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Kenneth Baynes
The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism: Kant, Rawls, and Habermas.
Albany: State University of New York Press 1992. Pp. xi + 240.
US $57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0867-1);
US $18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0868-X).

Baynes defends a constructivist account of justification in which 'there can be no higher appeal to something beyond the idea of that to which free and equal persons can rationally agree' (1). In the first three chapters, he develops individual interpretations of Kant's (non-demonstrable) Fact of Reason as the basis for criticism, Rawls' notion of reflective equilibrium, and Habermas' reconstruction of the unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation. He aims to expose this dialectic: 'For each theorist, the goal is to specify a procedure for critically assessing the legitimacy of social norms and institutions by reference to a normative conception of practical (or communicative) reason. However, with each successive theorist, ... this project is better able to withstand various criticisms and objections that have been raised against it' (8).

According to Baynes, 'Kant's aim is to specify a set of basic rights and a criterion of political legitimacy (the social contract) with reference to a notion of practical reason that cannot be reduced to instrumental reason or self-interested rationality' (13). But Kant ultimately depends 'upon an uncritical philosophy of history in which social change and revolution are attributed to the hand of providence or forces of nature' (41). Furthermore, appealing to a 'Fact of Reason' does not adequately recognize the historical origins and development of moral concepts and only begs the question against the skeptic (48).

Rawls and Habermas both avoid the 'two-world metaphysics' of Kant because it sharply opposes reason and interests, and naively assumes a 'harmony between the individual and collective rational will' (111-12). However, Rawls falls short of Habermas on a number of points.

First, Rawls retreats from 'the task of identifying the deep structure rules' of justification in his later writings, where he understands justification as a practical social task. This avoidance of philosophical argument reflects an implausible division of labor between philosophy and everyday practices (72). Second, 'Rawls allows substantive issues and historical tradition — "those constitutions that have worked so well" — to slip in surreptitiously as he slowly lifts the veil of ignorance at each successive stage. As a result, the basic rights and their priority appear as the conclusion of philosophical arguments rather than as proposals to which "we," the affected, must (in principle) all agree' (159).

However, Baynes' proposal is that we should combine Rawls' focus on the basic structure and primary goods with Habermas' insistence on the criterion of generalizable interests in a free and open discourse (151). Habermas pays

closer attention to the historical evolution of social institutions and their mutual interaction, and his sociological analysis in terms of rationalization, systems and lifeworlds has greater explanatory power than Rawls' account (163).

Yet critics have objected that Habermas' 'notion of consensus is either so exacting that there is no reason to assume any actual norm could satisfy it *or*, should a society approach that ideal to any significant degree, it could do so only at the expense of a plurality and diversity of viewpoints that is to be valued in a liberal political order' (120). Baynes replies that consensus concerns the processes of public decision making rather than the end product: 'The picture of a legitimate order implicit in Habermas' notion of a rational consensus is not that of a society that requires unanimity on every debated issue, but of a society that at a variety of levels and in different forms has institutionalized a network of overlapping and intersecting civic, political, and legal forums in which citizens collectively deliberate about and determine the basic terms of their collective life' (121). In particular, 'the formation of public opinion should take place within informal institutions or "secondary associations" that are sufficiently shielded from the colonizing effects of the capitalist economy and administrative state' (178). Furthermore, these associations should form an anonymous network outside of the formal political system, though the conclusions reached in them should have an influence in setting the agenda (179-80). This proposal remains sketchy, and Baynes does not dwell upon the social conditions that would be required to make a network of informal associations into an effective political force.

There is a hasty rejection of pragmatism in his critique of Rawls on justification. In order to avoid relativism, Baynes argues, we must emphasize principled agreement rather than historical trial and error, or the practical task of reaching a compromise. This distorts reflective equilibrium, and presupposes that we are forced to choose between principled argument and our considered judgments. Rather, reflective equilibrium claims that these considerations are compatible as inputs in a larger process of reasoning, and that they function as mutual constraints. For example, Rawls' claim that the American constitution and society are reasonably just is open to further debate because we can ask whether it really meets the principle of equal opportunity and addresses the disadvantages of the lower classes despite our embeddedness in its traditions and social meanings.

Referring to Rawls, Baynes says: 'Justification is a multifaceted and many-layered process in which beliefs are exposed to critical reflection at various levels and from a variety of perspectives' (70). His account of Habermas' informal associations is not sufficiently connected to his earlier discussion of reflective equilibrium. Perhaps Habermas' network represents a search for reflective equilibrium among persons with different needs and commitments, and improves upon Rawls' equilibrium among the different sets of beliefs of one person. Furthermore, Baynes does not sufficiently

recognize the gap between the Kantian 'validity claims' of Habermas and Habermas' more original claims about communicative networks.

Like Ian Shapiro in *Political Criticism*, Baynes provides a resourceful, lucid, and far-ranging account of liberal criticism. He also shows how Habermas might reply to critics and summarizes recent arguments that are not available elsewhere in English. However, he is too soft on Habermas and so what our lives would be like in Habermas' better world remains obscure. The interpretations of Walzer, Taylor and Rorty are too cursory and thus the case for alternatives to legitimation as what is universally agreeable is not seriously addressed.

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Rodger Beehler, David Copp and **Bela Szabados, eds.**
On the Track of Reason: Essays In Honor of Kai Nielsen.
Boulder: Westview Press 1992. Pp. xii + 230.
US $59.00 (ISBN 0-8133-8276-9).

At last political and moral philosophers have a *festschrift* of one of their noteworthy peers. In this volume the editors have, in carefully chosen essays, conspired to present the range and durability of the ideas of Kai Nielsen.

The editors provide a brief introduction to the contributors — information as desirable as it is necessary. Twelve essays follow roughly in groups of twos, threes and fours. There then appears a recent bibliography of the works of Kai Nielsen.

For the most part, readers will find this work to be engaging, covering topics such as equality and justice, socialism and global problems, ethics as it relates to reason and religion, Marxism, and finally epistemology, metaphysics and metaphilosophy.

There is a thematic connection tying together the essays of Rachels, Hurka, Miller, and Daniels. Each of these essays deals either with equality *simpliciter* or with a related matter having implications for equality. On the whole each of these is successful in what it sets out to do and each raises interesting matters: the problem of the disadvantaged child, the difference between leisure and wealth for an egalitarian, the existence of opportunity gaps in capitalist societies, and the difficulty of constructing just health insurance.

Cunningham's essay looks at broader issues than simple equality. It places this ideal in the context of socialism which in turn it places in the context of the more important democratic project (79). In a highly convincing manner, Cunningham argues that the attainment of sustainable development (see the *Brundtland Report*) will not be met simply by neutralising capitalism (86).

Adopting a neo-rationalist stance Bond takes issue with Nielsen's position regarding the limitations of rationalism in morals. In presenting what appears to be an Aristotelian view of morality, Bond intends to carry the reader beyond merely deontic morality to a morality in which social virtues flourish (105). As compelling as Bond's views are, Nielsen will not feel persuaded to give up his belief in the essential indeterminable nature of some moral questions.

Engaging Nielsen's remarks on the relationship between morality and Christianity, Penelhum explores the implications of some of the teachings of Jesus (111). With typical sensitivity Penelhum brings out the strengths and weaknesses of Nielsen's position that religion is but culture and tradition.

There then follow three essays in Marxist studies. Braybrooke presents an exegetical examination of Marx's conception of needs which break down into two groups: wants (desire needs) and primary needs (120). He argues rather successfully for an interpretation of Marx linking the ideology of capitalism to the second of these, i.e., to 'the sphere of animal needs' (123), but argues less successfully for an interpretation linking the richness of human development to the richness of needs (128). Ware for his part concentrates on Marx's idea of the phases of communism after the demise of capitalism, as this idea is found in *The Critique of the Gotha Program*. While there are no 'neatly trimmed' (137) phases according to Ware, such as they exist they would seem to be divided by the distribution principle first as based on labour and then as based on need. Nielsen would clearly resist Ware's denial that this principle when based on need fails to provide a standard of equality. Last in the trilogy of Marxist studies is the essay by Joshua Cohen which itself is a study of G.A. Cohen's technological account of historical materialism. Cohen's objective is that of understanding what remains of Marx's theory of historical evolution (155, 168). Convincingly, he argues against G.A. Cohen's belief in the likelihood of finding a theory which supports the belief in the existence of 'determinate material conditions imposing tight constraints on the social order' (156).

Martin attempts to come to grips with some of Nielsen's recent ideas in discussing his views on the realism/anti-realism controversy and on foundationalism. Some telling criticisms are raised against these views particularly those disclosing inconsistencies or ambiguities in Nielsen's thought.

The final essay is one by Hanen on contemporary metaphilosophy using Nielsen as a point of departure. She ranks Nielsen with Rorty as 'the most vocal of contemporary English-speaking philosophers attempting to transform the philosophical tradition' (193-4). After tracing the connection between Nielsen's work and that of Goodman's, she then shows similarities in

the *motifs* of Nielsen's writings and those of some feminists (e.g., Haraway, Longino, and Code). Hanen initiates suggestive ideas but underestimates the significance of Alasdair MacIntyre (196) in her discussion of metaphilosophy.

On the Track of Reason is required reading for anyone interested in the thought of Nielsen. Since virtually all the essays are well written and stimulating, the interest it will hold for those not examining Nielsen's thought will be a function of their interest in specific matters covered. The book is attractive with a fine cover portrait (by Tamara Grandmaison) of one whom most have come to know simply as Kai.

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Richard J. Bernstein
The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity / Postmodernity.
Cambridge: MIT Press 1992. Pp. 358.
US $35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-02337-7);
US $15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-262-52166-0).

The ethical and political implications of recent debates concerning modernity and postmodernity, Richard Bernstein argues in *The New Constellation*, have not been adequately thematized in the literature to date. Despite an apparent undercurrent toward normative questions in the writings of such figures as Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty, such issues have yet to receive the attention which they warrant. Bernstein points out in the ten (previously published and revised) essays which compose this book how following the direction of thought implicit in these debates eventually leads us back into confronting anew basic questions about praxis and 'how one should live.' Without attempting to reduce the thought of these and other twentieth century philosophers to a common generative principle, Bernstein undertakes to show how their thought gravitates toward related themes and demonstrates a distinctive mood which he terms 'modernity/postmodernity.' This is a mood (a *Stimmung*) which is 'amorphous, protean and shifting but which nevertheless exerts a powerful influence on the ways in which we think, act, and experience.' (11). It demonstrates a preoccupation with '"incommensurability," "otherness," "alterity," "singularity," "*différance*," "plurality,'" and is a mood of 'deconstruction, destabilization, rupture and fracture

— of resistance to all forms of *abstract* totality, universalism, and rationalism' (57).

Among the themes Bernstein develops is the issue of rationality in modernity/postmodernity. In 'the Rage Against Reason,' Bernstein addresses the question of why today reason and its derivatives so often conjure up images of violence and oppression. Tracing the modern history of the concept of reason from Condorcet through Weber, Adorno, and Heidegger, he documents how the term once associated with progress, enlightenment, and virtue came in the twentieth century to represent domination and terror. Reason for Condorcet and other Enlightenment figures had stood for faith in moral and intellectual progress and in the infinite perfectibility of human beings. In time, the fascination with technological and instrumental rationality came to represent a threat to otherness, difference, and singularity, culminating in present-day disdain (within certain circles) for all talk of 'reasoned' discourse or argument. This genre of rationality Bernstein traces back to Plato — specifically to the Plato of the eternal forms, 'the villain to whom we can trace back everything that has subsequently gone wrong with Western rationality' (49-50). There is also, however, the 'other' Plato, 'who is the great defender of the *spoken* and *written* dialogue — which is always open to novel turns and which knows no finality' (50). It is this 'other' Plato whom Bernstein characterizes as the progenitor of communicative rationality. This genre of rationality Bernstein locates at the heart of the pragmatic and hermeneutic traditions, as well as in the thought of Jürgen Habermas. In these traditions, rationality is inseparable from the dialogical process; it is marked by a willingness to listen to what is other, to risk one's beliefs and prejudices in dialogue, and to seek to learn from one's interlocutors. 'Critical engaged dialogue requires opening of oneself to the full power of what the "other" is saying. Such an opening does not entail agreement but rather the to-and-fro play of dialogue. Otherwise dialogue degenerates into the self-deceptive monologue where one never risks testing one's prejudgments' (4). Communicative rationality at once recognizes the radical alterity of the other without regarding the latter as an 'absolute other,' utterly unrelated to the I. 'We must cultivate,' Bernstein writes, 'the type of imagination where we are at once sensitive to the sameness of "the Other" with ourselves *and* the radical alterity that defies and resists reduction of "the Other" to "the Same"' (74).

The question of critique is another prominent theme in these essays. Particularly in his discussions of Foucault, Derrida, and Rorty, Bernstein inquires into the self-understanding of critique and asks in the name of what are their critical writings critical. After pointing out (with Derrida) that critical reflection always presupposes and is motivated by an affirmation of some sort (otherwise, as Habermas notes, there is 'the danger of the critical impulse consuming itself' [6-7]), Bernstein asks what it is which these philosophers are affirming, and for what reason. 'What is it that deconstruction affirms? What is Heidegger affirming when he thinks *against* humanism? What does Foucault affirm in his archaeological and

genealogical critiques?' (7). Proposing to follow the critical writings of such thinkers through to the consequences which their work seems to imply (if not expressly state), Bernstein asserts that a common ethical-political horizon informs the thought of each of these philosophers. Their writings demonstrate not only a shared moral skepticism regarding the possibility of 'grounding' our evaluative judgments in the manner of foundationalist theory, and a common commitment to warning us of the subtle dangers inherent to all talk of unity, consensus, and so on; they also share a common moral passion — one which leads 'back to the fragile, but persistent "ideal" of dialogical communicative rationality — an ideal which is more often betrayed than honored' (52). While the theme of communicative rationality is never fully thematized, for instance, in the writings of Derrida or Foucault, it is this ethical-political horizon which pervades much of their work and provides it with its critical impulse. It constitutes the moment of affirmation from which their disruptions and genealogical narratives do their critical work. The horizon of recognition, alterity, and dialogue is simultaneously presupposed and challenged by these figures, Bernstein argues.

What we are left to question, however, are the reasons why this normative standpoint is worthy of our respect. Bernstein frequently takes Derrida and Rorty in particular to task for leading us, as it were, 'out of the wilderness ... without providing us with an orientation for avoiding the abyss of nihilism that [they] so desperately want to avoid' (191). Derrida's intimation of a 'democracy to come,' he writes, runs the risk of deteriorating into a vacuous abstraction if it is not given some measure of content, some conception of the institutions and practices such an ideal would inform. We are also left to wonder why this ethical-political standpoint is any more 'warranted' than its rivals. While Bernstein notes that the very idea of providing a 'warrant' for our beliefs and evaluations has been called into question by each of these thinkers, he nonetheless maintains that such a project must not be abandoned. Abandoning foundationalism does not commit us to jettisoning all talk of normative justification and critique. We must avoid, he argues, being 'drawn into a grand Either/Or: *either* there is rational grounding of the norms of critique *or* the conviction that there is such a rational grounding is itself a self-deceptive illusion' (8). What is needed is a conception of justification and critique which neither appeals to ahistorical foundations nor reduces critical reflection to a form of arbitrary decisionism.

Bernstein is particularly critical of Rorty's strategy of appealing to 'our' historically contingent vocabulary and social practices when questions of justification and critique arise. He suggests that Rorty's historicism makes the choice of whether to adopt one vocabulary over another a matter of arbitrary preference, and criticizes what he sees as a tendency in Rorty's thought to suppose that all talk of normative criteria puts one on a slippery slope which leads to foundationalism. The latter move, Bernstein argues, diverts attention from the legitimate question of which historically contin-

gent standards ought to be employed in critical political discourse. He also argues that at times Rorty himself appears to subscribe to a version of the 'myth of the given' — that in appealing to '"our" practices, "our" tradition, the "consensus" of a particular community,' Rorty is merely replacing an 'epistemological myth of the given' with an 'historical myth of the given' (244). It is as if, as Bernstein expresses it elsewhere, 'social practices are the sort of thing that are *given*, and that all we need to do is to look and see what they are.' Such a move makes traditions, vocabularies, and social practices appear more solid and concordant than they in fact are. To speak as if there were even an historical fact of the matter regarding what constitutes our forms of solidarity and our common heritage overlooks the extent to which Western culture is today faced with a breakdown in ethical-political consensus and a plethora of conflicting practices. 'It is never clear why Rorty, who claims that there is no consensus about competing conceptions of the good life, thinks there is any more consensus about conceptions of justice or liberal democracy' (245).

Bernstein's manner of philosophizing frequently involves subverting radical oppositions and substituting what he sometimes refers to as 'both/and' arguments (a mode of thinking also exhibited in his *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism*). This is most notably reflected in his treatment of normative justification and critique, the most central themes discussed in these essays. He argues that we need not choose between fixed, ahistorical, universal principles and standards on the one hand and a localistic decisionism on the other. Even if we wish to maintain that critical reflection must always be local and specific, this does not relieve philosophers of the responsibility of identifying those historical and local standards to which an effective critique of existing practices and institutions must appeal. He is also critical of those postmodern philosophers who would set up new dichotomies — between otherness and sameness, contingency and necessity, particularity and universality — rather than think in their interstices.

The role played by theory in critical reflection and normative justification is an issue which Bernstein does not directly confront in these essays, although the line of argument he develops would make this question of central importance. Is the ethical-political horizon of communicative rationality and the rhetoric of emancipation which Bernstein traces back to Hegel and the master/slave dialectic in need of theoretical justification, or is he following Rorty in renouncing the need for theory? His discussion of the recognition/alterity theme draws upon not only the work of Rorty but of such defenders of theory as Dewey, Gadamer, Apel, and Habermas, leaving the reader to wonder on which side of the debate concerning normative theory Bernstein situates himself. Although pointing out that the rhetoric of recognition issues in a practical demand ('the *practical* demand for the achievement of reciprocity and symmetry that overcomes all forms of asymmetrical domination and bondage' [303-4]), the relation between the practical and the theoretical (an issue central to the theorists Bernstein cites) is not specifically addressed in these essays.

These reservations notwithstanding, *The New Constellation* represents a major contribution to the literature concerning modernity and postmodernity, particularly as this concerns moral and political philosophy. Bernstein is able to draw on different philosophical traditions, to interconnect the work of seemingly disparate contemporary thinkers without attempting forced reconciliations and without reducing their thought to a simplistic common denominator.

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Deryck Beyleveld
The Dialectical Necessity of Morality.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
1991. Pp. xxxviii + 523.
US $55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-04482-3);
US $22.50 (paper: ISBN 0-226-04483-1).

The Dialectical Necessity of Morality provides a careful reconstruction of Gewirth's argument for the dialectical necessity of morality, an extensive discussion of virtually all English language objections to the argument in print, and a spirited defense.

The real test is how well Beyleveld defends Gewirth's argument from the large number of objections that have been raised. One of the more forceful is that Gewirth commits the same mistake as the 17th century philosopher William Wollaston. Gewirth must rely on the intuitively implausible claim that, in Wollaston's words: '[W]hoever acts as if things are so, or not so, doth by his acts declare, that they are so, or not so; as plainly as he could by words' (106).

The dialectical necessity of morality in part means that any agent who acts contrary to Gewirth's supreme principle of morality, the principle of generic consistency (PGC), denies her status as an agent. Since she must acknowledge that she is an agent, her immoral action is logically contradictory. To establish this, Gewirth needs the Wollaston-like claim that all agents who act immorally are logically committed to the belief that they need not act morally. For only the belief that one need not act morally commits the agent to denying her status as an agent.

In his defense of this claim, Beyleveld relies too heavily on D.E. Geels formulation of the criticism (D.E. Geels, 'How To Be A Consistent Racist,' *Personalist* 52: 662-79). (This is indicative of a larger fault, that Beyleveld is too closely wedded to extant criticisms). The issue between Beyleveld and

Geels is whether a judge who acts contrary to a rule that he has declared to be universally binding has logically contradicted the rule (107). But this case isn't sufficiently general, for most agents probably haven't declared that they must follow the PGC. The real issue is whether any agent who acts contrary to the PGC has contradicted the claim that any PPA must follow the PGC. Although Beyleveld doesn't address this specific issue, a response can be reconstructed from his discussion of Geels (107):

1. Any X who acts contrary to the PGC acts as if X believes that the PGC doesn't apply.
2. For if X acts contrary to the PGC, this is evidence that X doesn't believe that the PGC applies.
3. This presupposes that X's acting contrary to the PGC implies that X believes that the PGC doesn't apply.
4. Thus anyone who acts contrary to the PGC is logically committed to believing that she need not follow the PGC.
5. And so anyone who acts contrary to the PGC has logically contradicted the view that any PPA must comply with the PGC.

This is a surprisingly bad argument. (2) is only true given a weak sense of 'evidence'. The only sense of 'implies' in (3) appropriate to this weak sense of 'evidence' and intuitively acceptable is correspondingly weak. 'Implies' cannot plausibly mean the same as 'entails' or 'presupposes,' but at most 'pragmatically implicates'. For there are plenty of possible cases (weakness of will and preferential wickedness) where the agent acts contrary to the PGC even though she believes in it. And the agent could act contrary to the PGC because she never thinks of it. (4) requires one of the stronger notions of 'implies'. Beyleveld's defense fails because it either equivocates between various meanings of 'implies' or makes an outlandish claim about what an action implies about the beliefs of an agent.

Beyleveld gives a detailed and careful defense of Gewirth's chief assertion: that all PPAs must accept the PGC on pain of logical contradiction. But the argument rests on a pair of Kant-inspired logical principles, the rule that 'ought' implies 'can'; and the principle of the hypothetical imperative, and both are in need of defense.

The argument clearly depends on 'ought' implies 'can' (57). Beyleveld says of this principle that it 'can hardly be questioned' (202). It is one thing to question the truth of the principle, another to question its logical status. For two who have questioned its logical status, see Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, '"Ought" Conversationally Implies "Can",' *The Philosophical Review* 93 (1984), 249-61; and James W. Forrester, *Why You Should* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1989), Chapter 2. If this rule is a substantive rather than a logical truth, Gewirth isn't entitled to conclude that any PPA must recognize the PGC on pain of logical inconsistency. Even more damaging, if this rule is a substantive moral principle, as Sinnott-Armstrong and

Forrester have argued, then it would undercut Gewirth's attempt to derive a moral 'ought' from nonmoral premises. Beyleveld should have acknowledged the controversy surrounding this principle and attempted to show that it is a logical truth.

Turning to the hypothetical imperative, it isn't as clear from Beyleveld's discussion that Gewirth's argument uses it, since Beyleveld doesn't notice that the argument relies on it. The hypothetical imperative holds that 'If a person wills an end and certain means are necessary to achieve that end and are within his power, then he ought to will those means' (Thomas E. Hill, 'The Hypothetical Imperative,' *Philosophical Review* 82 (1973), 429-50). Consider Gewirth's move from 'In order to achieve any purpose whatsoever by my agency, I need my freedom and well-being' to 'I ought to pursue my F&WB [freedom and well-being] proactively as necessary means to my purposes' (56-7). This move relies on the hypothetical imperative, for in essence it holds that since my freedom and well-being are necessary means to whatever end I will, I ought to will them.

The logical status of the hypothetical imperative is also debatable. It says something substantive, but if it were a logical truth, it would be trivial, a tautology. Furthermore, an agent who defies the hypothetical imperative is certainly irrational, but doesn't seem to be contradicting herself. Beyleveld should have noticed its use and defended its logical status.

Despite these shortcomings, *The Dialectical Necessity of Morality* is arguably the best defense of Gewirth's argument to date.

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Walter Brand
Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992.
Pp. 136.
US $75.00. ISBN 0-7923-1415-8.

Brand's subtitle is 'A Study in the Unity of *A Treatise of Human Nature*' and, appropriately, his own work expresses one unified argument. He shows how Hume isolated and emphasized two human tendencies (Brand will call these Principles) that extend or go beyond the given and offers a cogent hypothesis as to *why* we do this.

Part One of Brand's book is a discussion of 'Hume's Analysis of Reason' and it is here that the basic principles with which he will work (Brand, that is) are developed, and applied to mathematics, property, general rules, and

the inherent conflict between rules. Part Two, 'Hume's Analysis of Sympathy' further applies the structures developed in One to justify and explain Hume's concepts of moral judgment, the indirect passions, the impartial point of view and judgments of character.

Brand calls one of his principles Imaginative Supplementation and the other, The Regulative Rules of the Understanding. The former is often characterized as 'inertial', as a tendency of the imagination when once started in some way to continue on beyond the data which constituted its origin or base. The latter involves the reflective recognition that some of these inertial projections have gone too far or have projected irrelevant items coupled with iterated corrections of these mistakes. But these two principles produce an irresoluble conflict or, at best, an endless dialogue. That is, as Hume says and Brand emphasizes, it is decidedly *not* the case that our initial tendency to go too far (Principle I) is or should be *permanently* corrected by reasonable reflection (Principle II). For were these repeated corrections to occur there would finally be no refuge from a paralyzing scepticism with respect to our knowledge of the external world; our intuition respecting justice (as grounded in property) would lose its authority; and our capacity to make moral judgments would collapse when entirely bereft of non-reasonable extensions of sympathy. It is the obstinate survival of Imaginative Supplementation which finally prevents these three disasters from happening.

Brand's presentation is strengthened by his demonstration that, in Hume's works, it is one and the same motivation or human need which gives birth to and which sustains both of these fundamental principles. That is, we have *one mental force giving rise to two opposed principles*. The 'force' is generated by the need to avoid contradictory ideas and feelings; it is driven to *impose* coherence and stability upon our worlds of things, events and persons.

Brand first illustrates this thesis about Hume in his discussion of the Standard of Equality: '... the imagination provides for what is lacking, supplementing, as it were, the series of progressively accurate judgments by supposing a perfect standard of equality...' (26). This is followed (27-37) by a discussion linking our causal reasoning to this supplementation by the imagination. Here the operation of Principle I (imaginative supplementation) is to extend our experience of regularities to a coherent external world of independent and continuing objects. 'Hume will argue that in order to preserve our causal rules, in order to retain the same "dependence and connexion" which we have experienced, it is necessary to suppose that objects have a continued existence when unperceived. This supposition is not the outgrowth of causal inference but something which guarantees the causal inference itself...' (29).

The close analysis of 'imaginative supplementation' in this fourth section of Chapter One, which deals with causality and 'objects', is not only one of the most interesting parts of Brand's book, but one which would not easily have been guessed at from its title. Instead of *another* book on moral judgment (who needs it?), the work is in fact a sustained demonstration of

how the concepts of mathematical equality, of perceptual coherence (stable objects and causal orders), and of justice, as well as of moral judgments, are all generated, corrected, refined and sustained by the action and interaction of the two principles.

In the particular instance of moral judgments, Brand shows (how *Hume* showed) that the action of sympathy initiates our having any concern for others. Then, since obviously we sympathize more with persons close to us than with others who are remote, 'it will be shown that Hume's theory of moral judgment involves adopting a reflective viewpoint from which an impartial spectator considers the moral scene according to general rules' (93). And the motivation or need to do this, to make this move, '... is to overcome the contradictions that result within a system of morality where everyone's loves and hatreds count as the standard of morality... The movement toward an impartial and interpersonal system of moral sentiments is explained by the 'uneasiness' the mind feels when confronted with conflict and contradiction' (120). This corrective use of Principle II is what creates a stable, albeit artificial, viewpoint or location — the impartial one. But this artificial impartiality does not entirely abandon the vivacity of sympathy. 'Hume thinks that the *only* point of view from which contradictions can be overcome and agreement reached, is from the consideration of qualities or character that tend to benefit or harm the individuals that are immediately related to the person who has them' (121). By this means and with the collaboration (again) of sympathy, we have *feelings* for these other persons whom we do *not* know, feelings which are enlivened so that they are *as if* the affected persons were close to us.

Finally, in the discussion of Hume's concept of character, Brand again makes use of the stimulus we experience from incongruence and instability as the explanation for our extending dispositional traits (say, courage) to persons who have not been in a position to exercise the trait. 'In the evaluation of character, the issue ... is between stability and instability' (123). 'To establish a moral system on the basis of whether fortune allows persons to exercise their dispositions would ... generate contradictions... Hume has it that we actually sympathize with the pains and pleasures we do not believe exist...' (131). So again we believe what is unreasonable in order to sustain coherent systems of beliefs.

All of Brand's book is further commended for its clarity, its brevity and its telling use of examples from Hume's texts, examples which have not before been so carefully explained and embedded in the on-going Humean argument.

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John W. Burbidge
Hegel on Logic and Religion.
Albany: SUNY 1992. Pp. 184.
US $44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1017-X);
US $14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1018-8).

The present essays highlight the necessity of contingency in Hegel's logic (Preface, 39ff). The author holds that Hegel bridges Lessing's gap between necessary truths of reason and accidental truths of history (6-7); necessary truth is particularized and sometimes even reversed by accidental truth. He opposes both neoplatonic interpretation by which the logic approaches the contemplation of eternity above the accidents of history (35) and panlogist interpretation by which pure thought constructs necessary truth into which empirical history dissolves. The concept rather reconstructs contingent history (69).

The contingent becomes necessary, inalterable in general. But what is generally inalterable alters itself in particular by the novelty of continuing history. Burbidge is right that the necessity of contingency — the open determinability of the determinate present — is central to Hegel. The necessity of contingent continuations essentially marks history. Yet reservations apply to Burbidge's view that the contingent developments might reverse (6) rather than particularize the general sense of the present. An achieved determination of history can be reversed, but the dialectic is then interrupted, not continued.

The first essay — on being, nothing, and becoming — argues for a 'valid' movement of thought from one concept to an 'implied' next concept. Certainly if the absolute is mere indeterminate being, by implication it is nothing, for to be is not merely to be but to be determinately. And if the absolute is nothing, by implication it is assumed in the context to be mere indeterminate being. The alternation between these two-way implications is becoming. His defense of logical implication in the *Logic*, however, rightly denies that everything is deducible. The determinability of being is deducible, but the *contingent* determinations it in fact has are not.

The second essay contrasts the dialectic of the logic of being and that of the dialectic of essence: transition and reflection. In the transition from being to nothing, nothing is implicitly posited with being, but being does not explicitly posit non-being. In the logic of essence, identity immediately illuminates difference in a reflected light. But identity posits difference in general; it externally presupposes difference in particular as *contingent* relative to it.

The third essay concerns the *understanding* as the thought's faculty for abstracting, separating, and fixing in mind. Burbidge argues that negation of the negation leads to the understanding's absolutization of a more comprehensive but still abstract definition of the absolute. The abstractness of this new definition means that something else, which is *contingent* relative to the given definition, is left out, so that no definitional concept of the absolute is complete. Burbidge sides here with a left-wing interpretation of Hegel.

On the late Schelling, Burbidge argues that philosophical comprehension for Hegel is the self-reflection of what *contingently* is and has been. Any ability to foretell what the future necessarily will be is forsaken. In an essay on rationalism and empiricism, he argues that Hegel's rationalism reconciles itself with an empirical acceptance of *contingent* fact.

On time, Burbidge denies that Hegel is either a Platonist or an historicist. The philosophical concept is the fruition of time, time recollecting itself in thought beyond the temporal process. But each such self-recollection is eroded by the further *contingent* passage of time.

In 'The Inequity of Equality' Burbidge finds individuals represented politically only as their abstract freedom becomes concrete in *contingencies* of birth and profession. Yet he might have added that this only *qualifies* but does not deny Hegel's view that history results in equality, the freedom of *all*.

In an essay on unhappy consciousness Burbidge convinces us that the contingent being's experience of alienation from the infinite in the *Phenomenology* does not refer to medieval Christianity alone, but to a more universal structure of self-consciousness. This points to a conclusion of the whole book — absolute knowledge is only *contingently* 'Christian.'

In an essay on the theological import of death in Christianity, the incarnation is seen as the self-limitation of God in a *contingent* individual and, eventually, community. Writing on 'the syllogisms of revealed religion,' Burbidge explores how Christianity is brought within the contingent limits of logic and reason viewed as essentially malleable.

In his final essay Burbidge holds Hegel was sincerely Christian, but that whether Hegelianism is Christian can never be definitely decided. Some atrocities — holocausts — so differ in kind from the ordinary ones of the past as to preclude our reconciliation with the world (150). Burbidge follows here his teacher, Emil Fackenheim. But he does not give a criterion for deciding when atrocities such as Spanish genocide in America — known to the Enlightenment and reconciled by Hegel with the descent of the kingdom — so increase in magnitude as to become holocausts. Yet elsewhere Burbidge allows for a reconciling rose in the cross of even twentieth century holocausts. Still he claims that *contingent* future developments are so unpredictable that reconciliation might come to bear the label of Islam more than Christianity (151). This reasoning could be stronger, since it concerns labels more than substance, and discounts Hegel's commitment — with Lessing in *Nathan the Wise* — to a Gnostic invisible church.

Burbidge, author of *On Hegel's Logic* (1981), presents these essays to develop and sometimes correct this first book. In his careful hands the 'necessity of contingency' is not dialectical wordplay, but a demonstration of the deep historicity of the dialectic. Yet the subtitle ('The Reasonableness of Christianity') might more accurately have read: 'The Contingent Reasonableness of Christianity' to distinguish the book from traditional apologetics.

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Leslie Burkholder, ed.
Philosophy and the Computer.
Boulder: Westview Press 1992. Pp. xi + 268.
US $59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-7994-6).

This collection consists mostly of papers presented at the Computing and Philosophy Association's 1989 annual conference and aims to show the influence of computers in philosophy. Its contributors, from places great and small, practice mathematics, computer science, philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and law.

The sixteen papers are organized into four roughly equal parts: (1) Epistemology and the Philosophy of Language, (2) Philosophy of Mind, (3) Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics, and (4) Computer-Assisted Instruction.

In Part 1 Herbert Simon considers how thinking computers might advance epistemology in 'The Computer as a Laboratory for Epistemology'. With access to their internal workings, 'we can inspect directly the programs that produced the speech and the representations that are held of the environment' (6). Simon regards such access as providing insight into analyticity, synonymity, the mind-body problem, and even Grue. Too bad there aren't any thinking computers. Christopher Thorton's 'The Structure of Extensions' builds on Wittgenstein's problems with ostensive definitions and argues that 'references to "the extension" of a term or concept are inherently ambiguous' (24) because 'concepts typically have extensions at various levels of abstraction' (33). J.L. McClelland, M. St John, and R. Taraban in 'Sentence Comprehension: A Parallel Distributed Processing Approach' reject the view that language comprehension is understood by means of the construction of an internal set of propositional representations with a syntax and semantics. They opt instead for a PDP model which does not require 'information displayed in structured form in the representation itself' (41). H.E. Hendry and J.F. Hanna treat us in 'An Automatic Parser and Translator' to a program which parses and translates a fragment of English, one which, alas, 'contains sentences that are only marginally grammatical; e.g., "everything who is tall jogs"' (60). Thus it generates and analyzes yet more of the constipated strangled English condemned to symbolization at the hands of intern logic students.

Part 2 opens with S.C. Shapiro and W.J. Rapaport, 'A Fully Intensional Propositional Semantic Framework', who summarize the barest fundamentals of their SNePS (Semantic Network Processing System) which is used to 'represent a mind's model of the world' and indeed 'to *be* a cognitive agent itself' (76). E. Dietrich and C. Fields labour to make Fodor's modularity thesis compatible with computationalism in 'The Wanton Module and the Frame Problem' by building into cognition a continually humming background 'wanton inference processor' which plays around anarchically with analogies and so offers us that creative touch otherwise lost to computationalism. John Haugeland closes Part 2 with 'Representational Genera', an imaginative

thought-provoking study of major categories of representation in linguistic, iconic and distributed forms. Haugeland argues controversially that what distinguishes such genera are not the different 'representing relations' which link representations and their contents but the contents themselves.

Part 3 addresses more fully issues about the direct application of computers in practical contexts; e.g., mathematical proof and philosophical pedagogy. In 'Algorithmics: A New Paradigm for Mathematics' Newcomb Greenleaf considers the major changes in mathematical thinking about the status of algorithms and computing expressed in the new Kuhnian 'algorithmic paradigm' (195) the central tenets of which are that 'all proofs should be regarded as algorithms and all functions should be given by algorithms' (196). In 'Some Problems in the Computational Representation of Inference', T.A. Ager asks whether proof-checkers have 'theoretical interest ... whether they can contribute to understanding inference as such' (184) and concludes that computational representations of inference in interactive proofcheckers do illuminate 'the engines of rationality' (194). More directly applicable still are the work of W. Sieg and R. Scheines ('Searching for Proofs in Sentential Logic') and J. Barwise and J. Etchemendy ('Visual Information and Valid Reasoning'). Sieg and Scheines outline an interesting theorem prover the operation of which is a 'direct heuristically guided search'. Their aim is to revive the age-old project to describe the Laws of Thought and so indicate how a program theorem prover can reflect techniques of human thinking. The pedagogical motivation is to realize a computerized proof *tutor* which can relate proof techniques plausibly to students. More adventurous still is the project of Barwise and Etchemendy to develop a 'theory of heterogeneous inference' (161), one which accommodates on equal footing linguistic and visual representation in inference. The computer allows one to manipulate visual representations and so makes practical the pursuit of a study of inference not strictly confined to linguistic representation. What Frege did for the latter, Barwise and Etchemendy hope to do for reasoning using visual information.

Part 4 contains five short descriptions of various actual applications. M.J. Croy and J. Amidon describe interface improvements to their proofchecker and inference rule drill programs DEEP THOUGHT and JUSTIFIED THOUGHT, M. Bedau and J. Moor outline the versatile features of PROOF DESIGNER, and F.D. Portoraro displays the feature of SYMLOG allowing the construction and investigation of small finite models. More unconventional is DIALOGUE by D. Barker and S. Scott which helps students to understand the *Euthyphro* by prompting the user to follow and respond to the arguments as they unfold in the dialogue. Finally, P. Mostert, T. van Willigenburg, and F. Fernhout report on their HYPERSPACE program aimed at 'training students in ethical decision making' (254). The program uses the case-based approach and searches moral space to locate the moral problem under consideration in the context of 'our knowledge of clear cases' (253). If you're good at assigning numbers to moral states, properties, and virtues, you'll like this one. The papers in Part 4, I'm sure, were parts of live demonstrations.

I found this collection very uneven and far too eclectic. Some papers were just progress reports, some stifled by their own self-important jargon, some fat with confidence and light on intellectual humility. The computer connection in a number of cases was contrived. And without demo disks (which could and should have been attached), the Part 4 papers are as distant from the immediacy of computer *use* as the description of a recital is from sound itself. Still, there are some fine pieces here and some interesting news about pedagogical developments.

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David Cockburn, ed.
Human Beings.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991.
Pp. iv + 277.
US $22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-42245-0).

This stimulating series of encounters pushes the limits of the joint concern in directions you might not anticipate. In the opening skirmish Cherry and Hanfling draw opposing conclusions from Wittgensteinian premises. For Cherry our awareness of the properties of animateness, sentience, *and their contraries* in others is unmediated by criteria. Hence, however closely machines may eventually resemble persons in their *behaviour*, their distinctness is uneliminable. For Hanfling 'our language games of relations with other people' are neither based on, nor refutable by, evidence. Hence what distinguishes person from non-person is not some fact about origin or internal composition that differentiates organisms from artifacts.

For Diamond, in the next encounter, to acknowledge someone as a fellow human is not even to recognise some distinctive property. It involves instead a 'sense of mystery surrounding our lives, the feeling of solidarity in mysterious origin and uncertain fate.' Only thus, she believes, can we account for the moral concern that we may have, given sufficient imaginative understanding, for the severely retarded *despite, indeed because of,* their lack of salient human properties. (Pro-lifers, likewise, take heart!) For that purpose, MacNaughton responds, it would be enough to demote the role of universally applicable rules, instead of properties, in moral assessment. Ultimately, he holds, moral concern is based on comparisons between particular cases. He also suggests, albeit tentatively, that Diamond's appeal to a common mysterious origin, etc., provides a justification in terms of shared properties after all.

Are persons essentially a species of animal? That they are seems assumed by Cherry, and arguably also by Diamond. Lowe and Snowdon dissent. Lowe appeals in part to zoologically appropriate criteria for membership of an animal species. But he also posits more bluntly that '[t]here seems to be no good reason, either *a priori* or *a posteriori*, to suppose ... psychological capacities ... could not in principle be associated with an inorganic body.' Thereafter he develops a Strawsonian one-substance two-property account of persons. Snowdon defends the thesis that transplants of functioning brains are a metaphysical possibility. On that basis he accepts that the person as such is not an animal, given that the brain has the function of sustaining a person, and that the total system in which it might be rehoused as a functioning part need not be an animal at all. But if my total system includes a prosthesis does that preclude me from being an animal?

If persons in essence are not some species of animal, are they even some kind of object? Not, according to Madell, from a first-person perspective. Whereas the necessity-of-origin hypothesis is valid (he posits) for objects, that this experience is mine leaves open what my previous experiences have been. Furthermore, that the experience is mine is not determined by its character and content. Hence, he insists, the enigma of personal identity lies as much in the first/third-person as in the mind/body dichotomy.

Hertzberg disputes these claims at a somewhat general level, taking as his cue Madden's reliance on what can and what cannot be imagined. With reference to Wilkes' recent critique of philosophers' thought experiments, he argues that neither she nor Madden allow that what we mean in saying that something is imaginable may vary from context to context. Thereafter he claims that, while what we thus *mean* may require philosophical clarification, it is not for philosophy to decide whether what we *say* is correct, for to 'the extent to which there is a change in the conditions in which we use our expressions, then obviously the life we live with our language will no longer be the same.'

Gaita concentrates on method too, viz. Descartes'. He claims that the 'interrelated concepts of a consideration, of a reason, of an argument, of a proof, of a conclusion — all seem too idle when applied to the sceptical professions of the First Meditation.' Hence to the detriment of the latter he draws a distinction between a sincere and a serious profession of scepticism.

Back now to ontology. Heidegger has denounced Descartes' separation of the subject from the world as deriving from the Christian notion of a transcendent God. Yet, according to Kerr, to overcome that separation he appropriates, naturalizes and develops the incarnational aspects of Christian theology. Haldane in response seeks to show how an accommodation of central Christian doctrines within metaphysics may provide grounds for an 'incarnational anthropology'. He employs an 'aspect-involving' form of predication to remove apparent contradictions from the God/man dichotomy pertaining to Christ. For humans, he suggests, there could be a similar reconciliation between a present immanence and the prospect of a future transcendence. One might object that typically aspect-involving predication avoids contradiction by being extrinsic and relational, whereas 'God' and

'man' function as sortal, or at least intrinsic. But further devices adduced by Haldane indicate that he models his dichotomies on the caterpillar/butterfly sort of relation.

The final three papers deal with the notion of the self. For Clark in cases of so-called 'multiple personality' there is really but the one subject or self which functions as a sort of light which may dwell fitfully on different memory-chains. This self has the possibility of a hierarchical structure that would consist in its ultimate level of a non-polar awareness in which the subject/object distinction collapses. Wilkes' contribution here is somewhat eclipsed by her adversarial capacity in several of the preceding papers. Now she argues that we have as yet no reason to suppose that 'self' is preferable to 'person' as an *analysandum* or useful as an *analysans*. But contrariwise for Dilman the self functions as 'what a person is asking for when he asks "who am I?".' With Sartre he holds that there is no objective answer to this question, and more specifically that 'there are *internal connections* between my conception of the significance things have for me *and* the self to which I come.' Convincingly, however, he rejects Sartre's further claim that there is a nothingness inherent in human existence from which no one can escape.

To allow to these various voices enough antiphonal throat, my own intervention has been slight. However, no further comment could deny to this collection its excellence as, say, a possible focus for a well-rounded course on the subjects it covers.

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Pascal Engel
The Norm of Truth: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic, trans Pascal Engel and Miriam Kochan.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1991.
Pp. xii + 380.
Cdn $55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-2775-X);
Cdn $24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-6891-X).

Make no mistake: in spite of its subtitle advertising it as 'An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic', this book is not for the uninitiated. Even those with a background in both logic and the philosophy of language will find *The Norm of Truth* slow going. (You might like to look, for example, for the sentence of 108 words on p. 91.) In what sense, then, is the book 'an introduction'? Only in the sense that sometimes Engel alludes to problems without pursuing

them to completion or conclusion (see e.g., p. 270 or 281). The book takes its title from a sentence on p. 313: '... logic is a theory of the norm of truth.'

In the 'Introduction', Engel explains that this book is explicitly not intended to be comprehensive and certainly is not developed around a central theme: 'I have tried to deal with the various [selected] problems in a relatively autonomous way, in order to allow a separate reading of each chapter' (11, gloss added). In short, the book may be regarded as a collection of papers on various topics in the philosophy of logic. (Earlier [7] Engel explains his disapprobation of the term 'philosophical logic'.) Despite the claim that the essays are relatively self-contained, there is a great deal of 'previewing' in the earlier ones, and substantial cross-referencing throughout.

Engel's 'Conclusion' (321-3), is far more useful if read as a Preface. In his summing-up, Engel most clearly expresses the *philosophical* thrust of the book: 'logic ... does not commit us to any particular ontology, because it does not describe a world, but only prescribes the most general conditions for such a description. ... In this sense it is formal. I have held that the "formal contents" of logic rest on an ontology that is only minimal. By "minimal" I do not mean that the ontological commitments of logic are those prescribed by extreme nominalists ..., but rather that logic is neutral with respect to a number of ontological issues. Thus a theory of truth, as it is formulated through a Tarskian conception, is "modest" and "non-substantial". In modal logic, the "essentialism" that is prescribed by logical semantics is minimal too, and "possible worlds" are not genuine parts of the world. The logical theory of identity only states the constraints of the individuation of substances' (321).

Chapter 1 examines propositions, their (presumed) roles — as truth-value bearers, as the linguistic meanings of sentences, as the content of what is said, and as the content of certain psychological states — and their possible ontological character — as (linguistic) symbols, as abstract entities (including the possibility of being collections of possible worlds), and as collections of objects or properties in the world (facts, states of affairs, etc.). Arguing that it is impossible to individuate propositions to the degree needed to preserve many of our pretheoretical distinctions, Engel opts for a Quinean analysis of sentences as truth-bearers. But he does allow propositions a 'heuristic' value (34).

Already in Chapter 1, we find an early instance of what turns out to be one of the most pervasive puzzles in Engel's style. On p. 29, he explains and illustrates the *type / token* distinction; but on the facing page, he offers neither explanation nor illustration in his invoking of the concept of a 'partial sub-model'. One can only wonder what sort of audience Engel imagines he is writing for, one for whom he frequently pauses to explain relatively familiar and simple concepts while plowing on through relatively unfamiliar ones.

In the midst of Chapter 2, 'The meaning of propositional connectives', Engel examines Johnson-Laird's theory of 'natural' reasoning. Here the claim is (51) that — using Carnap's and Bar-Hillel's method of calculating 'information content' — the inference '*A*; therefore *A* or *B*' is improbable in ordinary reasoning because the conclusion has less information content (0.25) than the premise (0.50). This example is then contrasted with the more 'natural'

inference, 'If p or q, then r; p; therefore r'. The numerical values are not given; but if one calculates them, one finds that this latter inference is no better than the former, for the information content of the premise *set* is 0.75, while that of the conclusion is only 0.50. Indeed, this is just what we ought to expect, given that it is virtually universally conceded that deductively valid inferences are non-ampliative. Although Engel finds quite different fault with Johnson-Laird's suggestion, he seems not to have seen this one.

Chapters 3 and 4 deal with quantification theory. In 3, 'Subject and Predicate', Engel defends a Fregean view against Sommers' 'naturalistic' account of subjects and predicates.

Chapters 5 and 6 (Part 2) concern truth and meaning, and examine the theories, especially, of Tarski, Davidson, and Dummett.

Chapters 7 through 10 (Part 3 'Limits of Extensionality') concern (respectively) modalities, possibles and essences; reference and propositional attitudes; identity; and vagueness.

Finally, chapters 11 through 13 (Part 4 'The Domain of Logic') are given over to: the province of logic; logical necessity; and logic and rationality.

Throughout one finds all the expected writers visited: (in addition to those already mentioned) Kripke, Leibniz, D. Lewis, Mill, Prior, Putnam, Quine, Russell, Wittgenstein, etc. In each case, Engel has something interesting and probing to say.

On the production side, there are a very great number of typos in this book; fortunately most (although not quite all) are fairly obvious and do not prevent understanding of the author's intent. The (Subject) Index is novel and dual purpose: it is in fact a Glossary with references to the text. The Name Index is inexplicably selective. Although Engel cites and discusses, for example, the work of both Rips (298) and Wason (300-2, 311, 315), neither researcher is listed in the Names Index. The Bibliography, in contrast, is excellent and provides a valuable list of many important recent and historical writings in the field.

Overall, the book — notwithstanding certain flaws — is first rate. Anyone interested in the philosophy of logic should want to read this volume. It goes without saying that every university library should own a copy.

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Rod L. Evans and **Irwin M. Berent**
Drug Legalization: For and Against.
La Salle: Open Court Press
US $28.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9183-0);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9184-9).

This is an excellent collection of excerpts and essays. In conformity with the subtitle of the book — and the series it initiates — contributions are grouped (roughly) into 'legalization' and continued 'criminalization'. In tension with that conformity, however, the editors are quick to assert their 'conviction that the legalization debate is not neatly divided into only two sides,' and that 'the essays in this book were selected for their capacity to represent the delicate shadings and nuances of the various positions.' (Mark H. Moore, Todd Austin Brenner, Taylor Branch, Arnold S. Trebach) (2). This anthology includes some classics: the correspondence between Milton Friedman and William J. Bennett, and an excerpt from Ethan A. Nadelmann's influential article in *Science* (1989). The slate of contributors is diverse; although many are academics, the works of columnists, public officials, and physicians are included. Each of the eleven chapters is briefly introduced; each contribution is synopsized. I found the synopses essentially accurate, and helpful.

This anthology would serve well in an undergraduate course in philosophy of law, philosophy and public policy, or in a course in political science. It would also serve well as an introduction to the issues at the graduate level.

The arguments of the individual articles, like the characters in a Clint Eastwood classic, include the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.

The Bad arguments are those which assert, or presuppose, implausible (or demonstrably mistaken) causal networks. Some pieces are permeated with failures to distinguish the effects of the use of various psychoactives themselves, from the consequences of their use in a regime where that use is a criminal offense. Especially exasperating are predictions of increased drug use upon legalization which envision the continuation of the deleterious consequences that arise from *criminalization* rather than use itself: acquisitive crime, violent territoriality, uncertain purity and potency, etc. Correlative fallacies about the future use of legalized drugs are to be found in the predictions themselves. It is a mistake to simply extrapolate from current use trends, for that presupposes that no one is deterred by extant criminal statutes (Hodding Carter). It is also a mistake to simply predict that use would skyrocket, for that presupposes that *only* the criminal prohibitions — and not health concerns, religious convictions, peer and parental pressure — serve as a deterrent (Edward J. Tully and Marguerite A. Bennett).

The Good arguments try to sort out the complex causal networks, and offer genuine arguments for predictions about use upon decriminalization. It is possible for a person to have a $400/day cocaine habit; it is not possible for a person to have a $400/day muscatel habit. Why not — and what follows from this about crime, violence, corruption, etc.? (Nadelmann).

The Ugliest 'argument' leads to James Q. Wilson's claim that 'Tobacco shortens one's life, cocaine debases it. Nicotine alters one's habits, cocaine alters one's soul' (40). Surely the more apt comparison would have been with ethanol, not nicotine; it is most implausible to claim that the life of the alcoholic is less debased, or the soul less altered.

It is a virtue of this collection that each individual speaks in his or her own voice. It is a vice that there is no *assessment* of the individual arguments, or structuring of the controversy. As presented, the arguments have the format of parallel grocery shopping lists: here's an argument for legalization, and here's another argument, and here's yet another argument. And then we have this argument for continued criminalization, and this one, and this one, too. But it just isn't the case that the arguments are of equal merit, or of equal weight, or stand unrefuted. Some are fallacious, and some are deeply confused. Perhaps this assessment is best left to the reader. It would have been of help, I believe, to extract the central issues, to distinguish the essential empirical from the essential evaluative issues, and to sketch the positions of each of the contributors on each of these.

Three themes emerge from a reading of the entire anthology.

The first is the perniciousness of the metaphor 'war on drugs' (which, according to Wilson, dates from at least 1972). If one accepts this metaphor, if one makes one's case in its terms, then every proposal for a change in policy can be cast as a retreat, or capitulation, or surrender. The dispassionate assessment of extant policies, and the serious consideration of policy revisions, is thereby made more difficult — or perhaps impossible. It is most unfortunate that the rhetorical high ground has been ceded to the proponents of one particular position.

Second: no consistent criterion of criminalization has been invoked, or could be devised, that would yield the existing arrangement: alcohol and nicotine perfectly legal; marijuana and opium seriously felonious. Even those who favor continued criminalization of currently illegal psychoactives concede that nicotine and alcohol constitute far more serious a public health problem than the illegals. Is it not deeply ironic that one is legally free to become a nicotine addict by inhalation, but cannot free oneself of that addiction by transdermal absorption ('the patch') without a doctor's prescription?

Mark H. Moore addresses the more general issue. Having noted that marijuana, LSD and cocaine are 'Schedule I' drugs, the most stringently controlled, he acknowledges some 'weaknesses' of the categorization. 'First, neither alcohol nor tobacco — two of the most widely used and abused drugs in the society — are included within its scope. Second, the schedules do not give weight to the recreational use of drugs — regardless of how harmless they might be.... Third, the methods used to estimate the abuse potential of drugs are flawed, and government decisions are often influenced by commercial manufacturers....' Moore concludes: 'Still, despite its weaknesses, this statute is an honest piece of legislation that ... expresses our society's deep concerns about the potential hazards of psychoactive drugs...' (138). One wonders — what *could* render legislation 'dishonest'?

Third, it is clear that the contributors subscribe to widely divergent conceptions of the ideal society. Some seem to hold that 'no use is good use,' that the lower the incidence of psychoactive ingestion, the better the society. The optimal legal arrangement is that which reduces use. Others believe that psychoactives are a mixed blessing — with emphasis on both terms. Drugs have medical value and recreational value, as well as the potential for debilitation and destruction. The optimal legal arrangement is that which permits use, but discourages abuse (acknowledging all the while the difficulties of precisely drawing that distinction). Yet others focus on the negative consequences of both drug use, and drug laws. For them, the morally superior society is the one in which the 'evils' of drugs are visited on those who choose to use, and not on fellow citizens. The optimal legal arrangement would distribute the burdens accordingly; existing arrangements do not.

Like the contributors to this volume, individual citizens subscribe to widely divergent conceptions of the ideal society. Is it better to have methadone addicts than heroin addicts? If the use of psychoactives were to increase upon legalization, would that mean that society had become morally worse, or that people were living more pleasurable, less painful lives? Do people have a *right* to psychoactives (Brenner, Szasz)? In light of such diverse ideals, it cannot be a surprise that there is no agreement on public policy; there is no consensus on the objectives that that policy ought to secure.

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Peter A. French, Jeffrey Nesteruk, David T. Risser, with **John Abbarno**
Corporations in the Moral Community.
Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1992.
Pp. xii + 176.
US $16.50 (paper: ISBN 0-03-030782-1).

The authors of this textbook argue that the corporation is itself a moral actor and should be treated as a full-fledged member of the moral community. This position is implicit even in the first chapter, which is about an imaginary company, Liberty Oil, and the discussions among its personnel of ethical issues: an oil spill off California, when one of its tankers runs aground; plant closings; and several others. Fictitious but plausible, these discussions are a useful starting point for the analysis of individual and corporate moral responsibility in later chapters.

The second chapter outlines the authors' argument for regarding corporations as moral actors. Basic to the argument is the concept of a corporation's internal decision structure:

> Every corporation has an established way in which it makes decisions and converts them into action. We call this the corporation's internal decision structure (CID structure).... the CID structure licenses the descriptive transformation of events, seen under another aspect as the acts of human beings ... into corporate acts, by exposing the corporate character of those events. A functioning CID structure *incorporates* acts of human persons (17).

If the president of Liberty Oil signs a plant closing order, this can be understood as an action of the president in which the president signs a certain document; but because the president occupies a certain place in the CID structure and because the signing follows legitimate rules and is in accordance with policy, this physical action may also be described as a *corporate act*. Such an act is done for corporate reasons and has the character of intentionality:

> We can describe events in terms of physical movements of human beings and in terms of the reasons those persons have for their actions. Moreover, using a CID structure of a particular company, we can describe those same events as corporate actions done for corporate reasons. When we are able to do so, we have intentional corporate action and grounds for including corporations among the subjects of moral judgments, and so as members of the moral community (18).

This is only the barest outline of one argument for including corporations within the moral community. Not everyone may be convinced by the argument, but the authors certainly challenge those who think that it is possible to attribute moral responsibility only to natural persons.

The next chapter looks at legal issues from the standpoint of managers; however, late in the chapter the discussion is expanded to include issues that are ethical. The authors stress that conflicting legal roles create ethical dilemmas for managers. For example, government regulation of business implies that the manager has a role as public trustee, but at the same time the manager is an agent of the shareholders whose mandate is to maximize returns on their investment. For a company to remain competitive and generate a reasonable return on investment, its managers may have to close plants or reduce the work force. These actions produce negative externalities for communities and workers who have contributed to the company's welfare. The authors claim that managers have an obligation to provide some type of 'safety net' when such actions are taken (42).

Further ethical issues are explored in the next chapter, titled 'Employees'. Discussed in this chapter are such issues as corporate credos and codes of ethics, affirmative action, and whistle-blowing. In the following chapter on directors and shareholders, the authors argue for an expanded set of duties

and roles for directors which goes much beyond the classic conception that they ought to be concerned only with profit maximization. Shareholders are regarded not so much as owners of the corporation as beneficiaries. They no longer have control, and as the relation of shareholders to corporation becomes more and more distant, their role is reduced to that of investors. While the shareholder may still exercise some moral influence through refusing to buy the stocks of unethical companies or raising issues at annual meetings, much moral responsibility devolves upon the corporations themselves, as they become less subject to shareholder power.

The final two chapters consider corporations' roles in the political arena and in promoting economic justice, as well as the specific moral issues that arise from the development of multinational corporations whose actions have global consequences. A series of appendices, fifty pages in length, provides useful material on a wide variety of subjects including organizational flow charts, corporation credos and codes of ethics, the constitution of the World Health Organization, and a draft of a United Nations code of conduct for multinational corporations. There is also a useful index.

In emphasizing the role of corporate moral responsibility, this text has an interesting difference in focus from standard texts in business ethics. As well, the authors present challenging and well argued positions on many key topics. *Corporations in the Moral Community* is a useful addition to the growing body of literature in business ethics and is suitable either as a text or as supplementary reading for introductory courses.

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Edward C. Halper
One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics. The Central Books.
Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press
1989. Pp. xxxix + 309.
US $48.50 (ISBN 0-8142-0456-2).

Halper adopts a different method from that of other recent books on Aristotle's metaphysical theory: he carefully and thoroughly treats, in their textual order, the arguments of the central books of the *Metaphysics* (which are, for Halper, books E-Theta). Halper is aware of the pitfalls of two opposing approaches to Aristotle: that of using texts out of context as building blocks in a 20th-century philosophical reconstruction, and that of adopting uncritically a traditional framework of interpretation, with all its risks of philo-

sophical sterility. He hopes to steer between these dangers by approaching the *Metaphysics* through a characteristically ancient philosophical problematic, the relevance of which to Aristotle's arguments has been largely overlooked in traditional exegesis: the problem of the one and the many. That Aristotle is concerned with unity in the central books, and especially with the unity of substance, has of course not gone unnoticed. But Halper holds that a concern for unity underlies many arguments in which it does not explicitly figure, and it is this that gives him a fresh, but not anachronistic, slant on these books. Although in a few cases the attempt to work unity into a passage seems forced, it must be said that Halper's strategy pays off handsomely: he succeeds both in casting new light on obscure passages and in making plausible the claim that Aristotle sustains and develops a single argument throughout a text that often resembles a mere patchwork.

Most treatments of Aristotle's *pros hen* analysis of being restrict themselves to the ways being is said in the categories. Halper draws attention to the fact that 'categorial being' is itself one way in which being is said, alongside accidental being, actuality and potentiality, and being as truth. Being is said in a variety of ways within each of these; Halper argues that primary *ousia* is the focal being in each of them. Halper's treatment of accidental being and being as truth are full of interest, but the bulk of the book, and what will likely most excite the interest of readers, concerns the thorny problems of categorial being and being as actuality.

Halper argues that Aristotle's primary criterion for primary being is that it be unitary. (Accordingly he interprets the criteria isolated by other commentators — separation, 'thisness', being a subject — as capturing aspects of unity.) Primary *ousia* must be characterized by two distinct types of unity: unity in number and unity in formula. Aristotle devotes book Z to a systematic defense of essence as primary *ousia* by showing that it does, and rival candidates do not, possess these two kinds of unity. These rivals include, besides matter, the composite, genus, and universals, such entities as accidents (e.g., white), accidental composites (white man), *per se* attributes (snub), and *per se* composites (snub nose). (Halper's account of the failure of these entities to pass the unity test is masterly, and largely persuasive.) In book H, according to Halper, Aristotle shows how some of the entities that failed the unity tests in Z derive what unity they have from their relation to essence. The crucial cases here are the matter of the sensible composite and the composite itself, both of which are unified by an indwelling essence which, as the actuality for which the matter is the potentiality, unifies the matter, and itself with the matter, without being a numerically distinct constituent of the composite.

Unity in number is characteristic of individuals, unity in formula, of universals. But Aristotle often points out the absurdity in what he takes to be the Platonic error of positing essences that are both individual and universal. Halper sees Aristotle's theory as driven by the need to find a way to give primary sensible *ousia* both sorts of unity while avoiding the absurdities of Platonism; the notion of essence as the actuality of the matter in a

composite is his solution. Halper makes a forceful attempt to render this difficult doctrine intelligible.

A disadvantage of treating the arguments in their textual order is that aspects of the position being attributed to Aristotle remain unclear which a systematic presentation could have clarified. (The lack of an index locorum compounds this disadvantage.) For example, Halper suggests that for Aristotle form, not the composite, is the substrate for accidents (88); the passage he cites (1038b3-6) does not clinch the issue, and Halper does not discuss 1049a29-30 in this connection. This controversial claim could use systematic treatment. Halper does defend at some length the less controversial claim that form/essence is distinct from species; I should like to raise a query for his position. Halper's main argument for the distinction is that species are straightforward universals, predicated of many things, and universals in this sense cannot be primary *ousiai*; but essence is primary *ousia*. But that leaves the ontological status of species unexplained. (Generic universals are potentialities for form.) Halper produces no real text where Aristotle denies that species are primary *ousiai* (1049a34-6 [239] will not do the trick), and does not succeed in arguing away (293 n. 24) the bald statement at 1030a11-12 that *only* the species of a genus have essences (and so, given Z6, *are* essences). Since species are one in formula and have the same 'weak' numeric unity that essences have (see p. 123), why not identify them with essences and give up the claim that, metaphysically, they are universals in the strict sense of being predicated of independently existing substrates?

Halper's book is easily accessible to the Greekless reader, but is written by a trustworthy reader of Greek. Halper judiciously departs from Ross' translation, and sometimes his text, always on plausible grounds and always with philosophically interesting results. Some minor philological lapses (e.g., use of book II without discussion of its authenticity, failure to note that a rejected 'emendation' [at 1052b2] has some textual support [289 n. 20]) do not undermine confidence in Halper's good sense in textual matters.

This impressive and clearly-written book will be indispensable for philosophers who want to approach Aristotle on Aristotle's own terms. It should be at the side of anyone teaching the *Metaphysics*; researchers in the field will have to come to grips with its cogent arguments.

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Cornel M. Hamm
Philosophical Issues in Education: An Introduction.
London: The Falmer Press 1989. Pp. x + 184.
Cdn $32.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-85000-598-2).

Although Hamm regards philosophy as a 'multi-faceted and diverse activity' (10), he says that questions of meaning are 'logically prior' to other philosophical tasks — such as justification or the identification of assumptions (7). For H, questions of meaning are answered through the analysis of concepts; accordingly, the heart of this book is its attempt to 'lay bare' (15) the 'public' meaning of important concepts in educational discourse. Leaning heavily on the work of the British philosophers of education R.S. Peters and P.H. Hirst, H examines, in plain and clear language, concepts like 'education' and 'aims' (chapters 3 and 4), 'knowledge' and 'curriculum' (chapters 5 and 6), 'indoctrination' (chapter 7), 'authority' and 'discipline' (chapter 8). Each chapter concludes with exercises and short essay questions designed to help students sharpen their analytic skills. Hamm hopes that these philosophical skills will enable beginning students in the philosophy of education to employ 'better judgment and better practice in education itself' (15).

There are two obvious limitations to the approach H adopts in this book. First, he claims to provide students with a clear, relatively complete and current introduction to the philosophy of education (ix), but fails to acknowledge that contemporary philosophy (and philosophy of education) is no longer dominated by the methods of analytic philosophy. Over the last decade or so, philosophers of education on both sides of the Atlantic (including many analytic ones) have increasingly been influenced by intellectual traditions as diverse as Critical Theory, French post-modernist thought, continental philosophical hermeneutics and various forms of feminist theory. The considerable influence of such traditions on contemporary philosophy of education can hardly be dismissed as a mere 'fashionable trend' (x). Anyway, an introduction to the 'discipline' of educational philosophy that seriously aspires to completeness and currency can hardly ignore this influence.

Second, and more importantly, H exhibits an unfortunate habit of many analytic philosophers of focussing on existing, authoritative definitions and uses of concepts. However, this focus is of limited or negative practical value, since it largely neglects the ways in which meaning is created in educational discourse. Thus, while H hopes to contribute to increased precision in the use and understanding of existing meanings (14), he has little to say about, for example, how power may work in the process of meaning construction to advance the interests of some and marginalize those of others. Nor does he ask how hegemonic, counterproductive or outdated meanings are creatively reformed or resisted by marginalized groups. Yet such questions are of the highest importance for contemporary educational practice, where some voices and meanings (especially those of women and racial minorities) have traditionally been, and are still, often ignored or distorted.

In fairness, H acknowledges the creative aspect of meaning construction in educational discourse during his discussion of 'metaphors in education' (chapter 2). He recognizes that many educational concepts 'fit the description as shifting, elusive and polymorphous; and so we can expect that metaphors should continue to be used in educational discourse' (26). It is all the more disappointing, then, when his discussion of educational concepts in the remainder of the book does little to show how metaphorical language might be used to aid in constructing new understandings of educational concepts.

H's failure to appreciate the limited practical relevance of traditional analytic philosophy is evident in his analysis of the concept 'education'. Following R.S. Peters, H argues that the two most important 'criteria' of education are a) the achievement of knowledge and understanding in breadth and depth in each of the purportedly distinct forms of knowledge outlined by Hirst (36-8) and b) its intrinsic value (35). Furthermore, this definition of education is alleged to imply both a substantive conception of education, viz. 'the development of mind, of rationality and of persons' (50), and a substantive conception of the educated person, viz. one who has achieved knowledge and understanding in breadth and depth. This conception of the educated person is fleshed out by the discussions in later chapter, and is heavily influenced by Hirst's formal understanding of knowledge. For example, the intellectually disciplined person is defined in terms of her willingness to submit to the rules 'related to the structure of what has to be learnt' (109-10). And the morally educated person is understood as the person who, at least in social or inter-personal life, willingly adheres to the virtues, here understood as simple moral rules (e.g., 'don't tell lies'), and who masters the supposed rules of moral reasoning required to justify those rules (129-51).

One could certainly dispute H's analysis from an analytic standpoint. For example, one might ask why, given life's complexity and uncertainty, discipline or judgment should be defined in terms of the submission to rules, rather than the capacity to break rules, or construct new ones, when necessary. But an additional, and more important, problem lies in the difficulty of understanding why we should attempt to derive a substantive conception of education, and of the educated person, from the alleged definition of a concept. The problem is that philosophy does not merely 'lay bare' existing meaning, leaving it substantially unchanged. The very attempt to elucidate meaning is necessarily implicated in the process of creating (not just discovering) meaning.

This becomes clear if we begin by asking 'What *kind* of rational person should education seek to develop?' There is a vast number of answers to this question, and different answers will employ different and conflicting conceptions of the key words in the question: 'rationality', 'person', 'education', and 'develop'. Analytic philosophers of education might do a considerable amount to soften or reduce this conflict by seriously examining the challenges to authoritative educational meanings. For example, one might show how the

feminist emphasis on 'caring' as the fundamental constituent of moral personality — which is often thought to present an alternative and incompatible conception of morality to that of liberal justice and rights — in fact complements and enriches traditional conceptions of justice (see Eamonn Callan, 'Finding a Common Voice' *Educational Theory* 42:4 1992). This obviously requires the challenging task of paying considerable attention to the voices of those who have traditionally been excluded from educational conversations. But listening carefully to those voices offers the opportunity not only to discover new facets of our existing concepts, but may substantially change their meaning, and thereby suggest new possibilities for educational practice (Conspicuously, H's discussion and justification of rule/principle based moral education (chapter 9) ignores prominent feminist objections to such a view. See, for example, Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* Los Angeles, U. of California Press, 1984). If Hamm had attempted to listen to, and seek out the truth in, the voices of those not traditionally granted a hearing in philosophical discourse, he might have provided students and educators with a much more useful introduction to philosophy of education.

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James Harrington
The Commonwealth of Oceana and
A System of Politics. J.G.A. Pocock ed.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.
Pp. xxvi + 299.
US $54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-41189-0);
US $17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-42329-5).

Perhaps unkindly R.H. Tawney once characterised the central 'Model' of James Harrington's *The Commonwealth of Oceana*, first published in 1656, as 'remorselessly exhaustive,' a reader's nightmare of endless 'digressions' and wooden-mouthed 'imaginary statesmen' (our favourites, the young Philautus de Garbo [102ff., for example] and Lord Epimonus [177f.]). Still, he found cause to herald Harrington's 'new' vision of the economic determination of political institutions — shrewdly perceived by the seventeenth-century author as a massive shifting of property out of the hands of the nobility, — not to mention the sword's transference into the untitled hands of 'independent proprietors, freeholders and gentlemen' (xix; cf. 285). Otherwise an

admirer of Harrington's 'genius' (a point clearly shared by the present editor — xix), Thomas Reid warned his Glasgow students against Harrington's over-emphasis upon a 'Ballance of Property' [sic] as the 'Source of Dominion' (even Philautus de Garbo had recognised this threat not only to the '*fortuna*' of power, but also to 'industry'); more contentiously, he decried the lack of 'sufficient provision' for the virtuous and pious foundations of such a commonwealth. Pocock, of whose 1977 *Political Works of James Harrington* this edition is a diminutive, if happily accessible cousin, turns these and other long-standing criticisms of Harrington's purported 'utopia' to account and, as he has done consistently, makes a substantial case for *Oceana* as an '*occasione*' deeply rooted in the *de facto* of history (xvii) and as a 'pivotal' study in 'English political thought'.

Indeed, it is that and more. In Harrington's own words, it is a 'new modelling' of the whole 'case of a government,' an analysis of the 'fruit' of 'good trees' and evil (41), and a penetrating assessment of human behaviour, both in its 'sensuality' and in its 'refinement,' the latter an 'infusion of the soul or faculties of a man into the body of a multitude' (273). Infusion, perhaps, but there is never any question as to which will lead: the distribution of lands, known as the 'temperament of the body,' determines the 'orders of the form ... [or] mind of the government.' As for human nature, in this age of 'Leviathan' (ever a presence, though countered with the thrusts of good 'Machiavel' — 30-32), it appears as self-interested, yet saintly (its 'saintship' consisting in the election of magistrates 'fearing God and hating covetousness,' and thus eschewing favour or partiality — 61-4); as meek as the lord strategus Archon or as 'midsummer moon' as Epimonus (Archon, the '*punctum saliens*' and 'sole legislator,' who retires to the country, thereby becoming the first 'object' of the law he has instituted, a 'reflection,' that is, of the people's new liberty, but also of their ingratitude — 275-9, 246-50 — is a generous picture in himself); as sufficiently 'reflective' to deliberate in 'senate' (24f.), yet decisive enough not to jabber in the 'popular assembly,' where it is the casting of votes that counts (Harrington regards the people as the 'result,' and hence the 'power' of government — 252, 280); in short, as still Platonic in its hierarchies, yet Aristotelian in its actions.

Although the rivalry between reason and passion goes on unabated in *Oceana* (19), Harrington's insights are rather of a calculative nature. Consider the instance of the 'two silly girls' who have before them a 'cake undivided.' '"Divide", says one unto the other, "and I will choose; or let me divide, and you shall choose".' And now there unfolds, affirms Harrington, 'the whole mystery of a commonwealth'; for, once this plan is agreed upon, 'the divident dividing unequally loses, in regard that the other takes the better half; wherefore she divides equally, and so both have right' (22). As an argument for his mainstay principles of agrarian equality and rotative representation, Harrington need only 'Ask the girls' (24).

Conspicuously absent from this pleasant cake-cutting, of course, is the Hobbesian factor of *power* or the unceasing desire thereto: 'accumulation' does 'hate levelling' (277), but the former is not only the result of 'industry'.

Harrington's ideal model, the *de facto* historical changes, and the *de jure* uncertainties inherent in both are strangely out of step. His Archonish mind has already established 'liberty of conscience' in the minds of all — a godsend, no doubt, in curbing the strictures of 'national religion,' — and 'civil liberty' in their feet (252-4). He has answered the concerns of Reid by his 'infallible' maxim, 'give us good orders, and they will make us good men' (the converse, 'Give us good men and they will make us good laws,' has been judged 'fallible' — 64) and by that 'free' climate in which 'genius' is reflected in theatres and a kind of just 'charity' in marital provisions for 'the weaker sex' (259-62). He has not yet demonstrated, however, how the economic forces of 'lands, goods or money' which impel individuals are to recognise a need for 'obedience' to that *de jure* political order whose very creations, *qua* free and equal persons, they are. If *they* represent the new 'power' what, then, is that of the 'commonwealth'? If 'reason of state' can be likened to 'the main chance' and if, as appears likely, there exists more than one 'reason of state' (where 'irreconcilable' claims still exist — the *de facto* again), then the 'main chance' will begin to look more and more like 'open violence' (290-1).

It is salutary to read in that most Spinozistic of tracts, 'A System of Politics' (thankfully, also published here), that, *de facto* determinations notwithstanding, the 'philosophical creature' can still descend to the 'political,' and thence to the 'formation of government' (Plato's dream, surely). With 'a kind of trouble or impulse accompanying it,' writes Harrington, the sheer 'contemplation of form is astonishing' to us (273). Not wholly unlike *Leviathan*, really, Harrington could also 'hang' his system, albeit not an absolute 'monarchy,' 'by geometry' (56 and n. — 'hang' clearly referring to the analytic cohesions being 'attached above' without any empirical 'support beneath'). Deductively as well as historically, then, *Oceana* can and should be so contemplated.

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Paul Kurtz
The New Skepticism:
Inquiry and Reliable Knowledge.
Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books 1992.
Pp. 371.
US $24.95 (ISBN 0-87975-766-3).

Paul Kurtz decries religion but his writing is full of missionary zeal. In the present book, he vigorously defends and elaborates what he calls 'the new skepticism,' discussing its relationship to the history of skepticism and elaborating its consequences for a remarkably wide array of issues and concerns.

Kurtz's view of the historical context which confronts him is evident in the first few pages of his book: 'A paradox confronts humankind: the ancient systems of religious superstitions exist side by side with the most sophisticated forms of scientific knowledge.... Modern science has made an extraordinarily positive contribution to human civilization. Yet primitive religious and paranormal systems of belief retain their power over the lives of human beings' (10).

The way out of this predicament is, Kurtz thinks, a hard headed commitment to reason and science which entails a skeptical attitude to the religious and paranormal beliefs which he so vehemently disapproves of. This is the essence of his 'new' skepticism, which attempts to occupy a middle ground between the extreme doubt he associates with ancient skepticism and the uncritical attitude which allegedly gives rise to popular points of view. 'To forever float in a sea of indecisive doubt is to be out of touch with experience as we attempt to cope with the problems encountered in living. To live entirely *without* some honest doubt, however, is to live in folly and play the part of the fool' (30).

So conceived, skepticism is said to be 'the foe of absolute certainty and dogmatic finality' rather than knowledge broadly conceived, contributing 'substantially to the advancement of human knowledge and the moral progress of humankind' (29).

Philosophically, the key to Kurtz's account is a conception of knowledge that is inextricably tied up with behavior. 'I can say that "to be" is for us to be related in some essential way to a wide range of "behavioural interactions"' (82). Our goal should be reliable pragmatic knowledge that is defined as true belief intersubjectively corroborated. Different ways in which we might attain such knowledge — via firsthand testimony, secondhand testimony, etc. — are discussed. In defense of Kurtz, it might be said that this attempt to ground knowledge in practical experience is initially plausible, and that such a view needs to be taken seriously in discussing the various topics he addresses. This being said, the details of his account are extremely problematic from both a historical and a philosophical point of view.

One sympathizes with Kurtz's observation that 'It is difficult to compress the entire history of skepticism into one chapter' (31), but his treatment of

the topic is *so* insensitive to details of interpretation that one must wonder if the exercise is worth the effort. His generalizations about the sophists are contradicted by the views of the *physis* sophists (32); his suggestion that Aristotle is a skeptic makes a mockery of the ancient distinction between skeptics and non-skeptics (35); his account of Pyrrhonian skepticism ignores their practical criterion and the 'undogmatic' claims and beliefs they claim to base on it (35-42). On and on it goes, remarkably general claims being made about this or that kind of skeptic without any discussion of the texts on which an interpretation of the history of skepticism must be based.

Kurtz's philosophical discussion is equally crude. He suggests pragmatic imperatives as a basis for his position without considering the possibility that one might act upon them without knowledge claims (116-17); his book does not include a careful discussion of alternative accounts of truth and knowledge; he never seriously grapples with fundamental skeptical arguments — say Descartes' evil demon argument or Putnam's brain in the vat analogue — but simply asserts that he can clearly see and smell this or that or, more remarkably, that 'There is a body of tested prima facie ethical principles and rules that may be generalizable to all human communities' (73).

The most interesting chapters of the book apply Kurtz's outlook to specific topics. Chapter six contains a critique of the paranormal, attacking the suggestion that reports of such phenomena provide some evidence for supernormal, occult or supernatural phenomena. Chapter seven critiques religious belief, chapter eight argues against moral skepticism in the traditional sense, and chapter nine attempts to show how one might apply Kurtz's skepticism to the realm of politics. The latter discussion lacks detail but encompasses a refreshing rejection of ideologically based politics in favour of practical solutions and principles tested by a hard look at the empirical circumstances that surround the issues they attempt to deal with.

The final chapter of Kurtz's treatise elaborates his ideal of *eupraxophy*, a mix of science, new skepticism and good conduct. 'Eupraxophers will concentrate on two tasks: (1) They will seek ... a summing-up in a synoptic view of what the most reliable knowledge of the day tells us about nature and humankind. (2) They will also be concerned with *eupraxia*, that is with *eu* (good) and *praxis* (conduct) — succinctly, good conduct' (338). To abandon Kurtz's brand of skeptical inquiry is, he claims, 'to slip back to brute biological existence; to expand its use in all areas of life is to advance the cause of civilized living' (344).

These are well meant sentiments, but one must wonder if Kurtz's position is even internally consistent given that he makes a great deal of the principle of falsifiability, maintaining that claims are without content 'If there are no conditions whatsoever by which they can be falsified ...' (94). Putting aside the by now obvious objection that this principle fails its own test, Kurtz does not seem able to take seriously competing points of view. Just how artificial his reasoning can be is seen when he considers the apparent marriage of religious attitudes and skeptical inclinations one finds in Bayle, Berkeley, Pascal and Kierkegaard (a marriage which is, as Charles B. Schmitt and

others have shown, a commonplace in the history of skepticism) – a case where he seriously suggests that their religious views reflect the fact that they 'feel unable to come out of the closet to reveal their true skeptical doubts about religion itself,' assuming he need not give any historical evidence for this claim (52).

It is perhaps ironic that Kurtz's mix of crude argument and intense personal conviction sometimes make his own remarks peculiarly reminiscent of religious fundamentalism.

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Donald C. Lee
Toward A Sound World Order: A Multidimensional, Hierarchical Ethical Theory.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1992.
Pp. xv + 219.
(cloth: ISBN 0-313-27903-9).

Lee claims his book is 'not an investigation of a narrow scholarly topic but a broad interdisciplinary and speculative attempt at synthesis' (197). The main thesis is that humans 'live at several levels of being at once, and that human nature thus has multiple aspects; one has different duties at these different levels' (xiii); and, crucially, the 'laws that determine existence at one level ... are not reducible to the laws at any other level' (xv).

Part One (The Ethical Theory) includes five chapters, and in chapter one (Epistemological and Metaphysical Suppositions) Lee presents his general account of human nature. The main theme is anti-reductionist with respect to metaphysics in general and to human nature in particular. The second chapter (Critique of the Prevailing Western Ethical World View) is a short chapter in which Lee claims that the current popularity of relativism exists because of the view that all desires are equal. He rejects this view, and argues that desires can be objectively ranked. In chapter three (Ethics Based on Needs) Lee advances a moral theory rooted in the satisfaction of the 'needs' that exist at the various levels of human existence. All individuals live at biological, social, rational, cultural and individual levels, each with its corresponding needs. These levels and needs can be ranked, even though no absolute ranking criteria exist. With this analysis of 'needs' in focus, Lee turns to the fact/value distinction. In chapter four (From Need to Morality; From Is to Ought) Lee examines the 'naturalistic fallacy'. He objects to

Moore's analysis, claiming the 'good' is (at least in part) a complex natural property. This allows Lee to derive an 'ought' from an 'is', in so far as it is possible to identify hypothetical imperatives based on 'needs'. The theme of chapter five (Deeper Into The Subjective Dimension) is that knowledge is not enough to make one ethical.

Part Two (Extension of the Ethical Theory in the Environmental Realm) includes three chapters. In chapter six (Environmental Ethics) Lee argues that 'old values' cannot solve the new environmental problems. 'New values' are needed, ones based in the rejection of the 'mechanistic' paradigm, and the acceptance of the 'holistic' paradigm of ecological science. In the seventh chapter (Obligations to Future Generations), Lee contends that we have obligations to our descendants, and argues for an intergenerational social contract that has much in common with Edmund Burke's construal. Lee applies his 'levels of being' analysis to the moral status both of animals and of the environment in chapter eight (Our Ethical Relationship With Nonhuman Beings). He examines the moral views of Kant, Bentham, and Leopold. His main theme is that these views are not really incompatible, and actually serve to complement one another.

In Part Three (Extension of The Theory in the Political and Economic Realm) Lee turns to political and economic questions. In chapter nine (Freedom and Democracy) Lee follows Mill in arguing that we need freedom in order to achieve our potential. Chapter ten (Capitalism and 'False Needs') explores capitalism in theory and in practice. Lee argues that there is very little connection between the two in our present world. He places much of the responsibility for this on multinational corporations, and their ability to instill in people irrational desires to satisfy 'false needs'. He also argues that freedom is largely a myth in capitalist/worker interactions. In chapter eleven (Marxism-Leninism) Lee provides an explication and summary of the key ideas of Marxism. Lee is highly critical of several of what he takes to be the central themes of Marxism. He rejects the view that all value is reducible to economic value, as well as the presupposition that indefinite economic expansion is possible. Concerns are expressed about the place of freedom in Marxism and its proposal that there really is no such thing as morality. Lee also claims that Marxism simply does not work in practice, and argues for this claim with a discussion and analysis of Lenin and the Russian Revolution.

In chapter twelve (War and Peace) Lee considers the nature of peace. He discusses this issue in terms of 'levels of being', and proposes that peace is rational. In the last chapter (Conclusions: Toward The Reconstruction of the Political Order) he argues that peace also is obtainable. According to Lee, capitalism and Marxism-Leninism both have important insights, and he proposes 'to transcend and replace both capitalism and Marxism-Leninism in a world order that is directed toward meeting human needs at all levels' (169). According to Lee this is certainly possible in so far as 'experts have given us compelling evidence that the present misery of starving and diseased millions is unnecessary, for with a fair distribution of world resources

and jobs, the world economic system could support even an increased world population at the average standard of living of the average European in 1970 in the foreseeable future — for everyone' (173). He acknowledges that the new world order will have to occur in stages. Against the possible charge that he is being unrealistic he replies that what 'is realistic is to see the real possibilities for improvement. What is unrealistic is to believe that the future must be, or even could be, just like the present. The future will be different, and it is up to us, collectively, to decide what that future will be like' (181).

Several general worries about the book should be noted. Lee never really resolves the tension that exists in his moral theory concerning the fact that we have different obligations at different levels of being. He allows that the biological level tends to take precedence over the social level but he denies that the ranking is absolute. Furthermore, morality is tied directly to human needs, and it remains unclear as to how the theory really operates in the realm of nonhuman animals and the environment. Finally, it is worth noting that his claims about what is possible today in terms of the elimination of human (and nonhuman) suffering are very controversial. Lee does acknowledge that his work 'is highly speculative and, I am sure, incomplete. I welcome the efforts of others to extend and complete the theory, should they believe it worthwhile, or to criticize it, should they see weaknesses I have overlooked' (181). Lee is certainly right that the theory is incomplete. He is also right that the future cannot resemble the past with respect to our economic, social and moral practices. Besides being a theoretical work, Lee sees his work as one that 'also recommends and exhorts my fellow human beings to put what may be of value in this theory into practice in the designing of a world order directed at meeting present and future human needs at all levels to the optimum extent possible' (181). This is a book that provides much food for thought.

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Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller,
and **Jeffrey Paul eds.**
Economic Rights.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.
Pp. xiv + 314.
US $19.95 (ISBN 0-521-42873-4).

The eleven essays in this collection are new and as interesting as they are diverse. They are the product of the Social Philosophy and Policy Center's 1990 conference 'Economic Rights'. The central theme of this collection is, as the title suggests, economic rights. Economic rights, those rights we have to 'use, possess, exchange, and otherwise dispose of property' (vii), have taken on a new urgency in contemporary debates of social, moral, and political philosophy. The authors address some of the crucial issues that arise in any attempt to argue for what rights (economic or otherwise) people have, ought to have, or ought not to have. The book, in addition to the quality and sophistication of the essay's philosophical argumentation, has an extensive name and subject index. Having read earlier versions of most of these papers or participated in colloquia where they were presented, I am pleased to see them released in print. This book will occupy a prominent position in my library.

N. Scott Arnold's 'Equality and Exploitation in the Market Socialist Community' and Jan Narveson's 'Democracy and Economic Rights' address the issue of participatory democracy in the workplace but from different perspectives. Arnold argues that an egalitarian distribution of material goods under market socialism cannot take place without the exploitation of some workers, the most productive workers, by other workers, the least productive workers. If market socialism involves the notion that 'income rights are held collectively by all those who work in the firm,' then 'the workers will have to decide collectively how to divide up the income' (17). Arnold argues that the individuals involved would, in virtue of their own self interest, overestimate their own productive contribution and therefore seek to gain a disproportionate amount, thereby exploiting their more productive counterparts. Narveson argues against the view that if democracy is justified in governing the political arena, then it ought to rule in the workplace. To the extent that the institution of democracy is justified by appealing to individual liberty, then, Narveson argues, individuals ought to have the liberty to decide whether they will work in a workplace that is governed by democracy or not. He also argues that 'the forcibly imposed requirement that all associations within the society be "democratic" is in fact a denial of the right of freedom of association' (56).

In 'The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract' Randy E. Barnet offers a functional analysis of the concepts of several rights and freedom of contract. In his analysis Barnet demonstrates how the concept of several property assists in solving the knowledge problem associated with the efficient production and distribution of goods and services. Freedom of

contract, on Barnet's view, has two principles: freedom to contract and freedom from contract (93). Each of these principles plays a fundamental role, in conjunction with several property, in resolving the knowledge and other related problems. Daniel M. Hausman's 'When Jack and Jill Make a Deal' is concerned with externality problems — that is, those problems that are experienced as a positive or negative side-effect of another's actions — created by the institution of property rights and unregulated market activity. After first attempting to precisely define the notion of an externality, he argues that market solutions have proven to be ill-equipped to solve these problems.

James W. Child, in his 'The Limits of Creditors' Rights: The Case of Third World Debt,' assesses some of the moral and legal implications of major international commercial banks loaning funds to third world countries and the latter's inability to repay such loans. Child explicates the rights of creditors and the subsequent duties of debtor nations from within the conceptual framework of a moral theory and the legal norms of contracts and argues that creditors have 'either no rights of repayment or highly limited ones' (117). Jonathan R. Macey's essay concentrates on the distinction between economic and noneconomic rights and argues that the former should be granted as much legal protection as the latter recently have been.

In 'Gauthier on Right and Economic Rent' Eric Mack argues that Gauthier's derivation of rights, premised on Gauthier's interpretation of Locke's proviso, fails. (Gauthier interprets Locke's proviso to mean that one is prohibited from bettering one's own situation through interaction that worsens the situation of another.) In addition, Mack argues, pace Gauthier, economic rent ought not to be confiscated and subject to redistribution in accordance with Gauthier's principle of minimax relative concession. In this latter regard, Mack also argues that Gauthier's positive argument for treating rents as part of the cooperative surplus is flawed, for it rests on the assumption that the demand created by a potential purchaser of a good contributes to the production of the good by virtue of his demand for it.

Richard J. Arneson, in 'Property Rights and Persons,' criticizes Nozick's taxation-is-theft argument in the course of explicating and defending his version of welfare egalitarianism. He considers the liberal egalitarian views of both Rawls and Dworkin and argues that his version of egalitarianism is not subject to the same objections typically raised against the views of Rawls and Dworkin.

David Copp and Gregory S. Kavka in their respective contributions, 'The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living: Justice, Autonomy and the Basic Needs,' and 'Disability and the Right to Work,' argue, respectively, for the claim rights to an adequate standard of living and the disabled person's right to employment. Both Copp and Kavka's arguments presuppose that the society in which these claim rights are to be actualized have reached a sufficient level of material prosperity. Copp premises his argument on the notion of 'basic human needs' being a prerequisite of 'rational autonomy'

(232). Kavka, on the other hand, views his contribution as a first attempt to provide a moral foundation for the American Disabilities Act of 1990.

Finally, John E. Roemer employs some different economic models to illustrate the benefits of publicly financed schools over some recently proposed alternatives. He argues that 'no voucher or private system of education can be efficient as long as there is a social norm on levying different tuitions on different types of children' (309).

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Francis Jeffry Pelletier
Parmenides, Plato and the Semantics of Not-Being.
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1990. Pp. xxi + 166.
US $29.95 (ISBN 0-226-65390-0).

The first chapter of this book explains Pelletier's methodological principles; the other four apply them in expounding (a) Parmenides' problems about not-being, (b) the problems about not-being in Plato's *Sophist*, (c) the *Sophist*'s attempt to solve those problems by 'interweaving' forms, and (d) the different kinds of predication and participation acknowledged in the *Sophist*. That list of topics may suggest that the book's purposes are narrowly historical. Pelletier however has a further end in view: the ancient philosophical problems about not-being are problems also for semantics as studied in modern cognitive science; and modern cognitive scientists have much to learn from scrutinising Plato's solution to those problems.

Chapter 4 is the most useful part of the book. It summarises and classifies thirteen interpretations of the *Sophist*'s ideas on positive and negative predication, and three interpretations of the *Sophist*'s ideas on positive and negative existentials. This chapter is a revision of an article in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 3 (1983) 35-65. The revision does not take into account anything published after 1986; and it omits certain publications from before that date, e.g., R.W. Jordan, 'Plato's Task in the *Sophist*', *Classical Quarterly* 34 (1984) 113-29. Still, if you want to find out about earlier scholarship on these matters, Chapter 4 of Pelletier's book is a good place to start.

Unfortunately, there is little of value elsewhere in the book. This is because Pelletier all too faithfully applies the methodological principles announced in Chapter 1. We are there reminded of the facts that for over two

millennia nobody has had a native's knowledge of Classical Greek, and that ancient texts come down to us 'having been copied over and over by (sometimes) incompetent hands' (3). Pelletier infers from those facts the conclusion that nobody is in any position to correct any of his ideas on such grounds as "'Aristotle just couldn't have meant *this*! The Greek language just cannot support such a meaning!" or "Such-and-such in Greek would normally be taken to mean so-and-so," or "Such-and-so is not possible Greek"' (3).

Pelletier's methodological principles allow him some brisk replies to objections. Let three examples suffice. First, Pelletier supposes that the prefix μετα- occurs in the word μεικτόν (136); I object that this is a grotesque error, whose equivalent in English would be to suppose that the prefix *mis-* (as in *mislead*) occurs also in *mixed*; Pelletier can reply by asking how can 'scholars feel that their knowledge of ancient Greek allows them to make such statements' (3). Second, Pelletier supposes that in the *Republic* '*all* belief has "what is not" as its object' (23); I object that the Greek language just cannot support the meaning Pelletier would find here, for *Republic* 478c3-e5 plainly states that the object of knowledge is 'what is', the object of ignorance is 'what is not', and the object of belief is neither of those extremes, but something in between the two; Pelletier can reply that 'By the time we come to the rather subtle judgements called for to support philosophical disputes over an author's intended meaning, present-day scholars of Greek are in no position at all to make such judgements' (3). Third, Pelletier devotes fourteen pages (8-21) to discussing Parmenides without quoting or even citing a single line from that author; I object that we can say nothing useful about Parmenides if we do not consider his words; Pelletier can reply that 'what a philosopher *said* is only an indirect guide to what he *meant*' (3).

Pelletier's methodological principles are, in short, an impressive contribution to eristic technique. In their light, anyone who presumes to correct him can be presented as dogmatic and arrogant. In fact however, the boot is on the other foot. For the reasoning behind Pelletier's methodology is in effect: nobody's understanding of Greek philosophical texts can be immediate and perfect; therefore nobody's understanding of Greek philosophical texts can be any better than Pelletier's own.

Chapter 5 discusses the *Sophist*'s remarks about the 'blending' of forms. Some of these remarks seem to imply that the two 'blended' forms overlap; others seem to imply that one of the 'blended' forms includes the other. Pelletier contends that which of these two is implied by one of the *Sophist*'s remarks depends on grammatical case: where 'Ψ' is in the dative, the remark 'Φ blends with Ψ' implies overlap (102: 'As a matter of nomic necessity, something which is an instance of Ref(Φ) is also an instance of Ref(Ψ)'); and where 'Ψ' is in the genitive, the remark 'Φ blends with Ψ' implies inclusion (102: 'As a matter of nomic necessity, everything which is an instance of Ref(Φ) is also an instance of Ref(Ψ)').

Although Pelletier's methodology forbad reference to Parmenides, it does allow for interpretations of the *Sophist* to be tested against the text of the

Sophist itself. Pelletier himself notes that this text provides two apparent counter-examples to his genitive/dative principle. One is 261c7-8 αὐτῶν ἅπτεται τὸ μὴ ὄν ('not-being attaches to them [i.e., to speech and belief]'). Here we have a genitive αὐτῶν, where the straightforward application of Pelletier's principle would require a dative.

Pelletier's way of saving his principle from this counter-example reminds me of de Selby's way of saving his idea that you can tell what people are like by considering their names. 'This idea he pursued to rather fanciful lengths, drawing up elaborate paradigms of vowels and consonants purporting to correspond to certain indices of human race, colour and temperament and claiming ultimately to be in a position to state the physiological "group" of any person merely from a brief study of the letters of his name after the word had been "rationalised" to allow for variations of language' (Flann O'Brien, *The Third Policeman* [London, Paladin 1988] Chapter 3, note 3). Where de Selby 'rationalised', Pelletier puts into 'canonical form' this use of the word ἅπτω (130).

On Pelletier's account, ἅπτω is indeed a strange verb. Some forms of some of its compounds are straightforward blending metaphors: συνημμένην at 253d9 appears, without remark, on Pelletier's list of occurrences of blending terminology (109); and προσάπτωμεν with the dative at 251d5-6 is actually invoked in favour of Pelletier's genitive/dative principle (110). Other forms however of compounds of ἅπτω are not blending terminology at all: συνάπτειν at 252c5 appears nowhere on Pelletier's list. But the wiles of ἅπτω do not deceive Pelletier. He tell us that ἅπτω 'is not, strictly speaking, being used here [at 261c8] as a blending metaphor in the same manner that the other terms were being used' (130). In consequence, we are entitled to rephrase αὐτῶν ἅπτεται τὸ μὴ ὄν in order to get rid of the anomalous genitive.

Before we apply the genitive/dative principle to αὐτῶν ἅπτεται τὸ μὴ ὄν, we must decide 'what will be the "logical subject" and what will be the "logical object" of the blending' (130). In canonical form, the 'logical subject' appears as the grammatical subject of the verb for blending, while the 'logical object' appears as the grammatical object of that verb. In αὐτῶν ἅπτεται τὸ μὴ ὄν, the 'logical subject' is the 'grammatical object' αὐτῶν, and the 'logical object' is the 'grammatical subject' τὸ μὴ ὄν. Pelletier may be under the misapprehension that ἅπτεται here is passive, rather than middle; for it is hard to imagine on what other grounds one might declare that the grammatical subject of αὐτῶν ἅπτεται τὸ μὴ ὄν is not its logical subject. Be that as it may, we simply mutate this phrase into canonical form; we are thus rid of its genitive; and all is well with Pelletier's principle. We should be thankful for small mercies; Pelletier does not tell us how he thinks the canonical form would look in Greek.

Pelletier acknowledges a second apparent counter-example to his genitive/dative principle. This is 259e6 τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκήν ('the weaving of the forms together with one another'). Pelletier has a quick way with the genitive ἀλλήλων ('one another'): it is '"really" a dative', that has become a genitive because it 'is immediately adjacent to the genitive "of the

forms" (τῶν εἰδῶν), and it is a well-known tendency of Greek to allow this kind of adjacency to affect the case of the following phrase. Thus, even had Plato wanted to put "one another" in the dative case, considerations of style and euphony would have made it become genitive' (114). It is of course a mere slip to speak of ἀλλήλων as a 'phrase' that here 'follows' τῶν εἰδῶν. What is worse than a mere slip is Pelletier's 'well-known tendency of Greek'. Why he should invent this tendency when he has the device of canonical forms, I simply cannot tell. I can only speculate that he is speaking from some garbled recollection of the way that a Greek relative pronoun can be, as the grammarians put it, 'assimilated to the case of its antecedent'.

The printing is as sloppy as other aspects of the book: there is at least one misprint for every four pages.

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Edward Pols
Radical Realism, Direct Knowing in Science and Philosophy.
Cornell University Press 1992. Pp. 221.
US $28.50 (ISBN 0-8014-2710-X).

Plato thought that a rigorous study of dialectic would, in time, lead the philosopher to a direct encounter with reality. Pols believes that this encounter occurs considerably earlier, prior to language and theory, and that it constitutes direct knowledge. Nor does he have in mind by this anything like Russell's pre-linguistic perceptually based 'knowledge by acquaintance'. What we encounter directly is, initially, the reality of other persons, and later on, that of morality, of religion, and of art. The sub-text is, clearly, that we can have direct unmediated knowledge of God.

The argumentive strategy is disjunctive elimination. Pols assumes that there are three viable theories about the relationship between knowledge and reality: anti-realism, scientific realism, and direct realism. Anti-realism, and scientific realism, Pols argues, are both untenable, mainly because they both posit a reality which is dependent on theory and language. Since reality is clearly independent of theory and language, he argues, both those positions must be wrong. Hence only direct realism can be true.

Pols main argument *for* direct realism is an enthymeme that goes like this: Direct knowledge begins with appetite, or need. We have a need for

metaphysics. Therefore, there must be a 'real' metaphysics which satisfies that need. Analogous arguments, Pols thinks, prove the existence of other persons, morality, and art.

What follows is an exposition of our 'rational awareness' of direct knowledge. Rational awareness, a 'tormentively reflexive' undertaking, reveals the existence of an 'authentic' function of the mind. This function, which is based on appetite, is both part of reality, and the source of our rational awareness of it. Satisfied by particular 'beings,' it yields knowledge of a more general 'Being'. The relation between Being, and being is the 'U-factor,' and what our awareness of the U-factor reveals is that the unity of being (reality) is not dependent on our cognitive faculties.

The value of this book does not lie in either its analysis or its arguments. Its treatment of anti-realism and scientific realism lacks the precise expression necessary to convince devotees that they are either untenable or internally incoherent. The argument for a reality based on need infers too much, even if we assume that the needs in question have been properly identified, and adequately satisfied. Moreover, neither of these possibilities is discussed.

It is unclear as well what makes the conclusions reached through rational awareness direct. They are clearly not immediate or primal. Rather, it seems that what can be known directly can only be known to be known directly, indirectly. But this paradox is not explored, with the consequence that anyone who was lost in the dark before, is apt to remain there.

Arguments aside, there is something to be said for the author's attempt to subvert the subject-object distinction by refusing, in the first instance, to acknowledge the gap. Making the authenticity of appetite the nexus of a connection between Being and beings, the universal and the particular, the rational and the experiential, and so making this appetite the foundation of the person, the being participating in Being itself, seems like a good move. Those sympathetic to the strategy will find in this book a sincere, almost comforting, attempt to think through the classic problems of the relation between knowledge and reality. The overall strategy, after all, is respectable, and provides a birdseye view of what must be done, even if it doesn't manage to do it.

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Julian Roberts
The Logic of Reflection.
New Haven and London: Yale University Press
1992. Pp. viii + 307.
US $30.00 (ISBN 0-300-05207-3).

This is a book that I very much wanted to like. Concerned that 'one and a half centuries of positivism' (282) have left us vulnerable to 'charlatanry,' 'bogus theology' and irrationalism, the author sets out with the admirable intention of elucidating German metaphysics and philosophy of logic in the twentieth century with willful disregard for the traditional boundaries between 'analytical' and 'continental' thinkers. The light which he proposes to shine into the darker recesses of these respective traditions is a 'Kantian' one, which will illuminate the subjects under study where their work resembles Kant's project of establishing and respecting the limits of understanding and which will reveal deficiencies where the 'logic of reflection' has not been given its due. Always near the surface of discussion is a concern to save normativity from relativism, logicism, psychologism, positivism, naturalism, etc.

According to the dust-jacket, the book is 'intended for advanced undergraduates across disciplines — in philosophy, the social sciences, literary theory and theology.' Emphasis, however, should be placed on the word 'advanced,' since following Roberts' sometimes elusive exposition is a task which would be lightened considerably by a prior acquaintance with German thinkers from Husserl to Habermas *and* with philosophy of logic and mathematics, particularly the work of Frege, Russell, the early Wittgenstein and Paul Lorenzen. The idea that students of, say, literary theory, will be attracted to this study seems a charming naiveté. Yet, the book's multi-technical tendency stands in odd contrast with its occasional explanations of terms that one would hope even not-so-advanced undergraduates to understand already, *e.g.*, 'vicious circularity' (161).

The first chapter introduces in broad terms the importance of Kantian reflection on the boundaries of understanding — boundaries which cannot be described by means of 'the regular (and, in principle, mechanically reproducible) use of reason' (9). Important here are the problems of incongruent counterparts (Kant), the irreducibility of temporal relations (Heidegger), and problems of self-reference (*e.g.*, Russell's Paradox) — recurrent themes in the succeeding chapters. Putnam's model-theoretic argument against non-intentional accounts of reference is discussed approvingly, but no less vaguely than most everything else. The chapter's overall thrust — in terms that differ from Roberts' — seems to be that metaphysical realism, the correspondence-theory of truth and related efforts to exclude normativity from philosophical thinking leave us unable to account for the non-discursive constraints on our knowledge and tempt us to confuse what Kant called 'real' possibility with logical possibility.

The remaining chapters follow, more or less historically, the development of — or alleged failure to appreciate — these themes in Frege, Wittgenstein, Husserl and Habermas. Chapter 2 inveighs against the Russellian portrait of Frege as leading the 'overthrow of Hegel' (49) and paints him as indebted to Kant and Leibniz. Scholars of Frege might find points of disagreement, but as an introductory account of Frege's views on the foundations of logic and mathematics, this chapter holds its own. It gives a fairly sympathetic account of Frege whose claims to success in logicism, says Roberts, set '*the* philosophical challenge for the twentieth century' (4). What Russell's Paradox shows, we are told, is that Frege's stark separation of form and content — of function and argument — neglects the importance of the socio-historically situated, knowing subject.

Getting from Russell's Paradox to the importance of the knowing subject (which supposedly has models in epistemic logic, cognitive science, Hegel's '*Geist*' and Foucault's '*épistèmes*,' among others), however, is no easy task. The first step is said to lie in lifting Frege's (anti-psychologistic) ban on modality in the formalization of deductive reasoning. What modality is supposed to deliver depends on a quasi-Kantian account of modality as connected with 'understanding and its empirical employment.' Whether something is possible is to be assessed relative to certain background conditions of which we are assumed to have knowledge (see 100f.). Roberts' arguments would have been greatly enhanced by a clearer, lengthier, more focused discussion of the nature and import of this conception of modality (which is active in Putnam's rejection of metaphysical realism), as well as of how it contrasts with strict logical possibility and necessity — the fodder of most possible-worlds semantics.

As his exposition stands, Roberts feels driven to a variety of intuitionistic logic, which must then be reinterpreted in terms of Lorenzen's 'logic of dialogue' before the logic of reflection is done justice in terms which acknowledge the historical nature of truth as something which "'happens" in the interaction of "subjects" bearing "knowledges"' (105). It is Husserl's historical role (Chapter 4) to inspire intuitionism — though Husserl is also faulted for not making proper room for subjectivity, unable to avoid a movement from absolutism in his early writings to 'an almost relativist position' (4) in his later ones. Habermas (Chapter 5) assumes the burden of emphasizing *intersubjectivity*, thereby bringing nearer to fruition the recognition of Roberts' claim that 'All rationality ... presupposes intersubjectivity ...' (31), a view which he attributes — with little explanation — to Kant. That Habermas' somewhat uncritical absorption of Chomskian linguistics and elements of Searle's theory of speech-acts might compromise the programme of giving normativity its due is not an issue that arises, since the author chooses the 'simpler' course of 'disentangl[ing] Habermas from his well-meaning engagements with analytical philosophy' (271).

Roberts is most at home with discussing Husserl and Habermas. Here his style is relaxed, and his metaphors are unstrained, but, as throughout the book, some signposts are needed to remind us of our destination, and the

relevance and accuracy of some details is questionable. The lengthy digression (Chapter 5) on Lorenzen's account of dialogical reasoning is neither clear in itself (How does Lorenzen's notation 'eliminate' the logical connectives?), nor very elucidatory of Habermas. And the author's choice of Quine as a representative of the 'positivism' that Habermas criticizes ignores the important differences between, e.g., Quine and the Vienna Circle (to say nothing of Comte and Mach, whom Habermas actually discusses). Indeed, this choice seems peculiarly anachronistic for a book which decries the analytical tradition's disregard for the history of philosophy. It leads to curious remarks about 'the "positivist" contention that all observation is theory-laden' (227) and to the claim that Quine holds Carnap's view (criticized in 'Two Dogmas ...') that there is a sharp distinction between questions of ontology and questions of science (228).

Roberts disappoints most by not recognizing the importance of Wittgenstein's later philosophy to his concerns. Chapter 3 takes up the claim of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (TLP) to have solved the problems of philosophy at the level of first-order logic. Roberts is on relatively firm (but still contested) ground when he criticizes Wittgenstein's exile of the subject (e.g., TLP §5.631) from philosophy. But his reading of the Wittgensteinian corpus does not just down-play the differences between the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI); it clearly *mis*reads some passages (e.g., TLP §§5.1, 5.153) and severs others from the contexts which give them sense. Thus, Wittgenstein's suggestion (*Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* — RFM) that the notion of infinity *extends* the concept of 'number' (RFM 142) is transmuted into evidence for his life-long acceptance of finitism, despite his comparison of finitism with behaviourism (RFM 142) and his rejection of the latter (PI §§307-8). Waismann's *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis*, is said to present L.W.'s 'later thinking on mathematics' (135), even though Wittgenstein's views in that period were in continual revision — to the frustration of Waismann's attempts to assemble another book (unpublished for thirty years) on Wittgenstein's thinking. But most troubling is the assimilation of the formal character of logic in TLP with the account of rule-following explored in the later writings (136-54), for it is surely here that the *Investigations* repudiate the *Tractatus* and refuse reductive accounts of normativity — just the end embraced by Roberts.

Roberts' project is interesting and worthwhile, but in combining relatively independent interpretive studies with a difficult argument about the shortcomings of contemporary philosophy and with a crossing of intra-disciplinary boundaries (each a laudable project) *The Logic of Reflection* sets more goals than it manages fully to realize.

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William S. Robinson
Computers, Minds & Robots.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1992.
Pp. x + 281.
US $39.95 (ISBN 0-87722-915-5).

You can almost smell the chalk dust in the air reading *Computers, Minds & Robots*. This is a keen teacher's book — patient, provocative, even-handed, enthusiastic — a book which is both timely and very much of its time. Robinson surveys the Electrical Engineering Division of the Philosophy of Mind which, from Turing's eccentric 1950 opener in *Mind*, has blossomed as robustly as Intel. Expect herein no consideration of private Cartesian introspection nor surficial behaviourist parsimony. This is Virtual Gizmo philosophy and draws its spirit from designs of fantasy machines which (who?) talk back and mean what they say. Here is the driving principle: what better way to understand our own cognitive nature than by designing physically realizable devices which display intelligence? Accepting this, the driving conviction is that we can articulate the algorithmics of thought, that our cognitive mentality at least is essentially program-like.

Robinson treats various models of artificial intelligence by discussing sympathetically a series of landmark theories, both positive and negative. Though his approach is not strictly chronological, he opens with the Turing game and closes with Parallel Distributed Processing. To illustrate these and related theories, and to show how they can be mended to fend off problems, Robinson invents a series of robots named in alphabetic order each one of which is meant to overcome some shortcoming in its predecessors.

The Turing game plays a central structural role. Defending it as 'a proper test of intelligence' (22), Robinson focuses upon critics of the game and then upon the ways in which a machine able to play it might be designed. Robinson confronts Searle's Chinese Room by distinguishing (not altogether convincingly) between tests for understanding and for intelligence. Whereas the former requires 'word-world connections' (a.k.a. real world experience), the latter calls upon the 'production of flexible response' (36). Robinson accepts that though intelligence is necessary for understanding words, 'intelligently manipulating words is not sufficient for understanding them' (37). Just as one prepares to say 'Big Deal' about intelligence, Robinson rejects the claim that Searle shows no machine to be capable of understanding. The suspicion next grows that the cognitive and the affective aren't meaningfully separable, so Robinson tackles the feelings of robots and ends, again, on a compromised note. No, robots likely can't have feelings, so what they talk about can't have much point. Still, they may be intelligent, 'produce flexible verbal responses' (80).

Putting aside these deep worries, Robinson devotes the rest of his book to implementation. What inner engine could power a Turing game winner? Here *Computers, Minds & Robots* shines with expository clarity. Chapter 5 presents a lucid account of Turing machines with an accompanying

exercise for the reader. This builds to an informal exposition of Universal Turing Machines, programs, and the concept of computability, quite enough to whet the appetite for more details. And enough to make intelligible the issue about our being modelled by Turing machines. J.R. Lucas' challenge in 'Minds, Machines, and Gödel' enjoys in Chapter 6 another clear exposition. Further problems with computational models of language, with the contrived limits of AI experiments, with the sheer limitations of linear processing lead naturally to doubts about whether our intelligent use of words employs a 'sentence-processing strategy' (138). Disappointments with digital computer models turn us literally inward — no surprise to Searle — to an examination of how the brain processes inputs and generates outputs. Neurophysiology supplies notions of how data might be processed through networks, and a new breed of virtual data processors arises under the name of Parallel Distributed Processing. The problem, as ever, is with rules for the use of language and their appropriate application. Though PDP networks may associate patterns, applying rules may not come to that merely. But 'if PDP networks do not explain how to apply rules, then they do not explain something that is absolutely central to our intelligent performances' (220).

The limits of PDP turn out oddly to mirror, at least in spirit, those concerning robots and feelings. In neither case can we make sense of any higher-order reason or point to rule application or meaningful utterance because in neither case can we appeal to the intrinsic purposiveness of living things. Dreyfus' doubts about sentential AI draw upon an emergentist Hegelian view that an increase in quantitative complexity may yield qualitative, categorial, novelty. Human talk is not just one huge chess game with many more pieces and moves. In order to expand the mind modelling context to meet the reality, Robinson asks that we 'try to understand the development of intelligence as the development of improvements in meeting requirements for useful (life-sustaining) action' (232).

Once again Naturalism strikes back. One is inclined to shout 'Hallelujah! It's about Time!' Thought and action are not plausibly separable departments of some large de-centralized corporation. That's pathologically Cartesian and past it. The brain is not just some intricate PDP implementation. It's an organ which has made it biologically, adaptively. It is an ethological commonplace that intelligence is shared among those who do and do not use language. It's a biological fact that some non-humans are intelligent if we are. But that makes the whole linguistic adventure terribly narrow-minded, narrow-sighted, and obsessive. Intelligence, indeed, is one of life's general adaptive blessings. Why then the peculiarly and literally anti-biotic obsession with language? The disappointment in AI models, the nagging sense that something is missing, suggests there's a categorial divide between intelligent *creatures* and intelligent *machines*. Perhaps the latter category has very little of interest to teach us. Perhaps an open look at the neglected all-natural BIOS wouldn't hurt either.

The 'higher-level organizing principles' (231) needed to make sense of networks or linear processing turn out to be of an adaptive, teleological, evolutionary nature. Neural mechanisms are sorted relative to the Terran imperative to live long and prosper. Robinson's 'action-directed' view simply re-affirms the biological truism that creatures have to get on with their own business. Robots of my acquaintance haven't any of their own business, have nothing as such to do, let alone anything much to talk about. How could they mean anything if they can't do anything?

But what about wetware? Robinson will have none of that insisting that robots are 'essentially "metal people"' (77). What a shame, though. Doesn't that (arbitrary) boundary rob the issue of much of its deeper fascination?

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Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, ed.
Essays on Aristotle's Poetics.
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1992.
Pp. xii + 435.
US $69.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-06872-0);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-01498-1).

As an introduction to the philosophical and aesthetic problems raised by Aristotle's *Poetics*, this collection of twenty-one essays, all but five original to this book, is the best. It is not casual reading: the level of argument is high, and presupposes a close acquaintance with Aristotle, at least in translation. The contributions have been selected with a view to covering the major topics in the *Poetics*: individual studies are devoted to action (*praxis*), representation or imitation (*mimêsis*), plot (*muthos*) and what lies outside it, character and thought (*êthos* and *dianoia*), error (*hamartia*), necessity and chance, history versus poetry, pity and fear, and catharsis, as well as to Aristotle's appreciation of actual Greek tragedies, the pleasure specific to the enjoyment of tragedy and comedy, and Aristotle's usefulness to the practical critic. Many of the chapters offer full-scale interpretations of the *Poetics*, and so there is plenty of overlap in the subjects analyzed. Where this happens, do not expect agreement. Though the contributors know one another's work, they are likely to come down solidly on different sides of such questions as the nature of catharsis (purge, purification, education, dénouement), the quality of tragic pleasure (intellectual, emotional, a combination of the two), error (a moral flaw, an intellectual flaw, not a flaw at all), Aristotle's relation to Plato (massive, none), and so forth.

It is not a matter of multiple choice. The analyses are dense, and one is likely to be convinced of each position in turn. There is not the place for critical comment, but if you want to fight back, here are some differences to ponder.

Rorty's introductory chapter on 'The Psychology of Aristotelian Tragedy' argues that the 'plots of tragedies reveal the significant structures that unite serious actions ... into a self-contained whole' (8). But tragic actions are commonly thwarted actions: can the story of Oedipus really be seen as revealing 'the form and point' of his action (7)? Rüdiger Bittner, on the contrary, argues that 'there is no satisfactory account of "one action" on Aristotelian lines, since ... Aristotle needs an idea of units of meaningful activity for that, and this idea is inaccessible' (103); Bittner adds that if 'one action' means the kind of concentration in which everything hangs on a single decision, that is true enough of tragedy, but is also its defect — life is not like that. Dorothea Frede takes the view that dramatic action does not represent the action of a single individual, but rather 'a sequence of interactions between different agents' (211); but this is, as Frede knows, a far cry from anything in the *Ethics*. Elizabeth Belfiore elicits Aristotle's conception of dramatic structure from his own plot summary of his favorite tragedy, Euripides' *Iphigeneia in Tauris*; she notes his emphasis on Orestes' relationship with Iphigeneia, and concludes that the family bond, rather than intrigue, is central to Aristotle's reading (374). Would two versions of the same story differ significantly on this analysis? From Aristotle's references to Polyidos' play, it would seem that he was not much interested in this problem.

For Aryeh Kosman, drama imitates characters speaking about worlds real to them (57); it imitates 'agents acting' (58), not the thing they act. Paul Woodruff takes the position that 'A mimesis of an action is not necessarily an enactment' (80). Woodruff interprets *mimêsis* in the active sense of producing an imitative response in the audience: it is 'the art of arranging for one thing to have an effect that properly belongs to another' (91). There is room in this account for the thing imitated — a representation of a lion produces the effect that real lions produce — but, as Woodruff acknowledges, the inclusion of psychological effect in the operation of *mimêsis* is highly speculative. If there were consensus on the nature of an action, we might be closer to understanding imitation.

Good people suffer in tragedy. Why? There is an element of luck in success. According to Cynthia Freeland, if the hero of a drama is crushed, it must be the result of a deliberate action (passive protagonists are ruled out), but not one that follows from a flaw in character (119). Nancy Sherman too would rule out vice as a quality of tragic *hamartia*, though a protagonist's ignorance may be faulted: 'If only Phaedra were more circumspect in whom she trusted as confidante...' (189). But I wonder whether *hamartia* is a helpful notion if it isolates this moment as the ethical center of Euripides' *Hippolytus*.

Stephen White agrees with Martha Nussbaum that a good person may, through ill luck, commit actions that are regrettable and blameworthy; if

such moral luck affects the character of the agent, then the result is a change in moral fortune, as White labels it (225); and this Aristotle excludes from the best kind of tragedy. Nussbaum adds that, for this very reason, Aristotle is a better critic of Sophocles, where the protagonist's nobility manages to shine through misfortune, than he is of Euripides, whose *Hecuba* (285) reveals the power of events to corrupt character.

Jonathan Lear reviews the arguments for catharsis as a purgation of the emotions, a purification of the emotions, and an education of the emotions, and concludes that none of the above is possible, since the virtuous person, who enjoys tragedy, needs none of the above. By a process of elimination, which leans rather heavily on the immunity of the virtuous to improvement, Lear concludes that tragedy awakens its audience — including the virtuous members — to 'the fact that there are certain emotional possibilities that we ignore in ordinary life' (334). Alexander Nehamas defends the view that catharsis refers to the resolution of the plot; it is *pathêmata* in the sense of tragic events that are clarified in tragedy (307). Richard Janko rejects this interpretation outright (346), and supports the proposition that catharsis improves or educates our emotions. Janko considers in particular the emotions specific to comic catharsis, and of 'the emotions associated with comedy' he singles out laughter (350). I have my doubts whether Aristotle would have considered laughter an emotion, any more than crying. Leon Golden argues that the opposite of pity, according to Aristotle, is indignation (*nemesan*), and that this must be the comic emotion par excellence (382). I am inclined to agree, but we still need an equivalent to fear: here, again following the *Rhetoric*, I would propose *tharsos* or high confidence.

I have space only to mention the contributions by Mary Whitlock Blundell, Wayne Booth, Stephen Halliwell, Deborah Roberts, G.E.M. de Ste Croix, and Jean-Pierre Vernant. It is an excellent collection, and should keep the reader busy for months.

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Stuart Sim
Beyond Aesthetics: Confrontations with Poststructuralism and Postmodernism.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1992.
Pp. ix + 181.
Cdn $45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-2951-5);
Cdn $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-7777-3).

Despite its title, *Beyond Aesthetics* is about the vexed relations between postmodern philosophy and emancipatory politics. Has the fracturing of the metanarratives of progress, historical agency and universal liberation opened new possibilities for the rejuvenation of a sclerotic political left which otherwise looks more centrist everyday? Or, on the contrary, is the postmodern attention to margins and edges, hetero-this and micro-that, itself a symptom of late capitalist domination operating by means of fragmentation and dispersal? Stuart Sim wades into these debates by investigating the political implications of the work of Derrida, Hartman, Lyotard and Baudrillard.

Without denying differences between his four subjects, Sim treats them as a group united by antifoundational commitments. Sim means by antifoundationalism the philosophical position that challenges the possibility of grounding value judgments by appeal to self-evident or indefeasible criteria. Thus, the theorists examined all turn out to be versions of the philosophical skeptic (Sim analogizes them to Hume) who tries to lay bare the aporias in foundational political philosophy and also to reimagine a critical activity consistent with the lack of solid ground. Although he is generally unsympathetic with the positive projects of his subjects, finding that they either give up serious philosophical critique altogether (Baudrillard and sometimes Derrida) or smuggle foundations back in (Lyotard and sometimes Derrida), Sim does try to build a bridge between postmodernism and emancipatory politics. In Derrida and Lyotard Sim locates some 'nuisance' value, a capacity to remind systematic left theorists of the costs of closure and totalization to putatively liberatory projects. Nonetheless, Sim concludes that postmodernism is incapable of supporting an emancipatory politics and that 'antifoundationalism is an ideologically problematical position in which a surface radicalism all too frequently flatters to deceive' (84).

Although this is surely an important topic for anyone interested in the connections between philosophical critique and contemporary politics, Sim does little, I fear, to advance our understanding of it. The problem stems from his conception of antifoundationalism as an attempt to go 'beyond aesthetics,' beyond value judgment. Sim argues that making judgments requires foundations, that aesthetics is 'traditionally the site of legislation regarding the art and practice of critical value judgment' (1) and hence that

postmodern theory, insofar as it is antifoundational, intends to be post-aesthetic. These are all puzzling claims, and the central one about the role of aesthetics seems to me importantly wrong. Whether criticism requires indefeasible grounds is surely questionable, but that it was the project of aesthetics to legislate such grounds flies in the face of the original construction of the aesthetic as an autonomous domain. The problem posed by Kant such that a deduction of the judgment of taste is required is that there are intersubjectively valid judgments despite there being no principles of taste. The aesthetic, in other words, just is the domain of judgments without foundations. Hence, when Lyotard makes the claim which Sim labels astonishing that 'I judge but if I am asked by what criteria do I judge, I will have no answer to give,' it is precisely the aesthetic that is not gone beyond. Rather, Lyotard is trying to make aesthetics go beyond itself into domains in which — and here is a familiar criticism of postmodern critical theory — it traditionally does not belong.

Sim's misunderstanding of the aesthetic mars several of his readings. For instance, he interprets Derrida's conception of difference by saying 'where there are no fixed origins or points of presence, then aesthetic and moral judgments evaporate even as they are being made' (47). On the contrary: it is only where origin and presence are absent that aesthetic judgment begins, and the proper question then is whether the same is, can be, or should be true of moral and political judgment. Or, when Lyotard calls for reestablishing 'the rights of the critical tribunal' in matters of politics, he is trying to make the validation of political judgment more like the discursive validation of the reflective judgment of taste which is at the heart of philosophical aesthetics. It has been argued famously that this aestheticization of politics breeds its own dangers, but that it is a call to go beyond aesthetics seems to me quite backward.

Given both that Sim is interested in the relation of politics and philosophy, with the evaluation of works of art and natural beauty nowhere on his map, and that he believes postmodernism wants to go beyond aesthetics, one wonders in the end why he chooses to frame his analysis in terms of the aesthetic at all. If Sim had dealt with the extension of the aesthetic, of judgment without principles, into the political the purpose of the frame would have been clear, but then this would have been a different book. The result is a treatise oddly irrelevant to aesthetics and so also at right angles to the theorists discussed.

One final point: Sim announces in the introduction that he means to address his topic from a broadly socialist position 'which demands that discourses be made to declare their commitments' (4). To be fair, then, this review ought to adopt a confessional tone also. Although for Sim the confrontation between socialism and postmodern philosophy has something of the force of an encounter between liberatory politics and mere thought, for me, an American reader, this charge is missing. Whether, even as it guides political activity, socialism can provide a uniquely valuable practical vantage for the evaluation of other political programs depends on whether

it has a base in political parties, trade unions, or civic organizations. Hence, and I note this without celebration, there may be a relevant national difference in regard to the political pointedness of *Beyond Aesthetics*. Whether this is so will be decided by readers who have models of intellectual commitment to the socialist metanarrative more recent than, say, C. Wright Mills.

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John B. Stewart
Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1992.
Pp. 325.
US $45.00 (ISBN 0-691-08626-5).

Stewart's book is a substantial and well researched work on the foundations, commitments, and ultimate goals of Hume's political philosophy. Stewart's aim is to show that, contrary to the interpretations of such scholars as Livingston, Miller, and Whelan, Hume's thought was not conservative, but liberal.

The first two chapters provide historical context. Stewart presents general synopses of the theories of the legalists, Grotius and Pufendorf, the moral rationalists Clarke and Wollaston, the egoists, Hobbes and Mandeville, and of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Butler, who, in emphasizing the role of human passions and affections, directly set the stage for Hume's moral science of human nature.

Chapters three and four present an overview of Hume's moral theory, an account of his theory of justice, and of his view of civil society. Stewart's treatment is sympathetic and contains many valuable insights, but it also has a number of serious problems. Stewart deserves credit for noting an important point rarely recognized by commentators, *viz.*, that in his account of justice Hume was attempting to solve a problem evident in Hutcheson's moral sentiment theory. According to Hutcheson the morality of an action lies in the motive, and the only moral motive is benevolence — the desire for the happiness of others based on love. But Hutcheson claims (and Hume concurs) that human benevolence is partial and limited. How, then, can the motive of benevolence be the source of the moral merit of justice, which extends beyond those near and dear to those whom we do not love, even to strangers and enemies?

According to Stewart, Hume's solution is to reject the view that the moral merit of justice is traceable to benevolence. Moral obligation should not be confused with natural affection. Indeed, Stewart suggests that Hume's reason for beginning his account of morality with the artificial virtues is to prevent such confusion. But Stewart's interpretation here ignores the fact that, after having explained the origin of justice in the non-moral motive of interest, Hume tells us that to understand the *moral* merit of justice, we must wait until he examines the natural virtues. This claim seems inexplicable unless we suppose that moral obligation, including that of justice, has its basis in the natural affections.

Furthermore, in supporting his interpretation Stewart constantly confuses Hume's account of the nature of moral qualities with his account of the nature of moral approval. Stewart argues, for instance, that according to Hume, 'it is sympathetic perception, not love or the benevolence that follows love, that ties all mankind together,' and that sympathy 'is not strong enough to make us love the virtuous ... or hate the vicious ...' (132). But this does not address the question of the nature of moral qualities, which was what Hutcheson claimed to consist in benevolence. Sympathetic perception has to do with the nature of moral approval. To show that moral approval of justice does not consist in love or benevolence does not show that the moral quality we approve is not the motive of love or benevolence.

The final two chapters are devoted to Stewart's main thesis — that Hume is a liberal, not a conservative. They contain an analysis of the principles underlying Hume's notion of legitimate evaluation of political orders, and his recommendations for social and political reform. There is a wealth of information here concerning Hume's positions on various political controversies of his day, e.g., the effects of the Union on Scotland, and the Wilkes and Liberty affair. There are also some thoughtful, though likely to be controversial, interpretations of a number of Hume's political essays, for instance, 'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth,' in which Stewart rightly takes Hume to be offering a serious ideal for constitutional reform.

According to Stewart, while Hume eschews political rationalism, which attempts to model and evaluate political orders by abstract rational principles, he does not reject all manner of reason and reflection in framing models, and evaluating orders. Political orders develop naturally and unreflectively out of the social interactions of ordinary human beings confronting particular problems and situations. But the unreflectively formed practices and institutions can be refined, improved, and even abandoned as a result of critical reflection, which embodies the true principles of reasoning from experience, the principles found in the experimental method.

Although it has many merits, if one approaches this book with the hope of finding conservative interpretations of Hume subjected to a sound drubbing, one will be disappointed to find what is more an exercise in shadowboxing. There is little presented here regarding the basic principles of Hume's political thought with which Stewart's opponents are likely to disagree. The main difference is that which Stewart calls 'liberal', his opponents call

'conservative'. Which is correct? One will find no answer here because the book fails to provide any philosophical account of exactly what constitutes conservativism or liberalism. This is a rather astonishing omission in a book devoted to the question of whether Hume is a conservative or liberal. Apparently Stewart thinks that, because the terms 'conservative' and 'liberal' have public meanings, the public meanings will be adequate for answering the central question. Unfortunately, this is false. A public meaning of 'conservative' may make it perfectly reasonable for the media to refer to old Soviet hard-liners as conservatives, but one would hardly suppose that this implies they share a political ideological persuasion with Burke, Thatcher, or Buckley. Yet Stewart clearly employs just this notion of conservative throughout the book. A conservative is someone who favors whatever practice or institution happens to be established. A liberal is someone who favors reform. Stewart thus asks, 'Does Hume ever say that whatever is customary in society is always good' (209)? Surely not. But neither do any of Stewart's opponents attribute this view to Hume. For that matter, what actual conservative thinkers ever held such a view? Surely if they did, they would not be constantly clamouring for reform or even elimination of many of the customary practices and institutions for which they do indeed constantly clamour.

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Yusuf K. Umar, ed.
George Grant and the Future of Canada.
University of Calgary Press 1992. Pp. x + 175.
US $15.95 (ISBN 1-895176-22-0).

'There are no specialists, there are only vested interests' (W. Rathenau). The above quote from Grant's book, *English-Speaking Justice*, (fn. 103) aptly captures the contents of this collection of essays, proceedings of the conference, 'George Grant and the Future of Canada' (University of Calgary, 1990).

George Grant said, 'Obviously no sane person predicts the details of the future' (*George Grant in Process*, Anansi, 1978, 13). This fact was quoted by Zdravko Planinc at the beginning of 'Paradox and Polyphony in Grant's Critique of Modernity.' Planinc then engages in an exploration and critique of the many voices of Grant — the traditional voice, the Hegelian, the daimon of Grant's personae, the technological, the Straussian, the Nietzschean, the Christian-Platonic, and the Heidegger voice — the implication being that these voices are 'contradictory' (84). Yet Planinc is sensitive to the Grant

process of thought. He suggests that Grant's commitment to tradition acts as a synthesis, a balance between the voices, and that his discourse offers truth as 'spiritual polyphony' not argument. Planinc's post-modernist analysis leaves the reader wading, at times, through such sentences as 'Even Heidegger's parousiastic ontology, which attempts to immanentize the world-transcendent ground, requires only openness to the presencing of being in time from human beings, not love' (39). If Grant's discourse is a spiritual polyphonic vehicle of insight, then clear contradictions surely are more accessible than obfuscated truths.

The collection of essays includes authors who are well-known Grant scholars, as well as some new-comers. William Christian, a frequent contributor to Grant literature, argues in 'Religion, Faith, and Love' that Grant has 'one clear view of the nature of religion, not as a spiritual force but rather as a social organization' (47) — a view aligned with Leo Strauss. Christian's clear style gives the reader immediate access to the argument, one that has a long tradition in early Canadian philosophy. He explicates Grant's skepticism about the usefulness of Christianity as a public religion, and argues that such doubt is not incompatible with Grant's personal claim to be Christian. Grant's Christian love surpasses modernist reason. One is free to choose one's path, and one choice is to love, beyond self-interest.

Grant scholars will look for what *is* new beyond old themes newly interpreted. There are analyses which qualify as new ground. In 'Multiculturalism and Nationhood', A.J. Parel raises questions about the oxymoronic underpinnings of Canadian culture, multicultural Canada. Parel explores our present 'moral slavery to the empire of liberalism and to the universal, homogeneous state' (46). He defends the duality of French-English tradition, and questions the trend toward multiculturalism as 'a convenient instrument of realizing the ambitions of self-promoters' (149). But the asking of hard questions deteriorates into a polemic rant full of unanswered doomsday-style questions.

'Military integration and George Grant's *Lament for a Nation*', by R.C. Davidson, is a no-nonsense description of the military partnerships between Canada and the United States in the post-war period (50s and 60s). The details hammer home the point: Grant's vision in *Lament for a Nation* told the truth. Davidson, however, suggests that salvation of nation state will come through greater defence spending. Grant, a lover of peace, might shudder at Davidson's thesis, no matter how depressing a picture his report presents.

A third penetrating analysis is by Christopher Manfredi, 'Constitutional Adjudication and the Crisis of Modern Liberalism.' Manfredi spells out the differences between the American and the Canadian interpretation of rights cases, and deftly connects the Canadian cases to Grant's critique of liberalism. The location of the dignity enhancement provision in either constitutional supremacy or judicial supremacy is a critical factor in defining the nature of a political regime. In Manfredi's view, Grant's sensitivity to this question marks him as contemporarily relevant.

Throughout, the anthology is testimony to the interdisciplinary character of Canadian thought. Yusuf Umar, political scientist, introduces the anthology with 'The Philosophical Context of George Grant's Political Thought', a nimble dance of the dialectic through Grant, Hegel, Strauss and Kojeve. Rainer Knopff, political scientist, explores the epistemic relations between 'Rights, Power-Knowledge, and Social Technology.' Samuel Ajzenstat, philosopher, reviews 'The Place of Abortion in Grant's Thought.' An important, if skeptical, inquiry into myth and Canadian identity by Barry Cooper conjoins old friends, poet Dennis Lee and George Grant. Cooper explores Lee's poetic silence resulting from Lee's realization that his voice has been a product of a narrow myth (propogated by Grant and others), not a culture. Cooper urges us to rethink our culture in the wake of our myths. He also intimates that the lack of plausible myths leaves Canadian culture fragmented and vulnerable. The future, by implication, bodes ill.

As in all anthologies one must pick and choose. The offerings are heavily dominated by political scientists and few address directly the conference topic. With the exception of Cooper and Christian, there is little attempt to place Grant in any historical context of political, philosophical or religious theorizing in Canada. This Grant would have deplored. 'All species, human as much as non-human, can only be understood as continually changing, that is, as having histories' (Grant, *Time as History* 1969, 26).

Grant was a synthesis of Canadian history and modernism. He turned down a lucrative position in California. His father left an indelible mark on the character of Queen's University. (Young George was a pall bearer for Canadian philosopher John Watson.) Grant held a joint appointment at McMaster University and later, a triple appointment at Dalhousie. He did not acknowledge his own history, but then few thinkers do. Grant's Hegelian, conservative and tradition-bound roots are all emergent from his culture. Because of the richness of that culture his works have been claimed as relevant to many disciplines. His assessors, in this volume, extending Grant's relevance into contemporary concerns, seem often to have wrenched his views beyond their historical context. Grant's works largely survive the dislocation.

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Gregory Vlastos
Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1991.
Pp. xii + 334.
US $57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2551-4);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-9787-6).

Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher is the last book Gregory Vlastos published before he died October 12, 1991. It stands as a remembrance of him as both an eminent philosopher and a revered teacher. From the first pages of the book's Introduction we are greeted with a philosopher who welcomes views different from his own as opportunities to gain deeper understanding and to refine his arguments. Vlastos' writing style is one of acuity and care which quickly alerts the reader that she is in the hands of a philosopher who lived and breathed the Socratic texts.

The book consists of three parts. First, the chapters that constitute the main body of the book are a combination of revised papers either published or previously presented, and new material. Second, the footnotes in the main body are an invaluable companion to the chapter text. The footnotes provide the expected references and sources, but also catalogue issues and views discussed over the years, provide comments on the Greek, offer further arguments to support the claims in the main text and much more. And third, the Additional Notes compiled at the end of the book are mini-essays (with their own set of footnotes) too long to include in the chapter footnotes. When an additional note is relevant to the main text, it is noted in a footnote. The book's tripartite construction allows the reader to engage in Vlastos-on-Socrates at different levels, but the reader should be leery to claim understanding of Vlastos' views unless all three sections are read.

Vlastos' task is to set out the historic, philosophical Socrates and not just 'a Socrates in Plato' (for this latter approach see Santas' *Socrates* [Routledge]) (45). In Chapter One, Vlastos presents who Socrates is in style: an ironist. Vlastos argues that Socrates' riddling variety of philosophy was the historic paradigm responsible for changing the Attic practice of εἰρωνεία from an intentional deceitful act to what we, following Quintilian, take to be irony: 'something contrary to what is said is to be understood' (21). According to Vlastos, the ironic Socrates 'has the demon of contentiousness within him' (155) and is not 'the ideal philosopher pursuing truth in the ideal way in which Plato himself came to think, later, in life, truth should be pursued' (155). But the difficulty is discerning which statements of Socrates are ironic and which are not. Too often useful disagreement about interpretation is thwarted by a claim that Socrates is simply being ironic. Although no one could give a foolproof procedure for locating Socratic irony, the combination of Chapters One and Five and Additional Notes 1.1 and 5.1 provide both strategies for locating Socratic irony and a model for arguing for instances of it.

In Chapter Two and the remaining chapters, Vlastos itemizes the philosophical contribution of the historical Socrates and fleshes them out by offering (i) detailed contrasts between the views of Socrates and Plato, (ii) evidence from Xenophon, Aristotle, and the historical and intellectual milieu, and (iii) detailed accounts of some major Socratic themes: piety, rejection of retaliation, and the relationship of happiness and virtue. The material contrasting the views of Socrates and Plato make sections of the book as much about Plato as Socrates. Chapter Two (along with its accompanying footnotes and additional notes) provides the reader with an excellent discussion of Plato's account of the soul, and his theories of recollection and Forms; and Chapter Four details the influence of mathematics on Plato's philosophy and his subsequent rejection of the Socratic elenchus.

Vlastos' Socrates is a good guy with revolutionary views about religion and morality. In Chapter Five 'Does Socrates cheat?' Vlastos defends Socrates against many scholars' claims that Socrates imposes false premises on his interlocutors, albeit for their own good (132-3). Vlastos is committed to the view that Socrates cannot be involved in willful untruth because of his moral character and obedience to fulfilling his divine mission. Vlastos is right to focus on Socrates' discussion with Polus in the *Gorgias* (the dialogue Vlastos takes as the pinnacle of Socratic philosophy) since it is filled with arguments and claims that are dubious in nature. Vlastos argues away many of the *Gorgias* arguments by attributing to Socrates himself an inability to digest their complex philosophical structure. In this we get a breath of reality: Socrates is human after all.

According to Vlastos, Socrates was a revolutionary: he believed contrary to his community's tradition (i) that the gods were rational and could only do good and (ii) that the practice of justice as retaliation was wrong. Vlastos' arguments for these claims in Chapters Six and Seven show the importance to Socratic scholarship of placing Socrates and his philosophy in the fifth century B.C. with all its history and traditions. The setting of Socrates in his historical contexts along with Vlastos' intimate knowledge of the Socratic texts allows Vlastos to make sense of the claim that Socrates was a 'god-maker,' of the importance of Socrates' refusal to escape from jail, and of why Socrates would have such a place in our history.

As the title of the book indicates, Socrates was a moral philosopher, and, according to Vlastos, that is all he was. It is Plato who expands his philosophical project to epistemology and metaphysics. So, Socrates' place in the development of Greek moral theory is paramount. According to Vlastos, '[Socrates] is the first to establish the eudaemonist foundation of ethical theory which becomes common ground for all the schools that spring up around him and more; he is the founder of the non-instrumentalist form of eudaemonism held in common by Platonists, Aristotelians, Cynics, and Stoics, i.e., of all Greek moral philosophers except the Epicureans' (10). The last pages of Chapter Six contain the most interesting comments about Socratic eudaemonism, namely its relationship to Socratic piety: '[Socratic

piety] brings a release from that form of egocentricity which is endemic in Socratic eudaemonism, as in all eudaemonism' (177). This comment contains the key to understanding Socrates' behavior in the Socratic dialogues, but unfortunately Vlastos does not carry through with this insight and it nowhere appears in the book's culminating chapter, 'Happiness and virtue in Socrates' moral theory.'

The philosophical community can be assured that *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher* will not be the last of Vlastos' significant contributions since before Gregory Vlastos died he was hard at work on the sequel.

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Elizabeth Wolgast
Ethics of an Artificial Person: Lost Responsibility in Professions and Organizations.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1992.
Pp. x + 161.
US $10.95 (ISBN 0-8047-2034-7).

The theme of Elizabeth Wolgast's short book is an important one — how we can and should locate responsibility for the actions of artificial persons. She has in mind, as the sub-title suggests, individuals or groups of real live persons who act in roles (the lawyer, the health professional, the politician, the military service person) or in groups (the corporation, the committee, the department, the platoon, the parliament) in ways that seem to insulate those real persons from full personal responsibility for their actions. As EW shows, our current moral practices do not handle these problematic contexts in ways that are satisfying at the level of critical morality. Lawyers appeal to the idea that even the most despicable defendant deserves the best representation: military personnel claim they were only fulfilling their primary obligation and were obeying orders: committees announce decisions without giving information about the actual discussion: corporations hide behind diversified chains and loci of decision-making — all in order to disclaim responsibility for actions which, were they performed by a regular person, would bring down criticism and repudiation on the actor.

EW's own proposal is for a breaking-down of these insulating walls of role and institution. She proposes that institutional design be guided by 'one simple, governing principle: that is, to strive to create the conditions required

by the moral paradigm' (157) of the individual autonomous and responsible agent. She has, broadly speaking, two arguments for this. The first I have alluded to, that responsibility finds a resting-place, and thus undesirable actions can be resisted or ended. The second focuses on something not always focused on in discussions of this topic — the alienating effect on the individual her- or himself of action separated from the 'moral phenomenology' (a phrase she borrows from Thomas Nagel: cf. 67ff. and *The View from Nowhere* [O.U.P. 1986], 180-2) of that action — the experience of actually doing something, one's felt response to the action reasoned about. She envisages a world in which:

> professional and corporate obligations exist side by side with a person's other obligations and make their claims in the same moral arena. In it a person works out her decisions, always in her own name; she doesn't lack ground for rejecting morally doubtful projects; and she has full responsibility for both her decisions and her acts. (157)

She gives (148-57) brief and suggestive sketches of how the legal profession, government, corporations and the military might be reformed under her guiding principle.

For all the value and importance of EW's aims in the book, and substantive conclusions, the book is nonetheless a disappointment overall. Reading it is like rummaging around in an attic full of bric-à-brac. Virtually every page has a quotation from someone on it, and many from several. Very rarely does EW state a thesis, explain and defend it in her own authorial voice. She assembles reminders of other peoples' maps, not of the landscape itself. The familiar names are there — Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, Gerald Postema, Susan Wolf, David Luban, Peter French, R.F. Holland, Peter Winch, Milton Friedman, Hobbes, Sartre, Dostoievsky, Plato. Some are not familiar, because of the general lack (to some extent remedied here) of serious attention to issues of military ethics in standard discussions of professional ethics — Anthony Hartle, James Stockdale (the book was in part written during a stay at the U.S. Military Academy). Miscellaneous anthropological data also finds its way in from time to time. The result is a very choppy style of presentation, which does a disservice to the importance of her themes. Moreover, she mentions most of these people in order to take ad hoc potshots at what she quotes from them. As a result, we get an awful lot of dots and a few lines connecting them, but no coherent final picture. Of the ten chapters, one is introductory, eight argue negatively, and only the last (from which the passages I have quoted above are taken) argues positively — too unbalanced a structure.

All the same, very many of EW's potshots hit their target. She has a shrewd and penetrating eye for obfuscation and evasion in the holier-than-thou pronouncements of 'suits' of one sort or another and their academic defenders. One person who gets a raw deal, though, is Nagel. EW writes off (102-7) his position in his well-known paper 'Ruthlessness in Public Life' (in *Mortal Questions* [C.U.P. 1979]; originally in S. Hampshire, ed. *Public and*

Private Morality [C.U.P. 1978]) as just another defence of roles and professional/institutional interests. Yet the view is much more sophisticated than that. Nagel presents the virtue of impartiality both as one institutions are particularly well placed to instantiate and as one which makes sense only within an overall picture of morality as the province of individuals. EW may feel that Nagel's view in the end will not do — but she owes it to Nagel and to the reader to take the view, initially at least, on its own terms.

I have two other complaints as to omissions. First, EW shows only a brief passing awareness that the issue of the justification of institutional and role morality cannot avoid being implicated in wider questions which have preoccupied recent moral philosophy. I have in mind the discussion of agent-relative and agent-neutral conceptions of morality and moral reasoning; the discussion of consequentialism and the value of personal integrity. Yet her conclusions about the need to radically reconfigure our moral thought and to make the values of personal autonomy and integrity supreme shows little awareness of the deeper implications of her view. Second, she makes no mention of what I regard as the conceptually most sophisticated and factually informed discussion of her general topic in recent years, Meir Dan-Cohen's excellent book *Rights, Persons and Organizations* (U California Press 1986). Dan-Cohen presents there a putative scheme for the justification of institutions which is quite different and richer than any EW considers, even though his own view comes out in the end as sharing some of EW's worries about rights, persons and organizations.

In short, EW's book is important for the questions it raises, and for the debunking of existing complacency. But the positive argument does not advance the discussion very far.

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