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Daniel E. Anderson
The Masks of Dionysos
Albany: SUNY Press 1993. Pp. xi + 223.
US $44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1315-0);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1315-2).

This work comprises a commentary on Plato's *Symposium* and, in an appendix (125-51), an interpretative essay on the *Meno*. The presentation is expository, with most of the concise and competent scholarly disagreement being reserved for endnotes (153-86). The index is very detailed, occupying 33 pages. Anderson writes lucidly and clearly explains the grounds for his interpretation which is based on the text of the dialogue with minimal reference to other dialogues.

The 'masks' of the title signifies an interesting heuristic metaphor which guides the exegesis — the speeches of the *Symposium*'s personae express the viewpoints appropriate to so many 'masks' or roles adopted for public display. The characters are to be understood as hiding other facets of their personalities from themselves as well as from their audience. The leading idea is that Plato employs the notion of Dionysos as a 'life force' manifesting itself in all living things and so in all persons; and that there is no ultimate substratum or 'true self' underlying these manifestations, only indeterminate, ever-changing process. Platonic-Socratic self-knowledge is construed as 'a process of self-discovery and of self-creation' consisting in 'peeling away' layers of masks, to reveal (or even construct) previously unperceived aspects of the self. The *eros* of the *Symposium* is a process of personal growth which necessarily involves this sort of unmasking (8-9). Although this is an intriguing vision of Plato's intentions, it is not a compelling one. The dialogue indisputably trades in Dionysian imagery, but the 'masks' theme is not obviously a pervasive item in this commerce. Anderson candidly admits that the *Symposium* makes no mention of masks; the idea is only said to 'loom ever in the background' (10). A conservative interpreter might reasonably suppose that the background in which the idea looms is located in Anderson's mind rather than Plato's dialogue.

The commentary follows the order of the speeches, and frequently makes insightful suggestions about how the speeches are to be understood philosophically in relation to the cultural background and dramatically in relation to one another. The first chapter is devoted to the Dionysian imagery, the second to Pausanias and Phaedrus, the third to Erysimachus, Aristophanes, and Agathon, chapters 4-5 to Diotima's contribution, and the final two chapters to Alcibiades and Socrates. The psychological analyses of the characters are both plausible and enlightening. However, the major interpretive theme running throughout the work, although interesting, is extremely dubious. In harmony with the notion that Dionysus represents some sort of *élan vital*, and that this force is ontologically ultimate, the self is taken to be a 'process' capable of perpetual 'growth'. For example, Eryximachus and Pausanias 'don the masks' of lovers, Phaedrus and Agathon those of beloveds;

their common mistake is that they mistake these masks for their real selves. The tragedy of such exclusive identification is that the individual comes to believe any deviation from this self-image is 'self-destructive' and, driven by the desire to preserve the self, comes instead to destroy it, i.e. to freeze the process, contrary to the dynamic character of 'mortal nature' (74). Similarly, the eternal form of beauty invoked by Diotima is said to be an entirely inappropriate goal for human beings, and its pursuit 'necrophilic', because changelessness, however perfect, involves the negation of the 'life process' (86, cf. 122). To desire immutability is 'to desire death' (85). The invocation of the forms is said to be incompatible with the 'process view of the world' which Diotima espouses. For Anderson the problems of relating Forms to sensible things are insoluble and Plato has put forth two incompatible 'views of the world' with the intention of getting us 'to continue the dialectic' (99). Why we should do so, given this exegesis, is not clear. The motive for continual investigation doesn't seem to be the Sceptical desire to avoid adopting flawed hypotheses. Is it *better* understanding? But how can Plato hold out the epistemic lure of progressively more adequate understanding of the real without a firm *commitment* to Forms? After all, reality might otherwise be no more than the Heraclitean flux apprehended by the senses. Although I find his discussion of this issue unclear, my guess is that Anderson takes the inducement to further inquiry to be some sort of psychological fulfillment derived from harmonizing our concepts and goals with the process character of 'mortal nature'. On this view 'knowledge, insofar as it is conceptual, insofar as it has form, exists in order to be replaced. ... if the forms are perceived as immutable they bring the process to a halt. They destroy what life in its essence must be' (112). Since the *Phaedo* characterizes philosophy, for which Socrates is willing to die, as 'dying and being dead', there is room to doubt whether Plato shares this vision of the ultimacy of life-affirmation. Moreover, in the *Symposium* as in other dialogues, Plato seeks, not perpetual process, but *progress* towards some ideal — a vain expectation unless there really are standards by which such progress is to be measured. Since Anderson does not explicitly appeal to the usual substitutes for the ontologically real external standards he eschews — increasingly greater utility, coherence, precision, or comprehensiveness, he leaves it rather murky as to how, or whether, Plato can avoid the Protagorean relativism against which he perpetually fights.

The appendix on the *Meno* offers an interpretation akin to that of the *Symposium*. For example, writing about two passages on recollection, Anderson says, 'the implication is not that there is any certainty that one will learn something, but rather that one is a better person, more fully human, if one pursues learning than if one does not' (136). The famous 98A passage about tying down opinions with causal reasoning is taken to indicate, not merely that beliefs may be nullified by 'reasons for another, different belief', but that '*knowledge* is in its essence dialectical ... any given instance of knowledge must be viewed as open to the possibility of change' (148 my emphasis). The slide from 'belief' to 'knowledge' is painfully obvious; and it is hard to believe

that Plato would condone it. Anderson acknowledges that this conception of knowledge conflicts with the theory of recollection, which implies that genuine knowledge is immutable, and with Socrates's declaration that he knows that there is a difference between right opinion and knowledge. Here, at least, he explicitly recognizes the difficulty Plato would have avoiding the 'radical relativism asserted by the sophists' if he cannot confirm the difference Socrates proclaims. That task is said to require 'some sort of metaphysical claim' which the dialectical view of knowledge allegedly propounded in the dialogue will not permit, since all claims are subject to amendment or rejection in the light of newly recognized reasons (p. 150). Accordingly, the theory of recollection is played down as a questionable belief, as the doctrine of Forms was de-emphasized in his reading of the *Symposium*.

Despite disagreeing with, or being sceptical about, some of its key contentions, I find this book a commendable and engaging addition to the literature. Students of these two dialogues will profit by consulting it. If I may take the liberty of a personal note, I would like to add that I have known the author, who died early in 1993, since our graduate school days. Andy's commitment to the dynamic conception of human nature and the dialectical character of knowledge which he finds in Plato was personal and practical as well as hermeneutical. To engage him in serious dialectical play was to discover new insights, enlivened by wit to a degree to which his written words barely hint.

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Seth Benardete
The Tragedy and Comedy of Life: Plato's Philebus.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1993.
Pp. xiv + 250.
ISBN 0-226-04239-1.

To study philosophy is, very often, to study literature, and like contemporary literary theory contemporary history of philosophy has grown increasingly interdisciplinary. Seth Benardete has joined a growing number of classicists who have departed from the analytic style commentary, and has given us an invigorating and challenging new reading of Plato's *Philebus* in the mode of interpretation that was pioneered by Leo Strauss and popularized by Alan Bloom. Those for whom this method of reading a text is anathema will find little use for the present work; but for those who delight in the intellectually stimulating and novel readings that have characterized the Straussian

school, *The Tragedy and Comedy of Life* will provide much to enjoy and to ponder.

In addition to a literal translation of the *Philebus* that is remarkable both for its clarity and for its faithfulness to the structure and playfulness of the text, Benardete presents a very personal reading in the form of sixteen essays that proceed in a linear fashion through the dialogue. Although described as a commentary it should be noted that the essays differ markedly from traditional commentaries that proceed line-by-line. Benardete's essays are often meditative in nature, exploring themes and teasing out resonances with other dialogues. The important role that philology has to play in his methodology is evident from the start and Benardete's sensitivity to the finer points of Plato's Greek remains impressive throughout, but his primary concern is always with the larger whole of which the language is only a part. Finally it is philosophical analysis, not philological scrutiny, that underlies Benardete's project, and his analysis is supplied with few references to other commentators. Whether this is a failing depends very much on one's understanding of the purpose of a commentary in the broadest sense; certainly Benardete has succeeded admirably in providing thought-provoking commentary of a sort that has been lacking in many recent philological commentaries on the dialogues of Plato. While there will always be room for the sort of work that, say, Adams did on the *Republic* or Taylor did on the *Timaios*, commentaries should by no means be restricted to that kind of exercise in *Altertumswissenschaft*.

The influence of such works of Leo Strauss as *Persecution and the Art of Writing* and *The City and Man* will be evident to those familiar with Straussian hermeneutics. Prominent among the principles described in those books is the notion that there is much to be found between the lines in any Platonic dialogue, and for that reason the speeches must be interpreted in light of their surrounding context. But this context is itself set in the larger context of the dialogue as a whole, which, in turn, is set in the all-encompassing context of the Platonic corpus. To the Straussian, then, part of what it means to read a Platonic dialogue is to ferret out those elements that underlie a unifying interpretive stance that agrees with Friedlander that every dialogue is a carefully crafted part of a carefully crafted whole within which nothing happens by chance. According to this view the dialectic practiced by Socrates is itself an example of this hermeneutic — the elenchus is seen as a taking-apart and reassembling in an ongoing quest for greater understanding of the organic whole.

Benardete's approach to the *Philebus* is faithful to this Straussian hermeneutic of trying to explain the dialogue as a cohesive whole: he finds a set of thematic elements that he believes underlies every aspect of the dialogue and proceeds to explain, in the course of his essays, how these unifying elements can be found in the seemingly disparate elements of the text. The introductory essay serves to delineate some of the broader issues that Benardete thinks are fundamental to the structure of the dialogue as a whole. In particular the open-endedness of both the beginning and the conclusion of

the dialogue is taken as a figure for the open-endedness, or unlimitedness, of the dyad the-more-and-the-less, which Socrates explicitly likens to the *apeiron* at 24a9. This connection between the unlimited and the philosophical project of the dialogue is construed by Benardete as a metaphor for the good for humans, *viz.* the dialectical process itself, which is indeed pleasurable, but is not itself pleasure, nor is pleasure itself identifiable with the good. This connection between the philosophical issues of Plato's day (concern with limit and the unlimited, the one and the many, the dyads like the more and the less, etc.) and the project of the *Philebus* itself to unpack the good for humans as something more than pleasure, something less than pure thought, is at the heart of Benardete's analysis.

Few would question Plato's (or Socrates's) desire to separate pure pleasure from pure reason and exploit this dichotomy as constitutive of a proof that the good for humans does not lie in the direction of vulgar hedonism. But Benardete departs from the commonplace reading in trying to show how, once Socrates has divided pleasure and reason, he puts them together again and posits as the good for humans a mixed life of pleasure, pain, and mind that is supervenient on the combination of the parts. It is in this interpretation that Benardete articulates a genuinely Straussian reading of the dialogue. For those who may have been inclined to agree with Guthrie's rather prosaic dismissal of the *Philebus* as Plato's most 'weary' dialogue, Benardete's reading will provide some food for thought. Where Guthrie found 'a certain untidiness, and a lack of that precision which Plato himself singles out as the mark of real knowledge', Benardete finds beauty and unity.

The value of this book lies primarily in the freshness of its interpretation: it will not please everyone, nor will it prove to be the sort of book one assigns to undergraduates who are studying Plato's philosophy in broad outline — the views presented are far too personal for that — but surely it will serve to show that Plato remains an interpreter's gold mine. Certainly it will provoke comment from the philosophical community, offering as it does an implicit challenge to others to read the *Philebus* anew to see whether the Straussian approach can be a catalyst for further exploration and rediscovery.

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Aaron Ben-Ze'ev
The Perceptual System: A Philosophical and Psychological Perspective.
New York: Peter Lang Publishing 1993. Pp. ix + 220.
ISBN 0-8204-1872-2.

The rogues in Professor Ben-Ze'ev's gallery are Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and the whole tradition of 'perceptual dualism'. These philosophers envisaged a perceptual system with two separate stages: a contentless sensory stage followed by a perceptual stage in which meaningful content is added. With this they overthrew the prevailing paradigm, naïve realism, which lacked the conceptual resources to account for illusions and perceptual relativity. How, though, is perceptual dualism to explain the transition from contentless to contentful stages, particularly when lumbered with a sensory stage to which nothing positive can be attributed? Ben-Ze'ev raises this and other criticisms, making liberal use of psychological evidence (22-9). His aim is to shift the paradigm once more — this time to a model of perception which is 'constructive, direct, and in a certain sense subject-dependent' (11).

Ben-Ze'ev's heroes are Aristotle and Kant, who he credits with very subtle perceptual theories. One important aspect of these which he incorporates into his own model is a relational account of mental states. Out go mental entities, like the 'percepts' of perceptual dualism, and in come dispositional states which are kinds of capacities and belong to the whole system. The analogy he draws is with the shift of modern physics 'from a substantive-language referring to discrete entities to a functional language addressed to relational states such as fields' (33), — general relativity for the head. Stratification — the view that events can be described at a number of levels — also plays an important role in Ben-Ze'ev's model. The mental supervenes upon the physical, however it is irreducible to it since ascriptions of mental states cannot be translated into purely physicalistic descriptions (39). If this sounds Davidsonian, then of course it is. Ben-Ze'ev differs, however, in claiming that there can be 'lawful psychophysical *correlations*' (46) between physical and mental.

With these preliminaries in place, Ben-Ze'ev is ready to offer us an account of perception, which he does at length in chapters 3 and 4. Perceptual states are *'intentional state[s] of direct awareness of the environment'* (63). His dispositional theory allows him to identify them as ongoing processes and deny any role to internal subjective entities. Stratification, meanwhile, allows him to distinguish them from the neural foundations upon which they depend. The disappearance of subjective entities and mediating cognitive processes means that perception is direct once more. We do not, however, perceive the physical world. Rather, Ben-Ze'ev claims, there is a 'perceptual environment' which is the strata of reality relevant to discussions of perception. If this sounds Kantian, then of course it is. Ben-Ze'ev differs, however, in applying this approach only to perception, not to all forms of cognition.

Hence he can avoid the problematic notion of the 'thing-in-itself' since the physical world may be known through other cognitive capacities (94-5). There also seems to be a relation here to the 'to-handness' of the existentialists' world, which makes their almost complete absence from his bibliography surprising.

Such a view requires a new paradigm of perception. It is no longer sufficient to postulate an intellectual process inferring contentful mental states from uninterpreted sensations. Ben-Ze'ev's alternative is the 'schema paradigm'. A perceptual schema is 'the way a perceptual experience is organized ... [it] is a constitutive structure implicit in our perception' (121). Schemas participate in ongoing states of perceiving rather than mediating between the world and perceptions. They have much in common with abilities — hence perceptual learning is a matter of acquiring the ability to make more and better discriminations. Perceptual knowledge exists, but only in relation to a perceiver and their perceptual schemas, and even then it only gives us access to the world at one descriptive level.

The short chapter on illusions is the jewel in Ben-Ze'ev's crown since they are the original motivation for perceptual dualism. His answer, that the criterion of perceptual truth requires reference to normal conditions, neatly allows him to retain the direct approach to perception without dropping the common-sense idea that the explanation of illusions and relativity should make mention of the 'perceiver's' cognitive system. This would, of course, be rubbish if by 'normal conditions' he meant some single set of circumstances under which things 'showed their true colours'. Since, however, he relativises perceptual truth to context he cannot be accused of anything so unsubtle.

One area which requires more work is the relation between different levels of description. Searle's suggestion that lower levels cause higher ones might have been wrong (43-4) but at least it was clear, which Ben-Ze'ev's model is not. In this context he might have benefited from a more detailed examination of the relations between neurophysiology and 'higher level' functioning: for example the opponent processes model and colour perception. He might also have benefited from considering his model in the light of recent advances in artificial intelligence. Adoption of a microfunctional account of the mental, for example, might have cleared up this unclarity. Indeed, he comes close to just that when he says 'perceiving is not separate from the neural processes. Perceiving occurs when the processes are organized in a specific way' (68), however he fails to explore it sufficiently rigorously.

Beyond its obvious applications this book might be of interest to ethicists and aestheticians working on 'perceptual' and 'secondary quality' theories of value, who frequently lack a thorough account of the perceptual system. Ben-Ze'ev's model has the happy virtue of squashing such unproductive questions as 'are moral values real?' They are in some contexts and not in others. The way is then open to discuss the more interesting question, 'what sorts of reality do they have?'

Ben-Ze'ev is attempting to shift our paradigm of perception, and as such cannot avoid a degree of gesturing towards a solution. The great virtue of

this book is that, unlike some recent accounts, this is kept to a minimum. The work is well argued, interesting and, generally clear. His selection and command of psychological data is reassuringly impressive. More than that, he's just plain right. This book deserves to be widely read.

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Richard Bodéüs
Aristote et la théologie des vivants immortels.
Québec and Paris: Belarmin/Les Belles Lettres, 1992. Pp. 396.

This monograph undertakes an analysis of the relation between explicit and implicit theology in Aristotle's works. The explicit theology is contained mainly in Book Λ of the *Metaphysics*. The implicit theology is contained in numerous passages throughout the *corpus* where Aristotle makes claims about god or the gods. It is fair to say that the majority opinion among scholars is that the explicit theology includes all or at least most of what Aristotle actually believed about divine being whereas the implicit theology should be set aside as rhetorical or as unserious concessions to popular notions. Bodéüs aims to challenge the majority opinion. He argues that the implicit theology is highly traditional in content, that it represents Aristotle's own view, and that it actually informs the explicit theology by providing it with certain unargued for assumptions about the nature of divinity. In fact, according to the author the *only* theology in Aristotle is the traditional theology contained in Greek literature and civic life (12).

The book contains five clearly structured chapters, an important and lengthy appendix on the meaning of the word 'theology' in Plato and Aristotle, an exhaustive bibliography, and a complete *index locorum*.

The first chapter identifies a number of theses contained in traditional interpretations of the relation of the two sorts of theology in Aristotle. These theses are: (1) that the works of Aristotle contain an account of a science of theology, alluded to in E1 and K7 of the *Metaphysics*; (2) this science of theology is natural theology, that is, a science resting solely on the deliverances of reason; (3) the central text in which this account is contained is Book Λ of the *Metaphysics*; (4) this text represents Aristotle's authoritative view of theology; (5) other texts where Aristotle refers to the gods are not to be taken as his true view or at least they are subordinate to that view (17). After identifying these theses, Bodéüs proceeds to try to raise questions regarding

each one. He argues that these theses depend on unjustified assumptions regarding the nature of Aristotelian science and Aristotle's position regarding his own tradition (70-4).

In the second chapter Bodéüs moves to controvert the common interpretation which holds that Aristotle approached theology through his metaphysics of separate substance. Rather, it is more likely that Aristotle aimed to understand separate substance by using the traditional theology (76). In this regard, the analysis of *De Caelo* is of considerable importance. The author concludes that, for example, in speaking of superlunary substance, Aristotle is relying on the received 'doxologie' concerning the bodies of the gods (114). He is using, not rejecting, traditional notions.

In the third and fourth chapters the author explores in detail the import of the references Aristotle (and Plato) make to traditional theology. It is argued that Aristotle does not regard theology as a type of science and so its deliverances in poetry and custom are not to be understood in opposition to science. All the same, this does not prevent Aristotle, like Plato in *Laws* X, from reflecting critically on discourse about the gods, and concluding in support of the core beliefs of the tradition. This conclusion is particularly evident in chapter eight of Book Λ of the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle employs the popular conception of the gods as blessed immortal bodily beings in order to explain the multiple motions in the universe (202).

The last chapter is concerned mainly with Aristotle's many references to the gods in the two *Ethics* and *Politics*. Bodéüs argues that these two works reveal in Aristotle a sort of moral theology as distinct from the putative speculative theology of the *Metaphysics* (279-80). This moral theology concentrates not on knowing the existence and nature of the gods but rather on discovering the appropriate personal and civic behavior in relation to them and on recourse to them as paradigms of happy lives.

For Bodéüs, Aristotle's theological thought is essentially independent of scientific speculation on primary substance (285). Therefore, his speculative philosophy must not be seen as opposed to the basics of traditional religious belief (287). Aristotle's criticisms of that tradition must, accordingly, be seen as being from 'within' it rather from the 'outside'.

This book demonstrates an important truth about scholarship in ancient philosophy. That is, a slight alteration in perspective or in assumptions can open up exciting new ways of reading familiar texts. Approaching the Aristotelian *corpus* with the view that traditional Greek religion is for Aristotle a remnant of the pre-scientific history of the Greek people, one is apt to dismiss as unimportant or irrelevant many claims that are made about its contents. As soon as one recognizes this view as the ungrounded assumption that it is, a new and frequently illuminating perspective is opened up on Aristotle's thought. I think Bodéüs makes a strong case for the claim that Aristotle's criticism of popular or traditional religion is not made by one who wishes only to embrace what later came to be called the 'god of the philosophers'.

Nevertheless, there is a genuine opposition or tension between the view of god as final cause alone and the view of the gods as efficient causes. It is only for the latter view that it makes sense to speak about divine providence. A good indication of an ancient philosopher's attitude to the traditional gods is what he says about providence. For example, the Stoics' identification of providence with necessity goes hand in hand with their demythologizing analysis of religious myths and Epicurus's unequivocal rejection of providence allows us to evaluate the import of his seemingly benign references to the blessed lives of the gods. From this perspective, Aristotle and Plato seem to be quite different in their views. There is little in Aristotle that compares positively with the portentious claims made by Plato, for example, in the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*. For this reason, if the god of the philosophers is not the only god that matters for Aristotle, one can reasonably maintain that it is the god that matters most for him.

Bodéüs's book deserves the serious attention of all those interested in Aristotle and the history of Greek natural theology in its relation to the theology of the poets and the city-states. Although thousands and thousands of pages have been written on the texts that are the focus of this study, the author has in my opinion actually succeeded in saying many things about Aristotle that are original and likely to be true. What more could one ask?

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Thomas W. Busch and
Shaun Gallagher, eds.
Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics, and Postmodernism.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1992. Pp. xii + 263.
US $57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1139-7);
US $18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1140-0).

The eighteen essays in this volume, most of which are short pieces from meetings of the Merleau-Ponty Circle, situate Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological approach in the context of more recent discussions in hermeneutics and postmodernism. Though the authors differ as to Merleau-Ponty's precise place vis-a-vis these later movements, nearly all agree that the focus on 'ambiguity' found throughout his writings render him invulnerable to the charge of adhering to an objectionable 'metaphysics of presence'. Most also argue that his attempt to reconstruct (and not to abandon) traditional

philosophy and its problems marks a point of creative tension between Merleau-Ponty and the best known of his 'postmodernist' successors. The volume is divided into two rather loosely connected sections, 'Hermeneutics' and 'Postmodernism', with useful introductory essays to each part by Gallagher and Busch respectively.

Part one consists of six essays that, in the words of Gallagher's 'Introduction', seek to explicate Merleau-Ponty's 'oblique hermeneutics' (3). While the selections by Gail Weiss, Michael Yeo, and Glen Mazis focus on various aspects of Merleau-Ponty's own interpretative approach, those of Busch, Gallagher, and Gary Madison consider that approach in light of more recent authors.

Weiss leads off the section discussing the place of 'context' in Merleau-Ponty's conception of perspective. She argues against identifying a context of linguistic or perceptual significance with the metaphor of spatial 'horizon'. Yeo employs the distinction between fertile and stereotypic language in *The Prose of the World* to suggest how the ethical subject can attain to reintegration before the disturbing alterity of the other, by respecting rather than dominating the other. Mazis anticipates themes developed at length in the second part of the text, arguing that Merleau-Ponty's discussion of reversibility and 'the flesh' involves a critique of pure presence. More controversially, Mazis concludes that this culminates in his rejection of the 'subject' altogether (62).

Busch's essay traces the development of Merleau-Ponty's and Ricoeur's hermeneutical theories. Despite significant points of convergence in the later work of both writers, he concludes that, in contrast to the later Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur's writing remains squarely within a 'discourse of the subject' (34). Gallagher sketches how Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of language might be used to illuminate certain points in the Habermas-Gadamer debates. She argues that while Merleau-Ponty would concur with Gadamer's claim that language operates as a necessary constraint on all reflection, language's capacity to transform power structures permits it to effect a continuing critique of ideology (78).

The section concludes with the volume's lengthiest piece in which Madison argues for the startling conclusion that Merleau-Ponty had no theory of perception, at least insofar as 'perception' is understood either as the activity of a subject or as an event of the natural world. Madison sees Merleau-Ponty's position worked out most consistently in *The Visible and the Invisible* where he describes 'flesh' as 'a kind of primordial productivity', irreducible to any philosophical positivities (96).

Most of the ten essays in Part Two defend Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological approach from the charge that it invokes an indefensible metaphysics of presence. While essays by Geraldine Finn, Hugh Silverman, and Mark Yount tend to place that approach within a broadly postmodernist framework, those by Martin Dillon, Eleanor Godway, Gary Madison, Joseph Margolis, and Derek Taylor, find it superior in various respects to postmod-

ernism. Alphonso Lingis is alone in offering a more critical assessment of Merleau-Ponty's ontology.

Three opening essays by Madison, Dillon, and Silverman take off from each other's interpretations. Madison alleges that Merleau-Ponty's attempt to overcome oppositional thinking while maintaining a commitment to philosophy is undermined in Dillon's interpretation, with its appeal to a referential theory of truth and a 'pre-linguistic reality' (125). Dillon, while not denying a pre-linguistic reality, nevertheless offers a resourceful rejoinder to such a charge by arguing that Merleau-Ponty's language is 'allusive', still referring to an external world but not in the traditional mode of representational reference. It thus maintains ambiguity in reference while avoiding the unconstrained 'infra-referentiality' of Derridean *différance* (134). Arguing that Derrida himself need not deny extra-referentiality as Dillon charges, Silverman makes the case that Merleau-Ponty is best understood as firmly situated within postmodernism.

The essay by Taylor disputes Foucault's claim that Deleuze's 'phantasmic genealogy' of truth represents the decisive anti-Platonic (and anti-phenomenological) strategy, arguing that Merleau-Ponty's linguistics of 'divergence' marks a less equivocal embrace of ambiguity than Deleuze's approach.

Godway and Finn focus on political implications of Merleau-Ponty's work, especially as it bears on the liberation of oppressed groups. Godway uses the doctrine of reversibility to suggest a progressive historically situated politics that avoids both Foucauldian cynicism and Hegelian historicism. For Finn, Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the flesh implies a 'politics of contingency' that remains grounded in localized experiences of 'otherness' and thus opposed to all ideologies of totalization.

The following two essays by Dillon and Yount take up Merleau-Ponty's work in a Derridean context. Dillon 'deconstructs' Derrida's deconstruction of Husserl, concluding with an interesting defense of Merleau-Ponty's ontology of perception and time. Yount argues that re-reading Merleau-Ponty through the lens of Derrida's philosophy of *différance* reveals the former had already abandoned a metaphysics of presence.

Lingis criticizes Merleau-Ponty for adhering to an implausible 'one world hypothesis' in which perception is determined exclusively by practical objectives (228). He argues that the intentional fields of dreams, visions, and other non-practical phenomena are no less primordial in perceptual experience than those associated with practical activity.

The collection's final essay finds Margolis returning to certain aspects of Merleau-Ponty's politics as a means of understanding his relation to both modernism and postmodernism. He argues that while Merleau-Ponty's ontology of flesh does not reject the philosophical tradition in toto, it nevertheless 'subverts' it by 'experimenting ... with the conceptual fruitfulness of attributing to "subjects" what *in our discursive practice* is normally attributed to "objects", and vice versa ...' (254).

This volume is of interest not only to scholars of Merleau-Ponty, but to any reader interested in the scope and limitations of the postmodern critique

of philosophy. While most often brief in presentation and suggestive in their conclusions, taken together, the essays make a forceful case both for Merleau-Ponty's relevance in 'post-phenomenological' Continental philosophy, and for reexamining some of the claims of his successors.

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Albury Castell, Donald Borchert and **Arthur Zucker, eds.**
An Introduction to Modern Philosophy. Examining the Human Condition, 6th ed.
New York: Maxwell Macmillan 1994.
Pp. xii + 770.
ISBN 0-02-320092-8.

This is a heavy hardback with a pretty cover. There will no doubt be many people happy to have it on their bookshelves, and many of them will no doubt learn a great deal from the enormous amount of information it contains. For here we have almost 800 pages of excerpts from the writings of such great, dead philosophers as Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Mill and Sartre, as well as such minor, contemporary writers as Almeder, Bender, Blocker, Bridgeman, and Gert, clustered around such diverse questions as 'Am I a Body and a Mind?', 'What Grounds Do I Have for Belief in God?', 'What Things Shall I Call Art?', and 'When Can I Say "I Know"?', everything introduced, summarized and explained, and rounded off with biographical notes and, occasionally, some reading questions.

The book's formula is well-known and, I would say, by now definitely outdated. I take my hat off to the efforts made by Borchert and Zucker to produce yet another edition of Albury Castell's original anthology that first appeared in 1943, but I wonder why they considered such a book necessary now that libraries are overcrowded with Xerox machines and book shops with good, cheap introductions to and histories of philosophy.

The publication of this book raises interesting questions about teaching philosophy. Should an introductory class cover a wide range of topics? Should a beginning, subsidiary student read the original classics? Should one treat philosophy as a practice, or as a body of thought? I suspect that the editors of this book came up with all the wrong answers to these questions.

The book contains eleven chapters and an epilogue, covering most of the 'enduring' questions of philosophy with relatively much attention paid to existential questions. Such a wide range, and such an emphasis, might be of

interest to the student who will take no more than one class in philosophy, and, whether we like it or not, there will be many such students all around the world, and their numbers will have increased enormously since 1943. Reason enough to think hard about what we want to have them read. What *do* we want such students to learn, and remember, from their philosophy classes?

I can see the point of Castell's original conception. Let subsidiary students read a number of carefully selected excerpts from all the great philosophers of the past, he must have thought; make them acquainted with the canon of our tradition; group the selections around questions in order to give the impression that philosophy deals with perennial problems that are tremendously hard to solve because there seem to be too many plausible answers; give a sketch of the philosophers's arguments, paraphrase or interrupt the movement of their thoughts when they take too long or seem too difficult or unfamiliar for a beginning student; provide biographical notes, reading questions and an idea of how the following text relates to the one that precedes it. That must have been a useful idea in pre-Xerox days, at a time when introductions to philosophy were scarce and intended to be just that — introductions: stimulating the love of wisdom, not trying to provide its final satisfaction.

But is there a point in a 6th edition? I don't think so, and I got the impression that the editors from Ohio University must have been at their wits end on many occasions. The book has outlived itself, and in a desperate attempt to be faithful to the original plan — and to the publisher and audience, as well as the developments in contemporary philosophy — Borchert and Zucker have produced a text that looks like an untidy pile of dishes.

What worries me most is the large number of new selections written by unknown philosophers. There is nothing wrong with their writings — nor with the fact that the biographical notes reveal their connections with Ohio University — but it simply makes no sense to add to what used to be a collection of classics, new material specially written for this anthology. I can understand that the chapter on the mind-body problem begins with excerpts from Descartes's *Meditations*, and continues with excerpts from Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* (although I can't approve of half a page of platitudes entitled 'From Descartes to Ryle'), but I can only shake my head when I read five pages entitled 'From Popper to Bender', a piece in which the editors discuss the relevance of Freud's depth psychology for the free will/determinism issue, and find out in the biographical note on page 139 that John Bender received his PhD from Harvard in 1978, has taught philosophy at Ohio University since 1985, and is especially interested in epistemology and aesthetics. His essay may well be didactically fine, but it is not a classic, and will never be one.

Such editorial decisions make one wonder why the editors did not write a systematic introduction to philosophy, skipping the classics and thereby escaping from the questionable need to interrupt and paraphrase the writings of the great, dead philosophers.

Such a text would at least have been a book; this one is but a nice cover, enclosing a terribly unbalanced collection of words, that will be of interest only to those who think *one* book on philosophy is (more than) enough. Although I don't like such people, were I to give them advice I would not recommend this unsatisfactory piece of 'cut-copy-and-paste' that is neither a thought-provoking text nor a comprehensive encyclopedia, but rather any short book written by *any* of the great philosophers, one meant to be *not* the final tome on the subject.

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Stuart Zane Charme
Vulgarity and Authenticity: Dimensions of Otherness in the World of Jean-Paul Sartre.
Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press 1991. Pp. 255.
US $29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87023-740-3).

Sartre had an ambivalent relationship towards vulgarity. He was attracted to it because he knew that it was vulgar. It is this ambivalence which serves as the main thread through which Charme unravels Sartre's thought. 'Respectability and civility', Charme explains, 'define themselves in contrast to both vulgarity within society and the vulgarity of those outside it. Thus, the issue of vulgarity ultimately relates to who or what has been defined as other' (19). Simply put, vulgarity is a quality that the dominant social class attributes to other social classes, to the marginal and the common people. In other words, vulgarity is an ethnocentric term through which we distinguish and complement ourselves in contrast with the other.

However, 'the revenge of the vulgar', as Charme puts it, is that sometimes within vulgarity lies the possibility of authenticity. The vulgar, by not conforming with the norms of civil society, are also not being corrupted by civility and hence have the potential for an authentic existence. Consider, for example, the protests of the 1960s. The counter-cultural movement of the sixties sought self expression by rejecting the traditional norms of society. Vulgar language, vulgar behavior, fashion, sex and the celebration of emotional and physical openness were attempts to shed the chains of decadence and inauthentic society. The non-conformist, although deemed vulgar and often excluded from the crowd of civilized and respectable people, nevertheless stands a chance of discovering something genuine and authentic by being different. And this is something which the civilized and respectable people,

those who just follow the rules, will never be able to experience since they are lost and immersed in the norms of civility.

Nevertheless, despite its potential for authenticity, vulgarity also runs the risk of degenerating into the merely natural. A central element in the process of civilization has to do with ways in which humankind masters its primitive side. A person is said to become fully and authentically human only by transcending nature and rising above the level of instincts and impulses. 'Sartre's path to existential authenticity', Charme suggests, 'requires him to navigate between the dual threat and promise that lie within both civility and nature. Civility can be either a prison of bad faith or a refuge from the onslaught of nature. Conversely, what is natural can be a source of nausea that engulfs consciousness, or it can be an oasis in a desert of pretentious civility' (40). Hence, although civility often turns into a shallow, alienating and superficial process which is merely an inauthentic game, it also has the potential to lift the self beyond its crude physical nature.

As presented by Charme, Sartre was attracted to various forms of vulgarity and to various manifestations of otherness. Charme discusses some of the expressions of vulgarity towards which Sartre was attracted: scatology, ugliness, the obscene and certain repulsive scents. He goes on to examine the ways in which civility enforces its standards and defends itself by the use of shame, the gazing eye of society and laughter. In the second part of his book, Charme examines Sartre's ambiguous relation to various forms of otherness, such as: Jews, women, homosexuals and blacks. On the one hand he saw these alternative forms of life as means of escape from the inauthentic existence of bourgeois French life. On the other hand he sought to maintain a safe distance from the crude natural element manifest in these forms of otherness.

However, the various examples of vulgarity which Charme discusses are not the same in their relationship to authenticity and otherness. Charme fails to distinguish between two somewhat different senses of vulgarity. There is a difference between the vulgar other, which is part of another form of social life, and the vulgar non-conformist which is part of our society but fails to conform with our norms. Other forms of social life have their own norms and standards of civility. But not all forms of vulgar non-conformism are also alternative forms of social and cultural life. The non-conformist is often idiosyncratic; sometimes as a sophisticated rebel and sometimes in a naive and crude sense. These different forms of vulgarity raise different problems regarding authenticity and otherness.

Charme articulates Sartre's ambivalence towards vulgarity on two levels: on an intellectual level in Sartre's philosophical and literary work, and on a biographical level in Sartre's life. These levels of discussion illuminate one another and shed light on Sartre as both a man and a thinker. On the personal level, Sartre was raised in French bourgeois civil society. He feels that the norms of bourgeois civility are not genuine and experiences a sense of lack. Charme explains that 'Sartre remedied his sense of lack in two ways: by asserting an autonomous region of existential freedom independent of his social identity, and by identifying himself with an oppressed social group'

(144). In this manner Sartre deals both personally and philosophically with the problem of existential authenticity.

Sartre, the bourgeois Frenchman, needed the other to teach him who he was, namely a French bourgeois. But Sartre was not content in being who he was and instead sought to define himself by negation, a double negation. Sartre is a bourgeois due to his upbringing, and in this Charme suggests, Sartre negates the other. But Sartre is also critical of bourgeois civility and identifies in one way or another with various forms of otherness, thereby negating his own foundation. Charme suggests that 'out of this double negation, Sartre hoped to find something positive ... Two negatives make a positive' (23).

Do two negatives really make a positive? In mathematics, no doubt. But is this so for matters of personal identity? Does a person, or a culture for that matter, become authentic by negating both itself and the other? It seems that there is an important difference between, for example, a Jew living like a Jew and a French bourgeois living like a Jew. The first may or may not be authentic, the second is clearly an imposter and a fake. Charme's charitable reading of Sartre's attraction to vulgarity and otherness cannot save Sartre's notion of authenticity. In the end, and as a result of his double negation Sartre fails: He precludes himself from becoming an authentic bourgeois Frenchman, and yet lacks the natural and social background to become any one of the authentic others he discusses. Maybe this is what it means to be an authentic French intellectual?

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William Christian
George Grant: A Biography.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1993.
Pp. xxxiii + 472.
$39.95 ISBN 0-8020-5922-8.

George Grant thought 'it was always undesirable to write the life of a philosopher' (xxi) because the important matter is the truth of the writings not the details of the life. That truth, however, can be obscured by failing to appreciate the questions to which the writings are a response. And in this excellent biography, Christian argues that since Grant's distinctive philosophy 'grew out of his direct encounters with life' (93), the truth about the *man* is not a poor substitute for any truth in his *writing*, but rather a means of access to it.

The details of his family life (the Grants, Parkins, MacDonnells, Ignatieffs and Masseys), for instance, are woven together with names and events of national significance to open up an intriguing perspective on what it means to be a Canadian in the 20th century. In *Lament For a Nation*, Grant made this a philosophical question. His early education, undergraduate experience and first job as professor, moreover, was at three influential institutions (Upper Canada College, Queen's, and Dalhousie, respectively) which his father and grandfather helped build. So as Grant worked out his philosophy of education, he was also working through a deeply personal inheritance.

Grant was a 'visionary' says Christian: the questions imposed by the exigencies of life could only be focused and clarified through symbols drawn from life. Through his uncle, Jim MacDonnell, for example, Grant saw the culturally homogenizing alliance between big business and a technological mindset which reduced the pedagogical function of the university to training youth to fit into the existing scheme of things. Ed Sanders, Grant's colleague at McMaster, became a symbol of those forces in the humanities reducing traditions of art, philosophy and religion to research areas in the humanities.

While academic philosophers maintained a professional distance from these questions, Grant made brilliant use of the commercial press, the C.B.C., and public lectures to provoke thought outside the universities. Ironically, Grant's writings could well be described as 'Untimely Meditations', the phrase Nietzsche coined for a series of his own early works which similarly used symbols to identify and skewer realities obscured by the mixed signalling of massive detail or the tyranny of the reigning cultural narrative: the spiritual poverty of university education and research, the way power politics undermines national culture, the danger of scientism and 'cultural philistinism', etc.

Grant's writing is also infused with a quite different version of *seeing reality*: a radically Platonic vision which cuts through appearance to Reality, and history to Eternity, metaphysical dichotomies reflecting Grant's bedrock assumption of a perfect God transcending this imperfect world. His critical, 'untimely' seeing the way of the world is clearly dependent on this latter vision of a metaphysical ideal which is a perfect match for Grant's deeply polarized inner life. Indeed Christian's loving evocation of Grant's emotional responses to life, drawn from access to private letters and first hand reminiscences of family and friends, is the heart of the book.

On the one hand, the pain and suffering brought on by his work in London during the Blitz constituted a 'crisis' which almost broke him, and his mother's high expectations always evoked a feeling of emptiness and inadequacy. From boyhood, this 'chronic self-doubt' fuelled a need to be doted on by willing women. On the other hand, the fulfillment achieved while listening to Mozart, reading Celine, or simply by sitting amidst the stark beauty of his Terrence Bay ocean retreat, were aspects and intimations of the mystic consolation provided by his 1941 experience of God which thenceforth saved him from despair.

What, though, is the philosophical hold of this vision? Grant did not want to reduce philosophy to the production of arguments on questions raised by the literature, but the citation for his 1981 Cheveau Medal refers to 'one who in addition to being a critic proffers a vision by which a higher alternative comes into view and indeed becomes *intellectually cogent*' (339, emphasis added). Grant's higher alternative was best expressed in Plato and 'the primal and uncorrupted truth of the Christian revelation' (235). Yet authority rather than intellectual cogency supported Grant's crucial philosophical assumption: 'one cannot speak wrongly when one has Plato and Augustine and Kant behind one' (156).

His 'untimely' vision, for instance, was heavily dependent on Heidegger's critique of technology, and Nietzsche, who became Grant's favorite symbol of philosophical nihilism, was really Heidegger's Nietzsche. Yet Grant distanced himself from the authority of Heidegger precisely on the crucial question of the historicity of Being. On that matter Grant stood with Plato. The answer to the *why*, of course, lies in his vision of an eternal God, but we have no arguments elucidating the *how* of Grant's position. He planned but never wrote the major work defending Plato against Heidegger.

According to Christian, *credo, ut intelligam* is the point. Still, if an Ed Sanders produces a 'museum culture' which cuts off students from the living truth of Plato and the Gospels, what did Grant mean by truth? Insofar as he wanted to enrich 20th century thinking by fusing our horizon with the horizon of Plato or the Christian Gospels, Grant often sounds like Gadamer who shares Grant's indifference to narrow epistemological conceptions of truth. Yet Gadamer also conceives truth as essentially historical, so pursuing this fruitful philosophical avenue was precluded a priori.

Christian wanted to 'record for posterity the nature of this remarkable man, neither better or worse but just as he was' (xxi). He does not shy away from any embarrassing detail of Grant's life. But unlike recent books on Nietzsche (Nehamas), Wittgenstein (Monk) and Foucault (Miller), which also make plausible the idea that in certain thinkers, and in their strikingly different ways, philosophy is inextricable from life, he does not end up showing Grant to be a remarkable *philosopher*. Grant remains exasperating, because his life-transforming vision tied him to an unoriginal, Platonic-Christian framework which blunted as much as it sharpened his critical insight. Of course this is scarcely a criticism of the biography, and Grant's conviction that God is not dead but 'waiting' will ultimately have to be tested by time.

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Ilham Dilman
Existentialist Critiques of Cartesianism.
Lanham, MD: Barnes and Noble 1993.
Pp. xv + 179.
US $49.75 (ISBN 0-389-21004-8).

Ilham Dilman has in the past produced illuminating studies of Plato, Quine and Freud from a Wittgensteinian perspective. Here he provides a sympathetic discussion of some aspects of existentialist thought, drawing parallels with Wittgenstein, and showing how the existentialists' insights can deepen our understanding of such issues as the nature and status of the emotions, the mind-body problem, and freedom and self-knowledge. The title of the book could be somewhat misleading; this is not a general or comprehensive survey of existentialist responses to Cartesianism. Dilman discusses only three thinkers — Heidegger, Marcel and Sartre — and even Heidegger and Marcel are dealt with rather briefly. 'Cartesianism' is used in a very broad sense; Dilman is concerned, not with the details of Descartes's thought, but with the whole tradition of 'objectivism' which stems from his work. And Dilman is concerned not only with the criticism of objectivist ideas but also with the positive contributions that the writers he discusses have made towards developing a non-objectivist account of human beings. This book, then, is very largely a critical exposition of certain aspects of Sartre's philosophical anthropology.

Dilman starts with a brief exposition of the broad outlines of Cartesian epistemology. He then proceeds to set out — also in fairly broad outline — Wittgenstein's, Heidegger's and Marcel's responses to the Cartesian tradition. Dilman does succeed in bringing out the very considerable parallels between Wittgenstein's thought and that of the existentialists; they agree against Descartes that our basic relation to the world is not one of knowledge, of looking in as it were from the outside, but of participation. Immersed as I am in the world, I cannot abstract myself from it in order to question its existence; Cartesian scepticism is impossible. Having provided this general orientation, Dilman in Chapter 2 introduces his main concern, which is with the distorting effect of objectivist ideas on human self-understanding. The notion is deeply entrenched in our culture that people are to be understood on the same principle as things; scrutinised objectively, dispassionately, 'from the outside'. Cartesian dualism, for all its faults, at least preserved some awareness of the difference between people and things, but it still took the self to be a special immaterial kind of thing, to be known by a method of introspection, conceived on the model of physical perception. Dilman recommends a very different form of dualism, what he calls 'Existential Dualism', and he appeals to Charles Taylor as well as to Heidegger, in order to argue that to understand a human being involves understanding what significance things have for him, what shows up as salient in his world, what he understands himself to be. That the possibility of this understanding is ruled out by objectivism shows the bankruptcy of the objective approach and the

need for radically different approaches to the understanding of people and of things.

The first two chapters are very general and serve to set the scene for the more detailed discussions that follow. These focus on Sartre and aim to extract from his work a coherent non-objectivist view of the self which will not leave us committed to his more radical and melodramatic conclusions. An initial discussion of the emotions leads into the topic of good and bad faith and the question of what it is to have an authentic self-identity. Dilman then proceeds to endorse Sartre's (and Marcel's) anti-dualist account of the mind-body relationship before considering Sartre's views on solipsism. He accepts Sartre's anti-Cartesian arguments to the effect that my own psychic life is bound up with my recognition of the reality of others. However, he goes on to accuse Sartre of falling into another form of solipsism; I (any I) am not the centre of the universe, but I necessarily attempt so to make myself, and, as a result, to subject others to myself. Since I can never succeed, human relationships are always essentially conflicts. Dilman does a good job of unravelling Sartre's confusions here, which arise from his characteristic way of running together his often acute philosophical analyses with overgeneralised psychological observations. Sartre presents a contingent if widespread human failing as a universal human fate. Dilman here invokes Marcel again as a critic of Sartre, and for his suggestion of a more positive view of human relationships. A helpful chapter on Sartre's account of freedom follows. This is often dismissed as a piece of philosophical extravagance, involving an absurd underestimation of the limits on human freedom, but Sartre's account is more subtle than such dismissive critics allow, and Dilman provides a helpful and mostly very sympathetic reading of it. His main criticism is that Sartre's account is over-intellectualised. I am always free to respond in different ways to the situations in which I find myself; but it is misleading to suppose that I usually choose my response, if choice is taken to involve a process of conscious deliberation.

The central theme of the book is the nature of self-knowledge. For Dilman, self-understanding is essentially a matter of becoming clear about what matters to me; what I want to achieve, how I really see my life. This is not a matter of becoming acquainted with a ready-made entity of any kind; it is a matter of personal and moral growth. The failure to 'be myself' is not a 'failure of correspondence between the way a person actually is ... and some fixed inner reality which defines him independently of his own understanding of himself' (39-40). To gain self-knowledge is to become authentically oneself; it is to find projects and ideals to which one can commit oneself without reserve. Someone 'is "in touch with" himself in the sense that he lives what he feels about things. He knows what they mean to him, not just what significance they have in the culture to which he belongs. The direction of his life is now his, he is in the life he lives, behind his responses to things' (154). Dilman criticises Sartre's view that I cannot identify with, 'find myself in' any role, without falling into bad faith. But his own position also leads him to deny that self-knowledge can ever reveal to us that our characters are

unalterably fixed in a way which we abhor. Defending this view against D.Z. Phillips's criticisms in his last chapter, Dilman argues that Phillips concedes too much to the objectivist idea of the self as something which exists in a fixed state irrespective of what I think about it. If I can recognise that I am not as I should want to be, then there is at least always the possibility of building on that dissatisfaction, to strengthen that element within me that wants to change. I cannot, without bad faith, simply claim to look upon myself as an object with certain fixed characteristics of which I can only be the unhappy spectator. This debate seems to me inconclusive; self-knowledge is never like the knowledge of an object, but it is sometimes like discovering a reality that pre-existed the discovery and of which others may already have been aware. It is arguable that Dilman is attempting too essentialist an account here, trying to force all the complex phenomena of self-knowledge into a single framework.

Dilman's style is characteristically lucid and jargon-free. He does a good job of disentangling Sartre's important insights from the more dubious and extreme conclusions which he draws from them. As a demonstration or reminder to analytical philosophers of Sartre's significance for the philosophy of mind, the book works very well. Nevertheless, I was left with a sense that some of the deeper questions had been passed by. The title might lead one to expect a discussion of Kierkegaard's notion of subjective truth, and its radical difference from Cartesian 'subjectivism', or of Heidegger's placing of Descartes in his account of the decline and fall of Western metaphysics. It is perhaps slightly ironic that Dilman should have chosen to concentrate on the most Cartesian of the existentialists. Sartre's lonely, free *pour soi* confronting the inert and alien world of the *en soi*, is a clear descendent of Descartes's isolated ego facing an equally alien world of extended material substance. Other existentialists have been more radical in their criticisms of the Cartesian tradition.

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Thomas R. Flynn and **Dalia Judovitz, eds.**
Dialectic and Narrative.
Albany: State University of New York Press 1993.
Pp. xxi + 382.
US $54.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1455-8);
US $17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1456-6).

Dialectic and Narrative is the third and latest volume to appear in the International Association of Philosophy and Literature Series from SUNY Press. Collected herein are eighteen essays selected from over fifty papers presented at the April 1989 IAPL Conference at Emory University. Flynn and Judovitz have done a superb job of selecting eighteen excellent essays, organizing them according to six major topics and problematics, and providing introductions to each of these sections. This is a large volume of thoughtful and provocative essays that is best read over a period of several sittings.

Why, however, 'dialectic *and* narrative'? The medium of transmission, never ever appropriated, has always troubled the arbiters of coherence, consistency, and truth. The arbiters? A certain effect taking control of the transmission while being 'constituted' as symptoms of the very order it then attempts to appropriate (Freud-Lacan)? Is the philosophical subject incurably hysterical?

Turning toward this troubling matter, 'the linguistic turn', is recurrent in one form or another. The differing results of this turning all too often remarking the disseminations of Plato's narrative of Socrates's dialectical seduction of the son of vain man and lover of speeches — the in-finitely seducible Phaedrus. Yet, the 'masters' of language must always succumb to its otherwise ways. At and with its 'end', the Subject-Object Identical cannot but speak otherwise ... than Truth, Beauty, the Good, Being. What is brought to us, now and then, is something differing from the extreme measures (dialectics) attempting to control its passage (narratives) through the sending.

Philosophy begins by crossing the borders it sets forth as the framing of its fictive beginning: 'That philosophy is always only the discourse of the desire for self-sufficiency testifies that it is never yet the fulfillment of this desire. And this duplicity — whereby philosophy achieves originality and totality by leaving out that which left out belies its totality and left in betrays its originality — this duplicity, though historical, is no mere historical occurrence but the self-deconstructing moment in the definition of that which by definition is self-defining' (15). Philosophy, in other words, is otherwise than its 'self-sufficient' subjects — 'Think of the case of the Liar', Wittgenstein suggested. 'It is very queer that this should have puzzled anyone — much more extraordinary than you might think: that this should be the thing to worry human beings' (257).

The recognition of duplicity by and within subjects within the self-deconstructing moment of philosophy's self-definition gives rise to what Lyotard calls 'thought in dispersal' and 'clouds of narrative language elements'

(118-19). Foucault's 'epic history of modernity', *Les mots et les choses*, tells the voyage of these dispersions 'throughout the world's mirrors to imprisonment within the confines of modern discourse, then to freedom in a new dispersion' (147). What is at stake in this self-deconstructing movement is not the solitary fate of the fictive self-sufficient arbiter of truth, but the very idea of one world — the unicity.

Also at stake are related attempts at imprisonment that confine narrative to drama and thus to 'the logic and chronology of the Aristotelian *logos* and *mythos*' (214). Thus the notion of a hysterical [philosophical] subject may itself be another masked 'unicity' rather than a moment of philosophy's self-deconstructing process. Unlike this deceptive representation, 'the narrative self, though not entirely exclusive of the "dramatic identity" of the ego as capable of staging its fictions, is nevertheless a space of subjectivity that can be characterized as a dialogical self, as a "subject in process", the empirical (or dramatic) subject intertextualized' (222). The narrative self is not completely staged on the horns of the modernized tragic-oedipal / poetic anti-oedipus dilemma. Oedipal triangulations and their 'other' do indeed engender hysterical subjects in pursuit of their 'lack', but that is only one of the many stories of the narrative self.

The narrative self-reader will enjoy her meanderings through these superb texts. Self-recognition becomes less momentary as thought's freedom celebrates and explores its diaspora. *Dialectic and Narrative* is a very important contribution to the emancipatory potential of our postmodern condition. The 'real, authoritative world' of 'uncontaminated philosophy' is not so much a thing of the past as a now recognizable fiction with less-than-neutral alliances with those powers dead-set against the liberation of local rationalities, dialects, and communities of difference. The internal critique of modernity — postmodern thought — is for some nothing more than a chaos of interpretation (Nietzschean nihilism). What these critics miss is the urgent and very difficult sense of responsibility pervading postmodern thought and its often perplexing contestations of modernity's insistent denials of its discredited concepts and ideals. The essays that make up *Dialectic and Narrative* are responsive to this challenge.

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Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed.
The Philosophy of A.J. Ayer (The Library of Living Philosophers, Volume XXI).
La Salle, IL: Open Court 1992. Pp. xix + 696.
US $54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9172-5);
US $26.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9173-3).

Bertrand Russell once called this series 'the library of moribund philosophers'. The image thus raised has often been apt; the problem being that volumes it contains generally appear after their subjects have done their most noteworthy philosophical work, but before that same work has been around long enough to attract the serious attention of historians. The result is a series of books which occupy a kind of philosophical purgatory. They are filled with articles by first rate philosophers which summarize the subject's contribution to various areas in philosophy, and which offer (usually gentle, and usually well known) criticisms of the subject's views. The subject supplies an intellectual autobiography (which in many cases is a condensed version of an already published one), and replies to the critics. But although everything is of generally good quality, these are not books which usually beg to be read.

While the Ayer volume holds to the established pattern, it is clearly one of the better volumes in the series, for it differs from others in an interesting way. Ayer was an enthusiastic traveller through much of his life, and he managed to make contact with philosophers wherever he went. In putting together the present volume, the editor had the good sense to invite some of these far flung scholars to contribute to it. As a result, the volume contains several fresh and interesting discussions of a variety of Ayeresque topics from scholars in, for instance, Peru, China and Bulgaria. The remainder of the papers have more familiar origins: well known students and colleagues of Ayer have contributed a broad range of papers which range from interesting to terminally dull. I will have more to say on both groups below.

A.J. Ayer's primary intellectual legacy is (and is likely to remain) his popularization of a version of positivism, contained in his *Language Truth and Logic* (1932; 1946. Hereinafter LTL). Much of the English speaking world, in fact, first learned about the Vienna Circle by reading LTL (Rolf George's translation of Carnap's *Aufbau*, for instance, did not appear until 1967, and the Vienna Circle Collection did not begin to appear until even later). While Ayer's presentation was masterful in its clarity and forcefulness, what he presented turned out not to be the views of the Vienna Circle per se, but, as Tscha Hung points out in a fine article entitled 'Ayer and the Vienna Circle', was rather an amalgam of its views run together with those of the earlier British empiricists, plus Russell and Wittgenstein. While Ayer was perfectly clear on the point (the preface to the first edition begins 'The views which are put forward in this treatise derive from the doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein ...,' and only later does he mention the

Vienna Circle), many assumed that his views were basically those of the Circle, and it wasn't until the recently published work of Alberto Coffa, Michael Friedman and others that the non-empiricist influences on the Vienna Circle have come to be broadly recognized.

Papers in the volume focus on various well known aspects of Ayer's own version of foundational empiricism, including, most prominently, meaning and truth (Evandro Agazzi), pragmatism (James Campbell), verificationism (Michael Dummett), truth (Paul Gochet), causation (Ted Honderich), and other minds (Timothy Sprigge).

The best of this group is Dummett's ironically titled *The Metaphysics of Verificationism*, which begins with the old conundrum about the status of the statement of the principle of verification (i.e. is *it* verifiable?). Settling on the received answer to the question (the statement has the status of a theoretical principle, and is thus out of the running for verifiability), Dummett asks what the world must be like for the principle to hold — hence the metaphysics mentioned in the title. His answer, though poorly supported, is that phenomenalism must be true. Though the conclusion is not a surprise, Dummett's attempt to figure out how reality in general is mirrored in the assumptions of positivism is an interesting twist on an old topic.

Other papers in the volume are concerned with more global topics (Anthony Quinton on Ayer and ontology, Arne Naess on Ayer on Metaphysics, and Martin Hollis on Ayer on Social Science, for instance). In nearly every case, reading these papers is like being transported back in time and dropped into a meeting of the Aristotelian Society in the late 1930s or early '40s. Can one be a reductive phenomenalist without accepting the existence of qualia? Is the statement of the principle of verification itself verifiable, or is it analytic? The issues which engaged the philosophical community of the day rise up from these pages to live, however briefly, once again.

However, while the volume will be of interest primarily to those studying the content and development of Ayer's thought in particular, or the development of analytic philosophy during the period more generally, reading it produced another marked effect. The reason why many of these papers are not particularly exciting reading is that they cover ground now thoroughly ingrained in our common understanding of the development of contemporary analytic philosophy. But though the discussions tend to be somewhat old hat, by reading them one comes to realize how very central Ayer was in that development. No topic is untouched. Ayer left a recognizable mark not only on the various categories of epistemology, but on ethics, aesthetics, logic, philosophical psychology, and other areas as well. The very familiarity of the contents of the papers in this volume is testimony, in other words, to Ayer's reach, and to his impact.

Finally, though much of the volume travels well worn paths, there are some surprises. Ayer had the ability to bring a sense of excitement to philosophical debate, and that same quality is evident in some papers written by those who seem to have come in contact with his ideas relatively recently.

I have already mentioned Tscha Hung's paper on the Vienna Circle above. In addition, Azarya Polikarov and Dimitri Ginev's 'Remarks on Logical Empiricism and some of A.J. Ayer's achievements: Some fifty years later' also has the feel of a fresh look at some long lived topics.

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Hilde Hein and **Carolyn Korsmeyer, eds.**
Aesthetics in Feminist Perspective.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1993.
Pp. xv + 252.
US $39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-32861-6);
US $14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-20774-6).

As the authors of this important anthology point out, 'philosophical aesthetics has remained relatively untouched' by feminist scholarship 'until recently' (vii). However, this changed in 1990 with the appearance of two special issues of philosophical journals: the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* and *Hypatia*. This anthology is a much expanded edition of the Summer, 1990, special issue of *Hypatia*. Because it attempts to create a discipline, rather than present papers on a single theme, this work contains articles (17 in all) which are loosely connected by the topic Feminist Aesthetics. For the most part, however, each paper constitutes a subject matter of its own. As a discussion of each would be impossible, I will concentrate on those papers I found most interesting and suggestive (with apologies to the many left out).

Lauter argues, in 'Re-enfranchising Art', that feminist theory brings to art a perspective missing from traditional formalist accounts of both aesthetic properties and correct response. She argues that 'feminist thought re-enfranchises art by revisioning its relationship to its contexts' (21). Although women's quilt-making may seem an overworked example, Lauter does an excellent job showing that formalism can not, on its own terms, justifiably exclude just those objects it did exclude. As she says, 'It is hard to look at quilts now in the wake of feminist research without asking how they came to be devalued by a dominant *formalist* aesthetic theory, since they ... are often so excellent in design, anticipating by half a century or more the principles of collages, of geometric abstraction, and even of art based on optical illusion' (23). The sin, it seems, was in their use (or rather, assumed use). As Donovan points out, in 'Everyday Uses and Moments of Being', Western art and aesthetics, since Kant at least, has focused on 'masterpieces', objects divorced from the 'real' world. However, as feminist art history has shown, there is more going on in the quilt case and many others which Lauter

cites. Donovan's paper suggests literary sources which might be helpful in developing Lauter's views. Donovan points to ways in which Virginia Woolf, Sarah Orne Jewett, Willa Cather and Alice Walker all defended or exemplified nondominative, and non-formalist, aesthetics, and in so doing presented 'an aesthetic theory where art remained embedded in and arose out of conversation with the contingent, everyday world' (64). I found the reading of Woolf particularly interesting and recommend it to others. Lauter also argues for the development of a feminist theory which avoids many of the errors in theory making, and we hope in application, that have been the demise of formalism.

French asks 'Is There a Feminist Aesthetic?' although her paper actually considers the question, 'What would art have to do or be in order to be feminist art?' Her answer includes three essential properties: all art must be vital; additionally feminist art sees reality from a feminist perspective and it endorses female experience. The next paper, by Sheppard, seems to answer French's title question: Yes, there is a feminist aesthetic. The work of feminist cartoonists during the suffrage debate 'demonstrated an outlook which focused on women's perspectives, placed women in a particular social context, and called women to collective action' (88). This article presents not only feminist art, but an entire art form not captured by the traditional theories critiqued in the earlier papers. It functions as a nice example and something of a summary of the theoretical perspectives presented elsewhere in the collection.

'Feminine Perspective and Narrative Points of View' is Barwell's interesting and detailed account of narrative points of view. She argues that we can make sense of the concept of a feminine point of view, which may or may not be feminist, by looking at the 'structural features of works' (94). She distinguishes the fictional system, which includes the actual narrator and audience, from the hypothetical system. 'The hypothetical narrator chooses the fictional narrator ... [and] the point of view from which the narrative will be told' (99). When the point of view of the hypothetical narrator is feminine, the work presents a feminine perspective. This is an excellent paper — must reading for anyone interested in the relationships between works of art (and their internal structures) and readers (and their placement with respect to the work's structures).

Turning from the text to the reader, Robinson and Ross use Gilligan's work, and critiques of it, to develop an understanding of the difference between a female and a feminist reading of a text, in 'Women, Morality, and Fiction'. Drawing on some very interesting work by literary scholars (Kolodny and Kennard) as well as philosophers (Friedman, Nussbaum, Cohen), they defend the claim that one's life and politics not only do affect one's reading, but affect what one sees and can see as salient aspects of the text. In 'Analogy as Destiny', Cantrell suggests a form of 'reading as a woman' which allows the 'act of reading' to be 'more than an act of resistance; it [becomes] an act of recovery' (226). She claims that feminist insights into the hierarchical nature of philosophy's dualisms provides a reading of Beckett's

Molloy which reveals a 'language of gender' (219). However, not all women will see themselves in the woman reader Cantrell constructs. For example, I did not experience 'Molloy's description of his own birth' as the 'hostile rewriting of the actuality' of my body. Contrary to Cantrell's claims, there may be more than one 'woman reader's point of view' (224).

The last set of papers in the collection is the most dependent on knowledge of philosophy and the history of philosophy. Readers less familiar with feminist thought might start here. In 'Beautiful Exiles', Wiseman uses many of the insights about reading 'as a woman' developed in other papers and applies them to reading the history of philosophy. Although philosophers have been trained to look at the theoretical implications of our philosophical ancestors, Wiseman asks us to look at what was said about women. The bad guys here are Kant and Aristotle, those who treat women as the beautiful other, outside of morality; the good guys are Socrates and Descartes, those who might provide examples of how women can read, communicate, and re-create themselves despite their exiled status.

Two papers should serve as models for feminist critiques of the history of philosophy. 'Discipline and Silence', by Kneller, claims that taste and femininity in Kant's philosophy share three similarities: both 'further culture'; 'both are set up as socially organized and imposed practices'; and, unfortunately, both are 'effectively "silenced"' (180). Familiarity with Kant's facultative view of the mind is recommended but not essential. 'Dressing Down Dressing Up' is a wonderful analysis of philosophy's 'fear of fashion' and a defense of Hanson's claim that 'feminism may be a corrective therapy for philosophy's bad humor and self-deception' (229). I recommend that feminists read both of these papers carefully and apply these methods in other areas.

One other paper needs mention. Hein argues in her opening paper, 'Refining Feminist Theory: Lessons from Aesthetics', that feminist theory can learn from aesthetics, another marginalized discipline. The points of intersection include the consideration of personal experience and the toleration of changing objects of analysis — art changes and so do people. The paper is also sensitive to the limits of this very model. For example, 'the doctrine of aesthetic disinterestedness is a case in point' (10) as it asks women to ignore their own subjectivity and very interested responses, despite their 'figuring all too frequently as the matter displayed and transcended in art' (12).

Taken as a whole, this is an interesting and important collection. Feminists and aestheticians should be grateful to Hein and Korsmeyer for their efforts in bringing together these ground-breaking papers.

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Robert Howell
Kant's Transcendental Deduction: An Analysis of Main Themes in His Critical Philosophy.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992.
(Vol. 222 in the Synthese Library: Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Jaakko Hintikka, managing ed.)
Pp. xxiv + 424; bibliography, index.
US $131.00 (ISBN 0-7923-1571-5).

Robert Paul Wolff describes Howell's work as 'the most important contribution to Kant-interpretation in the past quarter of a century'. The result of more than 20 years of labor in the Kantian vineyards, Howell's work deserves attention for two reasons. First, the Transcendental Deduction is arguably both the most crucial and the most daunting element in Kant's theoretical philosophy; Howell's volume is one of only two book-length studies of the Transcendental Deduction in English. Second, Howell's work itself constructs an intricate framework of argument and criticism — one approaching its object, Kant's critical philosophy as unveiled in the first Critique, in complexity. This complexity is due in part, for example, to Howell's exemplary — and successful — efforts to untangle numerous problematic ambiguities in Kant's terminology and doctrine before proceeding further. More generally, Howell's essentially book-length argument regarding the Deduction and its failure demands the sort of study which we associate with a primary text in philosophy. Hence, as both commentary and critical analysis, Howell's book will become standard reading for Kant scholars concerned especially with the intricacies of the Transcendental Deduction and Kant's theoretical philosophy at large.

The book is divided into two main sections. The first five chapters explicate Kant's 'picture of knowledge' — both on an expository level, as Howell carefully lays out his understanding of Kant's epistemology, and on an argumentative level, as Howell examines with great care the fundamental ideas at work in understanding the structure and argument of the Deduction. In particular, Howell turns in Chapter 4 to the second version of the Deduction (i.e., the version Kant offers in the second or 'B' edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1787). Here Howell argues for the view of several well-known Kant scholars — most notably, Dieter Henrich — that the B Deduction is to be understood as a two-stage argument. Only the first stage is crucial for Howell, and so Chapters Six through Ten explore in detail this first half of the B Deduction. In his treatment of the Deduction, while thus following the lead of many (but not all) Kant scholars in its focus on the B version, Howell develops his own approach, especially as he takes up contemporary notions — specifically, intensionality (as a carefully defined characteristic of linguistic claims/sentences) and developments in modal logic. Howell is careful to distinguish, however, between the analyses he

develops *within* the historical context of Kant's thought (which would recognize, for example, Kant's notions of logic as defined largely by Aristotle), and those analyses which exploit more contemporary understandings (e.g., critiques of Aristotelian logic, analyses made possible by modal logic, etc.). In this light, Howell's text is less a commentary offering line-by-line guidance through the whole of the Deduction — and more an extended debate between Howell and other significant Kant interpreters regarding the Kantian text, possible characterizations and reconstructions of that text, and the meaning(s) and (in)validity of what is then taken to be Kant's argument.

While Howell's sustained and careful examination of the Deduction thus honors the Deduction through its attention to virtually every detail, those who hope to find in Howell a final defense and affirmation of the Deduction will be disappointed. Howell finds the Deduction to fail, primarily for lack of evidence in support of several of its main claims (e.g., about the unity and necessity of apperception, the unity of elements of intuition in the concept of an object, and the logical functions in relation to the categories). Howell points out that the acknowledgement of this failure is extraordinarily significant, precisely in light of the central importance of Kant's philosophy in modern thought and in light of contemporary debates which still swirl around the epistemological themes raised by Kant. Howell's Chapter Ten focuses on several of the most significant consequences of this failure especially with regard to Kant's own philosophy· this discussion alone will be of interest to every Kant scholar and contemporary philosopher. For Howell, out of the ruins of the Deduction as he has deconstructed it, the original thrust of the Deduction remains of interest — now in the form of a question, namely, '... whether from general facts about us as language users and thinkers — and about our relations to the situations in which we speak, think, and attempt to know — we can draw important conclusions concerning the structure of objects and the world' (319).

Though he is quite careful to anticipate and counter a wide range of possible objections to the views he develops, Kant scholars will no doubt take Howell to task on several levels — ranging from the most particular details of argument and analysis to his most general approaches and claims (e.g., whether his use of contemporary notions of intensionality and the tools of modal logic successfully avoids anachronism; his arguments for the priority of the B Deduction over the A Deduction; the restriction in his analysis to the first half of the deduction, etc.). Howell's analysis of Kant thus promises to be extraordinarily significant for both Kant scholarship and contemporary debate. This further means, however, that Howell does not write for the philosophical novice. Advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and instructors will find the opening chapters useful guidance and orientation to Kant's picture of knowledge, the significant philosophical problems therein, and the wealth of pertinent secondary literature. But Howell generally assumes a reader who is rather intimately familiar with both Kant's epistemology and especially the text and broad arguments of the first Critique. Such readers will not only benefit from Howell's analysis and erudition, they

will also enjoy the leisurely but careful tour Howell leads through Kant's text and argument. Howell is careful to assist such a reader: he is usually generous in both his discussion and in the extensive footnotes with the necessary references to pertinent passages in the Kantian corpus and to significant secondary literature.

In sum, this book promises to figure prominently in future scholarly debate over Kant's Transcendental Deduction and his theoretical philosophy at large. Despite its strikingly high cost, it belongs on the shelf of every research library and serious Kant scholar.

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J. Donald Moon
Constructing Community:
Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts.
Princeton University Press 1993.
US $29.95 (ISBN 0-691-08642-7).

Though the title may lead one to expect an analysis of moral pluralism as a moral theory, J. Donald Moon's *Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflict* is more precisely an analysis of the political ramifications of moral pluralism. Rather than defending moral pluralism (on page 4, Moon says 'plurality is intrinsic to the human condition') Moon offers a defense of 'political liberalism', which he describes as a 'strategy for constituting political order under conditions of moral pluralism' (8). More precisely, Moon argues that, unless moral pluralism is protected by the political system, there can be no truly inclusive community.

Moon describes an inclusive community as one which has 'a politics in which the principles governing human relationships are fully and freely accepted by everyone who is a party to those relationships' (3), and it is precisely because Moon's interest in moral pluralism is *political* that inclusivity is essential. Moon argues that 'liberal political theories are, above all, theories about *politics*, about the ways in which public power can and should be organized, and the ends to which it should be directed' (45); because politics involves regulation, because it suggests that adjudication between conflicting parties, the threat to inclusivity is inherent in the organization and use of political power. Given that Moon's account of inclusivity requires the acceptance of governing principles, the imposition of principles upon an individual who does not accept their legitimacy implies an exclusion. And

Constructing Community is an argument that such exclusionary imposition is inevitable if moral pluralism is denied.

Moon argues that 'the principles and institutions that appear to be necessary for the liberal strategy, and that are intended to be inclusive, function in such a way as to burden or even exclude some citizens' (11): the first half of the book offers a critique of the 'liberal strategy' in support of this point. In Chapters 2-4, Moon shows how political theory in general (and liberalism in particular) may unintentionally rest on non-pluralistic moral values which undermine the inclusivity which is required by moral pluralism. The discussion in these chapters is rich and far-reaching, and well worth reading for the many insights evident in these pages. In Chapter 2, for instance, Moon argues that appeals to reason or autonomy are themselves pluralistic; any attempts to diminish the pluralism — to say that only some conceptions of reason or autonomy 'count', or to structure a political system in such a way to privilege a particular conception of reason or autonomy — will result in just the exclusion that liberalism should avoid. His discussion in this chapter covers authors ranging from Thomas Hobbes to Michael Walzer, Martha Nussbaum and Charles Taylor: he thus casts his net beyond the expected defenders of liberalism. In Chapter 3, Moon turns his focus to contractarians (broadly construed to include Robert Nozick and Herbert Morris as well as David Gauthier and John Rawls) in reminding us that setting off a private realm in which one's pluralistic values are protected cannot protect inclusivity when there is disagreement about whether a particular value belongs in the private or public sphere. In Chapter 4, Moon turns to attempts at grounding liberalism in accounts of the *process* of 'free agreement' of participants: Rousseau, Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib are among the subjects of this chapter. Again, however, Moon warns that 'this model of discourse constrains the considerations that participants can bring up, and thus may prestructure that process in ways that may be adverse to the needs and aspirations of certain groups' (74); the result, of course, is exclusion. Thus, Moon reveals how even the 'thin' conceptions of society, self and discourse can nevertheless yield an exclusionary political theory.

So, how does political liberalism avoid the downfalls of these other approaches? Moon begins by defending political liberalism on largely formalistic grounds. He argues that rather than being based on an ontology of human nature, political liberalism is a *strategy* to achieve political community' (98): indeed, Moon argues that political liberalism takes *'political community itself as an aim'* (8, my emphasis). As a strategy, it adopts the model of generalized discourse, in which citizens engage in discussions 'with the aim of discovering norms they can accept' (98). Since the very nature of pluralism implies that neither an appeal to the ontology of human nature nor an appeal to a prestructured debate can guarantee continuing inclusivity — the acceptance of moral pluralism makes it impossible to predict the full range of disagreements, or to deny the possibility of the development of different voices in the future (100) — political liberalism must essentially

remain open to critique. It is worth noting that, since the point here is about the uncertainty inevitable in moral pluralism, the 'critiqueability' of political liberalism must remain in the abstract, without a substantive account of how this 'openness to critique' will play out.

This does not mean, however, that political liberalism is purely formalistic: a substantive commitment to agency is evident in Moon's analysis. However, it is important to see that Moon is offering the thinnest possible analysis of agency, one which is not dependent on the non-pluralistic assumptions he rejected in the discussions in Chapter 2-4: Moon argues 'although political liberalism rejects the essentialist claims of these theories, it can appropriate much of their analysis of the connection between agency and rights' (110). In Chapters 6-8, Moon discusses the sort of conflicts that political liberalism can give rise to because of the primacy it accords to agency: the analyses in these chapters is especially insightful for the recognition (which Moon requires of political liberalism) that threats to inclusivity of the moral community are the results of 'particular objections and frustrations that arise in specific institutional contexts' (121). In the end, Moon argues that political liberalism may, at some moments, find that the only solution to conflict is the suppression of some voices: this is the source of the 'tragic conflicts' of the title.

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Alan Musgrave
Common Sense, Science and Scepticism: A Historical Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993.
Pp. xiii + 310.
US $54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-43040-2);
US $17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-43625-7).

'The theory of knowledge or epistemology', according to Alan Musgrave, 'is actually a long and still unfinished war between dogmatism and scepticism' (10), and he has written *Common Sense, Science and Scepticism* with two aims in mind. The first aim is to introduce first year students to philosophy through the history of this 'battle' and the current status of the battlefield. His second aim is to take up what he sees as the position best placed to end the battle.

He begins the book with the no-surprises analytical philosophy definition of knowledge of a proposition p as justified true belief that p. Yet surely all attempts to justify our beliefs, relying as they must on further beliefs, will lead to some sort of infinite regress. Thus is scepticism introduced about whether we really know any of the things we claim to. Such all-embracing scepticism may initially seem inconsistent, impractical or downright ludicrous, yet needs to be taken seriously as it renders us clear-eyes to the vulnerability of many doctrines that would otherwise be held dogmatically (28). Having set up scepticism as the most vital problem in philosophy of knowledge, Musgrave begins with the ancient Greek sceptics, who he claims 'devoted much of their energy to the demolition of empiricism' (30). He discusses Sextus Empiricus, Aristotle, then Francis Bacon's spirited defense of empiricism regarding the senses. He finishes his discussion of perception by outlining the idea that 'observation is theory-laden', introducing and criticising empiricist psychology and Popper's 'bucket theory of the mind'.

Yet to fully understand empiricism, argues Musgrave, we must examine the great leap forward it made in the seventeenth century through 'idea-ism' — the epistemological doctrine that 'if we confine ourselves to reporting how things appear to be, then no error or contradiction can arise' (87). Musgrave distinguishes idea-ism from idealism, a metaphysical doctrine over which 'the great trio of British empiricist philosophers' (Locke, Berkeley and Hume) argued, whereas idea-ism is something which they all held in common. Musgrave thoroughly explores idea-ism, discussing primary and secondary qualities and the causal theory of perception, then Berkeley's critique of Locke. Musgrave then summarises Berkeley's metaphysics — so curious and ultimately untenable, yet so boldly logical within an idea-ist framework.

Next comes an in-depth discussion of Hume. Whereas for Berkeley, idea-ism became idealism, Musgrave argues, Hume's idea-ism led to irrationalism — simultaneously holding that all sorts of human reasoning processes (most notably induction) are invalid, and holding that we cannot live without them. Musgrave explores various possible answers to the problem of induction and counters them all before outlining his favoured Popperian response.

Having discussed empiricism in depth, Musgrave returns to rationalism, whose unsurpassed role-model and inspiration he finds in Euclid's crystalline deductive geometry. He discusses mathematical knowledge, then moves on to Descartes, whose Euclidean method was to break all knowledge down into atomic building-blocks and build up again from those building blocks that were self-evident. Yet Musgrave argues that scepticism rears its ugly head again here, for how can we know that axioms that look self-evident to us are really true? Next comes Kant and his idealist synthetic a priori, to which Musgrave is not sympathetic as it allows Kant to 'prove too much', which he illustrates with a chapter on alternative geometries. Amongst the propositions one may come to know through reasoning alone according to

Kant was Euclid's infamous axiom that parallel lines never meet. And yet modern mathematicians' eventual realisation that this axiom could be abandoned has resulted in a flowering of new and useful geometries.

Musgrave then turns to twentieth century philosophy and its preoccupation with truth. He considers whether one can defeat the sceptic by going 'subjective' about truth, and briskly catalogues the ways in which one might do so (such as 'the self-evidence theory', 'the coherence theory', 'the verifiability theory'). He dismisses all such approaches, claiming that 'relativism about truth encourages the use of violence to achieve consensus in action (if not in belief)' (253), and that it 'flies in the face of two laws of truth' (254) — namely the 'laws' of excluded middle and contradiction. I found this first claim a piece of armchair sociology of a dizzying generality. As for the second claim — whether statements about excluded middle and contradiction have the status of any sort of law (analogous to the laws of science) is one of the major issues up for debate between realists and antirealists about truth. For Musgrave to assume 'laws of truth' and then use them to establish his realist position begs the question.

Musgrave devotes the last chapter to his favoured answer to the sceptic, which incorporates elements from empiricism and rationalism. He calls it fallibilist realism, and it owes everything to Popper. When it comes to perception, we need to take a third view between naive realism and idealism by removing the hypothesis (that both views share) that we are somehow infallible. Yet he is strongly against any kind of reification of perceptions into ideas or sense-data, which would seem to be the natural middle ground for this third view. Instead he proposes replacing the traditional criterion for accepting a belief — a belief is reasonable if and only if it is certain or justified — with a belief is reasonable if and only if it has withstood serious criticism.

Such a suggestion does indeed provide a striking alternative to most current approaches to epistemology — yet one which has been bypassed by them and I would argue that there are good reasons for this. First of all there is the traditional 'grue' challenge to Popperian epistemology. For every belief or hypothesis we have that has withstood falsification, such as 'all emeralds are green', there are countless alternatives, such as 'all emeralds are green until the year 2000 and blue thereafter', that are equally unfalsified. Musgrave does discuss this challenge, arguing that the non-grue hypothesis is preferable because if it is false it will be easier to show that it is false, and that grue problems do not afflict his account any more than those of his rivals.

I would also doubt whether Musgrave could define the 'serious criticism' (to which we must expose our beliefs) in such a way as to give his criterion bite, while at the same time not rendering us epistemologically paralysed before all the beliefs we need to gather in real-time in order to perform the most simple actions. To this Musgrave responds that amongst the tenets which we have exposed to serious criticism, and therefore may reasonably believe, is Darwinian natural selection, and 'if the theory of evolution is to

be believed, we should also believe that the senses do not give us false information most of the time' (284). The isomorphism of this argument against the sceptic about perceptual beliefs with Descartes's famous argument that we should trust our senses — with 'evolutionary fitness' put in the place Descartes assigned to God — is rather striking. Yet Musgrave was rightly dubious of this sort of rationalist attempt to find an Archimedean point in his discussion of Descartes.

If I were teaching a first-year course in philosophy, I would put this book on my reading-list, because of its direct, friendly writing style and its careful use of illustrative examples (Musgrave even gives his readers 'the only joke in the Critique of Pure Reason' on p. 222). It tries to think through the Western philosophical tradition as a whole, which I believe to be valuable and increasingly rare. However I would not make it the only book on my list as I have reservations about the personal slant Musgrave gives to his analysis of Western epistemology. The tracing of its motivation squarely back to scepticism I would question — as if philosophers are intellectual firefighters rescuing us all from enormous epistemological danger (with respect to our most ordinary beliefs) that we never knew we were in. Such a view can lead to bewilderment amongst student beginners, and the impression that the subject is somewhat arrogant. I would also suggest that scepticism is thrown in high relief as a philosophical problem at least in part by one's adopting a particular perspective — that of uncompromising realism. That Musgrave is thinking through this perspective alone could be seen in his curt rejection of antirealist theories of truth of all stripes (Chapter 14).

And yet Musgrave does recognise both this connection of scepticism with realism and this danger of philosophical arrogance on some level, in his arguments for his own tellingly named 'fallibilism' — 'The overall conclusion seems to be that fallibilism stands up to old sceptical criticism better than either empiricism or rationalism. It is really quite obvious that this must be so: scepticism is parasitic upon dogmatism and perishes without it' (292).

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Martha C. Nussbaum and
Amartya Sen, eds.
The Quality of Life.
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993. Pp. v + 453.
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-19-828797-6).

The quality of life is a topic well-suited to an interdisciplinary treatment. While philosophers debate well-being in the abstract, economists, and policy makers are forced to use some standard, however imperfect, in judgements about peoples' lives. The thought behind this volume of essays — and the World Institute for Development Economics Research conference that preceded it — is that quality of life research would be advanced by bringing together work from a variety of disciplines and perspectives.

The editors accomplish their goal by pairing main papers and commentaries in a way that nicely captures some of the debate between theoretical and applied work. Comments by philosophers who have addressed quality of life questions at the theoretical level — James Griffin, Amartya Sen and Derek Parfit, for example — follow papers on applied topics. As well, the papers are grouped together by the issues raised, rather than dividing them up on the basis of the discipline of the writer.

The book has four parts: 1. Lives and Capabilities, 2. Traditions, Relativism, and Objectivity, 3. Women's Lives and Gender Justice and 4. Policy Assessment and Welfare Economics. Not all topics get equal treatment, however. Parts 1 and 4 each contain five main papers, while part 3 has only two papers. The introduction, by Nussbaum and Sen, describes the book in general and gives a short introduction to each of the parts. Still, some might hope for a more comprehensive introduction which took more time to carefully lay out the issues. *The Quality of Life* is not an easy read and many of the debates taken up by the participants will seem obscure to those not familiar with recent philosophical work on well-being.

Recent work in moral theory has revived questions about qualitative value under the heading 'well-being'. James Griffin in his book *Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance* and Derek Parfit in *Reasons and Persons*, for example, consider whether the right standard for evaluating a person's life is based on the contents of their mental states, the satisfaction of their desires or the extent to which they have obtained some set of objective goods (regardless of whether these goods are desired or yield the right sort of mental states). And it is this question — 'what makes a person's life go well?' — that is the primary focus of this collection of essays. However, readers expecting papers which straightforwardly advocate one of the standard positions in this discussion will be disappointed. The papers presume an understanding of the usual positions and most move beyond them by advocating sophisticated versions of the theory (Scanlon's objectivism), hybrid views (Sen's vector view, Brock's three scales) or new variants (Cohen's capability account).

The idea that we get better accounts of well-being by looking at actual cases of real people in the real world, instead of thought experiments, and actual measures in practice, rather than theories, is borne out in some instances but not in others. For example, the section on women and gender justice is perhaps the best in the book. Some of the difficulties faced by standard accounts of well-being are made very clear when we consider women's lives. Thinking about the extent to which women's desires are socially determined leads Annas to argue for an objective account of well-being. But thinking about the measures used in medical decision making turns out to be not so productive. Griffin, commenting on Brock's paper, writes, 'Professor Brock asks, What does the literature of medical ethics have to tell us about the quality of life? He answers, Not much. That is not surprising. What makes up the quality of a life? That is a tough question. Doctors' dilemmas make it more urgent, but not easier'.

Why the difference in these two cases? Griffin's remarks go some distance to answering this question. First, as Griffin notes above, questions about the allocation of scarce medical resources force us to come to some decisions about the quality of life insofar as that factor determines who gets treated, but why think the criteria used are any more likely to be right. Second, the sense of 'quality of life' or 'well-being' that is right for making decisions in medical contexts may be broader than 'health' but narrower than 'well-being' in its broadest possible sense. Consider the following example: Jan has a rich life, loving children, and an exciting career. Joan is usually unhappy, has no family, friends or meaningful employment. By any of the usual standards of well-being (desire satisfaction theories, mental state accounts or objective list views) Jan has a higher quality of life than Joan. Does this mean that we ought to give treatment to Jan over Joan, assuming all physical factors are equal, should we be forced to decide? No. Many people think that all that's relevant for decision making in medical contexts is physical well-being, and (more controversially) some minimal standard of overall well-being.

This example suggests a third response. Not only does it seem mistaken to use an overall standard of quality of life in this instance, it also seems unfair. Bad enough that Joan is having a rough life, we think, but worse still that her bad life is going to be used as the reason to make her even more badly off. Thus, it seems that in matters of distributing scarce medical resources well-being is a factor, but it's not the only factor. For example, we might think that a fair distribution of goods matters as well. The point here is not that anyone has suggested that well-being is the only feature of the situation that's morally relevant; rather, it's that the existence of these other factors makes it harder to determine the source of our intuitions. Our intuitions about well-being in contexts of medical decision making may be made worse by urgency, the restricted sense of well-being that is appropriate for this context, and by the presence of factors other than well-being that make a moral difference.

Although the difficulty of being clear about our intuitions and their source is most acute in the case of medical ethics, this is a general problem that runs

through most of the papers in this book. (The papers on the quality of women's lives are better and this may be because they are among the most abstract papers in the collection.) Some of the authors in the book are careful to note when the question they are addressing is not the broad question of determining a standard to judge the quality of lives. Brock's paper is clear in this regard as is Paul Seabright's 'Pluralism and the Standard of Living'. Seabright is concerned with issue of the standard of living which he claims is that part of our well-being that falls within the proper sphere of public concern. But others are less clear about what question, or aspect of the question, is being addressed. That there are so many different questions being asked seems likely to be the source of some of the disagreement about matters of well-being and the quality of life. Faced with the fact that most people have competing sympathies between subjective and objective theories of well-being, philosophers try different strategies for accommodating the clash in our intuitions. First, one might try and work both subjective and objective elements into a hybrid theory. Second, one could claim that one or other of our intuitions is simply mistaken. The first is the most common answer in this volume but the second answer appears as well. But there is a third alternative, namely that our intuitions do not conflict because they are our responses to *different* questions. To put it simply, it may be that we are objectivists when we are concerned about the sort of lives there are, subjectivists when we think about the lives of actual people.

The project undertaken in *The Quality of Life* is admittedly complex. The combination of different questions, competing theories and real world cases makes for a messy but exciting read. However, those who favour a clear and thorough presentation of concepts before the addition of both theoretical and factual detail will find this book frustrating. A great deal of work is left to the reader, both in terms of sorting out the conceptual framework and in making connections between the papers in the volume. For that reason, this book would work nicely with Griffin's *Well-Being* and together they make for a lively read for a graduate seminar. Complexities and confusions aside, this book makes a valuable addition to contemporary debates about well-being. (Two papers stand out as 'must reads' for those interested in this area: Scanlon's 'Value, Desire and the Quality of Life', and O'Neill's 'Justice, Gender, and International Boundaries'.)

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Moishe Postone
Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1993.
Pp. xii + 424.
US $49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-39157-1).

Time, Labor, and Social Domination is a deeply learned and profoundly ambitious book, one that aspires to no less than a refounding of Marxism that, in being critically attuned to Marx's writings, advances a form of Marxian critique that may succeed where all of the others have supposedly failed. Although this volume is only the 'initial stage' of Postone's reinterpretation of Marx, and its successor will have to, among other things, address more fully the changing realities of the newest phase of developed capitalist society, this book is the 'fundamental theoretical clarification' that if successful will dramatically redirect the course of Marxism, supplanting Habermasian critical theory.

In Part I, Postone contrasts his new Marxian critique with traditional Marxism and the Frankfurt School, and in Parts II and III respectively, he develops his reconstructions of the Marxian categories of the commodity and capital. But the book is essentially one long, unfolding argument. Insofar as it can be summarized in desperate brevity, it amounts to a long unmasking of the ways in which the best known varieties of Marxism have misread Marx through the lens of Ricardo and in doing so missed Marx's most powerful critique of capitalism — a remarkable indictment, given how the parties involved so often thought that they were in fact criticizing Ricardo in the name of Marx. Perhaps even more remarkable is the reconstruction of Marx that here emerges. Gone are the stale contrasts between the younger 'humanistic' Marx and the older 'scientific' (or 'scientistic') one. Now we are presented with a deeper contradiction, that between a younger Marx still entrapped by a 'transhistorical' conception of labor and a mature Marx whose self-reflexive critique of capitalism actually embodied a more compelling account of alienation, and anticipated the sophisticated poststructuralism of Pierre Bourdieu.

No doubt the time is ripe for such a reading, but does it work? Marxists of many stripes may unite in finding this book something of a shock. Throughout the volume, the older forms of Marxism are the object of one harsh verdict after another for their supposed inabilities to come to terms with such twentieth century horrors as fascism and state capitalism, or to recognize that routinized bureaucratic reds are less emancipatory than variegated but deep greens. But the thrust of Postone's revisionary version of Marxism, which is very heavily dependent on his reading of the *Grundrisse*, is in the claim that 'the Marxian analysis of capitalism does entail a critique of exploitation and the bourgeois mode of distribution (the market, private property)' but — and this is a crucial point — 'it is not undertaken from the standpoint of labor ... rather, it is based upon a critique of labor in

capitalism' (16). That is, 'Marx's critical theory tries to show that labor in capitalism plays a historically unique role in mediating social relations, and to elucidate the consequences of that form of mediation. His focus on labor in capitalism does not imply that the material process of production is necessarily more important than other spheres of social life. Rather, his analysis of labor's specificity in capitalism indicates that production in capitalism is not a purely technical process; it is inextricably related to, and molded by, the basic social relations of that society. The latter, then, cannot be understood with reference to the market and private property alone' (16). This reinterpretation of Marx's theory 'provides the basis for a critique of the form of production and the form of wealth (that is, value) that characterize capitalism, rather than simply calling into question their private appropriation. It characterizes capitalism in terms of an abstract form of domination associated with the peculiar nature of labor in that society and locates in that form of domination the ultimate social ground for runaway "growth", and for the increasingly fragmented character of work and even of individual existence in that society. It also suggests that the working class is *integral to* capitalism rather than the embodiment of its negation ... such an approach reinterprets Marx's conception of alienation in light of his mature critique of labor in capitalism — and places this reinterpreted conception of alienation at the center of his critique of that society' (17). In other words, although the mature Marx does analyze class exploitation and domination, and recognizes that *under capitalism* social relations are fundamentally shaped by labor, his real critique runs deeper, and 'goes beyond investigating the unequal distribution of wealth and power within capitalism to grasp the very nature of its social fabric, its peculiar form of wealth, and its intrinsic form of domination' (153).

Such is the key weapon in Postone's battle to save Marx from the Marxists. His Marxian critique of capitalism differs entirely from the 'productivist' critique, advanced by 'traditional' Marxists, that fails as a critique precisely because it still 'affirms proletarian labor, industrial production, and unfettered industrial "growth"'. For Postone, and according to Postone, for Marx, any such critique, appealing to a 'transhistorical, undifferentiated notion of "labor"', is simply a bourgeois critique of society rather than a critique of bourgeois society, one 'essentially identical to that of the early bourgeois critique of the landed aristocracy ... a normative critique of nonproductive social groupings from the standpoint of those groupings that are "truly" productive' (64). Such Marxists have not appreciated the real nature of Marx's critique as a critique of *capitalist modernity*, as a 'sophisticated theory of the sort proposed recently by Pierre Bourdieu — that is, as a theory of the mutually constituting relationships between social structure and everyday forms of practice and thought' (42).

Probably they have not. On Postone's reading, the traditional Marxists are not quite guilty of promoting a cure that is worse than the disease, but they are guilty of something that seems worse — namely, mistaking a form of the disease for the cure, and doing so in the name of the very doctor who

discovered the vaccine (or at least anticipated the distinguished contemporary French physician who did). But for Postone, there is a reason why so many have been so wrong about Marx: 'If *Capital* is read as anything other than an immanent critique, the result is a reading that interprets Marx as affirming that which he attempts to criticize (for example, the historically determinate function of labor as socially constitutive)' (142). For 'by analyzing the historical dialectic in terms of the peculiarities of the fundamental social structures of capitalism, Marx removes it from the realm of the philosophy of history and places it within the framework of a historically specific social theory', a move that involves the recognition that no theory, Marxism or any other, can claim absolute, transhistorical validity and that the critique of capitalism must proceed 'in a rigorously immanent fashion, analyzing society in its own terms, as it were' (140).

And for such reasons, even those Marxists who professionalized the business of despairing over the proletariat, the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, emerge from this work looking less than historically hygenic. Although vast stretches of Postone's work make plain that it is enormously indebted to the Frankfurt School's criticisms of traditional Marxism, to their critique of the growth of instrumental reason — of the 'completely administered, integrated, one-dimensional society' — his critique of this school is stunning, revealing how, for all their cognizance of the limits of traditional Marxism, critical theorists such as Pollock and Horkheimer ended up being fatally infected with none other than the transhistorical notion of labor. The failure of early critical theory to 'ground socially the conditions of its own existence and, relatedly, the conditions of a possible historical transformation' are traced to the position articulated in Pollock's state capitalism thesis, such that 'Labor had come to itself — yet both oppression and the domination of reified reason had grown stronger. Because the source of this development ... could now only be located in "labor" itself, it follows that the origins of reified reason, being grounded in "labor", must be located prior to the spread and dominance of the commodity form. It must be located in the very process of human interaction with nature. Lacking a conception of the specific character of labor in capitalism, Critical Theory ascribed its consequences to labor per se' (119). Even more remarkably, given that his entire project is to shift emancipation from the sphere of labor to that of interaction or communication, Habermas himself is brought to book on this count: Habermas 'retains the traditional understanding of labor shared by Pollock and Horkheimer, and then attempts to limit the scope of its social significance' (120). That is, he 'proceeds on the basis of the transhistorical notion of "labor" and overlooks Marx's conception of the specificity of the forms of wealth, production, and social relations in capitalism. ... If the process of social constitution by labor does indeed specify capitalism, then to project this mode of constitution transhistorically (as traditional Marxism has), or to replace it with an equally transhistorical scheme of the existence of two separate but interdependent spheres (labor and interaction, instru-

mental and communicative action) is to obscure the specificity of commodity-determined labor and, hence, of what characterizes capitalism' (231).

Postone's account of socially mediating capitalist labor can overcome the pessimism of critical theory without a Habermasian appeal to categories 'presumed to be applicable generally to the history of the human species' (231-2). The possibility of 'emancipation is grounded neither in the progress of "labor" nor in any evolutionary development of linguistically mediated communication; rather, it is grounded in the contradictory character of the structuring social forms of capitalist society in their historical development' (260).

Such is one major strand of Postone's long unfolding argument — an impressive, erudite exorcism of the (astonishingly mischievous) spectre of Ricardo that has been haunting Marxism for too long. There is much more, especially in Part III, which reveals the full force of Marx's categorial analysis of 'the quasi-objective, "necessary" character of social domination ... the ongoing directional dynamic of modern society, and its labor-mediated form of interdependence and of individual material reproduction' (386). It is here that the Marxian analysis of the commodity as 'the contradictory unity of both abstract and concrete labor, value and material wealth' is fully revealed as the 'conceptual basis for the dialectic of transformation and reconstitution' (386) — that is, as revealing industrial production as intrinsically capitalist and the dynamic, treadmill like, character of capitalist modernity, though also the possibility of social change.

There can be no hasty verdict on such a project. Clearly, this is not a readily accessible book; it is deeply absorbed in the internal debates of the Frankfurt School, past and present, and its sometimes slightly disdainful view of English and American Marxism's critical incompetence makes for frequent difficulties simply in translating Postone's project into terms admitting of comparison with contemporary Marxists. This would not be very disturbing if it simply involved, say, an understandable reluctance to try to translate everything he claims into the impoverished vocabulary of 'analytical' Marxism, which after all probably marks the ultimate in fetishized Marxism. But the difficulty extends even to comparisons with such Marxists as Sweezy and Harvey, as is evident in Postone's contestable use of the terms 'production' and 'distribution'. Perhaps Postone also shares some of the limitations of Habermas's critical theory in that the deep abstract structures of domination are presented wholly as the blight afflicting the advanced capitalist countries. At any rate, we need to be further enlightened about how these forms of domination are generated today, how well they travel, and why and where contradictions within them will lead to change, of a kind that can ground optimism.

Still, although the matters at issue here will take much labor to resolve, there can be little doubt that Postone's book will dominate the discussion of them for some time to come.

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Christine Overall
Human Reproduction:
Principles, Practices, Policies.
Toronto: Oxford University Press 1993.
Pp. iii + 174.
US $18.95 (paper: ISBN 1-19-540961-2).

Christine Overall has written a very informative collection of nine essays on various aspects of human reproduction, from abortion through *in vitro* fertilization (IVF) and surrogate (she prefers the more accurate term 'contract') motherhood. Although Overall's consideration of issues relevant to human reproduction is not comprehensive — notable absences include appropriate treatment of pregnant women who are drug or alcohol addicted or HIV infected and operations to correct defects in fetuses still in utero — the range of issues she does address are important and timely. Many, but not all, of these issues are the result of advances in reproductive technology. Overall's familiarity with the legal status of the reproductive issues in the U.S. and her use of cases from the states in discussing issues like the 'ownership' of frozen embryos (Ch. 5) makes *Human Reproduction* of interest to readers in the U.S. as well as Canada.

Overall defines medical terms in easily understandable language, even terms as seemingly straightforward as 'infertility' (9). She also makes careful distinctions among concepts, thus bringing conceptual clarity to her own analyses, as well as a framework for considering other ethical issues in human reproduction. Especially useful are the distinctions Overall draws among 'strong' and 'weak' variants of the 'right to reproduce' and the 'right not to reproduce' (*e.g.* 11). The 'strong' variant argues that women have the affirmative right to assistance with reproducing or not reproducing; the 'weak' variant argues only that women have a negative right to be free of interference in reproduction. The recurrence of these distinctions in several essays demonstrates their usefulness in a variety of different contexts, from abortion to IVF to contract motherhood. However, the arguments Overall provides of the dangers involved in granting a 'strong right to reproduce' are too speculative and contingent to well serve her opposition to granting such a right.

Overall makes a valuable contribution to ethical thinking about human reproduction in emphasizing the necessity of looking beyond the surface dimensions of any particular ethical issue involving reproductive technologies to examine its ideological underpinnings. One notable example Overall explores, in connection with the necessity of women who are forced to undergo operations for the selective reduction of fetuses in multiple pregnancies resulting from fertility drugs (Ch. 3), is the desire of some women to be biological mothers, regardless of the economic or psychological costs. She suggests that the intensity of this desire can be explained, at least in part, by the cultural ideology of gender, which regards (all) women (only) as mothers.

The individual essays are unified and strengthened by Overall's consistent application of a feminist perspective. Her repeated emphasis on women's interests — as the persons most intimately involved with and affected by reproduction — as central to the issues she considers reflect her commitment to a feminist perspective. This commitment results in more women-centered conclusions than those reached in Overall's first book, *Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist Analysis* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987). Nonetheless, she is careful not to universalize either women or feminists, pointing out where there are significant areas of disagreement among women and/or feminists on the issues she considers (*e.g.* 9).

This commitment to a feminist perspective is exemplified by Overall's observation that discussions of abortion and fetal rights tend to lose sight of the women's autonomy and bodily integrity that are at stake (37), and in her opposition to the ideology of 'procreation as central to, even definitive of, women and womanhood', and that results in 'a scientific and medical campaign to do everything possible to enable women to have babies' (4). Her definition of the foetus as neither an independent being nor a 'mere appendage' (1) underlies her perspective that foetal interests are dependent upon those of the pregnant woman rather than independent. This understanding avoids portraying the abortion issue as a conflict between maternal and fetal rights, and results in Overall's persuasive position that 'protecting and caring for foetuses means supporting and respecting pregnant women' through adequate housing, nutrition, education, and medical care, and freedom from physical and emotional violence and abuse' (12).

Overall's self-description as a 'committed radical feminist' rings true throughout most of the essays, although there are exceptions when she seems to take a more conservative than radical stance. One markedly 'nonradical' example is Overall's strong opposition to contract motherhood (Ch. 6). Among the arguments she marshals against the practice is its exploitation of women who contract to be surrogates. These are women, she notes, who are likely to be economically disadvantaged (at least relative to the men who procure their services) and whose average compensation amounts to far less than the minimum wage per hour of pregnancy (and only a tiny fraction of the amount that men are typically paid for the time involved in donating sperm). Overall's concern about the exploitation of women seems paternalistic in this context, especially given her general attitude that feminists should not protect women from ideologically-biased or coercive social processes or their own desires, even if they are the result of 'false consciousness' (*e.g.* 149-50).

Further, beyond this one negative reason, discussed only briefly, Overall does not consider whether there are aspects of contract motherhood that are in the interests of the contracting women. She ignores the interests of women in having the reproductive autonomy to decide whether to bear a child for others, and to willingly limit her autonomy for the duration of pregnancy in exchange for a fee. Further, she uncharitably characterizes arguments supporting the practices as 'coopting' feminist arguments 'to serve in the defence of misogynist reproductive practices' (105). She recommends making such

contracts unenforceable and criminalizing participation by agencies and professionals (134-5), contrary to her views regarding IVF, selective termination of fetuses, and other reproductive practices that are potentially harmful to women's interests.

Despite such occasional lapses, however, overall, *Human Reproduction* offers engaging and thoughtful analyses of a number of difficult ethical issues surrounding human reproduction from a feminist perspective. Overall's timely consideration of the ethical dimensions of current developments in reproductive technology make a valuable contribution to ethical and feminist theorizing about matters that are integral to the rights and status of women.

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Jung Soon Park
Contractarian Liberal Ethics and the Theory of Rational Choice.
New York: Peter Lang 1992. Pp. xiv + 291.
US $42.95 (ISBN 0-8204-1566-9).

Jung Soon Park's *Contractarian Liberal Ethics and the Theory of Rational Choice* is an attempt to assess contemporary contractarian liberal theories which rely upon developments in the theory of rational choice in order to 'deduce morality from rationality' (6). Park claims that these theories face a dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma catches any theory which, in an attempt to provide rational foundations to morality, ultimately fails to offer anything that could be reasonably counted as morality. These theories are irrelevant to morality. The second horn catches any moral theory which, in an attempt to escape the first horn of the dilemma, ends up being unable to defend the claim that moral behavior is rationally required. These theories, Park claims, are circular. David Gauthier's *Morals by Agreement* is then seen as attempting to overcome this contractarian dilemma. Or so I understand the project of the book. Park's style is so sketchy that any reasonable summary of his views must involve a large amount of reconstruction. Many complex arguments and views are presented in a few cryptic sentences. Park leaves as an exercise for the reader the task of transforming those hints into a philosophical idea. Especially in the first chapters, we also often move from one theme to another without any discernible pattern. A typical passage shows the extent of these problems:

> This descriptive/normative distinction on the nature of rational choice theory is an economic version of the so-called is/ought distinction. In detail, this twofold distinction can be developed into a fourfold distinction between description, prediction, explanation and/or normativity. This issue is also involved in "the battle for human nature" which is really two battles. One is between the selection of specific traits for any partial man (*homo partialis*) and the preservation of undissected whole man (*homo totus*), and the other is between different models of partial men (e.g., *homo economicus, homo faber, homo sociologicus*, etc.) (26-7).

We might expect Park to provide explanations of the poetically described 'battle for human nature', of what is involved in the two battles, or of the 'preservation of the undissected whole man', even if we are ready to concede that the phrase 'an economic version of the is-ought distinction' is readily understood. But nothing like this is forthcoming. Park relies throughout the book on unexplained and often unclear or ambiguous jargon. This starts on the very first page. We would expect a book on contractarianism to contain a definition of contractarianism. And indeed we do find the following definition on page 1:

> Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant are all regarded as contractarians in the following sense. Each gives a secularistic, voluntaristic, individualistic, and rationalistic variation on a historical or hypothetical political theory of consent as the foundation of government, civil society and political obligation in general.

We do not get *any* further elaboration of this definition, not even an explanation of what is meant by any of the -ic words (think about the many things that one could mean by the word 'individualistic'). Another ambiguity with dire consequences is the characterization of the book as a study of 'Rawls and Gauthier's contractarian project in so far as they seek to deduce morality from rational choice' (6). We never get any explanation about what is meant by 'deducing morality from rational choice'. There are at least two things that this expression could mean. It could mean that the principles of morality are proven to be consequences of the principles of rational choice alone. But it could also mean that the principles of morality are deduced from the principles of rational choice in the light of some background assumptions. Though it is more natural to identify the phrase 'deducing morality from rational choice' with the former, only the latter can be attributed to Rawls with any plausibility. Park's discussion of Rawls is hampered by a constant indecision about which of these two projects Rawls is committed to in a *Theory of Justice*.

None of the arguments that Park presents are particularly new or original. This is not, in itself, a criticism of the book. Even an unoriginal book summarizing all that has been said in the contemporary debate on contractarianism would be a more than welcome contribution to the field. Park has read an immense amount of literature on the topic and he dutifully acknowledges every mention of any part of it (the book has 530 footnotes and a 43-page bibliography for 165 pages of text). However, on one hand, the book

does not help the uninitiated, because no one could understand Park's presentation of the arguments without a firm grasp of the literature. On the other hand, it is of little use for the specialist either, not only because there is no new contribution to the field, but also because Park's presentation is invariably much more confused and much less compelling than the original renderings of the views he discusses.

The book proceeds by first presenting an outline of the various theories that constitute what is called 'rational choice theory' (chapter 2). Chapter 3 is an attempt to show that Hobbes and Rawls each fall prey to a different horn of the contractarian dilemma. Chapter 4 assesses Gauthier's attempt to overcome the dilemma, an attempt which Park claims ultimately fails. Chapter 5 assesses the consequences of the failure of the project of deducing morality from rationality for contractarian liberal theories and for moral theory in general. In what follows I will assess some of Park's main arguments with respect to each philosopher that he discusses.

Chapter 3 begins by explaining Hobbes's views on metaphysics. One might hope that we are finally getting an account of Hobbes's moral views that puts them in the context of the first chapters of *Leviathan*. But after he dedicates less than a page to the explanation of Hobbes's 'ontological individualism/nominalism' and his 'mechanistic concept of movement' (64), we learn how Park sees the connection between these views and Hobbes's moral theory:

> From his ontological individualism — the natural world is composed of unique and discrete individual bodies — Hobbes derives an individualistic conception of human beings: "We do not therefore by nature seek Society for its own sake, but that we may receive some Honor and Profit from it; these we desire primarily, that secondarily" (65)

Park thinks that Hobbes can infer, from the fact that the world is composed of individual bodies, that we must conceive human beings as seeking social life not as an end but merely as a means. Park gives no textual evidence that Hobbes actually made this fantastic inference.

After some groundwork on how to transform Hobbes into an advocate of a solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Free Rider Problem, we find five confused pages in which not only Hobbes but also a caricatured version of Locke's and Rousseau's political philosophy are rejected. The first move is to show that Hobbes's laws of nature are morally irrelevant. Basically we are told that they are so because Rawls says so. In particular, we are told that, according to Rawls, Hobbes's ethics is a mere *modus vivendi*. I take this to mean that Hobbes merely presents us with a way of settling conflicts of egoist individuals. This is supposed to fall short of 'a moral justification of liberalism' (75). Park also says that in Hobbes's state of nature 'unfair and unequal equilibrium between individuals as well as groups can prevail' (74). These clues (and there are really no others!) suggest that Park has the following argument in mind: Hobbes's state of nature might allow the contracting parties in the original contract to stand in unfair relations of power. The strongest might bully the weakest into accepting an unfair bargain. Thus, what the contracting parties

will accept might fall short of the ideals of liberal democracy. However, Hobbes himself does not think that the contracting parties stand in an unfair equilibrium since there are no relevant differences in physical and mental powers among human beings in the state of nature. If Park has an argument to show that Hobbes is committed to the possibility of an unfair equilibrium he is hiding it from us. Moreover, we were supposed to learn that Hobbes's laws of nature were morally irrelevant. What we are shown is that they do not imply liberal democracy. Is liberal democracy the only possible morality?

The second main section of chapter 3 presents Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* as caught on the second horn of the contractarian dilemma. According to Park, Rawls provides contractarianism with a derivation of morality but only at the price of circularity. His criticism is greatly compromised by a misunderstanding of Rawls's project. Park says that he is primarily interested in Rawls's *Theory of Justice* 'as a project which allegedly deduces morality from rationality' (5), and he claims that Rawls wants 'morality to be grounded in a notion of rationality that is itself independent of moral notions' (6). Park does admit that Rawls is aware that he is not deriving morality from rationality alone, but rather from 'rationality *cum* fairness' (96). He complains, however, that 'Rawls does not sufficiently treat this problem' (96). In view of this charge one would expect Park to consider Rawls's own account of the justification of the principles of justice. However, one is astonished to find almost no discussion of reflective equilibrium (hereafter, RE) in a book which purports to evaluate the justification of Rawls's theory of justice (and which condemns it as circular). At some point indeed Park acknowledges that Rawls takes RE to be a method of justification. But Park decides to attach little relevance to this method in view of the following statement of Rawls's: 'I shall not, of course, actually work through this process [of reflective equilibrium]' (85). But this statement can warrant a dismissal of the relevance of RE only when taken out of context. The full passage reads as follows:

> I shall not, of course, actually work through this process. Still, we may think of the interpretation of the original position that I shall present as the *result of such a hypothetical course of reflection* (21).

Thus a fair criticism of Rawls should show either that RE does not warrant the principles of *Theory of Justice* or that RE is an inadequate method of justification. However, to object to the characterization of the original position 'in view of the contractarian rational deduction project' (97) is to saddle Rawls with a project that is not his own.

The chapter on Gauthier starts with a summary of *Morals by Agreement* that is clearer than anything else in the book, though far from satisfactory. Gauthier's project is presented as an attempt to steer between the two horns of the contractarian dilemma presented in chapter 3. Park claims that Gauthier fails in this project. The first problem that Park identifies is Gauthier's characterization of the market as a morally free zone. It is hard to discern an argument among Park's several equivocations on the expression 'morally free'. He begins by asking whether Gauthier is right in claiming that the market is

a morally free zone, but soon shifts to asking whether the marginal productivity theory of distribution is morally free (140). I will try to reconstruct at least one of the arguments that informs this discussion. For Gauthier, moral constraints are superfluous in a perfect market. In such a market, individuals pursuing solely their own self-interest will achieve an outcome that is both optimal and in accordance with the requirement of impartiality embodied in our ordinary conception of morality. However, Park points out that Gauthier himself acknowledges that in the characterization of the market we have ruled out some sorts of immoral behavior. But if this is true, it is not surprising to find that individuals pursuing their self-interest in the perfect market comply with the requirements of morality. This compliance was already secured by our characterization of the market as place in which, for instance, 'the absence of force or fraud is posited' (138). But Park seems again to cling to an absurd 'all or nothing' view. According to Park, given that we made *some* moral assumptions about what could count as a perfect market, the conclusion that the operations of a perfect market *always* conform to the demands of morality must be trivial. It is important to assess the claim of triviality in view of Gauthier's aims. Gauthier wants to say that the need for moral constraints arises because the real world is not a perfect market. Thus understanding in which ways the real world is not a perfect market can help us understand what gives rise to the needs of moral constraints and how they can be justified in these terms. Given that we can characterize what counts as a perfect market in relatively precise terms, it seems, at least *prima facie*, helpful to think about questions of the justification of morality in these terms.

The final section of chapter 4 suffers from the same problems as the rest of the book. This section deals with Gauthier's use of the Lockean proviso as a way of determining the initial endowments that the bargaining parties bring to the table. Such initial endowments determine the initial bargaining position, which in its turn is an important variable in Gauthier's solution of the bargaining game. We get summaries of criticisms leveled against Gauthier that are endorsed without any critical evaluation. An example is an argument that he attributes to Hubin and Lambeth, leveled against Gauthier's version of the proviso. According to Gauthier, Nozick's version of the proviso is too strong, since it 'prohibits worsening the situation of others except where this is necessary to avoid worsening one's own position'. Park, apparently following Hubin and Lambeth, complains that Gauthier's version of the proviso is 'too weak' (169). We are left on our own to figure out why. We do not even get an example of a case in which we could at least intuitively say that the proviso is too weak; we get only a reference to the original critics.

This is just a small sample of the problems that one can find in Park's book. Although Park refers to an immense body of literature, his treatment of the issues is neither very clear nor insightful. Nonetheless, given its extensive bibliography, the book might have some value as a research tool.

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David-Hillel Ruben
Explaining Explanation.
New York: Routledge 1992.
Pp. xi + 265.
US $39.95 ISBN 0-415-08765-1.

The Routledge Series, The Problems of Philosophy; their past & present, seeks to provide both an accessible history of a particular problem and a lucid attempt at a solution in an analytic flavour. Ruben succeeds on both tasks. Where one might be tempted to give a complete, but largely irrelevant account of the history of theories of explanation, he gives an excellent cross-section of the most influential attempts at providing a theory of explanation (or something relevantly similar) and concentrates on relevant historical material to underline his own approach to the problem. The prose is clear and crisp and this provides both a seamless shift from history to theory and a text which lends itself quite nicely to an upper year or graduate epistemology course. In giving the argument, Ruben makes efforts to establish clearly what is to be discussed, i.e. what he means by certain things, without undue embellishment and proceeds on an historical development of an account of explanation. In essence, Ruben's task is to provide a realist conception of explanation, i.e. an account of explanation as an epistemological concept with a realist metaphysical 'backing'.

Ruben takes a great deal of trouble in telling us exactly what he's up to in the first chapter. His concern is to 'specify as precisely as possible *which* concept it is' (1) that he is concerned with. As the chapter unfolds, it becomes increasingly clear that it is a dispute between a 'language user's approach' and Ruben's technical approach. The language user's approach is characterised as the idea that 'our analysis of knowledge should capture all and only, or [...] most of, those situations in which we could prephilosophically be prepared to use the term "knows"' (11). The technical approach, as Ruben points out as 'more difficult to give a succinct general characterisation' (12), is the focus of the rest of the text. The technical approach treats scientific explanation as a different kind of explanation than what merely counts as explanation to language users. The question now is 'which of [the potential competitors for the concept] is the best replacement for the old concept?' (15). Not only is this important in actually laying hands on the best replacement, but, as he continues 'it is only when we can answer that question [of the best replacement] that we will know which set of analytic truths has any real claim to be of interest to us, and what it is that we are trying to do when we offer an analysis of explanation' (15). Ruben's position is that any theory of explanation must provide a way of distinguishing partial and full explanations, but he does not want to say that the 'pragmatics of explanation-giving' is in any way the same as providing a theory of explanation. His task is to provide an analysis of explanation.

Ruben is quite thorough in providing three well-defined distinctions within which he intends to work: (A) those theories which give different

answers to the question 'must our belief about the explained phenomena be certain or only likely?', (B) argument and non-argument theories of explanation, and (C) deterministic and non-deterministic theories. The epistemological distinctions he draws under (A) are certainty, high and low epistemic probability models. A certainty model requires that the explanation of the explanandum be wholly contained in the explanans. The high and low dependency models are strong and weak versions, respectively, of probability that the explanandum is true, given the explanans. The next set of distinctions is between argument and non-argument theories of explanation. Argument theories generally break down into deductivist, theories which take the deductively valid argument as the only proper form for a full explanation, and probabilist which are inductive. The last set is metaphysical — to wit, is causation a deterministic concept? This framework forms the basis for the rest of the book.

With all of this considered, Ruben begins his trek across four important thinkers with a mind to showing how 'metaphysical commitments make a difference to a view of explanation' (155). He develops the account of explanation in the *Phaedo* and *Theaetetus* primarily to show that Plato was opposed to 'physical explanations', that is, explanations resting solely on physical causation. This is not entirely unexpected since Plato systematically short circuits the physical through the Forms. Insofar as Ruben's argument is concerned, little real work is done with Plato. Basically, Plato emerges as rejecting a 'low dependency theory' and advocating a determinative theory. Since Ruben wishes to subsume as many metaphysical positions as possible, he finds Plato's account wanting.

The purpose of Ruben's discussion of Aristotle's general account of explanation is primarily to address the question 'what is a general account of explanation and how is one to justify one over another?' (77). Through a discussion of the doctrine of the four causes, something like a general account emerges. Ruben characterises it as 'something can be explained only by either its matter, or its form, or its end, or its change-initiator' (83). Ruben argues that this can be considered to be more in sympathy with the technical approach than the language user's approach. If so, how does Aristotle justify his position? Ruben takes an argument by Julius Moravcsik to show that 'the Aristotelian theory of explanation is ultimately grounded and to be justified in terms of a metaphysics' (85). In so doing, Aristotle subscribes to the technical approach by providing a metaphysical basis for explanation and providing reasons why this account is better. Interestingly, Ruben does not dwell on the nature of metaphysics, as certainly this is a temptation just here in the text. Instead he leaves us with the comment 'what I have to say is compatible with any view concerning the epistemic and logical status of metaphysics the reader might wish to adopt' (87). This I will return to later.

Hempel's views about explanation form the kernel of Ruben's modern discussion. Hempel states that some of his account of explanation has been defended previously, specifically by Mill. Ruben compares the two and discusses a number of important questions about what he called the meta-

physical 'backing' for explanation. The exegesis of Mill is of course quite selective, as Ruben's task is to show Mill's views of explanation and prediction require certain metaphysical justifications. The treatment of Hempel is also selective, and quite pointed; specifically, Hempel's account of scientific explanation. The purpose of the discussion here is to give a good exegetical treatment, albeit narrow, of what Ruben considers the starting point of modern theories of explanation. The upshot of the chapter is to provide a solid foundation for Ruben's own theory of explanation. Ruben claims that 'epistemology and metaphysics come together to give us our conception of explanation' (155). Insofar as he believes this to be the case, the discussion revolves around a question of what sorts of things 'stand in the explanation relation' (156).

The upshot of a fairly technical argument is that there is 'an epistemic requirement in explanation; facts explain facts only when the features and the individuals the facts are about, are appropriately conceptualised or named' (180). So, Ruben's realism is not 'full-blooded' in the sense that they depend to a certain extent upon their characterisation. If these 'epistemicised facts' are what are being explained and provide for explanation, then the question of what counts as an appropriate conceptualisation impresses itself. In the final two chapters, Ruben allows a general view of explanation to emerge. However, 'that general view is put tentatively and with some hesitation. [He] regard[s] it more as a research project than as a finalised theory that is able, as it stands, to meet all difficulties' (181).

In the preface, Ruben makes the claim 'that the concept of explanation should not be exclusively hijacked by the philosophy of the natural sciences' (ix). In the discussion of Hempel, it became apparent that causation 'seems to be a good bet for explaining explanation. The final question now faced is "are all singular explanations causal explanation"?' (209). As far as his challenge to the philosophy of the natural sciences goes, a great deal rests upon the question. In short, the answer is no. Ruben takes the view that not all dependency relations are causal. Some metaphysical relations do not contribute to the structure of the world, but result from the structure of the world.

> On my view, it is the presence of these "structural" determinative (and dependency) relations that makes explanation possible. They are not all that is required, for as I have stressed, these are metaphysical relations, and explanation is an epistemological idea. Conceptualisation must be considered in any complete account of explanation, as I have tried to do in chapter V. Whether the explanation relation relates those real objects or events directly, or only relates statements or facts about them, the basis for explanation is in metaphysics. *Objects or events in the world must really stand in some appropriate "structural" relation before explanation is possible.* Explanations work, when they do, only in virtue of underlying determinative or dependency structural relations in the world (210). (Italics his.)

If this is true, that there are 'other types of determinative relations, they might provide the basis for non-causal singular explanations' (211). Leaving aside the question of deterministic versus indeterministic conceptions of causation, Ruben's idea is that 'explanation rests on real metaphysical relations' (211).

Ruben justifies this view of non-causal singular explanation with a pointed discussion of some attempts to provide one. Specifically, he asks 'what is the concept of causation that is being used in the assertion or the denial of the causal theory of explanation?' (217). He proposes some limits as to how wide an acceptable theory can be. He assumes that nothing can cause itself and the causal relation is contingent. In so doing, Ruben argues that an account of identity statements as cases of singular explanation provide a 'successful refutation of a causal theory' (218). Are there other non-causal singular explanations? Ruben offers concepts like 'Cambridge dependency, supervenience, the by-relation that relates actions, and the relation between a disposition and its structural basis' as candidates for such explanations. Whether there are such other kinds of explanation rests ultimately upon 'whether or not there are determinative (or dependency) metaphysical relations between objects, events, or states other than causation and identity' (223).

Earlier I mentioned that I would like to comment upon the compatibility of this argument and any view of the 'epistemic and logical status' of metaphysics. Insofar as Ruben is offering a *theory* of explanation, I believe that a Wittgensteinian point of view could not be reconciled with his argument. However, if the book is taken, as it surely can be, as an exploration of the logical grammar of our concept of scientific explanation, then Ruben is quite right, provided the metaphysical claims are taken in a certain light. I believe that Ruben has accomplished to some degree what he has set out to do, that is, prevent the hijack of the concept of explanation by the philosophy of the natural sciences by providing for non-causal explanation, something the philosophy of the social sciences needs to deal with.

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Donald Scherer, ed.
Upstream / Downstream:
Issues in Environmental Ethics.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1990.
Pp. vii + 242.
US $37.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87722-747-0).

Its subtitle to the contrary, *Upstream / Downstream* is not a general, environmental ethics anthology. Rather, it is a collection of essays devoted to the constellation of questions and issues surrounding a particular set of environmental problems labelled by Scherer as 'upstream/downstream' problems. As the designation suggests, these environmental problems are characteristically ones in which the economic/productive activities of an individual or group result in environmental degradation which, consequently, 'flows downstream' (spatially and/or temporally) and negatively impacts the well-being of others in an asymmetrical fashion (the source of the designation 'upstream/downstream' and the paradigmatic example of such environmental problems appears to be the old frontier maxim that downstream settlers stake claims no less than six miles away from their upstream neighbors so as to allow the stream to purify itself of the latter's sewage). As Scherer indicates in his introduction, in the past, upstream/downstream problems could be more easily and simply addressed, but factors such as increased population density, proliferation of types and quantity of resource usage and resulting waste (e.g. pollution), and a lack of knowledge concerning the ecological effects of such increased and multifarious resource usage, have added complexity and urgency to the need to address and respond to such problems. The essays collected in *Upstream / Downstream* represent an attempt to tackle a number of the issues and conflicts arising out of what Scherer sees as the distinctive nature of upstream/downstream environmental problems.

There is a dominant theme which runs through all of the collected essays, and Scherer is to be commended for assembling a group of essays which philosophically feed off of one another with such coherence and smoothness. The dominant theme is that an intelligent, operational, and productive response to contemporary ecological problems posed within upstream/downstream environments requires a reappraisal of a number of philosophical, scientific, social, and legal commitments which have traditionally grounded our attitude toward and ability to cope with the impact of human activity on the environment. As a group, the essays do an excellent job of exposing some of these presuppositions, indicating and commenting on their inadequacies, and proposing, even if only in a tentative fashion, a new direction for dealing with the set of environmental problems Scherer has designated as 'upstream/downstream'.

The first essay, by Scherer himself, sets the tone for what is to follow by establishing the uniqueness of upstream/downstream environments (e.g. lack of reciprocity, specialization of roles, and the presence of anonymity)

and suggesting a set of means by which to address the problems posed within upstream/downstream environments which are dependent on a reshaping of upstream/downstream environments so as to give rise to more substantial and efficacious normative relationships. The second essay, by Ernest Partridge, provides an overview of typical arguments against the existence of 'rights claims' by future generations (temporal 'downstreamers'), and disputes the strength of such arguments while defending the position that present generations are bound by duties to future generations. That essay is followed by a related treatment of global warming and future generations by Dale Jamieson. Jamieson argues that present generations run the risk of abrogating their responsibilities to future generations by modeling policy-making on an outmoded, 'positivist' view of science and value, and makes some tentative suggestions for an alternative approach to policy-making regarding global warming. The following essay, by Kristin Shrader-Frechette, confronts the problems associated with a reliance on scientific models to provide the necessary data for environmental policy-making, and presents a list of six criteria for assessing the suitability of predictive, scientific models for public policy formation. The next two essays focus on the relationship between the law and upstream/downstream issues. Daniel Magraw and James Nickel attempt to show that the prospects for dealing with international environmental problems through the international political and legal system are not as dim as many would suggest. Mark Sagoff addresses the issue of takings and just compensation as regards governmental regulation of private property use, and argues for the position that property owners need not be compensated for takings aimed at benefiting others or the public, unless such takings constitute an unfair burden. The seventh essay, by Bart Gruzalski, tackles the difficult problem of isolating and attributing accountability for pollution in cases where the individual polluting act may seem to be insignificant or irrelevant when compared to the larger, collective cause of which it is but a single component. The concluding essay is a treatment of cost-benefit analysis, especially as it applies to the harm posed by workplace pollution, by Alan Gewirth in which he articulates and defends a 'moral cost-benefit analysis' in which 'costs' and 'benefits' are cashed out in terms of the 'generic rights' of rational agents to freedom and well-being, a view about moral decision-making which is an outgrowth of his well-known, general moral perspective.

All of the essays are well-written, as one would expect given that all of the authors are well-respected contributors to academic discussions of environmental ethics, applied philosophy, and public policy. Nonetheless, because of its narrow focus, *Upstream / Downstream* would not, by itself, be an adequate text for a course in environmental ethics. However, given Scherer's knowledge of the subject-matter to which the anthology is devoted, as evidenced by his excellent introduction and selection of essays, *Upstream / Downstream* would make for a nice companion text to a larger, more comprehensive environmental ethics anthology, if an instructor desired to address the kinds

of questions and issues raised in the context of a consideration of the set of environmental problems Scherer has tagged 'upstream/downstream' to a greater extent than is generally found in an environmental ethics textbook or anthology. *Upstream / Downstream* would be even more at home in a course devoted primarily or exclusively to questions of ethics, public policy and environmental quality.

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William Shaw, ed.
Social and Personal Ethics.
Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company
1993. Pp. vi + 480.
ISBN 0-534-17886-3.

In a world increasingly cluttered with anthologies designed to respond to the need for texts which service courses in contemporary moral issues, anyone who regularly offers such courses may be tempted to shout 'Enough!'. However, William Shaw's new anthology is not poured out of the standard mould and it is worthy of careful consideration. It possesses several features which highly recommend it.

First, in Part I: Ethical Theory, Shaw provides his own brief and well-written discussion of the nature of morality and normative theories. Complimenting his account with well chosen selections from Aristotle, Kant and Mill, he acknowledges up front the essential role moral theory plays in applied ethics courses. Although practical moral problems are the focus in such courses, some discussion of moral theory is unavoidable. Without it, the philosophy class becomes little more than a structured discussion group. Moreover, the student is left with the distinct impression that philosophers have little to bring to the discussion of moral questions. The third section in Part I, 'Three Contemporary Ethical Perspectives', contains articles by James Rachels, Julius Moravcsik, and Allison Jaggar which demonstrate that philosophers continue to reflect upon the nature of morality and in an ongoing way contribute to our understanding of it. The anthology also allows for careful consideration of the notion of an environmental ethic. Although this topic is placed in Part II, which is devoted to issues rather than presented as a contemporary ethical perspective, the articles Shaw has selected allow for the larger question to be considered. Discussion of either Singer's 'The Place of Nonhumans in Environmental Issues' or Callicott's 'The Search for an

Environmental Ethic' invariably will lead to questions about the scope of moral theory.

Second, throughout Shaw is faithful to the promise in the book's title that it is about social *and* personal ethics. Shaw's recognition in the preface that questions of personal ethics constantly intermingle with questions of social ethics is acknowledged in the selection of articles as well as the selection of issues. Consequently he avoids a one-sided misrepresentation of the questions which are the subject matter of ethical inquiry. Moreover, Shaw does not create the impression that the conceptual distinction between social and personal mirrors a polarization of our moral experience. The distinction is not employed to allow the two sorts of questions to be settled autonomously. Instead, he succeeds remarkably well in establishing their integration.

Third, richer than many competing anthologies, the number of issues and fine articles in Shaw's volume produce more than the usual number of regrets that contemporary moral issues courses are offered for a semester rather than a year. Although the number of sections in Part II: Issues in Applied Ethics implies that nine issues are examined, a few of the section titles should suffice to demonstrate the collection's variety. 'Happiness, Self-Realization, and Self-Respect', 'Liberty, Paternalism, and Freedom of Expression' and 'Surrogacy, Parenthood and Family Obligations'. Even the section 'Sexuality' manages to cover questions about adultery, pornography, date rape and homosexuality. In addition to the less common fare in the sections named, there is predictable coverage of euthanasia, abortion, capital punishment, affirmative action and economic justice. In each section, Shaw brings together excellent articles which permit a comprehensive and critical discussion of the issue. The articles are worthy of this positive evaluation because they are written by philosophers who do applied philosophy well. Equally important for a textbook of this sort, the articles are reasonably accessible to students who have not previously encountered philosophy. Shaw's selection of articles also allows one to avoid a common but unfortunate approach to the type of moral questions the book examines. The lining up of arguments supporting the yes-side beside a corresponding list of arguments for the no-side is avoided. Shaw's groupings of articles demonstrate the fuller range of options.

Any section of the anthology could be used to demonstrate Shaw's wisdom in article selection. I use 'Economic Justice' because these articles highlight the way in which this anthology stands out in the crowd and shows how conscientiously Shaw has kept all the promises made in the introduction. Articles by Singer and De George ask what morality requires of the rich in a world where many are desperately poor. In the face of this suffering and injustice, each article prompts consideration of personal as well as societal responsibility. Haslett's 'Is Inheritance Justified?' issues an appropriate challenge to conventional property rights of Western democracies which are typically assumed to mirror what morality requires. Kavanagh's 'Ethical Issues in Plant Relocation' addresses a concern which under NAFTA is as

real in Canada as in the United States. Schumacher's 'Buddhist Economics' concludes the section. It reminds us that by omission applied ethics courses imply that the Western tradition encompasses morality. This particular article provides insight not only into the different thinking of a Buddhist economist and a modern Western economist; but, it exposes the value-laden nature of economic reasoning.

Another indication that Shaw's anthology has been thoughtfully prepared for students and a feature peculiar to his text is the set of questions (Study Questions) preceding each article. He has kept the practice of questions following the article (Review and Discussion Questions). Both sets of questions are carefully put together and serve two very different ends. The set which precedes the article is designed to direct the reader to find basic information and concepts. The set which follows calls for critical analysis and assessment of the article's claims and arguments. In either case, the questions provide an excellent basis for discussion of the article.

William Shaw's excellent anthology would be a fine text for any course in contemporary moral issues whether or not the students are required to have a background in moral theory. Those that have this background will be able to consider more of the questions in applied ethics, those who lack it will benefit from Part I. My only criticism of the volume comes from being a Canadian philosopher who regularly chooses an anthology with some Canadian content. Shaw's book contains nary an article by a philosopher at a Canadian university. The richness of the volume is evidence that Shaw did not have to cross the border. However, our absence should prompt us to spread the word about Canadian accomplishments in the field of applied ethics. Then, those anthology compilers south of the border, who are largely responsible for the 'Enough' cry with which I began this review, would seek out Canadian philosophers.

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F.J. Sheed, trans.
Augustine's Confessions.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1993.
Pp. v + 294.
(cloth: ISBN 0-87720-187-2);
(paper: ISBN 0-87720-186-4).

The *Confessions* of Saint Augustine of Hippo is a collection of books which contain Augustine's account of his life. It is Augustine relaying his life's spiritual journey to God through stories of his childhood and young adulthood, leading to his conversion to God. In addition, some thoughts on creation are recorded in Books Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen. Augustine often intermingles his speaking to God with prayers to God. He begins this autobiography with praise: 'Great art Thou, O Lord, and greatly to be praised' (3). In the translation, F.J. Sheed has cleverly used 'Thee' and 'Thou' when Augustine addresses God through scripture and in a prayerful manner. 'You' is used to refer to God when Augustine addresses God in an intellectual manner. The original Latin did not allow for this distinction.

By looking back on his life, Augustine is able to think through his beliefs and compare how he thought when he was younger to how he thought while writing the book. We hear him wrestling with the problem of evil and attempting to understand his humanity which continually led him to sin. He was often disobedient as a child, having an intense love of playing games and of victory. He saw the adults playing games also, just different kinds of games. And it was difficult for him to understand why he had to be punished for behavior that was essentially the same as that which he saw in the adults. On p. 10 he says, '... the idling of men is called business; the idling of boys, though exactly like, is punished by those same men ...' By looking at the examples he had, Augustine understands why he fell into sin with such ease. All around him were men who had more concern for fine speech than right behavior.

Augustine continued in his study of rhetoric and in his search for understanding of God. He was determined to have absolute certainty of the truth before accepting truth. It was difficult to believe God as a spiritual, incorporeal being, because the eyes give proof to what may be considered true and real. Spirit is not seen, thus not believable. Augustine eventually comes to his realization that God is a spirit. He concludes that every substance is corruptible, and God is incorruptible, thus God must not be a substance. His lifelong search for God should have come to an end at that point, but he continued to long for something more. He says (130), 'I had found the pearl of great price, and I ought to have sold all I had and bought it. But I hesitated still'. What is it that makes man so unwilling (even willing, but unable somehow) to do what he knows is right? This 'hesitation' which prevails throughout the *Confessions*, is what Brown suggests to be a major theme of the book. He writes, 'The *Confessions* is not a book about what happened in Augustine's past. It is a book about why what should have happened took so

long to happen' (xvi). Indeed, we read of Augustine's conversion in Book Eight of the ten autobiographical books.

In the last three books (Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen) we see Augustine in the present, pondering over the first chapter of Genesis, seeking answers to questions of time and eternity, of how God created, and of what he created that which has been created. Augustine concludes that all must find their own way to answer these questions and one way is not necessarily right, while another wrong. Truth is always right and the one truth is that God created. This is what is important: not how it happened, but that it happened. Men often look to other men, or to that which has been created, for wisdom and knowledge, but understanding comes from God. 'For when in newness of mind he sees and understands Your truth, man does not need any other man to teach him to imitate his kind: but with You to teach him he sees for himself "what is Your will, what is good acceptable and perfect"' (275). Thus we see Augustine learning from God through the scripture, rather than learning from men for the pleasing of men, as when he was younger. We also see Augustine seeking God himself, rather than that which has been created by God, as when he followed the teachings of the Manichees.

Peter Brown's introduction gives us a brief account of Augustine's life, with the right blend of how the things of Augustine's time relate to the things of our time. We see how Augustine lived, his parent's place in society, and what was expected of him. Brown states that 'A classical Latin culture, geared to performance and learned in a manner as intensive as any modern drama school or musical conservatory, was as universal ... as a modern computer language among successful young executives' (xiv). We can understand how Augustine fit in to his culture, therefore, by comparing it to ours. In Brown's introduction we understand who Augustine is as a man, a philosopher, and a bishop. By contrast, we see a different perspective of Augustine in Sheed's Forward. Here we understand Augustine as a giant in history who saw himself as a man no greater than any other. Sheed believed this to be of significance while one reads the book: 'What matters is that he has no conception of his own greatness or of his towering importance in the history of mankind' (xxvii). Augustine, in his *Confessions*, has prayed out loud for any one who would listen. Little did he know that so many would listen. Sheed's translation is clearly an excellent choice. The passages flow with simplicity and ease. The verses from scripture are included in italics with number notations for the references, which are found at the end of the book. Thus, there is no break in continuity while Augustine 'prays' scripture to God, and these quotes are interwoven with his own words. The introduction, forward, and translation make this a fine edition of Augustine's *Confessions*. The timelessness of the *Confessions*, and the greatness of the author speak of the excellence of this work.

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Michael Shute
The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History: A Study of Lonergan's Early Writings on History.
Lanham, MD: University Press of America
1993. Pp. xxvi + 206.
ISBN 0-8191-8838-7.

This book is a well written and informative study of a set of early documents by the Canadian philosopher-theologian, Bernard Lonergan. The documents were discovered in the archives of the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto after L.'s death in 1984. The notions of dialectic and history are central to L.'s work and those who know his mature writings are familiar with relevant discussions in later works. However, L.'s mature writings seldom show traces of earlier stages of development, nor do they reveal clues to the personal struggles experienced by L. when he worked out basic ideas in dialogue with other authors. This book makes some of these developmental moments come alive and helps reveal the complexity as well as the profound significance of many ideas which appear deceptively simple in the later works.

The documents are from a file of L.'s personal papers known as 'File 713' and were written between 1933 and 1938 (67-8). L. had studied at Heythrop College in the late 1920s and taught at Loyola College, Montreal. In 1933 he left to begin his undergraduate studies in theology at the Gregorian in Rome. These studies lasted until spring, 1937 when he left for France, England, and Ireland to complete his Jesuit religious and pastoral formation. In the fall of 1938 his concerns shifted when he began his doctoral dissertation on Aquinas.

The file contains 12 separate items, all are in draft form, and many are pieces, notes, or drafts of other documents. Shute's first task is to assemble them into groups and units for study and arrange them chronologically. This he does by distinguishing two developmental phases in L.'s ideas, dividing the documents into two batches corresponding to the two phases, and further correlating references in the documents to dates of historical events (63-71). He then assembles the notes, sketches, and draft stages with their more completed versions and ends up with a total of 6 study documents, ranging in length from 2 to 36 pages. For purposes of his analysis, S. has entitled the documents, 'Essay in Fundamental Sociology', '*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*: A Theory of Human Solidarity', '*Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis*', 'Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity', 'A Theory of History', and 'The Analytic Conception of History'.

Lonergan scholars will appreciate S.'s text for its historical detail, developmental analyses, clarification of terms, and for insight into the full range of research materials integrated in L.'s thought. However, philosophers and theologians of other schools will find interesting S.'s portrait of L.'s struggles to integrate thomistic philosophy with insights from science

and continental philosophy and to forge tools for understanding the political events of his age. Early in life L. became convinced that the world views shaping history, Liberalism and Marxism, were fundamentally flawed and their flaws were wreaking havoc everywhere. Writing in the years between the World Wars, L. knew that a philosophy for understanding history would need to be sufficiently complex to meet the challenges of world events. To develop such a philosophy L. enters into discussion with such figures as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Newton, Marx, Hegel, Newman, Einstein, Sorokin, Toynbee, Jaspers, and Voegelin. While Lonergan scholars are aware that such conversations lie behind much of L.'s mature work, S.'s study brings these conversations into the foreground.

The result of L.'s work in this period is a theory of the dialectic of history which is developed on the model of the 'threefold approximation' (42-61). Drawing on examples from science, L. suggests that events which are shaped by a multiplicity of forces can be understood by analyzing, first, the forces individually, then the complex dialectical 'motions' which result when the forces are at work in combinations.

The 'forces' which are relevant to understanding human history can be grouped into three categories (138-57). The first are the operations of human intelligence and responsibility which function spontaneously in human beings, constitute social and historical structures, yield progress by building upon past achievements, and increase in competence and liberty as they turn reflexively towards an analysis of their own operating. The second are the forces of decline which are unleashed when human action fails to live up to the demands of intelligence and responsibility, institutions and societies are built upon these deformations, group allegiances accelerate the deformations, decline becomes the basis for theories which form later ages, and, finally, the quest for truth and value is abandoned as a hopeless ideal. In the third category are the forces of renaissance or redemption which are absolutely supernatural, which reverse the forces of decline, and which transform the dialectic of progress and decline in history.

Unlike other philosophies of history which yield formulae for historical predictions, L.'s is an heuristic for understanding and evaluating the actual course of historical events and for responsibly shaping history. The various forms of dialectical interaction among these sets of forces yield categories relevant to historical understanding and action. S.'s analyses (summarized neatly in tables on pp. 179-82) give a good indication of the alternative dialectical patterns envisaged by L. While some philosophers may question the relevance of a category 'redemption', for understanding history, L.'s analysis of the breadth and depth of decline in history is sufficiently compelling to warrant an examination of one's own grounds for evaluating past success or for hope in the future.

This book is neatly laid out, it moves well from a concise introduction to L. to the documentary analyses, it summarizes the findings in a final chapter, and is quite clearly written. Two technical flaws are apparent (the Roman numeral page count as indicated in the 'Table of Contents' is wrong,

and the publication date for the reference in note 38 of the 'Introduction' should be 1985). However, these are atypical and do not detract from an otherwise excellent text.

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Laurence R. Smith
Right and Wrong: Practical Ethics: A Fresh Look by a Retired Judge.
Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1993.
Pp. x + 150.
US $17.50 (ISBN 0-8191-9092-6).

Laurence R. Smith in his *Right and Wrong: Practical Ethics: A Fresh Look by a Retired Judge*, observes prevailing societal confusion regarding ethics, and offers 'the rank and file ... who have not studied philosophy ... a guidebook of practical ethics and ... a catalyst for discussion' (1); a worthy project. The book's first nineteen chapters serve to introduce Smith's methodology of ethical decision making. Fourteen remaining chapters each introduce one additional issue deemed appropriate by Smith to the popular discourse in ethics. Extensive appendices — about half of the book — provide pedagogical tools: discussion questions, skit scenarios, etc.

To its credit, the book is not long-winded. Chapter length averages one and a half pages; but brevity is not succinctness. Smith addresses many issues in this book, none thoroughly, and he fails to develop a coherent thesis.

The book begins, laudably, with an effort to define a few key terms and issues. Unfortunately the author's definitions do not offer much: 'Morals: 1. Standards as to moral conduct. 2. Standards as to conduct related to sexual behavior or vice' (5). Smith advises us in chapter four to forsake the terms 'moral' and 'ethical' and speak simply of whether a proposed action is wrong. 'Wrong' is defined rather objectivistically as: 'not in accordance with justice, law, morality, etc.: unlawful, immoral, or improper'. Yet in the next paragraph Smith explains: 'We are basically considering what is bad or improper from the standpoint of the decider' (7-8). This slippage between objective and subjective orientation represents the theoretical muddle endemic to the book.

Chapters 5 through 19 offer Judge Smith's ethical decision making methodology, which comprises thirteen 'Guidelines and Considerations' for the individual's ethical decision making process. This program boils down (and

in fact the distillation is presented once as Chapter 5 and again as Appendix C) to a list of several activities typically associated with ethical decision-making: i.e. 'determine whether the proposed behavior is in accord with ... the law ... public interest ... your values', etc. Smith's final prescription is: 'From the above and any other factors you deem relevant, it is by reasoning that you should make your personal determination as to whether certain conduct is right or wrong. You determine the weight given ... [,] decide between conflicting values and interests ... [and] achieve a proper balance between the interests of others and your own interests' (10). The result is almost vacant as a normative account.

The issues presented in the remaining chapters, unfortunately, range unsystematically from the semantic to the ethical; from the meta-ethical to the pedagogical, with no warning or indication to Smith's unsophisticated target audience of the rapid changes of terrain. The book sometimes shifts distractingly from its primary focus on individual ethical decision-making to social issues. In chapter 22 Smith jumps into considerations of public policy. In 31 and 32 he is suddenly expounding upon the importance of consensus to social order (73).

A brief semantical discussion of the too familiar expression: 'Family (or Traditional) Values' — the topic of Chapter 20 — may have its place in a book of this sort. Smith's synopsis, however, is unhelpful: 'I have concluded that both family values and traditional values mean: *values of relevance to children as well as adults, that most people consider good*' (44). Jumping from a discussion of the durability of moral standards, (Chapter 24), to 'Animals and Morality' (Chapter 25), Smith offers: 'To me, whether non-human animals have rights is more of a metaphysical question than a moral or ethical question. Irrespective of the rights of other animals, a human's abuse of other animals may be considered wrong' (53).

The goal of creating 'a guidebook of practical ethics' is ambitious. Absent the pith and/or Divine inspiration of *Poor Richard's Almanac* or the *Ten Commandments*, no *enchiridion ethicum* will have much effect among the rank and file. As for 'catalysts for ethical discussion', they litter the streets. Any book written to elevate the popular discourse in ethics should go beyond catalysis to offer a strong, useful framework and suggest clear, useful definitions. Even if it eschews formal theoretical discussion, such a work must reflect clear-headed consideration of ethical theory; or else risk contributing to the very confusion which its author seeks to dispel.

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Terry J. Tekippe
Lonergan and Thomas on the Will.
Lanham, MD: University Press of America
1993. Pp. xiv + 149.
US $42.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-9072-1);
US $17.50 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-9073-X).

Tekippe expands the argument proposed in his article, 'Lonergan's Analysis of Error: An Experiment' (Gregorianum 71, 2 [1990] 353-74). T. employs Lonergan's own process of discovering error to reveal an error he finds in Lonergan's claim that Thomas changed his position on the compatibility of necessity and freedom in the will.

T. states his intent to respond to the critique of the article that Fred Crowe levels in 'Thomas Aquinas and the Will: A Note on Interpretation' (Method 8, 2 [1990] 129-34). In chapters 1-3, T. cites, in full, texts representing Thomas's thought on the will from his early, middle and late periods, and comments on the relation between freedom and necessity in the will as found in these texts. T. concludes that Thomas never repudiated his belief that freedom and necessity are compatible in the will.

In the second part of the work, T. addresses Lonergan's interpretation of Thomas. In chapter 4, T. gives his understanding of Lonergan's interpretation: Thomas held in the middle period that the will was necessitated yet free in willing the end, because it was not coerced, yet changed in his late period to hold that the will is necessitated and not free in willing the end. T. claims that Lonergan errs in this interpretation of Thomas.

In chapter 5, T. extends his investigation to Lonergan's understanding of justification. If Lonergan claims justification is not a free act of the will, by which it wills beatitude, then, T. states, Lonergan holds the same position as Luther and Calvin, a position condemned in the council of Trent. Yet T. determines that the Council of Trent did not affirm a free act of the will in justification, and thus concludes that Lonergan did not 'technically' hold a position contrary to the statements of the Council.

In the final chapter, T. aims to refute the other factors Lonergan finds Thomas overcoming as his theory of the will developed. T. claims that Thomas did accept *'liberum arbitrium'* as a third potency, and thus did not reject the 'essence' of Albert's thought. Through a statistical analysis, T. attempts to demonstrate that Thomas's use of the term *'liberum arbitrium'* did not decline as Lonergan claimed. Finally, T. proposes that Thomas did not hold early on that the will is a passive power, and later hold that it is an active power, but held, both early and late in his life, that it is both active and passive.

There are serious flaws in T.'s interpretation of both Lonergan and Thomas.

I question T.'s basic understanding of Lonergan's position. T. quotes the pivotal passage from Lonergan's *Grace and Freedom*: '(I)n the *De Veritate*, the *De Potentia* and the *Prima Pars* one does find incidental statements to

the effect that non-coercion makes necessary acts free' (ix). Here, Lonergan states that in his middle period, Thomas seems to infer that the will which is subject to necessity is free because it is not coerced; in his later period, however, Thomas will reject this understanding of freedom. T. does not argue against this position; rather, he argues against a position which claims Thomas once held freedom and necessity to be incompatible, and T. instead argues that Thomas always held freedom and necessity to be compatible. As is evident from the quote, Lonergan is not claiming that Thomas denied the compatibility of freedom and necessity; rather, Lonergan claims that Thomas later denies this freedom is due to the lack of coercion.

Why does T. interpret Lonergan in this way? I find the limitation of T.'s analysis of Thomas's understanding of the will to be rooted in T.'s understanding of the act by which one wills the end, as distinguished from the act by which one wills the means. Thomas explains the act of willing the end as the 'first act' of the will, which is a passive act of the generation of the will in its nature; this act of generation is attributed to God, not the will, as the mover. The will, as the power by which the rational creature desires the good, is perfected through its 'second act' of willing some particular good, in which it moves itself; this act is necessary, in that one cannot will anything but the good on account of the nature of the will itself, yet is also free in that it is not determined to one object or another. This freedom is due to the diversity of particular goods which it may choose, as Lonergan explains in chapter 5 of *Grace and Freedom*. T., however, conceives the act of the will by which it chooses the end to be of the same type as the act by which the will chooses the means, as a kind of 'second act'; thus, the freedom and necessity that applies to one must apply to both, and T. affirms that the will is both free and not subject to necessity, in choosing the final end and in choosing the means.

This limitation in T.'s interpretation of Thomas gives rise to the most serious error in his book. In chapter 5, T. concludes that justification not only involves a free act of the will, but consists of the free act of the will, re-willing the end it desires by nature (112). This is clearly contradictory to Thomas's teaching on infused habits, and confuses the act of the will in consent, which is a second act, with the new 'first act' of the will, which is the infused habit. T. thus denies a difference between the end which is willed by the natural power of the will, and the end willed by the supernatural habit of charity infused in the soul; supernatural habits are not new principles, but stronger principles; natural and supernatural ends and powers are not different in their order, but in degree. Such an understanding opens T. up to the charge of Pelagianism (28), for he holds that the grace of the supernatural habit, which is the new principle or first act of the will, is an act done by the will itself in re-willing its final end (110), in which God operates only in the most general way.

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Eugene Webb
The Self Between: From Freud to the New Social Psychology of France.
Seattle: University of Washington Press 1993.
Pp. 268.
ISBN 0-295-97226-2.

The stated purpose of Eugene Webb's *The Self Between* is to introduce to American thinkers the newest generation of French philosophical/psychological/sociological thinkers — namely, the 'Girardian school' of post-Freudians such as Jean-Michel Oughourlian, Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Paul Dumouchel, André Orléan, and Michel Aglietta, and above all Réne Girard. These theoreticians, along with Francois Roustang, Marie Balmary, and Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen (who differ from Freud, but do not belong to the 'Girard school') all have been writing during the late 1970s and the 1980s, and so follow, and were much influenced by, the earlier generation of French intellectuals who were less critical of Freud (e.g. Ricoeur, Lévi-Strauss, Derrida, Lyotard, Kristeva, and especially Lacan). The author takes pains to clarify the 'enormous' influence of Lacan on these thinkers, particularly Lacan's idea that 'desire is always the desire of the other' (117). This Lacanian idea is recast as the 'central idea' of the Girardians: 'the fundamentally imitative character of human desire' (87). Their theory of 'mimetic desire', or 'metaphysical desire', breaches the traditional boundary between psychology and sociology, and opposes any radical individualism, arguing that the desires (as opposed to biological needs/appetites) that one feels are 'not desires one feels on the basis of a genuine inner appetite but desires one learns from others for objects one feels are important to certain individuals who have prestige in one's eyes' (91). Or, in the words of Girard himself, 'Man is the creature who does not know what to desire, and he turns to others in order to make up his mind' (7). The theme which emerges is 'the theme of the self as constituted dynamically and continuously by the relationships it finds itself involved in' (vii). The 'Girardian' view is compared to Freud's concept of 'identification' and Lacan's theory of the 'mirror stage'. Webb also makes insightful comparisons to the philosophies of consciousness of Hegel (especially Kojeve's exegesis of the master/slave dialectic), Heidegger (especially the concept of 'authentic existence' in the face of death), and Kierkegaard (especially the 'subjectivity' of self). These comparisons draw on an earlier work by the same author (*Philosophers of Consciousness: Polanyi, Lonergan, Voegelin, Ricoeur, Girard, Kierkegaard*, University of Washington Press, 1988). Webb is careful to explain that in these most recent French thinkers (as well as in much earlier French thought, such as that of Rousseau) there is a 'tension between the individualistic thrust of the Cartesian heritage [of an autonomous and self-transparent conscious self] and a general tendency to conceive of the individual as embedded within and largely determined by the social matrix' (152). As Webb points out, Sartre's swing from his earlier existentialist phase emphasizing radical autonomy, to his later Marxian phase with its collec-

tivistic orientation, is a good example. Speaking of the views of the Girardian psychiatrist, Oughourlian, Webb says, 'the selves in which we take such pride and their supposedly spontaneous, self-originating desires, are actually functions of our relations with real or imagined others in relation to whom we feel a dependency or inferiority that is the very last thing we will ever be willing to acknowledge, either to ourselves or others' (148). Here, as in his amusing example of the Rolls Royce advertisement which seduces us into identifying (*via* 'mimetic desire') with the Mercedes Benz driver who jealously desires the Rolls Royce, Webb suggests that such 'metaphysical desires' are merely symbolic desires of things which lend prestige and status to their owners. In fact, it is only when he uses a very Sartrean notion of 'fullness of being' ('ontological sufficiency') and the example of a lover who is attracted to a woman only because she is indifferent and aloof or because she is desired by someone who has such self-satisfaction and self-sufficiency, that we come to see the full meaning of the Girardian notion of an 'interdividual' (or, 'self between'). As Webb says, Sancho Panza (in Cervantes' *Don Quixote*) only desires that his daughter become a duchess some day, because Don Quixote and other ontologically self-sufficient nobles have such desires for their daughters, whereas Sancho's appetite for cheese or wine is not such a 'mimetic desire', but a given need. Webb, following Girard, draws on other works of literature by Stendhal, Proust, and Dostoyevsky to illustrate the Girardian theories of imitative desire, and the distinction between 'internal mediation' (which is envious and hateful) and 'external mediation' (which is loving, and not rooted in rivalry). He suggests, following Balmary, that Jesus was the paradigmatic 'external mediator' or model of imitative desire.

The Self Between contains many interesting philosophical and psychological apercus. For example, Webb observes that due to Kant's moral inquiries, the Germans typically are devoted to a 'universal principle of justice', whereas the French typically are loyal to the group's practical interests, rather than to some abstract principle (19). He also notes (90) that, 'many critics now tend to turn literature in on itself in such a way that it seems to have little or no reference to reality', and (91) 'French theoretical thought in the various intellectual fields has tended in the past two decades more toward a canonization of paradox, dilemma, and impasse than toward a search for positive solutions'. And he says (93), 'Girard's concept of the mediator explains why one so often finds an object banal until it is transfigured by the appreciation of another observer'. In a similar way he, like Oughourlian, explains that hypnosis works because 'the hypnotized actually experiences the other's wishes [i.e. suggestions] as though they were his own', rather than as hypnotic 'commands'. In chapter six, which devolves around arcane theological questions (such as whether the Bible teaches that it was Jesus's Incarnation or his sacrificial Crucifixation that provides man's salvation), Webb remarks that strictly speaking God did not order Abraham to actually sacrifice Isaac by killing him, and so Abraham's misinterpretation of the divine order was a kind of projection onto the divine, 'in a manner like that of psychological transference with an analyst' (195).

Webb's book is not without its problems, however. Generally speaking it begins with a lot of discussion of ideas interesting to philosophers, and true to its subtitle, relates the Girardian school to Freud's own positions. But as the book proceeds, especially in chapters five and six, it gets bogged down in discussion of political economy and theology, the relevance of which is sometimes hard to see. Furthermore, it is perhaps overly sympathetic in its exposition of Girard's 'scapegoat' theory of the origins of society à la Freud's *Totem and Taboo*. Also, like other recent studies of Freud (such as John Forrester's *The Seduction of Psychoanalysis: Freud, Lacan and Derrida*, Cambridge, 1990) it naively employs *ad hominem* psychoanalytic arguments against Freud (particularly gossip regarding 'family secrets'), which seems unjustifiable even if Freud himself used such attacks against his own enemies. And, finally, Webb never really acknowledges the great debt these thinkers owe Sartre in their ideas of 'fullness of being', and 'despair at not being God' (very similar to *être-pour-soi-en-soi*), and 'the fundamental gesture of becoming a self' which seeks to 'absorb all otherness into oneself and thus annihilate it' (highly reminiscent of Sartre's 'Hell is the "other"', reformulated by Webb in a footnote on p. 117 as: 'the demand to have one's own desire recognized by the other'). Likewise it might have been useful to draw the reader's attention to similarities between the Girardian notion of 'empathy' (215) and the concept of *Mitsein* used by existential psychoanalysts such as Binswanger, Bleuler, Ellenberger, etc. No mention is made of other important French deconstructionists such as Deleuze and Guattari, nor are all the members of the 'Girardian school' given equal attention (some, like Dupuy, Dumouchel, Orlean, and Aglietta, are mentioned once and then dropped from the discussion). Particularly offensive to this reader is the statement that, 'philosophy and psychology both find their ultimate work' in 'the elucidation of ... love' (243), and one also gets an uneasy feeling at the end of the book (247) that Webb, like the 'Girardians' he is introducing, has a hidden religious (i.e. Christian) agenda. In the end, one hopes that French theoreticians will in the future retain the depth of earlier generations of thinkers, but also present their ideas clearly in the way the 'Girardians' apparently do.

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David Weissman
Truth's Debt to Value.
New Haven: Yale University Press 1993.
Pp. xi + 355.
US $32.50 (ISBN 0-300-05425-4).

Truth's Debt to Value is a stone kicking realist's percussive reaction to antirealist metaphysics and theories of truth. The book is contentious and polemical, but sometimes careless in argumentation. It's author misses an opportunity to refresh those bored by the careful arguments to be found in much of the literature on the current realist-antirealist debate, by making the polemics needlessly long and repetitious. Weissman refers to a variety of philosophical views, including subjective and transcendental idealism, pragmatism, constructive empiricism, Putnam's internal realism, social constructivism, and post-modernist 'textualism' with the unifying pejorative 'value-based world-making'. His central claim is that world-making is an error, and a dangerous one at that. Values cannot determine particular truths. Values do, however, play a role in determining the metaphysical views of philosophers, and thus in shaping *theories* of truth.

Truth's Debt to Value, begins with a comparative historical look at realist and antirealist views followed by account of values as based on both subjective desires and objective knowledge of the world. The core of the book consists of a development and defense of a theory of truth as a relation of correspondence between sentences and instantiated possible states of affairs, and exposition and refutation of four competitor theories. The book is at its strongest with Weissman's positive account of truth. This account is largely a sketch of ideas already available in Weissman's *Eternal Possibilities* (1977). For this reason, while the positive account is not without metaphysical difficulties, it will not be the focus of what follows.

The historical work ignores important differences between various views and portrays the realist-antirealist debate as if the available positions consisted of metaphysical realism and crude subjectivist world-making. Weissman repeatedly asks how the latter view accounts for the fact that what we experience does not conform to our desires, and how it accounts for the possibility of error. Unfortunately, he fails to follow up with a historical investigation of how the *real* idealists have replied.

The critical overview of truth theories is somewhat better. Weissman examines the coherence theory, deflationism, truth as identity of knower and known, and 'behaviorist notions of truth'. He has an interesting approach. Theories of truth, according to Weissman, are grounded in an embedding metaphysics and the values which motivate the metaphysics. After criticizing reconstructed versions of each of these theories of truth, Weissman turns to criticism of the grounding metaphysics and values.

The reconstructions are not as strong as they could be. Weissman's objections to the theories are often familiar rotten old cherries: How can the coherentist explain why thoughts and sentences are candidates for truth

while other things that 'can cohere' are not, without claiming that it is because they are representations of the world (129)? The embedding metaphysics is always discovered to be naive idealism, to which Weissman's ultimate response is the stone-kick. Again and again, we are reminded that no effort of will can prevent our deaths or keep us from running into lamp posts if we shut our eyes while walking, and that if we go outside we risk bombardment with *real* excrement by *real* pigeons.

The discussion of the values which motivate antirealist metaphysics is not fair. According to Weissman, these values are romantic at best, pernicious at worst. The coherence theory of truth, we are informed, is motivated by such values as a desire for 'power over the world', the 'private desire for an ideal world', and the belief that everyone has 'a right to dwell in a world of their own choosing' (157). The redundancy theory of truth is motivated by a desire to hide the theorist's 'psychocentric metaphysics' .... Weissman does not produce textual or historical evidence that world-makers have held such values. Furthermore, he ignores the values which critical (and not merely skeptical) philosophers claim to uphold. By critique, Kant hoped to determine the boundaries of the knowable and to protect our moral and religious conception of ourselves as autonomous from both skeptical and dogmatic attack. Contemporary social constructivists are in part motivated by a similar critical goal of validating varying epistemic traditions by showing that much of what has been taken to be necessary is in fact historically contingent.

Weissman's claim that world-making is dangerous lacks support. He speculates that questions such as 'what will be the effects of my conduct on others?' will be 'ignored if we persist in the illusion that the world has no character apart from the montage constructed in service to our interests' (309), and claims that 'oblivious to a world we have not made, we pollute it' (2). A comparison of the moral effects of realism and antirealism is a difficult undertaking. However, I suggest that if common sense realism is, and has historically been, the view of almost everyone but the occasional world-maker, (as Weissman reminds us) then realism does not have a track record which would lead us to decide in favor of its moral superiority.

Weissman's lack of attention to positions between metaphysical realism and straw idealism is related to another common mistake, the failure to take seriously the idea that the truth of different domains of discourse might be determined in different ways — something Michael Dummett has long claimed. Those of us interested in truth and the realism-antirealism debate, should reconsider Austin's warning in *Truth* that it is probably as much a mistake to think that the world has no contribution to make to the truth of any of our claims as it is to believe that the universe is populated with possible states of affairs corresponding to virtually any assertion we can produce. The truth about truth surely lies somewhere in between, in a region all too often overlooked.

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Howard Lloyd Williams, ed.
Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
1992. Pp. xix + 331.
US $32.50 (ISBN 0-226-89909-8).

Over the last number of years there has been a great increase in interest in Kant's political philosophy. Williams has responded to that interest by collecting thirteen contemporary works, from many of the most deservedly respected scholars of Kant's political philosophy, that cover a tremendously wide range of the issues raised in Kant's political writings. The quality of scholarship in these works is consistently quite high (there being only a couple of instances where significant criticism, beyond merely noting alternative interpretations, is warranted). Furthermore, unlike many collections of essays that do little to meet many readers' interests because of the idiosyncratic or very highly focused nature of the selections, this volume is quite valuable for one with a general interest in Kant's political philosophy, as well as for the specialist pursuing a narrowly defined issue.

In 'Kant's Optimism in his Social and Political Theory', Howard Williams interprets the behavior of a Kantian 'moral politician' according to the principles of the prisoner's dilemma to show that such a politician will be a much less effective force in the gradual improvement of human society than Kant thought necessary. However, both the extent to which the prisoner's dilemma will describe the moral politicians circumstances, and the limitations Kant places on her response, have been exaggerated in Williams's argument against Kant's optimism.

Ernest Weinreb's 'Law as an Idea of Reason' provides a very useful treatment of Kant's legal philosophy as a comprehensive whole, in contrast with contemporary pluralistic views of the law. Of particular excellence is his extended discussion of exactly what it is for law to be an idea of reason, which reveals the essential connections between Kant's legal philosophy and his more general practical philosophy.

'Reason and Politics in the Kantian Enterprise' by Onora O'Neill is an excellent essay in which she uses a consideration of the rhetorical structure of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to argue that the categorical imperative is the supreme principle of all reason, i.e., even in our acts of theoretical reason we ought reject what others could not adopt.

Susan Shell, in 'Kant's Political Cosmology: Freedom and Desire in the "Remarks" Concerning *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*', uses these reflections on the Rousseau of about 1765, including Kant's comments on the relations between the sexes, marriage, and taste, to reveal his developing views on morality, and how they anticipate elements of his mature doctrine.

In '"Even a Nation of Devils Needs the State": the Dilemma of Natural Justice', Otfried Höffe supports Kant's argument for the necessity of the state by deriving the legitimacy of an external coercive order from the self-inter-

ested sacrifices of natural liberty that must be made as a precondition of our freedom as social beings.

Wolfgang Kersting provides a straight-forward, more expositive than interpretively controversial, account of Kant's views on the *a priori* justification, nature, and structure, and the historical progress of the state in 'Kant's Conception of the State'.

In 'Kant: "An Honest but Narrow-Minded Bourgeois"?', Susan Mendus investigates Kant's views on the political status of women. She concludes by arguing that individualists must treat the family as a single unit and, therefore, as having a single head. Thus, Kant's elevation of a contingent fact of eighteenth-century German society (the subordinate status of women) to the status of an eternal truth is best understood as his narrow-minded attempt to solve a problem inherent in individualism.

Samuel Fleischacker presents 'Kant's Theory of Punishment' to show the compatibility of that notoriously difficult theory with Kant's wider moral outlook. He seeks to accomplish this by arguing that 'retributive punishment serves a moral function for Kant by making the criminal live under the law he implicitly sets up in his criminal act' (200).

Roger Scruton, in 'Contract, Consent and Exploitation: Kantian Themes', focuses on tensions growing out of two Kantian ideas, the hypothetical social contract and the injunction to treat people as ends and never as means only. He concludes that the categorical imperative can ground a theory of pure procedural distributive justice, and is, thus, the more politically fruitful idea of Kant's, especially since, though this point is more contentious than Scruton indicated, there cannot be pure consent free from the influence of inequality and past exploitation.

R.F. Atkinson's 'Kant's Moral and Political Rigorism', in which he discusses the rigorism of Kant's views on lying, rebellion, and punishment, though interesting, is not particularly well integrated, and doesn't include some important considerations.

In 'Kant, Revolutions and History', Peter Nicholson argues that Kant means absolutely to prohibit resistance and rebellion against the state, and that his claims that appear to belie this absolute prohibition actually do not. Though Kant does claim that non-compliance is warranted (on the, no doubt, extremely rare occasion) when a state's order is in direct conflict with the moral law, this non-compliance need not entail resistance. Similarly, Kant's claim that '[the French] revolution has aroused ... a *sympathy* which borders almost on enthusiasm' (see 260), ought be interpreted in its context as revealing that human beings have 'a certain moral disposition' (261) towards certain moral and political ideals, but not as an endorsement of this type of political activism.

Steven Smith, in 'Defending Hegel from Kant', revitalizes several rather significant Hegelian criticisms related to three aspects of Kant's practical philosophy: '(1) his anti-naturalistic conception of rationality; (2) his conception of universalization and moral conflict; and (3) his idea of humanity as an end in itself' (271).

Lastly, in 'Hannah Arendt on Kant, Truth and Politics', Patrick Reily commends Arendt for pointing those who want to understand Kant's political philosophy towards his *Critique of Judgement*. However, Reily criticizes Arendt for 'thinking that Kantian politics is somehow concealed within his notion of "enlarged" and "generalized" aesthetic judgment or "opinion"' (305), and argues instead for the importance of looking to the 'Critique of Teleological Judgement' for an understanding of the relationship between politics and morality.

Quite obviously this volume is rather varied and interesting, while maintaining a high level of scholarship. It will be appreciated by readers who come to it from a wide range of backgrounds and interests in Kant's political philosophy.

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