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Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

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Academic Printing & Publishing
P.O. Box 4218, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 4T2
Tel: (403) 435-5898 Fax: (403) 435-5852

Publications Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X

Published six times a year

Volume XV, No. 6
December • décembre 1995

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Mailed in March 1996.

Editorial Note/Mot de la rédaction

Roger A. Shiner and Andrew Light are delighted to welcome a third member of the editorial board of *Canadian Philosophical Reviews / Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie*. Our new colleague is Prof. Alain Voizard from the Department of Philosophy, University of Quebec at Montreal. Prof Voizard will have responsibility for reviews of books written in French, and reviews written in French of books in any language. Persons interested in reviewing in these areas, or with suggestions for books to be reviewed, should contact Prof. Voizard directly. His address for post and e-mail will be found on the inside front cover.

C.P.R. / R.C.C.P. was founded in 1981 as a bi-lingual journal. For a variety of reasons the bi-lingual character became difficult to maintain, and indeed recently has almost disappeared. Scholarship nontheless remains international. The revival of the original conception of the journal is therefore to be celebrated not only for private reasons, but also because it permits us to serve better a wider community of scholars.

Roger A. Shiner et Andrew Light ont le plaisir d'accueillir un troisième membre au comité de direction de la *Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie / Canadian Philosophical Reviews*. Notre nouveau collègue est Alain Voizard, professeur au Département de philosophie de l'Université du Québec à Montréal. A. Voizard sera responsable des comptes rendus des livres publiés en français, ainsi que des comptes rendus écrits en français de livres publiés dans d'autres langues. Les personnes intéressées à soumettre un compte rendu en français, ou qui désireraient suggérer des livres en vue d'une recension, devraient s'adresser directement à A. Voizard. Ses adresses postale et électronique se trouvent en deuxième de couverture.

R.C.C.P. / C.P.R., revue bilingue fondée en 1981, a récemment, pour un ensemble de raisons, perdu son caractère bilingue. L'érudition demeurant néanmoins internationale, on ne peut que se féliciter de ressusciter le côté francophone de la revue, et ce pour des raisons internes certes, mais aussi parce que cela nous permettra de mieux servir la communauté des chercheurs.

Lynne Rudder Baker
Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. xi + 246.
US $59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-42053-9);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-42190-X).

Statements such as 'I believe Jones should get the prize because, as far as I can see, her work is the best' have seemed to many recent philosophers to be causal statements about connections inside of us. The best candidate for the seat of the connections is the brain. However, it is not clear that brain operations can be understood as over the sort of structured items beliefs are. And so, oddly enough, the sample statement may be just false because of very particular facts about our brains that are as yet controversial. Thus a seemingly sensible materialism has encountered the problems of eliminative materialism, with its accompanying thesis that we may be wrong to believe we have beliefs.

Rudder Baker's response is to say that while statements like the sample statement are or may be statements of personal causation, the contents of, for example, belief-ascriptions show that beliefs cannot be, or be constituted by, brain states (contrary to the 'Standard View'). Rudder Baker's position, 'Practical Realism', opposes the trend in recent philosophy of according a privileged status to scientific discourse and explanations. She situates our psychological discourse in a world which undeniably contains hosts of intentional phenomena, whose existence or occurrence depends on the presence of psychological attitudes. For example, as Rudder Baker emphasizes, discourse about checks on one's bank account, repairs done to one's car and academic tenure all presuppose attitudes on the part of people; at the same time, our knowledge of their truth is independent of the discoveries of neurophysiology. No research on the brain will ever show, for example, that Quine never had tenure at Harvard.

Practical Realism is firmly in the tradition of Anglo-American commonsense philosophy, whose proponents include Reid, James, Austin and the post-*Tractatus* Wittgenstein. It contains more in the way of theory than some of these philosophers would accept. Thus, Practical Realism appears to take 'beliefs' as a label for a kind of state, with correspondingly typical properties; further, it has a conception of the general form of attitude explanations. The explanations are causal. What it resists is the idea that terms for psychological attitudes are like natural kinds terms in entailing their realization in a kind of internal, material state.

A central claim of *Explaining Attitudes* is that neurophysiological explanations are not superior replacements for ordinary explanations given in terms of intentional phenomena. Suppose, for example, we agree that Janet Reno had secret service agents accompanying her in 1993 *because* she had been nominated by the President to be Attorney-General. No facts about the

neurophysiological events which may have constituted (according to the Standard View) Clinton's making the nomination can give us a better explanation of why Janet Reno had secret service agents accompanying her. The neurophysiological facts are not going to give better explanations because they will not satisfy the sort of counterfactual conditionals which seem tightly linked to explanation. This is because the explanans of an intentional explanation does not supervene on the Standard View's preferred facts. Rudder Baker generalizes this claim into the thesis of the autonomy of intentional explanation.

There is a worry about generalizing from such examples. Explanations in terms of moves in a situation created by a number of conventions (placing a king in check or appointing an attorney-general) may resist the encroachment of the neurophysiological in a way that explanations in terms of, for example, hurt feelings and irrational fears do not. But even if we think Rudder Baker's thesis of the autonomy of intentional explanations needs further defense, we are reminded of the extent to which perfectly good explanations employ or presuppose intentional facts, and of the fact that a wholesale jettisoning of our intentional terminology would have drastic theoretical implications and unacceptable practical consequences. For example, intentionality-laden concepts such as 'Wall Street trading' would have to be discarded.

Worries from a late-Wittgensteinian antipathy toward theories of the intentional may be less represented in discussions of *Explaining Attitudes*. One area for such concerns is Rudder Baker's agreement with many proponents of the Standard View that explanations in terms of beliefs are causal explanations. There are at least two problems, with the second involving a point the proponents of the Standard View should also make. First of all, Rudder Baker takes causal explanations in general to cite factors antecedent to the explanadum (99). But a little reflection shows that beliefs which partially constitute the reasons for which one believes, acts or feels, have to be contemporaneous with what they explain, not antecedent. Of course, causes can be contemporaneous and reasons may also be prior; the point here is about Rudder Baker's view fitting poorly with a requirement on arguably the most important kind of explaining that attitudes do. The second problem: In so far as Rudder Baker gives an account of what a belief is, it is the obtaining of a number of counterfactuals, the antecedents of which may be realized in the real world. She explicitly resists the idea she is giving an analysis of 'belief', but '*S* believes that *p* just in case there are relevant counterfactuals nonvacuously true of *S*, where relevant counterfactuals concern what *S* would do, say, or think in various circumstances' (167). The counterfactuals appear to be, as Dummett has put it, *barely true*; certainly, beliefs seem not to be independent truth-makers for the counterfactuals. Suppose, then, 'Were P the case, S would A' partially constitutes A's believing that R. In cases where P is true, we may want to cite R as the reason for S's A-ing. But if R is partially constituted by the conditional, then it does not have the ontological

independence it needs to be the cause of the fulfillment of the consequent. Rudder Baker does discuss the different question of whether the belief and the counterfactuals are conceptually distinct, but the ontological question does not really get sufficient hearing (though see 170-1). The problem is serious because some variants of the standard view, such as functionalism, are or can be responsive to just this question.

Explaining Attitudes addresses many more topics than I have mentioned, among them suspect motivations for naturalizing the intentional. The discussions are always interesting, and at times profound and foundational. It provides a contrasting voice in an otherwise too one-sided discussion; everyone now working in the philosophy of mind should read it.

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Jonathan Barnes, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. xxv + 404.
US $59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-41133-5);
US $17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-42294-9).

Like the other volumes in the Cambridge Companion series, *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle* consists of specially commissioned essays by distinguished scholars. The essays constitute a clear, concise, well organized, comprehensive treatment of Aristotle's philosophy. Because they are written for bright beginners, the essays are not crammed with pedantic commentary and detailed exegetical contortions. Nevertheless, Aristotle scholars will find not only the ninety-page bibliography, but also the essays themselves to be of interest. Naturally, in this review I shall touch on only a few of the topics within each essay.

J. Barnes has edited the volume with careful attention to detail. Barnes launches the volume with a thoughtful meditation on the nature of a philosophical companion and a short introduction to Aristotle's life and works. In an essay on the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics* Barnes argues that the *Rhetoric* lacks unity because rhetoric is not a single art. Instead, it is a blend of parts of logic, moral psychology, and stylistics (263). Might not Aristotle reply that these three constitute a single art because they have a common goal of persuasion?

Aristotle's *Metaphysics* seems even more jumbled than his *Rhetoric*. For example, at different points Aristotle says that metaphysics is (a) a science of first principles or causes, (b) the inquiry into being *qua* being, (c) theology, and (d) the investigation of substance. Barnes's essay on the *Metaphysics* describes these four studies and presents Aristotle's arguments for their unity. The study of being *qua* being is the study of those attributes which hold of entities in virtue of the fact that they exist. These are first principles, so (a) = (b). The final causes of things constitute a series leading eventually to God. Since God is the ultimate final cause, the study of first causes includes theology. Thus, (a) = (c). The focal meaning of existence is substance. That is, substance exists in a primary way while the existence of everything else depends upon substance. The study of being *qua* being reduces to the study of substance. Thus, (b) = (d).

Barnes disputes these arguments. First, Aristotle himself insists that the first principles of each science fall within the domain of that science. There is no science of first principles, no (a) (103-4). In particular, theology is a branch of physics rather than a superscience of all things (106). Thus, (a) ≠ (c). Second, even if everything else is ontologically dependent upon substance, the study of substance *qua* substance is only part of the study of being *qua* being (102). Thus, (b) ≠ (d). Might not Aristotle reply that these four studies are components rather than definitions of metaphysics?

R.J. Hankinson's essay on Aristotelian science helpfully exposes the student (and the scholar) of Aristotle to a sample of Aristotle's rather neglected scientific works. Hankinson's second essay is on Aristotelian philosophy of science. He explains why Aristotle thinks that scientific explanation consists of a chain of syllogisms. Perhaps Aristotle's own scientific treatises do not follow this format because they are works in progress rather than completed sciences. Aristotle also thinks that mechanistic explanations of natural things must be supplemented by teleological explanations. What is it that mechanistic explanations cannot account for? Hankinson takes Aristotle's answer to be the end-like order and regularity in nature, particularly in organisms. But Aristotle gives an adequate materialist explanation of this order and regularity. Well-adapted organisms flourish while others die out, so well-adapted organisms are plentiful while others are scarce (*Physics* 198b16-32). Perhaps Aristotle's view is that mechanistic explanations cannot account for *regularity of development*, the fact that natural things usually come to be in the same way.

In his essay on Aristotle's *Politics*, C.C.W. Taylor offers plausible resolutions of several interpretive problems. For example, Taylor suggests that even though Aristotle's best life is a political life, the best component of the political life is contemplation because, although contemplation is the best activity, a life of pure contemplation is incompatible with human nature. Taylor not only explains but also challenges many of Aristotle's claims. Taylor observes that Aristotle's classification of monarchy as a non-degenerate *polis* contradicts Aristotle's claim that the good life requires political participation. Taylor objects to Aristotle's claims that the *polis* exists by

nature, that man is by nature a political animal, and that natural slavery is justified. Finally, Taylor argues that 'the thesis that the *polis* stands to the individual as whole to part ... commits him to denying ... that the aim of the *polis* is the promotion of the good life for its citizens ... (241). Might not Aristotle reply that the goal of a whole can be the best interest of its parts?

Unlike the essays of Barnes, Hankinson, and Taylor, S. Everson's essay on Aristotle's *de Anima*, R. Smith's essay on Aristotle's logical works, and D.S. Hutchinson's essay on Aristotle's ethics are merely expository, and therefore, of less interest to the Aristotle scholar. Everson and Smith offer substantial aid to serious students by lucidly and carefully organizing and explicating complex texts. Hutchinson's essay, on the other hand, is simply a paraphrase of the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*. It might be a useful alternative to Aristotle's ethics, but it is useless as a companion to Aristotle's ethics. For example, instead of calling attention to the crucial and complex question of whether Aristotle's supremely happy life is the contemplative life or some sort of mixed life in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Hutchinson simply reproduces the tensions in the texts without comment. Moreover, Hutchinson makes several errors. He says, for example, that Aristotelian temperance demands that we desire only those culinary and sexual 'pleasures that are strictly necessary for our health' (219). But Aristotle is not such a prude. He says that the temperate person desires the pleasures that 'make for health or for good condition ... and also other pleasant things if they are not hindrances to these ends, or contrary to what is noble, or beyond his means' (NE 1119a16-20). Again, Hutchinson attributes to Aristotle the view that fear of envy, insult, shame, poverty, discomfort, or disease 'is not real fear' (220). But Aristotle does not deny that these are real fears. He merely denies that they are governed by the virtue of courage, thus providing a counterexample to the claim that to each passion there corresponds a single virtue.

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Peter Baumgartner and **Sabine Payr, eds.**
Speaking Minds: Interviews with Twenty Eminent Cognitive Scientists.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1995.
Pp. vi + 342.
US $29.95. ISBN 0-691-03678-0.

This book is surprisingly informative. A collection of interviews of some of the leading thinkers of our time on the subject of artificial intelligence, it is both entertaining and enlightening. Best read nonlinearly by tracing out entries from the index, with a bit of work *Speaking Minds* gives you a sense of some of the personalities, issues, and arguments in cognitive science today. I say it is surprisingly informative because the editors apparently had very little notion who the eminent cognitive scientists are or what the state of the art was circa 1989. As they explain in their introduction, they basically relied on the kindness and opinions of strangers in culling out the participants and putting together the interviews.

As the title states, there are twenty interviews in the book, though I hesitate to claim that they are all with cognitive scientists. Eight are with philosophers (Patricia and Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Hubert Dreyfus, Jerry Fodor, John Haugeland, Hilary Putnam, John Searle), four with computer scientists (Allen Newell, Joseph Weizenbaum, Robert Wilensky, Terry Winograd), three with psychologists (James McClelland, Stephen Palmer, David Rumelhart), one with a sociologist (Aaron Cicourel), one with a linguist (George Lakoff), one with a computational neuroscientist (Terry Sejnowski), one with Herbert Simon (who is a category unto himself), and one with a mathematician (Lofti Zadeh). Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and then lightly edited by the speakers. The result is a casual but accurate representation of the views of the leading thinkers in philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence. This makes for a highly readable and quite enjoyable book, even though it misses the boat in many other respects.

For example, the mix of professionals is odd: philosophers outnumber representatives from any other discipline. Though these philosophers are among the top in their field and are all keenly interested in how the mind works, they aren't among the founding fathers (or mothers) of cognitive science. It seems that if you were truly interested in what cognitive *scientists* are up to and what they think, you should ask those actively involved in the empirical research, and not the watchful bystanders or external critics. Go straight to the horse's mouth and ignore the gadflies buzzing about (or ignore most of them, anyway). All too often, the cognitive scientist responds to what the philosopher sees as the final death-blow to artificial intelligence with something like, 'Honest to God, ... [you do] not understand what goes on in computer programs ... [You are] just not a serious person' (Simon says of Dreyfus, 239). There are many such complaints leveled in the book, enough that I wonder whether Simon doesn't have a point. My suspicion is that (most

of the time) the scientists do know what they are talking about and the philosophers only think that they do.

There are also some glaring omissions. Baumgartner and Payr do point out that in the end five interviews had to be omitted. Nevertheless, some disciplines that should have been represented weren't (e.g., anthropology and 'wetware' biology), some are woefully underrepresented (psychology and neuroscience), and others are overrepresented (philosophy and computer science). One should not read this book expecting to get an accurate representation of the topography of the current intellectual landscape.

Indeed, the group chosen is quite inbred. As the editors explain in their introduction, they chose the interviewees mainly through recommendations from the philosophers they knew at Berkeley. Not surprisingly, we get a lot of interviews with philosophers plus interviews with the scientists these philosophers know best. Consequently, most of the scientists that appear in the book have some affiliation with West Coast programs. (The exceptions are Newell and Simon, arguably *the* founding fathers of cognitive science.) A poor substitute for honest research, word of mouth is not the best strategy for choosing exemplars. As this book illustrates, it makes for a lopsided presentation.

Also odd is the core set of questions Baumgartner and Payr ask. Most of the questions centered around issues in artificial intelligence, which certainly is not a central concern in most of cognitive science (though to be fair, Wilensky would disagree with me). At bottom, cognitive science is about *us* — how we reason, remember, perceive, and interact with the world — and artificial intelligence is but one tool among many that help us expand our cognitive intuitions. After reading the interviews and seeing how valuable an open and casual discussion can be in defining the issues and outlining fundamental points of disagreement, I hungered for the same frank and easy discussion on cognitive development, social dynamics, the importance of emotions, our connections with other animals, external cognition and tool use, and so on.

On the other hand, this theme does fit with the mix of people interviewed, as most are affiliated with some type of computer modeling, either as critic or advocate. The relative strengths and weaknesses of parallel distributed processing and serial algorithms, and their place within cognitive science, are hashed over, with a variety of perspectives and opinions weighing in. This is the organizing motif of the book and it is quite instructive to watch highly intelligent minds in a field struggle to accommodate the latest innovations in artificial intelligence into their *Weltanschauungen*. Cognitive science is growing and developing quickly, so quickly that what all the changes mean is not yet clear. What we get here is the barest glimpse at the adolescent throes of newest kid on the block.

What I find most valuable, though, are the descriptions of cognitive science's birth, not eavesdropping on its stormy childhood. Each of the speakers gives a brief history of how he or she got involved in cognitive science, and most of them were there at the beginning. Reading this book

does give you a nice sense of how cognitive science came to be, as well as some of the major controversies in the field (although ultimately I think there is more agreement than not among the scientists, perhaps to Baumgartner and Payr's disappointment). All in all, this book makes for good bedtime reading.

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Robert Bolton
Person, Soul and Identity. A Neoplatonic Account of the Principle of Personality.
Washington: Minerva Press 1994.
Pp. xxxi + 279.
Np. ISBN 1-85863-101-7.

This book purports to be, in the words of its subtitle, a Neoplatonic account of personality. The subtitle, however, is misleading: B has no interest in making a detailed philosophical or historical analysis of Neoplatonic thought about 'person, soul and identity.' His real interest is to oppose modern reductionist conceptions of the self as an empirical epiphenomenon of the brain with a 'conception of identity based on the spiritual soul, the unitary and substantive centre of the being, the one to which orthodox religion remains committed, despite certain appearances' (xx). Numerous comments scattered through the book (58, 92, 101, 216, 219, 221, 231-2, 234-6) make it clear that orthodox religion means Christianity. He has in fact written a thinly-disguised work of Christian apologetics that rests on a melange of philosophical fragments drawn from Plato to E.F. Schumacher without the slightest attempt to treat his sources honestly, critically or accurately. In this general muddle, the Neoplatonic material bulks rather small as a quick tour of the book's seven chapters will show.

After a long introduction, in which he frames the issue and makes some tentative stabs at philosophical tendencies thought to oppose the idea of a spiritual soul — among which he includes Oriental mysticism, simplistically described as monistic and pantheistic (xv) — B turns in chapter 1 to 'Soul as Separable Entity.' Here we are given a whirlwind account of the Platonic Ideas, accepted as literally true, with a few citations from the *Alcibiades I*, the *Phaedo*, the *Phaedrus* and *The Laws*. Chapter 2 contains the only sustained treatment of Neoplatonism in the book, if something so disorganized and error-ridden can be called sustained, and it deals mainly with just

three of Plotinus' *Enneads*: IV (six citations), V (five citations) and VI (five citations). Chapter 3 is wholly occupied with Augustine's conception of the soul, justified by his early study of Neoplatonism. From here B jumps in chapter 4 to Leibnitz' monadology, which he intends to show 'is steeped in Neoplatonic principles' (130), but in the end (152-4) only manages to draw a few forced parallels before conceding that Leibnitz' 'assimilation of the Neoplatonic metaphysic is so thorough that he does not need to make conscious applications of it or appeals to it' (155). In chapter 5 B claims to provide an empirical analysis of identity that will come to the same results as the preceding metaphysical one (156), but he is so concerned to refute Locke's conception of identity as consciousness that he entirely loses track of this goal and ends feebly with the negative argument that his own conception of personality 'involves no difficulties comparable to those which arise from the above kinds of criticism' (181). The last two chapters are almost unreadable due to the mass of disparate material thrown in pellmell to counter criticisms of the metaphysical idea of the unitary self. Chapter 6 starts with a critique of the scientific method that is so crude as to silence laughter and ends, after discussing various body-soul problems, with a modified acceptance of Cartesian dualism. The last chapter seems to have no focus at all. It opens with abrupt and confused comments about Kantian psychology, turns briefly to Otto Weininger only to dismiss him as philosophically worthless and then reverts to the minor eighteenth-century French thinker Fabre D'Olivet. B asserts that the introduction (actually, just the first 14 pages) to his *Histoire Philosophique du Genre Humain* contains much of use to his own theory of identity: 'What he says of the human composite closely follows Plotinus, but with certain developments to it which are relevant for the present purpose' (214). What he finds relevant is D'Olivet's addition of a unifying will to Plotinus' tripartite division of body, soul and intellect. (Since the bibliography lists only the French edition, one must assume that B has translated all the passages quoted in the text, although he provides no attribution of source.) A brief conclusion stresses the psychic damage done to us by a 'rootless intelligence' that reduces spiritual doctrines to mere flights of fancy with no special claim to truth (241).

The disorder of the book is compounded by B's method of argument, his failure to do the philosophical homework requisite for such an enormous project and his reckless disregard of scholarly accuracy. I take them in order. Each of the seven chapters is about 25-30 pages long and comprises from seven to thirteen numbered subsections. B's typical method is to (1) begin a subsection with a brief summary of what his particular author of the moment has to say about some topic, (2) adduce quotations out of context to support the summary and then (3) spend the remaining few pages in a critique of what he thinks the author meant or implied. Since he is only appropriating ideas to buttress his own metaphysical agenda, he does not even pretend to a fair and balanced presentation of the philosophy. Transitions from subsection to subsection are abrupt and often discontinuous. The result is not only fatiguing to read but exceptionally hard to follow. Prime examples of this are

his forays into the philosophy of Plotinus and Leibnitz in chapters 2 and 4 respectively. If one does not already know Plotinus on the soul or Leibnitz on the monad, one will not learn much here and may be seriously misled. The danger with Plotinus is especially great, since B does not explain the three hypostases or the way soul proceeds from intellect and returns to it in contemplation. Without this explanation, almost everything B says about the soul lacks proper context.

The bibliography reflects B's failure to do the research his project demands. It has only 75 items, of which a scant 20 are devoted to Plato and Plotinus, the pillars of his study, and the majority of those translations. The citations are often incomplete, inaccurate or highly inconsistent. Here are just a few examples. (1) Incomplete: E.R. Dodds is not listed as the editor and translator of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*; no editors or translators are given for the five Augustine translations, although A.J. Festugière's (grave missing) does appear as the translator of *In Platonis Timaeum commentarii*. (2) Inaccurate: Stephen MacKenna, not Mackenna, translated the *Enneads*, which are cited in the old 1956 edition rather than the 3rd edition revised by B.S. Page in 1962; Horkheimer's *The Eclipse of Reason* was published in 1947 and not 1946. (3) Inconsistent: the Loeb edition of Aristotle's *On the Soul* has no date while the fourth volume of Plotinus does; publication data sometimes include the publisher and sometimes only the place of publication without rhyme or reason. Publication dates are often of reprints and not first editions or major revisions. There are so many typographic errors it does not look as though an editor's or proofreader's hand ever graced the book. The problems do not stop at reference technicalities. B has omitted the majority of the best texts, translations and commentaries for his selected philosophers. He has also avoided any confrontation with current research into consciousness and identity by silent omission. It is difficult to escape the conclusion, therefore, that B is an untrained amateur posing rather badly as a scholar.

That impression is confirmed by a cavalier attitude to the accepted standards of scholarly accuracy and integrity. The following examples are representative but not complete. (1) Based on the bibliography, B's translation for the *Alcibiades I* is the old unrevised Jowett, but he misquotes 128e (36) and uses a completely different unlisted version for 133b-c (38). His translation for the *Phaedo* is the Tredennick version published in the Bollingen Series (1973), but his misquotes 64a (42) and proceeds to quote 65e (inexactly), 66d, 79d and 80b (42-4) from the unlisted Jowett version. His translation for the *Timaeus* is Jowett in the Bollingen Series, but he steals 43c-d (43) from Cornford's *Plato's Cosmology* without attribution and with a few substitutions that suggest he wants the reader to believe he translated it. Failure to clearly indicate the provenance of translations runs throughout the book and is inexcusable. (2) B claims on p. 65 that the relation between the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus* arguments on the soul 'has apparently not been seriously considered in philosophy before, either by commentators or even by the major Neoplatonists,' but it has been carefully explored by Hackforth in *Plato's Phaedrus* (67-8) and by Robinson in *Plato's Psychology* (113-8) to

name only two. (3) B quotes Greek, but always without any accents and so mutilated in places (*Ennead* IV.7.1 on p. 67) that he obviously does not understand it. (4) B cites Proclus on p. 118, but the corresponding note (33) refers to *Republic* X in a translation by Festugière not contained in the bibliography and apparently confused with his French translation of Proclus's commentary on the *Timaeus*.

This book is, I regret to say, worthless to scholars of Neoplatonism or personal identity due to its many deficiencies in coverage, accuracy and reliability. It is probably unsuited to most general readers as well due to the fragmented and often unintelligible presentation of exceptionally complex material.

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Dan W. Brock
Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1993.
Pp. xi + 435.
US $54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-41785-6);
US $18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-42833-5).

Dan Brock is widely (and rightly) regarded as one of the best practitioners of the field known variously as bioethics, biomedical ethics, medical ethics, and health-care ethics. He conceives biomedical ethics as an interdisciplinary field, indeed as 'a paradigm' (vii) of that class. The disciplines that comprise biomedical ethics, Brock says, are medicine, law, and health policy as well as certain unspecified social sciences. One should add theology to the list.

Brock thinks philosophy has a contribution to make to biomedical ethics. In a series of essays published between 1979 and 1992 and reprinted with little change in *Life and Death*, Brock applies his philosophical expertise to a range of normative and conceptual issues that arise in the practice of medicine and in health-care policymaking (although not, as the word 'biomedical' would suggest, in biological research). As its title indicates, the anthology concerns issues of life and death, although in different contexts and at different levels.

The book has three parts. In the first, entitled 'Physicians and Patients Making Treatment Decisions', Brock 'develops an overall ethical framework for health care treatment decision making' (2), which he uses throughout the

book. Brock rejects the paternalistic model of the physician-patient relationship in which the physician, taking to heart the slogan 'doctor knows best', treats the patient as a parent does a child. Brock also rejects what he calls the 'body mechanic' view in which the physician does no more than apply his or her expertise to the solution of the patient's health problems — at the patient's behest. The latter gives inordinate weight, and the former insufficient weight, to the value of patient autonomy.

Brock elaborates a model in which the physician and patient share decisionmaking. But there are at least two versions of this. In one, which Brock rejects, there is a clear division of labor between the two, with the physician supplying facts and the patient values. I, the patient, tell you, my physician, what my goals/values are. Your job is to use your factual expertise and technical skill to help me achieve my expressed goals. The difference between this model and the body-mechanic model is subtle but important: in the former, the treatment decision is joint in that both patient and physician contribute to it (although in different ways); in the latter, the decision belongs to, and is made by, the patient.

The problem with the rigid fact-value model of joint decisionmaking, Brock says, is that it presupposes, falsely, that there is a clear distinction between facts and values. Neither science nor medicine is value-free. Nor can the model incorporate a vision of medicine in which physicians, qua physicians, have moral commitments and obligations. Physicians do not (and probably, all things considered, should not) view themselves as mere providers of facts. The model also fails to take account of the dynamic, interactive nature of the physician-patient relationship. Brock seeks a model that acknowledges the moral agency and responsibility of physicians. He finds it in the second version of the shared-decisionmaking model. Here, the physician provides facts but is also actively involved in making the treatment decision — not *for* the patient, but *with* the patient. The ideal is one of collaboration, which implies concern, respect, a shared interest in the patient's health and well-being, sincere exploration of alternatives, meaningful discussion, and in some cases, as we shall see, persuasion.

In Chapter 3 (cowritten with Steven A. Wartman), Brock applies his favored model to a case in which, in the judgment of the physician, a competent patient makes an irrational treatment choice — a choice that is inconsistent with the patient's overall well-being. What should the physician do? The body-mechanic model requires the physician to defer to the patient's expressed wishes. The paternalistic model allows (perhaps requires) the physician to override the patient's wishes on grounds that doing so promotes the patient's welfare. The rigid division-of-labor model requires the physician to provide all relevant facts to the patient and ultimately defer to the patient's judgment. Brock and Wartman reach a different result. In their view, the physician not only may, but morally should (indeed, if conscientious, must) seek to persuade the patient to change his or her mind. If persuasion succeeds, the moral issue disappears. If the patient is not persuaded, try though the physician may, the value of self-determination requires that the

patient's choice be respected. This latter outcome, or the possibility of such an outcome, distinguishes Brock's model from the paternalistic model.

Brock's (and Wartman's) analysis and argumentation leave many questions unanswered. For example, how does persuasion, which is presumed to be morally acceptable, differ from manipulation, which is presumed to be unacceptable? A great deal of moral weight is being placed on this distinction, but aside from a brief discussion of manipulation in Chapter 1 ('Informed Consent') it is not clarified. Brock explicitly rules out coercion and manipulation as 'persuasive' techniques. Each violates the right to self-determination, whereas (rational) persuasion does not. Brock is aware of such phenomena as framing effects, in which the way choices are framed or presented can affect one's choice. A result-oriented (meaning unscrupulous) physician could easily take advantage of this to induce a particular choice by a patient.

Brock's solution is for the physician to 'present the choice in alternative ways in the hope of minimizing framing effects' (89). The 'ideal' physician would 'avoid putting information in a form designed to change the patient's decision from what it would have been with a sound understanding of the information' (46). The problem is that the world is populated with real physicians, not ideal physicians. The lack of a clearer distinction between persuasion and manipulation, and some indication of how the latter is to be discouraged in practice, is particularly problematic given the disparity in power between the typical physician and the typical patient. From a feminist point of view, for example, the concern is that women, being socialized to submissiveness, will be manipulated by their physicians (many or most of whom are male) into accepting certain treatments. (See, e.g., Susan Sherwin, *No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Health Care* [Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1992], chap. 7.) One might wonder whether rational persuasion is even possible in a relationship that by its nature involves disparities (sometimes vast disparities) in knowledge, skill, and power.

In Part II of the book Brock focuses on 'the subset of treatment choices in which the patient's life itself is seriously at stake' (5). This part contains essays on the moral permissibility of killing and on the concept of death as well as a longish discussion of what Brock calls 'voluntary active euthanasia' — euthanasia in which a competent patient requests to be put to death rather than (merely) allowed to die. Brock devotes a good deal of space in Chapter 6 ('Death and Dying') to debunking various distinctions used by medical practitioners and theorists, distinctions that are thought to provide constraints on the moral permissibility of forgoing life support. The distinctions Brock criticizes include (1) withholding versus withdrawing life support; (2) killing versus allowing to die; (3) forgoing life support versus suicide; (4) ordinary versus extraordinary treatment; (5) active versus passive voluntary euthanasia; and (6) intended versus merely foreseen consequences. Brock's view, which I believe is widely shared among (although not limited to) secular-minded philosophers, is that these distinctions are either incoherent or, once clarified, morally irrelevant. Therefore, no moral decision should rest on them.

Brock, to my mind, goes too fast over this terrain. Brock fails to understand, or even acknowledge the possibility, that physicians, qua physicians, use the word 'kill' in a technical way, to mean something like 'malevolently cause the death of a human being.' The motive and not the wrongness is built into the concept. Since medicine is by definition a benevolent institution, designed to preserve and prolong human life and to promote human well-being, physicians, while acting as physicians, do not kill patients. They sometimes allow patients to die, but they do not kill them, for that implies a motive inconsistent with their calling.

Why does Brock insist that 'kill' have only one meaning? Perhaps he is in the grip of an unarticulated semantic thesis. We know that words like 'burglary' have both (1) an ordinary meaning and (2) a technical legal meaning. Part of what one learns in the process of becoming a lawyer are the technical meanings of familiar terms. Why should medicine be any different? Given what we know about professional jargon, would it not be a surprise to learn that medicine had no technical terms? Notice what I am and am not claiming. I am not claiming that 'kill' does mean 'malevolently cause the death of a human being' in medical contexts (although I suspect that is close); I am claiming that its meaning must be investigated, that what the word means is an empirical matter. For Brock to assume, a priori, that 'kill' has the same meaning in both medical and nonmedical contexts is presumptuous.

Brock might reply that using the word 'kill' in two ways (one ordinary and one technical) increases the likelihood of confusion and equivocation. But that assumes one is unable to identify the context in which the term is being used. Does Brock argue that 'right' should be used to mean 'entitlement' but not 'morally permissible' (or conversely)? The same likelihood of confusion and equivocation exists there. What about 'burglary'? Should lawyers refrain from using this word in a technical way (as they do)? The larger question is whether it is the business of philosophy to dictate how words are to be used. An alternative view, to which I subscribe, is that the philosopher should attend to the way they are used. It would be a significant finding if, within medicine, the word 'kill' were used ambiguously, and that this led to fallacies. Brock has given no reason to think that this is the case; nor does it seem plausible to me that it is.

In Part III of the book Brock shifts his focus to 'the health policy arena' (11), about which he speaks with some authority, or at least experience. Brock served as a staff philosopher on the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in 1981-82. The final essay of his anthology addresses some of the problems that arose there, and that arise whenever an academic, who is committed as such to certain ideals of scholarship, finds himself or herself in a policymaking environment. I found this one of the more interesting pieces in the anthology. Other essays in this part of the book address the value of prolonging life, the use of quality-of-life measures in health care, and issues of distributive justice as they arise in connection with the elderly. The essays are well-writ-

ten and philosophically rich. Biomedical ethicists are indebted to Brock for mapping some of this terra incognita.

Overall, and not counting the seventeen-page, previously unpublished introduction, the book contains fourteen essays. It suffers from the usual problems of repetitiveness, but it is nicely produced (typographically, stylistically, and physically) and has a detailed index. The repetitiveness is annoying, but allowing it (which Brock says was a conscious decision) means that the essays can be read separately or in any order. The essays are sophisticated enough to interest the professional philosopher, but not so technical or obtuse as to thwart intelligent laypeople, scholars from outside philosophy, or students of philosophy. I used the book with some success in an upper-level undergraduate course where the repetitiveness of certain themes served a useful purpose (viz., reinforcement). Given his conception of the relation between biomedical ethics and philosophy, Brock would be pleased to find that the book has a large and diverse audience. He would be disappointed, I am sure, if it were read only by philosophers.

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Andrew Cutrofello
The Owl at Dawn: A Sequel to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.
Albany: State University of New York Press 1995.
Pp. xii + 196.
US $57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2583-5);
US $18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2584-3).

When Nietzsche diagnosed late nineteenth-century culture as suffering from a 'European Buddhism', he was reacting to what he saw as a pervasive and culturally damaging withdrawal of the human will from the world's stage. The sentiment, typified for Nietzsche by Schopenhauer's pessimistic moral torpor, is that we have no 'right' to make truth claims against the backdrop of a world which is radically indifferent to those claims. With the publication of Andrew Cutrofello's latest book, late twentieth-century philosophical culture would seem to have reached a similar impasse. This is ostensibly a book about the extent to which Hegelian dialectic has cast its shadow over all subsequent philosophy and culture. But it is more profoundly a polemic against Hegel and an attempt to sketch a prescriptive philosophy for the post-dialectical, liberal order.

Cutrofello describes his book as 'a thought experiment' (33), a *Bildungsroman* which, though it claims to have faithfully represented the positions it portrays, does not purport to have summed them up in any definitive fashion. Each character we encounter in this romp through one hundred and forty years of philosophy is identified not by name, but by a pithy description of his or her 'position'. The narrative begins, appropriately enough, where Hegel's left off, in the sphere of Absolute Knowledge. According to Cutrofello, a sequel to the *Phenomenology* is necessary at this point because the full establishment of the (I=We) and the (We=I) is not realized among Hegel's absolute knowers. This is a complicated section which is worthwhile lingering over since it provides the impetus for the dialectical confrontations which are to follow. The problem, as Cutrofello views it, is that each individual absolute knower has achieved the synthesis of (I=We) and (We=I) in a merely immediate manner. This means that these terms are unified in the consciousness of the individual absolute knower (as the (I=I)) but split insofar as the synthesis has been reached in isolation from other absolute knowers. In order to mediate his knowledge, therefore, each absolute knower must seek out a community of absolute knowers. As it turns out, however, this is no simple task. The dialectic of absolute knowers is itself distorted by the narcissism and subterfuge which characterize most struggles for recognition between two or more subjects. The result in this case is petty bickering and a struggle for power which culminates in the ascendancy of one absolute knower over all the others. This victor then becomes the fetishized feudal lord who carries the torch of Hegelian truth. Thus begins the history of post-Hegelian philosophy, the battle over the legacy of Spirit.

What follows is a brilliant dialectical survey of nearly every philosophico-cultural movement to have arisen since. We encounter characters as diverse as the 'true lover of humanity' (Lou Salome), the 'feminine psychoanalyst of gender' (Julia Kristeva) and the representative of 'reformed youth' (Jerry Rubin on Wall Street). In all, seventy-seven positions are considered. The transition from one position to the next is usually carried out with remarkable elegance, and so the narrative as a whole makes for surprisingly smooth reading, in spite of its scope. For Cutrofello, the motor of this dialectic is bad faith. Individual positions are staked out and sustained to the conscious exclusion and 'violent' suppression of competing positions. This raises a problem. Although he would avoid the reduction of persons to positions in his depiction of the movement of the *Geist*, Cutrofello does not seem worried about the converse sin. His narrative ties all significant developments in the history of post-Hegelian culture to the agency of individuals, mostly of individual philosophers. Hegel may have erred in claiming that the individual is in some sense merely the carrier of universal meaning, but Cutrofello, arguing from the largely undefended position that all truth claims are mere masks of the will to power, goes too far in the other direction by reifying the role of the essentially duplicitous individual knower in history.

Cutrofello's proposed solution to the 'violence' of all dialectical confrontation is also problematic. In his final chapter, he offers us a picture of the

'Nietzschean Satyagraha'. The difference between this culminating chapter and Hegel's is that the former is not tied to the sphere of religion. This means that the disputants — the Satyagrahis — renounce their claims to possess the truth and engage instead in a Ghandian struggle of peaceful protest against all truth claims. There is no attempt on Cutrofello' part to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate power for, as he tells us bluntly, 'truth claims and violence go hand in hand' (193). Resolution of conflict is therefore always deferred in the interest of preserving the multiplicity of perspectives. We show true respect for other 'religions' only when we view them as self-conscious fictions (that they may not want to be 'respected' in this manner does not appear to be problematic). But this view gives us little or no ground to stand on when making ethical or political judgements. It is difficult to see how ceaseless talk can help us think and act justly about questions of deep concern to us as individuals and members of a community. Surely we must hold to the *truth* of our beliefs if we are to defend them with any seriousness? Nor should the attempt to reasonably resolve passionately held but opposed truth claims necessarily be interpreted as an act of 'violence'. In any case, this metaphorical dalliance with the notion of violence risks de-sensitizing us to the full force of its literal meaning.

Cutrofello compares his project to that of Kafka's land-surveyor, K., who comes to a town of many castles but who, 'instead of seeking permission to enter any of them ... simply sets out to chart the territory' (40). This endless surveying of the intellectual landscape is a clear picture of the ethical disposition of the Satyagrahi, as Cutrofello sees it. It is surely a heady kind of freedom which is thus to be won, as K. himself recognizes. But we should perhaps take heed of K.'s equally strong conviction 'that there was nothing more senseless, nothing more hopeless, than this freedom, this waiting, this inviolability' (Franz Kafka, *The Castle*, translated by Willa and Edwin Muir [New York: Penguin Classics 1970] 105).

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William Desmond
Perplexity and Ultimacy: Metaphysical Thoughts from the Middle.
Albany: State University of New York Press 1995.
Pp. xiv + 263.
US $59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2387-5);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2388-3).

In this book, Desmond reflects on the region between the perplexity from which metaphysics arises and the ultimacy of that toward which it is directed. Being themselves metaphysical, Desmond's reflections are as much concerned with the question of metaphysical thinking itself as with the question of being. In Chapter One, Desmond defines metaxological being, the being of the middle (*metaxu*), as a mediation in which the self remains open to the other as other in thinking of itself and the other. In Chapter Two, Desmond considers the perplexity of being at a loss exemplified in tragedy. Any tragic loss, with which traditional philosophy is unconcerned, is the loss of the other as other, in which is revealed the singularity or uniqueness of the other. This leads to Desmond's discussion in Chapter Three of the idiocy of the self, by which he means the propriety of the singularity of the self to the self. In focusing on universal categories, traditional philosophy neglects this essential singularity and so goes astray in thinking of the self. The singularity of the self, its presence, is an individuating energy of self-articulation, emerging from and returning to nothing, that exceeds the determinations of the self, whether individual or social. The otherness of the self as idiotic forestalls any dialectical self-determination (in Hegel's sense of 'dialectical') and opens out the self to the other in its singularity.

Chapter Four discusses agapeic mind, a thoughtful openness to the other in its singularity. In contrast to erotic mind, a dialectical thinking in which the mind goes out to the other in order to fulfill itself by appropriating the other, agapeic mind is a metaxological thinking in which the mind gives itself to the other in order to let the other show itself in its singularity. Rather than dialectically determining itself in fixing the determinations of the other, agapeic mind lets its idiotic power of self-articulation unfold itself toward the other by letting the other unfold itself as other toward the self. This reveals the self and the other as given together in their irreducible plurality, which presupposes an ultimate giving that is to be referred to God as the ultimate giver. The last two chapters discuss the nature of God as the ultimate origin of being. For Desmond, God as ultimate origin is the creator of beings in their presence, the one Who gives forth the singular in its singularity. To be in the middle is to be given together with other beings in their singularity. Insofar as God gives forth beings in their singularity, being in the middle is agapeic being, the creation of which is 'the giving of being to the other that lets the other-being be as other' (218). In agapeic creation, God opens Himself out to His creation in order to let it be as other; in agapeic mind, human beings respond to creation by letting the other given to them be as other, thus sheltering creation.

I am sympathetic with Desmond's project of thinking about singularity as such, as I am disappointed that he does not in fact do so. According to Desmond, the idiocy of the self manifests itself in recognition of oneself, which depends upon a prereflective awareness of oneself in one's idiocy. But recognition is re-identification: to recognize something depends upon the selfsameness of the being recognized and of the one who recognizes. Since Desmond thinks one's singularity is the condition of possibility for recognition of oneself, he understands the singularity of the self in terms of its formal or final identity. I do not see that this is singularity. The uniqueness of a being is, if anything, not a matter of identity but of difference, of a process of differentiation prior to identity. One reason Desmond mistakes identity for singularity is the question with which he comes to grip with the issue of singularity. By approaching it in the context of being at a loss and the nothing it reveals, Desmond implicitly asks, 'Why are there beings rather than nothing?' This question asks what it is to be a being as such, what the identity of a being in general is. For Desmond, it is singularity as a selfsame underlying dynamism, itself explained in terms of giving, a metaphor that does not call the primacy of identity into question. A better question for thinking of singularity as such as what cannot be properly understood in terms of identity might be, 'Why are there *these* beings rather than *those*?' This question would focus on difference as primary and avoid the metaphor of giving.

Another reason is that Desmond is never clear on what the determinacy of the singular is. For Desmond, the singular self always already exceeds any determinations it articulates at a given time, and so is indeterminate. But is this indeterminacy simply a lack of determinacy, understood in terms of identity? Or can it be characterized positively in terms other than those of identity? Desmond seems to think the latter, but he never gives such an account, or indeed any. Finally, Desmond does not explicitly discuss the temporality of the singular. He touches briefly on it in characterizing the being of the singular as 'the This that is Once, and then is Never again' (46-7). The singular is a present that passes away. But is the present the only dimension of time in terms of which the singular is to be understood? If the present is a present that passes, then there must be a past as such which causes this passing that is not merely a void. And insofar as the singular happens once and once only, it is unique and therefore new. Accounting for this novelty of the singular requires a discussion of the future as such.

Perplexity and Ultimacy is an interesting book, but Desmond does not deal adequately with the task he sets out for himself in it, thinking of the uniqueness of beings. Since he repeatedly calls attention to the failure of traditional philosophy to deal with this task, he raises expectations which he does not fulfill.

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Martin C. Dillon
Semiological Reductionism: A Critique of the Deconstructionist Movement in Postmodern Thought.
Albany: State University of New York Press 1995.
Pp. x + 241.
US $59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2375-1);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2376-X).

Charges that Derridian deconstruction is reductionist are nothing new. Derrida himself has grown tired of responding to such charges. Dillon offers a valuable critique of Derrida's semiotic reductionism that is not itself a reductionistic account of Derrida's work: it is accurate and fair, even while concurring with and offering detailed support for the general charges leveled against the Derridian project. Dillon's perspective is phenomenological and the alternative he offers to Derrida is derived from Merleau-Ponty. His method is a close and careful reading of Derrida that is explanatory, analytical and critical. While he does not cover the whole Derridian corpus, all the 'classics' are here. This exegetical approach at points constructs a Derrida-as-author who is more coherent and unified than Derrida's work suggests. However, this may be seen as a positive point given the often difficult character of Derrida's writing. At points where Dillon's reading may be controversial, he usually provides a nod to the diversity of perspectives on Derrida's work.

Dillon argues that Derrida's readings of Western philosophical texts employ a 'strategy' of semiological reductionism apart from which 'Derridian thought in particular and postmodern thought in general are incoherent' (2-3). Dillon believes ultimately that Derrida adopts a hermeneutical strategy which reduces reality to text that has no extra-textual referent, and that to the extent that such a strategy is derived from a corresponding worldview, it collapses into philosophical incoherence, arbitrariness and radical relativism. While Dillon emphasizes early in the book that he is explicating Derrida's interpretative strategy, his critique is really concerned with the failure of Derrida to account for perception: the 'semiological reduction' that Derrida practices assumes the world out there is unknowable and stands under erasure. Derrida's critique of onto-theology really offers a Saussurean version of Kant's categories. In the conclusion Dillon forgets the boundaries he has placed on his inquiry and shares his guiding concerns: 'The semiological reduction is a philosophical mistake with real consequences. ... If signifiers refer always and only to other signifiers, then there is no ground against which the truth of interpretations can be measured' (167).

The book explores four themes expounded in some of Derrida's most significant works: time (*Husserl's 'Origin of Geometry': An Introduction*); truth (*The Truth in Painting*); the unconscious ('Freud and the Scene of Writing' in *Writing and Difference*); and desire (*The Postcard*). The first section addresses Derrida's critique of the metaphysics of presence and of

temporality. Derrida's doctrine of 'différance' seeks to solve the aporia of Western metaphysics. This aporia expresses itself in various conceptions of the problem of Being, of subject-object, of transcendent-immanent. Dillon values Derrida's critique of onto-theology (the grounding of reality in a foundation that functions as 'God'), but reads his alternative as nothing new. Derrida views the Eleatic conception of the immutability of true reality as being *the* Western conception of reality. The 'now' is conceived as a distinct unchanging point, which is itself the most representative intuition of the eternal now that characterizes (divine) knowledge. This ignores the alternative conception that true reality is the flow of becoming. While Derrida rightly critiques the transcendentalisms of Western philosophy, Dillon argues that his appeal to the play of signifiers as the essential mediator for the construction of meaning from the sequence of moments of perceptual experience itself rests on the assumption that time is a succession of points, an assumption he shares with the tradition he critiques.

Truth is problematic for Derrida and his followers because 'it names an impossible coincidence of finite saying with absolute saying' (61). The reduction of the world to text results in an inability to appeal to the world to adjudicate among the various readings of the world. Textual readings are all circular and have no contact with an unknowable abyss beyond language. Language for Derrida bears a functional correspondence to Kant's categories of understanding: 'extra-referentiality is replaced by infra-referentiality' (77).

Derrida's 'différance' originates in a non-originary unconscious. But Derrida's reading of Freud does not allow for the distinction between fantasy image and perceptual reality that is so important in Freud's work. The result is an ontological dualism: language can never refer to the 'other of language' — whose existence is only suggested by its unconscious 'trace.' However, Dillon repeatedly characterizes the unknowable wholly other of language as 'demonic' on the basis of a brief passage from *The Postcard*. This is perhaps the most problematic claim of the book. Although the demonic 'does not refer to the Prince of Darkness' (93), the term recurs rhetorically throughout Dillon's book to disturbing effect. The term appears to be an allusion to Descartes's duplicitous demon, an allusion that in Derrida is playfully deconstructive of the reader's expectations. However, Dillon appeals to the evil rather than the playful connotations. Whereas Derrida's demonic functions to de-absolutize, Dillon's repeated usage suggests a more 'demonizing' intent.

The unbreachable bar between signifier and signified gives rise to the prohibition that animates desire — which by its very nature is both deferred and differing. Dillon challenges the idealization that occurs when Derrida locates desire's restraint of prohibition in the bar between the signifier and signified. Such semiotic reductionism 'fails to account for the prohibitions of disease, pregnancy, violence of mate selection ... and so on, that inhibit fleshly desire as it manifests itself across cultures. ... This lifting, this idealization, recapitulates the essence of onto-theology: the bar that condemns the flesh to death, the animus against animality and corporeality' (148).

Dillon's expositions are valuable for the light they shed on Derrida. His writing is often clear, at times compelling, even if quite technical. His critiques are substantive even when open to challenge. Dillon points to Merleau-Ponty and sketches the outline of an option to Derrida's vision, even though space does not permit the construction of a detailed alternative vision. However, some will conclude that his negative judgment of Derrida's apophatic viewpoint causes him to misjudge the value of Derrida's perspective.

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G.L. Hagberg
Art as Language: Wittgenstein, Meaning, and Aesthetic Theory.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995.
Pp. vii + 190.
US $29.95. ISBN 0-80014-3040-2.

Hagberg has two important foci for his latest work: to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the comparison of art to language and to show the relevance of Wittgenstein's more sensitive investigations of linguistic meaning for the fate of this comparison. To accomplish the first task, Hagberg analyzes expressive theories of art, Langer, Collingwood, Ducasse, and intention theories, Beardsley and Wimsatt, T.S. Eliot and The New Critics. He also takes on the more contemporary analyses of Danto and Margolis. Hagberg's breadth is impressive; he convincingly makes the point that thinking about art has been captivated by the picture of language and thus has suffered the winds blowing linguistic analysis hither and thither. Hagberg's point is apparently not necessarily to deny the comparison, but only to make us aware of it and to encourage us to apply Wittgenstein's insights about language and his overall style of analysis to our thinking about art.

Hagberg writes well; he is wonderfully clear and concise. Smart too. Unlike the rest of us, he is not going to be sloppy in his talk about art, subject to unexamined similes. The problem is he never does get to talk about art or the value of the comparison between art and language. He is so involved in other's talk about art that one never learns what Hagberg thinks. And he writes well enough that one can't help being curious. Is art a language? Does Wittgenstein's conception of language fix the problems in all the other accounts? Should we abandon the comparison all together? Unfortunately, one never discovers what Hagberg thinks. He is too non-committal, too

tentative and unassuming. One wishes for a different kind of book, one that directly explores the validity of the comparison.

The composition of the text supports my point perfectly. The essays lack a syntax. One can read them in any order one chooses, starting in the middle, or even at the end. Guided by no grammar, they lack direction and significance. But while the string of essays lack a point, the individual essays read very well. Continuing the linguistic analogy, one could say, the text has a semantics, but no syntax. For example, Hagberg's analysis of the 'translation model' of art (Chapter 4) is perfectly captured in Wittgenstein's lens. On the translation model, art is 'the objective correlative' for a hidden expressive state. Hagberg correctly shows how Wittgenstein would deconstruct this view, showing how the picture invokes dualisms that are unnecessary to explain art's appeal: 'this exchange, however, can be of philosophically therapeutic value in showing that the translation model is far from inevitable. Indeed, a discovery of the expressive power and character of an artistic gesture or specific set of materials implies that we do not inject these gestures or materials with expressive life' (113). Thanks to Hagberg, one more cliché bites the dust: 'many excesses of criticism springs directly from confusions such as these' (116).

Yet, I think there is more to Wittgenstein. To be the Wittgenstein of art criticism, I believe one has to do more than rid art criticism of its time-worn clichés. At least, Wittgenstein does more, although it has always been hell to identify what that more is. Recently I have come to think that the 'more' Wittgenstein manages as he dismantles the categories of previous criticism, is an enactment of a new way of seeing. He performs — shows — a new line of thought. How we might see art, not how we *should* see art, once disabused of poor pictures, always makes itself felt in his work. It is this dimension that is lacking in Hagberg's book; he does not point us in any direction, even though he cannot be faulted for anything he says about the inadequacies of typical linguistic theories of art.

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Russell Hardin
One For All.
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1995.
Pp. xiv + 288.
US $24.95. ISBN *0-691-04350-7.*

An important, provocative assault on communitarian and multi-culturalist political theory and practice, *One For All* is concerned 'to understand the sway of groups in our time,' especially 'ethnic groups of an astonishing variety and complexity, involved in conflicts that dominate the lives of whole societies' (xi-xii).

Hardin is one of the best-known of recent utilitarian political theorists, having authored a number of elegant but highly accessible works — notably *Collective Action* and *Morality Within the Limits of Reason* — in which the arguments of Hobbes, Hume, Bentham, and the Mills are refurbished in the light of current utility theory and game-theoretic analyses of collective action. But in this volume 'solidarity' is forever problematic and the old player self-interest gets a fresh role, one that classical utilitarians tended to reserve for 'enthusiasm'. 'The argument of "collective action" is that self-interest typically runs counter to group interest. This is commonly thought to be a distressing conclusion: Because we are self-seeking, we fail collectively, and, therefore, individually. Hence the claim that [kin, ethnic and nationalist groups] have solved the problem of matching individual to collective interests seems odd to many observers who conclude that something else must motivate these actions. The argument of this book is that self-interest can often successfully be matched to group interest. And when it is, the result is often appalling. The world might be a far less bloody place, and less ugly in many other ways, if many groups failed in relevant moments' (4-5).

More specifically, Hardin examines four broad topics: personal identification with a group, 'the way certain norms benefit from reinforcement through self-interest incentives,' the 'way group identification can lead to violence that is commonly misread as simply reflecting elemental hatred,' and finally 'the way these arguments undercut the normative claims of communitarianism and of other group-solipsist moralities,' since normative communitarianism 'is the political theorists' variant of ethnic identification' (19). He wants 'to go as far as possible with a rational choice account of the reportedly primordial, moral, and irrational phenomena of ethnic and nationalist identification and action' (16), and in this, he favors a notion of 'rationality' as 'to have narrowly self-interested intentions,' with 'self-interest' being taken as an objective notion, the object of rational action such that 'one may fail to understand what is in one's interest' (47). Much of his argument derives from his suggestive redescriptions of familiar ethnic conflicts pointing to their particular strategic and institutional situations — either pure conflict interactions, where one party can gain only if another loses, or coordination interactions, where each party can gain only if others also gain, or cooperation interactions, which are a mixture of conflict and coordination. To these

he adds an important distinction bearing on the notion of 'power', that between 'exchange power' and 'coordination power', or 'the amassment of ordinary economic resources and the massive coordination of individual actions' (35).

Hardin maintains that the 'major forms of cooperation that we see in social and political contexts have their origins in two distinctively different kinds of strategic interaction: coordination and exchange,' which 'typically come together in important institutional arrangements.' Coordination may even have a certain explanatory priority, since it 'creates a convention — an institution, a norm, or power — and that convention then promotes further coordination and also exchange' — something that may happen without the actors involved intending any such thing (44-5). In other words, and the point is vital, 'a large part of the answer to our seeming paradox is that much of the cooperation that is needed to create central power to regulate further cooperation grows out of a substantially different form of collective interaction: it grows out of games of coordination, not out of games of exchange. *Coordination produces power that produces sanctions that motivate collective exchange*' (34). Hence, the stress in this work on 'explaining successful group coordinations that constitute extraordinary power' — often exploited to produce massive harms — and in showing how the coordination will often 'depend on the use of institutions to manipulate identification of individuals with relevant groups' (45).

In coordination, we 'coalesce because it is individually in our interest to do so so long as others cooperate as well. What we need to guide us in coalescing with others is merely the evidence of sufficient leadership and sufficient numbers to make our joining them clearly beneficial' (28). Coordination is an important form of power because 'it makes certain behaviors on the part of relevant others less rewarding than they would be against an uncoordinated group,' and the coordinated can then 'do many things at far less cost than doing these things would otherwise have exacted' (30) — as when a relatively small police force or army keeps a large population under control simply because it typically need not invoke its force against everyone at once. Much depends, however, on what kind of opposition the coordinated group is facing, and such power may be rather fickle and inflexible — which is why Hardin thinks he can go far to explain much ethnic and nationalist conflict. He urges, for example, that the sudden fall of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu in December 1989 occurred when, in the immediate aftermath of successfully quashing a small anti-government demonstration, he tried to assemble a huge pro-government counter demonstration: 'In the protection of the mass, some people began to shout that Ceausescu was a dictator. When no reprisal followed, the crowd joined the chant. Ceausescu left the balcony of the Central Committee headquarters and fled Bucharest. ... The mass of people were ironically coordinated by Ceausescu himself in Palace Square' (31). Had he not been so obliging, the opposition might have had a much harder time.

But if highlighting coordination is important to Hardin's analysis, even more so is the correlative effort to bring 'identification' within the purview of rational choice theory. After all, how can institutions manipulate people's identifications? And how can identifications be the object of rational choice? Hardin brings rational choice theory to bear not only on the forms and limits of knowledge but also, it would seem, on the very constitution of the self.

In the pivotal third chapter, 'Group Identification', he explains: 'There are three main moves in the arguments that follow. First, I consider the rationality of an action given one's available knowledge, theory, and so forth at the time of choosing. Second, I consider the rationality of *coming to have* the knowledge and theory one now has. And third, I consider the possibility of confusing moral and factual knowledge as seen from the epistemological stance of the person whose knowledge (or belief) it is.' As he rightly observes, these moves 'enormously increase the demand for data in trying to assess the rationality of actions,' and they are not the common maneuvers of most rational choice theorists (49), including his former 'Chicago School' colleagues.

Indeed, as the chapter on 'Group Identification' especially demonstrates, Hardin's chief theme is really 'how individual self-interest is or is not consistent with group identification and action on behalf of the group' (19) — with identification itself to be largely explained in terms of rational self-interest. For him, identification matters primarily 'when structural constraints of whatever kind make it potentially beneficial to be a member of the prevailing group,' or rather, 'because it can lead to coordination for great power' (8-9). He is of course aware of the conceptual difficulties involved in supposedly 'choosing' to identify — parallel to those of 'choosing' to believe something one thinks false — but it is just here that his various moves come in. Although he often puts the point too simplistically, claiming that individuals 'may find identification with their group beneficial because those who identify strongly may gain access to positions under the control of the group and because the group provides a relatively secure and comfortable environment' (70), he does recognize that 'for many identifications, it would be odd to suppose the individual had deliberately set out to develop or adopt the relevant identity ... the explanatory concern must be with the rationality of various choices they make that eventually lead them to identification with a particular group, identification that may, again, be an unintended consequence of many rational actions' (48).

Thus, his point is that '*it may be rational to do what produces a particular identification and, once one has that identification, it is commonly rational to further the interests determined by that identification*' (48) — hence the importance of considering precisely where someone is at at the time of choosing and how he or she got there. Community in this sense is not unlike rooting for the home team, precisely because it is so much easier and more rewarding to root for that team than for some other, whose fans, sports pubs, stadium, etc. are all elsewhere.

Moreover, on the third move, 'it seems to be a very nearly universal tendency of people to move from what is to what ought to be in the strong sense of concluding that what is is right,' as in the case of one's going group identifications. This move from 'is' to 'ought' has both an irrational and an extra-rational aspect. It is typically irrational in that there is no justifiable reason for the move, so that it may be unrelated to interest. ... But it may also lead to extra-rational behaviour in that one may be morally motivated by the fallacious deduction even when acting on its dictates is against one's own personal interests' (61). Hardin admits that this third tendency, characteristic of much ethnic and nationalist identification, is especially difficult to absorb into his rational choice framework, but he gives it a go, arguing that it may be rational to act even on such poorly grounded beliefs: for 'historical personal reasons of the particularity of our experience, our interests are causally associated with our group's interest' (64) — it is the group we know that can aid and comfort us, employ us, etc. And the 'fact of my tastes makes a difference for the goodness for me of various consumptions. The fact that a community has developed tastes or preferences for doing things in certain ways similarly makes a difference for the goodness to that community of doing things their way' (63).

Of course, Hardin's aim here is not to praise the communitarian 'comforts of home' or the way community can also serve exchange power; rather, as he goes on to argue in five more remorseless chapters, 'the urge for communal identification is unhappily subject to great distortion from the corrosions of self-interest mechanisms, such as those that feed norms of exclusion.' Two chapters focus on the differences between norms 'that redound to the benefit of members of a more or less well-defined subgroup within a larger society, and those that seem to apply universalistically to more or less all members of a society.' In comparing these, he concludes that the former, covering norms of 'difference and exclusion,' are 'especially tractable to rational choice analysis,' and that such subgroup norms 'typically reinforce individual identification with the group and enhance the separation of the group from the larger society or from another specific group in the society. They commonly work by changing the interests of marginal group members to get them to act in conformity with the interests of the core of the group' (73).

Thus, norms of difference and exclusion — which typically enjoin loving your group or leaving it, as well as various ways of determining who is in and who out and how to despise the latter — reinforce the basic point that membership does indeed have its privileges, but that these can support perversely hateful practices. The 'epistemological comforts of home' may seem benign, but they may require hateful exclusions of others, and there may well be 'a tendency for the selection of extremists, as results from the emigration from the Crown Heights of Jews not fervently attached to the Lubavitcher movement, or from the self-selection of the most radical Irish Catholics into the IRA and the most radical Zionists into the Israeli West Bank settlements' (217). It is because the achievement of community in any strong sense seems to require norms of exclusion that it is easily subject to excess, such that the

'development of communal loyalties and norms that can support many individuals in their lives can obstruct the lives of many others' (217-18).

Such are the morals elaborated in the remaining chapters. especially the one on 'Group Violence', which details the 'stepwise progression from identification with a group, to mobilization of still stronger identification, to implicit conflict with another group, and finally to violence, particularly when both the group and the other group are faced with increasing incentives for preemptive action. People who would not have put themselves at risk at early stages take great risks at later stages, when they are more subject to group commitments and less subject to extra-group connections and when there are fewer opportunities for doing anything other than joining the group violence' (23). These chapters contain much further material, including provocative discussions of the differences between ordinary or particularistic and philosophical communitarianism and, within the latter, epistemological and normative communitarianism — all of which, however, reinforce the main dreadful message that individuals can and often do have 'an immediate interest in doing things that lead to their own shackling and to the suppression of others. They can have an interest in reducing themselves to something less than human, to a standard pawn in a large strategic game, plausibly played by thugs' (230-1).

Hardin undoubtedly displays considerable ingenuity in trying to bring rational order to the analysis of Serbs fighting Croats, Tutsis fighting Hutus, Israelis fighting Palestinians, Irish Catholics fighting Irish Protestants, and so forth. Some critics will probably think that the 'data' assembled are too thin and anecdotal, but the range and sophistication of these applications of rational choice theory is breathtakingly adroit — so much so that the shared understandings uniting rational choice theorists might now look like another problematic identity.

More worrisome is the acerbity with which Hardin treats opposing positions, and, perhaps consequently, the way in which a number of fundamental questions concerning metaethics, self-interest, and identification go unaddressed. No argument is given against moral realism or even objectivism in ethics, although his 'third move' demands such. And his core notion of 'identification' remains fuzzy: 'I will generally speak of identification rather than identity. ... to explain actions, we typically wish to address subjective identification, which entails motivation, and not some putative identity, which may entail no motivation' (6). But how or why are some identifications by-products and others not, some valid and others erroneous? He admits that the relationship between identification and 'objective' identity calls for explanation, but he does not give any and this leaves him vulnerable. After all, on a Parfitian view of personal identity, supposedly 'self-interested' action for the sake of future selves may be akin to action for the sake of other persons. Plausibly, identifying with one's distant selves is somewhat analogous to identifying with a community or group; if so, to call such identification self-interested begs the question, as does peremptorily labelling such action 'rational.'

Hardin is right to be harsh with crude invocations of identity — many communitarians (and similarly inclined pragmatists, perfectionists, etc.) are evasive about the relations between personal identity, social identity, identification, ego ideal, etc. Still, casting identifications as another department of consumerism raises rather than answers the question of what kind of self is doing the choosing and what possible grounds it could have. And although Hardin's work is often reminiscent of Bertrand Russell's social criticism, he is not quite Russellian enough on how tales of community, self-interest and identification can be by-products and reflections of powerful capitalist social arrangements that manufacture consent rather than the conditions that make for the community of free and equal persons.

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Sidney Hook
John Dewey, An Intellectual Portrait.
Introduction by Richard Rorty.
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books 1995.
Pp. xviii + 242.
US $26.95. ISBN 0-87975-985-2.

Newly re-printed, Sydney Hook's classic (1939) work on Dewey appears with an Introduction by Richard Rorty. Hook may help us see how Dewey fit into his own time. That story is important. The new printing may also help us see how Dewey fits into our time. Rorty lauds more recent treatments of Dewey's work, especially Robert Westbrook's intellectual biography *John Dewey and American Democracy* (1991), and Steven Rockefeller's *John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism* (1991) gets honorable mention. Specific comments focus on Alan Ryan's *John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism* (1995). 'It may be that Dewey and Hook witnessed, as Alan Ryan suggests, ... "the high tide of American liberalism." But if this is so, then America has lost its soul' (xviii). Even future-focused pragmatists need to look back to Dewey and Hook. They were 'Americans who, in the final words of the Hook volume, "still had hope for what America may yet be"' (xviii).

That American disrespect for its liberal traditions amounts to 'loss of soul' is a striking claim. It reinforces the Deweyan conviction that America must be either liberal, in a broad integrative sense, or else self-destructive. Clearly, at the end of the Cold War, whether we end up with Dewey or something else,

we need to go back through Dewey. In spite of all frustrations with Rorty's interpretations, he has aided in the task. Since Rorty recommends Ryan's book, we may hope that looking into Rorty on Dewey and Hook will cast light on Ryan's theme. In good enlightenment style, Deweyans wonder what Rorty is up to.

At the start, he praises Dewey and Hook as 'giants' of their time. They are compared to the 'heroic' figure of J.S. Mill in contrast with present-day American philosophers and intellectuals in general. This is partly a matter of their social engagement. 'Hook's 1939 book on Dewey,' says Rorty, 'remains the best short introduction...' (xi). (For the general reader, Richard Bernstein's *John Dewey* [1966] is another likely candidate, and see James Campbell's *Understanding John Dewey* [1995].) But the Hook volume is a vivid, concise, and well-written book, and it has special virtues in introducing Dewey's theory of value inquiry. Hook is in some ways more congenial to the scientific orientation of much of contemporary analytic philosophy. He reminds us that Dewey's 'central faith is in the method of scientific inquiry' (8). Dewey's faith, and Hook's too, went further, but the point is worth stressing.

It's hard to believe that Quine didn't consult Hook's *Portrait* when writing his John Dewey Essay 'Ontological Relativity'. At least, we must wonder if the road from the rich universe of meanings in Dewey's social behaviorism to Quine's reductive behaviorism didn't go by way of rejecting Hook's Deweyan discussion of 'The Nature of Ideas' (Chp. III). While professing sympathy for Deweyan theses, Quine dissolves Deweyan meanings into their evidential relations, in somewhat the style of Bentley's process philosophy.

Recall too that Hook on Dewey is one root of the idea of Dewey's philosophy as 'having naturalized Hegel's historical approach by a biological theory of mind and an institutional analysis of social behavior' (14). Hook urges that 'by the time Dewey was called to the University of Chicago in 1894, he had come to question the relevance of any metaphysical view of the nature of reason and ideals to specific problems, difficulties, and predicaments' (15). More precisely, he had turned away from T.H. Green's neo-Hegelianism, under the influence of William James. But to Hook's occasional chagrin, naturalistic metaphysics and the religious returned to Dewey's philosophy. Hook is uniformly critical toward metaphysics in this volume, and he is noted for his forceful secularism.

An interesting contrast between Hook and Dewey: 'Except to a biologist,' Hook urges, '*what* a man is, literally depends upon what other people are' (119). Emphasizing the social, Hook argues that 'his unity as a *human being* consists in the cooperative functioning of his relationships to other human beings in a social environment' (125). This goes beyond the claim that the unity of a human being *arises from* what other people are and from cooperatively functioning relationships. Hook's notion of self seems to dissolve into social relations. (Doesn't process metaphysics count as metaphysics?) Dewey was fond of saying, though, that individual human beings are 'real causes' in

nature, thus emphasizing the stability open to us through the capability of forming and reforming social relations. Dewey and Hook (contrast Rorty's reduction of method to conversation) share Dewey's method of value inquiry, but looking into their contrasting concepts of sociality could prove of interest for discussion of cases where the attempt to forge common values comes to naught. Hook, no less than Dewey, sees conversation as the democratic opening to joint inquiry.

A drawback of the book, as Rorty points out, is that the philosophical scene of 56 years ago has been transformed, and logical positivism and Marxism, much emphasized by Hook, are not now taken so seriously. This makes the book more interesting for the history and evaluation of Deweyan thought: an affair of specialists. The implicit suggestion, quite independent of the validity of Rorty's view of Dewey, is the need to open a Deweyan dialogue with American analytic philosophy on the one hand and contemporary Hegelianism on the other. Rorty is generally sympathetic to Hook on Dewey, though it remains unclear if Hook's work supports a Rortian 'neo-pragmatism' any better than Dewey's work does.

Rorty takes a positive view of Morton White's (1956) theme of 'the gradual reconciliation of Deweyan naturalism with logical empiricism' (xii). In light of Quine, analytic philosophers no longer speak of 'the sensory given' and 'conceptual truths,' though they remain rather suspicious of Dewey and pragmatism. The Hook volume is useful for introducing Dewey's logic. Chapters IV and V show that Dewey rejected *a priori* conceptions of logic. Hook urges that Dewey's place 'in the history of science — broadly conceived — will depend upon the influence his conception of logic as the theory of inquiry will exercise upon subsequent generations' (88).

The question 'What legitimates inference?' gets the standard answer 'The rules'. But when we ask 'What legitimates the rules?' Dewey's *Logic* comes into its own. It has become a standard answer that what legitimates logical rules is their success in applications. Moreover, making this point requires us to situate formal logic within actual discourse, and discourse within the experimental doings of inquiry and the larger domains of cumulative experience. 'Logical norms,' Hook says, 'represent certain demands upon existing inquiries to which they must conform if they are to achieve the highly warranted results that have been won in some previous inquiry in which these norms were exhibited' (94). This is an opening for Dewey's argument from the objectivity of logical norms to a potential grounding of broader realms of normative standards in science and beyond.

According to Rorty, the dim view of Deweyan pragmatism in analytic philosophy is due to their 'hyperprofessionalism.' Current conceptions are remote from Dewey's idea of philosophy as social criticism and his focus on the normative. In contrast, Dewey and Hook thought, like Hegel, that philosophers 'should try to hold their time in thought.' Quoting Dewey: 'the task of philosophy is to clarify men's ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own day' (MW12: 94). In the end, we must ask if this is what Rorty is trying to do. Is Rorty 'deconstructing' contemporary American philosophy?

If so, his problematic interpretations of Dewey point to general misunderstandings. Rorty mentions that Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor see problems in Dewey, connecting him with 'historicism, subjectivism, and relativism.' Rorty complains that for philosophers in Germany and Italy, 'pragmatism still looks a bit naive, a bit scientistic and reductionist' (xiii). But when Thelma Lavine made similar complaints against Rorty, including a charge of process-reductionism of Bentley's sort, Rorty defends his position. (See Herman Staatkamp, ed., *Rorty and Pragmatism* [1995].) Who is Rorty deconstructing? Might the results bring us back to Dewey, or is he defending the 'Cold-War liberals?'

In making the (correct) point that 'Dewey's experimentalism is not scientistic,' Rorty's argument is troublesome. The claim is that the natural sciences are no more or less 'in touch with reality' than are politics or poetry. (Here he mentions contrasting interpretations of Dewey from James Gouinlock and Lavine.) The overall point is that 'universalist' critics of contemporary philosophy 'do no useful work.' So, apparently, contemporary pragmatists are to rid themselves of the appearance of relativism and subjectivism by concentrating, like Hook, on specific problems. Still, reading Hook's rejection of relativism (*The Question for Being*, 206ff) one gets the impression that too much concentration on specifics is just what leads to the appearance of relativism.

The problematic Rortian thesis is that pragmatists cannot claim that some aspect of human life could be out of touch with reality. If this means that we must all start where we are, with the understanding that we have, then I see no objection. But if he means that folks in the humanities are no more subject to various smokescreens than are folks in the natural sciences, then he over-states his case. Dewey takes the natural sciences as a methodological model, partly because they are less subject to the kinds of obscurities that are all too frequent in the humanities ('Masks'.) Dewey recognized that the methodologies of social sciences, ethics and politics, do not reduce to those of the hard sciences. A further question is whether Rorty hasn't adopted a mask himself, to do some 'useful work'. It has often seemed that Rorty is backing away to Dewey's position, though he also surely resists it.

Rorty holds that Dewey and Hook 'were anti-Communist social democrats.' The basis of this claim is Chapter 8 of Hook's *Portrait*. Those with an interest in Hook's turn from Marxism to social democracy need to take a look. But the point ignores the tension between Dewey and Hook on related themes. Dewey places more emphasis on individuality. Rorty seems to use 'social democrat' to substitute for the 'discredited' term 'liberal'. He does make the point that those who regard 'liberal' as a dirty word are on the wrong track (xvi). Right. There are no other possibilities for a society as culturally diverse as America. But we would do well to inquire whether any Hegelianism, whether right or left, can count as liberal in this sense.

'Today's "neo-conservatives," ' Rorty says, 'would seem to [Dewey and Hook] to be betraying everything that once made America an example to the world' (xvii). But this point is not intended to discourage us from looking to

our own traditions, seeing Dewey and Hook as 'heirs of Jefferson and Emerson, Lincoln and Whitman, Eugene Debbs and Jane Adams' (xvii). Might the Dewey revival reconstruct American liberalism?

A point where Deweyan readers may strongly disagree with Rorty's Introduction comes near the end: that 'Pragmatism, considered as a set of philosophical doctrines about truth, knowledge, and value, is neutral between democratic and anti-democratic politics' (xvii). Rorty is clearly wrong. Why does he say such things?

Dewey's philosophy is built upon an open development of scientific methodologies in the service of liberal-democratic approaches to social and political problems. This central strand of Dewey's thought is something which both 'liberals' and 'conservatives' ought to be able to appreciate. If we imagine Rorty using Dewey to deconstruct contemporary American philosophy, then his point might be that Dewey's analogy between epistemic theses and moral-political methodology is yet to be *effectively* made. Given Dewey's current standing, one must agree. Yet, in spite of all antipathy to relativism, historicism and subjectivism, Rorty is also right in claiming that the call for 'traditional values,' is a 'disguise for selfish unconcern' (xviii). That is how it often functions, whatever the intentions may be. A point left unmade is that the same is true of 'relativism, historicism, and subjectivism.'

If Dewey and Hook do represent the 'high tide of American liberalism,' they may also represent the high-tide of American civilization. But why pessimism? I suspect we'll find a new way forward, once we've gone back through Dewey. Pro-Hook Deweyans may find this book more appealing than will anti-Hook Deweyans. Both will find it of interest. Just how Deweyan was Hook, and where do they differ?

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Nasir Khan
Development of the Concept and Theory of Alienation in Marx's Writings.
Portland, OR: International Specialized Book Services (for Solum Forlag, Oslo) 1995.
Pp. 294.
US $45.00. ISBN 82-560-0976-4.

This is a good book for Marxist scholars to review some important basic concepts and a good book to include in a graduate course on the early writings of Marx. It increases the understanding of Marx in two important areas. First, it clarifies the logical development that took place in Marx's thinking as he crossed the boundary from democrat to communist. Second, it gives a precise description of the relationship between Marx's fundamental world view and those of Hegel and Feuerbach.

Not that others have not covered this territory before, it's just that Nasir Khan does it as well or better. Khan accomplishes this by vigorously focusing his research. He examines the period from March 1843 to August 1844, concentrating on three works by Marx: 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', 'On The Jewish Question', and 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844'. He further delimits his work by examining only the basic topic of alienation.

Khan demonstrates that at the time of writing the 'Critique', (in March through September of 1843, at the age of 25) Marx still thought that full political rights for all people and democracy would solve the problem of human alienation. In the 'Critique', Marx calls for the full democratization of the state (130). A month or two later, writing in 'On the Jewish Question' and his 'Introduction to the Critique', Marx rejects such a partial, purely political solution to the problem. Marx now calls for the abolition of the state (131).

This clarification alone makes the book important to Marxist scholars. The transition of Marx from democrat to communist is so swift that it is easy to miss or forget. It often appears that historical materialism just emerges full blown from the head of Marx. Khan carefully refutes this by tracing the progressive steps in Marx's thinking from the 'Critique' to the 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts'. He shows that Marx goes from criticism of religion to criticism of philosophy; from criticism of philosophy to criticism of the state; from criticism of the state to criticism of society; and finally from criticism of society to criticism of political economy and private property (145).

Khan's second clarification involving the Hegel-Feuerbach-Marx relationship also merits study. George Plekhanov in his chief work *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* (1908), spent the first 20 pages complaining that the Marxists of his day were unfamiliar with the works of Hegel and Feuerbach, and thus had a distorted picture of what Marx was all about. This complaint still rings true today. Khan gives a clear, demystified model of the relationship.

This is not an easy thing to do. In works about Marx, one often reads how Marx turned Hegel on his head, or how he criticized Feuerbach for only

conceiving of man abstractly and not as an historical and sensuous being. Yet the exact relationship among Marx's concepts and those of Hegel and Feuerbach's are more interesting.

Khan examines how Hegel had thought he had overcome alienation by showing that ultimately man was God (absolute spirit) in self-alienation (52). Feuerbach reversed this formula and turned Hegel upside down to show that the concept of God was really man in self-alienation. Marx deeply appreciated Feuerbach for this, but realized he had only challenged the top of the Hegelian system. Feuerbach had correctly criticized humanity's alienation in its holy form — religion, but not in its unholy forms — the state and private property. Marx attacked Feuerbach for not taking this next obviously necessary step. Marx himself took this step in his later writings. What Feuerbach had done to the crowning religious part of Hegel's system, Marx did to the rest of it. Marx appreciated Hegel, on the other hand, for his introduction of the historical method into philosophy; i.e., for showing spirit as historically evolving through dialectical conflict. Marx, simply replaced Hegel's Alienated God-Spirit by actual historical man as the true subject of history and ran Hegel's film backward to reveal that far from having overcome alienation through Hegel's philosophy, actual man was more alienated than ever by his real socio-economic conditions. This set the stage for Marx's later works when he delved ever deeper into the exact nature of those alienating conditions and came up with solutions for them.

In the shadowy background of Khan's book stands Louis Althusser's anti-humanist theory, as presented in 'For Marx', and 'Reading Capital'. Althusser put forward the theory of an epistemological break in Marx's works that turned them from reflecting a humanist ideology into a new science of society. Khan refers to this theory obliquely several times and firmly rejects it. Khan maintains 'Marx's ideas regarding humanist perspective and the question of alienation show continuity, but with important differences in the content and form of the concept and theory of alienation in the period under review' (19). Khan's work will give comfort to those who oppose Althusser's theory, but because it concentrates so strongly on the early works, it really cannot be considered a strong refutation. Althusser would certainly grant Khan's thesis that Marx's early works are strongly influenced by humanism. It is the later works that Khan really doesn't examine that Althusser would contend go beyond humanism.

Khan writes in an easy, clear and thoughtful style. His writing is pleasantly non-polemical. Khan declares, 'I have tried to present Marx's views on alienation as dispassionately as possible and have not let my own likes or dislikes dictate the inquiry' (18). It is to his credit that he presents conflicting views on many issues quite fairly.

One hears common talk of Marxism being dead as a result of Marxist parties in Eastern Europe losing state power. Yet, Khan's book proposes that the essence of Marxism is the overcoming of human alienation, and holding state power is only a small part of that. He suggests that Marx thought of Communism in three stages. In the crude stage, equal distribu-

tion and consumption are emphasized without an understanding of the mechanism of production. In the second stage, the proletariat controls state power and thinks of society in terms of pure politics. The third stage is the positive appropriation of the human essence by and for man (246-52). If Khan is right, events in the early 1990s in Eastern Europe should have about as much effect on Marxist Philosophy as the Fall of the Roman Empire had on Christianity.

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E.J. Lowe
Locke on Human Understanding.
New York: Routledge 1995.
Pp. x + 203.
US $45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-10090-9);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-10091-7).

Most students first encounter Locke in some sort of history of philosophy course, where the focus tends to be directed almost exclusively to the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. These students are the intended audience for Lowe's book. It is a challenging and at times sophisticated treatment of the *Essay* which can be approached on at least three levels. The book's success varies concomitantly with these levels.

After an introductory chapter situating Locke historically, Lowe proceeds to critically examine the *Essay* topically, generally following Locke's order of exposition. The chapters are: Ideas, Perception, Substance, Identity, Action, Language, and Knowledge. In each case, the reader is first given a context for considering Locke's treatment of the particular topic; sometimes, in the cases of Ideas and Substance, the scene-setting consists in a sketch of pre-Lockean approaches to the topic. In most other instances, Lowe presents the contemporary theoretical lexicon in which the particular topic will be discussed. The problems in Locke's discussion of Identity, for instance, are cast in terms of 'adjectival' criteria of application and 'sortal' criteria of identity, per P.T. Geach and P.F. Strawson, respectively (93-4). Throughout, Lowe is concerned with situating Locke's ideas within 'the broader context of intellectual history and assessing their relevance to modern philosophical thought' (ix). Lowe's position is always that plausible answers to questions Locke himself never considered, or perhaps did consider but in terms foreign to the modern reader, can nevertheless be drawn from the *Essay*. On this

first level, then, the book can be approached as a general discussion of certain philosophical problems, with the *Essay* as the fulcrum. The reader (student) is encouraged to pursue these matters further, and ample in-text and bibliographic references are provided. On this level, the book is quite successful.

On a second level, Lowe is concerned to attribute certain unfashionable positions to Locke and to defend both the attribution and the cogency of such positions. With regard to Action, the hesitancy on the part of some interpreters in labeling Locke a 'volitionist' stems from their desire 'not to attribute to Locke what they consider to be an untenable or incoherent theory of action' (119). Lowe contends that Locke did adhere to a volitionist theory of action, i.e., that a voluntary action involves a special kind of mental event, and that such a theory is both tenable and correct. Some commentators on the *Essay*, John Yolton for instance, want to deny attribution of a 'causal' theory of volition to Locke. Lowe maintains that Yolton is 'apparently unmindful' of a crucial distinction. Lowe argues that we have to distinguish between 'the *action as a whole*, the *volition* to perform that action, and what I shall call the *result* of the volition, which is another and quite distinct part of the action' (121). A Lockean action, on Lowe's account, is a heterogeneous whole of which the volition is merely one aspect. By giving such an account, Lowe seeks to avoid what he sees as the two most serious objections to volitionism, the so-called 'logical connection argument,' traceable to Hume (124) and the infinite regress argument, due to Gilbert Ryle (126). The problem here is that Lowe does not make an adequate case that Locke himself held the proposed view. The reader is directed to sections II.xxi.25 and IV.xx.19 of the *Essay*, but such passages are used by Lowe to argue against Yolton, rather than to support an attribution of his own 'heterogeneous action account' to Locke. Lowe is arguably successful here in maintaining that *some* version of volitionism may be coherent, but he fails to make the case that Locke could be construed as having maintained such a position.

In instances like the one noted above, there is a suspicion that Lowe is sometimes more concerned to present and defend his own position, which could be broadly labeled as Lockean, rather than to attribute a certain position to Locke. Other times, he is quite explicit in this regard. In the last section of the chapter on Perception, Lowe presents and defends a causal account of perception, which is both 'representative' *and* 'direct-realist'. Here he is concerned 'not so much with Lockean exegesis as with a presentation and defence of the sort of theory I have in mind' (59). On a third level then, the book can be approached as a presentation of Lowe's own theory. Apart from questioning the relevance of such a presentation, given the stated aims of the book, the second- and third-level readings become inextricably intertwined in Lowe's most compelling presentation, an 'adverbialist' interpretation of Locke.

Critics of Locke's theory of perception interpret him as maintaining that mental images are types of objects, and then proceed to 'knock him down gleefully, pointing out all the supposed absurdities' (38) in such a position. Lowe deflects such criticism by attempting an adverbialist reading of Locke.

Here, instead of 'X perceived a red idea,' we get 'X perceived redly'. This 'sophisticated reading' is ontologically superior — no queer objects — and has the same epistemological force as the alternative (46). While Lowe is chary about actually attributing an adverbialist theory to Locke, he maintains that such a theory is useful in other contexts. Thus, Lowe employs the adverbialist approach in criticizing Berkeley's notion of substance (84-6), in advocating Locke's ideational theory of linguistic signification (148-9), and in several other instances. Each time Lowe invokes such an approach he makes note of its unorthodoxy, so the reader is well-warned to be cautious. And invoking this approach lends a thematic undertone to the entire book.

For the student who comes to the *Essay*, is intrigued by it, and who wants to explore further the implications of Locke's treatment of many of the issues still central to contemporary philosophical debate, Lowe's book is a valuable resource. Even where he is less successful in making his case — where his sympathy for Locke's approach is not sufficiently argued for — such attempts may prove fruitful for the enterprising inquisitor.

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Diane L. Prosser MacDonald
Transgressive Corporeality: The Body, Poststructuralism, and the Theological Imagination.
Albany: State University of New York Press 1995.
Pp. xiii + 170.
US $57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2487-1);
US $18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2488-X).

In *Transgressive Corporeality*, Diane Prosser MacDonald attempts the seemingly impossible: a synthesis of poststructuralism and theology.

Building on the work of other 'poststructuralist theologians,' like Mark Taylor, Sharon Welch and Carl Raschke, Prosser MacDonald explores the theological implications of the attempt to re-think the body in post-metaphysical terms (9-14). This re-thinking, begun by Nietzsche, was continued by Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology of embodied perception, Foucault's genealogy of the disciplined and desiring body, and Kristeva's semiology of the 'abject' mother's body (15-16). Prosser MacDonald devotes three of the five chapters of her book to this trajectory of 'body thinking'. In each thinker, she finds, on the one hand, a critique of 'binary' modes of thought and experience, and on the other, an exploration of the 'remainders' of such

thinking, of what exceeds or escapes its grasp, as the basis of both new forms of subjectivity and new ways of relating to others (xii).

Embracing Nietzsche's critique of Platonism and ('foundationalist') Christianity as forms of body-hatred, Prosser MacDonald poses the strategic question of how to respond to ('transgress') this anti-corporal discourse without thereby fuelling its continuation. She uses an excursus on Umberto Eco (2-5) to draw a distinction between 'authorized' and 'unauthorized transgression.' Transgression by inversion or reversal, she says, is 'authorized' by the code it pretends to challenge. Thus, just as one is never more acquiescent in the hegemony of the Ten Commandments than when one systematically undertakes to violate each of them in turn (thereby ironically guiding one's life by their dictates), so too does the inversion of body-hatred — replacing the repudiation of 'corporeality' with its sanctification — serve only to reinforce the dominance of the body/soul dichotomy on which traditional metaphysics and theology thrive. An appropriate response to Nietzsche's insight, she argues, would have to evade ('subvert') the ideology of body-versus-soul itself. The mode of transgression would have to be unauthorized by the terms of the discourse to be resisted.

This perspective, outlined in the first chapter, forms the background to the discussions of Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Kristeva. Prosser MacDonald seeks in their work an understanding of 'corporeality' that dissolves or destabilizes the body/soul 'binary' in a radical but 'non-totalizing' way, thus enabling her to avoid both what she refers to, in a somewhat sensational manner, as the 'latent fascism' of binary thought (12), as well as the infamous crypto-totalitarianism of dialectical thought. What the three thinkers to whom she turns have in common, in her view, is a sensitivity to 'the ternary quality of embodied existence' (120). That is to say, they each interpret our embodiment in light of a (non-dialectical) 'third term', between the 'subjectivity' of the soul and the 'objectivity' of the body.

Thus, Prosser MacDonald construes Merleau-Ponty as having 'decentered' or de-localized the self in relation to, on the one hand, 'the body's prejudicative modes of seeing and touching' (47), and on the other hand, 'the "correlative encroachment" of corporeal interaction' between bodies (87). Merleau-Ponty, so understood, supplies the rudiments of, or at least the motivation for, what Prosser MacDonald calls an alternative 'ontology of relatedness' (47). Foucault's role, meanwhile, is to 'historicize and politicize' (16) the issue: 'The self for Foucault,' she says, 'is a body forged through the clash of competing power-knowledges' (87). The alleged centre of the self, in this case, is dispersed into the (discursive and non-discursive) social practices peculiar to an epoch. The problem with Foucault, to which Kristeva is supposed to be a solution, is that, while highlighting the dangers inherent in the political production of the embodied self, he offers no ethical guidance for the project which his critical discourse motivates: the formation of 'an alternative mode of relationality' (80). Kristeva, as read by Prosser MacDonald, supplies the needed ethical vision, namely, 'one of nonpossessive and

nondefensive encounters of the self with a respected and valued "other"' (124).

The theological effect of these reflections, according to Prosser MacDonald, is to facilitate the 'transgression of those orders of thought and being that effectively resist the call of the sacred' (xiii). Specifically, her final chapter sets out to challenge both the theology of divine immanence (tending toward 'secular humanism') and that of divine transcendence (tending toward 'the denigration of human achievement'), each of which is accused of 'closing out the cries of the sacred' (141).

Prosser MacDonald's 'Preface' warns her readers that her 'style of writing' may be 'potentially annoying' (xii). In this respect, one has to say, the book too often lives up to its 'potential', liberally drawing on poststructuralist jargon, and seldom clearly defining key theoretical terms.

A more serious problem, however, is her book's shortage of self-referential subtlety. In particular, after announcing that 'there are many ways to divide the world into binary categories' (xi), and repeatedly associating this practice with authoritarianism and, worse still, with 'foundationalist metaphysics', she then proceeds to define her own theology of 'transgressive corporeality' precisely in terms of a series of 'important distinctions' (14), that is, *binaries*. Above all, the whole project of the book rests on a fundamental (binary) distinction between, on the one hand, binary distinctions (which ought to be subverted), and on the other hand, ternary distinctions (which make such subverting possible). Should not this distinction itself be subverted? And, if so, can the book retain its coherence and plausibility? These questions are not posed, and so not answered, by Prosser MacDonald.

Transgressive Corporeality offers readers 'a theology of embodied existence from a poststructuralist perspective' (135). Those readers who are not too repelled, either by its theological or its poststructuralist dimensions, will probably find it worth reading. But this would be more for the questions it provokes, than those it effectively addresses.

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Gregory McCulloch
The Mind and its World.
New York: Routledge 1995.
Pp. xi + 225.
US $55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-09330-9);
US $17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-12205-8).

Now that few philosophers believe mentality requires immateriality, it is unsurprising to hear that rejecting dualism in favour of materialism leaves crucial questions about the nature of mind unresolved. McCulloch is decidedly of this opinion. His topic is the relationship between mind and world. He focuses not on Cartesian immaterialism, but on another Cartesian doctrine: the claim that the mind is wholly self-contained, that a mind could be just as it is whether the rest of the world is there or not. Cartesianism in this form, McCulloch argues, is far from dead: mind-brain identity theorists are committed to it, as are advocates of the computational mind. This view is false because externalism is true: our brains may be in our heads, but meaning isn't, so the meaning-bearing components of our minds are not self-contained. The book is a sustained defence of a far-reaching externalism.

The first four chapters (of eight) are devoted, in turn, to Descartes, Locke, Frege and Wittgenstein. The appeal and flaws of Locke's theory of meaning are thoroughly aired. Frege comes out rather better, but his theory turns out to be beset with difficulties only resolved by the later Wittgenstein. If understanding a word is being able to use it, as part of a communal world-involving practice, externalism in some form seems inevitable. This point is not immediately pressed home. Chapter V criticizes computational theories of mind: these may play a role in scientific theorizing about the physical underpinnings of language, but are irrelevant to the folk psychological mind, to meaning as we find it, which is what philosophers should be concerned with. This theme is elaborated in chapter VI, which is concerned with the phenomenology of meaning and embodiment; Heidegger and Sartre put in a brief appearance here. We then return to more standard territory: the final two chapters are devoted to exploring Putnam's Twin Earth arguments, which are taken to establish externalism for substance-concepts (singular terms are not dealt with).

A lot of ground gets covered, and most of it is covered very well indeed. The book is intended as a self-contained introduction to these topics, and although full of solid argument, it is well-suited to the relative beginner. The style is lively and very clear. Students who read and absorb it stand to learn a great deal. Moreover, the book provides more than a rehearsal of the standard arguments for externalism. In addition to the historical dimension, McCulloch's brand of externalism is distinctive and intriguing. This certainly makes for a more interesting book, but one that some might find occasionally baffling — I'll try to explain why.

McCulloch stresses the phenomenology of understanding: when you speak, I am conscious of what you are saying; I do not hear your words as

senseless sounds which I then interpret — your speaking unloads your meaning directly into my consciousness. Or so it seems. 'Meaning, as much as colour, is part of the structure of appearance' (154). I'll call this the doctrine that *meaning is present in consciousness*, or MPC. This doctrine has intuitive plausibility, and McCulloch makes it a cornerstone of his position: theories which do not respect MPC are not credible (e.g., Fodor's computational theory). MPC is also deployed against narrow content, and so internalism: meaning is what we are conscious of expressing and communicating in our everyday uses of language; narrow content is inexpressible in ordinary language (ordinary content is wide); so narrow content is not a species of meaning.

All this is unusual. The last person you'd *expect* to find advocating MPC is a Wittgensteinian externalist. Wittgenstein argued that meaning is *not* present in experience — McCulloch endorses these arguments. Many find externalism repugnant precisely because they don't like the idea of meaning being consciousness-transcendent. But this does seem an inevitable corollary of externalism. Contrast me with vatman, who is a moment-to-moment, atom-for-atom replica of my brain. Assuming externalism, I can understand meanings unavailable to vatman: I can think about water or my father, he can't. But assuming MPC, it seems vatman must understand everything I understand: we have the same experiences (phenomenologically speaking), meaning is present in experience, so we understand the same meanings.

How does McCulloch manage to reconcile externalism with MPC? The answer is simple: he holds that vatman *cannot* have experience just like mine. Unfortunately, the arguments for this surprising view (in chapter VI) are untypically elusive, largely because he is pushing a stronger form externalism than his focus on language might lead one to expect; because this isn't as clear as it might be, some of his arguments may seem puzzling. Consider this one. Our perceptual experience doesn't present us with patterns of sensory sensation, it is *world-presenting*: we are presented with familiar kinds of objects seemingly scattered about in space, objects that seem to be out there, not in here (with my thoughts and bodily sensations). World-presenting experience is conceptualized. Wittgenstein has shown that concept-mastery is a practical, world-involving skill. Vatman can't interact with the world; so vatman can't possess concepts, and so can't have conceptualized experience, so can't have experience which resembles *our* experience. This is neat but unconvincing. Why couldn't vatman have experience *as-of* manipulating objects and learning how to use words in just the ways we do — all in the virtual environment he 'finds himself' in? If so, why can't vatman have conceptualized experience just like ours?

McCulloch's response seems to amount to this: vatman's course of experience can only be regarded as phenomenologically indistinguishable from mine if we adopt a question-beggingly internalist notion of the *phenomenological*. Phenomenology is the study of what is directly presented in experience; in ordinary perception the external world is directly presented to us; since vatman doesn't perceive an external world, his experience is

phenomenologically different from mine. Now, this reply is fine as far as it goes. But of course there's another (more widespread) use of the key terms, according to which phenomenology is the description of experience, where 'experience' is how things *seem* irrespective of how they really are (experience as the domain within which there is no distinction between appearance and reality). It is only because McCulloch rejects *this* conception of experience that he can hold that meaning is present *in* experience. Consequently, McCulloch's reconciliation of externalism with phenomenology is less far-reaching than it might appear to be — although no doubt as far-reaching as he would wish it to be.

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Frederick J. McGinness
Right Thinking and Sacred Oratory in Counter-Reformation Rome.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1995.
Pp. viii + 337.
US $49.50. ISBN 0-691-03426-5.

Developments in the history of philosophy, in normative ethics and in moral theory have produced interest in forms of moral thought developed between antiquity and the enlightenment. One area that is likely to repay study is the late scholastic and early modern periods when casuistry in the Catholic Aristotelian tradition began to give way to neo-classical Christian humanism. On the one hand figures such as Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546) and Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) carried forward aspects of Thomistic moral theology so as to produce ever more elaborate accounts of the structure of virtue and the limits of its exercise (relevant to this are Vitoria's *On the Law of War* (1532) and Suarez's *On the Ultimate end, the Voluntary and the Goodness of Human Acts* (c. 1580); and on the other hand neo-Platonists of the Florentine academy rejected the broad naturalism of the Aristotelians in favour of quasi-mystical intuitions of a love (*humanitas*) that binds all men and is the arbiter of right conduct.

Whereas the former inclined in the political realm to the idea of a single just human order discerned by right reason (*recta ratio*), the latter took as their political model idealised versions of the city states of antiquity, and developed the notion that right thinking, or better perhaps 'right mindedness' (*recte sentire*) is a habit to be inculcated through membership of a

well-regulated civic community. This second option raises questions as to what the correct forms of social organisation might be and of how a general conception of order should find expression in the various departments of life. In recent times Quentin Skinner has explored aspects of renaissance civic republicanism but what have received little, if any, attention thus far are the religious versions of early modern humanism, and more precisely the attempts to embody these in particular civic orders.

Frederick McGinness's *Right Thinking and Sacred Oratory in Counter Reformation Rome* is a non-philosophical contribution to that task. The period he is concerned with runs from the close of the Council of Trent (1563) to the first quarter of the seventeenth century (marked by the death of Paul V in 1621), and the object of his study is the effort to make perfect the *respublica christiana* in the form of Rome the Holy City. The author's scholarship is impressive. He has studied contemporary orations published and unpublished, and knows his way around the main secondary literature. (Over a third of the book is given to endnotes followed by a short but useful bibliographical essay.) What his study reveals is the important role of preaching in fashioning early modern ideas of Christian social order after images of ancient civility. Abstract moral theology went on, but the application of intellect to practical affairs was effected through the sacred rhetoric of the pulpit. Interestingly, the great Jesuit philosopher-theologian St Robert Bellarmine is cited on account of the merits of his preaching in the course of *Quarantore* — the Forty Hours adoration of the Eucharist.

Fascinating as the general tale proves to be, readers who approach this work with philosophical interests to the fore will be disappointed. It is certainly not an historical study of moral philosophy nor even a contribution to the history of ideas as philosophers tend to conceive this. But it would be wrong to suppose that no philosophical lessons can be learned. The questions addressed are ones that have their counterparts today: how is a sense of cultural identity best promulgated and sustained? what is the role of public discourse in defining civic virtues? What we need, therefore, is for someone to take up the general theme suggested by McGinness's study and to produce a work of comparative political philosophy setting a religious account alongside that of the secular models inspired by the civic republicanism of renaissance Florence.

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Paul K. Moser and **J.D. Trout**
Contemporary Materialism: A Reader.
New York: Routledge 1995.
Pp. xii + 378.
US $65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-10863-2);
US $22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-10864-0).

The Moser and Trout reader selects sixteen papers originally published from 1970 to 1990, grouping them into four themes: the adequacy of general materialist or physicalist accounts; issues in materialist philosophy of mind; physicalist attempts to account for language's intentional content; and physicalist accounts of values and normativity. Generally non-technical, the selections aim to provide suitable content for upper-level undergraduate courses, and as an added bonus, the volume includes as postscripts the latter-day reflections of several authors on the papers reprinted here.

A wide scope is the volume's most valuable feature, for it effectively manifests the competition on a number of different issues between reductive and non-reductive accounts of materialism, perhaps most notably the extent to which the success of science provides evidence for materialism, and how it does this. As Tim Crane and David Mellor put it, the success of the physical sciences has led philosophers to become physicalists, and to take their continuing success as further evidence for physicalism (65). One may certainly raise doubts concerning the independence of the physical sciences from some physicalist thesis, making it ambiguous whether they can really support or must merely presuppose physicalism, but scientific successes do seem measurable in terms of reduction. A broad scientific success translates the language of a special science into the language of physics, what Jerry Fodor refers to as 'the generality of physics' (54), and this seems to imply the disappearance of the special science upon its success. As Fodor points out (51), this does not seem to happen, and he argues that in fact, general type reductions would be theoretically impoverishing (56) and recommends a liberalization of reduction along token-token lines (60). While Fodor revises, Crane and Mellor question whether there is a non-vacuous physicalism to be found underlying reduction at all (67). What ground grants physics ontological priority, while denying it to psychology? None of the usual appeals to reducibility in principle (67), the causality of the mental (71), and supposed differences in respect of lawful behaviour (75) serve to define physicalism non-vacuously. As Crane and Mellor would have it, 'physicalism is the wrong answer to an essentially trivial question' (82).

Such considerations lend themselves to non-reductive accounts, represented here in the (pre-repudiation) functionalism of Hilary Putnam and the supervenience thesis of Donald Davidson. The 'mental', for Putnam, stands in the same relation to our brain as a computer program does to the processor (128), and is therefore similarly as real and autonomous a feature of the world. Since the mental is functionally explicable, and multiply realizable in various physical media (123), we have no reason to pursue physicalism.

Davidson likewise holds that mental explanation typically employs mental terms and conditions, but denies that these explanations form a closed system (119). Mental explanation employs holistic normative expectations not present in physical explanation (117-18) — e.g., overall consistency of belief — which eliminates both reducibility and strictly lawful mental explanation, though he holds that mental phenomena are dependent on and interact with physical phenomena (118-19). However, in his critique of non-reductive materialism, Jaegwon Kim points out that Davidson's insistence on causal interaction but denial of lawful relations between the mental and physical serves only to recommend eliminativism, since the mental fulfils no necessary role (135-6). Putnam's 'multiple realizability' fares little better: it implies laws specifying a physical state's sufficiency to realize a certain mental state, thus implying a certain physical structural type, thus implying reducibility (138-9). More generally, Kim argues that if the property dualism apparently accepted by non-reductionists does any work at all, they must give it a substantive account (146): thus, he forces the choice among dualism, reduction and elimination. Finally, Frank Jackson presents an anti-materialist view, arguing that since physical sciences do not give accounts of the 'felt' quality of experience, they do not provide an exhaustive account of the mental (180-1).

Non-reductionists may take heart from the difficulty materialism has in accounting satisfactorily for the meaningful content of language and for values. As a solution to the classic sense-reference problems, Putnam once argued for a causal theory of natural-kind terms, that would have the meaning of a term linked causally with its reference. However, in the present work, he questions this account's reliance on intrinsic properties, for this seems out of step with contemporary materialism (226-7). If a term stands in causal relations to a physical thing, but no intrinsic properties may be ascribed to that thing, then it makes no sense to say there is one relation between the term and the thing that could be its meaning (231-2). But in his article, Daniel Dennett challenges the notion of an original intentionality belonging exclusively to minds, raising doubts as to whether minds really function differently from other things (247).

Comprehensive materialism must offer an account of moral phenomena, but as Bernard Williams argues, the case is a hard one, since the ideal of scientific enquiry seems to be a convergence toward an answer where this convergence is explained by the accuracy with which the answer represents 'the way things are,' while in moral enquiry, such convergence cannot represent 'the way things are' (281). Science and ethics seem radically different, but the materialist at least has the option of arguing the reality of moral phenomena, or denying it and providing an account of its origins. Richard Boyd takes a realist view, arguing that moral terms correspond to real properties, which can be discovered by observational moral enquiry along the lines of any empirical enquiry (297). Simon Blackburn, on the other hand, gives an evolutionary account of moral commitment. Moral commitment reflects those set reactions to circumstance that have turned out to

promote evolutionary success (359-60): thus Blackburn refuses to grant reality to moral phenomena.

Of course, a number of papers remain untouched here, notably a pair of articles, by Willard Quine and by Michael Friedman, on the relation of words to objects, for and against Quine's indeterminacy of translation thesis. Finally, this introduction to the broad impact of materialism on philosophy is only the more valuable for Moser and Trout's introductory piece, which sketches the background issues and context, and situates the papers firmly in their tradition.

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Luis E. Navia
The Philosophy of Cynicism: An Annotated Bibliography.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1995.
Pp. xvii + 213.
US $69.50. ISBN 0-313-29249-3.

The study of the Greek Cynics has long been handicapped by the lack of the basic research tools taken for granted in other areas. That is slowly starting to change, and Navia's bibliography is a very welcome contribution to that change. The fourth annotated bibliography from Navia (the previous ones covering Socrates, the Pythagoreans and the Presocratics), it has much the same strengths, and much the same weaknesses.

The book lists 704 items (though there are many repeat listings), in various languages, dating from 1508 to 1994. Chapters are devoted to 'General Studies' of the Cynics and their leading concepts, 'Antisthenes', 'Diogenes of Sinope' and 'Crates and Other Cynics'. Indices of authors and of names round out the book. Navia does not claim to have produced a comprehensive bibliography, but it is laudably broad in scope nonetheless. Articles from encyclopedias and histories of philosophy stand beside scholarly books and journal articles, with a scattering of novels and short stories thrown in. Unlike Navia's previous efforts, earlier bibliographies, as well as the small selection of translations, are included under 'General Studies' rather than under a heading of their own. Listings in each chapter are arranged alphabetically by author.

This diversity is the source of my major criticism. The annotations purport to be 'descriptive, not critical' (x), focusing upon each work's stance on some

of the major questions in Cynic scholarship. This results in the uncritical reports of encyclopedia articles being given the same weight as the carefully argued conclusions of philosophical and philological research. Similarly, no special notice is given to the central works in the history of the field (e.g., Zeller, Dudley). Indeed, it is unclear what (if any) principle determined the relative lengths of the annotations. Some standard readings (e.g., Geffcken) are presented with no annotation at all!

This will limit the usefulness of the bibliography for what is, presumably, its primary audience — those new to the literature. Surely some kind of device could have been found to indicate, 'this work is a standard scholarly reference for the Cynics' or 'this work simply echoes Diogenes Laertius', without prejudicing the goal of description?

Two further limitations are the lack of a subject index, and the inclusion of untranslated quotations. While most quotations are translated, many lengthy citations in French are not. While Navia's assumption that researchers will be familiar with the language may be true of scholars, it will frequently not be true for students seeking guidance on the topic. Similarly, a subject index, especially given the express intent to isolate certain major themes, would greatly increase the work's usefulness. As presented, the only way to find material on a given topic will be to patiently wade through every entry.

Despite these criticisms, Navia's work will undoubtedly be a great help to anyone trying to get oriented to the field, and a reliable aid to those working there. It only requires that one read through it carefully and patiently.

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Michael Palmer
Moral Problems: A Coursebook.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1995.
Pp. xi + 207.
Cdn $18.95. ISBN 0-8020-7661-0.

This book was originally a course for British high school students. Expanded for publication, it saw considerable popular success with a more general readership. It should serve as an excellent text for upper level high school classes or as part of a college level introductory course.

The first chapter is an introduction to the field of ethics and is followed by chapters on egoism, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics and the question of free

will as it applies to morally autonomous action. There are also three brief appendices on ethical naturalism, ethical non-naturalism and ethical non-cognitivism. Each chapter begins with an introduction, includes a selection from original texts with discussion exercises, and criticism of the theory, again using original texts. Each theory is then applied to a contemporary issue and the chapter ends with essay questions.

There is much to recommend this book. The explanations of the theories are clear and comprehensive without being verbose. Tricky points, such as the universal nature of Kant's categorical imperative, or Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures are well explained. The texts used to discuss, criticize and illuminate the theories are interestingly varied and generally well chosen. It is good to see an apposite piece from Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* along side pieces from Machiavelli and Dostoyevsky in the discussion on utilitarianism. The contemporary problems are also well illustrated with, for instance, pieces from Mohandas Gandhi and Elizabeth Anscombe discussing the application of Kantian ethics to the morality of war, and pieces from Judith Jarvis Thompson, Peter Singer and James Rachels discussing the application of egoism to the right to life.

There are, however, some criticisms to be leveled as well. It is a shame that the extract from Mill's *Utilitarianism* on the distinction between higher and lower happiness stops with the appeal to competent judges to decide the worth of various pleasures. Mill himself goes on to lay out the prerequisites for a satisfying life, shifting the discussion from discrete instances of pleasure to what it means to live a good life. This move is central to the distinction between Benthamite quantity and Millian quality of pleasure.

A more serious criticism is the lack of any mention of either Aristotle or the tradition of virtue ethics. Mill's discussion of the higher pleasures introduces the question of what the best sort of life to live is, but this point is never picked up. Virtue ethics is also relevant to the debate about moral motivation that surfaces in the chapter on egoism. It is never possible to include everything in an introductory course book, but this text does aspire to be an introduction to the field.

These points aside, this is an excellent introduction to the major questions in moral philosophy. It strikes just the right balance between theory and application, revealing the complexity, depth and relevance of the material, while remaining lucid and even entertaining.

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Graham Parkes
Composing the Soul: The Reaches of Nietzsche's Psychology.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994.
Pp. xiv + 481.
US $37.95. ISBN 0-226-64686-6.

Graham Parkes's study of Nietzsche's psychology represents a substantial and valuable contribution to contemporary Nietzsche studies, and particularly to debates over the legitimacy of Nietzsche's claims to psychological perspicuity. Parkes's analysis is wide-ranging and his comprehensiveness doubly noteworthy: first, for the sheer quantity of Nietzsche's work he discusses (including, fortunately, his oft-neglected juvenilia); and, second, for his sensitive re-translation of every quote from Nietzsche he uses. Parkes justifies his translations on the grounds that a reading of the metaphorical content in Nietzsche's texts, which lies at the centre of his own largely imagistic and Jungian/archetypal analysis, necessitates that close attention be paid to the semantic ambiguities inherent in their original German. Similarly noteworthy, although by their near absence from Parkes's discussion, are Nietzsche's unpublished notes from the *Nachlass*. Parkes justifies this exclusion on the grounds that Nietzsche never intended these notes for publication, although his argument seems weak given both the countervailing tendency in much recent Nietzsche scholarship, and their importance to a number of noteworthy Nietzscheans, Heidegger perhaps most prominent among them.

Parkes chronologically traces the development of Nietzsche's psychology from the philosopher's boyhood — marred by the insanity and premature death of his father, to which Parkes attributes Nietzsche's early attraction to paternalistic mentors like Ritschl, Wagner, and Schopenhauer — through to his failed academic career, subsequent break with Wagner, and own mental collapse. The chronological thread binds the three major sections of Parkes's book together, and helps provide a vivid sense of the metamorphosis of Nietzsche's conception of the 'soul' from its articulation more or less atomistically in his juvenilia, through to its bifurcation in *The Birth of Tragedy*, its fragmentation in *Zarathustra*, and its subsequent dissolution in *The Twilight of the Idols*. Understanding the 'soul' is for Parkes a prerequisite to any thorough consideration of Nietzsche's psychology, since it ('Seele') is the term Nietzsche himself used 'to denote the topic of his psychology' (19). Clearly Parkes intends to link Nietzsche's view of a fragmented soul with his mental collapse. The parallel is never explicitly drawn by Nietzsche in his work, however, and can seem contrived in Parkes's.

The first section of Parkes's book is devoted to isolating the major influences on Nietzsche as a child and adolescent. Thus we learn of the importance of Goethe, Byron, Hölderlin, and Emerson to the young philosopher. On Parkes's view, these precursors instilled in Nietzsche Romantic tendencies manifested in his early work most noticeably as a fascination with the power

of the natural world, and as a brooding melancholia. Parkes identifies the end of Nietzsche's adolescence as roughly coincident with his discovery of the two great influences on his early professional life: Wagner and Schopenhauer. From the former Nietzsche gained both an appreciation for things German and access to a Bohemian *modus vivendi* that made life teaching in Basel bearable; from the latter he obtained the germ of a naturalistic conception of the will that would soon prove central to his own formulation of the 'will to power' and its attendant 'drives'. Nietzsche's debt to these two philosophers is most evident in *The Birth of Tragedy*. Parkes's interpretation of this most widely read of Nietzsche's works is straightforward, and offers little either to offend or excite scholars familiar with the large body of criticism already surrounding it. Perhaps most significantly, Parkes emphasizes context, particularly the (largely negative) reception of *The Birth of Tragedy* which, among other things, confirmed Nietzsche's suspicion that he was miscast as a philologist and, more seriously, drove a wedge between him and Ritschl, for whom the work was simply too radical.

In the second section of *Composing the Soul*, Parkes isolates what he refers to as three 'levels of metaphor,' or image clusters, suggestive of Nietzsche's conception of the soul: 'In giving us a *logos* of *psyche*..., [Nietzsche] eschews proposing a theory that tells us what the soul is, but rather intimates what the soul is *like* by reporting its speech about itself in images' (117). These clusters consist in earthly images (rocks, sun, water), vegetal images (trees, cultivation, irrigation), and animal images (kinds of wildlife, animal reproduction, pregnancies and birth). Parkes scours what seems like the whole of Nietzsche's works looking for images and image patterns, and his results are informative, if sometimes surprising, particularly when placed alongside work by another imagistic philosopher, Plato, to whom the later Nietzsche was more or less plainly indebted.

Platonic parallels are legion in Nietzsche's work, and form the basis for much of the comparative analysis in Parkes's third section devoted to the philosopher's conception of the multiple soul or *psyche*. Parkes traces the evolution within the Western philosophical tradition of 'psychical polycentricity,' beginning with Homer and encompassing Herder, Kant, Schiller, Fichte, and Lichtenberg. The impact of these thinkers on Nietzsche was profound, and their theorizing of the relation of the drives to the psyche strongly influenced Nietzsche's own genealogical method. Parkes holds that 'a main trait of the genealogical method [is] to take what appears to be a unitary phenomenon and disclose its multiple origins, showing it to be generated by a plurality of drives' (277).

In perhaps his most speculative manoeuvre, Parkes draws a parallel between Nietzsche's ordering of the drives within the psyche and Plato's political organization in the *Republic*, and he contrasts the multiplicity of the soul with the community of the *polis*. The two philosophers most obviously diverge in their views on the government of their respective 'communities': Plato recommends government by meritocracy, while for Nietzsche the rulers of the soul 'are to be understood not as representatives of reason, constituents

of the "calculating part" of the psyche, or as enduring self-identical agents, but rather as offices or positions capable of being held by a succession of different figures' (354) — 'figures' here meaning 'drives'. The Nietzschean 'soul' is thus manifold and decidedly post-Christian, and consists in the dynamic inter-relation of various drives, some of which dominate the psyche only for brief periods of time before being replaced by others. The soul is in 'no static condition, but rather one of overflow, downpour, and uprush — flows of *eros* in Dionysian *Rausch*, a constant rising and abating of drives' (359).

Parkes's account of the major transformations in Nietzsche's thought (and of their social and intellectual contexts) differs minimally from other standard works on the subject, most notably Walter Kaufmann's. What Parkes succeeds in doing, however, is providing a great detail of information on *an aspect* of Nietzsche's thought relatively neglected by scholars more interested in his more controversial views on race, power, and sexuality. Parkes joins the ranks of scholars like George Stack for whom a narrower assessment of Nietzsche's ideas offers explanatory power unavailable to those committed to wholistic readings of his life, work, and times. I can think of more useful introductions to Nietzsche; I can think of few better introductions to Nietzsche's psychology.

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Gila Sher
The Bounds of Logic: a Generalized Viewpoint.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1991.
Pp. xv + 178.
US $30.00. ISBN 0-262-19311-2.

In her excellent book, Gila Sher extends and unifies the study of generalized quantifiers initiated by Mostowski and carried on by Lindström, Keisler and others within the framework of the Tarskian model-theoretic semantics of first-order logic. The existential and universal quantifiers can be considered second-order properties which map first-order properties to truth values. Thus, the existential quantifier maps a property to 'true' if and only if the extension of the property is non-empty. In a seminal 1957 paper, Mostowski showed that there are other quantifiers that cannot be expressed in the standard vocabulary of first-order logic, claiming that they should qualify as

logical quantifiers as well. For example, 'there are only finitely many ... ' cannot be expressed in the standard vocabulary, so Mostowski introduces new quantifiers to handle these kinds of expressions. (Of course, some cardinality quantifiers, such as 'Exactly n ... ' can be defined using only the existential and universal quantifier and identity.)

Sher aims at providing philosophical support for the large literature on nonstandard systems of first-order logic in mathematics and in linguistics and to argue for unrestricted logic (UL), as Sher calls the system of generalized quantifiers, by providing and justifying criteria for calling quantifiers logical. If she succeeds in answering the question of what makes a quantifier logical, Sher will be able to justify the inclusion of Mostowski's cardinality quantifiers, as well as Higginbotham and May's relational quantifiers, such as 'Most ... ' as part of logic. The details of her argument are for the specialist but Sher's ambitions are central to the philosophical enterprise in the analytic tradition, since investigation of the scope and limits of formal logic leads to constraints on the conventionality of logic.

There are many other possible extensions of logic not considered by Sher, such as higher order logic, many-valued and probabilistic logic and modal logic. UL is very inclusive, but limited to generalized quantifiers in standard first-order logic. Sher traces the development of quantification from Frege to Mostowski, and follows the extension of Mostowski's work by Lindström and Higginbotham and May. She provides her own Tarskian semantics of generalized quantifiers and also discusses the literature on branching quantifiers. The logical machinery allows Sher to criticize and sharpen the extant criteria for including extended quantifiers in logic and to focus the philosophical issues in a way that makes the questions she raises answerable.

The central philosophical issue raised by Sher is the distinction between logical and nonlogical terms. Sher argues that we have an intuitive understanding of the distinctions between logical and nonlogical terms, that is, we know that some consequences are necessary and formal, while some are material; the only question is what counts as logical and nonlogical (51). Sher's answer will be that, generally speaking, mathematical terms are logical. I will discuss this claim shortly, but first want to point out that Sher's intuitive distinction is very close to the analytic/synthetic distinction. Clearly, not all philosophers would agree that the only difficulty with the analytic/synthetic distinction is that we do not know where to draw the line. In logic, however, Sher makes a clear distinction and shows how it is compatible with Tarskian semantics. According to Sher, logical particles are those structures that are preserved under permutations of the universe over which they are defined. The shorthand version of her criterion is that 'all and only formal terms, terms invariant under isomorphic structures, can serve as logical terms in a logic based on Tarski's ideas' (53) and she develops this idea into a set of five criteria. Sher's criteria clarify and extend Mostowski's original idea while conforming to Lindström's characterization of generalized logical quantifiers. In addition, Sher's criteria show us how to construct

logical terms, since the principle of closure under permutations determines all of the logical terms over a given universe (75).

One interesting general question raised in the book is how Sher's UL fits with the logicist thesis that mathematics is logic. As Sher notes, according to the criteria she has developed, mathematical constants generally count as logical, so the whole program of reducing mathematics to logic could become trivial. However, '[logicism's] main tenet, that mathematical constants are essentially logical, is of course, strongly supported by this conception' (132). Sher claims that her analysis is consistent with Frege's views. It is far beyond the scope of this review to discuss what Frege was really up to but, in support of Sher, I would argue that logicism does not necessarily need to be seen as a reductionist program. Indeed, the interesting and long-lasting legacy of the study of the foundations is the formalization of mathematics. So it is not surprising that, according to Sher's view, logic is being defined mathematically; logic became modern when it became formal (or mathematical or symbolic). However, as Sher's development of criteria for logicality shows, logic can be mathematical only because math is already formal. Thus, Sher's comments echo those of Couturat: she says that logic is mathematical and also that mathematics is logical (63), apparently advocating the identity of mathematics and logic rather than a reduction, which leads to the interesting question of how the formalization of mathematics, the idea of invariance and of isomorphic structures, arose.

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Charles Taliaferro
Consciousness and the Mind of God.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994.
Pp. viii + 349.
US $59.95. ISBN 0-521-46173-1.

In *Consciousness and the Mind of God*, Charles Taliaferro is concerned to argue the merits of substance dualism against various types of contemporary materialism. In doing this, he demonstrates remarkable boldness. The standard analytic philosopher of mind is of the view that substance dualism is so clearly false that one wastes one's time arguing against it. One should associate the view with ghosts and ectoplasm, laugh derisively, and then turn one's attention to a more plausible position, like, e.g., analytical behaviorism. Early on, Taliaferro makes the plausible claim that dualism is rejected so quickly not because of solid philosophical arguments against it, but rather due to its lack of fit with naturalistic dogma. In contrast, Taliaferro's project

is to see what can be said for dualism and how it fits into a theistic world view.

The scope of this book is staggering. Taliaferro argues against various competing theories of mind (the identity theory, functionalism and eliminative materialism), defends dualism against a whole host of materialist attacks, defends dualism against a whole host of religious attacks, offers a (modal) argument for substance dualism, develops his own positive solution to the mind/body problem (a view he calls 'integrative dualism', and to which we will return), discusses issues of personal identity, defends the traditional theological doctrines of divine immateriality and omnipresence, and argues against the alleged attribute of divine impassibility.

There is so much going on in *Consciousness* that it would be futile to try to give a more detailed general account in a short review. The paragraph above is indicative of the book's contents. In the remainder of this review, I shall focus on the position that, as I read it anyway, is at the book's core: integrative dualism. I should say before looking at the fine print, however, that this is a well-written and engaging book. Taliaferro has a good grasp of the literature and is engaging the right opponents. He also keeps the reader interested with a brisk pace and frequent subject changes. Of course, there are drawbacks to such a style: after reading a quickly-passing objection or argument one finds oneself, saying 'But ... .' only to find that Taliaferro is now on to the next subject.

As was previously mentioned, Taliaferro defends a position he calls, 'Integrative Dualism'. Integrative dualism (ID) is a form of substance (as opposed to mere property) dualism. The essence of ID is ' ... persons are themselves nonphysical individuals. As embodied beings, however, persons are not ghosts or mere accessories to their bodies' (114). Taliaferro stresses that while his view is a brand of substance dualism, his picture is not one of humans as 'splintered'. Taliaferro complains that many critics caricature the substance dualist's view by presenting the theory as though the relations it posits between the person and her body are meager and tangential. For example, some critics argue that if substance dualism were true, we wouldn't be able to re-identity persons since our evidence of identity can only come to us via physical characteristics. Taliaferro argues that this objection belies a misunderstanding of dualism, or at least of ID. Because of the deep integration of mind and body, re-identification is possible on the basis of recognized physical characteristics.

Another standard objection to substance dualism is that it entails that, strictly speaking, the person has no physical attributes. If what I am is an immaterial Cartesian ego, then I don't weigh anything; nor am I spatially located, i.e., I'm not anywhere. Taliaferro denies that ID has this implication. It isn't easy, however, to see his grounds for this. He claims that one who thinks this 'underrates' (120) the degree of mental/physical integration. But ID is just classical dualism with a slightly distinctive spin: a person is metaphysically distinct from her body (though she is well-integrated with it). Properties of the body are then properties of a metaphysically distinct (if

'integrated') entity. There is simply no way of avoiding this. Of course, the friend of ID can maintain that there are properties that are only properly ascribed to the integrated duality, for example, facial expressions of anger. That something is an expression of anger, it might be claimed, requires that there be a person in a state of anger and that the facial expression be causally hooked up to that state. Thus, the property of wearing an expression of anger might be thought to be a property not of the body or mind but of the integrated unity.

At bottom, Taliaferro's ID is just standard substance dualism. It is telling that in his canonical formulations of the position, Taliaferro calls the nonphysical entity the 'person'. One might have expected, given the advertised 'integrative' nature of the view, that this nonphysical entity would be labeled the 'mind' or 'soul' with 'person' being reserved for the integrated unity of the metaphysically distinct mind and body: a person *just is* the body/mind combination. Such a position would be a truly integrated view of persons. Of course, such a view has trouble with a particular view of immortality: truly integrated dualism is apparently inconsistent with a person's immediate survival of her death. If a person *is* the mind/body combination, then she perishes when her body does.

This suggests an account of the mind/body/person relation perhaps more in the spirit of what Taliaferro wants; call it 'truly integrative dualism' (TID). TID claims that during the course of her embodied life, a human being is at any time constituted by an immaterial mind and a body. The mind is a proper as opposed to improper part of a person. Just as a statue (on some views) is not identical to the hunk of marble of which it is composed, so a human being is not identical to the body and mind of which she is composed. Since the relation between the person and the mind/body unity is one of composition and not identity, there is nothing to stop the TID theorist from claiming that at death, the person is composed of mind only. Just as a materialist might say that when with full body, a person is constituted by her body but when shorn down to only an envatted brain, she is composed just by the brain, so the dualist can say when pared down to her immaterial mind, she is constituted by that mind and by that mind alone.

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Jonathan Westphal, ed.
Certainty.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company
1995.
Pp. v + 154.
US $24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-319-0);
US $5.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-318-2).

This volume edited by Westphal is one of a series of compact anthologies containing classical, modern, and contemporary writings from major philosophers on a particular topic of interest. In this case the topic is certainty and the volume provides a wide ranging selection of ways in which this topic has been approached (metaphysical, scientific, analytical, phenomenological, and literary).

Westphal provides a helpful introductory essay outlining the historical place, and philosophical importance, of each selection he has chosen. While Westphal does not approach his selections in the following way, a very helpful approach to this volume would be to center the concept of certainty around the two major philosophers which Westphal includes in this anthology: Descartes and Wittgenstein. With the various authors of the selections that Westphal includes in this anthology in mind, they can be characterised under the categories of 'Cartesian' and 'Wittgensteinian' in the following way: (1) Pre-Cartesian (Plato, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas), (2) Cartesian (René Descartes), (3) Post-Cartesian (G.W. Leibniz, David Hume, Thomas Reid, Edmund Husserl); (4) Pre-Wittgensteinian (G.E. Moore), (5) Wittgensteinian (Ludwig Wittgenstein), (6) Post-Wittgensteinian (Hans Reichenbach, Norman Malcolm, O.K. Bouwsma, Raymond Smullyan). The remaining selection by Octavio Paz, while of philosophical interest, provides what Westphal calls a 'reflective elegy on certainty' and functions as a kind of literary relief from the previous philosophically oriented selections. Whether this approach is at all helpful in adequately addressing the concept of certainty is left for the reader to decide.

There is no doubt that Descartes' approach to the concept of certainty was a major shift of emphasis away from metaphysics to epistemology, thereby achieving for himself the rightful title of the 'father of modern philosophy'. However, despite the fact that Wittgenstein's philosophy manifests another major shift in the history of philosophy from epistemology to language, it is important to point out that this shift did not originate with him, and it is at this point that Westphal's otherwise insightful choice of selections can be questioned. Given the fact that Wittgenstein himself acknowledges 'the great works of Frege' as having a decisive influence on his philosophical development it would have been helpful if a selection from Frege would have been included in this anthology (cf. Dummett's argument that this anti-Cartesian shift of Frege's establishes him as a philosopher comparable in achievement to Aristotle or Kant). An example of such a

selection could possibly be Frege's essay 'Thoughts' from his posthumously published book *Logical Investigations*.

Despite this minor criticism of Westphal's choice of material, this anthology provides the reader with a wide-ranging approach to the concept of certainty within the context of Western philosophy, and can be highly recommended as a good introductory text for undergraduate courses in epistemology. Those who are concerned with a more advanced understanding of the theory of knowledge as it relates to recent philosophy of language and mind would benefit from this collection as well insofar as it provides a basis from which contemporary debate in these two areas can be both historically grounded and philosophically informed.

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R.S. Woolhouse
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The concept of substance in seventeenth-century metaphysics.
New York: Routledge 1995.
Pp. ix + 214.
US $49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-09021-0);
US $15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-09022-9).

In conversation, Woolhouse has told me that the publishers switched around the original title and subtitle of his book. This will not be a surprise to readers who will immediately see that this is, above all, a book about 'substance' in the seventeenth century. Perhaps the publishers were concerned that with the original title potential readers would come to expect a dry analytic approach to this rich period of philosophy. However, the truth of the matter is that in his book Woolhouse moves in a dazzling way between the discussion of the formal analyses of substance and the discussion of a rich set of metaphysical issues. The result is a book that leads the reader into the central philosophical problems of seventeenth-century philosophy. For example, in chapters 5-7 Woolhouse makes clear the way metaphysical issues concerning the nature of material substance were closely connected with scientific problems in mechanics which were central for Descartes and Leibniz, as well as other thinkers of the day such as Malebranche, Huygens and Newton.

Discussing Leibniz's views on the relation of extended substance to thinking substance, Woolhouse writes the following: 'Typically positive, he explained his view, not as a denial of Malebranche's, but as an advance or

development of it' (180). The kind of positive approach which Woolhouse ascribes here to Leibniz is characteristic of his own treatment of each of the philosophers he discusses in the book. While making clear their differences, he always sets their views in the context of those of their predecessors and stresses the continuity of ideas.

In the first chapter Woolhouse lays out the different accounts of substance in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* which he thinks were drawn on by seventeenth-century thinkers. While such a link back to Aristotelian philosophy is obvious for Leibniz who explicitly revived the Scholastic notion of substantial forms, Woolhouse claims that it is basic even for an understanding of Descartes. Descartes's idea of 'some properties being referred to others which are "principle" ' — i.e., extension and thought — is an echo of the Aristotelian view that 'some properties "flow from" and are explained by reference to others.' Descartes's belief that the phenomena of nature are all to be explained in terms of extended matter in motion is seen as a manifestation of this basic Aristotelian doctrine (20). So also can one understand the disappearance of Aristotelian secondary substances ('man, horse, oak') within Cartesian philosophy as the continuation of a trend in scholastic philosophy based on Books Z and H of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: these suggest a notion of substance as basic matter stripped of all qualities (Aquinas's '*materia prima*'). At the same time, Woolhouse is careful to show the differences between Cartesian and Aristotelian 'matter' and to make clear that 'unlike Aristotelian matter' that of the Cartesians 'has an essence or nature to which various modes or properties of material things are to be "referred" — a function previously served by substantial forms.' Indeed, Descartes's 'matter' is in this sense more related to Aristotelian forms (9, 24-5).

Woolhouse does not hesitate to set out his own interpretations of the philosophers he discusses, though through his excellent grasp of the secondary literature he makes us aware of alternate views. I was particularly challenged by his discussion in Chapter 6 of the principle of inertia as it appears in the writings of Descartes — having been previously convinced that Descartes had anticipated Newton's first law of motion in the first two laws of his *Principles of Philosophy*. Woolhouse argues that despite the apparent similarity between Descartes and Newton, Descartes still held that 'inertia' is an actual force in bodies, a view much like the medieval 'impetus' theory. The question is key for an understanding of the metaphysical question of the passivity of matter and God's involvement in the creation. I am still not certain of the correctness of Woolhouse's account, especially in the light of his admission that in Chapter 7 that Descartes can be seen as having anticipated Malebranche's occasionalism. Nevertheless, Woolhouse's analysis of Descartes's laws of motion in Part II of the *Principles* is typical of the care which he takes with his primary sources.

I found Woolhouse's account of Spinoza helpful in understanding the thought of that difficult philosopher. The second Chapter on 'Spinoza and Substance' begins with an excellent account of the difference between the analytic and synthetic methods of reasoning in order to prepare readers for

the forbidding rigors of the *Ethics*. After a careful discussion of the way in which Spinoza's concept of substance develops from that of Descartes, he argues against those who have claimed that Spinoza identified God with Cartesian extended substance. According to Woolhouse, when Spinoza identifies God and extended substance, he does not mean the created extended substance of Descartes; rather, it is the uncreated essence of matter which inheres in God in Spinoza's system. Moreover, Spinoza means something entirely different when he says 'God exists' than does Descartes: 'When he says "God exists" or "extended substance exists" he means it "essentially" rather than "existentially"' (46-9). If I understand Woolhouse correctly, this shows the error of those who think that Spinoza identifies God with the created universe itself.

Finally, let me mention the very helpful discussion in Chapter 9, in which the nature of the union of mind and body in the three thinkers is dealt with. Woolhouse begins by noting what has come to be recognized by most Descartes scholars, that he himself saw absolutely no problem about interaction between substances of entirely different kinds (166). Woolhouse traces the way this became a problem for his successors, partly because of further developments in physics which made it clear that such interaction would undermine the law of conservation of motion, or rather, directed motion. But what I found most revealing was Woolhouse's discussion of the close parallels of the accounts of Spinoza and Leibniz and the divergence of their views from that of Descartes. While rejecting Cartesian interaction, they both maintain that there is a one to one correspondence between mental events and those which occur in the body. This means that *all* bodily events — not only those in the brain — have corresponding mental events (182-3). Both philosophers also maintain that 'this non-causal correlation between body and mind is one of "representation" ' (184). Of course, for neither philosopher is the mental identified with what is explicitly conscious as it is for Descartes. Woolhouse's elaboration of these views can remind us how much present day discussions of the relation of mind and body take place within a framework which is basically Cartesian, and that a serious exploration of the full range of seventeenth-century views may well help us to see other philosophical possibilities.

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