

# Canadian Philosophical Reviews

## Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

### Editor • Directeur

Wesley E. Cooper  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Alberta  
Edmonton, Alberta  
Canada T6G 2E5

As a rule, C.P.R. publishes only invited reviews. However, we will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English.

En général, R.C.C.P. ne publie que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, nous prendrions en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais.

### Subscription prices

for a volume of six double issues

#### *Institutions*

\$92 (Canadian)

US\$90/Cdn\$108 (Foreign)

#### *Individuals*

\$45 (Canadian)

US\$48/Cdn\$54 (Foreign)

#### *Students*

\$34 (Canadian)

US\$33/Cdn\$42 (Foreign)

### Prix de l'abonnement

à un volume de six numéros

#### *Institutions*

\$92 (Canada)

US\$90/Cdn\$108 (Hors-Canada)

#### *Individus*

\$45 (Canada)

US\$48/Cdn\$54 (Hors-Canada)

#### *Etudiants*

\$34 (Canada)

US\$33/Cdn\$42 (Hors-Canada)

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:  
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

### Academic Printing & Publishing

P.O. Box 4218, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada  
T6E 4T2

Publications Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X

© 1993 Academic Printing & Publishing

Published six times a year



**Volume XIII, No. 1**  
**February • février 1993**

**Table of Contents • Table des matières**

<b>Gregory Bassham, <i>Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study</i></b> .....	1
Joseph Ellin	
<b>Andrew Benjamin, ed., <i>Judging Lyotard</i></b> .....	3
Raphael Sassower	
<b>Vernon J. Bourke, ed., <i>Augustine's Love of Wisdom: An Introspective Philosophy</i></b> .....	6
John King-Farlow	
<b>Tim Crane, ed., <i>The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception</i></b> .....	8
Brian McLaughlin and Gene Witmer	
<b>Jean De Groot, <i>Aristotle and Philoponus on Light</i></b> .....	13
Donald N. Blakeley	
<b>Jan Faye, <i>Niels Bohr: His Heritage and Legacy</i></b> .....	16
Niall Shanks	
<b>Michael Ferejohn, <i>The Origins of Aristotelian Science</i></b> .....	18
Robin Smith	
<b>Michael Friedman, <i>Kant and the Exact Sciences</i></b> .....	21
Kenneth R. Westphal	
<b>Stephen Cade Hetherington, <i>Epistemology's Paradox</i></b> .....	24
Anne Jaap Jacobson	
<b>Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe and Albrecht Wellmer, eds., <i>Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment</i></b> .....	26
Tony Couture	
<b>Harro Höpfl, ed., <i>Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority</i></b> .....	31
Richard J. Mouw	
<b>Arnold Koslow, <i>A Structuralist Theory of Logic</i></b> .....	33
George Englebretsen	
<b>Julia Kristeva, <i>Strangers to Ourselves</i></b> .....	35
Kelly Oliver	
<b>E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. McCauley, <i>Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture</i></b> .....	38
John King-Farlow	
<b>G.W. Leibniz, <i>De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers 1675-1676</i></b> .....	40
Catherine Wilson	
<b>Jerome Neu, ed., <i>The Cambridge Companion to Freud</i></b> .....	43
Andrew Brook	
<b>Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki, eds., <i>History and Evolution</i></b> ....	45
Paul Thompson	



<b>Robert Nozick</b> , <i>The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations</i> . . . . .	47
Wesley E. Cooper	
<b>Norvin Richards</b> , <i>Humility</i> . . . . .	50
Eamonn Callan	
<b>Steven C. Rockefeller</b> , <i>John Dewey, Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism</i> . . . . .	52
Andrew J. Reck	
<b>Bernard E. Rollin</b> , <i>Animal Rights and Human Morality</i> . . . . .	54
Doug Simak	
<b>John R. Searle</b> , <i>The Rediscovery of the Mind</i> . . . . .	56
Stewart Nicolson	
<b>Hugh J. Silverman</b> and <b>James Barry, Jr.</b> , eds., <i>Texts and Dialogues: Maurice Merleau-Ponty</i> . . . . .	59
Wayne J. Froman	
<b>Robert C. Solomon</b> and <b>Kathleen M. Higgins</b> , eds., <i>The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love</i> . . . . .	61
Robert Ginsberg	
<b>Martin Warner</b> , ed., <i>Religion and Philosophy</i> . . . . .	63
Donald Wiebe	
<b>Richard Wolin</b> , <i>The Terms of Cultural Criticism. The Frankfurt School, Existentialism, Poststructuralism</i> . . . . .	26
Tony Couture	



**Gregory Bassham**

*Original Intent and the Constitution:  
A Philosophical Study.*

Rowman and Littlefield 1992. Pp. xi + 256.

US \$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7737-0).

'Original intention' legal interpretation will conjure up for some people the troglodyte jurisprudence of Judge Robert Bork and Chief Justice William Rhenquist. Under originalism, most of the major decisions of the US Supreme Court during the last half-century would not have been reached; these include, in a long list, the decisions ending segregation, imposing 'one person one vote,' and extending the rights of criminal suspects. Originalism, as Bork's Senate confirmation hearings demonstrated, is typically regarded as the slightly mad, politically irredentist pseudo-philosophy of the Far Right. So it may come as a surprise to learn that at the time of the writing of the US Constitution and its principal amendments, and indeed essentially for the first century-and-one-half of the Republic, originalism was not only the leading theory of legal construction, it was virtually the only theory, finally giving way, in the middle third of this century, first to the attacks of Legal Realism and then to the activist decisions of the late New Deal and Warren Courts.

This is the first full-length book on a subject that has been debated extensively virtually everywhere legal ideas are peddled. As Bassham demonstrates, much of what is derided as originalism is but a caricature of a philosophical theory which has more to be said in its favor than critics wish to admit. Writing with admirable lucidity and disposing a wide knowledge of technical questions in philosophy as well as of legal theory and Constitutional history, Bassham competently distinguishes the quite distinct ideas that go, or could go, under the name of originalism. After developing the most plausible version of the theory, he examines, and rejects, many of the standard criticisms, only to reach a final (negative) assessment of the theory.

What does originalism hold? Bassham distinguishes between what he calls the 'scope beliefs' of the original authors (that is, what they thought their words referred to) and their 'semantic intentions.' It is only a caricature of originalism to attribute to it the view that contemporary courts must adhere to the authors' scope beliefs, so that under originalism interstate trucking could not be regulated under the Commerce clause and skyjacking would not be an 'infamous' crime. Semantic intentions roughly are what the authors thought their words meant when they wrote them. Hence the Equal Protection clause, as an interesting example, was very likely taken by its authors roughly to prohibit certain forms of legal discrimination based merely on prejudice. The mid-19th century authors of the Amendment would not have intended the clause to prohibit discrimination against women, since in their minds legal disabilities imposed on women were not based merely on prejudice but on certain basic facts of nature. If we think otherwise today and interpret the provision in accordance with our own views of the facts, we



are not violating the original authors' intentions in the broader ('semantic') sense of intentions. A statute that regulates 'toxic' substances is not confined to the substances thought toxic at the time the statute was enacted, and a judge would not violate originalist principles by applying the statute to substances never known to the statute's authors. On the other hand, the Equal Protection clause was very likely intended to be strictly limited to specific forms of legal disabilities regarding such matters as owning property, entering into contracts, bringing suit, testifying in court etc; it was not meant to be a general edict extending to racially mixed marriages, segregated schools and all other legally-imposed discriminations. Decisions holding otherwise must therefore be excluded by any form of originalism.

The strongest parts of the book are the chapters examining the actual and possible varieties of originalism and setting out and refuting certain standard criticisms. It is doubtful that Bassham has anything new to offer to the well-known arguments in favor of originalism: stability, clarity, predictability in the law; legitimacy of the judicial role and process in its claim judges must employ standards already made and may not make new rules to suit their philosophies or tastes; democracy in that law should be made by elected officials, not by unelected judges. Ultimately, originalism protects liberty in so far as liberty is based on government under a Constitution: under other theories, the Constitution is in danger of becoming 'a blank paper by construction.'

The arguments against originalism Bassham finds persuasive are, first, the havoc originalism would do, or more properly would have done, to Constitutional law as we know it; quite literally, most contemporary constitutional law would not exist, at least in its present form. But this point is an argument from hindsight: no one can say what form our liberties might have taken had literalism remained the ruling philosophy. Bassham seems to argue that given the course of Constitutional law over the past 50 years, it is today too late for originalism: far too many departures from originalist ideas have become embedded parts of our law. But this is an argument for precedent, not against literalism: even Judge Bork was forced to admit that as an originalist he would merely refrain from extending anti-originalist precedents, not try to turn back the ones already decided.

Bassham's more daring argument, following Holmes' dictum that 'the present has a right to govern itself,' is to challenge the right of the original authors to impose their intentions on the present. This is the point which in effect underlies his anti-originalist defense of 'flexibility' in jurisprudence. But though he hints that constitutional government is not legitimate, his argument goes no further than holding that the present has a right to break away from the intentions of the Founders when it finds it necessary to do so. This claim seems to miss the point that the strength of originalism is that it plausibly expresses something crucial about constitutional government: living under a constitution means doing things the way the Founders intended, even to the extent of sacrificing desirable policies when there is no way of reaching the policy under the constitution's scheme. Any view such as



Bassham's which endorses the legitimacy of constitutional government while rejecting originalism has to provide a better explanation of what it is to be governed by a constitution. This Bassham fails to provide, turning instead in the last chapter to the question of which philosophical theory can best support a proper balance between a 'living Constitution,' and 'the need for powerful constraints' on officials. (He plausibly defends the 'eclectic pragmatism' of Cardozo). But the problem of what it means to live under a constitution can not be reduced to the question of how to strike a reasonable balance between judicial rigidity and judicial activism. It is not implausible to suppose that what lies behind the contemporary rejection of originalism, is our unwillingness to accept the severe restrictions on self-rule that constitutional governance imposes (as many of Bassham's own arguments unwittingly illustrate). But unless some other view of constitutional construction explains better than originalism what it is that constitutional government requires, then originalists will have their argument that rejection of originalism is tantamount to rejection of constitutional government itself.

**Joseph Ellin**

Western Michigan University

**Andrew Benjamin, ed.**

*Judging Lyotard.*

London and New York: Routledge 1992.

Pp. xii + 211.

US \$69.95: Cdn \$87.50 (cloth: ISBN

0-415-05256-4);

US \$17.95: Cdn \$19.95 (paper: ISBN

0-415-05257-2).

Play of words can be a useful literary and philosophical ploy to entice potential readers and stimulate their imagination while they read. Instead of *Au Juste*, the translation of Thebaud's interview with Lyotard is titled in English 'Just Gaming,' playing on the notion that the interview is nothing more than just Gaming, playing games, having fun, while at the same time playing on the possibility of gaming in a Just manner, invoking the notion of justice despite its application to games. *Judging Lyotard* attempts a similar duplicity or multiplicity of interpretations. Is Lyotard being judged? Why is Lyotard being judged, and by whom, and with what prefigured criteria? Is Lyotard's judgment being judged? Is the very notion of Judgment being evaluated, regardless of the particular use made of Lyotard's texts? To use



Geoffrey Bennington's words: 'our task in this book (that of "Judging Lyotard") puts us in the situation of having to judge the case which thus prescribes judgement without grounding its possibility: we therefore repeat the presupposition of judgement in the attempt to judge it' (163).

As all nine contributors to this fine collection of essays (including Lyotard himself) concede in one way or another, Kant's concern with judgment is paramount in judging Lyotard's judgment. The focus on Kant's third critique by Lyotard is explained not solely in terms of an infatuation with aesthetics in general and the sublime in particular, but more importantly in terms of the philosophical role that the *Critique of Judgement* supposedly plays in bridging the gap that emerges from the two first critiques, the *Critique of Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Aesthetics is not an escape or a refuge from rationality and action, but some sort of a 'bridge' which Kant, to use Bennington's words, 'attempts to throw over the "abyss" between theoretical cognition of nature and practical laws of freedom, a bridge the possibility of which Lyotard would want to interrogate between genres of discourse in general' (147).

David Ingram ably describes the centrality of Kant to the debates covered in this collection and in any other discussion of postmodernism: 'Kant's differentiation of cognitive, practical and aesthetic domains of rationality anticipated the fragmentation of modern society into competing if not, as Weber assumed, opposed lifestyles, activities and value spheres, and ... this has generated a crisis of *judgment*' (119). And, of course, the bifurcation of modernism and postmodernism depends on the presumption that each 'movement' responds differently to the implications of Kant's original grounding and ensuing crisis.

Two interrelated concerns inform this collection of essays: first, a concern with the distinction between modernity and postmodernity, and second, a concern that the postmodernism typified by Lyotard's texts is apolitical or politically irresponsible. For both of these concerns Kant remains a pivotal figure, at once the hero of the Enlightenment project that modernists (with Habermas and others) are still completing, and the author of essays on political issues (e.g., 'perpetual peace'). In order to deal with these concerns, Lyotard's own essay '*Sensus Communis*' (1988) is reprinted at the outset, followed by a series of comparisons with other so-called modernist thinkers.

Anne Barron compares Lyotard with John Rawls, while John Keane traces Lyotard's views to Alexis de Tocqueville, claiming that 'philosophical postmodernism of the type defended by Lyotard is not a break with the modernization project but, potentially at least, its socio-political ally, a vigorous agent of the renewal and deepening of modernity's democratic potential' (84, also 91).

Emilia Steuerman compares Lyotard with Habermas, reviewing the long-standing debate that has evolved around their respective positions, and concluding that Lyotard's notion of the postmodern condition 'is indeed a *radicalization* that in no way challenges the modernity project as such' (100); instead, 'postmodernity is the continuous critique demanded by modernity'



(113). Steuerman finds parallels in the works of Habermas and Lyotard on three levels: critiques of post-industrial capitalist society; linguistic turns or breaks: 'The move to language for both Habermas and Lyotard is a way of answering modernity's challenge' (113); and recognition of the 'problem of norms, of criteria, what Habermas calls the *normativity* problem and Lyotard the *legitimation* problem' (108).

David Ingram compares Hannah Arendt with Lyotard, claiming the former to be a modernist who is concerned (after Kant) with 'a universal ideal of community,' while Lyotard still 'embrace[s] relativism' (119). Defining Lyotard's politics as relativist, Ingram also condemns 'absolute pluralism' as a 'totalitarian logic' of Lyotard's own making (136). It seems that no matter how his work is interpreted, Lyotard's political cache pales by comparison with Arendt's.

Geoffrey Bennington compares Lyotard with Horace, recognizing the intimate relation between the literary commentary that surrounds both Horace and Lyotard and the political conditions that brought that commentary about. That is, the notion of *differend* is useful in relating two cities at war, understanding that when Rome and Alba interact it is not a matter of 'translating' from one language or argument to another, or finding a 'common ground' (in the Habermasian sense of consensus), but instead, as Bill Readings argues, 'The pagan tolerance of difference does not mean an identification with the other but an endurance of that unbearable difference without trying to appropriate it' (184). What remains central in these discussions is the political dimension of the Lyotardian insistence on a linguistic paralogy, a multiplicity of interpretations or language games, and a diversity of rules that regulate discursive games. Discursive moves (whether the legal code or daily communication) are political through and through, even democratic, as Keane reminds us, because 'Socio-political democracy is an implied, counterfactual condition of the practice of paralogism, and not a type of normative (or, as Kant would have said, imperative) language game' (95).

The political character of modernity as expressed by Habermas, Arendt, or Rawls in institutional terms differs from Lyotard's way of thinking and writing. But that does not mean that Lyotard is apolitical or politically insensitive and irresponsible. On the contrary, what becomes clear from this informative collection is that a great deal of thought about politics in general and democracy in particular is part and parcel of the Lyotardian legacy. I think Bill Readings is correct when he says that 'Lyotard's rethinking of philosophy as a process of experimental or pagan judgement allows the question of justice to be kept alive in late capitalism' (168).

In a brilliant application of Lyotard's political orientation, Readings analyses the dominant Australian culture's relation to the Aborigines in view of the film 'Where the Green Ants Dream.' Readings reminds us that 'acts of great terror have been committed not simply in the name of but *as a result of* the presumption of a common, abstract, universal humanity' (176). That is, 'injustice is the effect of the very fairness of the white man's law, its blank,



bleached, abstract humanity — its claim to be “common law” (180). Readings’ application of the so-called relativized politics of Lyotard challenges the dominant view of the Habermasian model of ideal speech acts as the only emancipatory model with the following recognition: ‘Lyotard’s paganism is not a politics of despair ... it is a chance to think liberation otherwise than as an abstraction into ever more splendid (more universal) isolation, a refusal to think freedom as self-domination’ (184).

Though it may fall on all too many deaf ears, I think this volume contributes to our anticipation of the political impact and promise stored in Lyotard’s postmodern orientation. Perhaps Readings’ conclusion retains the political suspense that will remain Lyotard’s trademark: ‘Deconstruction rephrases the political, not by adding race along with gender and class to the categories by which we calculate oppression but by invoking an incalculable difference, an unrepresentable other, in the face of which any claim to community must be staked’ (186-7).

### **Raphael Sassower**

University of Colorado, Colorado Springs

### **Vernon J. Bourke, ed.**

*Augustine’s Love of Wisdom:  
An Introspective Philosophy.*

West Lafayette, IN: Purdue U.P. 1992. Pp. ix + 234.

US \$27.00 (cloth: ISBN 1-55753-25-4);

US \$13.75 (paper: ISBN 1-55753-026-2).

This book can be usefully recommended as a book for undergraduates — preferably with some Latin — who would like an introduction to Saint Augustine to be set mainly against a Scholastic background. As author and editor, Vernon J. Bourke shows much enthusiasm for the Bishop of Hippo. Bourke is, of course, a long respected Augustine scholar, now still blooming in his eighties. His English is a pleasure to read, while St. Augustine’s Latin and his personal style in the selections from the original texts reveal, (as Bourke proclaims), his gifts as a truly exciting and noble prose writer.

Chapter One, ‘Life and Writings of Augustine’ is certainly a good one: it leads the readers on to the intended span of text while they receive a clear picture of a dramatic human being. But Bourke could afford to offer less autobiographical verbiage in his ensuing commentaries, given considerations of focus and space. What appears to be more needed, in view of Saint



Augustine's often prophetic or dramatic style of exegesis, would be comments which offer more structured accounts of his *arguments*, perhaps even some diagrams to help students pin down and evaluate the validity of his sometimes elusive reasoning. (Undergraduates, after all, usually need to become more reflective, critical, philosophically self-assertive.) As for enabling students so to pin down and evaluate Augustinian inferences, teaching experience suggests to me that it is best to make a *start* with stress on arguments in the little treatise, *De Magistro*. Bourke sometimes mentions it here, but does not explicate its unusual argumentative brilliance. As an introductory text, it presents a very lively picture of the Saint and his son. It also presents amusing one- or two-way arguments, easier than usual to decipher from his hand. One must not, however, be unfair to a book under review. Bourke offers very relevant quotations for his most preferred topics.

The editor provides from pages 56 to 113 the first thirty chapters of *The Confessions* with interfacing chapters of the original Latin and of Bourke's own translation in *The Fathers of the Church Series*, Volume 21, for 1953. He comments at page 55: 'The literal translation is intentionally close to the Latin of Augustine'. I think that in the 1990's, again for the sake of getting modern undergraduates to engage with the Saint closely as fellow philosophers, the style should have been changed since 1953's explosions of 'Thou', 'Thee', 'mayest' and the like. 'You' is a good word, for example, to capture the literal meaning of Augustine's original 'tu', etc., and to keep one's translation *literal and close to the Latin of Augustine*. Failure to update the 1953 effort suggests a mechanical and lazy approach to editing which is not characteristic of Bourke at all. But some older scholars will find in his translation a pleasantly mellow and bell-like quality. For example, Bourke starts: '(I) I shall know Thee, O Knower of mine, I shall know Thee even as I am known. Virtue of my soul, go deep into it and make it fit for Thee, that Thou mayest have it and possess it "without spot or wrinkle".' (57) Compare: *Cognoscam te, cognitor meus, cognoscam, sicut et cognitus sum. Virtus animae meae, intra in eam et coapta tibi, ut habeas et possideas sine macula et ruga*. The Latin seems much more casual and up to date for the 300s and 400s than is Bourke's rather archaic English for our own time. Of course, the translation remains clear and accurate. Philosophy may serve the ancient house of prayer, but it doesn't usually function in the same place. Even the new houses of prayer often resonate now with far more contemporary idioms than some of Bourke's.

First, *God*, next, *the Divine Illumination* constitute topics which are discussed most often in the volume. Happiness and the Happy Life are, also, among the most frequently appearing. So are Introspection, Light, Love (as *dilectio*), Memory, Mind (*animus*), Oblivion, Order (*ordo*), Reason (*ratio*), Eternal Reasons (*rationes aeternae*), Soul (*anima\animus*), Virtues, and, of course, Wisdom (*sapientia, sophia*), and, again, *Lies*. The subject of lies evokes several of Bourke's liveliest comments. In discussing a number of issues, such as the *illuminatio divina*, the editor makes helpful references to Plato, Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. Here, again, it is a pity that



Bourke emphasizes too little the philosophers' *arguments* and writes too much, relatively speaking, about their views. With such a powerful thinker and with these notable others there is no need to risk confining them to the history of ideas. An Oxford tutor once rightly warned that the philosophers' arguments for their conclusions can be considered much more useful than the history of these conclusions alone.

**John King-Farlow**  
University of Alberta

**Tim Crane, ed.**  
*The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception.*  
Cambridge University Press 1992. Pp. xi + 275.  
US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-41727-9).

This is a collection of nine original essays by as many authors: J.J. Valberg, Paul Snowdon, E.J. Lowe, Christopher Peacocke, Tim Crane, Michael Tye, Thomas Baldwin, Michael Martin, and Brian O'Shaughnessy. All of the essays are concerned with perception; a number focus specifically on the contents of perceptual experiences. Crane put the volume together with care; and his introduction does an excellent job of weaving the essays together. The essays are all polished and philosophically substantial; some are ground-breaking. The volume is sure to help to set the agenda for philosophical discussions of perception and experiential content for some time to come. We will now discuss each essay in its order of appearance.

The opening essay, Valberg's 'The Puzzle of Experience,' is concerned with the following puzzle. On the one hand, there is a certain 'compelling' line of reasoning that concludes that no external objects are objects of perceptual experiences. ('External objects' are objects whose existence does not depend on their being 'present in experience.') On the other hand, when we are 'open' to our experiences, we find it incredible to deny that external objects are objects of our experiences.

The line of reasoning in question can be applied to any arbitrary case of perceiving an external object. Valberg applies it to a case of seeing a book (26-31). He says that 'were God to eliminate the book but ensure that the activity in (the visual part of) my brain remains the same, how things are in my experience would remain the same' (27). From this he concludes that the book is not an object of his experience. Valberg calls this line of reasoning 'problematic,' but says that he cannot pinpoint where it goes wrong. We submit that the reasoning essentially depends on a false assumption. To infer



validly that the book is not an object of his experience, Valberg must assume that since how things are in his experience would remain the same even if God were to remove the book, the objects of his experience would remain the same. But this assumption seems false. The natural reading of 'how things are in my experience' is 'how things seem to me in virtue of my having an experience'. Taken this way, while it is true that 'were God to eliminate the book but ensure that the activity in (the visual part of) my brain remains the same, how things are in my experience would remain the same,' it is not true that the objects of my experience would remain the same. For *how things seem to me* in virtue of having an experience may remain the same even when some of the *objects* of my experience do not. Thus, the reasoning essentially depends on a false assumption, and so should be rejected.

In 'How to Interpret "Direct Perception"', Snowdon stipulates a notion of direct-perception (= d-perception) intended to illuminate what philosophers have been asking when they ask 'Do we ever directly perceive material objects?' Here is his definition:

x d-perceives y iff x stands in virtue of x's perceptual experience in such a relation to y that if x could make demonstrative judgements, then it would be possible for x to make the true and nondependent demonstrative judgement "That is y". (56; 58)

This definition, we believe, does not capture Snowdon's intended notion. Notice that it won't be possible for x to make the true and nondependent demonstrative judgement 'That is y' unless x has the concept of y. However, Snowdon's discussion suggests that he does not want x's d-perceiving y to require that x have the concept of y. We suspect, then, that the following better captures Snowdon's intended notion:

x d-perceives y iff x stands in virtue of x's perceptual experience in such a relation to y that if x could make demonstrative judgements, x could nondependently demonstrate y.

Snowdon explicates the notion of nondependent demonstration, a notion central to his definition of d-perception, thus:

your perceptual experiences put you in a position to nondependently demonstrate x just in case they put you in a position to demonstrate x where that does not depend on there being a y (not identical to x) such that you can count as demonstrating x only if you acknowledge that y bears a certain relation to x (59).

Unfortunately, given this 'acknowledgement' requirement for nondependent demonstrations, Snowdon's notion of d-perception won't do its intended work. For there are versions of indirect realism that are consistent with the claim that we d-perceive material objects. Consider, for example, the following version of indirect realism: whenever we perceive a material object, we perceive it by perceiving some sense datum that belongs-to the object. This thesis is consistent with the claim that we can nondependently demonstrate material objects, and hence d-perceive them. For even if one only perceives



material objects by perceiving sense data, one might still demonstrate a perceived material object without acknowledging that a sense datum belongs to it. One might (mistakenly) believe that there are no sense data, and so make no such acknowledgement, yet demonstrate the perceived material object. Such acknowledgement is not required to demonstrate perceived material objects.

In his ambitious, wide-ranging paper, 'Experience and its Objects,' Lowe (1) provides an analysis of seeing an object, (2) argues that the capacity to have beliefs requires a capacity for sense perception in at least one modality, and (3) objects to computational accounts of perception on the grounds that they treat visual experiences as epiphenomenal in the production of perceptual judgements. We will confine our remarks to Lowe's analysis of seeing an object:

One sees an object iff one's visual experience is directly causally dependent on certain properties of that object in such a fashion that one is thereby enabled (with the aid of background knowledge, maybe) to form a fairly reliable judgement as to what those properties are (79).

These conditions seem to us both too strong and too weak for seeing an object. They are too strong since there are creatures who can see but who cannot make judgements, for example, bees. A case that shows the conditions are too weak is provided by Lowe himself. He says: 'it may be objected that the clause concerning background knowledge in my definition is too lenient, in that it forces me to say that ordinary folk see their own retinal images whenever they are looking at their everyday surroundings' (81). He responds to this objection by accepting this consequence of his definition, saying: 'as far as I can see, no good reason can be given for excluding [retinal images] as *bona fide* objects of vision, and the mere fact that ordinary folk would not say that they see such objects is just a symptom of their fully excusable ignorance' (82). We think that, on the contrary, there is a good reason to claim that one does not see one's retinal images in such circumstances. One sees something only if it looks some way to one. Even though one could, with the aid of background knowledge, form reliable judgements about some properties of one's retinal images when looking at one's everyday surroundings, in such circumstances, one's retinal images do not look any way to one. So, one does not see them in such circumstances. Hence, Lowe's conditions are too weak to define seeing.

Peacocke's 'Scenarios, Concepts, and Perception' is a philosophically rich paper that demands careful study. Peacocke asks two questions: (I) What kind or kinds of contents do perceptual experiences have? (II) How is our mastery of observational concepts related to perceptual contents?

Peacocke claims that perceptual experiences can have conceptual contents. For example, one's visual experience might be such that one sees something *as* a tree, and that involves the exercise of the concept of a tree. However, in response to (I), he claims that perceptual experiences also have nonconceptual contents. And in answer to question (II), he claims that the



possession conditions for observational concepts include having had perceptual experiences with certain nonconceptual contents. That is one key point of interest in the ambitious research program he sketches.

The main focus of his paper, however, is to develop a taxonomy of nonconceptual contents which are possessed by perceptual experiences. Peacocke distinguishes two kinds of nonconceptual contents: positioned scenarios and protopositions. A scenario is a spatial type that includes an origin, axes, and an array of points surrounding the axes with various properties. The sorts of properties included in the spatial types will vary from perceptual experiences in one modality to those in another. For example, spatial types related to visual experiences will include hue-properties, while spatial types related to olfactory experiences won't. 'There is no requirement,' Peacocke says, 'that the conceptual apparatus used in specifying a [scenario] be an apparatus of concepts used by the perceiver himself' (107). For example, a positioned scenario for visual experiences will include visual angles, whether or not the subject of the experience has the concept of a visual angle. Now, according to Peacocke, every perceptual experience will have a *positioned scenario* content. Peacocke tells us:

A positioned scenario consists of a scenario, together with (i) an assignment of labelled axes and origins of real directions and places in the world which fall under the labels, and (ii) an assigned time (108).

A positioned scenario content is satisfied iff the positioned scenario is tokened. Positioned scenario contents, Peacocke maintains, capture the perspectival nature of experiential content.

Finally, Peacocke spells out the notion of a protoposition thus: 'protopositions are assessable as true or false. A protoposition contains an individual or individuals, together with a property or relation' (119). A subject can continue to have a perceptual experience with the same protopositional content, even when the experience's positioned scenario content has changed, for example, as a result of a change in the orientation of the subject's relevant sense organ. So, protopositional content is an 'additional layer' of nonconceptual content of some perceptual experiences.

Crane's essay, 'The Nonconceptual Content of Experience,' complements Peacocke's. Crane presents a notion of nonconceptual content and argues that perceptual experiences have nonconceptual content. According to Crane, a state has nonconceptual content iff one can be in the state without having the concepts that characterize the content of the state.

Much of Crane's paper is devoted to arguing that perceptual experiences have nonconceptual contents. He claims that concepts are postulated as the inferentially relevant constituents of intentional states. And he then argues that perceptual experiences have contents, but do not participate in the inferential relations necessary to count as having concepts as constituents.

In 'Visual Qualia and Visual Content,' Tye argues that there are no visual qualia. He clarifies this claim as follows: 'What I am denying is that there are any intrinsic, nonintentional features of which the subjects of the expe-



riences can be aware and by virtue of which the experiences have their contents' (159). The bulk of Tye's paper is devoted to defending the following supervenience thesis: 'any two visual experiences that are alike in all their intentional properties are alike in their subjective characters [i.e., in what it is like to have them]' (160). (By 'intentional properties', Tye means not only properties of having certain conceptual contents, but also properties of having nonconceptual contents, and, in addition, such properties as being a visual experience.) By defending this thesis, Tye attempts to respond to the leading argument for positing visual qualia, namely, that there are cases in which we can only explain the differences in subjective character by appeal to a difference in qualia. In his careful, sometimes ingenious discussions of would-be counterexamples to the supervenience thesis, Tye goes an impressive distance toward accommodating the intuitions of friends of qualia without countenancing qualia.

Baldwin's essay 'The Projective Theory of Sensory Content' offers a new theory of the contents of perceptual experiences. The theory emerges as a response to a problem with adverbial theories. The problem is how to characterize apparent spatial relations among putative sensory objects, for example, how to characterize having a red afterimage on the left and a green afterimage on the right. The projective theory avoids this problem by combining adverbialism with a representative theory of spatial contents:

The projective theorist accepts the adverbial theorist's treatment of subjective colour — to have a blue sensation is to sense bluely. But she rejects the adverbial theorist's treatment of the sensory spatial properties ... and in its place proposes an essentially relational account of these properties (185-6).

The leading idea is that while visual experiences do not represent colors (color is treated adverbially), they do represent spatial positions. Baldwin responds to some apparent difficulties for the projective theory, including the possibility of having experiences with spatial contents when there are no appropriate points of space to which the subject is related.

Chock-full of interesting phenomenological data, Martin's 'Sight and Touch' contains a detailed discussion of the differences in how spatial properties are represented in visual and tactual experiences. Martin argues that tactual experiences represent spatial properties at least partly by means of representing where parts of the subject's body are, while visual experiences can represent spatial properties without representing any part of the subject's body. He appeals to this difference in offering an original explanation of why seeing involves a visual field.

The final essay of the volume, O'Shaughnessy's 'The Diversity and Unity of Action and Perception,' is loaded with philosophically rich material. He discusses a large family of issues concerning the relationship between perception and action. He argues, among other things, that we cannot immediately perceive our (bodily) actions, but that we can will certain kinds of perception. We will perceptions when we engage in certain kinds of mental



attendings, for example, listening and looking. While O'Shaughnessy recognizes that we can hear something without listening to it, he points out that, nonetheless, listening to something entails hearing it. And he argues that listening to something *includes* hearing it. Moreover, he argues that one can listen to something just by trying. Now we acknowledge that listening to something entails hearing it. (Whether listening to something includes hearing it is, however, another matter, one which we will not discuss since it seems to us to turn on the broad issue of how events should be individuated.) However, we do not believe that one can listen to something just by trying. One can listen just by trying. But one can try to listen *to something* and not succeed; for the something one is trying to listen to may, for instance, be too faint to hear.

In any case, this last point does not affect O'Shaughnessy's theory of the structure of attending, a theory that has much to recommend it. And the essay as a whole considerably enriches the study of perception and action. We should thank O'Shaughnessy for bringing attending to our attention.

**Brian McLaughlin and Gene Witmer**  
Rutgers University

**Jean De Groot**

*Aristotle and Philoponus on Light.*

New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc.  
1991. Pp. ix + 183.

US \$53.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8240-7251-0).

John Philoponus' commentary on Aristotle's definition of light in *De Anima* II.7, 418b9 is the material that initiates this study by Jean De Groot. After a brief historical introduction, De Groot observes an important distinction in methods of approach to the subject of light that helps explain the contribution of Philoponus. One includes the theory of light, its nature, propagation, and associated ideas beginning with Aristotle. The other is concerned with geometrical optics, the nature of mathematical science, and demonstration. Chapters 2-5 deal with the former issue, Chapters 6-7 address the latter. Chapter 8 concludes with a brief summary of the results of the study and an indication of the import of Philoponus' position for later analysts such as Bacon, Pecham, and Descartes. Two appendices complete the book. The first comprises an outline and a twenty-four page translation of Philoponus' commentary on *De Anima* II.7, 418b9. The second appendix contains a brief account of why De Groot differs from G.E.L. Owen's interpretation of Aris-



tote (in *Physics* VIII.3, 253b15-35) on the issue (*athroa alloiôsis*) of whether or not alteration takes place in no time whatever. The book is published in the series: *Harvard Dissertations in the History of Science*. De Groot acknowledges that the material is 'substantially the same as my 1979 doctoral thesis' (ix), with the addition of new material that comprises Chapter 6.

Philoponus, the sixth century (c. 490-570) philosopher who studied with Ammonius, the head of the Neoplatonist school in Alexandria, and contributed to Christian theology, is especially noteworthy because of his critical commentaries on Aristotle. Philoponus developed his own distinctive position on a range of important issues through a series of critical responses that focus upon cosmological doctrines and physical explanations set forth in the works of Aristotle, Neoplatonists, and early scientific and mathematical thinkers such as Euclid and Ptolemy. The significance of his contribution in the area of theory of motion and dynamics is highlighted by Richard Sorabji who draws attention to a declaration made by Thomas Kuhn that the change to impetus theory was a historic, revolutionary paradigm shift in the history of scientific explanations. Since the theory of light advocated by Philoponus is an intimate part of this novel explanatory approach, the book by Jean De Groot promises to be of special interest.

The book begins (Chapter 1) by providing information about the situation of philosophy in Alexandria during the 5th and 6th centuries. There is a brief but helpful placing of such matters as the impact of the edict of Justin against pagan philosophy and the closing of the school of philosophy in Athens in 529, the relation between pagan philosophy and Christianity in Alexandria and the school of Ammonius, the influence of Neoplatonism and the monophysite Christians in Egypt, and Philoponus' diatribe against Proclus. De Groot also considers Philoponus' relation to Ammonius, presents a listing (and an estimated chronology) of Philoponus' surviving commentaries, and raises the question of the evolution of Philoponus' position from early Neoplatonism to later non-Neoplatonic and non-Aristotelian theological philosophy.

Chapter 2 sets the parameters for the study by explaining the way in which Philoponus' theory is the result of his critical response to the mathematical accounts of vision and perspective exemplified in the works of Euclid and Ptolemy and to Aristotle's analysis of the nature of perception. Chapters 3-7 carefully delineate the specific concepts and arguments that Philoponus encountered and they set forth the basis for the critical position that he advocated to reconcile the diverse approaches.

Some of the important issues that are considered in the well-organized presentation by De Groot include the refutation of the theory of light and vision based upon the emission of visual rays from the eye, arguments against the corporeality of light, an extended and very important account of how Philoponus can find Aristotle's distinction between actuality (*energia*) and motion (*kenêsis*) supportive of his claim that light is propagated by a series of effects and transmitted all at once without the passage of time (*achronos*). De Groot cautiously and perceptively investigates the way in which other



important terminological distinctions made by Aristotle such as *dunamis*, *entelecheia*, *to paschein*, and *alloiosis* have their place in Philoponus' analysis.

Chapter 5 explores the case for Neoplatonic influences, i.e., Proclus, on Philoponus' causal theory. Chapter 6 examines the intriguing issue of the physical basis for mathematical demonstration. The status of three-dimensionality in the order of nature and existence, the application of the matter-form distinction, and the import of the separability in thought of mathematical objects from physical objects are issues considered. This leads, in Chapter 7, to an examination of the mixed science of optics which takes the conceptual-mathematical objects and explanations of geometry (e.g., lines) and applies these considerations to the physical occurrence of light (e.g., a colored object across the room). Philoponus' understanding of the nature, legitimacy, and importance of this kind of demonstration is explained.

De Groot has provided a rigorous, well-researched analysis of the topic. It is perhaps a hazard of the commentary type of analysis employed by De Groot that no unified explanation of either Aristotle's or Philoponus' view is presented. A reader expecting a general survey or systematic elaboration will be disappointed. But the text is a valuable contribution for its perceptive delineation of the analytic details that contributed to the development of Philoponus' position. So the details for such a systematic construction are available in the analysis that is set forth. The study is also valuable for drawing attention to this neglected area of philosophy and the history of science. De Groot's book is an important analytical commentary. Anyone interested in the history of the theory of light and Philoponus' contribution to this issue will find it to be very helpful. This study, containing a clear and careful translation of Philoponus' commentary on the *De Anima*, deserves a place alongside the important series of publications (in progress) on the commentaries of Aristotle edited by Richard Sorabji (Duckworth & Cornell University Press).

**Donald N. Blakeley**

California State University, Fresno



**Jan Faye**

*Niels Bohr: His Heritage and Legacy.*

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991.

Pp. xxii + 263.

US \$76.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7923-1294-5).

By any reasonable standard, Niels Bohr was one of the great scientific minds of the twentieth century. His contribution to the quantum theory is monumental. He was a participant in the quantum revolution: the 'Bohr atom' was a central component of the *old quantum theory*, and Bohr's concept of *complementarity*, as well as his response to the *Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox*, would provide central ingredients of the 'orthodox' Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Jan Faye has performed an extremely valuable service by writing this book. In recent years it has become fashionable for physicists — for example, the late Richard Feynman — to take 'pot shots' at Philosophers in general, and Philosophers of Science in particular. At best, Philosophers of Science are viewed as mere underlaborers, and at worst as intellectual tourists — busybodies on vacation who have contributed nothing to the hard and serious pioneering work done by the scientist-frontiersman. But this is to ignore the history of science itself — and especially the history of the quantum theory. The European scientists who initiated the quantum revolution and who played central roles in the subsequent development of the quantum theory were, for the most part, highly cultured individuals — the beneficiaries of what one might term a 'classical education'. This was notably true of such figures as Jeans, Planck, Heisenberg, and DeBroglie. And it was particularly true of Niels Bohr.

Faye's book falls into two parts: Part I concerns a detailed study of the influence of the philosopher Harald Høffding and his influence on Bohr's thoughts both about the nature of quantum mechanics and the nature of science itself; Part II consists of a presentation and analysis of Bohr's philosophy of quantum mechanics, in which Bohr is interpreted as offering a version of anti-realism.

I will begin with Part I. The first chapter is devoted to the life and thought of Høffding. Faye provides a useful discussion of the formative influences on Høffding's philosophy — which included Kierkegaard and William James. Høffding was also influenced by the emerging spirit of 19th century positivism, with its emphasis on experience. It seems that he also managed to anticipate some of the details of *Gestalt* psychology. In the second chapter, Faye begins by making a case for the claim that Bohr enjoyed a fairly extensive philosophical training at the hands of Høffding — who introduced the young Bohr to both James and Kierkegaard.

In the first two sections of the third chapter — in which numerous examples of the Høffding-Bohr correspondence are reproduced — we learn that the relationship between Bohr and his philosophical mentor persisted long after Bohr had become one of the great figures of twentieth century



science. The third section, however, is significant. For here the claim is made that the concept of complementarity — one of the cornerstones of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics — may have been something which grew out of Bohr's acquaintance with Høffding's epistemological theories.

The fourth chapter is devoted to an exposition of Høffding's theory of knowledge. In the context of a discussion of the subject-object relation, Faye comments: 'Thus, Høffding believed, there is never a "pure" object, but only an object that is comprehended by a subject and colored by it, and likewise there is never a "pure" subject, but only a subject whose nature is partly determined by the objects that constitute the world that surrounds it' (88). This is amazingly reminiscent of the remarks that Bohr would become famous for in his discussion of measurement interactions in the context of the quantum theory!

Moving now to Part II, the fifth chapter opens with a discussion of the quantum mechanical correspondence principle, according to which quantum mechanics reduces to classical mechanics in the limit  $h \rightarrow 0$ , where  $h$  is Planck's constant. Faye examines formal, syntactic and semantic formulations of the principle and shows how consideration of these issues led Bohr to reject the 'causal space-time description of the atomic phenomena' (125). By 1927, Bohr was well on the road to complementarity. This latter doctrine is discussed in the sixth chapter — where Faye demonstrates the influence of the philosopher Høffding on Bohr's formulation of this central doctrine of the Copenhagen interpretation. The indispensability of classical concepts for a description of atomic phenomena turns out to be part of Bohr's debt to his philosophical mentor.

Experience — of atomic phenomena — has to be described and communicated in classical garb. Yet complementarity tells us that when we are dealing with atomic phenomena, where Planck's constant is significant, we are precluded from simultaneous use of all the classical concepts we were accustomed to dealing with in classical theoretical contexts. Faye also provides a useful discussion of the implications of complementarity for both psychology and biology.

Bohr's reaction to the EPR paradox receives treatment in the seventh chapter. Faye provides a lucid discussion of J.S. Bell's elaboration of the EPR puzzle. And it was in this context that Bohr asserted the impossibility of separating a discussion of the behavior of atomic objects from the measuring devices they interact with. Complementary phenomena arise from interactions of atomic objects with distinct experimental arrangements. But all this raises the issue of realism versus anti-realism: are atomic objects realities lurking behind a multiplicity of complementary manifestations?

The final chapter argues that Bohr is to be viewed as an anti-realist. Faye discusses a variety of realist and anti-realist positions — and the chapter is worth reading for this reason alone. Once again, Høffding turns out to be important. Under the influence of his mentor, Bohr is neither a traditional realist nor a traditional anti-realist. He rides two horses at once, believing



in both a mind-independent reality and the cognitive-dependence of truth. This is the doctrine that Faye terms *objective anti-realism*. Faye sees it as an anticipation of Dummett's semantic anti-realism.

Faye's book is eminently readable, and it will serve as an excellent text for Philosophy of Science courses offered at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Faye's scholarly achievement lies in the clear demonstration of the historical fact that physics and philosophy are inextricably intertwined.

**Niall Shanks**

*East Tennessee State University*

**Michael Ferejohn**

*The Origins of Aristotelian Science.*

New Haven: Yale University Press 1991.

Pp. xii + 174.

US \$24.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-300-04649-9).

Ferejohn offers us 'a full-scale account' of the theory of demonstration in the *Posterior Analytics* by 'placing all of its contents into a unified and intelligible analytical framework' (1). As such, it fills a critical lack in existing work. Since I disagree with many of Ferejohn's proposals, let me make it clear that this book is a major advance in our understanding of Aristotelian science and should be required reading for those interested in the topic.

The book is divided into two parts. Part One, 'The Structure of Demonstrations' (Chapters 1-2), first seeks to clarify the role which the theory of inference in *Prior Analytics* I.1-7 (the 'syllogistic') plays in the theory of demonstration. Ferejohn positions himself between two opposed factions: the 'strict syllogisticists,' who suppose that all scientific principles must be premises of syllogistic deductions (this founders on the problems of getting the assumptions of existence and logical axioms Aristotle wants to include into the subject-predicate form the syllogistic requires), and the 'antisyllogisticists,' who are alleged to deny that the theory of demonstration is 'significantly based' on the syllogistic (though he cites Barnes and me as examples, I doubt that anyone holds this extreme view). His alternative, a 'qualified form of syllogisticism,' distinguishes two stages in the demonstrative process: a non-syllogistic 'framing stage' in which the necessary first premises are collected and a syllogistic stage in which propositions are explained by deduction from these premises.



The framing stage uses an Aristotelian descendant of Platonic Division to build an inverted-tree structure of terms and thus a system of universal propositions: if A is above B in a tree, then 'Every B is an A' is true, and if A and B are the diverging sides of a branch, 'No A is a B' is true. Knowledge of this entire structure constitutes the basis for demonstrations which explain relationships between terms by deducing them from the immediate connections between adjacent terms. Excluded middle and non-contradiction function as 'background' presuppositions of the division procedure. Thus, Aristotelian scientific knowledge is intrinsically systematic, since to know a demonstration requires knowing the entire underlying structure.

The existence assumptions Aristotle says a science must make are more puzzling. Ferejohn interprets these using a distinction between two readings of universal propositions. Taken as 'platonistic,' 'Every A is a B' is a universal quantification without existential import; taken as a 'referential' universal, it somehow refers to the individuals actually falling under its subject term, so that it is equivalent to the conjunction of all its actual instances (43). This has epistemic consequences. To know 'Every A is a B' platonistically, I need only know (on the basis of definitions, say) that the property A implies the property B. Knowledge of the referential universal, however, is 'de re' knowledge: 'de re knowledge contexts are transparent in the sense that if *a* knows de re that [every pair is even], then it follows that for every pair *b*, *a* knows that *b* is even, whether or not *a* knows of *b*'s existence' (42). I do not see how this avoids Aristotle's own question at 71a26-7: how *can* I know *x* to be F if I do not even know *x* exists? Yet on Ferejohn's 'referential universal' reading, it seems that in order to know 'de re' that every A is a B I must indeed have some kind of acquaintance with each individual A; if Aristotelian science requires such knowledge, then either it requires extraordinary cognitive feats or its range is highly restricted. Worse: Ferejohn says that if different things were *in fact* A, then the proposition expressed by 'Every A is a B' would be different (44): but then I do not know what I mean by 'Every dog is a carnivore' unless I know what actual things are dogs.

In other places, however, Ferejohn appears to use a less extreme conception of unqualified scientific knowledge. The division procedure of the framing stage yields only 'platonistic' universals; sensory perception and experience undergird a transition from this to 'de re' knowledge of the corresponding referential universals. In this transition, which Ferejohn often describes somewhat vaguely as a 'deployment,' 'some set of Platonistic ὅροι that have been previously acquired ... are then superimposed upon some scientifically interesting genus of individuals whose existence and place in the broader scheme of things has already been recognized or assumed' (50). It sounds as if what is really going on here is the discovery that an abstract system has a model. But for those purposes it might be enough simply to say that the universals refer to natural kinds, and Ferejohn's frequent remarks about Aristotle's 'immanent realism' do seem to lean in this direction.

The principal goal of Part Two, 'The Explanatory Content of Demonstrations' (Chapters 3-7), is to explain Aristotle's requirement that the principles



of sciences be necessary. Ferejohn argues convincingly that there are different types of necessity which attach to different types of Aristotelian principles. The relevant senses are to be found by analyzing the kinds of *per se* predication in *An. Post.* I.4 and corresponding forms of 'accidental' (*per accidens*) predication. In the first case (Type 1), B is true of A *per se* if A is in the definition of B. Ferejohn argues that this is an enrichment of the 'said of' relation of the *Categories* so as to give a full-fledged semantics for such predications.

In a Type 2 case, 'A is B' *per se* because B is in the definition of A (e.g., 'number is odd'). Ferejohn argues convincingly that their function is to accommodate differentiae: Aristotle regards each differentia of a genus as belonging *per se*, and so necessarily, to that genus (so that e.g., 'odd' and 'even' necessarily belongs to the genus 'number'). But how are we to understand this 'necessary belonging'? Barnes proposed that the necessity in question is the necessity of a disjunctive predicate: 'odd' and 'even' partition 'number,' so that every number is necessarily odd-or-even. Ferejohn rejects this with the complaint that disjunctive predicates are disallowed by Aristotle in syllogistic premises (104-5) and instead proposes to find a pair of *particular* propositions: 'Some numbers are necessarily odd,' 'Some numbers are necessarily even.' To explain why this pair implies 'Every number is necessarily odd or even,' he proposes that they are 'referential particulars' (analogous to his referential universals). But this notion is too unclear to be helpful; nothing he says explains why we cannot infer 'Every number is necessarily odd or divisible by 7' from 'Some numbers are necessarily odd' and 'Some numbers are necessarily divisible by 7'. And his objections to Barnes' disjunctive-predicate view are unconvincing. He says the examples of disjunctive predicates Barnes cites occur in 'non-syllogistic' contexts, which presupposes that Aristotle differentiates between valid arguments and 'syllogisms'. I doubt that this distinction is in Aristotle: his definition of *sullogismos* would render it absurd; *An. Pr.* 47a21-40 (where it is allegedly found) says only that some arguments have missing but implicit premises; elsewhere (43a16-24, 46b38-47a9, 68b8-14) he says unequivocally that every valid argument can be 'reduced' to the syllogistic figures; and in any event a look at Barnes's examples makes it clear Aristotle thought they were 'syllogisms'.

Type 3 cases are represented in *An. Post.* I.4 only negatively by their *per accidens* counterparts like 'the white is a log.' Ferejohn shows that these are merely a way in which a proposition can *fail* to be *per se*, with no corresponding positive sense of *per se*. He then links these with 'inherence' in the *Categories* semantics and suggests that these are what Aristotle has in mind in all his remarks about the fortuitous. Type 4 cases, by contrast, are a genuine and important class of *per se* propositions: Ferejohn argues that these rest on causal connections, assimilates them to the 'for the most part' cases important to science, and concludes with an ingenious argument linking them with the *per se propria* (*kath'hauta idia*) of *An. Post.* I.10 and elsewhere. These are the best-argued and most valuable parts of the book.



Chapter 7 interprets Aristotle's thesis of the 'compartmentalization' of science (demonstrations must be restricted to a single genus) as a response to problems inherited from Plato about the 'semantic fragmentation' of negative terms. Ferejohn claims Aristotle held that such terms were only meaningful if appropriately restricted in application to a single genus. But there is no textual evidence that Aristotle thought an improperly restricted negation is *meaningless*, and plenty of passages which show just the opposite: e.g., *Cat.* 13b14-20 (curiously cited on p. 137 as evidence for Ferejohn's thesis) says that both 'Socrates is well' and 'Socrates is ill' are *false* when Socrates does not exist, and a bit later (13b32-3) notes that 'Socrates is not ill' is *true* when there is no Socrates. He also appeals to 'Aristotle's remark at 77a22-6 that because unrestricted instantiation of the Law of Excluded Middle are subject to semantic fragmentation,' the law must be restricted (137). But the passage says only *that* demonstrations make use of excluded middle in a restricted form, without a word about why or about semantic fragmentation.

The book is well produced, with a helpful index, and nearly free of typos (but the occasional Greek quotes have more than their share).

**Robin Smith**

Kansas State University

**Michael Friedman**

*Kant and the Exact Sciences.*

Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1992.

Pp. xvii + 357.

US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-674-50035-0).

Friedman's scope is ambitious, his presentation clear and vigorous. He reconstructs Kant's career-long engagement with fundamental problems in mathematics and physics. He devotes a long Introduction to Kant's pre-critical writings; Part One covers the Critical Period; Part Two treats Kant's *opus postumum*.

Chapters 1 and 2 concern Kant's philosophy of mathematics. Friedman agrees with Russell that Kant must view mathematics as intuitive and synthetic because of his pre-Fregean monadic logic (56). Monadic logic cannot represent the idea of infinity formally or conceptually, but only intuitively, by an iterative process of spatial construction (63). Generating new points by repeatedly applying constructive functions substitutes for our use of quantification rules such as existential instantiation (65, 121-2). Arithmetic is synthetic because, e.g., the sum of two numbers must be constructable, and to be



constructable is to result from the successive repetition of a given operation (e.g., addition) (117). Kant's theory of the synthetic character of mathematics aims to show that general (monadic) logic cannot represent mathematical concepts and statements; this motivates Kant's analysis of pure intuition and transcendental logic (129). Repeating operations is a temporal process, and Kant shares Newton's temporal conception of limit operations (74). The kinematic interpretation of calculus doesn't meet modern standards of rigor, but it avoids the problems of consistency and coherence faced by infinitesimals (77). Moreover, blending physical and mathematical ideas through the common idea of motion grounds Kant's contention that an important part of physical theory — pure kinematics or 'phoronomy' — is *a priori* (77).

Chapters 3 and 4 reconstruct Kant's metaphysical foundations of Newtonian physics. Friedman aims to understand Kant's claim, in both the first *Critique* and in the *Prolegomena*, that the understanding prescribes laws to nature (165, 183). To do so he reads the Transcendental Analytic of Kant's first *Critique* in terms of *The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (hereafter 'MFNS'), and the MFNS in terms of Newtonian science. The three laws of motion defended in MFNS chapter 3 ('Mechanics') realize the principles of the three Analogies of Experience by specifying their application to the empirical concept of matter as 'the movable in space,' thereby schematizing them sufficiently to apply to objects of experience (136-7, 159, 163-4, 171, 185, 202-3, 234, 255, 259). Kant's MFNS replaces Newton's postulates of absolute space and time with a procedure, adapted from Newton's *Principia* Book III, for constructing frames of reference from regions of space and motions of bodies within them (140-3). Within Kant's procedure, the law of gravity has a mixed status because it is derived from *a priori* laws of the understanding (specifically the principles of the Analogies) and of sensibility (Euclidean geometry) together with the empirical data of experience (Tycho and Kepler) (167, 177-8). The immediacy and universality of gravitational attraction are not merely empirical properties of matter known inductively; they are necessary presuppositions for determining the true motions of material bodies, and hence are conditions for the possibility of objective experience of them (158, 171, 174, 231n29, 235).

Part Two is one chapter, 'Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics,' divided into five chapter-length sections: 'The Transition Project and the *Metaphysical Foundations*,' 'The Transition Project and Reflective Judgment,' 'The Chemical Revolution,' 'The Aether-Deduction,' and 'The Fate of the Aether-Deduction'. Friedman treats Kant's proposed 'Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics' in view of two main problems: How can the experimental sciences of chemistry or heat be systematic and be integrated with mathematical physics (240, 242)? How can the 'top down' constitutive procedures of the Transcendental Analytic and MFNS be coordinated with the 'bottom up' reflective procedures of scientific investigation analyzed in the Transcendental Dialectic and Third *Critique*? Without a guarantee that these two approaches converge, there is a serious 'gap' in Kant's Critical philosophy (254, 256-7, 262, 304-5). Kant's



thought is unsettled here, and Friedman gives different versions of Kant's arguments. One version is that constitutive and regulative principles can be coordinated only through a principle that has both collective and distributive, both synthetic and analytic, universality. An all-pervasive active aether has both kinds of universality. As omnipresent it has collective or analytic universality; as perpetually active through attraction and repulsion at any point in space or time it has distributive or analytic universality (310-11). As the medium for the transmission of light, the aether provides a necessary condition for the empirical observations needed for the Newtonian argument for gravity (325). Unfortunately, this argument only justifies a light-aether, which provides no ground for integrating the diverse physical sciences (317, 325, 327-8).

Friedman's Introduction and Part Two are new; Part One contains revised versions of previously published articles. These revisions are significant, but this is more a collection than a book. Friedman offers many mathematical and scientific insights; unfortunately he is cavalier with the problems and methods of Kant's transcendental idealism and Critical metaphysics. First, Kant's Analogies of Experience cannot be so closely tied to or dependent upon the *MFNS* as Friedman repeatedly insists. The principles of the Analogies are necessary to identify co-existing objects, objects that move, and objects that undergo non-spatial changes of state. Applying these principles is necessary in order to identify planets or even our instruments of astronomical observation. These principles are necessary for collecting Tycho's data and for formulating Kepler's laws, on the basis of which alone Newton was able to develop his gravitational theory. The laws of motion may be necessary for distinguishing true from apparent motions, but not for applying the principles of the Analogies. Second, Friedman's interpretation of the *MFNS* ignores Kant's procedure. The only empirical element in the *MFNS* is supposed to be the empirical *concept* of matter as the moveable in space (Ak. IV 472.1-12, 480.6); Kant's further specification of this concept is to be entirely *a priori* (IV 470.1-12, 477.14-17; *KdU* V 181.15-31). Friedman's version of Kant's reconstruction of Newton has Kant appealing to Tycho's data about planetary orbits, and mounting an *a posteriori* 'boot-strap' argument (Glymore) for the immediacy and universality of gravitational attraction, which Friedman calls a transcendental argument (171). Third, Kant's *opus postumum* exhibits the experimentalism of his 'skeptical method' (A423=B451f.) at its unresolved fullest; hence its interpretation is especially fraught and dependent upon one's view of Kant's problematic. Much of Friedman's treatment of Kant's *opus postumum* is compromised by disregarding Kant's metaphysical method and theory of matter in the *MFNS*.

Anyone interested in Kant's philosophy of mathematics should study Friedman's analysis. Newcomers to Kant's philosophy of science will find an engaging introduction to some of his main issues and problems; specialists will find much that is stimulating in Friedman's book.

**Kenneth R. Westphal**  
University of New Hampshire



**Stephen Cade Hetherington**

*Epistemology's Paradox.*

Savage, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield  
Publishers, Inc. 1992. Pp. x + 234.

US \$46.75 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7674-9).

Epistemology has been dismissed recently by some philosophers for employing allegedly primitive folk theoretic notions, such as that of belief. In addition, systematic challenges have been issued by feminist philosophers and by the sometimes overlapping postmodernists. Further, there is a growing worry that the baroque proliferation of examples and counter-examples in epistemological discussions indicates an absence of genuinely explanatory content. As if this were not enough, Hetherington has launched a thorough attack from the inside.

Many recent complaints have been directed toward a Cartesian model of a perspectiveless knower of perfectly objective truth. If the presence of such a model is essential to epistemology, then it may well be true that the field's demise should only be hastened. Hetherington's charges against epistemology include a sustained attack on one aspect of the picture of the epistemologist as perspectiveless spectator.

Hetherington argues that epistemology's paradoxical nature is revealed when we look at situations in which epistemologists try to apply their conceptions of knowledge to particular cases. For example, suppose Gettier is actually trying to convince a particular believer that she lacks knowledge because she has been Gettiered. Hetherington argues that in such a case, Gettier is under an inconsistent set of demands: He must be self-preoccupied and not self-preoccupied. More exactly and generally, at the moment of rational epistemic evaluation, the epistemologist must be both epistemologically preoccupied and epistemologically detached.

To be epistemologically preoccupied is to presume oneself to be one's epistemic subject, the one being evaluated. To be epistemologically detached is to presume that one's epistemic subject is not oneself, and, moreover, to presume that one sees things one's subject does not. Clearly, both conditions cannot be met at any one time. If the epistemologist is required to meet both at some one point in time in order to give a rational epistemic evaluation, then epistemic evaluation cannot be rational. Epistemology implodes; it is self-refuting.

Hetherington starts his arguments with the sceptics and here many of his readers may be prepared for agreement. If we anachronistically consider Descartes in the context of the *First Meditation* as actually trying to argue that for all *we* know *we* are dreaming, then the prospects of success already seem dim. Indeed, many philosophers have argued that scepticism is self-defeating, as Hetherington notes (114).

Hetherington does not restrict his attention to the sceptics, or even to those like Gettier, who is particularly concerned with negative evaluations of epistemic states. Hetherington also asks whether an epistemologist can



know or be justified in believing an affirmative assessment that a believer, in a particular case, has satisfied at least one theoretically distinctive condition of knowledge or justification. Here Hetherington divides epistemologists into the reflectivist and the non-reflectivist, where the reflectivist epistemologist's 'guiding intuition is that an epistemically reflectivist aspect A of you and your circumstances is such that, if it is to contribute to your having justification, you must be aware of its doing so' (140-1). The non-reflectivist is exemplified by such recent authors as Goldman and Quine. And his conclusion is similarly negative: The epistemologist must be both preoccupied and detached, but cannot be both. This is the paradox of the title. Hetherington's general conclusion is that the paradox reflects distinct and ultimately inconsistent demands on the rationality of epistemology.

Hetherington's epistemologist has a perspective, but it is one constituted in a psychologically unrealistic way, as Hetherington seems quite aware. The requirements for epistemic rationality are often generated *solely* by considerations of logic and substantive rhetoric (for example, who has the burden of proof). As a consequence, Hetherington's epistemologist appears to be a one-dimensional instantiator of premises and conclusions. For example, Hetherington maintains that if one argues against a view internally — by assuming it to be true and deducing unattractive consequences — one must at least begin by being a 'theist' about the view (122, his quotes). But, of course, this claim is psychologically false, since one can assume something true in an argument which one does not really at all assume to be true. Hetherington's use of quotes indicates he would agree. Nonetheless, it is not clear that the empirical implications of an epistemological theory should be characterized and assessed in, as it were, conditions of such abstraction. Hetherington might reply that the epistemologists he is discussing do, with one sort of exception, treat knowers and believers in this way. (See his 106.) But even where they do, Hetherington's charge that they are self-refuting is only one possible conclusion. Another might address more directly the issue of one-dimensionality and conclude for example, that the epistemology is better characterized as consisting largely in idealizing recommendations. Such a defense could mitigate the consequences of one of Hetherington's requirements; namely, that the epistemologist apply the terms of assessment to his or her own case. Perhaps, however, Hetherington would claim such a rereading indicates the force of his arguments.

The one exception just mentioned is provided by the non-reflectivist epistemologist. Such an epistemologist, given Hetherington's characterization, insists on psychological realism. It is not clear that Hetherington's demands on the non-reflectivist epistemologist remain within the constraints of that sort of theory, as he thinks they do. But the arguments here are subtle and intricate, as indeed the arguments of the book are in general.

Despite the abstractions, in considering epistemologists as evaluating particular cases, Hetherington issues a new kind of challenge to the supposedly perspective-free traditional epistemologist. At the same time, some of the assumption of freedom from perspective is due to the *prima facie* plausi-



ble idea that the epistemologist is concerned with something like conceptual issues, not specific judgements regarding actual cases. (Such an assumption makes the defense conjectured above particularly congenial.) Hence, it is important that Hetherington extend his problem from specific cases to general conceptual issues. I think his arguments here are not foolproof. Nonetheless, if he is right just in arguing that epistemologists *cannot* rationally evaluate any actual cases, his work is important. And it does have impact on the claim that epistemology can successfully pursue conceptual issues, even if the impact has not been specified exactly correctly.

More generally, Hetherington's discussion of recent epistemologists and the specific problems which link their enterprise to that of traditional sceptics is original and very interesting. Further, the conceptual grid he lays over the entire epistemological map does provide a genuinely new perspective. And his arguments are intricate explorations of this distinctive point of view.

**Anne Jaap Jacobson**  
University of Houston

**Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe and Albrecht Wellmer, eds.**

*Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment*, trans. William Rehg. Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press 1992. Pp. x + 351.

(cloth: ISBN 0-262-08208-X);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-262-58109-4).

**Richard Wolin**

*The Terms of Cultural Criticism. The Frankfurt School, Existentialism, Poststructuralism.* New York: Columbia University Press 1992. Pp. xxv + 256.

US \$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-231-07664-9).

Both books concern contemporary reactions to the Enlightenment understood as the rational criticism of traditional institutions. They agree that expansion of achievements such as public accountability and recognition of human rights remains viable despite the catastrophes of the 20th Century. Wolin's book is one man's tony ruminations on the despairs and hopes of liberal democrats. *Philosophical Interventions* is a nonpolemical anthology honoring Habermas' sixtieth birthday that contains eleven essays from



*Zwischenbetrachtungen: Im Prozess der Aufklärung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989). The other thirteen essays are translated in a companion volume called *Cultural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment*.

Wolin focuses on the theme of power versus reason and defends a Habermasian account, though he eschews conceptual analysis entirely in favor of detailed historical narratives. Cultural criticism is an inversion of Marxist criticism, a displacement of political economy by political aesthetics, that targets attitudes, ideas, style, media, etc. He aims to develop an 'immanent criticism' of the Enlightenment that reaffirms its 'original utopian aspirations' (xviii). He concedes that the regulative ideals of reason have 'historically miscarried' (xviii) but explains the emergence of the disciplinary society and Eurocentrism as contingencies that do not condemn the second order conceptual framework which supports egalitarian reform.

Five of Wolin's ten essays have already been published. The introduction focuses on Thrasymachus' claim that might makes right and how it reemerges in de Sade's and Nietzsche's anti-civilization ethos. The next three essays discuss the Frankfurt School's development and show that there is no consensus on the adequate normative foundations for Critical Theory.

Essay #4 recounts Carl Schmitt's legitimization of the emerging Nazi regime as a religious Right, existentialist reaction against secular humanism, and essay #5 reviews Merleau-Ponty's synthesis of historical materialism and Weber's value relativism in *Adventures of the Dialectic*. Essay #6 compares Sartre's and Heidegger's existentialism initially, but reverts to the controversy over the relative value of early versus later Heidegger that Wolin articulated exhaustively in his 1990 book, *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger*.

Essay #7 assesses the political implications of Richard Rorty's neopragmatism. Essay #8 rejects Foucault's view that reason is merely an instrument of the disciplinary society. The final essay contrasts Derrida's deconstruction with Charles Taylor's notion of 'strong evaluation,' and concludes that we should not give up the reflexive project of cultivating second order evaluative frameworks to regulate political argument.

There are some problems with the design of Wolin's book, such as the absence of a conclusion. Wolin's cultural criticism consists in exposing the objectionable aspects of other critics without making a compelling positive case for his own. The title, 'The Terms of Cultural Criticism,' is never explained, though at one point he complains that Rorty hesitates to acknowledge that Plato, Descartes and Hegel are 'gifted spirits who have in the course of cultural history established the terms of debate' (158). Why doesn't Wolin explicitly state what he is proposing as the inescapable framework(s) for criticism? His exclusive focus on white male Europeans is supposed to provide the categories of criticism for our century, but this suggests absurdly that a whole generation of feminists must be irrelevant.

The essay on Rorty lacks the attention to background details that characterize the rest of the book. Wolin rehashes the criticisms that Rorty promotes a neoconservative attitude, reduces questions of value to taste, and engages



in 'timorous, neoliberal apologetics' (164). Officially, Wolin rejects the 'culture critic' (described by Rorty in the preface to *Consequences of Pragmatism*) as a chatty, narcissistic, name-dropper who has lost faith in serious argument (158-9). Yet Wolin's own performance falls back into this very stereotype, and his support for principled argument is purely rhetorical. He never lays out what distinguishes acceptable from unacceptable cultural criticism, and so nothing prevents reading his rebuff of Rorty as the hypocritical gesture of a beautiful soul liberal.

Wolin has some careless communicative habits that resemble what he rejects as Heidegger's evocative rhetoric. For example, Wolin claims that the recent rage against reason is 'historically overdetermined' by the catastrophes of the 20th century (5), and that Heidegger's refusal to discuss the Holocaust was '*philosophically overdetermined*' by his belief in the destiny of Being (142). Such unclarified terms of argument as this relationship of overdetermination do not make his case compelling. Finally, the suggestion that we must maintain our capacity for strong evaluations is not developed or properly defended, as if Taylor has done all the hard work and Wolin wants a free ride.

These weaknesses tend to overshadow the interesting aspects of Wolin's work. There are many *risqué aperçus* concerning the internal problems of continental philosophy, such as the 'theoretical selfishness' that led Horkheimer to drop the ideal of interdisciplinary materialism, disband the Institute for Social Research in 1941, and collaborate with Adorno to produce *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (59). The essays on Adorno's elitism and Heidegger's denial of the evil of the Nazis reflect the same probing instincts, and suggest that Wolin's free spirited review of the 20th Century provides an alternative to cliché enthralled retrospectives.

*Philosophical Interventions* consists of three essays on Habermas, five essays that are thematically related to his research, and three essays that have no obvious relevance to him. They are all by German or North American men (though *Cultural-Political Interventions* includes work by Seyla Benhabib, Jean Cohen and Gertrud Nunner-Winkler). Charles Taylor's 'Inwardness and the Culture of Modernity' is a highly compressed version of Part II, 'Inwardness,' from *Sources of the Self*. Richard Bernstein's 'Foucault: Critique as a Philosophical Ethos' is a chapter from *The New Constellation*. Thomas McCarthy's 'Philosophy and Social Practice: Avoiding the Ethnocentric Predicament' is an edited essay about Rorty from *Ideals and Illusions*.

Michael Theunissen contributes a Heideggerean reading of Parmenides on Being and time; Ernst Tugendhat contrasts Wittgensteinian conceptual clarification with the appeal to intuition or essences; and Peter Bürger discusses Brecht and Benjamin on allegory and meaning in art. In addition to Taylor, Bernstein and McCarthy, Dieter Henrich's history of the theory of the subject and Herbert Schnädelbach's discussion of Foucault on the human sciences are tangentially related to Habermas.



Karl-Otto Apel reviews the difference between Habermas' coherence account of justification and his own transcendental position on ultimate justification. Albrecht Wellmer unpacks Habermas' proposal that 'We understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable.' Martin Jay focuses on Habermas' regulative ideal of a 'performative contradiction' and how Foucault, de Man or Rodolphe Gasché might evade its constraint.

This smorgasbord is not for someone collecting striking particular arguments about Habermas nor for someone with systematic interests in Enlightenment issues. First, this sample is far less useful than the whole of McCarthy's *Ideals and Illusions* or Bernstein's *The New Constellation*. Second, some of the writers, such as Henrich, Bürger and Schnädelbach, have weaker organizational skills that plague their arguments. No coherent picture of the Enlightenment today emerges from the anthology, and the contradictions among them, such as Apel's gung-ho transcendentalism and Taylor's cautious contextualism, are not addressed. If the Enlightenment is unfinished history, then it would help to know what has been achieved and what remains to be done in order to direct our continuing criticism.

Despite the lack of integration, there is much raw material for future debates. For example, Apel argues that we are forced to choose between an approach that allows reasons based in our own peculiar form of life and the transcendental appeal to a higher level of justification. This resists Habermas' compatibilist approach which combines both reasoning strategies in a coherentist view.

First, Apel claims that there are different levels involved, and there is a '*transcendental difference*' between propositions that can be empirically tested and the procedure of testing which cannot be judged as true or false without circularity (129). Second, the 'postconventional reconstruction and grounding of lifeworld rationalization processes can call on background resources of reason that are not identical with the historically conditioned, contingent background resources' of a specific lifeworld. Yet Habermas 'fails to make any architectonically appropriate use of what he has uncovered' in his theory of the rational, internal structure of communication, and 'reduces the *justification of validity* ... to such lifeworld resources, apparently for fear of otherwise losing contact with lifeworld praxis as the material basis of philosophy' (152-3). Third, particularistic approaches endow forms of life 'with an idealistic radiance' that overestimate their ability to question their own presuppositions (158). Apel's view is not a Kantian 'transcendental deduction,' as it is 'pragmatic' in appealing 'to what cannot be circumvented in philosophical argumentation and thus is not in need of justification' (161).

These arguments are highly abstract, and the insistence on conceptually incompatible levels only begs the question against a coherentist approach. Apel's vocabulary is vacuous at crucial junctures, such as his definition that 'the ultimate transcendental-pragmatic justification consists in the *reflexive* confirmation of the principles of reason that have necessarily already been acknowledged' (161). The point is that if you just think about how you really



think, then you will be forced to agree that the rational conditions for the possibility of any thinking whatsoever are not themselves in need of justification. This position neglects the long history of abuse of this very *political* claim that a belief is not in need of justification, but must simply be believed.

On the other hand, Taylor makes the opposite complaint, that Habermas' proposal remains too transcendental, by distinguishing cultural versus acultural theories of modernity. In cultural theories, transformations are understood with reference to specific cultures, or 'defined by their endpoint in a specific constellation of understandings' (89). Changes are described in terms of 'a contrast between constellations, before and after, which will not normally be *defined* evaluatively' (91). In acultural theories (such as Habermas' account of the evolution of communication), transformations are described in terms of some culture-neutral operations, 'things which any traditional culture could undergo' and 'that all will probably be forced to undergo' (89-90).

Taylor contends that we are not forced to make an exclusive choice between acultural and cultural theories of modernity (92). The debate between modernism and its critics is, moreover, a trap. 'A more rounded view of our culture shows the deeper connections between rival spiritual outlooks, which the partisan views ignore or tear apart. Above all, these partisan acultural views fail to measure how inescapable this modern identity is for us, how much of it is involved even in what is seen as the most radical opposition to it' (108). Perhaps this exhibits some of the idealistic radiance about ethnic cooperation that Apel rejects. But, in any case, *Philosophical Interventions* does not lead to any grand conclusion, though it testifies to the unmatched fecundity of Habermas' theoretical labors.

**Tony Couture**  
McMaster University



**Harro Höpfl, ed.**

*Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority.*

Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought.

Cambridge University Press 1991.

Pp. xlv + 96.

US \$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-34208-2);

US \$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-34986-9).

'Thin' theories of political value have been under attack in recent years. There is a new interest in the relevance of 'thick' particularities — ethnicity, gender, class — to normative political thought. Needless to say, not all critics of Enlightenment-type universalizing are attracted to the particularities of religious conviction. But the recently developed sympathies for political thickness at least parallel important new studies in religious political thought, including a renewed interest in the politics of the Protestant Reformation.

The two Reformation texts featured in this slim volume — Luther's treatise *On Secular Authority* and the concluding chapter of Book Four of Calvin's *Institutes* — are nothing if not theoretically thick. They deserve to be studied carefully, a task made easier by the splendid editorial introduction by Harro Höpfl. A careful reading of these selections will reveal, not only that the Reformers' political reflections were more complex than is often granted, but that they were addressing issues that continue to be significant for any understanding of the political dimensions of human interaction.

For Calvin and Luther, religion was no private affair: a reform of the church without a concomitant reform of the political order was unthinkable for them. Not that they were in agreement about the proper patterns of political leadership. For both of them, of course, the political task was shaped by the very practical challenge of establishing a societal context favorable to Protestantism. But Calvin saw politics as more than a mere remedy for sin. His model political leader was God himself, the political ordering of human affairs was a reflection of the Creator's righteous ordering of the cosmos. Thus, the exercise of political power could be a noble case in point for the *imitatio dei*.

Luther, on the other hand, was more ambivalent about political power; it wasn't easy for him to reconcile the *imitatio Christi* themes of the New Testament with the brutal realities of political leadership. But like Calvin, Luther was no friend of the pacifist Anabaptists; he recognized the need for Christians to wield 'the sword' as a God-ordained means for taming the depraved impulses of fallen humanity.

The differences between the Reformers' assessments of political authority have led many theological taxonomists to treat their viewpoints as representing two very different types of Christian political thought. Luther is taken to be espousing a strict 'two kingdoms' perspective, in which the harshness of political life stands in an unavoidable tension with the tender



mercies which are meant to characterize Christian relationships, while Calvin is seen as a 'one kingdom' theocrat who, because he blurs the boundaries between church and state, takes unquestioning civil obedience to be an important mark of godliness.

The selections presented here make it clear that these characterizations need to be heavily nuanced. While there is abundant evidence of Luther's ambivalence about politics, there are also clear signs of his conviction that political leadership can itself be an exercise in Christian discipleship: the Christian ruler should lead his subjects, says Luther, 'with love and Christian service' (41).

Calvin, on the other hand, argues for a clear distinction between the churchly and the political realms in a manner that sounds very Lutheran: 'anyone who knows how to distinguish between body and soul, between this present transitory life and the eternal life to come, will not find it difficult to understand that the spiritual kingdom and Christ and civil government are things far removed from one another' (48) — although Calvin quickly warns against treating 'everything related to the polity as something unclean' (49).

As Höpfl argues in his Introduction (xx-xxi) — and, more extensively, in his important 1982 monograph *The Christian Polity of John Calvin* — the Genevan Reformer was intensely interested in the idea of polity. There were important links in his mind between the ordering of ecclesiastical life and the order appropriate to civil society. The Calvinist God is very committed to the ordering of the cosmos; it is not surprising, then, that his manner of giving order to both political and churchly affairs would manifest some degree of continuity.

Calvin's commitment to proper order inclines him at times toward an advocacy of political passivity. Since God can use even ungodly rulers as instruments of his ordering of human affairs, Christian citizens must honor all political authority as agents of the divine rule. But it is also precisely this dedication to proper order that keeps Calvin from consistently encouraging unquestioning obedience. Only God deserves our total devotion, he argues. When the rulers themselves clearly violate the will of God, they are not worthy of our subjection.

Insofar as political well-being can be attained in a fallen world, on the Calvinist view, it will consist primarily in the maintenance of a properly-ordered polity. It is here where some of the more important differences with Luther have their roots. As Höpfl observes (xiii-xiv), Luther was not as interested in the patterns of 'secular law' as he was in the character of the rulers and in their manner of ruling. In this sense, Lutheranism presents something akin to a theory of political virtue, in contrast to the Calvinist's more deontological Calvinist account of the well-ordered political system.

There is an irony here. Calvin, who is well-known for his emphasis on the ravages of sin in human affairs, shows a surprising lack of sensitivity to the tragic dimensions of politics. Here Luther seems to be the better Calvinist. The Christian prince must be ever vigilant, he warns, if he wants to guarantee that 'his condition will be outwardly and inwardly right, pleasing to God



and men.' And in doing so, Luther quickly adds, 'he must anticipate a great deal of envy and suffering. As illustrious a man as this will soon feel the cross lying on his neck' (41).

Calvin's political thought has been studied more systematically than Luther's. There is a good reason for this: Calvin was the more systematic thinker of the two with regard to political topics, and Calvinism has often had a high profile in the shaping of political programs and movements. Luther's political reflections, on the other hand, are more in the genre of devotional reminders of the practical challenges and dangers of political life. Like all 'virtue' oriented accounts of the good life, it is easy to treat Luther's discussion as merely a helpful supplement to the more systematic treatments of the sort that Calvin offers. Perhaps this is legitimate. But in a contemporary climate where tragedy seems clearly to be dominating the political stage, helpful supplements can sometimes provide us with our only sources of real hope.

**Richard J. Mouw**

Fuller Theological Seminary

**Arnold Koslow**

*A Structuralist Theory of Logic.*

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.

Pp. xi + 418.

US \$69.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-41267-6).

The aim of *A Structuralist Theory of Logic* is to provide a theory which accounts for logic from an extremely broad point of view. This, then, requires taking the notion of logic in its most general sense. The result ('structuralist theory') is dependent upon a single, central idea — the idea of an 'implication structure'. An implication structure is an ordered pair consisting of a nonempty set and a finitary relation defined over that set. The generality achieved by Koslow's theory is the result of allowing the sets of such structures to be composed of any sort of thing (objects, sentences, predicates, names, theories, etc.) and, more importantly, allowing a wide variety of implication relations. Standard logical theories take implication relations to be either the deducibility relation or the semantic consequence relation between a set of sentences (or propositions) and sentences (or propositions). Since, on the structuralist theory, elements of the set are not confined to items having certain syntactic or semantic features, the kinds of implication relations defined on the sets of implication structures can include such



relations as set inclusion, mereological inclusion, epistemic relations, etc. To be an implication relation on a set a relation must satisfy certain conditions (including reflexivity, transitivity, projection, etc.).

The logical programme offered by Koslow owes much to the work of Gentzen, Hertz and Tarski. But he has gone far beyond these predecessors in his quest for a truly general perspective on formal systems. Koslow's book examines a large variety of implication structures. Such structures can be compared to one another in terms of their logical operators. Logical operators are always described relative to a given implication structure and are taken to be functions that assign members (or sets of members) of the structure to that structure. The familiar truth-functions and quantifiers of standard first order logic are so defined. Thus they are seen as independent of one another and are defined without recourse to either syntax or semantics. In general, operators are defined as satisfying a filter condition (e.g., *modus ponens* for the material conditional) and yielding the weakest member of the implication structure to do so. In short, as in the Gentzen or Belnap programmes, operators are understood solely in terms of their roles in implications. What makes Koslow's programme so interesting is that the logical operators are seen relative to a variety of different implication structures so that, say, negation, conjunction or disjunction can be examined as they operate over such things as sets of objects, predicates, names, or theories, as well as sentences (propositions). Accordingly, the part-whole relation or the set inclusion relation or the predicate inclusion relation are not viewed merely as analogous to the hypothetical relation of the propositional calculus — they are hypothetical relations (each relative to a different implication structure).

Among logical operators are the modals. And, as with other operators, these are defined relative to a given implication structure. The result, as one might well expect now, is a view of modals far more general than the one usually found in the literature. The conditions which an operator must satisfy in order to count as a modal (*viz.*, that it must distribute over the implication relation but not over the dual of that relation) permit a very broad characterization of modals. Necessity is, as one would expect, a modal (its dual possibility, is a modal because it distributes over the dual of the implication relation but not over that relation). As it turns out, not only are necessity and possibility modal but so are universal quantifiers, epistemic operators, deontic operators, intuitionistic double negation, and many others. These sometimes surprising results must be viewed within the context of the structuralist theory. An interesting, indeed important, consequence of Koslow's account of modality is that it provides a systematization of the normal modal laws in terms of the accessibility relation, but without recourse to the usual Kripkean concept of possible worlds.

The care and attention to detail, as well as the sensitivity concerning areas of potential misunderstanding or concern, displayed in *A Structuralist Theory of Logic* reveal Koslow as masterful logical theorist. This is a rich and often demanding book. It is full of important results and suggestive ideas — far too many even to be enumerated in this brief space. The discussions of



logical operators, phrasal conjunctions, natural language formatives, mereology, erotetic logic, deontic logic, and much, much more make it a valuable resource for logicians, mathematicians, linguists, computer scientists, and philosophers. Even those who are not well-versed in the more subtle and arcane technicalities of formal and mathematical systems will (if willing to persevere) profit from reading it.

Koslow's presentation of the many formal definitions, theorems and their proofs are consistently clear, complete and useful (many less essential proofs are left for the reader, making this, after all, an 'interactive' work). There are three brief appendices (on an implication relation for integers in BASIC, symmetric sequents, and component-style logical operators for relevance logic). There are numerous substantial notes (some of which might have been incorporated into the text), an adequate bibliography, and an index which is less than adequate, in that too many items are not listed. Finally, the book is well-produced, with very few typos (though there are important lines missing at the bottoms of 46 and 47).

Whether or not one is ultimately convinced by Koslow's structuralist theory of logic, the reader with a genuine interest in the logical matters met with here cannot help but feel a certain heady exhilaration generated by viewing logic from the broad prospect he offers.

**George Englebrechtsen**

Bishop's University

**Julia Kristeva**

*Strangers to Ourselves*. Leon Roudiez, trans.

New York: Columbia University Press 1991.

Pp. 240.

US \$29.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-231-07156-6).

*Strangers to Ourselves* is about how we can live with difference. As early as 'Women's Time,' however, Kristeva had set out the premise of her theory. There, in the context of analyzing feminism, Kristeva argues that we must address difference within personal identity itself. She suggests that this is the central step toward a 'demassification of the problematic of difference,' which can acknowledge difference without attempting to totalize it, annihilate it, or reconcile it. In this way, the violence directed toward the other can be disintegrated 'in its very nucleus'. The subject can understand the other, sympathize with the other, and more, take the place of the other, because the subject is other. As Kristeva is quick to point out, this does not mean that



subject and other share their strangeness, their otherness. That is to say, they are not the same in this strangeness. Rather, the subject can relate to an other as other because she is an other to herself. Kristeva's strategy is to make the social relation interior to the psyche.

Kristeva argues that what we exclude as a society or a nation — in order to be a society or a nation — is interior to our very identity. It is our own Unconscious that is projected onto those whom we exclude from our society/nation. In this way we protect our own proper and stable identity both as individual subjects and as nation-states. Kristeva argues that when we flee or combat strangers or foreigners, we are struggling with our own Unconscious. The stranger or foreigner is within us.

Kristeva suggests that the exclusions that are necessary in order for the nation-state to exist can be analyzed as analogues to the exclusions that are necessary for narcissistic identity. Like psychic identity, group identity forms itself by excluding the other. For Kristeva, in the case of psychic identity, it is necessary for individuals to distinguish themselves from others through this type of exclusion in order to communicate. Just as the individual must learn to deal with the return of the repressed or excluded other, so too the nation-state and its citizens must learn to deal with those elements that are excluded and foreign. Kristeva maintains that this problem is condensed in the person of the stranger or foreigner, the main character of her *Strangers to Ourselves*.

The problem, then, is how do we confront that which we have excluded in order to be, whether it is the return of the repressed or the return of strangers. For Kristeva, fundamentally, the problem is how do we confront alterity. She suggests that in order to understand how and why we confront strangers in the ways which we do, we must understand the stranger within 'ourselves.' That is to say, that in order to understand our social relations with others, we must understand our relation to the other within ourselves. Kristeva believes that this analysis can help us to find a way to 'live with others, to live *otherness*, without ostracism but also without levelling' difference.

In a world that is moving toward a more global economy and global politics, this is necessary in order to live well, perhaps at all. As the identities of Nation-states begin to break down, the question of personal and group identity is thrown into crisis. This can be seen in Eastern Europe where the drastic changes in National identities have given rise to various sorts of ethnic unrest. Without a stable national identity, among other factors, groups and individuals define themselves in terms of violent exclusion of others. In our world it seems completely normal that there are strangers/foreigners. Kristeva tries to make this normalcy appear strange.

She asks, if foreigners can get the rights of citizenship, then why can't they get the right to vote? What is it that makes nationality? Is it automatically acquired or chosen? Kristeva analyzes nationality dividing it into citizens by soil and by blood. She analyzes the relationship between the rights of the citizen and the 'rights of man [sic].' She points out that the stranger is a scar between citizen and man [sic]. Is the stranger a citizen or a man? Kristeva argues that states separate off the rights of noncitizens in order to



define themselves as states. Yet, who are these noncitizens? Are they not 'other men'? Kristeva argues that without the rights of citizens they never fully have the rights of man. She points to a paradox in the very notion of the stranger/foreigner. She argues that the stranger/foreigner is defined through the legislation of a government. Yet it is through that very legislation that strangers/foreigners exist. In other words, legislation defines strangers/foreigners into existence. Legislation creates foreigners and the very concept of 'foreign.' Therefore, states find foreigners only because they have created them. Kristeva tries to make all of these categories — citizen, man, foreigner — which seem natural in our contemporary political world seem strange.

By making the notion of stranger/foreigner strange to us Kristeva attempts to dislodge any notion of the identity of the stranger. Her analysis provokes a transference in the reader to the place of the stranger. Through the concept of the stranger Kristeva makes us strangers to ourselves. She demonstrates how what seems to be a normal meaningful distinction between native/foreigner, citizen/noncitizen is not only a symptom of the inability to adjust to social relations, but also a paradox. Through her analysis of Western political philosophy, Kristeva opens up the possibility of considering the unconscious dynamics at work in our own traditions. She conjures the uncanny even while she analyzes it and can make a Western reader experience her own tradition as other, as the other within.

After over a decade of denouncing politics, in the conclusion of *Strangers to Ourselves*, Kristeva provides the foundation for a politics which she argues grows out of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis calls on us to work toward this humanity whose solidarity is founded on a consciousness of its Unconscious. Kristeva instructs us to recognize the difference in us as the condition of our being with others.

**Kelly Oliver**

University of Texas



**E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. McCauley**  
*Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition  
and Culture.*

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990.  
Pp. 256.

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-37370-0).

On the back cover of *Rethinking Religion*, the distinguished anthropologist Edmund Leach writes of Dan Sperber's book *Rethinking Symbolism*: 'The merits of this book are of several kinds. It is short; it is lucid; it is elegant and witty; it is concerned with a theme which is central to current interest not only of anthropologists, but of linguists, philosophers, theologians, and literary critics of all kinds. It is also very ambitious.' Of Lawson and McCauley's *Rethinking Religion* it is regrettable to say that a philosopher and a professor of religious studies try to capitalize upon and then to go very ambitiously far beyond Sperber's book in a work of eye-gouging print. Again, they are not lucid enough for many philosophers to profit much, let alone for expected general readers. They lack elegance, and wit and a well-rounded understanding of the most relevant problems in modern philosophy of religion. They show little or no grasp of indicated work by John Wisdom, Terence Penelhum, R.G. Swinburne and James Kellenberger for the cognitivist side and by Kai Nielsen, Antony Flew, C.B. Martin and their predecessors for the non-cognitivists. Indeed, in presuming to speak for philosophers on such issues, they sometimes seem to have failed to distinguish 'cognitive' in social science jargon from 'cognitivist' — and failed, as well, to illuminate the differences effectively.

On the other hand, a partial understanding does emerge on behalf of philosophy of physical and social sciences: 'The logical empiricists confined knowledge,' the authors write, 'to the logically and empirically knowable, and they confined the meaningful to the knowable so defined. On this view, then, the formal and physical sciences are not only the paradigms of human knowledge, they may well exhaust it. Other sorts of human utterances — the poetic, the moral, the political, the metaphysical and the religious — were expressive at best or, more often, utter nonsense' (23). Lawson and McCauley hope in their book to use 'generative grammars' to vindicate the meaningfulness of religious utterances — partly through showing the usefulness of constructing and applying such grammars to some known forms of some *religious rituals*' structure. (See especially Chapters Three and Five. The former is entitled 'Ritual as Language'.)

Let us allow, for the moment, that the suggested analogy holds between at least *some* body of public utterances and another set of religious rituals: one can, then, allow *some* religious rituals to have something like syntactic structures with the authors' strong constraining powers. But, if we grant this much for now, we should also grant that some (actual or possible) systems of rigorously nonsensical strings exhibit similar syntactical forms of bondage. Even a near-dodo of a politician can thus be thought to manipulate such



strings, like those of a purely abstract ballet according to a complex tradition. 'So', it may be asked, 'has something gone wrong?' What seems, at times, to have gone wrong is that cultural and linguistic scholarship has been stuffed with smothering force into the crowded cage of open-minded enquiry. Lawson and McCauley have simply begged the question or assumed unwittingly in varied contexts that monotheism and transcendence-minded versions of polytheism make basic sense. In effect, they fail to keep an eye on where purely syntactic structures and, also, a justified *semantics* (for differing discussants) must be viewed apart. They focus soon on semantics, but omit to give a justification of semantics for transcendent agents. Their favouring outlooks on human religions and Liberation Theology (their client?) need backing by more arguments from philosophy of religion and fewer from linguistics and anthropology of religions — if they are to look well justified in outside circles when they advocate their kind of cognitivism. Compare: 'The religious world is populated by all the objects of the ordinary world as well as by those entities uniquely posited in religious models' (159).

If one starts, like these writers, with a belief in the possibility of an *intelligibly transcendent* metaphysics and such a theology, too, then one must look *inter alia* for examples of terms which could be intelligibly used to refer to non-spatial entities. These should live outside space, be strong analogues of persons and sound interesting as causes of events in the world of men. Here, their so far disclosed familiarity as philosophers with philosophy of science almost alone — with Hempel, Putnam, Fodor, Chomsky, Quine, Dennett, Carnap, Toulmin, Achinstein and others taken *as* philosophers of *science* all but exclusively — could be put to more fruitful kinds of work. Think about the strange particles which are now attributed to the nucleus of the atom — positron, neutrinos, etc. Probably several of these should be given an instrumental, rather than an empirical status. Next suppose that the effects and causes of some nuclei are so strange and so 'crowded' already that physicists need a new, *aspatial* particle, the utopitron, to explain such causes and effects in handily balanced equations. Some relevant, non-tautologous sentences of the new physics (about atoms, etc.) may have empirical verification or confirmation, but not existential sentences about utopitrons. The concept of an utopitron may later disappear from atomic theory, but still remain intelligible. If this sort of meaningfulness applied to some particles is all right, then so is talk of a non-spatial God's or gods' causings and effects quite all right.

Lawson and McCauley stress their eagerness to keep *explanation* and *interpretation* as equal partners in several disciplines that are dear to them (30/*passim*). They take the best of earlier researchers to have excluded one or subordinated one to the other. Now the term 'explain', rather like 'Why?' and 'Because', has many possible uses. Not enough of these uses are carefully distinguished by L and M, perhaps because of preoccupations with philosophy of science and with explanations in current physical and social science literatures. At any rate the *Justifying Explanation*, whereby humans explain their faults, omissions and actions with a view to *upholding the rightness and*



value of most of their positions has far more bearing on the understanding of religions than the linguistic-syntactical and anthropological offerings of this book. Religious teachings so often function most to offer Justifying Explanations of why we even exist, of why we suffer evil in non-pointless ways, of the waiting for Eternal Life, and the like. (See King-Farlow's and Christensen's *Faith and the Light of Reason*.)

A final lesson of such a book is that good *interdisciplinary* work frequently requires glossaries and a specially developed sort of clarifying meta-language of comment. This is not to be polluted with too much jargon from the different disciplines. Let us all avoid the *obscurum per obscurius*, and the *ignoratio elenchi*.

**John King-Farlow**

University of Alberta

**G.W. Leibniz**

*De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers*

1675-1676. Tr. with an Introduction and Notes  
by G.H.R. Parkinson.

New Haven and London: Yale University Press  
1992. Pp. li + 145.

US \$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-300-05187-5).

*De Summa Rerum* is the title G.H.R. Parkinson has given to a collection of short drafts, sketches, and meditations which Leibniz wrote between December 1675 and December 1676. This interval comprised his last months in Paris, where he had arrived in March of 1672, and his reluctant departure for Hanover. The period had been fruitful for him both mathematically and philosophically. He not only brought the minimal knowledge of mathematics with which he had arrived up to scratch, but had invented the calculus in the fall of 1675. In 1672-3, he composed a dialogue on free will, determinism, individuation, and the problem of evil, *The Confessio Philosophi*, and in the Paris period he encountered the unpublished manuscripts as well as the published works of Descartes, conversed with Malebranche, Huygens, and Foucher, visited London, and met Spinoza. Although Leibniz made and saved sketches like these by the thousands over the course of his life, this set was recognized as particularly deserving of collective publication. Ivan Jagodinsky brought out a somewhat confused edition of some of the papers in 1913; this furnished in turn the basis of Leroy Loemker's translation of a few selections known as the 'Paris Notes'



in his anthology first published in 1956. Without disparaging Loemker's great service and accomplishment, it should be said that Parkinson's translation is throughout more graceful and intelligible as well as more complete, relying as it does on the text of the German Academy edition of Leibniz's *Saemtliche Schriften*. Besides the introduction and notes, Parkinson furnishes a useful table showing Leibniz's major published and unpublished papers and treatises from 1663-1716, a name index, and a subject index.

The new translation is a welcome event in publishing. *De Summa Rerum* is a repository of beautiful, vivid, and at times extremely strange reflections, and it is likely to influence Leibniz scholarship out of all proportion to its length. The main themes of Leibniz's philosophy are all here: the notions of plenitude, simplicity and multiplicity, sufficient reason, compossibility, and harmony; and the problems of individuation, continuity, atomism, and spatial relations all receive discussion. It was also a profoundly difficult undertaking: unlike the *Confessio*, which is an eminently readable and relatively presuppositionless dialogue, these notes are not written with an audience in mind, and, particularly when they touch on physics and mathematics, demand considerable background knowledge. Parkinson's introduction and footnotes, without being intended to serve as a complete commentary, clarify puzzling constructions, supply contemporary references to figures and ideas, and refer the reader discretely to current literature.

The Introduction of forty pages itself deserves some comment. In 1986, Parkinson published a paper in *Studia Leibnitiana*, 'De Summa Rerum: A Systematic Approach' (Vol. 18, 132-51), in which he argued that the Paris papers contain the outline of a metaphysical system, and he repeats his conviction here. The claim is most convincing if one takes the harmony of perceptions, the doctrine of confused omniscience, and the associated phenomenalism, as Leibniz's fundamental metaphysical innovation: Meditations no. 10 of April 15, 1676 and no. 15 are especially remarkable in this respect. However, Leibniz also seems disposed to imagine matter as external to individual minds, and as informed by a 'mind' (God), or else finite 'minds,' which confer on it substantiality, as in no. 3. Arguably, this indecision persists in Leibniz's so-called mature metaphysics, in which hylomorphic ideas persist together with various incompatible-seeming phenomenalisms. Leibniz takes (no. 10) as primary truths both the logico-linguistic propositions that 'A is A' and that concepts have unprovable definitions, and the statement of experiential givenness, which is not the Cartesian 'I think,' but instead, 'I have such and such experiences.' Parkinson points out that we do not find any trace in 1675-6 of the doctrine that a substance has a complete concept. One might think this a blow to Couturat's thesis that Leibniz's logic determined his metaphysics, as the absence of any treatment of 'force' here might be considered a blow to the thesis that Leibniz's metaphysics is a consequence of his physics. Alternatively, one can dispute Parkinson's contention that a complete system can be glimpsed in *De Summa Rerum*. To my mind, the obvious conclusion to



draw is that the sequentiality and harmony of perceptions is Leibniz's fundamental idea, and that it attracts linguistic and physical models as he matures, without ever forming a mature *system*, let alone having constituted a system in his youth.

These papers thus promise to promote further vigorous discussion of the systematicity problem. But they also suggest numerous specific research problems. I mention here only two of the issues prominent in these texts which stand out as particularly deserving of scholarly study. The first is the subject of atoms, vortices, and minds. Leibniz's statements that there are 'as many vortices as solid bodies' and as many minds as vortices, and that the solidity or unity of the body comes from the mind (nos. 7 and 10), needs detailed study and explanation. Parkinson's notes refer the reader to the cosmological vortices of Descartes: more to the point perhaps are the mini-tourbillons of Malebranche. One might see the vortex-theory as an attempted reconciliation of Aristotelian hylomorphism with Cartesian physics, and it is well worth asking whether this attempt persists or is abandoned in Leibniz's later approaches to matter. A second promising area of investigation is Leibniz's theology. Leibniz insists here, as Parkinson pointed out in his *Studia Leibnitiana* article, on the personhood of God (no. 3); yet there is a pronounced tone of mysticism and even pantheism — extending even to the titles of the works, in which secrets, the sublime, and the wondrous, are frequently referenced — in these meditations. Research is needed to situate these texts within the spectrum of theological possibilities in Paris and in German mysticism. To put the question bluntly: what significance are we to attach to such expressions of enthusiasm in an allegedly 'rationalist' philosopher? To what extent are they discarded or residual in his later work?

Every serious student of Leibniz has reason to be grateful for G.H.R. Parkinson's work as author, editor, and translator. The projected publication of future volumes in the Yale Leibniz series indicates that Anglo-American scholarship is on its way to achieving a level of sophistication comparable to that of its continental counterparts.

**Catherine Wilson**  
University of Alberta



**Jerome Neu, ed.**

*The Cambridge Companion to Freud.*

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991.

Pp. vii + 356.

US \$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-37424-3);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-37779-X).

Though generally very good, the papers in this collection do not make up a *companion*. They draw from only a very narrow spectrum of the disciplines in which work on Freud is done and touch on only a few of his interests and theories. There are no papers by literary theorists or developmental psychologists or dream researchers or people engaged in empirical studies of psychoanalysis or ... or ... or .... In fact, eight of the thirteen papers were written by philosophers, and one of them is not even about Freud! Moreover, despite the importance of psychoanalytic theories and the critique of Freud in contemporary feminist and post-modern writings, only three are by women, though the one by Nancy Chodorow is pathbreaking.

Even more remarkably, only one author, and a joint author at that, is a practicing psychoanalyst. Seven of the authors are or have been in some form of psychoanalytic training, six with an eye to practicing. However, only one had graduated as of the date of this volume. The papers in it are thus by people who are either very junior members of the psychoanalytic community or not members at all. (Richard Wollheim is an exception; he is an Honourary Associate Member of the British Psychoanalytic Society.) In addition, of the fourteen authors, only four are not Americans: three English and one Israeli. There is not a single French, or German, or Italian, or Latin American, or Hungarian, or ... author. In short, this volume is an American, non-practitioner, philosopher's collection. Even at that there are odd omissions. Among analysts, why was nothing by Marshall Edelson included?; among philosophers, why not Adolf Grünbaum? Nevertheless, the papers that did make it are mostly very good and some break new ground. First the philosophical ones.

'Freud's androids' by Clark Glymour is centred on a claim that Freud was not only a homuncular functionalist, no longer a novel idea, but a particularly interesting one. Contrary to the usual strategy now, Freud's squad of homunculi (id, ego, super-ego) are not stupider or less richly endowed than the mind itself, yet the model he develops is still explanatory. The homuncular approach to Freud seems to me to suffer from a fairly obvious objection: id and super-ego are more like programmes than homunculi.

In a long paper, 'The interpretation of dreams,' James Hopkins continues his promising project of showing that some of Freud's characteristic modes of analysis are very specific extensions of strategies central to folk psychology.

Sebastian Gardner's 'The unconscious' is a careful, perceptive but rather unpsychoanalytic sorting out of the Freudian concept(s) of the unconscious. The implications of this analysis, as Gardner makes clear, include some that are strongly hostile to construing Freud's psychic systems as homunculi (*pace*



Glymour above). The paper also probes the interesting question of the status of unconscious states.

Jerome Neu, the editor of the volume, contributes 'Freud and perversion', in which, like Freud himself, he uses the so-called perversions as a window onto sexuality in general. Again like Freud, the paper seems not to distinguish broadening the range of sexual phenomena from broadening the concept of sexuality, broadening the range of things that are included in the sexual, not just the sensual.

In a short paper, 'Morality and the internalized other,' Jennifer Church rehearses some of the features of the process of fantasizing others as judging us and then elevating these figures into the system of judgments of self that Freud called the super-ego. Like Freud (but unlike Melanie Klein), she seems not to distinguish persecutory anxiety from guilt. She also seems to take little or no account of Freud's rare but important remarks on the super-ego's loving side (cf. e.g., his 1927 paper, 'Humour').

In 'Freud's later theory of civilization,' John Deigh compares the pessimism of *Civilization and Its Discontents* to the optimism of *The Future of an Illusion* and *The New Introductory Lectures* that straddle it. 'Freud and the understanding of art' by Richard Wollheim was published twice already in the early 1970s. David Sachs' 'In fairness to Freud: A Critical notice of *The Foundations of Psychoanalysis*, by Adolf Grünbaum' is not only reprinted (from *The Philosophical Review* [1989]) but is also not about Freud.

Turning to the non-philosophical papers, 'The psychoarcheology of civilizations' by Carl Schorske, author of *Fin-de-siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture*, explores the role of bourgeois liberal London, libidinal Paris and maternal Rome in Freud's psychic life. As Schorske argues, for Freud all roads led to Rome.

In 'Seduced and abandoned: The rise and fall of Freud's seduction theory' Gerald Izenberg explores the vicissitudes of Freud's brief conviction in the 1890s that adult neurosis is the result of sexual abuse in childhood. Contrary to the accusations of Jeffrey Masson, Izenberg shows that the changes in *the emphasis* placed by Freud on sexual abuse (for he never stopped believing that sexual abuse occurs or, when present, plays a role) was more a response to developments and strains in his theories than to cowardice or the desire to exculpate a friend.

The development and vicissitudes of Freud's ideas on the Oedipus complex' by Bennett Simon, the only analyst in the group, and Rachel B. Blass, gives an interesting history of the Oedipus complex in Freud's writings. They may underplay the fact that Freud laid out the essentials in *The Interpretation of Dreams* ten years before he first officially announced the idea.

Nancy Chodorow's 'Freud on women' is a major study of Freud's curious views on women. Despite having Lou Andreas-Salome, Hermine Hug-Hellmuth, Sabina Spielrein, Helene Deutsch, Ruth Mack Brunswick, his own daughter Anna and other women as confidantes and collaborators, Freud held what would now be classed as blinkered and sexist views of women. Chodorow shows that Freud's views on women split along a divide. On one



side is woman as subject, on the other woman as object of the male gaze. Moreover, in Freud's various writings he laid out not one theory of each kind but many different theories! A wonderful paper!

In 'Freud's anthropology: A reading of the "cultural books",' Robert A. Paul argues most interestingly that Freud's works on the prehistory of culture are more about universal fantasy schemas than any search for real historical origins.

All in all, *The Cambridge Companion to Freud* is a fine collection of papers, but it is far more restricted than one would expect in a work called a 'companion' to Freud.

**Andrew Brook**

Carleton University

**Matthew H. Nitecki and  
Doris V. Nitecki, eds.**

*History and Evolution.*

Albany: State University of New York Press

1992. Pp. vii + 269.

(cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1211-3);

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1212-1).

This is a very stimulating collection of articles by a number of leading biologists, geologists, and historians and philosophers of biology. The collection is divided into three sections: Methodologies of Historical Explanation; Historical Explanations and Evolutionary Biology; Historical Science and Philosophy of History.

The articles in the first section are conceptual. The authors grapple with the nature of explanation in history and evolutionary biology and with the relevance of history to evolutionary biology. Robert Richards argues for the fundamental importance of narrative to historical and evolutionary explanation. He argues that the logical empiricist model of explanation (covering-law/deductive-nomological) is flawed. In its place he argues for narrative explanations which are causal and which 'secure both the relevant conditions and appropriate laws' of an explanation. Rachel Laudan argues that a division of enquiry into historical sciences and non-historical sciences is not sustainable or useful. Different areas of enquiry have different methodologies and history does not have a privileged or fundamental methodology. There is, she argues, nothing special about the past or investigations of it. David Hull argues for a model of explanation in which particular circumstances play a fundamental role. For Hull historical entities are particular



and, when traced through time, can produce explanations in the form of historical narratives. Marc Ereshefsky defends Hempelian explanation against a number of criticisms (most made somewhere in the volume) but claims to have identified a distinctive historical aspect of evolution. 'The units of evolutionary theory, taxa, consist of sequences of objects which can transmit information with great fidelity. There are no comparable sequences of natural objects in the physical sciences.'

The struggle in this first section to carve out a role for history in evolution either through a pattern of explanation that is fundamentally historical or through entities that are fundamentally historical makes it lively reading. There is much with which to disagree in these papers but for those interested in generalizations, laws, covering-law explanation and narrative in biology, they are all provocative and important articles. They advance the discussion and stimulate new perspectives.

The second section consists of two articles. Both explore historical aspects of evolutionary biology, especially paleontology. Douglas Futuyma explores the benefits that incorporating a historical evolutionary perspective will have on population genetics. Recent attention focused on macroevolution illustrates this point. Most significantly, patterns of character evolution which result from improved phylogenetic analysis can profitably direct research on genetic architecture and variation in population genetics. Given the polarization in the early period of the controversy over punctuated equilibria and macroevolution, this paper offers a bridge between the two main conflicting fields: paleontology and genetics. David Kitts explores the potential for paleontology to have general laws. Punctuated equilibria is a view of evolution that its proponents argue makes laws in paleontology possible. Kitts claims that geology is the paradigm historical science and he discusses the impact of plate tectonics on the nomothetic character of geology as a way of understanding laws in a historical science. Although he supports the distinction between the fact of evolution (or the course of evolution) and the theory (causal mechanisms) invoked to explain it, he thinks the two are inextricably intertwined. Paleontology is nomothetic to the extent that it is part of the interconnected fabric of fact and theory. This paper would have benefited from a more extended discussion of the nature and role of law in paleontology and geology. In this way the rationale for, and benefits of, a nomothetic paleontology would have been clearer.

The third section is a collection of diverse themes. Michael Ruse discusses the concept of progress in society, in scientific knowledge and in organic evolution. In this article he gives a taste of the central themes of his forthcoming book on progress: a book that I think, from glimpses of the research and results over the last several years, promises to be a landmark study of the concept. Ruse argues that, despite vociferous claims to the contrary, the idea of progress in society, science and evolution is alive and well. Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richardson respond to a criticism of their views on cultural evolution as set out in their seminal work *Culture and the Evolutionary Process* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). The criticism



they address is that culture can only be understood and explained historically. Their response involves a defense of their Darwinian theory of cultural evolution based on an argument that 'several cultural evolutionary processes can give rise to divergent evolutionary development, secular trends, and other features that can generate unique historical sequences for particular societies.' This is the best paper in the collection. It is an important addition to their earlier work. Garland Allen explores the similarities between Marx and Darwin. Allen argues they share: (1) an anti-teleological evolutionary world view, (2) the view that human beings are part of nature, (3) an adherence to materialistic explanations, (4) a use of a dialectical approach to dynamic change, and (5) a faith in progress through struggle and change. Lawrence Slobodkin focuses on the origin and extinction of scientific fields. Ecology, his own field, is an important case for his analysis.

This is a rich and rewarding collection. Even the article with which I disagree the most (R.J. Richards, 'The Structure of Narrative Explanation in History and Biology'), perhaps because it touches a nerve close to the surface, manifests analytic skill and a great depth of historical knowledge and methodological expertise. Although Richards successfully rehabilitated Spencer for me by his analysis in his impressive book *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behaviour* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), he failed to do the same for narrative explanation in his paper in this collection. Nonetheless the article is, like most of the articles, rewarding reading. I highly recommend this collection.

### **Paul Thompson**

University of Toronto  
Scarborough College

### **Robert Nozick**

*The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations.*  
New York: Simon and Schuster 1990. Pp. 308.  
US \$10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-671-72501-7).

Readers of *Anarchy, State and Utopia* will be intrigued that Nozick now views as seriously inadequate the political philosophy he articulated there.

Having myself written earlier a book of political philosophy that marked out a distinctive view, one that now seems seriously inadequate to me — I will say some words about this later on — I am especially aware of the difficulty of living down an intellectual past or escaping it. (17)



What Nozick now wants is a four-layer moral structure in which the rights theory of ASU, under the rubric of the ethic of respect, would make up the first layer. One tries to minimize mutilation of rights as one achieves the aims of the higher layers: the ethic of responsiveness, the ethic of caring, and the ethic of Light. So the ethic of responsiveness would impose a duty on you to 'be responsive to another's reality and act so as to enhance it' (212), in addition to honoring that person's rights. And the ethic of care, related to the second layer by the same principle of minimum mutilation, makes a moral demand for an attitude of caring that 'can range from caring and concern to tenderness to deeper compassion to love' (213). And the fourth and in some sense highest layer, the ethic of Light, calls on you to be a vessel for truth, goodness, beauty, and holiness (214).

Taxation of the wealthy for social insurance programs can now be justified because it allows a society to define itself as having a caring attitude towards its poor and ill, and bequests can be taxed so as to subtract that portion which the giver did not contribute himself or herself. A far cry from ASU's entitlement theory! Other signs of turning away from the doctrines of the earlier book include a chapter on the zig-zag of politics, in which Nozick praises the 'it's time for a change' syndrome of democratic politics, on the grounds that the resulting rotation of political agendas helps to ensure that the community makes contact with many important dimensions of reality, not just those which are congenial to the values of a particular party. This is a change of course from ASU's scornful dismissal of democracy as violating natural rights under most conceivable circumstances.

The center-piece of the new book is an exotic theory of reality. ASU's thought-experiment of the Experience-Machine showed that in Nozick's view a life worth living required contact with a deeper reality than felt experience, and his discussion of organic unity in *Philosophical Explanations* showed his commitment to objective value, but *The Examined Life* reveals how deep the reality is, how imbued with value it is, and how extensive one's contact with reality must be in order to lead a good life. Reality is distinct from existence. (An evil person exists but has little reality.) Reality indeed has the structure of a rectangular polyhedron with the three axes of Towardness, Functioning Nature, and Being. On the Towardness axis are the dimensions *inherent*, *relational*, *telos*, and *ideal limit*. On the Being axis are *liveliness*, *concentratedness*, *thereness*, and *spirit*. On the axis of Functioning Nature are *structural composition*, *vectorial direction*, and *mode*. Within the parameters defined by these axes, reality contains the following dimensions: value, meaning, importance, weight, depth, amplitude, intensity, fulfillment, energy, autonomy, individuality, vitality, creativity, focus, purpose, development, serenity, holiness, perfection, expressiveness, authenticity, freedom, infinitude, enduringness, eternity, wisdom, understanding, life, nobility, play, grandeur, greatness, radiance, integrity, personality, loftiness, idealness, transcendence, growth, novelty, expansiveness, originality, purity, simplicity, preciousness, significance, vastness, profundity, integration, harmony, flourishing, power, and destiny.



That we should connect to reality in our desires, beliefs, and emotions is important in its own right for Nozick, and not just for the pleasure that may attend such a connection. This is what he calls the Second Reality Principle, Freud's having been the first, counseling connection to reality not for its own sake but in order to satisfy the pleasure principle. But reality is large, raising the question of which aspects of it to connect to, so we need what Nozick calls the *zoom lens ability* to focus on what's important when we connect to reality. His Third Reality Principle says that we should be prepared to focus on negative aspects of reality, not fiddling like Nero while Rome burns (the music is real, but so is the conflagration, and it's more important to attend to that). Nozick distinguishes between reality and existence in such a way that the real is a much more extensive category than the existent. Literary characters can be real though they do not exist, just in case they are vivid, sharply detailed, and integrated in the way they work toward a goal. (He instances Hamlet, Sherlock Holmes, Lear, Antigone, Don Quixote, and Raskolnikov.) The Fourth Reality Principle commends being more real, and Nozick adds that 'one view of immortality might be that what survives our death is our reality, whatever reality we manage to realize' (132). The Fifth Reality Principle calls for connecting with reality in a way that has some impact on it (171). The Sixth says, Become a vessel of light. And the Seventh enjoins, Connect to the very highest and deepest reality (258). I leave it as an exercise for the reader to decide whether Nozick's theory of reality is the holy grail that unites fact and value, or a philosophical Rube Goldberg machine.

There is much to savor, or gasp at, in this book. Nozick writes about the essences of foods (apples possess purity and dignity, for instance), whether it's a bad thing to die (it's not so bad after a full life, and the elderly should be especially willing to take on risky projects), sex (be inventive), and many other topics. He even proposes the secret to happiness. He finds that he doesn't like to think that he's much more than halfway to the end of the major thing he is engaged in, and that there is leeway to decide what this halfway-point is; so he adjusts boundaries accordingly to create new midpoints. ('The strange fact is that even as I smile at my shifting the boundaries to create a new salient point and a different second half, still it works!' [23]) Nozick concludes that if there is any secret of happiness, it resides in regularly choosing some baseline or benchmark or other against which features of the current situation can be evaluated as good or improving (114). He uses this idea to explain the intuition that we'd rather have a life in which the happiness-curve of our lives slopes upward rather than downward, even if the area under the curve is the same in both cases. An upward-sloping life leads us to judge the present against the recent past, which, happily, it surpasses, rather than against some other baseline from which it might fall short. 'Happiness can be served,' he concludes, 'by fiddling with our standards of evaluation' (115).

Nozick has written a brilliant book, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, and a deep book, *Philosophical Explanations*, and with *The Examined Life* he has



written an intimate book, one that takes the risks of self-revelation and requires a reader's patience, sympathy, and forbearance. The slashing argumentation of *ASU* gave way to the non-aggressive explanatory style of philosophizing in *PE*, and in *EL* Nozick has reinvented himself so that he is addressing not just the philosopher within us, whether to argue or explain, but rather the whole person.

**Wesley E. Cooper**  
University of Alberta

**Norvin Richards**

*Humility.*

Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1992.

Pp. 240.

US \$37.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87722-927-9).

Humility belongs to a family of virtues that has a vaguely antiquated air. Meekness and temperance are others. It is not obvious that the marginalization of these in our contemporary ethical thinking is an unqualified good. So we should welcome Richards' *Humility* as a serious attempt to unravel the meaning and establish the enduring importance of a neglected virtue. The book has the strengths, as well as the limits, of the virtue it investigates: it is consistently sensible and unpretentious, with an occasional arresting insight, though the deeper and darker questions surrounding the topic are modestly avoided. Richards' prolixity is not what one would expect of an exemplar of humility, though the verbal padding was perhaps a matter of humble acquiescence to a publisher's demands regarding the length of the book. We may need another book about humility written (concisely) by someone with a bit more intellectual arrogance and speculative daring, but we should still be grateful for this one.

Richards rejects the common view that humility entails a low estimate of oneself. That view makes it virtually unintelligible that humility could be a virtue. Where an individual's accomplishments have some merit, humility on the common view requires a lack of self-knowledge (if not downright self-deception). Richards maintains that a better understanding of humility would make it the ally rather than the enemy of self-knowledge. Humility is knowing yourself well enough to be disinclined to exaggerate your importance in the scheme of things. The humble see their lives in the right perspective, and so their humility keeps in check the familiar human temptations to take an inflated view of our merits, ignore our imperfections, and magnify the signifi-



cance of all that befalls us. After a defence of this alternative conception of humility in the opening chapter, its bearing on a diverse range of moral issues is carefully explored throughout the remainder of the book.

The first of these issues is mistreatment. The humble will be disinclined to respond to certain kinds of wrongdoing with the indignation or resentment we might expect of others. Yet humility in Richards' favoured sense is perfectly compatible with a robust self-respect, and hence there is no requirement that the humble passively endure violations of their dignity. Humility is also conducive to a willingness to forgive in that it rules out any propensity to amplify the significance of the wrongs we have suffered. But the willingness to forgive that is relevant here is not indiscriminate because a true understanding of some wrongs may justify a refusal to set resentment aside.

Richards also maintains that humility requires something in the way of compassion. Humble people cannot be self-absorbed, and this means they must be responsive to suffering in others' lives. There is also the requirement that one see the afflictions of others as no less intrinsically important than comparable misfortunes of one's own, and this too establishes a partial convergence between the virtues of humility and compassion. Humility does not rule out either envy or jealousy, though its distinctive habits of interpretation will restrain the occurrence of unreasonable instances of both.

The relationship between humility and paternalism is explored in two chapters. Humility countervails the arrogance that often motivates unjustified paternalism and the self-absorption that sometimes underlies resistance on the part of those who are subject to justified paternalism. There is a chapter on humility and the simple life. The good news is that you don't have to endure Spartan austerity to live humbly. The book ends with a chapter that is an extended summary of what came before, with a few pages on humility and pride thrown in for good measure.

Richards' book rarely rises above and never descends below the level of sober commonsense. That is better than can be said about most published moral philosophy, though those who like their philosophy a bit flashy will find nothing to charm them here. But there are more serious reasons to be a bit disappointed in the book, notwithstanding its clarity and good sense.

According to Richards, self-knowledge in the sense of seeing ourselves in proper perspective is the cognitive core of humility. Humble people are averse to exaggerating their own importance because that would distort or misrepresent their sense of perspective. But the same sense of perspective should make one equally averse to underestimating one's importance. Indeed, if a sense of perspective is the decisive consideration, the truly humble *must* be equally averse to underestimation. That seems strongly counterintuitive. When Wittgenstein prefaced his *Philosophical Investigations* with the observation that this is not a good book we are hardly inclined to infer that he lacked humility.



More important, Richards' largely unexamined concept of a sense of perspective serves to disguise the deep and important issues that have divided moralists about the value of humility. Humility in Richards' sense is something that an Aristotelian great-souled man, a would-be Nietzschean overman and a follower of St. Francis can all agree in prizing because each sees the good life as one that requires us to see ourselves in the right perspective. But a really adequate philosophical discussion of humility must make sense of the fact that such people disagree vehemently about the value of humility. It is implausible to dismiss such disagreements as conceptual confusion, as if the Nietzschean could go along with the follower of St. Francis once he saw that to be humble you don't need to think badly of yourself. Ethical disagreements about humility are apt to cut deep because the concept of seeing our lives in perspective is essentially contestable, and only some conceptions of that concept permit the emergence of humility to a salient place within our catalogue of the virtues. A book that addressed such questions seriously should be far more historically engaged than this one, its forays into literature might be less perfunctory, and its conclusions would be less cut and dried.

**Eamonn Callan**

*(Educational Foundations)*

University of Alberta

**Steven C. Rockefeller**

*John Dewey, Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism.*

New York: Columbia University Press 1991.

Pp. xiii + 683.

US \$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-231-0734-8-8).

Rockefeller's fat book on Dewey follows at the heels of another 600 page book on the same philosopher, Robert B. Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1991). Although both works cover the same ground, they do so from a different slant, and each includes details the other omits, both contributing to our understanding of a major — if not *the* major — twentieth century American philosopher. While Westbrook's intellectual biography focuses on Dewey's conceptions of democracy and democratic ideals and his applications of these conceptions in his political activism, Rockefeller examines Dewey's conceptions of religion and their evolution into a democratic humanism.



One segment of Dewey's saga may illustrate the different treatments rendered by Westbrook and Rockefeller. The segment began during World War I, when Dewey became involved with the Polish American community. In the fall of 1917 Dewey offered a seminar, in which Albert Barnes, a wealthy Philadelphia businessman with a keen interest in the arts who had befriended Dewey, and Anzia Yezierska, a 33 year old female Polish-Jewish immigrant with literary ambitions, were enrolled. With financial assistance from Barnes, Dewey conducted a research study of the Polish community in Philadelphia and, endeavoring to persuade the Wilson administration to intervene in the politics of this community, he submitted several reports, at the request of the U.S. Military Intelligence Bureau, to the American government. Westbrook discusses the matter under the rubric 'the Polish question,' for many pages (Westbrook, 212-23), mentioning Anzia Yezierska slightly (Westbrook, 221-3). On the other hand, Rockefeller spends almost an entire chapter on Dewey's poetry, much of it love poetry meant for Anzia, his junior by at least twenty-five years, and sketches further details of their love affair (346-50). As for the Polish Question, Rockefeller devotes only a paragraph to it (350-1).

Rockefeller's focus is on Dewey's religious thought. He locates its core in Dewey's struggle to overcome the dualism of the actual and the ideal. He examines this struggle in a broadly construed religious context, and enters upon an exploration of Dewey's religious thinking. He distinguishes six stages in the evolution of Dewey's religious thinking, four of which belong to the early years. The first stage, childhood, is marked by his mother's moralistic evangelical pietism and the presence of Vermont Congregationalism. The second stage, college years, is influenced by Vermont Transcendentalism, the compound of New England theology, Kant, Coleridge, and Wordsworth, under the tutelage of his university mentor, James Marsh. The third stage, graduate education at Johns Hopkins, traces Dewey's development into an Hegelian idealist under the sway of his professor, George Sylvester Morris. During this stage Dewey, as an absolute idealist, identified, despite all appearances to the contrary, the actual with the ideal. However, his moral conscience, born in his earliest years, eventually fed by his awareness of the conditions of society and the need for reform, drove him to his fourth stage, characterizable as a radical version of the Social Gospel. The fifth stage covers the period from 1894-1928, when Dewey changed from his idealism to the profession of his distinctively experimental, pragmatic philosophy, described by Rockefeller as 'a new naturalistic process philosophy and democratic humanism' (21). The final stage comes after 1928 and stretches until Dewey's death in 1952. During this stage, punctuated by two major, relevant publications, *The Quest for Certainty* (1929) and *A Common Faith* (1934), Dewey offered a theory of the religious life which he deemed consistent with his naturalism and humanism. Rockefeller is thorough; he gathers together a plethora of biographical facts and texts to illuminate the roles of religion in Dewey's life and thought, culminating in the philosopher's synthesis of the sacred and the secular.



It is unlikely that Rockefeller's investigation into Dewey's philosophy of religion will ever be surpassed. Nonetheless, philosophical questions about the validity of Dewey's thought in this area will persist. A professed naturalist and humanist, Dewey in his later years employed the term 'God' in equivocal senses. Sometimes it is a symbol for the universe as a whole, and here Dewey incorporates Santayana's idea of cosmic piety ('natural piety' in Dewey) as descriptive of humankind's appropriate response to it. At other times, especially in his climactic work on religion, *A Common Faith*, Dewey defines God as the unity of all our ideals arousing human desire and action. The first conception is reminiscent of Spinoza; it has a quietistic tone compatible with mysticism and resignation. The second conception has affinity with the religious philosophy of William James; it is activistic. Rockefeller argues that still a third sense may be discerned in Dewey's thought — namely, the uniting of the ideal and the actual. But, as Rockefeller points out, this uniting is neither given, as Hegelian absolutism proposes, nor is it secure as the destined, cosmological outcome, as eschatological process theology affirms. Rather it is a chancy result of cooperative human endeavors. No wonder, as Rockefeller records, the critics of Dewey's doctrine have been so numerous, springing from nearly all points on the philosophical spectrum as regards the nature of God.

Still Rockefeller is an audacious commentator and thinker. He even examines the senses in which Dewey, despite his assault on supernaturalisms of every stripe, indulged in mysticism and proposed a theory of ultimate meaning.

**Andrew J. Reck**  
Tulane University

**Bernard E. Rollin**  
*Animal Rights and Human Morality*,  
revised edition.  
Buffalo: Prometheus Books 1992. Pp. 248.  
US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87975-789-2).

This book, like the previous edition, 'concerns itself with the theoretical and practical issues related to animals and morality' (13). The book contains four chapters, and in the first chapter (Moral Theory and Animals), Rollin adopts the 'philosophical strategy of extracting a new ethic for animals from our consensus, common sense, social ethic for humans' (9). He contends that if 'we can find no morally relevant differences between humans and animals,



and if we accept the idea that moral notions apply to humans, it follows that we must rationally extend the scope of moral concern to animals' (30). Such differences, Rollin argues, do not exist. He further argues that social contract ethics, Kantianism and utilitarianism all fail to capture crucial aspects of morality. 'The moral of the story so far is that neither rationality nor ability to experience pain and pleasure nor even both taken together gives us an adequate account of what makes a being an object of moral concern' (70). He claims that 'regardless of what moral theories one holds, regardless of one's principles of right and wrong, one is logically compelled to apply these theories and principles to animals' (83).

In the second chapter (Animal Rights and Legal Rights) Rollin contends that 'one cannot separate questions of law from questions of right and wrong, that is, from morality' (118). His support for this view resides in an appeal to Ronald Dworkin's rejection of legal positivism, and subsequent acceptance of a natural law account. Rollin concludes that 'enjoying legal rights follows and is indeed inseparable from enjoying moral status. So ... animals ought to be considered as recipients of legal rights' (118). He argues that animals do not have the legal rights that they are morally entitled to in so far as their legal rights are largely grounded in the idea that animals 'are personal property, much like automobiles or television sets' (119). The proposal is that the 'relevant legal analogy here is the case of children. Although children cannot press legal claims on their own behalf, they still enjoy legal rights. They are not the property of their parents' (126).

In chapter three (The Use and Abuse of Animals in Research) Rollin allows that 'society is not yet ready to grant full legal and moral rights to animals' (135). So, 'we must look to the best approximation of these ideas that can be actualized in our current socio-cultural context' (135). The rest of the chapter explores various issues involving animal research in light of such pragmatic considerations. The rationale behind the fourth chapter (Morality and Pet Animals) is to move the discussion 'to an actual situation with which virtually everyone can find a point of existential and empathetic contact. Here we stand the best chance of engendering the moral gestalt shift with regard to animals' (214).

A comparison between the two editions leads to the following observations. There are almost no changes in the fourth chapter, and very few in the second. Noteworthy changes exist in the first and third chapters. The changes in the third chapter are largely empirical. New sections on animal protection legislation have been added, and the discussions in some of the other sections have been expanded. Chapter one also includes several new sections, and expanded discussions in others. There are new sections on animal pain, the need for a moral ideal concerning animals, and the discussion of the nonliving environment has been expanded from one brief paragraph to four pages. Overall, the discussions in the third chapter have increased by approximately fifteen pages, while those in the first chapter have increased by over twenty pages. The bibliography has almost doubled



in size. Finally, the expanded edition includes many linguistic changes that reflect gender-inclusive language.

The book is an important contribution to the discussion of the moral status of animals. Anyone who has not read the book will find it an important source of information and insight. Anyone who has read the first edition will find that the new edition is still worth examination, particularly the first and third chapters.

**Doug Simak**

*(Arts and Humanities Department)*

Douglas College

**John R. Searle**

*The Rediscovery of the Mind.*

Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, Bradford

Books 1992. Pp. xv + 270.

US \$22.50. ISBN 0-262-19312.

In John Searle's opinion the philosophy of mind is a discipline marred by widespread acceptance of positions that are plainly inadequate, even absurd. The problem is that philosophers routinely deny the reality of the obvious: intrinsic intentionality, conscious mental states, and subjectivity. In Searle's experience, adherents of 'these incredible views' will not be moved through direct refutation, a situation he puts down to the socialization process of the current materialist tradition. Accordingly, one of the main aims of this book is to undermine the tradition indirectly, through an exposé of the historical misconceptions that have shaped it. Searle wants to explain the mistaken motivations for fantastic positions like eliminative materialism and Dennett's instrumentalist intentional stance theory, and to 'put the final nail in the coffin of the theory that the mind is a computer program.' On the constructive side, he wants to begin a discussion of consciousness as one biological phenomenon among others, no more mysterious than photosynthesis and digestion.

How did this situation ever arise, where obvious facts are ignored and ridiculous views defended? By Searle's diagnosis the problem largely derives from a mistaken philosophy of science, a web of defective ideas about objectivity dating back to Descartes and Galileo (10-12). There has been a persistent confusion between objectivity in the sense of freedom from personal biases, and objectivity in the sense of intersubjective accessibility, the sense which contrasts with the subjectivity associated with mental phenom-



ena. This fundamental confusion between epistemological and ontological objectivity is behind the entrenchment of the idea that scientific activity is objective partly because it must deal with a *reality* that is objective. Moreover, because reality is objective, so the tradition maintains, it must be physical, and physical in the sense of being opposed to the mental. The result of this 'objective' stance is a belief that cognitive science must operate from a third-person point of view, which eventually leads to the equation of the study of the mind with the study of its intersubjectively accessible symptoms. If the mind really exists as an object of scientific study, its ontology must be behavioural, or behavioural and neurophysiological. Saddled with the occupational 'terror of consciousness', philosophers who want to be scientific are drawn into the tradition's 'compulsive neurotic' cycle of putting forward theory after futile theory attempting to deny the reality of subjectivity (31).

But if we can see through the confusion between epistemology and ontology, Searle says, we can face the facts without fear and state the obvious, that there is an irreducible subjective component to reality, something that has only a first-person existence. If this conflicts with models of observation and knowledge, it is the models which must be made to conform to the reality of subjectivity. On Searle's view the mind-body problem admits of a simple solution: mental phenomena such as conscious mental states are simply higher-level or emergent properties of the brain, 'in the utterly harmless sense of "higher-level" or "emergent" in which solidity is a higher-level emergent property of H<sub>2</sub>O molecules when they are in lattice structure (ice) ...' (14). With this 'biological naturalism' there is no problem with recognizing that some physical properties are mental, and all mental properties physical. The Cartesian dogma that severed mental and physical is now rejected.

Of course, we do not yet know which specific neurophysiological phenomena cause consciousness (57, 92, 101, 105). This makes Searle's claim that we *know* that animals like cats and dogs are conscious somewhat puzzling, since he says that we know this on the basis of knowledge of our own consciousness taken together with the principle of same causes-same effects (21-2, 73). Even if the principle is broadened, as Searle suggests, to 'relevantly similar causes-relevantly similar effects', our ignorance of the neurophysiological causes of consciousness means that we are ignorant about whether these animals exhibit the relevant similarity. Perhaps the volume of their brains falls below a critical point.

Searle develops a theory of the unconscious (ch. 7), according to which unconscious mental states exist, but must be states that are potentially conscious. He explains that, being genuinely intentional, unconscious mental states must possess what he calls 'aspectual shapes', the specific points of view from which intentional states represent their objects. As an element of subjectivity, an aspectual shape cannot be completely characterized from a third-person standpoint. But an unconscious intentional state consists entirely of neurophysiological phenomena, which *are* thus characterizable. The apparent contradiction is resolved in Searle's theory by specifying that an unconscious intentional state preserves its aspectual shape by being a



*possible* conscious thought. This is his 'connection principle': 'The ontology of the unconscious is strictly the ontology of a neurophysiology capable of generating the conscious' (172).

The connection principle leads to one of the book's main themes, a rejection of large parts of the cognitive science paradigm: 'If we are looking for phenomena that are intrinsically intentional but inaccessible in principle to consciousness, there is nothing there: no rule following, no mental information processing, no unconscious inferences, no mental models, no primal sketches, no 2-D images, no three-dimensional descriptions, no language of thought, no universal grammar' (228-9). All of these, Searle maintains, belong to a 'pre-Darwinian' conception of brain function which anthropomorphizes the brain in the same way that a plant's turning itself to follow the sun is anthropomorphized in terms of the plant's 'desire' to survive. The plant's behaviour is properly described, at a hardware level, in terms of secretion of the hormone auxin, and, at a functional level, as playing a role in the plant's survival. But this functional level description depends upon our interests. It is not intrinsic to the plant. Similarly, nonconscious brain processes should be described in strictly neurophysiological terms, while any functional descriptions must be considered a matter of interpretation. Searle made his case against strong AI when he used his Chinese room thought experiment to argue that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, that the mind cannot be just a program running in a digital computer. Now (ch. 9), he offers an independent argument attacking 'cognitivism', the view that the brain is a digital computer in the first place. Computational processes require a syntax, and even a syntax is not intrinsic to a physical system, but must be assigned by someone.

Of the criticisms I would make of Searle's approach, I would like to say something about how he explains the evolutionary significance of consciousness. According to Searle the biological advantage of consciousness is that it 'does all sorts of things' (107). In its different forms it is involved in hearing sounds, seeing objects and states of affairs, smelling odours, and so on. But we know that these things can go on without consciousness. Searle says that what consciousness adds to them is greater powers of discrimination and flexibility. But the traditional materialist is convinced (as is Searle) that every grade of discrimination and every measure of flexibility has its neurophysiological correlate. It is the neurophysiology that is doing all sorts of things, not any emergent property. And this is why some will continue to seek an explanation for the mind in these terms, and to critically analyze intuitions about subjectivity rather than acquiesce in them.

**Stewart Nicolson**  
York University



**Hugh J. Silverman and  
James Barry, Jr., eds.**

*Texts and Dialogues: Maurice Merleau-Ponty,*  
trans. Michael B. Smith, et al.

Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press 1992.

Pp. xxi + 232.

US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0391-03702-1).

The texts and dialogues brought together in this volume span Merleau-Ponty's philosophical career from early research proposals concerning perception that date from 1933, to three pieces that date from 1960, the year before his death: 1) an interview with Madeleine Chapsal, 2) a transcript from a conference where philosophers including Merleau-Ponty, Van Breda, Ryle, Ayer, and Quine discussed potential points of convergence and divergence between British based language analysis, on the one hand, and phenomenology on the other; 3) five notes regarding the literary work of Claude Simon that Merleau-Ponty had made for his lecturing at the Collège de France. With the exception of two pieces, the early research proposals on the topic of perception and a review of Max Scheler's 1935 book *Ressentiment*, none of the pieces in this anthology have appeared in English translation before. In the original French, the texts gathered here are for the most part not readily available.

In addition to the 1960 interview with Merleau-Ponty and the 'Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy' transcript, the *dialogues* include: excerpts from the transcript of a 1946 conference where the participants included Merleau-Ponty, Benda, Lukacs, and Jaspers, (Crisis in European Consciousness); four responses to questions from readers (on the topics of intellectual leadership, the philosopher's role, gender identity, and the 'objectivity' of liberalism) published in 1954 and 1955 in the socialist newspaper *L'Express*, where Merleau-Ponty regularly responded to such letters (*L'Express* 'Forum'); and a transcript of a discussion opened by Merleau-Ponty at a session of a meeting in 1956, of intellectuals from West and East Europe (including such well known writers as Silone, Sartre, Spender, and Ungaretti) (East-West Encounter).

In addition to the two 1933 research proposals concerning perception, and the five notes on Claude Simon, the *texts* include: four reviews by Merleau-Ponty — of Scheler's *Ressentiment* (1935), Marcel's *Being and Having* (1936), Sartre's *Imagination* (1936), and Sartre's *The Flies* (1943); a 1947 response to criticism by Communists of the international meeting in 1946 (from which part of the transcript appears in this volume as 'Crisis in European Consciousness') (Apology for International Conferences); two of Merleau-Ponty's introductions (others of which appeared in the collection of writings that Merleau-Ponty published with the title *Signes*) to sections of *Les Philosophes célèbres* — the 1956 encyclopedic collection of essays on major figures from the beginnings of philosophy up through the twentieth century that Merleau-Ponty edited — one called 'The Founders of Philosophy' and the other called



'The Discovery of History'; and the transcript of a 1959 radio broadcast of a lecture that Merleau-Ponty gave at the *Maison Canadienne* in which he described the philosophical and historical contexts in which existentialist philosophy had taken shape, specified major themes found in Marcel's work and in Sartre's work, and in effect, took his leave of the period even while acknowledging a debt to that venture in thinking and commending its written legacy to future readers.

The dialogues and the texts are followed by three appendices: 'Merleau-Ponty's Early Project Concerning Perception' by Forrest W. Williams, on the significance of the 1933 research proposals in light of Merleau-Ponty's subsequent itinerary and findings up to and including his final, unfinished work; 'Merleau-Ponty and the Husserl Archives at Louvain' by H.L. Van Breda, a detailed discussion of Merleau-Ponty's abiding interest in texts contained in the archives and of his efforts to open a Husserl Archive in Paris; 'Husserl's Concept of Nature (Merleau-Ponty's 1957-58 Lectures)', a transcription by Xavier Tilliette from notes that he took at two lectures at the Collège de France on the philosophy of Nature, where, in a study of Husserl's works on Nature, Merleau-Ponty introduced findings that were to be worked out extensively in the book that was unfinished at the time of his death and that was posthumously published as *Le Visible et L'Invisible*. The volume includes a bibliography of Merleau-Ponty's works as well as an extensive bibliography of books, book chapters, and articles on Merleau-Ponty's thought.

Both long-time students of Merleau-Ponty's work and newcomers to it can learn from glimpses and insights that these dialogues, texts, and pertinent appendices provide into Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the relation between philosophy and politics, a direction for ontology that no longer understands Being as full being (*l'être plein*), how this ontological work will inspire a politics no longer under the illusions operative in the politics of the day, how religion can be addressed philosophically, points of access to analytic philosophy from the vantage point of phenomenology, and the role of the philosopher in the contemporary world.

The volume is especially helpful for long-time students of Merleau-Ponty's work by virtue of how discussions here reinforce recognition of the persistence in Merleau-Ponty's thought of the problematic of the *Gestalt* and his continual meditation on the ultimate philosophical implications of the work of Edmund Husserl, as well as the help from a number of passages toward understanding Merleau-Ponty's points of departure for the analyses of 'reversibility' and 'the flesh,' both of which are crucial for his late work. Finally, a wider public can take an interest here in Merleau-Ponty's observations with regard to such matters as historical turning points in the relations between Eastern, and at that time Communist, Europe on the one hand, and Western Europe on the other hand, the way in which 'the abyss of modern society' — 'its misery and its greatness' — 'will become evident in everyday life,' and the situation — in this case, France's situation in world politics — of being involved in a game in which its stakes are considerable but in which it does not hold the 'high cards' — topics that occupy the world's attention today.



The editors of the volume, Hugh J. Silverman and James Barry, Jr., have aptly subtitled their Introduction, 'Philosopher at Work!' What we find in these pieces that span Merleau-Ponty's career, is a philosopher coming to terms with social and political shifts, intellectual currents, and the movements of history in the midst of which he found himself, and at the same time, with the aporias of individual existence that lie at the internal and external horizons of all this. Given, as the Introduction begins, that he was 'perhaps the most important French philosopher of the twentieth century,' we can do well to look to him as a companion in thinking through our changing times.

**Wayne J. Froman**

George Mason University

**Robert C. Solomon and  
Kathleen M. Higgins, eds.**

*The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love.*

Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1991.

Pp. xii + 522.

US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7006-0479-0);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7006-0480-4).

A feast for the intellect. The book is equally a delight for the mature scholar's philosophical reflection on a subject that interests all human beings as it is for the beginning student's use in the philosophy classroom as topical reader. Higgins and Solomon treat us to a multi-dimensional arrangement of a wide range of thoughtful readings. Half the book is outstanding primary material that sets and develops the terms for theory of love in the Western tradition, beginning with Plato's *Symposium*. In the wisdom of Solomon and Higgins the words of philosophers such as Augustine, Spinoza, Rousseau, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche are complemented by the voice of poets such as Sappho, Ovid, and Rilke. Included are a set of modern essays by psychologists Freud, Jung, and Horney, and by existentialists Sartre and De Beauvoir, along with selections from the landmark treatises on love by Andreas Capellanus, Stendhal, and De Rougemont. The correspondence of Héloïse and Abélard, a tract by Milton, fiction by D.H. Lawrence, and a remarkable letter from the Pythagorean Theano are balanced by essays by Emma Goldman, Philip Slater, and Shulamith Firestone. Love receives ample praise here, but we also receive ample caution against it. Love is the best that we may hope for and aim at, or else it is a suffering that doth make fools of us all.



While these materials make an enjoyable intellectual source book, Higgins and Solomon add a critical dimension to the anthology by reprinting recently published essays that assess the thinking of the source materials. Thus, we have Martha Nussbaum and Jerome Neu both on Plato's *Symposium*, Amélie Rorty on Spinoza, and Elizabeth Rapaport on Rousseau. These current critical reflections on foundations of Western thinking about love are then complemented by the reprinting of another half dozen essays which are original contributions on love by such contemporary philosophers as Robert Nozick, Annette Baier, and William Gass.

We could read the book from back forward as a panorama of fresh contemporary thinking, which can be related to an extensive tradition, that we then sample. Or we may read in the traditional way, moving chronologically up the ladder from the classics, ancient and modern, to their critical discussion by contemporaries, and then to the original ideas of our contemporaries. The merit of this volume is in its conception as book as much as in its contents. Solomon and Higgins assist the traditional reading with their excellent comprehensive introduction which exposes the structure of the book, their principles of selection, and paths in the history of the idea of love. Then Solomon tops it all off with a closing essay, probably the best one in the book for its lively expression, intense insight, and passionate inquiry.

Solomon makes a case for love as a virtue; this in the face of the frequent association of love with the vice of lust. He exposes the value love has us place upon subjectivity; hence, love is beyond reason and powered by emotion. Its aim is a shared identity, a full being-with the other as unique tangible person. Thereby it is a fulfilling of one's own being: the fullness of oneself as feeling, yearning subject. 'When we talk about "the real self" or "being true to ourselves," what we often mean is being true to the image of ourselves that we share with those we love most' (512). True enough. Love viewed this way is existential and a form of truth. Solomon brings to the fore the dialectical selfhood wherein those who love become more fully themselves thanks to each other.

We may add that not only is such love a virtue, as the crowning characteristic of a worthy selfhood, but it is a profound liberation, for it frees the individual to be more than what that person had been, more than what that person had dreamt upon in philosophy. Love thereby opens the mind as well as the heart: it is a knowing. Through it we better come to know one another as human beings. And we better create ourselves as human beings. Of all existential commitments, love may be the one in which we express our truest authenticity. That real self, which Solomon discussed, *becomes* with loving. A loving self might be the only self worth living.

If these notions sound romantic that is because Romanticism helped those in the West to these insights. The Higgins-Solomon book illustrates the intellectual history and the cultural context surrounding such romantic notions. That leaves the reader with troubling doubts. Is romantic love outdated and being replaced by a more mundane image? Is love itself overemphasized in the Western value placed on individuality, and should the world move away from love for the sake of more rational values, such as



justice? Is love, including romantic love, primarily a cultural pattern that shapes people, or can it be willed by individuals against the grain of their culture and the push of their times?

Highlights of other essays include Nozick's striking view of the transformation of two persons by romantic love into a new entity, a *We* (418); Gass' sad caution about the wording of love, the image-making of language; Ronald de Sousa's chilling image of the theatre of love, a mutual acting-out governed by imagination, in which we deal with the unattainable.

In a foreword bursting with cleverness, Arthur C. Danto teeters back and forth between the levels of writing, philosophizing, and loving. Danto gets it right when he credits Sappho with 'getting it right. It is not Beauty that makes things objects of love but love that makes its objects beautiful. *Whatever* one loves is the finest sight on earth ...' (x). The philosophic treatment of love in this exemplary volume should be expanded by further inclusion of aesthetics. While poetry is here, and much talk on imagination, we need to look into visualization of love in the arts as shaping how we envision love in our hearts. The movies replaced the novel as mirror for being in love. Video is moving in to replace the movies. But whatever the place of love in the arts, love has its arts, and beauty seems inseparable from loving experience. Thus, love may bring together in oneness the beauty of existence, the fullness of knowing, with the virtue of being a person. Wouldn't that be just divine?

**Robert Ginsberg**

Pennsylvania State University

**Martin Warner, ed.**

*Religion and Philosophy.*

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.

Pp. vi + 155.

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-429-51X).

*Religion and Philosophy* is a supplement volume (31) of the Royal Institute of Philosophy and contains the papers presented to the Institute Conference for VIth Form and Further Education Teachers held at the University of Warwick in 1991. The volume consists of five major presentations and critical responses to each: one devoted to issues of faith and reason, one to the moral dimension of religion and three to questions about the language and logic of religion.

Bambrough's essay on 'Reason and Faith' which opens the volume is a rather traditional treatment of a perennial issue in the philosophy of religion



in the West. Faith, Bambrough argues, does not always stand in contrast to reason for it is, in some contexts at least, a mode of rational response to the situation at hand. Faith, therefore, even though involving the adoption of beliefs on grounds that are less solid than is normally the case, does not imply the acceptance of altogether groundless beliefs. In his response to Bambrough, Roger Trigg applauds his resistance to sharp faith/reason dichotomies. Only a realist view of religious faith, Trigg continues, can prevent an identification of faith with arbitrary decision making. No argument, he admits however, can make of faith a kind of knowledge, nor exclude from it every element of uncertainty, but it can show faith as being capable of reaching beyond what is properly demonstrable.

The next three essays relate to a variety of issues of language and logic in religion. In the first Herbert McCabe sets out, on Thomistic grounds, to explore the limits of language in talking about mysticism. Though he contrasts mystical with scientific discourse, he nevertheless maintains that traditional talk about God can be sensible, so to speak, because it is possible to understand what God is not and because we can see that words can be used 'to point beyond what we can understand them to mean' (56). Cyril Barrett's response to McCabe is essentially one of support, though he comes at the question of the logic of mysticism from quite a different direction. Mystics according to Barrett are not a special breed of religious believers because all knowledge of God is fundamentally the same — a non-positive knowledge. 'It is fundamental,' he writes, 'to any philosophy of religion to realize that it must be firmly based on a logic of religious language, and that religious language is itself mystical, that is, an attempt to express the inexpressible' (69).

In 'The Meaning of God' Michael Durrant maintains that there can be no talk about God unless 'God' is somehow a description and not merely a proper name. He therefore attacks the notion of God as 'the wholly other' and insists that the notion is somehow indicative of a specific meaning and therefore is descriptive. Although Peter Geach finds Durrant's comments regarding the alleged difference between the God of philosophy and the God of the Christian believer puzzling, he is not fundamentally at odds with Durrant's claims.

Martin Warner's 'Language, Interpretation and Worship' is essentially an argument in favour of abandonment of the scientific paradigm of meaning when attempting to understand religious discourse. Adoption of the notion of creative metaphor as a model for biblical and liturgical meaning, he maintains, can account for much more than merely the supposed cognitive content of those discourses. Fundamental to the model is the absence of the notion of a literal paraphrase and an emphasis upon issues of aptness and effectiveness of the metaphor rather than on its truth or falsity. Peter Lamarque's response to Warner is positive but not without reservation. Lamarque fears that Warner's emphasis on metaphor may overlook the apparently cognitive aspects of the discourse. Lamarque proposes what he sees as an even more radical alternative approach to religious discourse that sees the literary work rather than metaphor as paradigmatic. This approach,



he argues, still involves a theological realism but not one bound by the scientific model since the divine dimension in the text can only be discerned by the eye of faith.

'Religion and Ethics' by Stewart Sutherland completes this volume. Sutherland's concern here is to explore the nature of the links between religion and morality — the two are, he argues, ultimately compatible and interdependent. Phillips Griffiths does not find himself at odds with Sutherland's conclusions but does find it necessary, if various philosophical difficulties are to be avoided, to give different reasons for them.

Though of interest in themselves, the essays in this volume do not, generally speaking, move the philosophy of religion into new realms. In the first instance, they concern themselves essentially with issues within the Christian tradition. Furthermore, with the exception of the contributions of Warner and Lamarque, the essays present pretty standard philosophical fare with little new either in terms of methods of analysis or results achieved.

**Donald Wiebe**

Trinity College

University of Toronto





# The Southern Journal of Philosophy

**Spindel Conference proceedings only \$12.00 each**

Ancient Minds - Vol. XXXI, 1992

Kant's Third *Critique* - Vol. XXX, 1991

Moral Epistemology - Vol. XXIX, 1990

Heidegger and Praxis - Vol. XXVIII, 1989

Aristotle's Ethics - Vol. XXVII, 1988

Connectionism - Vol. XXVI, 1987

B-Deduction - Vol. XXV, 1986

Moral Realism - Vol. XXIV, 1985

Recovering the Stoics - Vol. XXIII, 1984

Supervenience - Vol. XXII, 1983

Rationalist Conception of Consciousness - Vol. XXI, 1982

***Planned for 1993 is a conference on Husserl and Derrida.***

Proceedings published in the Spring following the conference.  
For more information please write to:

THE SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Philosophy

Memphis State University

Memphis, Tennessee 38152

(901) 678-2669 / FAX (901) 678-4365



**An Interdisciplinary journal of Philosophy**

Since 1958 INQUIRY's contributors have included such influential authors as A.J. Ayer, Richard B. Brandt, C.D. Broad, Donald T. Campbell, Stanley Cavell, G.A. Cohen, Donald Davidson, Hubert L. Dreyfus, Michael Dummett, Jon Elster, H.J. Eysenck, Paul K. Feysabend, J.A. Fodor, Jürgen Habermas, Alasdair MacIntyre, Stanley Rosen, John R. Searle, Herbert A. Simon, Quentin Skinner, Charles Taylor and Peter Winch.

Recent special issues have included an extensive symposium on Charles Taylor's *Sources of the Self* and a double issue (1992:3-4) devoted to technology and human value, with contributions from Albert Borgmann, Paul Dumouchel, Yaron Ezrahi, Andrew Feenberg, Don Ihde, Bruno Latour, Helen E. Longino, Pieter Tijmes, and Langdon Winner.

The 1993 volume also includes a symposium on Daniel C. Dennett's *Consciousness Explained*, with papers by Stephen Clark, John Foster, Anthony O'Hear and Roger Fellows, Michael Lockwood, William Seager, Charles Siewart, and Timothy Sprigge, together with replies by the author.

SCANDINAVIAN  
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Subscription to be ordered from: Scandinavian University Press, P.O.Box 2959 Tøyen, 0608 Oslo, Norway,  
or U.S. Office: Scandinavian University Press, 200 Meacham Ave., Elmont, NY 11003, USA.

## ORDER FORM/CARTE POSTALE



Please enter my subscription to *Inquiry*, from No. 1, 1993. ISSN 0020-174X. 4 issues per year. Postage included. Airspeeded delivery worldwide. Prepayment required.

- ☐ Private subscription, NOK 320 (outside Scandinavia), SEK 280 (in Sweden), NOK 300 (in other Nordic countries).
- ☐ Institutional subscription, NOK 660 (outside Scandinavia), SEK 565 (in Sweden), NOK 610 (in other Nordic countries).
- ☐ Please send me a free sample copy of Inquiry.

PLEASE TICK ONE BOX:

☐ Cheque enclosed ☐ Please send invoice ☐ VISA ☐ Eurocard ☐ Mastercard ☐ AmEx ☐ Diners

Card No.: \_\_\_\_\_

Exp. date: \_\_\_\_\_


*Make the cheque payable to Scandinavian University Press and staple it to your order form.*

Name/address: (Capitals)

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_





# Teaching Philosophy

Editor: Arnold Wilson

University of Cincinnati



*Teaching Philosophy* provides an open forum for the exchange and evaluation of ideas, information and materials concerned with the teaching of philosophy. Published quarterly, *Teaching Philosophy* explores experimental and interdisciplinary courses with philosophical content as well as innovative teaching methods and classroom stratagems. The journal features: articles and discussions; case studies; special topic issues; and reviews of new books, computer software, and instructional videos.

Institutional Subscription \$55

Individual Subscription \$22.50

**Send orders to: Philosophy Documentation Center  
Bowling Green State University  
Bowling Green, OH 43403-0189  
(419) 372-2419 (800) 444-2419 Fax: (419) 372-6987**



# the review of **metaphysics**

*a philosophical quarterly*

**MARCH 1993**

**VOL. XLVI, No. 3**

**ISSUE No. 183**

**\$11.00**

*articles*

**JORGE J. E. GRACIA**

**JOHN B. BROUGH**

**YOAV RINON**

**LLOYD P. GERSON**

**JACK ZUPKO**

**MATTHEW CUDDEBACK**

**AND STAFF**

*Hispanic Philosophy: Its Beginning and Golden Age*

*Husserl and the Deconstruction of Time*

*The Rhetoric of Jacques Derrida II: Phaedrus*

*Plotinus's Metaphysics: Emanation or Creation?*

*How Are Souls Related to Bodies? A Study of John Buridan*

*Summaries and Comments*

*philosophical abstracts*

*announcements*

Individual Subscriptions \$25.00

Institutional Subscriptions \$42.00

Student/Retired Subscriptions \$15.00

Jude P. Dougherty, Editor

The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. 20064



---

## Editor's Note

The anglophone editor of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews  
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

is pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

The E-mail address of CPR/RCCP is

CPRS-G@VM.UCS.UALBERTA.CA

Any institution's computing services department will be able to advise on how to access the address.

*W.E. Cooper*