannot move beyond faith, for faith depends upon the separation of human from the absolute.

Much has been made of Hegel's 'Unhappy Conscious', and anyone who truly wishes to understand Hegel should have a clear understanding of its nature and place within Hegel's system. Jamros's explanation of this central concept is well presented. Indeed, I found the central four chapters to be highly valuable in clarifying quite a bit what I have always found difficult in Hegel. The reader would be best served by reading the initial and last chapters first and then those in the middle. In this way, the reader will find the Hegelian system laid bare and will see clearly how and why the traditional views were engendered.

As an outline and analysis of Hegel's work, Jamros has done an excellent job. He has made clear what to many of us has been muddy waters. Hegel can be hard work, with his difficult, if not obscure, style. For those who study Hegel or the philosophy of religion, this volume belongs on the 'must read' list. However, in attempting to prove his principal claim that Hegel was some sort of idealist meta-christian, one may be less satisfied. One need only substitute 'The One' or 'The Absolute' for every occurrence of 'God' to find an unrepentant idealist. Between the lines lurks the possibility that Hegel was as uncomfortable with Christianity as with atheism and so attempted some more idealistic ground, only to find himself just as unsettled.

Micheal van Pelt

Jeff Jordan, ed.
Gambling on God: Essays on Pascal's Wager.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1993.
Pp. viii + 168.
US $49.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7833-4);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-7834-2).

Although the most important version of Pascal's Wager has been definitively dismissed by Anthony Duff ('Pascal's Wager and Infinite Utilities,' *Analysis* 46 [1986] 107-9, discussed but unfortunately not included in the present volume) betting on beatitude continues to generate papers. A very light search reveals over three dozen since Duff's little gem appeared, a number of them by the editor of the present volume, and here is a collection of nine more: John K. Ryan on the history of Wager-like manoeuvres; Ian Hacking's classic piece on the logic of the Wager; Richard Foley being briskly unworried by the problem of doxastic surrender; Thomas V. Morris usefully taking more account of Pascal's non-Wager views than is common; Philip Quinn on the moral problems associated with the Wager, noted by Penelhum and others; George Schlesinger offering a variety of responses to a variety of criticisms and suggesting that the underlying logic of the Wager is closely associated with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, a claim which, if substantiated, would be sufficient to damn it in some eyes, but not in Schlesinger's; Jeff Jordan on the many gods objection; Edward McClennen considering the Wager from the point of view of *finite* decision theory; and finally a piece by Roy Sorenson, 'Infinite Decision Theory', which not only discusses its central topic interestingly, but introduces the reader to a host of other fascinating philosophical areas in the Wager's neighbourhood. As well, there is an introduction by the editor giving a précis of the papers for harassed reviewers. Two of the papers (Ryan, Hacking) have appeared previously, while others make use of points made elsewhere by their authors.

The papers are somewhat uneven, but the collection as a whole is valuable. The Wager, like the triangle, predates Pascal, but the only paper which concerns itself directly with the historical antecedents is Ryan's 'The Wager in Pascal and Others' (1945) which, though interesting, could well have been replaced by a piece taking account of the last half-century of scholarship.

The contributors often write past one another. Sorenson, for example, crisply rebuts an earlier anti-Duff manoeuvre of Schlesinger's, but Schlesinger makes the same move in the present volume.

The editing of the volume is a trifle casual. The bibliography is highly, if haphazardly, selective. Some important works cited are listed; others, discussed at length, are not. One of the articles has its own overlapping bibliography: half of its references are repeated in the main bibliography, though not its reference to the *Pensées*. No attempt has been made to standardize the references to Pascal, and no edition of the *Pensées* (or indeed anything else of Pascal's) is listed in the Bibliography. The book has an index,

which too many anthologies lack, but it is spotty in the extreme. Opening the book at random is almost guaranteed to yield unindexed names and topics.

The back cover quotes William Rowe: 'This is a remarkably good book. It will serve faculty and students well.' Perhaps, but readers are expected to be remarkably well informed. Schlesinger, for example, manages to offer two references on a single page (95) which many students (and faculty) would be hard pressed to pick up immediately: 'L.C. Larson in his highly influential book poses the problem ...' *What* highly influential book? Neither author, nor editor, nor bibliography give us any further hint. The book is *Problem-Solving Through Problems* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1983, corrected third printing 1992), but would most students, or even most readers, know that?

The Larson example is pretty, but the conclusions drawn from it by Larson and Schlesinger are dubious: Find a maximum value for xy subject to the constraints that x, y are positive, and $x + y = k$, a constant. Without loss of generality let $k = 1$. Standard considerations suggest letting $x = {}^1/_2 + \varepsilon$, and $y = {}^1/_2 - \varepsilon$, whence $xy = {}^1/_4 - \varepsilon^2$. Clearly xy is maximized when $\varepsilon = 0$, and hence when $x = y = {}^1/_2$. Larson then applies this result to the similar problem of maximizing xy (equivalently, x^2y^2) under the constraints that x, y are positive and $x^2 + y^2 = 1$. In this case too $x = y$, and hence a square is the solution to the also equivalent problem of finding the rectangle of maximum area inscribed in a circle. Larson claims this as an example of 'the *principle of insufficient reason*, ... "Where there is no sufficient reason to distinguish, there can be no distinction." ' (31). 'A strong illustration of how compelling the PSR is,' says Schlesinger, and proceeds to offer a further example: 'Some 2400 years ago Democritus argued "that there are infinite worlds, hypothesizing that the void is infinite; for why would this part of the void be filled by a world, but that part not? So, if there is a world in one part of the void, then also in all the void. So, since the void is infinite, the worlds will be infinite too." '

This passage, also unreferenced, 'is of special significance as it shows that the PSR ... was known and made use of two thousand years before [Leibniz]' (96). But the reader who is sufficiently at home in Aristotle's Christian commentators to recognize the passage as Philoponus, *In Phys III* (405, 23ff), will surely be already familiar with the atomists' *Ou Mallon* Principle (helpfully discussed by Jonathan Barnes in *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2 vols., [London: Routledge, 1979], 2:251-7), and will not need to be told that it predates Leibniz. Schlesinger should not have been so slipshod about his sources, of course, but having been, his editor should surely have pulled him up. Incidentally, neither Larson nor Democritus (nor Philoponus) achieve the index.

This, then, is a useful collection of papers, some of which are very good, and all of which are interesting. All the essays deserve, and will receive, further attention. I recommend the volume to anyone interested in Pascal's Wager, but any future edition should allot ten to fifteen pages to various short contributions (including Pascal's own *infini — rien* passage) centrally dis-

cussed in the present volume, and some attempt should be made to improve both the index and the bibliography.

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Lucian Krukowski
Aesthetic Legacies.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1992.
Pp. xiv + 245.
US $44.95. ISBN 0-87722-972-4.

In this his second book on aesthetics, Krukowski works to understand why 'postmodern' art is as it is, and he speculates about art's future. This requires that he articulate what postmodernism is and where it might be headed. He goes about his work in a very careful way showing, as one would expect, close acquaintance with modern philosophy, the history of aesthetics and the current critiques of modernist philosophy, aesthetics, and art, as well as (and this is not expected) an insider's familiarity with recent art practice. Krukowski is an active and successful painter as well as a Professor of Philosophy at Washington University.

Here is how the argument goes. It is assumed that we got to the confusing present from somewhere — that we are still quite unpracticed in breaking with the past and therefore that postmodernism is deeply informed by modernism. One way of trying to understand modernism is to look carefully at some of the themes that constitute the centers of the aesthetic ideologies which dominated modernist art. Postmodernist art revises or reverses these core modernist ideas grown dogmatic and restrictive. Krukowski traces the dominant aesthetic theories of modernism out of their origins in 19th-century system philosophies, shows how they functioned well for a time, gradually became less and less tenable, continued as dogmas after they ceased to make sense in terms of either a more comprehensive theoretical framework or in terms of new influences on art practice, to the point where they prompted the postmodern reversal.

The dominant modernist aesthetics are formalism, expressionism, and criticism. (Criticism is the ideology that sees art as progressing, and thereby promoting social emancipation, by innovation rooted in the dislocation or destruction of the tradition, of previous art advances.) Formalism can be understood to derive from Kant's notion of taste, expressionism from Schopenhauer's idea of expression, and criticism from Hegel's idea of pro-

gress. In their original formulations, these foundational notions served crucial functions far beyond the confines of art: taste ultimately helps us to think that there is a correlation between the assumptions underlying empirical knowledge and moral action; expression discloses the noumenal will in its physical and psychological instantiations, a precondition for going beyond willing; criticism discloses the unfolding of the Absolute, of Truth and History. Modernist aesthetics results when one gives up on the assumption that there is some philosophically important knowledge to be had by virtue of the epistemic functioning of aesthetic categories, and one questions the intelligibility of or ceases to valorize philosophic notions like beauty (Kant), irrational will (Schopenhauer), or rationalized history (Hegel). Perforce art becomes autonomous, valuable only for its own sake, and aesthetic understanding is understanding of art works, not of ontological or noumenal truths.

After showing just how the respective key philosophic notions yield the key modernist aesthetic ideologies, and showing the connections and radical dissimilarities between the three positions, Krukowski lays out the most damaging criticisms of each perspective, levelled from the standpoints of its rivals:

—The challenge to formalist aesthetics is that it lacks the necessary internal criteria for authenticating competent judges of significant form. The functional criteria are social and political — a criteria-less self-validating art-world elite does the deciding. Modernism's progress is marked by one set of ideologues, the avant-garde, supplanting another elite, the academicians, in the labor of enlightening the taste-challenged majority.

—The challenge to expressionist aesthetics is that it becomes increasingly difficult to discern the difference between artistic and other sorts of creativity, and to continue to give art some special significance and value above the rest. Once expressionism is democratized (everyone is an artist) and rid of Romantic ideas about the genius and alienation of the creator, art is hardly sacred and may indeed be pointless.

—The challenge to critical aesthetics is that it is only negative, now that we are done with Hegelian teleology. The original imperative to build by controversion of tradition was in the name of cultural progress, not directionless, purposeless change. Modernist criticism now lacks any criteria for preferring one future to another; its systematic disengagement with the past fosters emancipation as rootlessness rather than positioning one to pursue more promising possibilities. Moreover this form of elitism, promoting cultural change by challenging the forms of culture acceptable to the public, breeds hostility and social divisions, without any legitimate expectation that the future it brings will be better than the past.

Postmodernism is a breathing space between a socially restrictive modernism grown inadequate to any conceptual work and a new outlook which for the moment is little more than an inconsistent amalgam of modernist ideas and their reversals. Supposing modernism is dead, working out an alternative conceptual framework will depend on clearly understanding why certain modernist notions were believed, and now this interstitial time in

philosophy is as fully determined (and for the moment quite limited) by its repudiation of modernism as is modernist art determined by the tradition it found necessary to controvert. Supposing post-postmodern art might be more interesting and significant than postmodern art (which Krukowski clearly struggles to find significant at all) presupposes clearly understanding how postmodern art is a costly reversal of the sound principles gone sour that brought modern art to an end.

The final chapter pulls all the threads together in a (fairly strenuous) effort to suppose that after postmodernism, there will not only still be art, but it will regain some of the significance lost to postmodern art. Krukowski says why the belief that art has ended is well grounded. Objects and events, no matter how radically heterogeneous, still cohered as a class when art was thought to have an epistemic function within a teleological framework. Unhooking aesthetics from the systematic philosophies which generated them also had the effect of destroying art as a system. Art loses its importance as a symbol and becomes nothing but a symptom of culture. Though Krukowski resists the conclusion that 'art' has only honorific import and that art making perdures after art because of social, economic, etc. consequences, his insider's analysis of postmodern art making, his catalogue of all the reasons for believing postmodern art to be derivative and unimportant is very sobering. However he thinks postmodernism has made a turn away from its initial cynical and merely reactive stage. He tries to discern its emerging shape by identifying some of the (few) clearly fixed themes in current thinking about art that escape modernist thinking and suggest the beginning of a new and constructive successor ideology. These include the view that modernism's assumptions about the unity and autonomy, and hence value, of art were deeply wrong (one supposes for the same sorts of reasons that modern philosophy has been judged to be deeply flawed). In fact there is no separating aesthetic judgments and social interests; the latter condition the former. Postmodern art history is far from certifying and holding up for veneration those works which successfully embody deep truths, significant form, sparks of genius and the rest. It is instead the history of images, ideologies, and techniques. The primary interest in past art is for what it might contribute to present art making, not for any references to something outside of art as a practice. (Attila Richard Lukacs is a postmodern artist who expresses this view with impressive ingenuousness.) If art historians try to influence public taste, this is because historians and critics have their agendas of manipulation and control. Art is a form of politics. Postmodern appreciation includes appreciation of the political mechanisms at work — who is in control, whose interests are being served.

Krukowski applauds the demise of modernism, with its unworkable notions of art's autonomy, universality, unity, integrated evolution of style, and with its political agenda in the service of a self-selected elite. This opens up space — local spaces in which to manipulate, for postmodern artists. He is hoping that this liberation will elevate the quality, artistic and social, of the present, and generate visions of alternative, viable, futures. In the end,

the last chapter, it is not clear that he has convinced himself that art's significance is not now forever forfeit. Nothing in postmodern philosophy or art suggests that there can be any basis for normative judgments. To project a possible 'better future' resulting from the willy-nilly operations of artists dispossessed of aesthetic criteria and driven by personal and group interests requires imagination. The deep problem here is that postmoderns for the most part do not provisionally lack criteria for normative judgments; they reject the very notion. There simply is not space in the ideology, as constructed against modernism, for 'better' art or a 'better' future. Krukowski admits that postmodern artworks are transient and superfluous and that postmodern criticism is ineffective, given a break with the past and no sense of the future. He leaves us with two uninviting pictures of post-postmodern art. On one view, the postmodern philosophical view about history, especially narratives of progress, may be too inconvenient to embrace for long. It may be, however, that the particulars of the construction of postmodern aesthetics against a decadent modernism make it virtually impossible for art to retake its seat in the mainstream of history. It might forever remain local and marginal (though perhaps with some commodity value) as it is now. On the other view, history and therewith art has come to an end; in that case post-postmodern artmaking remains (again as it often is now) a repetitive, minimalist saying of the end of history. Grim.

Despite the multiplicity of interconnected themes, the crossdisciplinarity, the to-ing and fro-ing across description, analysis, hypothesis, historical, philosophical and art critical understanding, the text is admirably lucid and would serve well in senior and graduate courses in aesthetics and art history. It is a model of writing about notoriously difficult philosophical writers (Kant, Schopenhauer, Hegel) and murky ('modern') and inchoate ('postmodern') concepts. At the end, it is difficult not to find the account of how modernism begat postmodernism, as forms of art and of consciousness, to be highly plausible. One is helped to articulate at least, if not to resolve, some of the deeply disturbing aspects of contemporary art and contemporary consciousness.

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John Macnamara and
Gonzalo E. Reyes, eds.
The Logical Foundations of Cognition.
New York: Oxford University Press 1994.
Pp. 368.
US $50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-509215-5);
US $25.00 (paper: ISBN 0-19-509216-3).

In their introductory essay, the editors of this collection — a psychologist and a mathematician respectively — explain their approach to psychology according to which the intentional notion of reference is central and primitive. Their main thesis, developed in detail by Macnamara in chapter 2, is that logic and psychology constrain each other in much the same way that calculus and the study of dynamics are mutually constraining (each contributing to the development of the other). In particular, they believe that considerations derived from the referential structure of natural languages — especially distinctions between proper names (PNs), count nouns (CNs), and mass nouns (MNs) — are best represented within category theory, a generalization of set theory that is described in considerable formal detail in the essays by Lawvere (chapter 4), Magnan and G. Reyes (chapter 5), and M. Reyes, Macnamara, and G. Reyes (chapter 6). This is not the place to give a full explication of category theory, but most salient for the approach to psychology urged by the editors is the idea that quantification, identity, and predication should be understood only as relative to categories or kinds. The ability of category theory to represent typed quantification, typed identity claims, and typed predication is both justified by and applied to various psychological facts such as our ability to understand cross-temporal identity claims such as 'that man is the boy who used to live next door', children's abilities to learn that a word like 'dog' refers to the kind, not individuals (Macnamara & G. Reyes, chapter 7), the natural tendencies of children to prefer CN, MN, or PN interpretations of unfamiliar words under different learning conditions (Hall, chapter 9), and our ability to understand fictional texts (M. Reyes, chapter 14). Peruzzi's essay (chapter 8) also sings the virtues of category theory, and argues that an adequate philosophical theory of meaning and reference cannot be obtained without taking facts about human linguistic development into account.

Braine (chapter 10) writes on the methodological question of how to discover mental logic, and he advocates three approaches: the study of reasoning, linguistic universals, and language acquisition. Braine does not directly consider category theory, but both he and the proponents of category theory believe that the psychological facts support the hypothesis that children have an innate language of thought, albeit one that is stocked with fewer innate concepts than Fodor's. Thus, over half of the essays in this collection of sixteen are devoted to advancing the cause of category theory as the logical foundation of cognition (although, to be fair, category theory is regarded by its proponents as mutable in the face of psychological discover-

ies). The remaining essays are much less programmatic. Putnam's commentary (chapter 3) on Macnamara (chapter 2) is generally sympathetic, but challenges the interpretations of some of the empirical claims that are alleged to support category theory as the best way to understand reference. Bach (chapter 11) draws a distinction between external and internal semantics which roughly corresponds to whether syntactic categories should be characterized with respect to their roles in referring to extralinguistic entities, or with respect to their intralinguistic roles. In his commentary on Bach, Pelletier (chapter 12) embraces this distinction and uses it to argue that both sides are wrong in a dispute about the compositionality of semantics. Bach also raises a question about the status of syntactic categories such as noun and verb as linguistic universals. Bach does not address this point, but it seems that the status of such categories would have enormous implications for the category theory approach to cognition which argues for the existence of various innate cognitive resources on the basis of distinctions between various types of nouns (CNs, PNs, and MNs) and predicables (adjectives and verb phrases).

The remaining three essays have much less to do with category theory, but they are concerned with intentionality more generally. Follesdal (chapter 13) provides a very useful introduction to Husserl's notion of intentionality, particularly as it diverged from that of Husserl's teacher Brentano. Hahn, in a stimulating essay (chapter 15), proposes that philosophers would do well to consider the de re/de dicto distinction as applying to cognitive states directly, rather than to the sentences by which we ascribe such states. Hahn's use of Husserl's notion of 'the determinable X' to explicate the structure of de re beliefs is vigorously challenged in the commentary by Hanson (chapter 16). Nonetheless, the chapters by Follesdal and Hahn show that Husserl's ideas are relevant to contemporary worries about intentionality, and both essays do this in a way that should appeal to those of us whose philosophical educations neglected Husserl.

I have tried to indicate some of the highlights among these essays, but overall the quality is rather spotty. Many of the interpretations of specific empirical claims will strike many readers as unsupportable (Putnam identifies some of these in his commentary on Macnamara). Some of the arguments also seem rather shallow. For example, Braine objects to the criticisms of connectionism by Fodor and Pylyshyn, on the grounds that the brain is, after all, a massively parallel structure. But this entirely misses the distinction between process model and implementation model that is essential to the argument given by Fodor and Pylyshyn. There is also considerable variation in the care with which different authors state their claims, and some readers will be annoyed by a certain amount of sloppiness.

According to the editors, approximately half of the papers in this collection are derived from a 1991 conference they organized in Vancouver. Although they do not indicate so, presumably those paired with commentaries are from that conference, and it seems clear that the later contributions are mostly intended to reinforce the editors' goal of promoting category theory. There

are a number of aspects of this program that will strike many readers as undesirable. Some philosophers will feel uncomfortable with the explicit bracketing of naturalistic theories of intentionality (92). Many psychologists will dislike the central role given to intuition over experimentation and computational modelling (27) and both philosophers and psychologists may be uncomfortable with the ensuing Platonism. A substantial number of readers are likely to object to the emphasis on language as the route to a comprehensive theory of cognition (and the consequent neglect of cognition in nonhuman animals).

Because not all the contributors share the goal of promoting category theory and (except for Putnam) are not explicitly responding to it, the result is a collection that tends to seem more schizophrenic than balanced. Furthermore, the heavy formal machinery trotted out in the name of category theory is often not well motivated with respect to the psychology. The volume is also marred by two production deficits: the lack of an index and the lack of a unified bibliography. Nonetheless, there are many ideas within these pages that deserve the further attention of philosophers of mind and language.

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Norman Malcolm
Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View? Edited with a Response by Peter Winch.
Cornell University Press 1994. Pp. 140.
US $32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2978-1);
US $10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8266-6).

Whatever you have achieved cannot mean more to others than it does to you. Whatever it has cost you, that's what they will pay. This may seem like mean bartering between author and reader but it is simply Wittgenstein's (W) way of cautioning us that to understand his work requires hard — even a lifetime's work. Witness Norman Malcolm's philosophical career. Even the last piece of work he managed to finish before his death has as its focus a remark W made in 1949: *I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view.* This remark puzzles and threatens Malcolm. He is puzzled because religious and theological ideas are absent from the pages of the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI). So are problems that call for religious reflection such as poverty, racial prejudice, war. By suggesting dominant spiritual/ethical concerns, the remark also threatens Malcolm's,

and indeed a whole generation's understanding of W as primarily a philosopher of language and mind.

What is fresh and thought-provoking about this little book is Malcolm's exploration of what W could have meant. Malcolm takes the remark to be an indication of W's awareness of an analogy between his later philosophical thought and a religious point of view. Malcolm argues for four points of analogy. First, there is the shared theme of limits of explanation. In a religious setting the words *It is God's will* are meant to bring an end to the torment of regressive explanations. They are meant to quiet, for example, the cri-de-coeur *Why did the children have to die?* and bring about acceptance of a fact over which a parent keeps on tripping. Now a reiterated theme of W's later work is that explanations, justification and reasons reach a limit, and when pressed further, lose their sense. Eventually all we can do is describe and accept the everyday language game. Second, a religious person sees the world as a miracle, wonders at its sheer existence. Similarly, W expresses a kind of astonishment at the existence of the various language games and their contained forms of life. Both the religious person and W's philosopher have a kind of reverence. Third, religious people see themselves as radically imperfect or ill. This spiritual malaise has its analogue in the later W who sees philosophical perplexity as a kind of disease of the understanding. Hence, the right kind of philosophical work is akin to therapy. *A philosopher treats a question: like an illness.* Fourth, in both religion and W's later philosophy, the bottom line is acting and reacting which take priority over intellectual understanding and reasoning. The religious attitude that *Faith without works is dead* resonates with W's post-Tractatus stance that our everyday concepts require a base of action rather than reasoning or interpretation.

In his discussion essay, the editor, Peter Winch, makes perceptive observations. Here is a sample. If W saw problems from a religious point of view, what particular religion did he have in mind? Christianity as an answer seems partisan in light of the facts that such exclusiveness was foreign to W's thinking and that he was respectful of the varieties of religious experience. *All genuine expressions of religion are wonderful.* Winch also notes that if all language games and forms of life are beyond explanation, anchored in deeds, to be looked at with reverence, then obviously religious language games and forms of life will also have these features. This is not analogy but straight deduction and why should we find it surprising? In case we get carried away with Malcolm's analogies, Winch points to some differences. For example, while it makes sense for W to forge a therapeutic method to cure a person of the diseases of philosophical thinking, he would not speak in a similar way of spiritual malaise. Another difference, W spoke of faith and religion as a passion through which one's life can be turned around. Winch claims that W never spoke of philosophy in remotely similar terms. W thought of philosophy as *A temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling with them.* Finally, Winch says that to look for the spiritual dimension of W's work in comparisons between religious and philosophical

questions is to look in the wrong place. The key to such a dimension, he suggests, is W's idea that the purity of the writer and the character of the writing are internally connected.

I offer a few reflections. *Concerning Malcolm's comparisons*: they are insightful but fail to explore the links between W's pursuit of clarity of mind and language and ethical/spiritual concerns. W's remark challenges the conventional dichotomy between problems of life and problems of philosophy. Malcolm's reaction to this threat is to re-assert the dichotomy: religious problems have to do with *the way we live and feel and regard others, philosophical problems have to do with perplexities and confusions about concepts and language*. This view, I believe, isolates philosophical problems from life almost by definition, and runs counter to a movement in W's thought which sees philosophical problems as expressive of large tensions and discontents in our forms of life and culture.

Concerning W's Jewishness: Malcolm collects the textual and anecdotal evidence for W's religious sensibility which includes what we might call a lifelong engagement with Christianity. Yet not a word is mentioned about his Jewishness. This is a strange omission given W's attentions to his Jewishness highlighted in his confessions to friends and in his meditations on what it is to be a Jewish thinker. And let us not forget W's comment to Drury: *I am a 100 percent Hebraic thinker*.

W's personal confessions are philosophically significant to the extent that they throw light on the relationship between the character of the author and the character of the work. Adopting this perspective enables us to see the PI as an original retrieval of the almost forgotten literary genre and style of philosophical confession or spiritual autobiography. This might be added to Malcolm's analogies. We are grateful to Norman Malcolm and Peter Winch for this stimulating and thought-provoking book.

Errata: p. IV, read *response* instead of *reponse*; p. 89 lines 2-3 from bottom, interchange *on the one hand* and *on the other hand*; p. 92 line 8 from bottom, replace *:* with *;* after *thing*.

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George McCarthy
Dialectics and Decadence: Echoes of Antiquity in Marx and Nietzsche.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1994.
Pp. xx + 386.
US $54.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7920-9);
US $22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-7921-7).

Echoes of Antiquity is a subtitle that understates the interpretive claims made in McCarthy's latest book. Around its central contentions that 'Marx evoked the ethical and political writings of Aristotle for moral enlightenment and critical direction' (302), and that 'Nietzsche found the will to power, which inspired him to challenge life, realize self-potential, and create a meaningful world in all its cultural expressions, in the Greeks tragedies of Oedipus and Prometheus' (302), the book clusters wide-ranging assertions about the influence of the ancients on these thinkers. For McCarthy, 'two distinct moments of Aristotelian ethics' respectively underwrite Marx's critique of capitalism (systemic inequality, fetishism and utility as an end) and Nietzsche's call for a fuller exercise of moral imagination (the possibility and value of 'self-realization'). Moreover, he suggests that a 'modern integration' of these two moments could help address contemporary questions about ethics (of the sort posed by Alasdair MacIntyre in *After Virtue*) (xx).

Of its seven chapters, McCarthy devotes three to Marx's use of antiquity ('use' is as good — or bad — a term as any to describe the ambiguity of the connection explored throughout the book), three to Nietzsche's, and one short concluding section to an 'Untimely Mediation of Marx and Nietzsche'. If the proposed integration of their respective Aristotelian 'moments' remains sketchy, the attempt to frame the relation between them in terms other than their different reactions to Hegel is a salutary advance on the endless variations worked on this theme.

Readers of McCarthy's earlier book, *Marx and the Ancients*, will be familiar with his assertion of the influence of Aristotle's concept of justice on the *Grundrisse*. Here, the focus is on the relationship between the *Politics* and *Capital*. Tracing Marx's critique, in *Capital*, of the contradiction between the accumulation of wealth and the properties of money on the one hand, and a virtue-based moral economy on the other, to Aristotle's analysis of this contradiction in the *Politics*, McCarthy then outlines how Marx's conception of participatory democracy (as it appears in his assessment of the Paris Commune) is rooted in his understanding of ancient Greek democratic theory and practice. This is supplemented by an excursus on the Hebraic strain in Marx's condemnation of fetishism. Perhaps the most interesting chapter in the book, it argues that the definitive concern of the prophecies is social justice; what might seem to be dire predictions are really denunciations of present transgressions against principles of equality, justice and shared wealth (the ancient Hebrews believing that we have only stewardship over God's property). This is enlisted as analogous support

for McCarthy's claim that Marx confined himself to a dialectical analysis of contemporary conditions.

The three chapters on Nietzsche discuss 1) his early appropriation of the ancients through the filter of German idealism, particularly in *Birth of Tragedy*; 2) the development of his 'perspectivism', which McCarthy sees as the umbrella for his critique of enlightenment ethics and science, his conception of the 'will to power', and the overman; and finally 3) nihilism, the overman and self-realization. McCarthy finds that Nietzsche radicalizes the Kantian location of the nature and limits of consciousness in subjective structures of mind by criticizing them as anthropomorphic projections (already at work in the pre-Platonics) and calling for their creative overturn (a possibility glimpsed in the creative synthesis of Greek tragedy).

On his reading, Nietzsche's perspectivism is a 'wildly exciting anticipation' of quantum physics and the post-analytic philosophy of Quine, Sellars, Feyerabend and Rorty (259). An infelicitous summary of this perspectivism reads: 'the world is nothing, where human beings are everything' (264), and an infelicitous conclusion finds that the affirmation of individual potential is an ideal to which other of Nietzsche's teachings are subordinated. (The eternal return teaches 'the strengths of the past must be saved for the future' [294].) Lost in this is Nietzsche's scorn for individualism — an unmistakable feature of what is here rightly identified as an attack on the Kantian subject.

Aside from the humanistic bent of McCarthy's characterization of Nietzsche's project, the argument of the book gets somewhat attenuated as it labours through an extensive (and yet informative) treatment of other German Idealists, with short sections devoted exclusively to summarizing the views of Schiller, Goethe, Schopenhauer and others (including four pages devoted to Bauer, whose lectures on the Old Testament Marx attended).

The surprisingly broad compass of 'antiquity' (including Greek thinkers from the pre-Platonics to the Stoics, Greek politics from Solon to Pericles, Greek art from early myth to late tragedy, as well as the Hebrew prophets) makes it difficult to follow exactly what is being asserted (or assumed) about the nature of influence in general and antique influence in particular — a thorny but unavoidable question facing any such exploration. This is especially troubling in the case of Nietzsche for whom this was a crucial and on-going question, one behind his last published declaration 'Dionysus versus the Crucified!', and one explicitly framed and reframed in his more 'expository' essays on history and in the *Genealogy of Morals*. Where Nietzsche's position on such an orientation never settles into a strict Adornian condemnation of it as regressive nostalgia, it is always wary of that possibility.

Finally, the broad scope of McCarthy's 'antiquity' makes his own selective appeal to it difficult to assess (and at times comprehend). For instance, Aristotle's democratic theory gets good play, but the non-democratic Homeric

ethos at the roots of his thought does not; the Hebrew prophets warrant close attention, the world and thought of the New Testament does not.

Still, in reframing the Nietzsche-Marx question in terms of our current need to criticise modernity and redefine humanism, rather than in those of the conventional question 'which one?', the book consistently raises pressing interpretive questions, and offers material useful for their address.

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Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and **Jeffrey Paul, eds.**
Property Rights.
Cambridge. Cambridge University Press 1994.
Pp. xiv + 291. n.p. ISBN 0-521-46739-X.

This collection of twelve essays, all of which have been previously published in *Social Philosophy & Policy* 11:2, examines the issue of property rights from a number of different perspectives. In addition to the essays, the book version contains an introduction and a name and subject index. For those who do not subscribe to the journal, this book would prove to be a good edition to add to your library.

David Friedman's 'A Positive Account of Property Rights' uses the notion of a Schelling point — that point which is individually identified by both parties in strategic interaction as a unique focal point due to some property — to offer an analysis of how and why people might come to defend their own property rights and respect the property rights of others. In addition, he attempts to demonstrate how the use of a Schelling point can not only move rational agents from a Hobbesian state of nature to civil society, but also maintain that social system.

Richard Epstein argues, in his 'On The Optimal Mix of Private and Common Property', that economic efficiency can and should determine which property should be held privately and which should be held in common. The main problem, as Epstein sees it, is to determine 'what set of rules will create the incentives for the optimal value of the contested resources' (30). This is an important question for, as Epstein rightly notes, advances in technology can change the relative value of a particular resource.

In 'The Institution of Private Property' David Schmidtz argues that while there may be difficulties in satisfying the Lockean Proviso of leaving 'enough and as good' for others, the alternative can only lead to tragedy; that is, the

tragedy of the commons. Moreover, he argues, if property is not privately owned, then the Lockean Proviso will be violated for there would be no incentive for a rational agent to conserve unowned resources.

John Simmons examines the Lockean argument for original acquisition, as well as the arguments of Nozick and Pufendorf, in his 'Original-Acquisition Justifications of Private Property'. In his analysis he distinguishes justifications which are morally permissible from justifications that are morally required and argues that original acquisition arguments based on the former notion are more plausible than those based on the latter notion.

'The Advantages and Difficulties of the Humean Theory of Property' is Jeremy Waldron's contribution. While Locke and Rousseau argued that the initial acquisition of property rights must be morally acceptable, Hume argued that almost any distribution of property rights may be morally acceptable provided that it moves us in the direction of civil society. While arguing in favor of a modified Humean view of the institution of property, Waldron criticizes the views of James Buchanan, David Gauthier, and, to a lesser extent, Jules Coleman.

Jules Coleman, in his 'Corrective Justice and Property Rights' argues that 'distributions of resources that are less than ideal can be sustained by corrective justice' (138). The argument Coleman advances to support this view rests on the importance he grants to the notions of autonomy and human well-being.

Gary Lawson addresses the issue of property rights from a legal perspective in his 'Proving Ownership'. The law has various standards of proof, standards concerning the admissibility of evidence, and standards concerning the empirical truth of propositions. Lawson argues that legal theorists have failed to give these standards their due when it comes to explaining how a system of property rights can resolve certain kinds of legal disputes.

The issue of aboriginal property claims is discussed in James Tully's 'Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle Ground'. Tully argues that traditional western theories of property rights are ill-equipped to deal with such claims, for such theorists do not typically grant equal status to aboriginal views concerning property.

Jonathan Macey argues in his 'Property Rights, Innovation, and Constitutional Structure' that there has been a 'legislative assault on property rights in America' since the 1930s (181). While the framers of the American Constitution were aware of the importance of property rights, modern politicians and interest groups have made significant gains in eroding the constitutional impediments erected to protect such rights. Macey identifies the changes that have allowed such infringements to take place.

In 'Property, Rights, and Freedom' Gerald Gaus examines the conceptual relationship between freedom and property. He argues that a version of the classical liberal view — that is, 'that liberty is a type of property, or property a type of liberty' — is mistaken (237). The proper link between liberty and property is, Gaus argues, mediated by the concept of rights.

The penultimate essay in this collection, Alan Ryan's 'Self-Ownership, Autonomy, and Property Rights' addresses the issue of self-ownership. Ryan analyses the concept of self-ownership found in the writings of Locke, Kant, and Hegel and utilizes the fruits of his labors to criticize Nozick's arguments about self-ownership.

The final essay is Stephen Munzer's 'An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights in Body Parts'. The most common objection to allowing a market in body parts is that such a market entails that we treat body parts as commodities and many find this objectionable. Munzer, aware of this argument, takes a different approach, one based on Kantian notions of human dignity. In the end, Munzer finds that his account, even in conjunction with the commodities objection, provides 'no rapid and cogent move from the mere existence of a market in body parts to a sound objection, ..., to that market' (286).

In summary, the essays in this book are well written and provide the reader with an analysis of some of the foundational questions concerning property rights that need to be asked and answered. The approaches taken to address these questions range from philosophy, economics, law, and political theory. A careful reading of these essays will be well worth the effort.

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Karl Popper
Knowledge and The Body-Mind Problem: In defence of interaction.
New York: Routledge 1995. Pp. 158. n.p.
ISBN 0-415-11504-3.

Popper's new book is based on transcriptions of lectures on the mind-body problem that he gave in the year 1969 at Emory University. It maintains the informality and dynamism of the spoken lecture format with a question-answer period at the end of the lecture.

I review Popper's book from the perspective of this question: Does the book show how Popper implemented his theory of critical rationality? Popper argues, in different places, and in different forms, for the theory that we learn through posing questions, and critically discussing alternative answers, regardless of the background or framework of the participants. Indeed, according to Popper, the more divergent the backgrounds of the

participants, the more potential interest there is in the discussion. In many different writings, Popper urges that only through the logical clash of frameworks can we critically evaluate otherwise hidden assumptions. Popper also proposes that the birth of rational argument was through the clash of cultures in ancient Greece. In other words, my question in this review is — Does Popper apply critical rationality by addressing the questions and criticisms of those with different philosophies or frameworks in this (transcribed) lecture-series?

According to Popper's own lights, we should look for counter-examples to our theories. In the rest of this review, I will look at potential counter-examples to Popper's view that not only are rational discussions among people from differing frameworks possible, but also, that they are the most fruitful.

One possible counter-example would be sticking to the course of one's lecture regardless of comments. Popper does not do that. One might notice that Popper actually gets side-tracked into an extremely lengthy discussion of world 3 (the objective products of mind). However, one might notice further that Popper's discussions of world 3 both in the lectures following the first introductory lecture, and in the question-answer periods for each lecture are responses to questions and criticisms. For instance, one major criticism is that proposing 3 worlds as opposed to 4 or more is a simplification. Popper admits the point but argues that the simplification is made in order to highlight his main thesis: objective products of mind transform subjective consciousness. What is important is the distinction between subjective minds and the objective products of mind — beliefs and the logical content of beliefs (i.e., theories and propositions). Another reason Popper focuses so much on world 3, which he makes clear was not his original plan, is to clarify a theory that many in his audience find mind-boggling.

A second possible counter-example: Popper avoids fundamental questions. However, Popper does not avoid the fundamental question of how world 3 originates from mind or matter, which he might do if he were only interested in advancing a thesis to the already converted — i.e., to those who already agree with his fundamental world view of a pluralistic, open, indeterministic, objective reality. Rather, Popper is speaking to those who might consider themselves either as strict materialists, strict dualists, or, strict subjectivists (idealists). He wants to contend to the strict materialists that world 3 is a product of biological evolution. World 3, Popper proposes and argues, is a product of human biological evolution. He develops Darwinian (or neo-Darwinian) arguments to explain how world 2 (subjective minds) evolved from world 1, and how world 3 evolved from the interaction of worlds 2 and 1. In arguing with dualists and subjectivists, he explains how world 3 both shapes the contents of our beliefs, and contains aspects that are not necessarily subjectively realized by the proponents and originators of those beliefs. For instance, new problems are generated by the solutions of current problems, unknown by the originators of those solutions.

A third possible counter-example would be that though Popper apparently talks with those from other frameworks, he does not take their problems

seriously. For instance, a strict idealist would want to know how mind as an objective reality evolves. A strict interactionist would want to know where mind and matter physically connect. (Was Descartes correct that mind meets brain in the pineal gland?) A strict materialist would want to know the physical morphology and functions of so-called mental operations. A modern day functionalist would want to know about the computational architecture of various mental functions or modules. Does Popper actually address those issues?

Popper did not extensively address the functionalist, perhaps because there were none in his audience. However, his answer to the idealists about the dynamism of MIND does provide a computational architecture for mental functioning: P1→TT→EE→P2 (problems, theories, error-elimination, new problems; or, in computational terms: problems, algorithms, debugging, loop-back to problems at a higher-level). The most conjectural part of this book is his answer to the interactionists — mind and brain interact in the left-hemisphere, specifically, in the speech centre. Also, in response to those who identify mind with brain, or, at least, identify mind with properties of the brain, he responds that world 3 has influenced the morphology and functioning of the brain: in specific, the higher brain functions, including speech, evolved in response to the development of language, and the higher levels of language — i.e., description and argument.

A fourth possible counter-example would be that Popper uncritically assumes a scientific outlook. This outlook does not seriously question Darwinian biology. However, Popper advances some criticisms of Darwinism and offers some corrections. Popper argues for replacing the Darwinian problem of the apparent evolutionary ascent towards higher forms of life with the problem of the emergence of increasing complexity, and new organisms. Popper proposes that his schema (P1→TT→EE→P2) also explains the emergence of novelty, increasing complexity, and increasing adaptability. When the TT or behaviour of an organism is found in error, new behaviours that correct the error, provide selective pressure against organisms that cannot adopt the new behaviours. From this, Popper predicts that organisms which thrive in restricted eco-niches and develop highly specialized behaviours suited to those restricted eco-niches, are more prone to extinction than organisms with less specialized behaviours.

Summing up: Popper's attempt to put into practice his theory that everything can be rationally discussed with everyone, results in a lecture-series that is dynamic, bold, and reader-friendly. We see how Popper's views on mind and matter actually evolve by Popper listening to and addressing the questions and comments of his audience.

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Karl Popper
The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality. Edited by M.A. Notturno.
New York: Routledge 1995.
US $22.95. ISBN 0-415-11320-2.

This volume contains a series of addresses and lectures that the late Sir Karl Popper delivered to several institutions world-wide between 1959 and 1976. Although most of those were meant for non-specialist audiences, they offer a deep, lucid and systematic exposition of Popper's conception of science and its growth, thereby rendering *The Myth of the Framework* a valuable guide to the elements of Popperianism.

One of the central themes of this volume is this: how can one defend the rationality and objectivity of theory-change in science while acknowledging that theory-change can be best characterised as 'revolution in permanence'? Popper's approach to this problem was to conceive of rationality in science as a matter of attitude towards one's own theories and views. It is the critical discussion of one's own pet theory, its subjection to severe tests, its attempted refutation and, should it clash with observations, its elimination that renders theory-change rational. In Sir Karl's own words: 'As to the *rationality of science*, this is simply the rationality of critical discussion' (160). But even if rationality rests well on critical discussion, progress and objectivity require something more than open-mindedness and critical spirit. For in order to judge progress and safeguard objectivity amidst a state of permanent succession of theories, one needs ways to compare the abandoned theory with the successor one and show that the latter is doing, in some sense, better than the former. Popper devotes most of his 1973 Herbert Spencer lecture 'The Rationality of Scientific Revolutions' to this issue. He admits that a certain dose of 'conservativeness' should be injected to the 'Revolution in Permanence' thesis: the successor theory, however revolutionary, should always be able to explain and improve on the successes of its predecessor.

The issue of comparability, or commensurability, between theories and conceptual schemes is discussed in detail in the paper that gave its title to the volume. There Popper takes on some of the most central themes in the relativists' repertoire, for instance the so-called indeterminacy of translation, the alleged relativity of truth and the implications of the theory-ladenness of observation, and sets out to show that they fail to undermine the possibility of rational deliberation between the proponents of different theories. His own view is that rational discussion does not aim to establish, justify or prove a theory (or a framework) from admitted premisses. In fact, he suggests, if this was taken to be the aim of rational deliberation, then we would ultimately face the dilemma of either dogmatism ('insist dogmatically upon the truth of a framework of principles of axioms') or relativism ('there are different frameworks and [...] there is no rational discussion between them'). On the contrary, the Popperian aim of rational deliberation is to improve under-

standing by eliminating theories or frameworks with unacceptable, and ultimately false, consequences (cf. 60).

Isn't it the case, however, that since — as Popper time and again stresses in the volume at hand — all observations are theory-impregnated, no theory can be threatened with refutation? Isn't it the case, in other words, that since all observation is an interpretation of facts in the light of some theory, no empirical result can fail to be inscribed within this theory? And if this is so, how can Popper's model of rational deliberation (and of science in general) work? Popper devotes his address 'Science: Problems, Aims and Responsibilities' to these matters. He carefully and systematically distinguishes (by means of a series of theses) between inductivism and his own falsificationism. The differences are many and well-known, but the one that Popper focuses on is the claim that science does not begin with observations, nor with generalisations established on their basis. Rather, on Popper's view, science begins with problems and proceeds with severe scrutiny of the theoretical conjectures that are offered as tentative solutions to these problems. Conjectures that are falsified give way to fresh ones, while those that stand up to severe tests get corroborated (cf. 93-101). Popper suggests that this model of scientific growth sits well with the thesis that observation is always theory-laden. For, he suggests, the latter thesis does not preclude the possibility that a theory can be refuted by an observation, even though the latter is an interpretation of the facts in the light of theory. Still, we do not have here an adequate answer to the Duhem-Quine problem, and, I think, Popper has never really offered such an answer: from a logical point of view, falsification can always be avoided by either re-interpreting the recalcitrant fact or by putting the blame to the auxiliaries.

Arguably, the best pieces in *The Myth of the Framework* are 'Philosophy and Physics' and 'Models, Instruments and Truth'. In the first piece, Popper offers an admirable, if brief, historical illustration and defence of his well-known thesis that scientific theories emerge as attempts to concretise, articulate and render testable metaphysical programmes about the structure of the physical world. 'Models, Instruments and Truth', on the other hand, is a rare piece in that it advances Popper's views on model-construction in the natural and social sciences. He distinguishes between two kinds of problems, i.e., explaining a *singular* event and explaining a *type* of event, and suggests that whereas the first can be solved without constructing a model, the second is most easily solved by means of a model. Both kinds of explanation are broadly subsumed under the Deductive-Nomological pattern, but the relevant difference is purported to be that while the explanation of singular events requires specification of certain initial conditions, the explanation of a type-event dispenses with initial conditions; the latter can be replaced by a model incorporating, for instance, some typical assumptions about the physical event under consideration.

All in all, *The Myth of the Framework* is an important collection that no-one interested in Popper's philosophy can afford to miss.

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Nicholas Rescher
American Philosophy Today and Other Philosophical Studies.
Boston: Rowman & Littlefield 1994.
Pp. xii + 175.
US $49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7935-7);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-7936-5).

The standpoint of the detached but knowledgeable observer, or the insider with the outsider's temperament, almost always makes for insightful observation of what is (for the rest of us) hidden by virtue of its proximity. It certainly makes for interesting reading. True, it has been done before, with Santayana's penetrating *Character and Opinion in the United States* remaining a shining example. But while the technique is not new, the landscape surveyed is closer to home, and this, more than anything else is what makes Nicholas Rescher's book worth reading.

The book is divided into three parts: the first (and by far the most interesting) contains Rescher's reflections on the state of philosophy today, while parts two and three deal respectively with issues in moral philosophy and what Rescher labels 'Philosophical Critiques', which denotes a short collection of pieces in Rescher's more traditional field of epistemology, concluding with a brief consideration of the role of scientific evidence in religious belief.

The subject matter of part one makes for relaxed reading, and if Rescher doesn't pull any punches when it comes to stating his opinion on the contemporary scene, he does avoid undue cynicism or nostalgia (not always an easy task). Furthermore, if one looks back and compares his work with Santayana's 1920 survey of American philosophy, Rescher's work fares reasonably well. Not content with anecdotal evidence on academia as he sees it, Rescher includes statistics to back up his interpretation of the proliferation of philosophies and philosophers, as well as a taxonomy of the 'subdivisions of philosophy' and this is — to say the least — unusual, though not unwelcome. His delightful essay 'On Writing Philosophy', which is the largest in this collection, makes entertaining and instructive reading and lends itself easily to use in teaching (or, perhaps, to being deposited under the doors of colleagues deemed guilty of any one of the cardinal sins described therein!). If there is one general criticism to be made it is that the essays trade depth for brevity, and many readers will find the lack of suggestions for further reading aggravating. In addition, the brief reference to historical traditions in American philosophy (which is a classic feature of the better surveys of contemporary American intellectual life) is sorely missed in the later essays.

Section two in general, and 'Obligation Dynamics' in particular, is a disappointment, primarily because of the familiar ring of a non-specialist intent on shedding new light on an old subject. Here the insights are unremarkable and detract from the earlier sections of the book, though these

essays may broaden the appeal to those whom metaphilosophy and cultural commentary leave cold.

The same holds true for section three. While it may engage those who share Rescher's interests in epistemology (though the defects he uncovers in Reichenbach's probabilistic epistemology and Chisolm's ontology are of limited significance), it does take one further and further away from the presumed main theme of the book, and this is a disappointing thematic inconsistency. One wants to know that these are *relevant* philosophical critiques, and not just sketches filling out an unfinished book. This, and a handful of editorial oversights suggest a certain haste of composition and detract from the enjoyment of the book. With a little more polish, it seems evident that Rescher's thoughts could have been woven into a far more engaging structure.

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Tom Rockmore
Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel's Thought.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1993. Pp. xi + 211.
US $38.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-520-08205-2);
US $14.00 (paper: ISBN 0-520-08206-0).

A version of this book first appeared (1992) in the *Éditions Critérium* series, *Avant/Après*, Rockmore preparing this translation specifically for English-speaking readers. 'This book is neither more nor less than an introduction to Hegel's thought, ... simplified but not simplistic,' meant to be generally accessible insofar as 'it does not presuppose any prior philosophical knowledge' (3). Intended for students in philosophy and allied disciplines who require a way into [Hegel's] theory' (x), the text is divided into three sections: a short 'statement of some main aspects' (136) of the Kantian background to Hegel's system as mediated through the post-Kantian debates; a central discussion 'exploring and explaining the outlines of Hegel's position' (39); and an 'even more selective' treatment of aspects of the reception of Hegel's thought up to the present. The aim is 'not ... completeness, even in outline' (135), abundant references for further study being provided in the footnotes and bibliography. Although the text's tripartite structure follows the *Avant/Après* format, it is not procrustean. Since 'Hegel is above all a historical thinker, ... perhaps the first great philosopher to perceive an

indissociable link between philosophy and history' (47), a *historical* introduction to his theory accords with the subject-matter itself. 'Hegel remains perhaps the first and the last to know how to integrate history into his thought,' uniting 'historical and systematic aspects within a single philosophical vision' (54).

R.'s focus is epistemological in the broad sense, having to do with the general 'problem of how to formulate a systematic theory of philosophy' (5, 8). 'The central thread of this book [is] to indicate how Hegel reacts to the theory of knowledge of his time, what he does with it, and what will become of it in the post-Hegelian period in which we live' (3). R.'s thesis (familiar from *Hegel's Circular Epistemology* [1986]) is that Hegel propounds an 'unfounded system of knowledge' in a positive sense, one that constitutes itself as absolute knowledge within the framework of a necessary and complete 'circularity'.

Kant's 'critical philosophy' is presented as a 'theory of knowledge' (8, 9), its metaphysical mission being served by the transcendental inquiry into the a priori conditions of empirical knowledge (experience). Though 'Kant understands philosophy as system,' his immediate successors argued both that 'the system for which he congratulates himself was nowhere present in his own theory,' and, paradoxically, that his very 'concept of system was never really formulated in a single, unambiguous manner' (18-19). In addition to the anti-Kantian reaction to this perceived failure (e.g., Haman, Herder, Jacobi), R. sketches both Reinhold's attempt to reconstruct the critical project through analysis of the capacity of representation itself, and the criticism of this attempt (e.g., Schulze, Maimon) that its premises are unfounded so that the system falls into vicious circularity. R. then sketches Fichte's counter-proposal of 'a system without foundation' (36). Yet, lacking a *fundamentum absolutum*, the Fichtean system is explicitly hypothetical and circular, and so on traditional terms is also a failure.

R. presents Hegel's system too as a 'reconstruction of the critical philosophy' (40). Hegel reaffirms in principal Kant's quest for systematic completeness via reason's *self*-examination, yet levels three criticisms: that the Kantian attempt to know the conditions of cognition a priori is incoherent (90); that Kant 'lacks an adequate concept of reason' (*Vernunft*), his thinking being consigned to the level of 'understanding' (*Verstand*) with its fixed antitheses and merely finite categories (69); and that Kant's avowed 'third' way is not effectively a 'position of thought' different from empiricism (125). Hegel's 'new contribution' is the concept of 'philosophy as a totality of knowledge conceived as system, as an organic totality of concepts produced by reflection, dependent solely on reason' (74). This contribution turns on a new concept of reason. Like Kant and Fichte, Hegel regards reason as a *self-activity*, though specifically an infinite 'speculative' self-activity which '"tends to reconstitute identity" so as "to return to unity by surpassing dichotomy"' (71) and which culminates in an absolute circular system with no 'outside.' Hegel also rejects the idea of the actuality of pure reason in the abstract, affirming instead the actuality of the rational only as reason is

concretely realized in the world (85). Thus he rejects the idea of a system of knowledge 'deduced' from some supposedly self-evident first principle, or any rational system constructed independently of historical, experiential actuality. R. traces aspects and highlights of the Hegelian notion of system through the *Differenz-Schrift*, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the *Science of Logic, The Encyclopedia*, and the *Philosophy of Right.*

R. sketches the initial break-down of Hegelian thought into 'centrists', who affirm Hegel's union of eternity and history; 'right-wing' Hegelians, who retain eternity at the expense of the actual world; and left-Hegelians, who retain the historical matrix and direction in Hegelian thought but without eternity. He then quickly notes Kierkegaard's elevation of religious life and existential commitment over systematic thought; Marx's attempt to 'turn Hegel on his head' to realize reason through the critique of society and the projected communist future; and Nietzsche's overcoming of the whole previous tradition of philosophy for the sake of a future philosophy and a new human reality. R. concludes this discussion with terse indications of more recent reactions to Hegel, for example, in British idealism and analytic philosophy, in American idealism and pragmatism, in phenomenology and deconstruction, and ends with a restatement of the continued importance of Hegel.

For English-speaking readers, more might have been said about the still-surviving Hegel legend (i.e., as panlogist, Prussian-state apologist, etc.) and the still-read illiterate polemics (e.g., Popper, Russell). Also, although strictly an introductory text, the Hegel-interpretation is expressly 'controversial', Hegel being portrayed as an 'epistemological relativist' (with Heidegger being named, along with Husserl and Chisholm, as a contemporary 'foundationalist' [37]), Hegel's claim to absolute knowledge being taken to mean 'that when we think through the epistemological problem to the end, we become aware that no claims to knowledge are absolute since all such claims are relative' (102-3). Third, insofar as the historical interpretation begins from Kant, it occludes the extent to which Hegel's thought shatters the context of German idealism. Still, assuming the uninitiated reader that R. intends, this is a useful and generally reliable *first* reference, clearly organized and presented in a lecture-style, by an author who regards Hegel as 'incontestably ... one of the most important philosophers of all times' (x, 1, 39, 135, 164).

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Jay F. Rosenberg
Beyond Formalism: Naming and Necessity for Human Beings.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1994.
Pp. xvi + 241.
US $44.95. ISBN 1-56639-118-0.

This book is timely and important. Much work currently being done in the philosophy of language has been greatly influenced by so-called direct reference theory. For example, competing semantical views about belief-reports often presuppose many of the same direct reference notions and theses, but then disagree about details. Their disagreement is thus 'internal' in the sense that they share certain fundamental presuppositions.

Rosenberg is *not* a party to such internal debates, and herein lies the timeliness and much of the importance of his book. His project is rather to piece together the views Saul Kripke has proposed on reference, necessity, and belief, to offer a wholesale critique of them, and then to suggest an alternative 'big picture'. This picture includes methodological suggestions about how to understand the relationships among natural languages, formal systems, and philosophical commitments. To get the flavor of Rosenberg's views, let us focus on his attack on Kripke's 'causal-historical picture' of nominal reference and the 'epistemic picture' he proposes in its place.

Rosenberg considers Kripke's picture to be an account of *speaker's reference* and formulates it roughly as follows: what determines the reference of, e.g., John's present use of the name 'Aristotle', is an historical chain of communicative transactions in which 'Aristotle' was passed from speakers to hearers, leading back from John's utterance ultimately to the ceremony in which Aristotle's parents originally gave him his name (72-3; cf. *Naming and Necessity* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press 1980], 91). But this picture is overly simple, as Kripke himself realizes, for upon encountering 'Aristotle' for the first time John might have decided to use it *unconventionally*, e.g., as a name for his dog. So for the historical chain just described to be applicable, Kripke suggests, a further condition must be satisfied: John must intend to use 'Aristotle' with the same reference as the person from whom he acquired it (cf. *Naming and Necessity*, 93 and 96-7).

Rosenberg finds this supplementary condition problematic, because *inter alia* the 'reference-preserving' intention it specifies is 'neither necessary nor sufficient for the transmission of a proper name reference across a communicative link' (75). To fix ideas, Rosenberg offers a thought-experiment in which a student, Helmut, acquires two previously unfamiliar names, 'Moritz Schlick' and 'Otto Neurath', by listening to his teacher, Heidi, give a detailed lecture on the early Positivists. Helmut, moreover, is so engaged with Heidi's stories that he decides to tell them to his roommate, Reinhold, who likewise has never heard of Schlick or Neurath before. But, according to Rosenberg, as long as Helmut remains faithful to the content of Heidi's lecture, he *need not* form any kind of reference-preserving intention in order to refer to, e.g.,

Schlick by his uses of 'Moritz Schlick'; indeed, it would seem odd and pointless for him *explicitly* to form such an intention (78). Even supposing he does, however, that in itself would not be sufficient, since, if Helmut has an extremely bad memory, he might *systematically* confuse what Heidi said about Schlick and Neurath, attributing 'to someone he *calls* "Moritz Schlick" the views, accomplishments, and experiences of Otto Neurath and ... to someone he calls "Otto Neurath" the views, accomplishments, and experiences of Moritz Schlick' (ibid.). In such a case, Rosenberg claims, our pretheoretical intuitions seem to yield no determinate answer, e.g., to the question, 'To whom does Helmut refer by his uses of "Moritz Schlick"?' (79). Answering with either 'Moritz Schlick' or 'Otto Neurath' seems possible, and both answers are 'at least *equally* intuitive,' so Helmut's reference-preserving intention has *not* ensured that his uses of 'Moritz Schlick' have the same reference as Heidi's (80).

Rosenberg takes explaining cases such as Helmut's to be a criterion of adequacy for any satisfactory theory of nominal reference. More specifically, any theory must explain how in such cases a speaker's reference *can* 'track with the descriptive content of the statements actually made rather than with the proper names actually used' (89). Rosenberg gleans several other criteria of adequacy from Kripke's work (summarized on pp. 86-8) and suggests two more of his own, *viz.*: any theory must be consistent with, (a) 'the possibility of proper name reference to fictional, mythical, legendary, and other non-existent entities' (90), and (b) a 'naturalistic ontology' (104).

Rosenberg observes that *prima facie* there seems to be a tension between (a) and (b) (104-5). But there is a tension *only if* it is presupposed that reference is a relation obtaining between language and the world, a presupposition Rosenberg rejects. On his view, '"philosophical semantics" — including accounts of reference and truth — [is] ontologically *noncommittal*, and distinct from the theory of *representation*, that is, the more general enterprise of explaining how a language or other representational system sometimes can and does secure extralinguistic import' (105). This is *not* to say there are no word-world relations, but instead that semantic claims such as '"Socrates" refers to Plato's chief philosophical mentor' and '"Santa Claus" refers to the generous North Pole elf' are not most usefully viewed as being instances of the following general scheme: *expression* **R** *entity* (ibid.). However, rather than immediately suggesting how we *should* view such semantic claims, Rosenberg proposes an alternative methodological strategy, *viz.*: explain what it means to say that two speakers refer to *the same* item by their uses of a given proper name, and then use this to fund a general account of speaker's reference, which can be used in turn to construct a theory of semantic reference (106-8).

Unfortunately, we can only touch briefly on the first two stages of Rosenberg's strategy here. Rosenberg begins by inviting us to suppose that Greta and Petra both have the name 'Jan Paderewski' in their linguistic repertoires, but have rather different beliefs about the person they think of as bearing that name (109). Greta is familiar with Paderewski's numerous

musical accomplishments, while Petra is familiar with his many political achievements. That is, each 'has a set of beliefs which are "about Jan Paderewski" in the ontologically ... noncommittal sense that each ... is disposed to assert and assent to a set of (indicative, purely descriptive) sentences, each of which has the proper name "Jan Paderewski" as its grammatical subject' (110). Rosenberg calls these respective sets of beliefs Greta's and Petra's *idiolectic senses* for the name 'Jan Paderewski' (ibid.).

As we know, their beliefs are true of one and the same person. Further, Greta and Petra might discover this by 'find[ing] out more about Jan Paderewski' *via* a common procedure of inquiry, which Rosenberg calls an *epistemics* (111). That is, since Greta and Petra both presumably believe that Paderewski was an actual historical figure of the late 1800s and early 1900s, each would presumably recognize 'the methods of *historical inquiry* as appropriate for revising [their] idiolectic senses' (110-11). Now suppose they undertake to revise their idiolectic senses by doing some historical research. Then each will find she is justified in adding those beliefs constitutive of the other's idiolectic sense to *her own*. As Rosenberg puts it, 'when fully *commensurated* ... Petra's and Greta's initially different idiolectic senses for "Jan Paderewski" would *converge*' (111). Since this would be the case, Rosenberg claims, Greta and Petra use 'Jan Paderewski' *confluently* (even though their idiolectic senses for that name are currently different) (ibid.).

Rosenberg proposes to use the notion of confluence to answer the question of whether two speakers are referring to the same item (ibid.). In the present case, since Greta and Petra use 'Jan Paderewski' confluently, they are 'referring' to the same item. The scare-quotes here are meant to emphasize that their confluent use of 'Jan Paderewski' neither 'records nor presupposes the obtaining of any determinate natural relation ... between that name and any object, item, or entity in the world ...' (112). Rather, since there are *fictional* as well as empirical epistemics, 'the notion of confluent use can be straightforwardly carried over to proper names that are *not* the names of empirical existents' (ibid.). For instance, Greta and Petra might agree that Sherlock Holmes is a literary character and that Hercules is a figure of Greek mythology. So it is reasonable to suppose that if they were to consult the relevant canonical texts and myths, their idiolectic senses for those names would converge, and hence that they use the names confluently.

Rosenberg's account thus seems to alleviate the apparent tension between (a) and (b) from above. But what about Helmut's case? One possible intuition about the case was that Helmut's uses of 'Moritz Schlick' referred to Otto Neurath. Rosenberg proposes to interpret this as roughly the *non*-relational claim that 'Helmut's uses of "Moritz Schlick" are confluent with the communal sense of "Otto Neurath" within *our own* linguistic community' (117), where the *communal sense* of 'Otto Neurath' is a kind of idealization, thought of as the product of successive 'fusions' of the idiolectic senses of all speakers of the community (115). Thus Rosenberg's account seems to explain how a speaker's 'reference' *can* track with the descriptive content of his statements instead of the proper names he actually uses.

Rosenberg's criticism of the causal-historical picture is compelling, and his own 'epistemic' picture satisfies the criteria of adequacy he offers. But his views are likely to meet much resistance because, in effect, they radically reinterpret what nominal reference is. In particular, there seems to be room for disagreement about whether *all* of his proposed criteria of adequacy are appropriate. But the fact that Rosenberg raises and addresses such general issues as this makes his book a valuable contribution to the philosophy of language.

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Frederick F. Schmitt
Truth: A Primer.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1995.
Pp. xi + 251.
US $49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-2000-3);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-2001-1).

This book is about truth and associated issues. There are chapters titled 'Realism and Idealism', 'Absolutism and Relativism', 'Truth and Knowledge', as well as chapters which are dedicated to the standard accounts of truth. The book is intended to be 'a brisk introduction to philosophical thinking about truth' — a primer. So we get a map of the landscape, with the various views of truth, arguments for and against them, and their relationship to positions such as realism and absolutism. Schmitt keeps one eye always on the question of whether, or rather, how exactly, truth is supposed to be related to believers. And he admirably highlights the thought that we must adopt a theory of truth 'that has some chance of honoring the explanatory work and the expressive power we intuitively ascribe to truth' (198-9). He writes exceptionally clearly and undergraduates in epistemology courses will certainly find this book useful.

Schmitt, however, does not intend his primer merely to provide a catalogue of theories of truth on offer. He is a fan of Hartry Field's correspondence theory and is keen to show its superiority to the other brands. Although he says he has little to add to Field's theory other than 'accessibility' (147), he carefully defends it against some of the usual objections. The book will thus be of interest to those who are engaged in Field's project — the project of showing that if we ascribe beliefs and desires to others in order to explain their behavior, the truth-conditions involved in the ascription must be

construed as a correspondence theorist construes them. Without going into the difficult question of what corresponds to what in this account, the argument is roughly as follows. We ascribe propositional contents to beliefs and desires. Since propositions 'necessarily carry with them truth-conditions' (149), we ascribe truth-conditions to beliefs and desires — we treat their propositional contents as being true or false. And these must be correspondence truth conditions, for we only want to refer, in explaining the behavior of others, to their beliefs, desires, and environment. We do not want to refer to ourselves or to our language. Thus, truth does not involve a 'deep' relation to believers.

But here we encounter cause for some dissatisfaction with this book as an introduction to truth. Schmitt quickly runs through the competitors to the correspondence theory, offering lots of arguments pro and con, but in the end knocking the competitors down one by one. This briskness is fine, if not downright necessary, in a primer. But when it comes to the correspondence theory, the pace slows. Instead of the twenty pages devoted to each competitor, we have over fifty on correspondence. And at this point we will hear shouts of protests from advocates of those other theories — they too will want a chance to put their view in the best light. Those interested in arguments from inference to the best explanation will not want to be described and dismissed in two paragraphs (17), proponents of Dummett's view will want more consideration than one footnote (234), and pragmatists will not want to be represented by the weakest version of their position — James's thoughts about true beliefs being those which work (indeed, the founder of pragmatism, C.S. Peirce, does not, on Schmitt's account, even hold a pragmatist view of truth; he is supposed to be a coherence theorist).

After witnessing the care taken with respect to the correspondence theory, the reader is tempted to go back through the book with a more critical eye, evaluating it not as a primer, but as an argument about what theory of truth we ought to adopt. Then scores of claims look objectionable. On the first page, we find the claim that 'nearly every philosopher' before the 19th century endorsed the correspondence theory, including Hume and Kant. But there are powerful interpretations of these philosophers which speak against this claim. On the second page, we find the claim that 'correspondence theorists begin with the role of the notion of truth in the explanation of behavior'. But this is true only of Field's correspondence theory. In the more entrenched views about correspondence, the role of truth in explaining behavior and 'certain successful practices' (148) has been explicitly neglected — neglected out of principle, if you like. The role of truth in explaining behavior and practice has been thought by many a correspondence theorist to be the obsession of those muddled pragmatists. (See, for instance, Brian Ellis's *Truth and Objectivity*, for the argument that the correspondence theory cannot explain practice.)

So in the end, this primer will be thought to be reasonable only by those already committed to a very specific kind of correspondence theory. Schmitt's descriptions of, and arguments against, the competitor theories are far too

brief to convince anyone who is undecided and prepared to think carefully about these matters. But those inclined as Schmitt and Field are inclined will find the primer very much to their liking and useful as a text in their courses.

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Douglas Stalker, ed.
Grue! The New Riddle of Induction.
Chicago: Open Court 1994. Pp. viii + 446.
US $54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9218-7);
US $24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9219-5).

The new riddle of induction, and the (quasi) color grue, were originally articulated by Nelson Goodman in *Fact, Fiction and Forecast* (1st ed. 1955). The dilemma(s) arise from the fact that although all emeralds examined before time t, which will be some time in the future, are green, there may come a time, t, after which an emerald will be discovered, which is blue. The statements 'All emeralds are green' and 'Emeralds a through n are green; therefore emerald $n+1$ will be green' will both be false after t. Goodman poses grue as a predicate, which is attributable both to the pre-t and to the post-t emeralds, so that the new propositions 'All emeralds are grue' and 'Emeralds a through n are grue; therefore emerald $n+1$ will be grue' remain true before and after t, where grue emeralds are green emeralds before t and blue ones afterward. Goodman's crystallization of this vulnerability of the inductive process comes about, because the evidence prior to time t seems to support the proposition, 'All emeralds either have been examined before t and are green or have not been examined before t and are not green.'

Douglas Stalker's *Grue! The New Riddle of Induction* is a collection of fifteen articles addressing the grue problem. The first eight articles have been previously published and date from 1958 to 1990; the remainder are new for this volume. In addition, Stalker provides a 175-page, annotated bibliography, which describes the 316 books and articles published on this topic from the 1950s into the 1990s. The book is the first compilation of articles on the grue problem. Articles discuss the relationship, for example, between Bayesian probability theory and grue (112, 225, 241) and between grue and artificial intelligence theory/epistemology (117). Theorists in inductive knowledge will doubtless find the book essential. Since Stalker's book seems to be aimed at a broader audience, though, in this review I will discuss

two broader arguments from the book that may pique the interest of those previously unacquainted with this logical problem.

Goodman's analysis of the grue problem is that it illustrates the difference between projectible and non-projectible predicates (24). Even though the induction 'Emeralds a through n are grue; therefore, emerald $n+1$ will be grue' is apparently uncontradicted, the predicate grue, which leads to the contradiction, cannot be projected inductively, and its projection leads to the conclusion, 'All emeralds are grue'. Goodman explains that only 'entrenched' predicates will 'project' validly, and defines 'entrenchment' (roughly) as general usage (27), with some elaboration to allow for new predicates' development.

In one of the early articles in the book, 'Natural Kinds', W.V.O. Quine takes the grue riddle as an opportunity to discuss the concepts of 'kind' and 'similarity' and the remarkable notion that people are able to group objects and phenomena together in general categories at all (41). Quine asks whether two emeralds would be of one kind (or similar), if only one of them were green and proceeds to ask what it means to have a 'kind' (42). Quine ultimately concludes that evolution has given people an innate, unscientific ability to subjectively space qualities, so that the spacings (i.e., yellow, yellow, yellow ...) accord with natural groupings and so that inductions come out right (48). He says, 'Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind' (48).

Quine finally arrives at the position that inductive science, which relies on 'kinds' to classify objects and which can neither incorporate nor eliminate 'grue', both rests on human progress and is eliminated once mature, theoretical science makes it possible to define 'similarity' (e.g., as chemistry can define the predisposition to dissolve in water): the standards become fixed and theoretical, so that the class of objects that can replace one another in the world (e.g., all emeralds, green and blue) are definable in terms of readily determinable physical attributes (53). Quine does not return to grue, but he would agree that at some historical point the 'similarities' in these replaceable objects become entirely 'entrenched', in Goodman's sense, but the 'similarities' also become unnecessary, since 'similarity' is no longer a useful term.

The amount of discussion on the grue problem shows that it is a nexus where philosophical tools stop working, either because one is using them in the wrong way or in the wrong place. Quine's explanation of the grue problem itself is that terms' complements will not project, even if their negatives will. While a number of the essays in the book express frustration at their failure to solve/explain the problem (see, e.g., 150), few except Quine's and Ian Hacking's (193) draw explicit connections between the grue problem and other philosophical issues. Like Quine's essay, Ian Hacking's essay 'Entrenchment' points to the important connections between grue and other philosophical issues, although rather than finding a misuse of induction, as Quine does, he argues that the grue problem results from extending induction into an area that is not ethnographically warranted. Hacking points out

that one cannot bring oneself consistently to use 'grue' or to act like emeralds are 'grue', because too many other parts of the world would have to change for one to be able to do so (204-5). Because human knowledge does not stop at 'all emeralds are green' but also includes the fact that green light is near the 550-nanometer wave band, post-*t* emeralds would have to reflect light around the 475-nanometer wave band, and the crystal structure would have to change. Thus, more than the simple 'grue' character of the emerald is at issue. For Hacking, 'entrenchment' has to do with this relationship of grue with other knowledge about the world, rather than simply with the frequency with which an entrenched term has been used (214-15). Indeed, he draws social/political inferences about the practice of arriving at ostensive definitions, by collecting and assembling things rather than spreading a class of things around (216-17), and he advocates a return to the combination of generalization (which is what grue does) and classification (which is what grue does not do) (215-16).

Both Quine and Hacking attempt to draw broader implications from the grue problem. They place the riddle in an atmosphere of epistemology and even, in Hacking's case, of social philosophy. These articles and others, and the annotations on still others concerning wider questions, make this book useful for the general reader who is interested in the connections between philosophical areas, as well as to the reader interested in carefully defined, articulated and circumscribed 'problems' in philosophy, like the 'problem' of grue.

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John Stewart
Language as Articulate Contact: Towards a Post-Semiotic Philosophy of Communication.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1995. Pp. xiv + 303.
US $57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2287-9);
US $18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2288-7).

In this book John Stewart intends to articulate a theory of communication that he believes will overcome the difficulties of previous, 'semiotic' or 'symbolic' accounts of language that have been the predominate way of thinking about language from the time of Socrates until the present. It is only in the twentieth century, Stewart suggests, that a move to a more original notion of language is accomplished, by thinkers such as Martin

Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Mikhail Bakhtin and others. Stewart's purpose is to elaborate a more fully developed account of a post-semiotic theory of communication, based on the indications found in the texts of these twentieth-century pioneers.

On the way to accomplishing his task, Stewart gives a nice treatment of the history of the 'semiotic' account of language, from the ancients to the present, in which he shows that most thinkers who have treated language have fallen prey to the traps that he spies lurking in the heart of the semiotic theory of language. The 'five commitments' of those who, since the pre-Socratics, attempted to provide a theory of language, have resulted in the total misunderstanding of the nature of language and communication. These five errors include, first, a fundamental commitment to a dualist ontology, with language and the world that it purportedly 'represents' serving as the two poles of 'being'. Second, Stewart holds that all semiotic accounts of language are committed to what he calls 'atomism'. Since semiotic accounts of language are, for the most part, analytic instead of synthetic, they have emphasized the analysis of language into separate representational bits, thereby obviating the 'whole' that lies behind this analysis. Third, traditional accounts of language are committed to representation. The dualist ontology that forms the core of the semiotic account of language necessitates this move, i.e., that the 'atoms' of one order (language) 'represent' discrete entities in the other. The fourth commitment is that language is a system, 'rather than an event or as a mode of human being' (11). That is, language is analyzed as a static system of reference, rather than as the dynamic, and indeed transcendentally constitutive, mode of being that Stewart suggests it is. Finally, the fifth commitment is that language is a tool used by its speakers, rather than a dynamic mode of being in which a language's speakers dwell.

Stewart's alternative, post-semiotic, model of communication is an attempt to 'get behind' the commitments of traditional semiotic theories in order to reveal a more fundamental account of the nature of language. This project accounts for the second half of Stewart's book. In it, Stewart's most fundamental suggestion is that language transcendentally constitutes the human world (although Stewart himself does not use the term 'transcendental', it seems that this is what he means by 'constitutes'). That is, as the title of Chapter Four of his book ('Language as Constitutive Articulate Contact') implies, language *constitutes* the human world, rather than merely representing it. Drawing heavily on a Heideggerian account of the *way* of human being, Stewart suggests that humans do not 'use' language as a tool but instead that language fundamentally constitutes the world in which we dwell. Language articulates the world through this constitutive mode of being. Moreover, as Stewart suggests, this constitutive articulation of the world by language brings us into contact, not with discrete objects in the world (if Stewart were to suggest this he, too, would slip into a dualist ontology), but primarily with other humans. This is important for Stewart, insofar as language, in his view, is to be seen as a social phenomenon. Stewart mentions Husserl's notion of the life-world in this context, which seems to be

quite appropriate. Just as Husserl seems to claim, in *The Crisis of the European Sciences*, that the life-world plays a transcendentally constitutive role, so Stewart's post-semiotic account of language suggests that language itself, as a social phenomenon, plays a similarly constitutive role.

The virtues of Stewart's *Language as Articulate Contact* are many, beginning with its strong interdisciplinary approach. Indeed, this mode of articulating the problems associated with the semiotic account of language and Stewart's post-semiotic response gives his text a more panoptic view of language, which, I think, a text rooted in only one discipline could not reveal. Moreover, Stewart is quite thorough in his explanation of the problems associated with the traditional semiotic accounts of language, and also in articulating his post-semiotic solution. However, one troubling aspect of Stewart's text is that he does not explicitly take up the work of Jürgen Habermas, which strikes one as odd, given the affinity of their views. That is, both share a notion of language that suggests that it transcendentally constitutes the human world, and so it seems odd that Stewart does not choose to clarify his position with regard to Habermas's in a detailed fashion, given that, for the most part, they seem to agree. Furthermore, it seems as if most of Stewart's fundamental points have already been made by thinkers such as Heidegger and Habermas, but this, in itself, is not a liability for Stewart's book. First, Stewart does a good job of 'translating' Heidegger's technically laden vocabulary, thus making it accessible to those who have not studied Heidegger intensely. Second, because this book addresses more than one audience (that is, not strictly philosophers or communications theorists), Stewart can be interpreted to be 'spreading the word' of Heidegger's insights into the nature of the being of language. Third, as Stewart himself points out, the fundamental concepts to be found in Heidegger and others like him are not developed into a *working* theory of communication, but instead are indications of the possibility of such a theory. The lack of any extended treatment of Habermas, however, still remains troubling, especially given Habermas's influence on contemporary thought and the similarity of his project.

In the end, however, Stewart's *Language as Articulate Contact* is an excellent treatment of the semiotic account of language, its problems, and Stewart's solutions. Again, its greatest virtue is its strong interdisciplinary approach, but it is also to be recommended based on its clear descriptions of the positions involved and the thoroughgoing analysis that Stewart gives of them.

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Alfred Tauber
The Immune Self: Theory or Metaphor?
New York: Cambridge University Press 1994.
Pp. ix-x + 354.
US $59.95. ISBN 0-521-46188-X.

In 1900 Edmund Husserl, in the first edition of his book *Logical Investigations*, wrote 'I must frankly confess that I am quite unable to find this ego, this primitive, necessary center of relations.' In a later edition Husserl added a footnote: 'I have since managed to find it' (Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1900), 549. The search for a demonstrable 'self' has been the project of cognitive philosophy since Descartes. Alfred Tauber's book makes the argument that a similar project has been the driving force behind the development of modern immunology.

Tauber's account begins at the end of the nineteenth century with Elie Metchnikoff's focus on the evolutionary determinants of host-pathogen response. Metchnikoff, about whom Tauber has written an earlier book, began with the search for the mechanisms of development 'responsible for integrating (and constructing) intermediate designs and their final adoption' (5). The agent that engages in this process of integration is some notion of the organism's 'self', already conceived as an evolving and indefinite entity.

The inquiry into the nature of the immunological self would be abandoned after World War I, only to reemerge in considerations of autoimmunity and tolerance after World War II with clonal selection theory (CST). CST combined natural selection in the evolutionary development of antibodies with a tolerance-based conception of pathogen response, according to which an organism is imbued with a baseline identity against which a sufficient deviation (pathogenicity) triggers an immunological response (113-14). Recognition of such an event is based on a phagocyte's reaction to an antigen that has become bound to a major histocompatibility complex (an 'MHC'), modifying it in a way that is recognized by the phagocyte as 'foreign' (124-25). Thus CST represented a move away from the chemical-based reductionism of the interwar period, and a return to 'the organism in its entirety': '[t]he true conceptual basis of CST is inextricable form an explicit concern to define the self' (123).

Having established the metaphor of the self as central to immunological theory, Tauber turns to a philosophical critique of that concept. Tauber asserts that during the period of Metchnikoff's work there was 'an extraordinary parallelism in fin-de-siècle concepts of the self in psychology, art, philosophy, and our subject, immunology' (201), a 'tantalizing hint of a shared Zeitgeist' (227) marked 'by a startling reassessment of the self ...' (201). This very broad historiographical claim leads to the invocation of a broad range of cognitive philosophical concepts in the service of two arguments: that common conceptions were at work in immunology and philosophy, and that arguments from cognitive philosophy *ought* to be applied to the cognitive metaphor in immunology in order to develop sophisticated models of self/non-

self interactions which 'may be found to stimulate fecund scientific models' (200).

Tauber's historical account of the development of immunology is impressive and well-presented. Furthermore, Tauber demonstrates a laudable sensitivity to factors such as interdisciplinary resentment and psychobiographical influences. On the other hand, one looks in vain for references to the historical context of development outside the laboratory. Immunology gained public prominence as the scientific miracle of the late nineteenth century, in the context of public health. The language of disease as a public phenomenon quickly took on political overtones, with extensive borrowing of medical metaphors into nationalist discourse. This story is well known: I was hoping to hear from Tauber the converse story of the ways in which public discourse came to influence the development of immunological metaphor.

A different set of problems beset Tauber's attempts to prescribe a direction for future immunological research. Tauber is particularly drawn to the phenomenological theories of Edmund Husserl. Husserl began from a position that the perceiving subject's 'identity' could be entirely ascribed to the cumulative effects of perceptual experiences. In time, as the quotation at the outset of this review indicates, Husserl found it necessary to recognize the existence of a transcendental ego: i.e., of a knowing 'self' that was the agent for the reception, recording, organization and manipulation of perceptual experience. The *eidos* — the apperceptive conceptualization of the thing to be perceived — required an independent ego as its platform. Tauber calls for immunology to adopt the pre-transcendentalist form of Husserl's phenomenological self (see p. 270), in which identity is defined by alterity, the interaction with the other.

Tauber then turns to a lengthy discussion of Nietzschean theories of identity, culminating with a presentation of Foucauldian ideas of the (cognitive) self as an historical construct positioned by relationships of biopower, the modernist conception of self in Kant, and a dizzying review of challenges to the assertion of the transcendent Ego in *fin-de-siècle* philosophy. The point of this exercise is, apparently, to argue that Metchnikoff and Burnet's theories contain implicit modernist commitments to the idea of a static 'self' (293) that should be questioned in light of post-modernist theories. There is no attempt to follow this line of reasoning by suggesting the contours of a post-Foucauldian immunological theory, however: in the end Tauber returns to the phenomenological conception of self as process and thus sidesteps 'the conundrum facing the modernist-postmodernist dispute' (295).

The relevance of this very difficult discussion to immunology is not clear. More importantly, it ellides over a serious philosophical problem in Tauber's attempt to connect the immunological self with the perceiving subject. While Tauber notes points of congruence between Nietzsche's and Metchnikoff's ideas of an evolving 'self' (261), the relevance of the broader philosophical exploration is not established. Unlike the phenomenological question of perception, the core concerns of cognitive psychology — freedom, reflexive consciousness, will — have no obvious parallels in immunology. This is

precisely why Tauber is able to step away from the entire question of post-modern identity and adopt a (pre-transcendentalist) phenomenological approach (see p. 295), a move which raises the disturbing suspicion that the reader has been put through a great deal of unnecessary labor.

Biologists are sometimes heard to lament that theirs is a science without an informing philosophy. Tauber attempts to ground a philosophy of biology in the idea of identity. This is a strong and interesting argument, elegantly developed in the phenomenological idea of the biological subject as an evolving entity in dialectical relationship with its environment (as, indeed, Edelman has persuasively argued of the cognitive 'self' as well). If the treatment of historical and metaphysical themes is less satisfactory, this does not diminish the value of this book as a starting point for important extended discussion to come.

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W. George Turski
Toward a Rationality of Emotions: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.
Athens: Ohio University Press 1994.
Pp. xv + 182.
US $39.95. ISBN 0-8214-1075-X.

This slim volume in the Series in Continental Thought is not so much an essay in the philosophy of mind as a series of seven related investigations, '... a sort of Hegelian gathering of perspectives whose overall unity is secured by the common focus on the emotions. In this context, the "rationalizing" of emotions means simply the enrichment of our understanding of them by the cumulative insights thus obtained' (21). The orientation of the book is broadly hermeneutical and each of its chapters opens on a different area: consciousness, language, emotional development, the self, responsibility, self deception and morality. In each case Turski plays one interpretive stance off against another using emotion as the mediating vehicle.

Turski takes emotions to be '... modalities of mind or positional postures that *thematize* the sense of our *engagement* with(in) the world, where that sense ... reveals itself as a style of partiality — for or against, broadly construed — vis-à-vis the objects we are involved with' (13). They are thus broadly speaking cognitive as they both aim at action and embed reasons for

action, but they are also bodily modes of being in the world. An emotion's aim is a pattern of attention whose object can be '... considered a sort of shorthand description or focal point that nevertheless could never exhaustively capture the lived experience within which it is embedded ...' (57). The emotions thus serve Turski as a springboard for discussions of the density of human experience, its recalcitrances and its ambiguous depths.

Eschewing from the beginning the construction of a theory of the emotions, Turski nonetheless has axes to grind. Halfway through the book he says: 'If emotions are mental stances that thematize the self's engagements in the world, then the self is nothing other than an integral complement, descriptively, and a central component, existentially, of every structure of lived emotional experience we may attempt objectively to understand and describe' (78), and later he describes the 'overall thrust' of the essay as '... to argue against the all too facile acceptance of emotions as states that intrinsically subvert the stability and coherence of the intellect' (119). For Turski the self is clearly a relational structure of institutionalized conducts and feelings mediated by speech and social interaction. A conception of consciousness and the self lurks in the background of the book, slowly taking form and gathering content.

Turski proceeds by canvassing different positions, examining intuitions and assembling an interpretation of consciousness and its bodily embeddedness, but the interpretation he assembles conflicts in interesting ways with other views and thus is in need of defence and development. There is, unfortunately, little of either. One hopes for supporting arguments but in fact the book contains almost no arguments at all. The analytic philosopher, who thinks of the development of philosophical ideas as proceeding by way of argument and counter-argument, will find this both frustrating and disappointing. Of course, what counts as a suitable defence of a position is in part a matter of philosophical style. Turski tells us that his method aims at the enrichment of our understanding by way of cumulative insights, and one defence of an interpretation is what it shows us — how it illuminates our understanding of new cases. The most interesting parts of the book, the chapters on the formation of emotion and the feeling self, do shed some light on the task of self understanding. However, even the hermeneutically comfortable reader will find the light cast by much of the rest of the book rather ordinary.

The book has more serious defects. Turski spends much too much time rehearsing familiar historical disagreements without thereby illuminating their resolution. Here is an example. The last chapter on ethics begins with a mention of Hume's view that the emotions are important in ethics and then turns to Kant's rejection of the emotions in favour of reason. In the five pages he devotes to this, Turski manages to tell us that he 'has in mind' Carol Gilligan's 'care' ethics (140), that Hume 'found himself unable to fulfil a key demand imposed by the enlightenment' (142), that Kant's views can be explained by his Protestantism, but that it is too easy to be dismissive of his extreme position (but we must guard against this because there are impor-

tant truths to acknowledge here), that a brief comparison between Christ's and Aristotle's list of virtues shows the importance of cultural difference in the cultivation of emotion (145). This list culminates with the claim, 'One could go on here, but the point, I think, has been made. We must remember, as MacIntyre (1984) insists, that those traits submitted as virtues are goods or excellences intrinsic to specific practices and ways of life contextualized by geography and history' (146). If this discussion had set up important arguments or insights it could be excused, but it does not. Both Kant and Hume, have complex and powerful things to say about the emotions and their relations to ethics, but of these there is no hint. In fact that discussion just stops and the chapter turns to a brief, and equally superficial, discussion of the fact-value distinction. Simply too much of this book has this casual chatty character, mentioning some things and reminding us not to forget the importance of other things, without ever developing enough systematic content to make the remarks do any work for us. Turski's style is reasonably clear, but ponderous and never beautiful.

Who should read this book? The analytic philosopher interested in the cluster of problems connecting rationality and value to the emotions will experience considerable frustration and little illumination, and the historically oriented philosopher hoping to find insight into Aristotle or Descartes, or Hume or Kant, will find little as well. While the views of these philosophers are present throughout the book, Turski relies on the reader's prior knowledge of them without contributing to it. On the other hand, the serious student of the emotions will find enough in the detail to justify reading this book, as, perhaps, will the hermeneutically oriented philosopher interested in the narrative constitution of the self.

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Joseph Vining
From Newton's Sleep.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1995.
Pp. xvii + 398.
US $24.95. ISBN 0-691-03487-7.

It is difficult to imagine the market for this book; there is nothing at all in it that would be of the slightest use to practicing lawyers, and there is precious little in it that will be of interest to professional philosophers. Most likely the book's principal audience will consist of persons much like the author himself:

trained lawyers who occasionally feel themselves moved to reflect upon the nature of meaning of their profession. In other words, the book will be of interest mainly to law professors rather than to philosophers of law.

The book is not a systematic treatise. Rather, it is formed out of a collection of brief, self-contained passages somewhat mysteriously grouped together under eight broad headings. Each group ostensibly deals with a different major aspect of legal thought running the gamut from language and logic to organization and time. Yet many of the actual passages bear little obvious relation to the headings under which they are placed. There thus appears to be a certain arbitrariness in the book's organization. Because of the book's fragmentary structure, it is difficult to summarize its contents. It is possible, however, to identify overarching themes.

The thrust of the book seems to be that the phenomenon of law pervades every aspect of our experience, and that this pervasive quality of law has hitherto gone unrecognized by theorists of the various disciplines which law touches and informs. As a corrective to this oversight, Vining sets out to identify connections between law and practically everything else under the sun. Unfortunately, his efforts frequently seem overreaching and less than satisfying. On some topics, the connection consists only in a blunt, unexplained, statement that the matter is of importance to lawyers. And on many other topics, Vining doesn't bother to make any explicit connections at all. This seems to be the case with most of the numerous entries dealing with science and aesthetics; one is left to wonder what was the point of including them.

Additionally, more than a few of Vining's 'insights' turn out upon close inspection to be little more than highly adorned trivia. For example, in an entry titled 'The Dailiness of Law' Vining compares law to journalism. He writes, 'Journalism does not last. It is not read closely, reread — there is hardly time to do so. It is replaced. It cannot be reread, read closely, if it does not last, and if it is not reread, it does not last. It disappears' (6). The passage goes on like this for a total of three paragraphs. But what does it mean? When we strip away the excess verbiage and the needlessly complicated syntax, the message of the total passage amounts to this: law is similar to journalism in that texts in both fields are ephemeral; but one difference between the two fields is that old legal texts are reread when writing new ones, whereas old journalistic texts are not reread. This might well be true, but it is not at all clear that the fact has any real significance. A large number of the book's sections touch upon topics of genuine philosophical interest, but Vining's treatment of those topics seldom offers anything new, and he evinces no awareness of the existing philosophical literature. For example, in a section titled 'Identity and Identification' Vining takes up one aspect of the problem of personal identity. He writes, 'What would be the difference between you in the future and any of the great number of yous, which could be set side by side, each emerging from a different path followed from a different decision you could take now? From the vantage point of one of them, you in the future are but a might-have-been, one of a great range of might-be's, fanning out

from the possible decisions at an earlier point of decision' (191). There is nothing here that one could not find in any decent introduction to possible worlds theory.

Another problem with the book is that it contains little, if anything, recognizable as argumentation. The book is sustained instead through unsupported assertions, some direct, many unnecessarily oblique. Significantly, Vining writes in a section titled 'Partial Insight' that '"Not a lawyer" observed Flaubert, playing with the connection between poetry and law and resisting its strength, "but carries within him the debris of a poet"' (5). Unfortunately, Vining takes Flaubert's observation too much to heart. His flowery prose and disjointed aphorisms invite comparisons with Nietzsche, but Vining is no Nietzsche, and one finds his mode of presentation both irritating and pretentious.

A book such as this calls for a special type of reading, and Vining provides instructions on the dust jacket. He tells us that the book 'is intended to be read in pieces, as time and occasion allow, especially at evening, by lawyers and all their fellow nonlawyers.' The book seems to have been written in much the same piecemeal fashion in which we are recommended to read it. This is no great criticism in itself, for few things worth reading are ever composed at a single sitting. Allimportant works are built up laboriously, layer by layer, over an extended period of research, contemplation, composition, and revision. But Vining's thoughts have an unfinished quality to them. The individual passages read suspiciously like diary entries written in immediate response to things that he happened to have been reading, or even that he saw on television, and collected haphazardly over time with only minimal effort to collate them. It is as if Vining had relished the creative phase but had no patience for the hard work of synthesizing his creation into an organic unity.

Still, the book is not without merits. The individual sections do provide stimulating food for thought about assorted aspects of the phenomenon of law. It might be helpful to think of the book as a kind of miniature encyclopedia of one man's musings about his profession.

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M. Norton Wise, ed.
The Values of Precision.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1995.
Pp. viii + 372.
US $49.50. ISBN 0-691-03759-0.

This collection of essays is the first in a new series stemming from workshops hosted by the Program in History of Science at Princeton University. The overall theme of this volume is the rise of precision measurement from the Enlightenment to the early twentieth century. The general approach to this topic is to avoid the familiar dichotomies between internal and external history, between realism and relativism, and between cognitive and social interpretation. Instead, the growth of the importance of precision is viewed from mathematical, scientific, technological, economic, political and social perspectives. The fundamental question being asked is 'How has exactitude come to occupy such a prominent place in western culture?', and the individual essays explore a wide variety of historical episodes in the attempt to answer it. Some common themes are: the role of centralising bureaucratic states, the needs of large-scale commerce, and the scientific drive for increasing knowledge of the natural world. Also prominent in most of the papers is the significance of the cultural and moral values attached to particular precision measurements within the various communities in which such precision developed. A general conclusion to emerge is that the impetus for increased quantification, precision and accuracy came primarily not from mathematics or the increasing sophistication of measuring instruments but rather from the various commercial, political and scientific needs to extend uniform order and control over ever increasing territories.

The collection is divided into three parts and the editor provides a linking commentary at the end of each part, based on the workshop discussions. Part I contains essays on the Enlightenment origins of quantification and precision measurement. The contribution by A. Rusnock discusses the attempts at population measurement in late eighteenth-century France. The rise of centralised monarchies and the nation state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries gave rise to a need for a definition of state identity through precise border specification and realistic population estimates. This need was heightened by the taxation process, and also by the contemporary political debate over the supposed link between corrupt government and population decrease. The interesting distinction between precision and accuracy is graphically illustrated here by the numerical figures themselves, quoted usually to the last individual whilst based on admittedly approximate calculations. K. Alder's essay traces the attempt by the technocratic elite in Revolutionary France to introduce metrication as a means of breaking the hold of the Ancien Regime over the economy. The rational uniformity of the metric system became a rallying cry for egalitarian ideals. Feudal and territorial division, upheld by differences in units of measurement, were to be effaced. J. Golinski, in his paper on the introduction of quantification into chemistry during the

chemical revolution of the 1770s and 1780s, argues that Lavoisier used his precise measurements as a rhetorical device in his attempt to win over supporters to his oxygen theory of combustion from the rival phlogiston theory. His opponents, chiefly Priestley and the British chemists, stubbornly refused to accept his arguments because they believed in the value of purely factual narrative in chemistry and accused Lavoisier of introducing interpretation. Indeed, they criticised the very value of precision on the grounds that easy replication of experiments was of more value than sophisticated precision.

Part II, on industrial cultures, is introduced by K. Olesko's paper on the phenomenal growth of precision measurement in nineteenth-century Germany. The German scientists were the first to seriously introduce error analysis, based on Legendre's and Gauss's method of least squares. The use of this method to choose the most probable value from a series of measurements was closely associated with moral judgements of the honesty and integrity of the individual scientist. S. Schaffer continues this section by tracing the measurement of electrical quantities in Victorian Britain. William Thomson's interest in commercial telegraphy and James Maxwell's need to show that light travelled at the speed of electromagnetic waves led to ever increasing accuracy in the measurement of the ratio of electrostatic to electromagnetic units. The credibility of these measurements was bolstered by the mobilisation of unprecedented numbers of technicians and resources, using standard resistances produced by the British Academy. In his survey of the actuarial profession in nineteenth century Britain, T. Porter emphasises the insistence of the profession on placing the experience, skill and judgement of its practitioners over the mere mastery of mathematical techniques. The final essay in this section, by F. Holmes and K. Olesko, describes the use of graphical methods by Helmholtz in his measurement of the speed of nerve impulses in muscle contraction. The persuasive value of visual images is clearly shown here.

In Part III, entitled 'Mass Distribution', the production and distribution of precision instrumentation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is discussed. G. Gooday traces the genesis of the commercial ammeter and voltmeter, particularly in relation to the work of Ayrton and Perry at Finsbury Technical College. The differing values in the electrical engineering industry and the physics laboratory led to initial resistance by the physicists to acceptance of Ayrton and Perry's techniques as genuine measurement. The physicists' support for the 'absolute' method, using the tangent galvanometer, was based on a belief in self-reliance (not requiring commercial calibration) and a corresponding emphasis on the skill of the individual experimenter. G. Sweetnam describes the virtual monopoly on the production and distribution of concave diffraction gratings held by Johns Hopkins University due to the work of Rowlands. This grating provided a transformation in the international cataloguing of spectral lines. Although the monopoly of production was maintained through secrecy about the methods used, the motive was not financial gain. Indeed the University had to subsidise the

production for the sake of academic prestige. Rowlands' own emphasis on action over contemplation and his high valuation of pure observation led to increasing improvement of the gratings. The final paper by A. Warwick discusses the close link between calculation and practical measurement. He argues that the 'calculational technologies' (tables and mechanical computers) helped keep the interface between theory and experiment manageable.

All the essays are written to a high standard of historical scholarship and the volume as a whole may be welcomed as a valuable addition to the field. The detail of the individual essays is matched by a corresponding breadth in the areas covered. The general reader is also likely to find much of interest in this very readable collection.

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Editors' Note

The anglophone editors of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

are pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

The E-mail address of CPR/RCCP is

CPRS-G@VM.UCS.UALBERTA.CA

Any institution's computing services department will be able to advise on how to access the address.

Roger A. Shiner & Andrew Light