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Robert M. Baird and
Stuart E. Rosenbaum, eds.
Animal Experimentation: The Moral Issues
Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books 1991. Pp. 182.
US$14.95. ISBN 0-87975-667-5.

Peter Singer
Animal Liberation (Second Edition)
Avon Books 1990. Pp. xviii+320.
ISBN 0-380-71333-0.

Animal Liberation was originally published in 1975, and soon became one of the most influential and important books ever published on the moral status of animals. Singer claims a new edition is now needed. He notes that a great deal 'has been written on this topic — much of it commenting on the position taken in the first edition of this book. ... Some response to all this discussion seemed necessary, if only to indicate the extent to which I have or have not altered my views' (x). In addition, *Animal Liberation* contains two chapters documenting the use of animals in experiments and on factory farms. These chapters have been updated, and this constitutes the major change in the new edition. Otherwise, the changes in the book are not major, and none of them alter the main themes and arguments of the first edition.

Providing a basis for critical discussion of the moral status of animal experimentation is the stated aim of *Animal Experimentation: The Moral Issues*. As Baird and Rosenbaum note in the Introduction, 'the issue of animal experimentation will present increasingly difficult challenges in the years ahead. ... We hope this collection of essays will be a positive contribution to efforts to meet this challenge with some grace and wisdom' (14). All of the sixteen essays, with one exception, have been previously published. The anthology has an introduction and is organized into five parts.

The Introduction raises questions about the moral status of animals, and these questions are used to introduce the notion of speciesism. The theological rationales for speciesism are briefly considered. Examples of experiments performed on animals are also presented. As an introduction to the moral issues surrounding animals and the essays that follow, the Introduction is less than satisfactory. The discussion of speciesism is too brief, and there is no discussion of utilitarianism, rights-based theories, or the differences between them. Since many of the essays involve theoretical assumptions and arguments about morality, the Introduction needs some discussion of the relevant concepts and notions.

Part One (Approaching the Issue) includes four essays that 'introduce the moral controversy about animal experimentation; their style and content will be congenial to readers largely unfamiliar with moral philosophy' (14). Two of the essays (Zak's 'Ethics and Animals' and Wright's 'Are Animals People Too?') certainly can be described in such terms. They both involve articulate reflections about the moral complexities of animal experimentation. Ryder's 'Speciesism', the third essay, also is congenial and thought provoking. The

first essay (White's 'Beastly Questions'), however, is little more than an emotional outburst in favor of animal experimentation.

Part Two (Animal Advocates and Their Critics) 'contains position statements by two foremost advocates, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, along with carefully crafted essays distinctly critical of each of their views' (14). Any discussion of the moral status of animal experimentation requires some prior discussion of the moral status of animals in general, and Part Two fulfills this requirement. Singer's 'The Significance of Animal Suffering' provides a utilitarian defence for taking animal suffering into account morally. Gray's essay ('In Defense of Speciesism') provides a 'special duty' defense of speciesism. Speciesism 'can be coherently defended on the grounds that, just as a mother owes a special duty to her child (and for the same kind of biologically based reasons), so we owe a special duty to members of our own species' (69). It is unclear why such a defense could not be used to justify special duties based on race and sex. In 'The Attribution of Suffering', Timberlake claims that Singer's position has two defects. The first is that Singer has failed to provide any definition of suffering, while the 'second problem with Singer's approach is that there is a common quality that unites humans and separates them from animals, namely, the unique aspects of DNA found in human cells' (74). The need for gene pools to reproduce themselves provides some moral grounds for giving greater weight to the gene pool of homo sapiens over the gene pools of other animals. This theme is explored briefly but it is never made very convincing. Regan's 'The Case for Animal Rights' provides a defense of animal rights that is based on the idea that all 'subjects-of-a-life' have equal inherent moral value. Warren provides an excellent critique and criticism in 'Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position', and then goes on to defend, what she calls, a weak animal rights theory.

Part Three (Supporters of Animal Experimentation) includes three essays. Cohen's 'The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research' defends the use of animals, and argues that we should increase, not decrease, the number of animals used in experiments. Cohen claims that objections to using animals are found in arguments about rights and arguments about suffering. The first argument is rejected on the grounds that animals are not rational and autonomous and therefore cannot have rights, while the second is rejected on the grounds that human gains outweigh animal suffering when one performs the utility calculations correctly. Hettinger's 'The Responsible Use of Animals in Biomedical Research' is a direct response to Cohen's essay, and provides a point by point rebuttal of Cohen's essay. Harrison's 'Animal Pain' claims that 'Descartes' view of animal pain ... can seriously be entertained without the necessity of subscribing to Descartes' unfortunate ontology' (128).

Part Four (Positions and Proposals) 'contains a position statement adopted by the deans of thirteen medical schools of the Associated Medical Schools of New York, along with two proposals for action to address the conditions of animals in experimental facilities' (14). Singer's 'To Do or Not to Do' raises questions about the possibility of taking direct action against

experimental facilities, while Rollin's 'Some Ethical Concerns in Animal Research: Where Do We Go Next?' advances a social ethic that takes animal welfare more seriously than is the case now. His paper, the only one that was not previously published, included a number of specific recommendations aimed at the individuals involved in animal experimentation.

Part Five (Beyond Traditional Approaches) contains one essay. 'Scratching the Belly of the Beast' by Freeman and Mensch raises questions about the individualist emphasis that stands behind much of the debate concerning the moral status of animals. The essay is designed to challenge 'important moral and philosophical assumptions of both sides of the issue' (14).

Since almost all of the papers have been previously published, there is not really anything in the anthology that advances the philosophical discussion of animal experimentation. One of its strengths as a textbook is that it includes a variety of perspectives and viewpoints. However, it is worth noting that many of the essays, particularly those defending the use of animals by humans, are of dubious philosophical merit. In addition, given the Introduction, the instructor will need to supplement the readings with either explanatory lectures or other reading materials. Still, as long as these limitations are kept in mind, the book is the positive contribution to the moral debate on the issue that its editors hoped it would be.

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Michael Bakunin
Statism and Anarchy, trans. Marshall Shatz.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1990.
Pp. xlix + 243.
US$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-36182-6);
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-36973-8).

This addition to the series, 'Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought', makes available in English — for the first time in a readily available and reliable translation — the complete text of Bakunin's anarchist classic. Marshall Shatz's rendering of Bakunin's Russian is clear and readable, and he supplements the text with an index, an annotated bibliography, useful background notes, an excellent introduction, and a chronology of the principal events in Bakunin's life.

Originally published in 1873, three years before his death, *Statism and Anarchy* is probably Bakunin's best known book. Bakunin was an intriguing and complicated figure, with a magnetic personality and a penchant for

conspiracy, and he led a tumultuous life as an itinerant European revolutionary. But general readers turning to *Statism and Anarchy* for insight into this remarkable man, for a systematic statement of his political philosophy, or for a guide to anarchism in general are likely to be disappointed. Although Shatz divides the book into chapters and provides a helpful, analytic table of contents, the book remains a rambling commentary on contemporary events, much of it dated and of little enduring value.

To be sure, *Statism and Anarchy* contains declarations of Bakunin's anarchistic political creed, but these are scattered throughout the book with disappointingly little development or argument. Unlike Proudhon, whose anarchism influenced him, Bakunin upheld collectivism over individualism and welcomed violent revolution. Like Marx, he believed that the toilers must organize their own emancipation and that the function of the modern state is to oversee the capitalistic exploitation of labor. But Bakunin differed from Marx in believing that no state, 'howsoever democratic its forms, not even the reddest *political* republic' could benefit the people (24); it 'will necessarily be a prison for the proletariat' (50). For Bakunin, the idea of political liberty was a contradiction (48); the goal must be to abolish not just exploitation, not just the state, but politics itself and with it 'every kind of domination, governmental tutelage, hierarchy, and authority' (33, 48). What Bakunin wanted was the 'free organization' of the people 'in their own interests from below upward' (24), 'a voluntary fraternal union of voluntary productive associations, communes, and provincial federations, embracing without distinction ... people of every language and nationality' (90).

Bakunin wrote *Statism and Anarchy* in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and the splintering of the International Working Men's Association into Marxist and Bakunist factions in 1872. The first half of the book reviews the balance of power among European states and the revolutionary potential of different countries in the wake of Germany's victory over France. That victory, Bakunin thought, spelled German hegemony in Europe — 'there is only one truly sovereign state left on the entire continent of Europe and that is Germany' (103) — and he traced the implications of German dominance for the revolutionary movement in Europe. Because he saw Germany as expansionist and as the bastion of European reaction, Bakunin pinned his hopes for revolution on the German danger uniting the Slavs and allying them with the Latin countries, whose workers and peasants he saw as instinctually revolutionary.

These pages contain some memorable bits — for example, Bakunin's portrait of the German military machine and its officer class (77-82) and his nicely wrought description of differing class attitudes toward the Russian empire (61). But, in general, the commentary is too superficial and politically too tendentious to make it of much interest to non-specialists. Worse, Bakunin's anti-semitism and his explanatory reliance on group stereotypes or supposed cultural or national characteristics are unlikely to find favor with modern readers. Indeed, as Shatz observes, Bakunin's continual invective against the German character verges on a kind of racism. For example, the

Germans are said to have both a 'servile instinct for obedience at any price' and a 'domineering instinct for systematic subjugation of anything that is weaker' (104). They 'have never needed liberty. To them life is simply inconceivable without ... an iron hand to order them about. The stronger the hand the prouder they are and the more cheerful life becomes for them' (122).

The second half of *Statism and Anarchy* describes Bismarck's character and political objectives, the bankruptcy of nineteenth-century German liberalism, and the dour effects of Hegelianism and metaphysical speculation on German culture. Bakunin paints Lassalle, Marx, and the German social democrats as German patriots and links them to Bismarck on the grounds that they share his pan-Germanism and worship the state. Bakunin lauds Marx's erudition, but his explicit rejection of all systematic social theorizing undercuts this praise, as do his barbs about Marx's personality: 'A nervous man, some say to the point of cowardice, [Marx] is extremely ambitious and vain, quarrelsome, intolerant, and absolute, like Jehovah, the Lord God of his ancestors, and, like him, vengeful to the point of madness' (141).

Bakunin criticized (177-9) the Marxist notion that the working class should become the ruling class, arguing that even with popular representation and universal suffrage, a workers' state would still mean a privileged minority ruling over the vast majority. Bakunin's argument that proletarian rule would lead to a new despotism seems prescient today, and, interestingly, it provoked Marx to scribble several pages of rebuttal into an 1874 notebook (where he copied extracts from Bakunin's book while working on his Russian). But perhaps the best argued and, historically, the most influential part of *Statism and Anarchy* is an insightful and cohesive, twenty-page appendix on the revolutionary potential of the Russian peasantry — a problem which exercised Marx and Engels and more than one generation of Russian revolutionaries. Bakunin believed in the insurrectionary potential of the peasant communes and thought that revolutionary propaganda could unify them and help them to overcome their self-contained character. But Bakunin acknowledged that patriarchialism, faith in the tsar, and a tendency for the commune to swallow up the individual were important countervailing factors, which must be battled against. Of these, patriarchialism is 'the main historical evil,' with 'the despotism of the husband, the father, and the elder brother' inside the family propping up worship of the tsar and tyranny within the peasant commune (209-10).

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Jonathan Barnes
The Toils of Scepticism.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1990.
US$34.50. ISBN 0-521-38339-0.

Leo Groarke
Greek Scepticism.
Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 1990. Cdn$34.95.
ISBN 0-7735-0756-6.

Growing interest in ancient Greek scepticism seems to reflect two areas of resurging research: (i) studies in anti-realist epistemologies as a consequence of wide-spread disillusionment among philosophers with the familiar realist programs; the ancient sceptics are envisaged to provide case studies in the development of anti-realist theories of knowledge, somehow parallel or analogous to the contemporary dilemmas; and (ii) studies in the history of ancient Greek philosophy that seek to re-appraise the centrality of Plato, Aristotle, and the realist epistemologies that have become synonymous with their names. The recent contributions by Jonathan Barnes and Leo Groarke are expressions of just these resurging interests.

Jonathan Barnes' new work, *The Toils of Scepticism*, goes beyond the recent study he co-authored with Julia Annas *(The Modes of Scepticism [Cambridge 1985])*. Whereas the earlier work was intended to be an introduction to sceptical philosophy, the new project is intended for the more sophisticated student. The Toils is preoccupied exclusively with the works of Sextus Empiricus and focuses on the Agrippan aspect of Sextus' Pyrrhonism, namely the five modes (detailed in the 1985 work, p. 182, Appendix C): (1) the mode deriving from dispute, (2) the mode throwing one back *ad infinitum*, (3) the mode deriving from relativity, (4) the hypothetical mode, and (5) the reciprocal mode. The five modes display the chief argumentative forms in which ancient scepticism developed. Accordingly, the book investigates, exegetically and philosophically, these argument forms in so far as they exhibit a sceptical system. Corresponding to the Agrippan five modes, then, Barnes organizes his book into five chapters: (1) Disagreement, (2) Infinite regression, (3) Reciprocity, (4) Hypotheses, and (5) The sceptic's net.

Leo Groarke's objective is to provide a history of Greek precursors to modern epistemology. He states, several times, that he has tried to focus on those aspects of scepticism relevant to modern philosophical concerns. Contemporary debates on realism and anti-realism, in turn, help to shed light on the views of the ancient Greek sceptics. The contemporary debate has illuminated Groarke's insight into an issue that he regards to be the heart of the commentators misunderstanding: the *logic* of sceptic philosophy.

The account of scepticism that is proposed in his book, Groarke believes, is difficult to reconcile with the standard treatments of it. What makes the account different, in his estimation, is the attempted defense of *mitigated* scepticism and the outlook — the logic — subscribed to by its proponents.

Whereas the unmitigated sceptic suspends judgment on the truth of all beliefs — the sceptical attitude that Groarke identifies as the subject of the standard criticism of scepticism — the mitigated sceptic is able to countenance belief that is nevertheless ultimately unjustified. The mitigated sceptic can accept a belief in the external world and in the principles of reason without being able to justify them. This is to be explained by an understanding of the outlook of the mitigated sceptic who raises doubts about the rational and evidential merits of justification for given beliefs, who doubts that necessary and sufficient reasons have been or could be discovered, while still being able to accept those beliefs. Thus, *Greek Scepticism* offers a new approach — gleaned from contemporary anti-realist discussions — into an old and often neglected study of the ancient Greek sceptics. In the author's estimation, the value of the study consists, in large part, in the new-found ancient insights that it wishes to contribute to current debate; and by displaying this relevance hopes to militate against the view that Greek philosophy is a dispensable frill in modern, publicly funded, education (p. xv).

To achieve these objectives, *Greek Scepticism* consists of seven chapters. Chapters I and VII are wrappers that envelop the historical discussions. Chapter I introduces Groarke's interpretation of the sceptics by introducing the positive contribution that the ancient sceptics made to the promotion of anti-realism. Chapter VII invites the reader to consider adopting scepticism as a plausible alternative to modern and contemporary epistemology.

Chapters II and III offer an historical prelude to the introduction of sceptic doctrine by examining the status of Greek epistemology in the sixth and fifth centuries BC. The sceptics' immediate precursors, that is, the early pre-Socratic thinkers '... raise questions about the relative nature of belief and cast doubt on the human ability to establish realist truth' (47). The analysis exhibited in chapter III includes the fifth-century sophists, with special emphasis on Protagoras, Metrodorus, and Anaxarchus. Groarke treats Socrates as a mitigated sceptic, and briefly considers the supporting role played by the Megarians and Cyrenaics. Finally, a few words are said about Plato, namely to concede that with regard to an assessment of phenomena, Plato joins company with both the sophists and the sceptics; he parts company, of course, by his insistence that there is something behind and beyond the phenomena, and that this is properly the locus of knowledge.

In Chapters IV-VI, scepticism is investigated in terms of Pyrrho and early Pyrrhonism (ch. IV), the Academy (ch. V), and finally, Later Pyrrhonism (ch. VI). Groarke pursues his announced plan by offering what he regards to be an interpretation that contradicts the standard view of ancient scepticism by arguing for its mitigated, not unmitigated, character.

The studies by Barnes and Groarke surely deserve a place in undergraduate and graduate courses. Groarke's book seems to function more like Barnes/Annas 1985 work, namely, as an introduction to problems in ancient scepticism and epistemology in general. Barnes' new work can be appreciated more easily by the reader familiar with such introductory texts. Both Barnes' and Groarke's studies have the virtue of being concise. They are books that

can be read, studied, and enjoyed, without being entirely overwhelming. Groarke takes great effort to make clear not only the intricacies of debate but also the overall epistemological enterprise as he proceeds; his introductory and concluding chapter help the reader organize the wide range of thoughts investigated in the book. His bibliography is useful, as were the notes. Barnes' book is the latest in a series of deeply insightful studies of ancient Greek thought. I would have appreciated, however, a more formidable introductory chapter, more detailed notes relating the contemporary epistemological debate that Barnes' clearly has in mind (cf. note 9, p. xi), and a concluding chapter organizing the divergent strands interwoven in his impressive five-chapter study.

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Ernst Behler
Irony and the Discourse of Modernity.
Seattle: University of Washington Press 1990.
Pp. xiii + 154.
US$20.00. ISBN 0-295-96998-9.

There are four main topics and four corresponding chapters: Modernism and Postmodernism in Contemporary Thought; The Rise of Literary Modernism in the Romantic Age; Irony in the Ancient and the Modern World; and, lastly, Irony and Self-Referentiality. The author, Ernst Behler, is Professor of Comparative Literature at the University of Washington. The chapters are an expanded version and development of what is presumably an award-conferring University of Washington faculty lecture, given in 1986. In what follows I shall try to concentrate on what, in the text, would be of interest to philosophers.

First, however, an overview of the philosophical themes as set out and addressed by Behler, is in order. Modernity and Postmodernity are characterizations of two separate periods of philosophical thought, which embody two different epistemological enterprises. The modern period is characterized by Cartesianism, taking Mathematics and Physics as its model of truth and knowledge, and then attempting to fit as many other disciplines as possible within this model. This enterprise seeks to build a foundation for knowledge, and for disciplines concerned with truth. It employs reason and evidence to construct theories. A belief in universality, perfectibility and progress are among its presuppositions.

Postmodernity and its thinkers reject all such claims, models and presuppositions. There are no real foundations of knowledge. Disciplines cannot be analysed in terms of perfectibility or progress. There is no universality, there is only Relativism. There are no theories to be constructed, only, as Behler puts it, 'an intensified critique of reason and rationality, a bewildering questioning of those values and norms which have governed the course of modern history' (9). In Behler's text, the main proponents of the modern period are Descartes, Pascal, Hegel and Kant. The postmodern thinkers cited are Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida, and Rorty. One should note, however, that any view of the history of thought which would place Descartes and Pascal on the same side, as sharing any common norms and values, is in need of a great deal of defense and argument. Indeed, the whole characterization of periods of modern versus postmodern thought and epistemologies may be too simple-minded, if not unintelligible, to be useful, despite its popularity.

In setting up the opposition between two enterprises, within two periods of thought, Behler cites and relies on a great deal of postmodern cant and jargon. Such uncritical acceptance may be symptomatic of literary treatments of philosophical themes, or even of postmodernity itself. The following quotations, cited from Derrida, Heidegger, and Habermas are a sample of the unexplained, unargued, and uncritically accepted prose with which this text is filled: ' ... the truth of a present or the presence of a present ... ' (114); ' ... the Being of beings has indeed been thought, but the truth of Being as Being remains unthought ... ' (120); 'The totalizing self-critique of reason gets caught in a performative contradiction ... ' (132); and 'Reason and its other do not stand in a dialectical relationship to each other, mutually negating and thereby enhancing each other' (135). Work of this sort may be what is typically accepted as significant in writings on postmodern thought and epistemology, by members of Departments of Literature, but it falls far short of a contribution to the subject.

Chapter by chapter, the contents are as follows: Chapter 1 discusses modernity and postmodernity as philosophical theses, and their crossover into other fields, such as Literature and Aesthetics. There is a discussion of the work of Lyotard, the originator of the distinction between modern and postmodern. This chapter was readable and informative. Chapter 2 is Behler's discussion of Literature and modernity. He sees the unfolding of modernity as the attempt to make Literature conform to the standards, models, presuppositions, norms, and values of the modern period. Eighteenth-century literature and the quarrel of the ancients and the moderns are examined. Here I found the best idea in the book, as I shall shortly explain.

The last two chapters, 3 and 4, deal with a topic, irony, on which Behler has previously written. The reason for the inclusion of these chapters, and their connection to the previous chapters, is somewhat mystifying. At best, it may be this: postmodern thinkers use indirect modes of communication. Hence, a discussion of irony, as an indirect mode, is suggested. At worst, the connection may be this: Rorty wants to call some postmodern thinkers 'ironists'; hence too a discussion of irony is suggested. In either case, the

tenuous connection to what went before is strained and unconvincing. These last chapters are really two separate literary journal pieces, rather than parts of an extended text with one unifying, central theme. I found them unreadable and empty.

As mentioned, I did find one interesting idea in the text, derived from Behler's discussion of Pascal's epistemology. I would set this out as follows: Pascal believed that the various disciplines concerned with truth, proof, belief and knowledge could be separated into two disparate groups. On the one hand, there were those subjects, like Geometry, Arithmetic, Physics, etc., which reflected similar patterns, and which could be explored in imitative or reductive manner. For these disciplines, Pascal had devised clear accounts of good evidence, accurate methodology and valid reasons. All this gave rise to understandable ideas of infinite perfectibility and progress.

On the other hand, there were such disciplines as History, Jurisprudence, Linguistics and Theology, which Pascal thought did not conform to, and could not be made to imitate, the first model. According to Pascal, these disciplines employed different grades and standards of evidence, were subjected to different methodologies and errors, and used intuition or 'the heart', as well as, or instead of, reason. For such disciplines, perfectibility and progress made no sense. Behler found this Pascalian distinction which I have set out, but does not put it to significant use. Developed, it would undermine Behler's modern, postmodern distinction. Investigating these themes more fully, and following their unfolding in the history of ideas might, however, prove to be more worthwhile than pursuing gross distinctions between modern and postmodern thinkers. By adding to *Pensée* (888), we can allow Pascal to have the last word: 'Only those who are not courtiers use the word "courtier", the same with "pedant" and "provincial". And I am ready to wager that ... only those who are not modern or postmodern use the words "modern" or "postmodern thinker".'

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Pierre Bourdieu
The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger,
trans. Peter Collier.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University press 1991.
Pp. viii + 138.
US$22.50. ISBN 0-8047-1698-6.

Bourdieu's short study of the overlap between politics and philosophy in Heidegger's work is the most exciting and thought-provoking contribution to the recent flood of writings on this topic so far. Written in 1975, long before the furor started by Victor Farias' 1987 *Heidegger and Nazism*, Bourdieu tells us his essay is intended not as an indictment of Heidegger, but as an 'exercise in method' (though this claim comes to seem disingenuous before one is through). What fascinates Bourdieu is the way Heidegger implants a 'vulgar,' conservative political message in what is supposed to be pristine, 'essential' philosophical thinking. According to this study, Heidegger was neither a sucker co-opted by the Nazis nor a scheming totalitarian ideologue. Instead, Bourdieu quite correctly treats both Nazism and Heidegger as offshoots of an underlying 'conservative revolution' festering in Germany through the turbulent years of unification, industrialization, world war, and economic collapse. This approach helps to situate Heidegger's texts within the wider context of social and historical developments of his time. But it also provides a valuable cautionary tale that speaks to the place of intellectuals in the conservative revolution in our world today.

Bourdieu's method is to identify the *habitus* — the unfolding set of background practices in a society — which predefines the field in which textual production is carried out. This *habitus*, in the case of a professionalized philosopher like Heidegger, includes those tacit rules of the academic field which demarcate not only the form and content of moves acceptable in the philosophical game, but also the modes of 'reception' suitable to those texts. In terms of this analysis, Heidegger's writings can be seen as embodying a latent or repressed message, a '"naive" politico-moral stance,' beneath the guise of an overt, purportedly 'autonomous' philosophical message. Drawing on the best of structuralism in his reading of Heidegger, Bourdieu shows how the impositions of the *habitus* operate at an unconscious level. Given Heidegger's initial class position as a member of the lesser petty bourgeoisie in academia, meanings are 'secreted automatically' by the fields into which he is placed. Thus, his writings are by-products of social forces operating behind his back, side-effects of ideologies pushing his hand, so to speak, as he poses the apparently bland 'question of being.' One benefit of this approach is that we end up with a picture of Heidegger as the political ignoramus he actually was.

The story begins with an attempt to 'reconstruct the structure of the field of philosophical production ... in relation to which [Heidegger's] own position will be defined negatively and differentially.' Bourdieu recreates the collective *Stimmung* of cultural despair in post-war Germany, emphasizing such key figures as Spengler, Jünger, and Moeller van den Bruck, and he traces

the array of binary oppositions prestructuring the conservative revolution — elite/*Volk*, machine/organism, individuality/community, rootlessness/*Boden*. This information is familiar to readers of Ringer, Stern, and Mosse, but it is helpful to have it drawn together in a succinct form. Bourdieu shows how the 'orchestration of the *habitus*' provides the basis for a particular strategy Moeller called '*das dritte Reich*,' the technique of radically overcoming all radicalism by finding a 'third way' between opposites. Just as Moeller imagines a national socialism as an alternative to capitalism and communism, Heidegger tries to overcome 'ontic' dichotomies by finding an 'ontological' structure to serve as a *conciliatio oppositorum*.

We then get a picture of Heidegger jockeying for position in the academic field of his day. That means, above all, overcoming the neo-Kantians (and especially the hated Cohen and Cassirer). Heidegger's texts display his 'absolutely polyphonic talent' for speaking in several registers at once. In a close reading of the 'internal logic' of Heidegger's writings, Bourdieu shows how political positions come to be 'euphemized' in allegedly neutral philosophical form. The philosophical field imposes limits, by means of censorship and the imposition of form, which dictate a surface form and reinforce the submerged political subtext. The examination of how academic texts are produced — of how ordinary 'vulgar' language gets reworked into an elitist, 'consecrated' form — is among the most illuminating parts of Bourdieu's study. Heidegger, consistently disavowing every 'vulgar' interpretation of his texts, evokes the crass political significations in the very act of revoking them.

For all the insight it has to offer, however, Bourdieu's work should be read with caution. As a sociologist, Bourdieu can adopt a detached, 'scientific' perspective, the stance of an entomologist observing the bizarre behavior of philosophical bugs. This stance obscures a great deal of what Heidegger accomplished. Focusing solely on the 'dual message' in Heidegger — the overlap of political and philosophical codes — Bourdieu bleaches out the complexity and richness of writings that include a thick weave of religious, classicist, agrarian, neoRomantic, existentialist, and other strands. There is no hint of the relation to Aristotle, St. Paul, or Hegel, no mention of the importance of Heidegger's early religious training or his studies of mathematical logic. Despite Bourdieu's avowed intention of avoiding reductionism, he tends to trivialize Heidegger's writings, treating them as thinly veiled political propaganda. The philosophical superficiality of this approach is especially evident in Bourdieu's tendency to run together writings from very different periods, ignoring the complicated 'turns' in Heidegger's thought. (This results, for example, in a particularly wrongheaded interpretation of *Gelassenheit* on p. 66).

Bourdieu's 'exercise in method' shows both the advantages and limitations of his brand of social constructionism. On the one hand, we get a much needed insight into the social context of Heidegger's thought. Anyone who thought that Heidegger was an exceptionally original thinker will benefit from seeing how close his key concepts are to those of the other conservative revolutionaries of his time. But, on the other hand, given Bourdieu's social construc-

tionist standpoint, there is the presupposition that Heidegger can be nothing other than a crossing-point of social and historical forces, and that his texts 'automatically secrete' meanings that must trickle down through academia in predetermined ways. In the light of this sort of outlook, we might sociologize the sociologist a bit, asking whether constructionism does not itself embody a politically questionable ideology which takes away individual responsibility for texts, thereby trivializing the significance of Heidegger's actions and thought.

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John V. Canfield
The Looking Glass Self: An Examination of Self-Awareness.
New York: Praeger 1990. Pp. xiii + 243.
US$45.00. ISBN 0-275-93586-8.

This book is an inquiry into the nature of the self, done from a Wittgensteinian perspective. Canfield hopes that the book will reach a larger audience than that of professional philosophers and consequently it is written in a plain style reminiscent of Locke.

Canfield's aim is to argue that the self is a fiction, an illusion. He sees what he has to say as of a piece with the views about the self of such philosophers as Hume, Nietzsche, and especially the earlier and later Wittgenstein. But he also aligns himself with accounts of the nature of the self found in the sociology of George Herbert Mead and Charles Cooley and in the Zen Buddhist tradition.

By intent the book divides into two parts. The first part, consisting of the first four chapters, is about the metaphysics of the self. After an unfortunately weak and choppy first chapter, the real work begins in chapter 2 ('Looking for the Self') in which Canfield surveys (what he calls) 'the ordinary conception of the self', as well as various metaphysical accounts of the self (Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant and the early Wittgenstein.)

The argumentative core of the book is the chapter 'The Philosophical Grammar of "I".' Behind the idea that the self is a something is the idea that 'I' is a referring expression. Canfield argues (1) that while 'I' does refer in some expressions, it then refers to a *person* not a different thing called 'the self' and (2) that in the philosophically significant cases 'I' is not a referring expression at all. (In so arguing, Canfield is taking sides in an ongoing dispute over the proper interpretation of Wittgenstein on the grammar of 'I'.)

'When "I" denotes, as in "I ordered soup" or "I am unshaven," it refers quite unproblematically, to a person. One of us. In the examples that have been crucial in metaphysics, however, such as "I think [of such and such]" or "I see the red light," "I" does not refer at all. What results does the latter fact about the use or meaning of "I" have for the metaphysical questions "Does the self exist, and if so, what is its nature?" It cuts the ground out from under these questions. It makes them into non-questions or senseless questions' (89).

This first part concludes with a chapter on personal identity which is largely concerned with rejecting the idea that the topic of personal identity will be illuminated by producing intuitions about puzzle cases. In this Canfield is securely in the Wittgensteinian tradition (see Hallett's recent *Essentialism* about the use of puzzle cases generally.)

It is in the final three chapters that Canfield is most original. For he thinks that even if we become convinced on theoretical grounds that the self is a fiction, we, all of us, still have a 'gut-level, pre-theoretical belief in I' (93). His ambition is to show that even at that level the I, the self, is a nothing. He treats the investigation into this pre-theoretical adherence to the self as real, as a something, as a topic beyond metaphysics and anti-metaphysics, as something not discussed by Wittgenstein or by the broader class of analytic philosophers and calls his inquiry an exercise in 'philosophical anthropology.' Here the central figures are Mead and Cooley, and also Zen, although Wittgenstein's spirit is still prominent.

Canfield is quite correct in seeing the uniqueness of this part of his work. Moreover, what is important is not simply *that* he has something to say about personae and self-images but also *what* he philosophically says about such matters is genuinely fascinating.

Still, Canfield goes astray in a major part of the story. He takes it that he is following Wittgenstein in concluding from the non-referentiality of 'I' that the self is a grammatical illusion, a fiction, a nothing. But I urge that he should have taken to heart Wittgenstein's well known remark about pain (about any sensation): 'It is not a *something*, but not a *nothing* either' (PI #304). That is, it does not follow that because the self is not a something designated by the word 'I', that it is a nothing. To a significant extent it is *because* Canfield (and Hume and others) have called the self a fiction, that we, all of us, find ourselves responding by exhibiting that gut-level belief in the self which Canfield discerningly notices. What is wanted at that point, however, is not a further attempt, as Canfield's, to extirpate this deeper belief in the self. Rather the philosophical task is to spell out what is involved in holding, as Wittgenstein would, that the self is not a nothing despite not being a something. Although Canfield does not locate their discussions in this context, he does notice that those who have discussed the social construction of the self are relevant at this point. For what they are up to is showing how it is that the self can be something without being a naturally occurring inner object of reference.

Nor does Canfield get the Zen tradition quite right, though he comes close. For in calling the enlighted one 'selfless', Zen masters are not talking of

someone akin to human vegetables nor even, as Canfield seems to think, of someone like his nine month old daughter. Rather, they are talking, to put it cleverly, of someone who has lost his or her egotism but not their ego. (See Herbert Fingarette, *The Self in Transformation*, especially the paper 'Mystic Selflessness'.)

All in all, the book is the most interesting book on the self around.

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Rene Descartes
The Passions of the Soul.
Trans. and annot. Stephen Voss. Intro.
Geneviève Rodis-Lewis.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. 1989.
Pp. xxv + 165.
US$22.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-036- 1);
US$4.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-035-3).

This translation in a separate volume is very convenient for anyone teaching Descartes' philosophy, or, more generally, for the English-language student of Descartes. The translation itself is very good, though an occasional shortening of Descartes' sometimes over-long sentences might have been desirable in the interests of greater clarity. But conversely, the other side of this same coin shows itself clearly if one compares Voss's translation with the translation to be found in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* (trans. J.Cottingham, R.Stoothoff & D.Murdoch. [Cambridge University Press 1985]) Vol.I, pp.325ff. Such a comparison shows, from the start, that Voss's translation is more of a literal translation, and therefore less likely to contain implicit interpretations.

This is *one* of the factors in considering the usefulness of this work. But there are others as well. The dominant Cartesian commentator in France during the 1950s and 1960s was Henri Gouhier. Since then, Mme. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis has succeeded to that position, and therefore her Introduction will surely be seen to enhance the value of the book itself. The Introduction, which was also translated by Stephen Voss, is done in the thorough-going manner which is one of the main characteristics of introductions written by French academics. Mme. Rodis-Lewis situates the work chronologically and intellectually, and she also discusses a number of particular points in Descartes' theory of the passions. No doubt, the most significant of these

particular points is Descartes' break with the tradition in introducing and underlining the 'physicist's' point of view in analysing the passions.

Another element adding to the utility of this work is the fairly substantial amount of information and references which can be found in the footnotes to the text itself. Voss comments on many of the articles and is at pains to give cross-references for his views. This, by itself, makes the possession of this text highly desirable for anyone wishing to specialize in Cartesian philosophy. Moreover, in addition to this commentary there is a Lexicon of variations in possible translations for some of Descartes' key terms, a Lexicon based on Rodis-Lewis' edition of this work. Since translations published as parts of the general corpus of Descartes' writings cannot usually afford such amenities for the individual works of that corpus, it is clear that these two elements constitute an added reason for holding this book to be a very useful tool for teaching and research.

A more theoretical point needs to be raised. Given the wholesale rejection of Cartesian philosophy in what is so frequently referred to as the present 'postmodern' era, one might raise the question as to whether it is not something of a paradox to engage in a new translation of Descartes' *Passions of the Soul*, and to even pinpoint it by this elaboration of study tools related to the work. Voss has himself raised this question, and he answers it essentially by saying that whatever the philosophical climate, historical scholarship needs to be developed. This is certainly true, but it does not really answer the underlying reason for the question itself. That underlying reason can perhaps be formulated in this way: given Descartes' conviction that the body/mind framework is basic and irreducible (leaving aside his attempt to deal with the problem of their 'union' by holding this to be a 'primary concept'), and given the contemporary rejection of any sort of 'mind-substance', does it not follow that Descartes' analyses *must* be misleading, and that it is therefore a mistake to encourage the study of the emotions based on such an approach?

It seems to me that this would be an entirely valid objection if there existed a generally accepted alternative to the body/mind framework. But despite the development of the physical sciences, and despite the more widespread belief in a purely physicalist approach, that physicalist approach has, itself, a fatal flaw: it is incapable of explaining how the passions can arise in the first place from purely physical process. It is for this reason that Freud, whose overall framework was physicalist, nevertheless operated a most remarkable inversion by going straight from the fundamentally materialist intention of his 'psychology for neurologists' to an analysis in terms of 'the unconscious', a word designed to be as close to brain process as possible, whilst at the same time remaining fundamentally psychological.

The relevance of all this to Descartes' treatise on the passions is that the 'area' between body and mind remains a grey area, and that this has consequences. For instance, however unsatisfactory it may be to posit both a brain-based memory and a mind-based memory, it is nevertheless true that there is no purely physicalist explanation for memory. In other words,

however unsatisfactory the Cartesian framework may be — and this reviewer believes it to be entirely unsatisfactory — there is no clear alternative explanation. And therefore, short of agreeing with the sceptics that all explanations are merely verbal or metaphorical, it will always be necessary to return to Descartes as a necessary, if misleading, starting-point. And that, of course, constitutes a philosophical justification, to be added to the purely scholarly justification, for this new translation of Descartes' theory of the passions.

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M. David Ermann, Mary Williams and **Claudio Gutierrez, eds.**
Computers, Ethics & Society.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1990. Pp. ix + 376.
Cdn$22.50: US$16.95. ISBN 0-19-505850-X.

Some doubt that there is a field of computer ethics. Computers raise ethical issues, but so do chainsaws. What makes computers special?, asks the sceptic. The computer-related articles in this collection go far to answer this scepticism. They indicate that computerization has been both rapid and extensive. These changes raise many philosophical issues, from conceptual questions ('Can a computer be an author?') to ethical problems both new ('Should we trust computers to make important decisions?') and old ('How should we distribute the impact of these changes?'). Indeed, the more pressing sceptical question is whether philosophy provides tools to help solve these problems. Unfortunately, on this front the book is less successful.

This is a collection of essays used by the editors to teach an interdisciplinary undergraduate course. Twenty-five of the thirty-four essays are about computing. Of these about half deal with the effects of computers on society (poorly labeled 'Computers and the Ideal Life'), ranging over privacy, the impact of artificial intelligence on our concept of the person, and issues of distributive justice in the workplace. This last topic is quite sobering. Like many who will likely teach with a book like this, I am a computer enthusiast. It is discomforting to read (in Kling and Iacono) that I am part of a computerization movement, with its own distinctive, and (arguably) misleading, ideology. Another of my enthusiasms, telecommuting, evidently has quite different effects on the working lives of men and women, according to Olson and Primps. Sociology is important for the ethical evaluation of computing

technology because the technology's consequences are often unintended and sometimes part of devious plans. Not only is computing technology technically complex — large software projects are arguably the most complex constructions we have attempted — but it is used in business, bureaucratic and military contexts that are structurally antagonistic to openness. Some issues are familiar — differential effects on men and women, or the more and less developed economies, raise standard questions of distributive justice. Others are more esoteric. Nilsson argues for technological determinism — since no state could afford to take a Luddite position on the development of artificial intelligence — leading to radical questions of distributive justice in a world where most need not work. Minsky stands out as radical in another respect. He argues that developments in artificial intelligence should change our concept of the person, thus upsetting the unidirectional paradigm where ethical theories are simply applied to an independent subject domain.

Unfortunately, these questions outstrip the answers provided by the opening section on ethical frameworks, which is a curious mixture. For example, it is hard to see the relevance of Augustine on 'The Morals of the Catholic Church' to computer ethics. The section on ethical theory is especially weak. Hospers' selection on utilitarianism stresses utilitarianism as a theory of individual choice which is inappropriate to the subject at hand. The introduction of computer technology raises serious issues about evaluating social change; see Bereano's excellent contribution, 'Technology and Human Freedom'. It is ironic to present utilitarianism, originally conceived as a theory for evaluating large-scale social changes, in a narrowly individual form. A more appropriate introduction to utilitarianism would raise questions about the ethical relevance of cost-benefit analysis as well, perhaps, as the issue of changing preferences. Second, Hospers' brief utilitarian defense of capitalism is far too sketchy for an issue so central to this area of business and professional ethics. Hospers' contribution on justice — listing a series of intuitionistic criteria — is simply out of date. Students would be much better served with a sketch of Rawls' theory of justice, which at least provides a method for dealing with the conflict between various criteria of distribution, and thereby gives students a theory they might try extending to other problems raised by the book. In contrast to the selections on broad ethical theory, the narrower articles by Fried (on privacy), Hart (on law and morals) and Bok (on whistle-blowing) are excellent.

The last third of the book deals with professional issues. Some of this material — a sketch of U.S. copyright law on 'look and feel', the history of innovation in user interfaces, and an account of the IBM 'sting' operation against Hitachi —raises few philosophical issues. Some, like Stallman's GNU (GNU's not Unix) manifesto and the Association for Computing Machinery's Code of Professional Conduct, are important source documents. Two contributions stand out in terms of philosophical interest. The first is Pamela Samuelson's 'Can a Computer Be an Author?', which uses legal material to advance a thorny conceptual question. The second is David Parnas's justification of his decision to blow the whistle on the software component of the

Strategic Defense Initiative ('Starwars'). This powerful and well-argued case by a major Canadian computer scientist makes plain the importance of ethics to technical professionals. Unfortunately the companion piece does not develop the hard questions of professional ethics raised by Parnas.

Finally, the editors' contribution is meagre. There is no index, and the introductions and bibliographies are skimpy. In these respects the book contrasts poorly with its competitor, *Computerization and Controversy*, edited by Dunlop and Kling (San Diego: Academic Press 1991), which also provides pointers to on-line discussions of issues in computer ethics, valuable resources for the intended audience of these books.

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Sir Robert Filmer
Patriarcha and Other Writings,
ed. Johann P. Somerville.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.
Pp. xlvi + 328.
US$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-37491-X);
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-39903-3).

Citing a recent 'explosion of interest in social history and in Women's Studies,' Somerville offers this edition of *Patriarcha* by Filmer (1588-1653), originally published posthumously in 1680, with other political writings originally published 1648-52, to replace Peter Laslett's 1949 edition (which used a more limited set of manuscripts). Somerville also supplies a scholarly historical introduction, a list of events in Filmer's life (omitting works on witches and other women — see below), bibliographical note, and discussions of disputes concerning authorship of some works. The 'other writings' are *The Free-Holders Grand Inquest* (a tedious history — 'disputed' in more ways than one — overlapping *Patriarcha*'s Chapter 3), *The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy* (elaborating ideas of *Patriarcha*'s Chapters 2 and 3), commentaries on Hobbes, Milton, Grotius, and Aristotle, and *The Necessity of the Absolute Power of All Kings*, not by Filmer but Filmer's compilation of translations of Jean Bodin (Filmer's favorite, with Aristotle). Historians of women may be more interested in three works mentioned in but omitted from S.'s edition than in most of those included. They are *An Advertisement to the Jurymen of England touching Witches* (1653) ('an interesting discussion of the evidence for the existence of witches' [xxx], in which 'he did not actually deny the existence of witches but certainly came close to doing so' [xiii]), an

(unnamed) work that 'deals with marriage and adultery' (xiii), and 'In Praise of a Vertuous Wife', recently published in Margaret J. M. Ezell, *The Patriarch's Wife* (Chapel Hill 1987). Appearing at the peak of Western European witchburnings, Filmer's *Advertisement* arouses curiosity. S. should be encouraged to resurrect the work, which, he notes, 'unfortunately is not available in a modern edition.'

Because the other writings do not expand significantly the philosophy of *Patriarcha*, I focus on that work, in particular, the first two (undisputedly Filmer's) of its three chapters. (Chapter 3 is a Tory version of the history of English parliaments, meant to buttress Chapter 2 by rejecting the idea that monarchs are limited by law). Though 'canonized' by Locke's refutation, Filmer's theory was not original, says S., historian of 17th-C. England, documenting earlier English patriarchal theorists (xvi-xviii). Unlike Steven Goldberg's *The Inevitability of Patriarchy* (New York: Morrow 1973), *Patriarcha* rejects democracy. Its task is dual: to offer a patriarchal theory of the State and to defend absolute monarchy. Chapter 1 does the former; Chapter 2, the latter. Chapter One's 'argument' appeals to Scripture — the Genesis creation story, histories of Biblical patriarchs, and the Commandment, 'Honor thy father' — concluding that God bestowed political sovereignty entirely upon Adam and intended that power to descend (to sons only) through the right of primogeniture. This Chapter is roundly refuted by Locke in his lesser-known 1st *Treatise of Civil Govt* — with humor, in detail, at length. Locke asks, what about the other half of that Commandment: 'and thy mother'? Against Filmer he argues that if God's mere creation gave political authority, lions must have it, too, and that if God's giving Adam dominion over animals and plants grounded political authority, then either that authority is only over animals and plants or it must give Adam cannibalistic rights, too. Furthermore, Locke asks, if fatherhood gives absolute power, wouldn't grandfathers have the power to absolve grandsons from honoring the latters' fathers? — an internal contradiction. Although S. says Locke is an unreliable guide to Filmer, I do not find Locke inaccurate. To produce arguments worth approaching philosophically Locke had to supply missing premises, which he did ably and scrupulously, distinguishing what Filmer says from what he (Locke) supplies.

In Chapter 2 Filmer's concern about alleged Papal authority surfaces. His targets are Jesuits who argued that people bestow authority upon kings and may reconsider if kings are abusive. With more logic than in Chapter 1, Filmer identifies inconsistencies within and between Jesuit writings and raises difficult questions for the view that sovereignty ultimately resides in 'the people': Who are 'the people'? How is one 'people' to be distinguished from another? How can 'the people' get anything done unless they move to majority rule, and how can majoritarianism be reconciled with the view that sovereignty resides in all the people? How can a people who choose an absolute monarch retain sovereignty? What is to prevent any dissatisfied group from declaring themselves a new political unit? Detailing his distrust, he enumer-

ates atrocities committed by democracies, which he believes exceed those of patriarchies.

Filmer's atrocities suggest these democrats had had patriarchs as political role models. Ignoring effects of a history of impotence and abuse upon one's exercise of power in case of fortune reversals, Filmer never inquires in his credible documentations of mob injustice into causal antecedents but simply accepts that the masses are morally inferior. One comes away with a lively sense of the more interesting problems of political philosophy that Locke inherited, addressed in his 2nd *Treatise* as well as by Madison, Jay, and Hamilton in *The Federalist Papers*.

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Mark Fisher
Personal Love.
London: Duckworth 1990. Pp. 118.
n.p. ISBN 0-7156-2340-0.

Mark Fisher thinks he has discovered the 'fine gold thread' of love that knits together all personal loves — friendship, erotic love, parent-child love. He proposes that a logically necessary condition is the lovers merging into a single entity. Fusion is an ideal, it is the lovers' goal, and it is at least partially achievable (26). This notion has been discussed by everyone from Plato to Kierkegaard and Tillich. But Fisher adds a new twist to an old story, mixing with fusion a desire he calls 'humble benevolence' (HB): x desires for y whatever y desires or, nonequivalently (Fisher seems not to care), x desires y's good according to y's view of that good. Fisher contrasts HB with x's desiring y's good according to x's view of that good. Let's call this 'paternalistic benevolence' (PB).

For Fisher, then, 'the central features of love [are] fusion and HB' (97). In particular, love is 'the development of a fused self deriving from,' (98) and 'through the growth of,' HB (30). 'As a lover,' x assumes y's view of y's good (26-7), which replaces in x's affective and cognitive life x's own view of y's good (35). X's assimilating x's view to y's is the first step of the fusion. Once entering this slippery slope, the lover 'com[es] to see everything through [her] eyes.... This is how HB tends to bring about fusion' (27). Soon 'the lover [can] less and less ... distinguish his desires ... and beliefs from her[s]' (26).

This inability to 'distinguish' is essential to Fisher's concept of fusion; it gives body to the unified 'we'. Persons fused in love of course 'seek the good of that single self' they have become (70), thinking in terms of '*us* and *our*

concerns' (44). The lovers even 'perceive, feel and act as a single person, so that ... neither can say who originated' the perception, feeling or act (28); 'the boundary between our two selves becomes vague and I do not know what in our thoughts and feelings is his and what is mine' (103).

Fisher devotes one scholastic chapter to arguing that this model applies (counterintuitively) to parent-child love. Another chapter repeats the sophomoric wisdom that certain synchronous acts of 'fucking' (his word) produce 'an effective analogue of the fused self' of love (59; his thesis is refuted by the illustration decorating the dust jacket). In a very brief chapter he defends his account against an anticipated, but hardly the most forceful, feminist objection. Fisher should have read, in this regard, Lillian Rubin's *Intimate Strangers*, which is also relevant to his argument that autonomy is to be jettisoned because love's fusion destroys autonomy (28) and love is one of the greatest goods (65, 98). But Fisher's chapter spent uncovering love's value is so negative and tentative in its conclusions that even he doesn't seem convinced. Rubin would tell Fisher, first, that the clash is not between love and autonomy, but between intimacy and independence, both of which occur *in* love, and second, that the trouble with his account is not that it is anti-female but that it is one-sidedly psychologically feminine.

Fisher claims that fusion in his sense is 'not unusual' and 'familiar' (28). But to say that two loving persons cannot know whether an emotion or act is *x*'s or *y*'s, or originates with *x* or *y*, is to speak nonsense and attribute utter stupidity to lovers. This problem — how to describe merging without falling into absurdity — has always plagued fusion models of love. Fisher tells us that Irving Singer (*The Nature of Love*) thinks 'the idea of merging meaningless; but he describes it quite eloquently' and that in Roger Scruton's *Sexual Desire* 'it is persuasively expounded' (26). I wish Fisher had quoted pieces of these splendid explications, for his own gets into trouble quickly.

PB, it is clear, cannot be part of love, because while HB generates fusion *y*'s view of *y*'s good replaces, for *x*, *x*'s view; *x*'s retaining an independent view of *y*'s good resists, not abets, fusion. But Fisher never notices that on his fusion model HB itself cannot be part of love. If fusion occurs, there is no longer any *y*'s good in *y*'s sense, but only 'our' fused view of *y*'s good or a nowhere view of *y*'s good neither *x* nor *y* knows who originates. Or *y*'s good is absent altogether, dethroned by the 'our' good of the fused entity. In either case, *x* cannot — for logical reasons — desire *y*'s good according to *y*'s view. Thus it is quite misleading for Fisher to say that fusion develops 'through the growth of HB' (30); when HB successfully leads to fusion it self-destructs. HB is possible only when lovers are frustrated in achieving their goal of fusion.

Perhaps Fisher's idea is not so much that *y*'s view of *y*'s good replaces, for *x*, *x*'s view, but that during fusion *y*'s view of *y*'s good becomes, for *x* (and for *y*?), indistinguishable from *x*'s view: *x* cannot tell where the thought originates, that something is good for *y*. If so, HB might be part of love after all. But then we must allow that PB, too, is part of love in the same muted sense; both HB and PB are operative even though *x* cannot tell them apart. Fisher, however, agrees that PB is outside love: 'all love involves the possibility of

painful inner conflict, because my *loving* desire for the beloved's good as she sees it can conflict with my *benevolent* [n.b., not "loving"] desire for her good as I see it' (81).

Throughout *Personal Love* Fisher often mentions this conflict between HB and PB (e.g., 75-6; quite confusingly on pp. 19-20). His favored position seems to be that HB is *in* the love, PB is outside it, this correlating with the ways in which lovers have and have not fused, so that HB exists in the fusion and the challenge from PB exists, or persists, just because fusion is incomplete. Were fusion to be complete (which Fisher says is impossible [27]), there would be no conflict because nary a bit of PB would remain, all of it ousted by HB. If I am right, however, that full fusion destroys HB, the incompleteness creates conflict in a different way, by making logical space available for HB to exist, which then comes face to face with the PB that exists in virtue of the same incompleteness. The conflict is not fusion vs. no fusion, but occurs altogether outside of fusion.

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Jay L. Garfield and **Murray Kiteley, eds.**
Meaning and Truth: The Essential Readings in Modern Semantics.
New York: Paragon House 1991.
Pp. xxviii + 637.
US$17.95. ISBN 1-55778-300-4.

This collection of readings is offered for intermediate and senior undergraduates in philosophy, linguistics or cognitive science as a companion to Ken Taylor's forthcoming *Introduction to Modern Semantics*. The collection includes essays from both philosophy and linguistics, and is divided into seven sections based on loosely defined and overlapping issues. Each section contains a brief introduction, which summarizes the readings and outlines their contribution to the debates around which the book is organized.

Garfield and Kiteley define the domain of semantics broadly, as encompassing, 'what linguistic meaning is, how it is represented, and how we can decode the linguistic message to arrive at it' (xxiv). Most of the sections treat central and familiar issues within theory of meaning: definite descriptions, Tarski's definition of truth, opacity, and possible worlds. As the editors point out, other subjects such as presupposition and logical form can be addressed by rearranging the order of readings. Many of the articles are classics, and

the collection as a whole offers a good cross-section of work from the nineteenth century to the present. On the other hand, Garfield and Kiteley have not attempted to include all of what might be considered essential readings in a field as broad as this. Some important subject areas, such as speech act theory, propositions, and the empiricist-rationalist debate are not represented except as they arise in articles on other subjects.

The first section contains modern classics by Mill, Frege, Tarski, and Russell, selected to reveal the roots of contemporary debate. The selection from Mill, 'On Names and Propositions', is effective in setting modern semantics against its background in nineteenth century logic. The articles by Frege, Tarski, and Russell ('On Sense and Nominatum', 'The Semantic Conception of Truth' and 'On Denoting') introduce the subject matter of subsequent sections. Section Two offers a good selection of readings on definite descriptions. It includes time-honoured pieces by Strawson, Russell, Carnap, and Donnellan, and more recent articles by Kripke, Bergmann, and Kaplan. Section Three contains philosophical responses to Tarski's work, including Davidson's 'Truth and Meaning', and Field's and McDowell's examinations of the adequacy of Tarski's definition of truth. Section Four, entitled 'Intensionality', presents alternative solutions to the problems surrounding opaque contexts. The section begins with Quine's 'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes', and Davidson's 'On Saying That'. These are set against an overview of Montague semantics by Weisler, and Kiteley's own 'Subjectivity's Bailiwick', which argues that opacity is not susceptible to a unitary analysis. Section Five is an interesting collection bearing on compositionality and logical form that reveals the overlap between philosophy and linguistics. Two chapters from Cresswell's *Structured Meanings* are placed together with Hornstein's analysis of quantifier scope, and a study of the logical form underlying verb-phrase deletion by Sag. Section Six is a good collection of contemporary classics on possible-worlds semantics by Stalnaker, Lewis, Plantinga, and Lycan. The final section is a collection of articles on nonlinguistic determinants of meaning. It contains two articles on metaphors, one by Skulsky and one by Bergmann, together with a study of indefinite noun-phrases by Cormack and Kempson, and Perry's, 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical'.

What draws the collection together is not obvious from the table of contents, but the book does have a unifying theme. The intent of the editors is to emphasize the interdisciplinary nature of modern semantics. The articles are selected and introduced with a focus on how solutions to the problems of meaning necessarily demand the resources of a number of disciplines: logic, linguistics, cognitive science and metaphysics. This is an excellent goal, although it places some constraints on the range of courses to which the text is suited. The book requires some background in first-order logic, and the articles employ a variety of formal notations. So the collection may not be ideal for all students first encountering theory of meaning, and instructors will need to be adept at rendering formal material approachable. But students will gain from the book a good sense of the complex character

of semantic theory, and Ken Taylor's companion text, when it appears, may well fill in the background necessary to bind the articles together.

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Jeffrey C. Goldfarb
The Cynical Society: The Culture of Politics and the Politics of Culture in American Life.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1991.
Pp. xi + 200.
US$22.50. ISBN 0-226-30107-9.

Goldfarb, a sociologist at the New School for Social Research, has written a provocative book of interest to social theorists and philosophers. Goldfarb sees cynicism as 'the single pressing problem of our time'. Political parties, media reporting, and social scientific analysis all contribute to a 'cynical malaise'. Issues of substance are avoided or distorted due to a cynical mode of interpretation, according to which statements are systematically regarded as the rhetorical manifestation of self-serving interests. Substantive analysis, commitment to shared values as a basis for collective action, and reasoned discourse can scarcely survive. Goldfarb elaborates these claims in discussions of a wide range of topics including the U.S. presidential campaigns of 1984 and 1988, the Reagan presidency, fictional works by Thomas Wolfe and Toni Morrison, and fundamentalist proposals for improving American education.

Although this is not basically a philosophical book there are, I think, a number of themes which should interest philosophers. These include Goldfarb's understanding of cynicism as a (faulty) interpretive frame, his comments about the relationship between cynicism and relativism, and a brief historical account relating and contrasting destructive mocking cynicism with the ancient cynicism of Diogenes. Goldfarb sees cynical interpretations of political and social life as effecting self-fulfilling prophecies. He stresses shared democratic values — which persist in spite of media cynicism — and 'reasoned discourse' as essential in yielding non-cynical interpretations and substantive analysis of social problems. Especially intriguing — and to me plausible — is Goldfarb's claim that cynicism, while appearing on the surface to offer social critique, turns out in the end to be 'a form of legitimation through disbelief.'

Diogenes the Cynic held that people should control their desires and live in harmony in nature. He satirized the social life of his time to show how far social reality was from his ideals. Despite his apparent outrageousness, Diogenes was a social critic communicating a normative alternative to the social practices of his time. His cynicism, a cynicism of radical social critique, is to be contrasted with the later Roman cynicism of Lucian the Mocker, who believed that everything was a sham and anyone who sought to live a moral life was a fool. This cynicism is not based on a normative alternative to actual society; it only mocks, communicating bitterness, passivity, and resignation. The rampant cynicism in America of late is of the mocking variety.

Contemporary cynics often think the ultimate motivation is to be found in the quest for power: every gesture ostensibly in the direction of justice, equality, democracy, peace is *underneath* a bid for power. If not power, the almighty dollar rules: nothing counts except the economic bottom line. Profit is everything, if not on the surface, then underneath. To the cynic, every ideal is merely professed, a mere facade for an uglier reality.

Goldfarb gives an interesting and persuasive account of Tom Wolfe's *Bonfire of the Vanities* which he sees as a paradigmatic expression of mocking cynicism. The book could have been written as a tragedy. The young black man who is the victim in the traffic accident around which the plot centers is surrounded by 'schools without learning, courts without justice, journalism without the pursuit of truth, churches without morality, and politicians who operate without the common good or collective interest in mind.' Instead, Wolfe made the novel a comic series of happenings. No one is taken seriously; all pursuits are a sham. The author and his readers, who are able to see through the facade of appearances, are, by implication, superior to these characters and others like them. The book misses the opportunity to express an authentic voice of concern; it offers not sorrow, not sympathy, not reason, not sincere substantive analysis, only mockery. Promoted, celebrated, and consumed, *Bonfire of the Vanities* sold well as 'a good read'. Thus the circle of cynicism is completed.

Goldfarb argues that American life and culture are still based on the shared values of freedom, democracy, and equalitarianism. Values commitments, however, are downplayed by mass media operating within a cynical political culture. People are brought to the 'center' from the 'periphery' in a mediated fashion where there is a considerable lowest common denominator effect. Image and advertising count for much; substance and reason for little. Ideology has played a destructive role because it virtually calls out for cynical interpretation. Goldfarb defines 'ideology' (interestingly, I think) as a distinct type of political thought in which a single absolute 'truth' provides the basis for a totalized set of actions and policies understood as implementing it (82). Despite its promising beginning anchored in democratic values and a program for positive social change through enfranchisement of African-Americans and poor whites, the American New Left lapsed into simplistic Marxist ideology, seeing history as class struggle and the student movement as a vanguard which might have to fulfill its role in revolutionary activity. As for

the Right, its central ideological principle is the struggle between individualism and collectivism. Both ideologies over-simplify and, in their promise of too-easy solutions to complex problems, so grossly distort social reality that it is difficult to take them seriously.

An active alternative to cynicism is fundamentalism. Goldfarb suggests that there is a kind of natural negative cultural logic — from democracy to relativism to mass cultural structures to cynicism — and from cynicism to fundamentalism as a clear alternative strongly based in 'grounded' values. He prefers pluralistic reasoned discourse as an outcome of democracy and argues that it is still possible due to shared values, the memory in America of democratic achievements in the past, and the expression of imaginative alternatives by authentic voices in an autonomous (unmanipulated) culture. Democracy presumes that people know their interests and the common good; this in turn presumes their having access to knowledge; such knowledge presumes the capacity for reason. Democracy requires 'an excellent culture for the many.'

The book has its flaws. I found parts turgid, obscure, and hard to follow. The discussion of ideology seemed poorly integrated with earlier parts of the book. The book sets out to discuss *American* culture and does so, but I found its exclusive focus on the United States somewhat frustrating. Mass media and contending interest groups operate in mass cultures outside the United States. I felt the analysis had broader implications; it struck me as applying all too well to post-Meech Canada.

Philosophically, it would be desirable to have a clearer definition of cynicism, a stronger historical discussion, and more use of intriguing-sounding works cited only in footnotes — especially Slotendijk's *Critique of Cynical Reason*. I was led to wonder about the distinction between cynicism and related (but distinct) concepts such as scepticism, pessimism, and despair. Goldfarb says tantalizingly that 'despair is a temptation', but fails to distinguish cynicism from despair or to say *why* despair is a temptation. Presumably he thinks it is a temptation we should not give in to, but he does not say why not. Another theme that is not developed is the suggestion, emerging from the account of *Bonfire of the Vanities*, that the cynic and his audience are superior and 'above it all'. The important claims that cynicism produces self-fulfilling prophecies and legitimation through disbelief are neither clearly explained nor argued in detail.

Goldfarb allows that cynical interpretations have an important role to play in democratic cultures where different interest groups are contending with one another; he also grants that cynical interpretations are correct some of the time. He fails to raise the obvious question of how we would tell when cynical interpretation is *ad hoc* and mistaken, and when it is right. Nor does he offer any clear general argument as to why cynicism is a faulty interpretive frame.

At one point (36) Goldfarb says that in contemporary America any talk of the good, the true, or the beautiful, is automatically dismissed as 'mere rhetoric'; he appeals for reasoned discourse instead of mockery. Clearly

cynical interpretation is an important cultural theme for contemporary philosophy.

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Nicholas Griffin
Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship.
Don Mills, ON and New York:
Oxford University Press 1991. Pp. xii + 410.
Cdn$112.50: US$98.00. ISBN 0-19-824453-3.

Griffin has spent time at the Russell archives but writes as if he disdains metaphysical issues while thriving on trivial disputes, tedious recitations and petulant, patronizing criticism. Expecting insights into R's thought, one gets citations, quotations and pretentious comments advertising G's familiarity with particle physics, relativity, geometry, analysis, logic and 'non-monotonic logic', set theory, history (of mathematics, physics, logic, psychology and philosophy), the 19th century, etc. R's ideas are buried by condescension: 'the ... foundationalism associated with [R], Moore, Ayer ... has largely been played out ... some ... results ... achieved in [R's] hands, though definitely mistaken, were not misguided by the standards of the time ...' (40); pompous prattle: 'The besetting difficulty of this manner of proceeding when there is a tacit metaphysical agenda is that of adjusting the particular results ... to the overall metaphysical scheme of things. Ward and [R] ... suffered acutely from the problem' (40); and once fashionable slogans: 'it is a category mistake to say', 'to say ... is simply nonsense', 'a rather odd use of "change", no doubt' (257).

The first 100 pages take up R's early education and thought, the 1890s Cambridge years and R's 'neo-Hegelianism', characterized in terms of the *Absolute Idealism* of Bradley and Bosanquet (McTaggart has a 'distinctive brand' [47]), *holism* and *internal relations*. G skips from R's early ties to Moore to their relations to Wittgenstein in 1911-14 to churlishly criticize a book on M, 'At least this gets the timing right', and give his own account of M's keeping W's notes from R: 'the deterioration of their relationship' (58). Pages chronicle philosophically trivial pursuits, yet G is obscurely brief on basic issues. Discussing Bradley's 'existential theory' of judgment, analysis of negation, and influence on R, G fails to separate two sense of 'positive' crucial to the claim that '$(\exists\phi)(\phi a$ & ϕ is incompatible with F)' provides a 'positive ground' for analyzing '*a* is not F'. It *is positive* as it is an existential

claim avoiding 'not' (ignoring '*in*compatible'); it *is not* as no *positive* ϕ incompatible with F is *specified*. Missing this simple distinction, G's discussion is futile. As G fails to probe into B's 'existential theory' of judgment and its role in B's analysis of particulars, he also misses its obvious significance for R's developing analyses of denotation.

A 91-page chapter takes up R's early views of geometry. Like much of the book, it mixes lifeless biography, facts about what R wrote and read when, third-hand history and verbose commentary. The biography repeats familiar material; the history is a rehash of Kant, the rise of non-Euclidean geometry, the views of Couturat, Helmholtz, Lotze, etc. Declaring Moore's criticism of R's claim that a 'form of externality' is *necessary* for experience to be confused and 'unthinking' (133), G caricatures M's key argument in two ways: one makes it trivial, the other trivially mistaken. Yet M loses 'the battle', not 'the war', as R is wrong to 'carve out' a 'territory' between 'the logically necessary' and the 'contingent' for the necessity 'Kant accorded geometry'. Citing Routley's *proof* that *there are* unknowable true *propositions* (hence *being unknowable* is not *being false*), G then oddly offers a variant of M's own argument: claims about the knowable, being contingent, fail to ground necessity. But whether 'this is an inevitable fate for transcendental arguments' cannot be 'tackled here' (134).

Patronizing R, G ironically *denies the antecedent*: 'if [R] ... has shown what he says he has shown, that the Euclidean axioms are independent of the general functions of space and time ... he has shown that the Euclidean axioms are not a priori. For a geometrical proposition is a priori if it is necessary for ... experience and it is necessary for ... experience if it is true of any intuition which fulfils the "general philosophical functions" of space. The Euclidean axioms are false of some such intuitions, and therefore are not a priori' (174). Bizarrely, G then explains why R did not use the argument and concludes, about disputes with Couturat and Poincaré, 'on the ... a priority of Euclidean geometry' R was right, but on 'whether choice of geometry is an empirical matter, opinion remains divided' (176).

In 'Physics' G discusses R's views of a plenum and atoms: '[R's] first criticism of extended atoms is shallow ... His second criticism ... though not without its embarrassing moments, takes him into a major controversy in the physics of his day ... since the atoms are extended they must have parts and ... be analysable into further atoms. These ... if ... extended, will be ... analysable ... and so on indefinitely' (196). It is odd to find Bradley on space a 'tangle of naiveties' (184) given what is cited as a major issue in physics. Pages are devoted to Boscovich, Newton, Maxwell and Leibniz. We are told space was 'purely relative' to R, but we cannot tell to what extent R 'was pointing in the direction ... Einstein eventually took', for 'apart from lack of technical expertise' other reasons prevented his 'pursuing [E's] line of thought' (208): space was not of variable curvature. In 'Pure Mathematics' G rightly cites R's logic of relations as one of his most important contributions (but neglects R's own comment on that and Frege) and surveys R's early views on quantity, continua and numbers as ratios.

The chapter 'Logic' considers nonexistent objects, R's distinguishing a class as *one* from a class as *many* and the influence of Moore's *concepts* on R's *terms*. As G holds possible objects are not terms for R, he chastizes some who disagree, but shows little grasp of M's early ontology or its influence on later work of R and M. Preoccupied by non-existents not being terms, G focuses on M saying concepts do not exist and dismisses a difference with R since M's 'primary concern was with ethics' (308). G's preoccupation leads him to ignore links M and R have to Bradley on concepts and the analysis of *particulars*. Surprisingly, M's 1900-01 'Identity', a paper crucial to the issues and one R cited as influential, is not even mentioned.

A last chapter is on relations, diversity and intrinsic and extrinsic properties. G seeks to 'capture what [R] meant' with 'a property ϕ ... is *extrinsic* if there is a ψ and a b distinct from a such that $\phi(a) \vdash \psi(b)$' (323). He neither explains his use of the proof theoretic '$\vdash$' nor notes that he gives a condition for ϕ *being extrinsic to* a term, not for ϕ *being extrinsic*. This may be due to blurring 'ϕ is extrinsic if $(a)(\exists\psi)(\exists b)(a \neq b \ \&. \ \phi a \vdash \psi b)$' with '$(a)(\phi$ is extrinsic to a if $(\exists\psi)(\exists b)(a \neq b \ \&. \ \phi a \vdash \psi b)$'. That aside, given more than one *term* and a *provably* universal *property*, $(\lambda x)(x=x)$ say, any property is extrinsic to any term; and for any a, if ψ is $(\lambda x)((x=a) \supset \phi x)$, ϕ is extrinsic to a. G's saying 'Trivially, any relation can be reduced to a property. For given any relation R, we can specify a property, $(\lambda x)xRb$ ...' (324) indicates the philosophical depth of his analysis and leads him to consider *strong* reduction to *intrinsic* (non-extrinsic) properties. The discussion revolves around the inconsistency of holding that diverse terms of a relation must differ in intrinsic properties but may differ only relationally.

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Frank-Peter Hansen
'Das Älteste Systemprogramm des Deutschen Idealismus': Rezeptionsgeschichte und Interpretation. (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie. Bd. 23. hrsg, G. Patzig, E. Scheibe, W. Wieland.)
Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter 1989.
Pp. xii + 490. DM212. ISBN 3-11-011809-2.

There was once a scholar's joke that ran: 'An American, a French and a German academic go on safari. On returning, each publishes a book — the American, a hundred-page magazine entitled, *The Complete Elephant: An Illustrated Encyclopædia*; the French scholar, a four hundred-page paper-

back, *L'histoire structurale du commerce d'ivoire*; and the German, a five volume, leather-bound collection, *Der Elefant: Eine kleine Bibliographie*'. So meticulous is Hansen's scholarship in this study, and to the outsider so seemingly narrow his topic, one might readily think him the butt of just such a joke. His subject is not one of the *magna opera* of the maturity of German idealism, but an anonymous and programmatic two-page manuscript fragment from its junvenilia. (See F. Rosenzweig, *Der Mensch und sein Werk: Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. III, Nijhoff, 1984; for an English translation, see E. Behler, ed., *Philosophy of German Idealism*, Continuum, 1987.) Limiting discussion to the German literature, in which 'since 1965 alone more than 150 works dealing directly or indirectly with the System-program have been published' (1), H. offers in the first two-thirds of this book a carefully documented three-part account of the manuscript's *Rezeptionsgeschichte*, charting the views of roughly 50 interpreters, followed in the latter third of the book by his own comprehensive interpretation.

Yet, in some measure, H. may be in on the joke. What animates his interest is the fact that the fragment has generated such a 'torrent' of publications, an end to which seems 'nowhere in sight,' yet after 70 years of scholarship, including in 1969 a major colloquium devoted exclusively to the topic (182ff.), no 'comprehensive presentation' has emerged and no single consistent reading has gained acceptance (1). 'In the matter of the System-program, everything seems possible and nothing decided' (2). Moreover, various interpretations have arisen by and large not from newly revealed 'facts' but from changing prejudices and pre-occupations. 'By regularly reading the relevant literature,' H. notes, 'one experiences something of the prevailing interpretive concern and obtains, surprisingly, a reasonably good insight into the developing *Zeitgeist* of this century' (4). What he proposes, then, is 'a piece of German *Geistesgeschichte*,' the history of 'System-program' interpretation being taken to reflect shifts in the spirit of recent German philosophy.

The 'facts' about the text are easily summarized. In 1913, the Königliche Bibliothek in Berlin purchased at auction from the firm of Liepmannssohn a manuscript fragment consisting of 'an unbroken folio leaf, not entirely filled on both sides' (19), totaling 68 lines of handwritten script in 6 paragraphs. The firm listed the manuscript as 'Treatise on Ethics,' mistaking the first two words of the fragment ('*eine Ethik*'), which were underscored, for its title, instead of 'what they are: the end of a sentence begun on the preceding page' (19). The following summer, while reworking his *Hegel und der Staat*, Franz Rosenzweig discovered the manuscript and immediately prepared it for publication, along with a 40-odd page interpretive study. After wartime delays, the text and study appeared in March 1917 in the *Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften*, under the now customary title coined by Rosenzweig, 'Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus.' Though Liepmannssohn 'could or would provide no information' concerning the manuscript's provenance (5, 19), philological work established that the writing stemmed

'unequivocally from Hegel's hand' (19) and, given the particular character of the script, that it was 'composed at the latest in 2/7/1797, but at the earliest in 29/4/1796' (20). Beyond this, a more specific determination of provenance has remained in dispute. However, in the mid-1970s the Hegel scholar, Dieter Henrich, found in a copy of a Liepmannssohn's stock-list from 1913 an entry for the 'Treatise on Ethics' that included the note: 'from Friedrich Försters *Nachlaß*' (239). Förster, a student of Hegel's, was the 'first to obtain for inspection from Hegel's family the entire handwritten *Nachlaß*' (239). There is 'the greatest probability,' Henrich concluded, that the 'auctioned manuscript stemmed ... *"from Hegel's own Nachlaß"*' (239) and hence was Hegel's *own* composition. At the very least, the burden of proof would rest with those who claimed otherwise.

Yet, on both intrinsic and extrinsic grounds, Rosenzweig had already rejected Hegel's authorship. The whole thrust of the fragment — calling for the withering away of the state, making art the highest act of reason, granting poetry intellectual supremacy, demanding a new mythology — seemed entirely at odds with the fundamental sense of Hegelianism, and far too radical for a Hegel who already in Tübingen 'had been known as the "old man"' (20). Such themes were explicitly considered in the later course of Schelling's thinking, a thinking marked by its precocity and its penchant for programmatic statement. Moreover, in contrast to virtually the entirety of Hegel's philosophical manuscripts, this fragment is 'neatly written and shows only a few corrections,' lacking the 'quite wide margin' elsewhere characteristic. Rosenzweig therefore concluded that Hegel merely copied an 'original text,' whose 'author ... could only be Schelling' (22). The majority of 'System-program' interpreters have shared this judgment, including such luminaries as Lukács, Jaspers, and Habermas.

As the ideas expressed in the fragment were natural to romanticists, Rosenzweig had conceded that Hölderlin might have been an influence. Ernst Cassirer (1917/18) argued further that in terms specifically of the proposed theory of art and poetry, Schelling "'gave conscious systematic formulation to what at that time was in spirit already present as a demand in Hölderlin'" (44). Agreeing with Rosenzweig and Cassirer on the dating, the handwriting, and the manuscript's facsimile character, it remained for W. Böhm (1926), the co-editor of the 2nd edition (1910) of the *Hölderlin Gesamtausgabe*, to provide textual and biographical evidence for Hölderlin's exclusive authorship, presenting him as a "'*streng systematisch denkender Dichter*'" (47). Böhm claimed that the young Hegel was too limited in his preoccupations and too much a child of Kantian rationalism, and the young Schelling too much bound to an 'extreme Fichtean standpoint' (47-51), for either to be the author.

To advance Hegel's authorship, the legend of the 'old man' *ab ovo* had to be dispelled. This came through study of more recently published early manuscripts, from which emerged the image of a 'young' Hegel, much more 'romantic' in outlook, having concerns and ideas consonant with those announced in the System-program. The manuscript was then read accord-

ingly as a stage in Hegel's development, and not as the 'oldest' idealist 'system.' This *in nuce* is H.'s thesis. Marshalling persuasive evidence from Hegel's early essays and correspondence, H. shows that the ethical and aesthetic doctrines sketched in the fragment are indeed those of the young Hegel, marking his explicit appropriation of romanticist notions and of ideas from Kant's second and third *Critiques*. In contrast, 'at the time in question, Fichte is for Schelling the central figure to which he orients his thinking' (382), an orientation contrary to that of the fragment, while Hölderlin is philosophically too unsystematic.

H.'s textual, philological discussions are thorough and his interpretation is convincing. Still, he might have been even more in on the joke. A Derrida, for example, would have had a much more playful time with notions of 'authorship' and 'anonymity'. A social historian would have linked the 'System-program' *Rezeptionsgeschichte* more directly to larger ideological struggles within the German university. Even on his own terms, H. might have done more toward the *geistesgeschichtlich* aim. For instance, he might have situated the advocacy of Hölderlin's authorship more fully in terms of the 'rediscovery' of Hölderlin early this century (through, e.g., the Stefan George 'circle'), with the re-emergence of the politically charged discourses on *Dichter* and *Germania*, in which Heidegger, for one, was very much involved. He might also have better connected Rosenzweig's advocacy of Schelling with the rejection of Hegelian absolutism in the *Stern der Erlösung*. To Rosenzweig, we philosophize now *post Hegel mortuum*, Hegel's reconciliation of heaven and earth in absolute thought being the culmination of the whole tradition of philosophy initiated by Parmenides, yet foundering irretrievably on the essential fact of human finitude. What is called for is a 'new thinking' that refuses the traditional metaphysical 'retreat from the flow of reality to the protected circle of wonder' (*Understanding the Sick & the Healthy* [Noonday 1953], 30), but which still finds 'eternity' confirmed in the midst of time. To Rosenzweig, Schelling is the herald of such 'thinking'. 'Had Schelling's *Die Weltalter* [1813] not remained a fragment,' he writes, '... the *Stern* would deserve no attention' (*Briefe*, [Schocken 1935], 399). Not to pursue such themes in depth is to miss a deeper *geistesgeschichtlich* import to 'System-program' interpretation.

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Michael P. Hodges
Transcendence and Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1990.
Pp. xii + 205.
US$39.95. ISBN 0-87722-692-X.

The central thesis of this book is that the *Tractatus* is doubly incoherent: both its theory of meaning and its ethical vision are fraught with irresoluble paradox. In both cases, according to Michael Hodges, the problem has its roots in Wittgenstein's commitment to 'grasping language and the world from the "outside" so that each appears as a "limited whole"' (21) — that is, in Wittgenstein's commitment to what Hodges calls 'transcendence'. Given this, it is not surprising to find Hodges urging that the two incoherences are in fact versions of the same 'fundamental paradox' (86); and he argues in addition that it was Wittgenstein's belated recognition of the impossibility of maintaining a transcendental viewpoint of any sort that led to his rejection of the *Tractatus*'s theory of meaning and served as the springboard into the position developed in *Philosophical Investigations*. Because it is on the later Wittgenstein's authority that many contemporary critics (e.g., Rorty) are announcing 'an end to philosophy' (19), and because what Wittgenstein himself was putting an end to in that later work just was the possibility of philosophy à la *Tractatus* (19), it behooves us, says Hodges, to understand the early work well — not only 'for the sake of the later philosophy' (21) but for the sake of understanding a significant strand in post-modern American thought. According to Hodges, 'Wittgenstein made the philosophical turn that Rorty and others currently recommend. A clear account of the transformation in his [Wittgenstein's] own thought should [thus] offer an avenue to understanding much that is under debate in current philosophical circles' (20).

Unfortunately, Hodges develops this interesting line no further. The book is taken up almost entirely by an exposition of first the logico-semantic, and then the ethical, difficulties of the *Tractatus*. Although the first of these will hardly come as news to those familiar with Wittgenstein's work, and the second will, in my opinion, fail to convince many readers, the suggestion that Hodges' notion of transcendence might serve as a useful axis of comparison between the early and late work has much merit. (This despite the fact that Hodges' account of the genesis of Wittgenstein's later views is, historically, insufficiently complex.)

Hodges acknowledges that his reading of the logical theory of the *Tractatus* is not especially original (27). The first five pages of Chapter 2 nonetheless contain one of the clearest summary presentations of the picture-theory available in the secondary literature; and while I take issue with certain points in Hodges' discussion of objects, I recommend this chapter to anyone looking for a concise introduction to Wittgenstein's early philosophy of language. The paradox which Hodges discovers at the heart of that philosophy is the one noted by Russell in his introduction to the original English-language edition of the book: Wittgenstein does manage to say a good deal about what, by the *Tractatus*'s own lights, cannot be said, 'thus suggest-

ing to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole ... ' (*TLP*, trans. Pears & McGuinness, xxi). Alas not, Hodges argues: if the *Tractatus*'s theory of meaning is correct, the *Tractatus* itself is comprised of meaningless sentences; if the *Tractatus*'s sentences are true, then the theory of meaning which they outline must be false. Hodges' treatment of this difficulty is occasionally somewhat repetitious and literal-minded — he nowhere, for example, gives us any indication of how it might have been that Wittgenstein came to commit, and even in the face of Russell's objections, to stand by this howler — but it is, on the whole, sound. And his diagnosis is essentially correct — taking up a position outside the sayable (i.e., 'transcending' it) in order to say what its defining features are is, indeed, asking for trouble.

But the heart of the book — and what, in Hodges' view, constitutes 'a substantially new contribution to the understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy' (27) — is his discussion of the ethical wing of the central thesis. About these chapters I am less sanguine. Hodges has been at pains to take the ethical remarks, and Wittgenstein's own contention that 'the book's point is an ethical one', seriously. He has culled relevant material from the *Notebooks*, reflected on the relation between goodness and happiness asserted there, and discerned the continuity between the stoic elements in Wittgenstein's thought and his assertion of an identity between ethics and aesthetics. He has attempted to connect the logico-semantic theory and its failings to the ethical vision, and its failings, by arguing for the centrality of 'transcendence' in each. But his reading nonetheless fails to be compelling.

In part, this seems to be because it becomes overly-enamoured of its own paradox-detecting machinery. Hodges vacillates between the claim that his ethical paradox is structurally isomorphic to the logical paradox owing to their shared victimization by transcendence, and the claim that Wittgenstein's ethical views 'require a notion of transcendence that is inconsistent with that required on the logical side' (26). That is, Hodges claims, not only is the *Tractatus*'s logic self-contradictory and its ethical vision paradoxical, the ethical vision and the logical doctrines are *mutually* inconsistent. This, on the surface, is hard to follow: how can two contradictions contradict one another? In fact, what I think Hodges means to say is that the only way to make the ethical views *appear* to be tenable is to introduce a notion of the 'transcendent self' that is *just* the notion that Wittgenstein outlines and rejects in 5.632 - 5.641. But of course the ethical views, according to Hodges, are *not* tenable, and this notion of the 'transcendent self' has already been obviated by the nature of the transcendence that Hodges has argued is required by 'the ethical viewpoint' itself. So I must confess that I don't really see the point of the additional arabesque, especially given Hodges' characterization of it.

The other reason his reading is unconvincing, though, is that it seems simply to miss Wittgenstein's point. Again, the argument is occasionally difficult to discern, but I think it is something like the following: 6.421 — 'Ethics is transcendental' — requires a perspective which, in its logical essentials, mirrors the perspective required for the *Tractatus*'s theory of

meaning — that is, one effectively 'outside' the world of objects, facts, and sentences, from which that world can be viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*. Here, I think Hodges is on firm ground: the 'ethical subject', that which values and wills, must, for Wittgenstein, be 'outside' the world in just the way the eye must be 'outside' the visual field. This has the consequence, as Hodges rightly notes, that the 'ethical subject' cannot be described (since, for Wittgenstein, everything describable resides *in* the world); and so, Hodges contends, it cannot be distinguished from other willing, valuing subjects, i.e., cannot be a particular self. Paradox results, he claims, when we note that the *point* of ethical transcendence must, logically, be its achievement; but an achievement, by definition, is 'an event in the world that happens to some specifiable individual' (154); therefore, the self that achieves ethical transcendence must be a specifiable individual, viz., a particular self. That Wittgenstein concurred in this latter view, Hodges claims, is borne out by his preoccupation, documented in letters and diaries, with becoming a good person.

But all of this is to misconstrue the sense in which 'ethical transcendence' can be an 'achievement' on the view adumbrated in the *Tractatus*. For Wittgenstein, the point of moral-aesthetic transcendence is the *dissolution* of the (world-enmeshed) self — that is, to put it more provocatively, it is the vanishing of the problem (6.521). While this leaves the field open to speculation on *how* a self might dissolve, the paradox in the simple form in which Hodges presents it simply cannot be constructed: the 'self' that achieves the transcendence required by 6.421 need not be a particular self since, according to Wittgenstein, it is no self at all. There is thus no apparent conflict with Hodges' transcendent non-particularizable 'ethical subject'.

I do not want to suggest, however, that Wittgenstein's ethical views are without their difficulties. These are deep waters, and Hodges should be commended for his efforts. It's true that at one level Hodges' account might have benefitted from closer attention to the way, and degree to which, Wittgenstein's views on the relation between happiness and the will are indebted to Schopenhauer; and how, therefore, they must at least initially occasion some tension with the overtly mystical intuitions that also underlie the *Tractatus*. But I do not think the fundamental difficulty is one of faulty scholarship or lack of perspicacity. It stems, rather, from a bad match of temperaments.

This is a difficulty that haunts most of the secondary literature on Wittgenstein, particularly the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein was an artist. As such, he is a phenomenon rarely encountered in the academy, and one for which our training as scholarly readers rarely prepares us. The gap in sensibility between Wittgenstein and students of his work is frequently breathtaking. In the present instance it is revealed not only in the misreading which has such drastic consequences for Hodges' central thesis, but in a variety of other less crucial confusions (the suggestion that Wittgenstein might have found Bullough's 1912 essay on 'psychical distance' as an aesthetic principle anything but distasteful (14-15), the identification of the hypothetical book *The World as I found it* (5.631) with the *Tractatus* (23), the

conflation of elucidation with showing (Chapter 3), etc.). Not that one has to be an artist to understand an artist (or a scholar to understand a scholar) — but that we do not get far in that appreciation which is the *aim* of understanding if we neglect the fundamental stylistic energies, the *duende*, of an individual's thought.

Is the fact that these energies are to some extent neglected in Hodges' study therefore grounds for dismissing it? No. This is, above all, an *earnest* book. As such, its weaknesses are a certain doggedness in its pursuit of its conclusions, a lack of nuance in its vision, and a repetitiveness of style and content. But its corresponding strengths are thoroughness, perseverance, and intellectual honesty. Moreover, its grasp of Wittgenstein's theory of language is admirably secure. Whatever its author's temperamental distance from Wittgenstein, its achievements are earned, and its failures deserve our respect.

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David Ferrell Krell
Of Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing: On the Verge.
Studies in Continental Thought series.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1990.
Pp. 340.
US$37.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-33193-5);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-20592-1).

John Sallis
Echoes: After Heidegger.
Studies in Continental Thought series.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1990.
Pp. 213.
US$27.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-35058-1);
US$12.50 (paper: ISBN 0-253-20583-2).

The rule in our discipline is that bad books should be ignored rather than condemned, because it is far more polite and because being ignored is really a far more painful fate for a book than being attacked. This attitude reflects a certain theory of evil, in which hell is a function of distance from God (here the God of learned opinion) rather than being a domain of fire, brimstone, and other mechanisms of torture.

When we were in graduate school in the middle seventies, we looked forward to the day when the spirit of phenomenology would continue on its westerly course and make the great leap from France to the New World. But the jump has proven a formidable one and the spirit has spent more years preparing itself than any of us expected at the time. Phenomenology was born in Germany with Husserl, and became a version of Neo-Kantianism under his hand, and was (almost) liberated from metaphysics by Heidegger, and practised by Scheler and Jaspers and Gadamer, before it went west to France with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Then Paul Ricoeur, Herbert Spiegelberg and others did bring it to the United States, where something unexpected happened. There did not appear any native American thinker to go to the things themselves in a more powerful and comprehensive way, to carry on the tradition in a genuinely creative manner. What happened to phenomenology in the great Atlantic leap? This is no place to speculate on this troublesome question. What we can say is that the two works under consideration here are symptomatic of the failure.

As an old journal and series editor, and as the new W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University (replacing Alasdair MacIntyre), John Sallis is one of the two or three principle academic bureaucrats of the phenomenological movement in America. That is why he can get by with publishing a book such as *Echoes* in his own series. Except for the Introduction and Conclusion, the book has nothing to do with echoes at all, so that the title of the book, and its putative theme (though 'echo/echoes' is not an entry in the Index), are just screens for publishing a wide-ranging series of commentaries (largely previously published in journals) on assorted topics in Heidegger (e.g., the end of philosophy, imagination, mortality, antirationalism, poetics) under the guise of a unified academic monograph.

There is, by all appearances, no original thinking in the book, nothing but the somewhat stuffy pedantry we have come to expect in works of phenomenology. Certain sections go over material treated years ago and much more convincingly by others who are, nevertheless, not mentioned by Sallis; the section on Heidegger's account of time, for instance, fails to mention Charles M. Sherover's *Heidegger, Kant and Time*, perhaps the best piece of Heidegger scholarship written by an American. Moreover, certain sections beg the question about important topics without even considering the alternatives; for example, Sallis makes the initially implausible claim that Heidegger's five ways in which truth can occur are reducible to three (161-3) and rushes on to his next textual juxtaposition. One more thing: Sallis trots out an abbreviated version of the standard evasion/apology for Heidegger's Nazism, which maneuver just will not do in 1990, especially by one of the chief keepers of his corpus.

David Farrell Krell's *Of Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing* is better sized than Sallis's effort; and there is no difficulty in recognizing its announced theme(s) in each chapter. It mentions the views of dozens and dozens of philosophers from ancient times to the present, and is hence a scholarly tour de force. To quote Vanderbilt professor Charles M. Scott's blurb on the

back of Krell's book, 'Krell creates a remarkable interplay of meanings, allusions, and connotations — an interplay of multiple resonance which is finely tuned to Derrida's thought and which makes his essay as artful as it is conceptually disciplined.' What Scott was discrete enough not to mention is that the equality of artfulness and conceptual discipline is a product of the book having these qualities in, as the phenomenologists are wont to say in their lighter moments, an entirely privative mode. (Scott, being one of those phenomenologists who prefers the word 'rigorousness' over 'rigor' by reason of the former's greater sonority, was, however, perhaps not speaking ironically.)

Krell may be forgiven for failing to write like Derrida, for Derrida has not been up to this task himself at times; what cannot be understood is trying to write like Derrida in the first place. For Krell is one of the innumerable translators of philosophy (he is one of Heidegger's principal translators, and by reputation a good one) who are incapable (by reason evidently of learning too many languages too well) of reaching the philosophical level of comprehension, something that he himself might have realized before releasing this, his third, book.

It is a bad book. Whether the reader is ignorant or learned with regard to the figures discussed (in order: Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Coleridge, Erwin Straus, Merleau-Ponty, Freud, the early Derrida, Hegel, Heidegger, Nietzsche, the recent Derrida), he will get little from Krell's treatment, and that hard won. This book is recommended to all analytic philosophers, who might keep it on their bookshelves in case one of their students begins to covet the forbidden fruit of deconstruction. 'Read this,' one might say to her, 'and if you still have a stomach for poststructuralist gobbledegook, go forth with my blessing.' For no analyst should want a student capable of devouring this Derridean writing from cover to cover. It says nothing, nada, nien, and does so in an exceedingly chaotic manner. In nearly every other paragraph, for example, and always in the middle of a sentence, the author has spliced quotations from the works of Faulkner, Joyce, Melville, Poe and Robert Musil. In fairness, let us add that Krell's book is very original, for nothing quite like it has been written anywhere, and let us hope that it remains that way.

A final comment. The most intellectually rigorous manner of revitalizing American philosophy has for forty years been to reconnect it to a Continental tradition that, except for the structuralist deviation, has not been oriented by positivistic and reductionist tendencies. French and German phenomenology never abandoned its roots to the broad metaphysical tradition, even when it had to repudiate that tradition to remain faithful to it. The same is true for phenomenology's heir. The huge influence of deconstruction and poststructuralism throughout the humanities and social sciences demonstrates it. Yet until the spirit of phenomenology and its heir finds a true home in North American academic philosophy (and not just in modern language departments), that is to say, until America produces original Continental thought, rather than mere Heidegger and Derrida commentaries, we shall

ever be under the sway of German and French thought, when it occurs to us, that is, to think at all.

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Michele Le Doeuff
The Philosophical Imaginary,
trans. Colin Gordon.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1990.
Pp. vii + 199.
US$29.50. ISBN 0-8047-1619-6.

In *The Philosophical Imaginary*, Michele Le Doeuff's central concern is with the place of images in philosophical texts. Her contention is that while philosophy has been vigilant in its attempt to speak directly and literally, it is unavoidably indebted to the images found in its texts. She wonders why philosophy has been so concerned to distance itself from literature and what effect the denial of these images has had on the construction of philosophy. The book is structured as a compilation of essays that look into these questions with a preface that develops a general framework to tie them together.

Each of the chapters gives a fascinating and close reading of a particular philosophical text or issue in decoding the philosophical imaginary. The chapters range from a discussion of Thomas More's *Utopia* to an inquiry into the status of the red marks we put on the texts of our students. Each of the chapters stands alone and represents a significant contribution. The real merit of the book, however, lies in the general thesis, which represents a real breakthrough in the discussion of alterity in philosophy.

Le Doeuff claims that through focussing on the images used in a philosophical text, one is directed to places where the tensions in a system manifest themselves. The images work to support the text through covering gaps with seductive images, and to undermine the text, since support through the use of images undermines the claim to rational autonomy made in so many philosophical texts.

Le Doeuff's textual strategies are informed by these claims and by the more general claim that there is something working in philosophy which she calls 'the philosophical imaginary.' While she argues that there is an imaginary working in Western philosophical texts she does not see this general phenomenon as being based in any pre-textual universal. The desire that operates in philosophy, which is found working in the images of philosophical

texts, is actually constructed through those texts. There is nothing absolute, unchanging or natural about the alterity that finds itself both implicated in and excluded from philosophical texts.

In learning philosophy we are introduced into that particular desiring regime of the philosophical imaginary. Le Doeuff writes that ' ... desire structures itself into the desire to philosophize.' Philosophy is a particular form of desire rather than a defense against desire. Thus, she writes, 'let us stress once more that imagery and knowledge form, dialectically, a common system. Between these two terms there is a play of feedbacks which maintains the particular regime of the discursive formation. Philosophical texts offer images through which subjectivity can be structured and given a marking which is that of the corporate body. In turn, the affectivity which is thus molded sustains the effort of philosophical production and the system of presuppositions which govern the distinction between the thinkable and the unthinkable for a consciousness attached to settled loves' (19).

This general thesis can be seen most clearly in Le Doeuff's discussion of Kant. In *The Critique of Pure Reason* Kant paints the image of the island of pure understanding cut off from the stormy ocean of illusion (8). Kant takes great pains to show that this island is cut off from the sea, and to distinguish this austere North Sea island from the seductive South Sea islands. Le Doeuff raises the question as to why we should be concerned to find a pure understanding, cut off from the desires of life (16). Le Doeuff engages in a fascinating analysis of the workings of the images of islands and renunciation of desire in Kant. She shows that what is going in Kant's work is not a renunciation of desire, but rather, the instigation of a particular austere form of desire. We are seduced into wanting to go to that place of the island cut off from the sea and sun.

Like Derrida, Le Doeuff looks at philosophical texts by focussing on what they exclude. Unlike Derrida, however, she does not romanticize the position of exclusion or alterity. It is in this that her greatest significance as a feminist thinker lies. Some feminist thinkers, most notably Kristeva, have followed Derrida in valorizing the position of alterity. They argue that Reason's other has been denigrated by philosophy in order to protect a masculine regime of discipline. To counter this oppressive regime, we should valorize Reasons's other, the feminine which has been excluded by Reason.

Le Doeuff concurs that the regime of reason instituted by philosophy is masculine, but she does not see this as a regime that excludes desire and leaves it to float freely in the feminized margins. Rather, in philosophy a particular masculine desire is constructed which simultaneously creates and excludes the feminine.

As Le Doeuff puts it: 'As soon as we regard this femininity as a fantasy-product of conflicts within the field of reason that has been assimilated to masculinity, we can no longer set any store by liberating its voice. We will not talk pidgin to please the colonists' (116). The task is not to get outside the philosophical text into the free realm of the 'other'. If Reason is constructed through a parasitic relationship to desire and image (a connection

which is then repressed in the working of the text) then there is no outside to reason where the subaltern can position itself.

Instead, we need to lift the repression and see the connections between Reason and desire and, at the same time, between philosophy and literature. 'Insisting on philosophy's lack, while making of this lack the condition of its insertion into historical reality, allows philosophy to be moved towards a position where the alternative between a hegemonic reason and a revolt of unreason can be seen as mythical, a connivance or complicity between forms which present themselves as opposites' (118). Le Doeuff is aware that this might sound like a less than radical solution and that her text can be called as philosophical as those that she is criticizing. She grants the point but argues that this is the only terrain from which we can engage in the necessary ideological struggles.

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Plotin
Traité sur la liberté et la volonté de l'Un (Ennéade VI,8 (39). Introduction, texte grec, traduction et commentaire par Georges Leroux. Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1990. Pp. 447. 210FF.

Year by year our knowledge and understanding of Plotinus are enhanced by the availability of better works of fundamental scholarship. After Henry and Schwyzer's massive *editio maior* and Oxford text, we have recently seen the completion of Armstrong's excellent Loeb volumes: the Oxford text plus very accurate and literate English translations. The greatest basic task remaining is the production of commentaries, on a larger scale than the revised Harder versions, especially of the philosophically more important treatises. Recently we have benefitted from Helleman-Elgersma on parts of IV 3, Atkinson on V 1, Hadot on VI 7, Bertier, Brisson and others on VI 6.

To these we may now add the work of Georges Leroux, professor of philosophy at the University of Québec at Montréal: a full-length treatment of what is arguably the most important of all the Plotinian essays: VI 8, *On the Freedom and Will of the One*. Leroux has reprinted the Oxford text, but he notes in his commentary that he would revert to the *editio maior* in 16 places and would accept one conjecture of Harder and one of Kirchhoff. He discusses all passages where he would decide against the reading of the Oxford text.

Apart from the commentary itself Leroux has provided us with more than 100 pages of introduction to the treatise as a whole. As in the commentary, this is marked by common-sense and judiciousness, and based on a wide knowledge of the best contemporary discussion of Plotinus. Three themes predominate: first, that in his account of freedom Plotinus' main concerns in VI 8 are metaphysical-theological, not ethical; second, that in treating of the will of the One Plotinus wants to distinguish willing from wanting, that is, from needing and any kind of qualitative lack or insufficiency. That point is significant because all other beings in the Plotinian universe strive for the One and want it precisely because they do not possess it. So that Leroux is right to emphasize that the notion of the will of the One must be understood in the context of an act of the One rather than as indicating any kind of potentiality.

Leroux's third major theme is that Plotinus' account of willing depends on and is to be regarded as an exegesis of a metaphysically key passage of the sixth book of Plato's *Republic* (509B), where the Good is said to be beyond any substance and existent: that is, Plotinus is developing a 'positive' metaphysic of the First Principle as Goodness rather than as Unity. It is in the context of the Good that such 'positive' notions as activity, sovereignty and love can best be presented. This is — though Plotinus of course does not say it, and Leroux does not risk it — a Platonism of the Platonic dialogues rather than a Neopythagorean treatment of the *Parmenides* or an 'Aristotelian' Platonism from the *Metaphysics*; on it positive, as distinct from negative, 'theology' can be built.

Leroux devotes a good deal of attention to the question of why Plotinus wrote VI 8 — such an unusual treatise — at all. He rightly concerns himself with a mysterious objection in chapter 7, the chapter which marks the turning-point of the *Ennead* where discussion of freedom based on the earlier accounts of Aristotle, of the Stoics and of Alexander of Aphrodisias, yields place to a directly metaphysical treatment of the nature of the First Principle itself. The objection tries to undermine Plotinus' account of the First Principle by supposing that the Good or One exists not indeed by necessity, but by chance. Not only, that is, might the 'others' of the universe be radically contingent, but perhaps such contingency applies to the First Principle itself. Plotinus' answer to this is that the One is not as he chanced to be but as he willed to be.

Much scholarly ingenuity has gone into the question of where the challenge to Plotinus has come from which produced such an unusual response. On the basis of little evidence some have thought of Gnosticism. Theiler, much more interestingly, supposed that we have here a 'thought-experiment' due to Plotinus himself. Leroux himself favours a version of the view, espoused in more or less nuanced versions by Whittaker and Armstrong, that the objection is of Christian origin. But he rejects, with good arguments, the suggestion that Plotinus is replying *directly* to a Christian challenge on the nature of the deity; rather, combining the Christian thesis with that of Theiler, he argues, with some plausibility, that Plotinus was prodded into

the themes which uniquely characterize this *Ennead* by reflecting on certain Christian ideas; hence the objection is in fact Plotinus' own, but provoked by the ideas of those whose major contribution to ancient philosophy was to widen the realm of theological possibility by emphasizing the special nature — whatever it is — of the *Deus Christianorum*. I do not know if Leroux is right about the objection, but his thesis is certainly the best on the table so far.

Beginners in Plotinus will find Leroux's commentary hard, but very rewarding if they are serious; those who know a little about Plotinus, but want to know more (or to relieve themselves of prejudices), especially about some of his more powerful and unusual ideas, would do well to buy this commentary and give it their most careful attention. They will find a shrewd use of the best historical studies of Plotinus' sources — the emphasis on Alexander of Aphrodisias, whom Porphyry says that Plotinus read, is especially welcome (for here Plotinus found one of his bridges between Aristotle and the Stoics); above all they will find a thoughtful, ideology-free, approach to the ideas of the philosopher himself. Leroux is to be congratulated.

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Scott MacDonald, ed.
Being and Goodness.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1991.
Pp. xii + 328.
US$43.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2312-0);
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-9779-5).

This collection of essays illustrates the fruitfulness of the Cornell-Notre Dame connection. S. MacDonald, E. Stump and N. Kretzmann have strong ties to Cornell; they represent the new interest in medieval philosophy in American secular philosophy. The three Notre Dame contributors, R. McInerny, M. Jordan and T. Morris, are heirs to the rich Catholic tradition of research and study in the field of medieval philosophy. The three remaining contributors are J. Aertsen (Amsterdam), J. Gracia (Buffalo), W. Mann (Vermont). Only two articles have appeared elsewhere; one of those has been substantially revised since its initial appearance. A translation of Boethius' *De hebdomadibus* appears as an appendix.

Unlike many philosophical anthologies, *Being and Goodness* is unified. In his useful and able introduction, MacDonald presents his basic thesis: The

intuition that there is a necessary connection between being and goodness has guided an important philosophical tradition that includes Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Boethius and Aquinas. The elements of this tradition, properly understood, constitute a significant contribution to current debates about the nature of goodness.

The collection has two parts. Part one examines medieval metaphysical accounts of the connection between being and goodness and their implications for other metaphysical issues such as the nature of evil, the nature of human morality and will, and the relation between goodness and the divine nature. The essays in part two demonstrate the importance of the concept of the good developed in this tradition for issues in philosophical theology, including the nature of faith, the concept of God, and the problems of evil and creation.

Interestingly, aspects of MacDonald's interpretation of Boethius, *De hebdomadibus*, are challenged in Aertsen's brief and elegant article on goodness and the transcendentals. Basing himself on Thomas, Aertsen distinguishes between the concept of transcendental goodness which pertains to all categories and transcendent goodness which surpasses all categories.

R. McInerny argues (among other things) that Thomas' distinction between essence and existence was anticipated in Boethius' *De hebdomadibus*. When he takes issue with Pierre Duhem and Cardinal Cajetan as interpreters of Aquinas, McInerny's prose occasionally makes for exciting reading: 'In short, Cajetan embraces the fallacy Thomas is intent on dissolving.'

Strictly speaking Gracia's incisive article on Suárez (d. 1617) belongs in a discussion of early modern philosophy. Its inclusion here is the more surprising (and welcome) since it challenges the thesis of the collection, the claim that 'being and good are convertible in reality'. One problem with the thesis is that it does not appear (155) that 'evil is ... just privation ... it is also itself positive.' Suárez' solution to the problem involves a distinction between evil in itself and evil for another. Evil for another is defined as a relational concept, disagreeability. Ultimately Gracia suggests (176) that effective as Suárez' solution is in many ways, 'the clear advantages of a strongly relational understanding of good and evil' suggest that it would be wise to abandon or modify the original claim that 'being and good are convertible in reality'.

The four articles by Stump (1) and Kretzmann (2), including one joint article, are finely crafted, and well worth the careful reading they require. Stump's essay 'Aquinas on faith ...' is particularly noteworthy in this respect. She gives an exciting and plausible account of the legitimate role of will in intellectual assent. In his essay on why and how God created a world at all, Kretzmann's attitude toward Aquinas is refreshingly critical. He asks whether Aquinas' claim that God freely chooses to create the world is consistent with his other views. 'If perfect goodness is an aspect of God's essence, and self-diffusiveness is essential to goodness, it looks as if creation has got to be an inevitable consequence of God's nature.'

Jordan's 'The Transcendality of Goodness and the Human Will,' is a study of Aquinas' views on the relation of will and understanding. According to Jordan that relation is one of reciprocal causality, and that reciprocity is resolved ultimately only by an exterior cause — namely, God. Jordan also maintains that the will is free in a strong sense according to Aquinas; it can refrain from willing the good. Jordan's interpretation is attractive and persuasively presented.

I raise one minor point of disagreement about translation. For the most part, Jordan translates the phrase *secundum rationem* as 'according to the formuable notion'. In my view, this rendering is unnecessarily complicated. Elsewhere in this volume, McInerny and Kretzmann quite properly translated the term 'ratio' as 'definition', 'essence' or 'nature' (85, 92, 227). I realize, of course, that *ratio*, as it is used here, itself translates Aristotle's *logos* (*Metaph* IV 7, 1012a24), and so can have profound philosophical significance. In medieval usage, however, *secundum rationem* is a common expression, which should not be translated in a cumbersome fashion; *descriptio* and *definitio* are used as synonyms for *ratio*. Deferrari's *Lexicon* suggests 'essential concept', which is less mystifying than 'formuable notion'.

Unlike the other authors, T. Morris does not engage in a close reading of a medieval text. Instead, he examines a very general form of the ontological argument and argues provocatively that metaphysical independence or aseity does not imply temporal, spatial or property simplicity.

In 'The Best of All Possible Worlds', William E. Mann presents a sympathetic treatment of Leibniz, whose views he contrasts with the 'desert landscape' of fourteenth-century Franciscan voluntarism. The picture of Franciscan voluntarism presented in this brief (Ockham, 3pp; Vital du Four, 4 pp.) discussion is, unfortunately, traditional and inaccurate.

According to Mann, Ockham holds that creaturely goodness is always accidental, never intrinsic. This is mistaken. As Marilyn McCord Adams has shown, Ockham distinguished between positive and nonpositive morality. He held that no moral theory which did not identify a human act that was necessarily and intrinsically virtuous could be adequate ('William Ockham: Voluntarist or Naturalist,' *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*, ed. J. Wippel, pp. 234-239).

Similarly, what Mann characterizes as Du Four's 'robust specimen of theological voluntarism' is (as Mann himself indicates) 'not strictly dictated by du Four's text.' To Mann's credit, he sketches the common fourteenth century interpretation, as well as the more 'robust' caricature, which he contrasts unfavorably with Leibniz.

Hence one reservation about this book: primarily concerned with the interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas, these essays do not concern themselves with such major medieval authors as: Anselm, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, John Duns Scotus, Francis Meyronnes, Adam Wodeham or Gregory of Rimini. The views of the Franciscans, William of Ockham and Vital du Four are misrepresented in the only article which discusses them. Of the Franciscans, only Bonaventure's views are carefully examined

(by Kretzmann). A collection of essays which purports to deal generally with the medieval philosophical tradition should not focus so exclusively on Thomas.

A minor point has to do with references to medieval works. Familiar, standard abbreviations make the reader's life easier and waste little space. Thus Boethius' *De hebdomadibus* should be rendered *De hebd.*, not DH. Similarly reference to Aquinas' disputed questions, *De potentia*, as *De pot.* not DP, spares the reader a search for the table of abbreviations, at the cost of only three letters.

On the whole, this is a first-rate book. It is an excellent introduction to an important nexus of philosophical problems. Doubtless it will be an important source of inspiration for scholars examining related subjects in the works of other major philosophers in the medieval tradition.

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Pragmatism: From Peirce to Davidson.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1990.
Pp. viii + 152.
US$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-7809-5);
US$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-7810-9).

Murphy intends *Pragmatism* to be of use primarily to students and teachers — an 'extraordinarily clear and coherent story,' as Richard Rorty puts it (vii) in his introduction to the book, about pragmatism and the relations among Peirce, James, Dewey, Quine and Davidson. Murphy is, for the most part, highly successful in achieving his intentions, providing a rich resource for anyone interested in pragmatism generally, and a thrifty resource for students particularly, who can now purchase one text instead of half a dozen. *Pragmatism* is indeed clear and coherent, lively and insightful, sustaining a story line both chronologically and thematically. The book itself is composed of a pragmatic blend of salient and well-placed quotations enhanced by Murphy's discussion of them.

The primary drawback is that as the book and the pragmatic chronology progress, the balance of quotation to discussion gradually shifts to such a degree that the final chapters consist predominantly of frequent and lengthy quotation. This is to the detriment of the book, as Murphy's own discussions are valuable. The progressive decline in commentary may be partly attrib-

uted to Murphy's untimely death in 1987, after a draft manuscript was completed, but before Murphy was able to develop a revised version. (Rorty kindly edited the manuscript for publication, but changed very little.)

Murphy situates his story of pragmatism in an account of Peirce's critique and rejection of Cartesianism, particularly of its representational influence, in which 'ideas' are conceived of as mental pictures, and of the impossible suggestion that one put anything and everything into doubt without any plausible reason for doing so. After an account of James' battles with the debilitating exigencies of depression and determinism, and his consequent development of a teleological (and happier) theory of mind, Murphy segues back to Peirce and his development of an experimental method of inquiry which begins with the generation of a plausible and often critical doubt, and ends, at least in theory, only when a community of agreement has been reached.

Murphy tracks the question of the origin and 'ownership' of the ideas of and term for pragmatism, and marks the contrast between Peirce's experimentalism and James' humanism. He emphasizes perhaps the main tendency of pragmatism — its focus on the practical consequences and implications of any claim, especially in cases which are philosophically unresolvable (this last move is often referred to as 'changing the subject').

Murphy is especially good at distilling the main claims of each pragmatist, often setting them out in a series of familiarly contemporary-looking, well-ordered propositions; in correcting trenchant misconceptions and confusions about their ideas; in identifying implications of points made by the philosophers and of issues both theoretical and practical they discuss; and in grounding each pragmatist in his personal and sociohistoric biography — at least until, with Dewey, he shifts into the twentieth century.

Murphy squarely sets Dewey's life in a distinctly twentieth century cultural background (59, 60), but considers his philosophy to be predominantly that of a nineteenth-century man (79). However, of Dewey's writing, Murphy highlights not only earlier pragmatist issues, but also Dewey's alternative to the idealist fallacy of identifying experience with cognitive experience. For Dewey and for other pragmatists, experience is always already interpreted 'as' something — particularly by modes of linguistic communication, or language.

The more that Murphy follows Dewey in the linguistic direction, especially through Dewey's work on value and taste as being equally needful of applications of the experimental method as is science, the more Murphy relies on quotations and the less he offers discussion. Perhaps it is the linguistic turn that daunts Murphy, and perhaps it is that, as the philosophizing is of increasingly recent vintage, Murphy is himself caught up in the story of pragmatism, and less able to tell his/story about it.

After a brief description of the move to language and meaning, Murphy helpfully distinguishes Quine (who emphasizes the thesis of meaning as primarily a property of behavior) from Davidson and Rorty (who emphasize language as a mode of interaction between at least two beings, set against

an organized group to which they belong and from which they have acquired their habits of speech) (81), setting the whole of this move as contra positivistic empiricism. The remainder of *Pragmatism* consists almost entirely of quotes from Quine and Davidson which together comprise a summary of their work bearing most directly on pragmatism, with some relevant Rortian commentary. (Perhaps Murphy felt that he couldn't do better than Rorty on Dewey through Davidson?)

Despite the lack of commentary, Murphy's *Pragmatism* is nevertheless a remarkably lucid philosophical read, an excellent introduction to and reference for the essentials of pragmatism, and a very practical resource for saving both time and money.

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Stephen Neale
Descriptions.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1990.
Pp. xiv + 286.
US$25.00. ISBN 0-262-14045-4.

This is a sustained defense of Bertrand Russell's theory of descriptions (*the Theory* henceforth). Neale is sensitive to both philosophical and linguistic concerns. He collects and discusses a wide variety of well-known issues surrounding *the Theory* in a remarkably coherent manner. His discussions are sometimes less than totally original but always lucid and well-presented. The endnotes, some of which go at length in technical details, are extensive, and the bibliography comprehensive.

The book has six chapters. Chapter 1 is a general introduction to the rest of the book. In Chapter 2 *the Theory* is motivated, characterized, and given a precise formulation. Neale says that the main purpose of *the Theory* is 'to make available a class of propositions to serve as the meanings of (utterances of) sentences of the form "the *F* is *G*," whether or not anything answers to "the *F*"' (20). His use of the word 'meaning' in this connection is fast and loose but nothing important seems to hinge on it, for he is not so much concerned with the meanings of expressions as with the propositions expressed.

Neale characterizes the main claim of *the Theory* as follows: 'a phrase of the form "the *F*" is not a genuine referring expression; or [equivalently], the proposition expressed by an utterance *u* of "the *F* is *G*" is object-*independent*' (20). That definite descriptions are not referring expressions is the

cornerstone of *the Theory* according to Neale, so the notion of object-independence is crucial. Yet his characterization of the notion could be cleaner. A proposition is object-independent iff it is not object-dependent. 'An object-dependent proposition is a proposition about a particular individual ... that would simply not be available to be entertained or expressed if that individual ... failed to exist' (19). The words 'entertained or' here are otiose and needlessly psychologistic. Neale persists in using such overtly psychologistic terms. The reason is to avoid commitment to any particular metaphysical theory of what propositions are. But one need not embrace psychologism to do so. In fact, even 'or expressed' in the above quotation is needlessly extrinsic to propositions. One only needs to say that a proposition about a particular individual would *fail to exist* if that individual failed to exist.

Neale counters the worry that *the Theory* does violence to the surface syntax of sentences containing descriptions, by treating 'the' and 'a' as quantifiers on a par with the standard first-order quantifiers such as 'every'. 'Every F is G' is given the logical form '[every x: Fx](Gx)'. Likewise, 'The F is G' and 'An F is G' are given the logical forms '[the x: Fx](Gx)' and '[an x: Fx](Gx)', respectively. Let **F** be the set of things that are F and $|\mathbf{F}|$ be the cardinality of **F**. Similarly for **G**. Then the semantics goes as follows:

'[every x: Fx](Gx)' is true iff $|\mathbf{F} - \mathbf{G}| = 0$.
'[the$_s$ x: Fx](Gx)' is true iff $|\mathbf{F} - \mathbf{G}| = 0$ and $|\mathbf{F}| = 1$.
'[the$_p$ x: Fx](Gx)' is true iff $|\mathbf{F} - \mathbf{G}| = 0$ and $|\mathbf{F}| > 1$.
'[an x: Fx](Gx)' is true iff $|\mathbf{F} \cap \mathbf{G}| \geq 1$.

(Here 'the$_s$' is 'the' in the singular sense and 'the$_p$' is 'the' in the plural sense. Neale does not use these subscripts.) Neale is not the first to advocate such a treatment of 'the' and 'a' but he goes on to develop a fairly comprehensive picture of natural-language syntax and semantics accordingly. He is also right to claim that this treatment of 'the' and 'a' is perfectly Russellian.

In Chapter 3 the well-known objections by Peter Strawson and by Keith Donnellan to *the Theory* are countered by means of the distinction between the proposition expressed by an (utterance of a) sentence and the proposition meant by the speaker in making the utterance. This parallels Saul Kripke's distinction between the semantic reference and the speaker's reference of a definite description. Neale cannot adopt Kripke's distinction because according to Neale, definite descriptions are not (genuinely) referring expressions at all and therefore the notion of semantic reference is irrelevant to them. Neale shows, among other things, that Donnellan's distinction applies to other quantifiers and since they are not semantically ambiguous, neither is 'the'. Paul Grice's conversational implicatures are invoked exactly where one expects them. Other closely related issues are discussed with clarity.

In Chapter 4 *the Theory* is defended from W. V. Quine's objection against quantifying into modal contexts. Following Arthur Smullyan, Neale argues convincingly that modal contexts are referentially transparent according to

the Theory. Though hardly original, this is superbly presented with utmost clarity. Neale deftly demonstrates how the Russellian treatment of definite descriptions as nonreferring expressions blocks Quine's argument that modal contexts are referentially opaque. One minor complaint: A paragraph on referential transparency of attitude contexts at the end of 4.5 is too short to be satisfactory.

Chapters 5 and 6 are the most linguistically oriented chapters, in which a general theory of anaphoric pronouns is presented and vigorously defended within *the Theory*. In chapter 5 objections to *the Theory* from considerations of pronominal anaphora are countered. A general theory of the semantics of pronouns is presented: 'Every pronoun is either a referring expression or a quantifier' (165). More specifically, '(i) nonanaphoric pronouns are referring expressions; (ii) pronouns anaphoric on referring expressions are themselves referring expressions; (iii) pronouns anaphoric on quantifiers are either bound variables or quantifiers depending on the syntactical relationship between antecedent and anaphor' (165-6).

In chapter 6 the problem of 'donkey' anaphora is solved within *the Theory*. 'Every man who bought *a donkey* vaccinated *it*' is given the logical form '[every x: man x & [a y: donkey y] (x bought y)]([whe z: donkey z & x bought z](x vaccinated z))', where 'whe' is a quantifier neutral between 'the_s' and 'the_p', i.e., '[whe x: Fx](Gx)' is true iff $|\mathbf{F} - \mathbf{G}| = 0$ and $|\mathbf{F}| \geq 1$, or more intuitively, '[whe x: Fx]' means 'whatever is F'.

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Patrick Nerhot, ed.
Legal Knowledge and Analogy. Fragments of Epistemology, Hermeneutics and Linguistics
(Law and Philosophy Library, 13).
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
1991. Pp. 243.
US$84.00. ISBN 0-7923-1065-9.

This is a collection of essays which were presented to an invited seminar at the European University Institute (Florence, 1989). Many aspects and problems of analogy in law come to the fore, either as the explicit topic of one or more papers (universalizability) or in passing (rule of law). Logical structure, however, is not one of these. Most of the other papers are, basically, variations on a common theme, namely that at the end of the day all legal reasoning is analogical reasoning in the methodological sense and that this is quite a

decent way of living up to the standards of rationality. Lenoble's and Jackson's papers take this one step further by arguing that analogy brings us to the point where the standards of legal rationality are set and transferred to new contexts. Many papers share a fascination with the strategies of establishing or testing rationality at the level of enunciation, expression, speech act, performative, pragmatics, or whatever it is called. Only one of the papers (it comes as no surprise that it is Broekman's) is broad enough in scope to introduce analogy as the keyword of the reality of law itself; that is to say: as an operation which establishes the legal discourse as a discourse pretending to be about non-legal reality. Broekman's essay is therefore the gate to some questions of analogy which are hardly touched upon at all in this volume, notably around *analogia entis* (as opposed to *analogia proportionalitatis*). One who is interested to pass that gate might well profit from reading a different, recently published, volume on analogy in general (*Études Philosophiques* 1989 [3-4]), with only one article on law (M. Bastit, 'Interprétation analogique de la loi et analogie de l'être chez Suarez: de la similitude a l'identité', 429-43).

To give adequate information, this review has to be boringly descriptive. Karl-Heinz Ladeur opens the parade with a penetrating report on the use of analogy in German legal history, from the Historical School of Von Savigny to the present Constitutional Court, concentrating on the political pay-offs and presuppositions in reasoning stamped 'analogical'. Giuseppe Zaccaria's paper is on analogy as the paragon of legal reasoning and asks for the hermeneutic foundation of the analogical procedure. Cees W. Maris takes the classical Dutch case of analogical reasoning in the criminal law (stealing electricity) as his point of departure to discuss Dworkinian integrity of law. Jacques Lenoble presents a thorough analysis of the function of analogy in law, by reading the role of the symbol in Kant's second and third *Critique* against the background of the recent Wittgenstein debate (Baker and Hacker, Kripke, Bouveresse). Bernard S. Jackson submits a piece of comparative legal philosophy (referring to Biblical law and early Jewish law) in order to give an account of 'the logic of the level of expression'. This account is a semiotic one, more specifically articulated in the terms of cognitive psychology. Vittorio Villa continues with a paper on legal analogy to argue that it constitutes, as in fact every legal norm does, a unity of found (pre-existing) law and newly designed law. Patrick Nerhot uses legal analogy as an example in his general approach of legal knowledge and meaning as based on 'similitude'. Bobbio's classic *L'analogia nella logica del diritto* (Torino 1938) is his guide throughout the paper. Zenon Bankowski's 'Analogical Reasoning and Legal Institutions' stresses that analogy plays an important role in letting law develop within the context of its own tradition (which, he claims, is also what Dworkin's one right answer thesis is all about). Broekman then, as already said, considers analogy as the ultimate model of the relationship between law and non-legal reality. A quote from the opening sentences may suffice to see what he is up to: 'There is only one analogy in the law, namely the analogy between legal reality and non-legal reality. "Law and Reality" is in that regard a tricky expression: the conjunction is likely to

deceive us, because it conceals the analogy. But the analogy remains the basic operation which establishes the legal discourse' (217).

The papers are introduced by Patrick Nerhot. I am not sure whether this introduction adds something up to their respective qualities. I found it very difficult to detect the profound view on the complete set which Nerhot is trying to explain. No doubt this is partly a linguistic problem, in which some editing by a native speaker of English would have helped a great deal. But perhaps it is also a problem of performance: Nerhot desperately wanted his orchestra to play a symphony, while they went for a jam-session (or perhaps just tuning up). That, however, does not devaluate his merits as the instigator of this bunch of undoubtedly original papers.

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Michael Pakaluk, ed.
Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company
1991. Pp. xiv + 273.
US$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-114-7);
US$7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-113-9).

This is a collection of twelve pieces on friendship, by writers ranging from Plato and Aristotle to Emerson and Kierkegaard. The essays are introduced succinctly by an essay in which the editor notes the special interest which friendship has as a topic in modern moral philosophy. On the one hand, friendship is clearly a wonderful thing, without which life would be infinitely poorer, and provides the occasion for impressive acts of loyalty and selflessness. On the other hand, it's equally clear that we are *partial* to our friends, and doesn't morality require us to rise above partialities and act according to abstract rules? How can there be a place for friendship in the moral life, let alone the place it seems to have?

Kierkegaard was on to this, it turns out, casting it in terms of an incompatibility between loving one's neighbor as the scriptures command and loving one's friends as one naturally does. Not that this volume of essays focuses on this single topic: it is far richer. As Pakaluk observes, the essays chosen ' ... constitute something of a tradition. For Plato's dialogue on friendship influenced Aristotle; Aristotle influenced Cicero; and all the others were acquainted with either Aristotle or Cicero' (vii). Hence there are certain commonalities in the questions addressed and discernible relationships

amongst the answers offered, as the various writers consider how to distinguish friendship from other human relationships, how exactly to characterize the enormous value of having friends and of being a friend, how far loyalty to a friend ought to extend, whether friendship is available only to good people or also to bad ones, how we come to be friends and how friendships pass away. One contingent of the writers concerns itself with the extent to which we should grieve when our friends die (Cicero, Seneca); another, with whether there is a type of friendship available only to Christians (Aelred; Aquinas) or, indeed, whether Christians ought to eschew friendship because it precludes impartially loving one's neighbor as oneself (Kierkegaard).

There are common themes, then, yet each essay also casts light into corners of its own, if only to show us new questions to ponder. How does needing friends square with being suitably self-sufficient? To what extent must a friend be like oneself, and to what extent may he or she be different? What would it mean to say we must *respect* our friends, and is it true that we must? What is the difference between showing the affectionate concern which friendship requires and being objectionably paternalistic? If there is a sense in which friendship provides one with another self, does this undercut the selflessness we admire in some acts of friendship?

The essays which stimulate this wealth of questions are easy to read, for the most part, Aquinas and Emerson being less so. The editor helps make them accessible by providing each with a very brief introduction flagging the main points to be argued and noting relationships to preceding selections. More basically, the selections themselves are simply very readable and illuminating. This will astound the sort of student many of us teach. To show such students how richly they can profit by perusing material they would have ignored must be one of the most valuable ways in which we can educate them, as well as one of the most enjoyable. Pakaluk's collection provides the opportunity to do exactly that. It would serve especially well as one text for a seminar in moral philosophy at the undergraduate level. Moreover, presumably there are Eastern texts about the nature of close human relationships; it would be a great pleasure to join them with this representation of Western thought on the same matter. Even if one were to reserve the volume for one's own perusal, however, it would be a fine source for reflection on a topic in which we all have a personal interest and which proves so rich philosophically, as well.

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Aleksander Peczenik
On Law and Reason.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
1989. Pp. xii + 443.
US$89.50. ISBN 0-7923-0444-6.

Aleksander Peczenik has for a number of years been among the better-known legal theorists from continental Europe. Originally from Poland, he has worked for over 20 years in Sweden, and has published in Swedish, German and English. His first book on legal theory, *The Basis of Legal Justification* (Lund 1983), defended a version of a coherence theory for legal justification, but with a twist. Peczenik fully acknowledged the existence of 'gaps in the law' in the sense that 'the sources of law do not deductively entail a legally acceptable answer to some legal question' (*BLJ*, 156). Despite such gaps, legal decisions could be justified, he claimed. The chief justificatory device was the notion of a 'transformation' (*BLJ*, 70 ff.), a non-deductive inference underwritten in the end by the notion of a 'good reason', familiar to students of post-war moral theory from its deployment by Stephen Toulmin in *The Place of Reason in Ethics* (Cambridge 1950) and by Kai Nielsen in a series of influential papers in the '50s. Peczenik also made the valuable distinction between 'contextually sufficient' and 'deep' justifications for legal decisions. A 'contextually sufficient' justification is one that makes use simply of valid legal transformation-norms; a 'deep' justification shows the legal decision to be rooted in valid requirements of morality.

The present book is in more than one sense a considerable expansion of the earlier theory. It is more than twice the size, for starters. It also lays out a theory which differs from that of the earlier book in literally having more components or elements. The two-part structure of contextually sufficient and deep justifications, and the picture of the steps in legal arguments as transformations or jumps, are still the bases of the theory. But what is built on the basis differs.

It is clear that a complete theory of the justification for a legal decision on Peczenikian lines will require two large subtheories — the theory of contextually sufficient justification and the theory of deep justification. With respect to the former, Peczenik considers at some length and in general terms what the officials operating the institution that is law will typically take to be the components of a justified legal decision, what the potential difficulties are likely to be in making these assumptions about justification, and how far there are solutions to these difficulties. This project covers a lot of territory. For example, at one level of specificity we find a discussion of whether a legal decision has sufficient contextual justification if it deploys the principle that the owner of a vehicle may recover from a person who tortiously damaged said vehicle the wages paid to the owner's employees during the period of time the vehicle was being repaired even though they could do no work during that period because of the damage. We also find discussions of the doctrine of *desuetudo* and obsolete laws; principles of legal interpretation; custom and precedent; the role of *travaux préparatoires*; methods of legal reasoning;

statutory analogy; and the like. These discussions are by and large as interesting and helpful as one would expect from a fine-grained, sensitive but quirky theorist spreading a pot of good intellectual jam over a very great number of slices of bread. At almost any point one says to oneself, It just ain't that simple, while being aware in one's heart of hearts that with much more detailed discussion the wide sweep of the whole would fall from sight.

At least when Peczenik is discussing the law he is on his own turf, whatever irritations one might feel at the speed at which points go by. When we move to the discussion of the components of deep justification, the irritations worsen. In the nature of the case, the components of deep justification will be extra-legal. The most obvious components will be norms from morality individual and political. And so we find discussions of Hare, MacIntyre, Rawls, Nozick; cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism; prima facie moral reasons vs. all-things-considered reasons; and the like. But all in 60 pages. Not very helpful.

There are also two sections on an issue which is now standard fare in European legal thought, but a rarity in Anglo-American anglophone legal thought — a discussion of the principles of practical rationality and rational practical discourse. The guiding light here has been primarily the German legal theorist Robert Alexy whose major work *Theorie der juristischen Argumentation* (Frankfurt am Main 1978) only recently appeared in an English translation, *A Theory of Legal Argumentation* (Oxford 1989, trans. Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick). Alexy's own roots are in Habermas and the concept of 'discourse theory', though Alexy differs from Habermas' views in various ways. The subtitle of Alexy's book is instructive: 'the theory of rational discourse as theory of legal justification'. The first two-thirds of Alexy's book is about the theory of rational practical discourse in general. It culminates in a list of rules for the same, which includes rules for justified assertion (the speech act); rules for allocating the burden of argument; rules for valid forms of practical argument; rules for changing the subject of the discourse; and for who may speak in the discourse (anyone, of course; this is a democratic theory); and the like. In the last third of the book, Alexy represents legal argumentation as no more than a special case of rational practical discourse. Peczenik takes Alexy's system and plugs it in as a prefabricated module into his own theory.

Peczenik's big picture should now be emerging. We have a functioning social institution, the law; it is an institution of enormous internal complexity, but an institution situated in society. It is essentially a normative institution; the deliverances of its officials are in some sense normative. So they must be justified — first contextually and then deeply. In theorizing about legal justification, therefore, we are looking at the interrelations between three different normative systems — the legal, the moral and the practical. The remaining key question is that of how these different systems are to relate to each other. Here we can see a difference between Peczenik and Alexy. The latter's 'special case' view seems to imply a hierarchical relation between practical rationality and law. Legal norms are ultimately

all subject to the requirements of practical rationality, and the only job for theory of law is to show how the determinations arise. Peczenik, in contrast, continually emphasizes coherence and (in this case: very, very wide) reflective equilibrium. He defines a 'reasonable' jump as one which could be made deductively valid by the addition of 'reasonable premisses'. But this concession to deduction is short-lived, for what in the end identifies a premiss as 'reasonable' is its contribution to overall coherence. Coherence considerations flow throughout the web of legal, moral and practical discourse; these are not arranged hierarchically, but are more on a level. A deeply justified legal decision is one which has its place in one enormous equilibrial structure of legal, moral and practical norms.

In fact, norms of institutional and cultural history get in there as well, which seems to introduce an uncomfortable degree of relativity into any such justification. From the perspective of legal theory, the result is a view which is thoroughly in the tradition of Scandinavian legal realism (as is pointed out by the distinguished Finnish theorist Aulis Aarnio in his useful introduction to the book). Of course, neither Aarnio nor Peczenik consider that a difficulty. But the point is important. Peczenik's view differs from radical critiques of law such as Critical Legal Studies in what is in the end a moral judgment about the existing institutions of law. Peczenik believes that legal institutions are repositories of value, and that is why they can at times remain in place while extra-legal norms are abandoned in the search for equilibrium. Radical critiques reject such a view as intolerable complacency. In form the views are isomorphic; they differ in content alone.

Legal theorists are no different from theorists in other fields in finding coherence theories of justification attractive when the problems of foundationalism seem intractable. But there is a real difficulty for such theories in relation to the law. The *raison d'être* of law as an institutionalized normative system is, as Peczenik well realizes, to acknowledge and entrench contextual justifications for normative claims. The thrust of coherence theories is exactly to resist such entrenchment. The very richness and ingenuity of Peczenik's theory — his valiant attempt to include *everything* so that the coherence will be as well justified as possible — is also its ultimate weakness, for a theory of the relation of everything to law is a strange candidate for a theory of law. It is right to imply that the solution to the problem of legal justification requires a story about how to reconcile the two kinds of justification which law seems to embody. Peczenik's theory, as the limiting case of coherence theories, raises serious questions about the coherence of coherence theories.

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Johanna Seibt
Properties as Processes: A Synoptic Study of Wilfrid Sellars' Nominalism.
Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company 1990. Pp. xiii + 337.
US$38.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-917930-59-2);
US$20.00 (paper: ISBN 0-917930-99-1).

Abstract entities, according to Seibt, are multifaceted and multifunctional: philosophers who defend their reality have taken them to be referents of general terms, the designata of predicates, objects of knowledge, and/or irreducible components of concrete objects. In her view, a fully successful nominalist philosophy must repudiate all these facets and functions: it must be a 'full scope nominalism'. As she sees it, Sellars, nominalism is the only one, ancient or contemporary, that has this generality; it is the only one that 'does justice to each dimension of a nominalist stance.' By presenting Sellars' logical, semantic, epistemological, and metaphysical arguments for the 'expendability' of abstract entities in their systematic connection, she hopes to promote both 'full scope nominalism' and 'full scope Sellarsianism.'

Seibt's book is divided into three parts, each consisting of chapters devoted to a facet of Sellar's nominalism. Part I is concerned with 'property talk' — that is, with the use of quantifiers and abstract singular terms that ostensibly commit their users to the existence of abstract entities. The first chapter is called 'One Dogma of Quineanism', the dogma being the belief that our ontological commitments are determined by the existentially quantified formulas that we accept — or, a bit more exactly, the required values of the variables involved in such statements. Seibt explains in detail why Sellars did not accept Quine's criterion, and why he held that existentially quantified formulas are existence statements only when their quantified variables take proper names as substituends. She argues that Sellars' emphasis on the substituends appropriate to various quantified variables shows that he operated with a basically substitutional conception of quantification, and she proceeds to defend a nominalist position against standard objections that are focused on this kind of quantification. I found her discussion of the matter informed, intelligent, and enlightening.

Her second chapter is called 'Reductional Nominalism'. Here she concentrates on Sellars' nominalistic treatment of abstract singular terms such as 'the word "triangular"' (whose referent is ostensibly a word type) and 'triangularity' (whose referent is ostensibly a universal). Sellars' reductive nominalist strategy was to argue that both terms actually function as distributive singular terms: their use is comparable, that is, to that of 'the whale' in 'The whale is a mammal'. Thus, just as this last sentence means 'Whales are animals', the sentence '"dreieckig" stands for triangularity' has a meaning that Sellars captured with the technical formula: '"dreieckig"s are •triangulars•'. The need to relate the English 'triangular' to the German 'dreieckig' recalls Quine's problem about translational indeterminacy, and to cope with that and other problems Seibt devotes two chapters to Sellars' conceptual-

role semantics. To deal with residual worries about whether Sellars' semantical theory could be understood and pertinent claims known to be true without knowing certain things about abstract entities, she adds a chapter on what she calls Sellars' epistemological nominalism.

The second part of the book is entitled 'Nominalism and the Usage of Predicates'. Seibt begins this part with a chapter on Sellars' criticism of Platonic and neo-Fregean views of the referential function of predicates. Sellars argued that there are serious difficulties with the idea that predicates refer, singularly *or* distributively, to anything at all; and Seibt expounds his arguments for this view in a helpfully detailed way. Her next chapter is concerned with Sellars' claim that predicates are actually dispensable — that they would not appear in a semantically perspicuous language. She illuminates this claim by discussing the peculiarities of Jumblese, the predicate-free language whose syntax Sellars took pains to describe. The classifying and characterizing functions that ordinary predicates do, in his view, perform are carried out in this language by names that are printed or articulated in special ways. So long as a language contains distinct predicate expressions, there will be a persistent temptation to suppose, Sellars thought, that a thing or group of things must be represented, or symbolized, by those expressions. But the actual functions of predicates, which is essential to any proper language, can be performed, he argued, by symbols whose sole referential role is that of a proper name — a name referring to a concrete individual rather than an abstract entity.

The final part of Seibt's book is concerned with Sellars' account of linguistic representation and empirical truth; it also includes a chapter on Sellars' naturalism, his scientific realism, and what Seibt takes to be his commitment to the reality of 'particularized properties' (268). Sellars held a picture theory of linguistic representation and empirical truth, and Seibt does a good job explaining it and defending it against objections that are naturally raised against it. Her account of Sellar's naturalism and his distinction between the manifest and scientific images of humans-in-the-word is detailed, lucid, and helpful. On the other hand, her account of 'properties as processes', which she thinks is the final outcome of Sellars' ontological reflections, is puzzling and, for me, unconvincing. I was especially perplexed by her claim, expressed in admittedly 'ironic fashion', that 'in the Sellarsian nominalist scheme properties are ultimately all there is' (268). When Sellars emphasized the 'qualitative determinateness' of the absolute processes that he expected to be featured in the final (utopian) stage of scientific development, I think he was emphasizing that *those particular processes* will be qualitatively determinate, not that a qualitatively determinate property will be 'had by' or partially constitute them.

Although Seibt expounds and defends what she takes to be full scope Sellarsianism in this book, she does not manifest the attitude of an uncritical true believer. She writes as a highly informed, clear-headed expositor of views she finds compelling; and the arguments she offers in support of her convictions are tough-minded and carefully deployed even when (as in the

case I have mentioned) they are less than convincing. Her book is not an easy read, but it provides a thorough exposition and assessment of a complex philosophy that deserves to be better understood than it currently is.

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Tsenay Serequeberhan, ed.
African Philosophy — The Essential Readings.
New York: Paragon House 1991. Pp. xxii + 250.
US$13.95. ISBN 1-55778-309-8.

African Philosophy — The Essential Readings is a text comprising eleven papers published in the last fifteen years by African philosophers on theoretical issues relevant to contemporary Africa. In this collection one finds important papers written by some of the prominent names in African philosophical thought such as Hountondji, Wiredu, Towa, Oruka, et al.

A proper appraisal of this text would require some understanding of the historical and sociological contexts in which contemporary Africa seeks to chart its path in the world. Let us recognize first of all that the Africa of today is best understood as a conglomerate of societies demonstrating both precolonial and post-colonial features and structures imposed as a result of the European presence in Africa.

It is to be understood too that the sociological structures of precolonial African societies were founded on belief structures that were of three types: (1) particularistically ethnic, (2) transculturally Islamic, and (3) transculturally Christian (consider the Coptic Christianity of Ethiopia and Egypt). But Africa's social structures proved to be rather ineffective in dealing with the critical mass of technology (and its accompanying belief structures) that Europe marshalled for its successful irruption into Africa. It is for this reason that the social structures of modern Africa's nations reflect the institutional imprints of Europe.

The African colonial experience on balance is to be understood as benefitting Europe much more than it did Africa. Political economists speak of the exploitation of the mineral and agricultural resources of Africa for the benefit of Europe. Political sociologists also point to the distortions of African cultures resulting from the colonial experience. The technology and institutions introduced by Europe did not produce the kinds of technology transfer and institutional change that would normally accompany a modernising metamorphosis.

For reasons of further explaining the ideas expressed and questions asked by Africa's intellectuals and theorists today (who invariably accept the technology and some of the institutions of the modern world) one might compare the modernising experience of colonial Africa with those of Eastern Europe and Japan. Eastern Europe absorbed the principles of a modernising Europe as it gave up its feudal structures. But some cultural trauma was experienced as a modernising Eastern Europe strove to adopt the capitalist structures of Western Europe or the communist principles inspired by Marxian thought.

Japan, on the other hand, has successfully transformed itself from premodern feudal structures to a modern industrial society, dominant in trade and technology. It is Asia's best example, to date, of a response to an expansionist and colonizing Europe. Japan has not been westernized; rather it has modernized.

It is in this context that *African Philosophy* assumes relevance. Europe's expansion into Africa was accompanied by an interpretive paradigm which sought to evaluate the various cultural and technological contours of Africa's civilisations. A peculiarly European view of Africa couched in its own special vocabularies and parlance developed in this regard. But Europe was forced to decolonize and to take stock of itself as the colonized world responded to its subjugated status. This is the basis for the post-modern thesis that Europe's view of Africa was myopic founded as it were on a Eurocentric paradigm. According to this paradigm Europe fancied itself as the most advanced link in the great chain of biological and cultural being.

More specifically, it was anthropology, the supposed science of human culture, that was employed in the inferiorising of the African. Consider the evaluations of African culture in all its dimensions formulated by Frobenius, Malinowski, Lévy-Bruhl, Lévy-Strauss, Marcel Griaule, and Placide Tempels. Europe spoke for Africa and to Africa. Thus are the papers in this volume which focus on African traditional thought systems as philosophy ('ethnophilosophy' according to Hountondji) to be understood. The essays by Onyewuenyi, Oruka, and Bodunrin should be seen in this respect as attempts by African thinkers to reevaluate African cosmology and metaphysical systems from an African viewpoint.

The two papers by Wiredu ('On Defining African Philosophy') and Hountondji ('African Philosophy: Myth or Reality') on the other hand point out that it would be an error to view African philosophy as merely analyses of precolonial cosmologies and metaphysics. They argue instead for a dynamic modern African philosophy geared towards grappling with the sociological, political and technological issues of Africa in the modern world. Quite obviously there is scope in contemporary African philosophy for the two orientations (and various forms of their mergers) discussed above. There is need for Africa's thinkers to rationalize traditional African thought systems given their often simple-minded and unscientific evaluations by European scholars. This task is the point of Okolo's paper ('Tradition and Destiny: Horizons of an African Philosophical Hermeneutics'). But there is also the

need for African philosophers to discuss and formulate (along with the modern African scientist, writer, artist, etc.) paradigms of discourse appropriate for contemporary Africa.

The final paper in this collection is the very comprehensive and critical piece by E. Wamba-Dia-Wamba ('Philosophy in Africa: Challenges of the African Philosopher'). This paper, set in a context of political philosophy and cultural hermeneutics, views African philosophy as encompassing any theoretical work which seeks to interpret and locate Africa's path in a contemporary world of fierce cultural and national rivalries for economic and technological supremacy. For Wamba-Dia-Wamba the task of African philosophy is primarily political: its ultimate praxis is the liberation of Africa from the oppressive forces that seek continuously to subjugate it. In this regard his analyses point out the interactive relationships between all of Africa's intellectuals and activists. Cabral, C. A. Diop, Fanon and Nkrumah, et al. are all discussed within the context of African philosophical thought. Again, from the diachronic analysis of Serequeberhan ('African Philosophy: The Point in Question') to the modernizing program of Towa ('Conditions for the Affirmation of a Modern African Philosophical Thought') *African Philosophy* constitutes a very useful collection of essays for students of African and/or Comparative Philosophy.

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Judith Shklar
The Faces of Injustice.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1990.
Pp. vii + 144.
US$19.95. ISBN 0-300-04599-9.

'One misses a great deal by looking only at justice,' Judith Shklar warns in this slim volume based on her Storrs Lectures given at Yale Law School in 1988. She thus proposes to broaden the compass of debate by examining, not justice, but *in*justice. Shklar begins by arguing that a firm distinction between injustice and misfortune cannot be maintained. Injustice is usually thought to refer only to injuries caused by human agents. But for Shklar such a narrow understanding of injustice licenses either indifference to cases where we cannot find blame; 'passive injustice' in cases like the Irish potato famine which, while not the direct result of human action, are 'amenable to purposive human alteration' (68-70); or a search for scapegoats when harm is in fact the consequence of multiple and diffuse factors (51-65). She thus

makes the persuasive point that Friedrich Hayek's laissez-faire argument that inequality is the result of the market's 'spontaneous order' tells us nothing about the appropriate moral response (75-82). In any case, Shklar says, whether suffering is the result of bad luck or unfair treatment is irrelevant from the point of view of those harmed. Giving 'injustice its due' (50) requires that we listen to the voices of those who call themselves its victims. The political consequence of this, according to Shklar, is a commitment to a constitutional democracy, such as the United States, which allows the victim's voice to be heard.

While the idea that we heighten our sensitivity to injustice by means of an 'inquiry into the preferences of the oppressed' (115) is admirable, it also raises a number of unanswered questions. How do we weigh competing claims about unjust treatment? In Shklar's U.S.A., for every person seeking government aid there is another who believes taxation is theft. Determining which victims' voices should win out surely needs more than an invocation of America's ambivalent democratic legacy. For some, it may require precisely the far-reaching reforms and legislative changes which Shklar declares cannot be gleaned from Americans' present conceptions of injustice (110-11).

Whatever we should do about injustice, Shklar is adamant that we should not settle disputes by appeal to formal juridical rules. This emerges clearly in the book's fascinating discussion of the portraits of Injustice and Justice in the Arena Chapel, Padua, by the medieval artist Giotto. Injustice is portrayed as a man with fanged teeth, wearing a judge's cap backwards and carrying a pruning hook, surrounded by figures either engaged in crime or indifferent to it. Justice, on the other hand, is a placid woman who weighs rewards and punishments in her hands while her subjects enjoy themselves at her feet. Shklar considers Injustice to be a 'public menace' actively involved in the immoral life of his victims,'responsible for maintaining and serving bad governments and in daily life for allowing fraud and aggression' (48-9). But Justice for Shklar is an uninspiring alternative. Expressionless, indeed 'insipid,' Justice 'calms our fears but thwarts our highest aspirations, whether they be heroic or civic' (103-5). Shklar even suspects Justice's rule is despotic (which she strangely compares to 'a Hegelian state run by a universal class'); 'the rule of law is secure thanks to its upright public servants' but citizens are denied self-government. Democracy depends, not on an 'orderly system of justice', but 'a public sense of injustice' that will hold rulers accountable to the ruled (106). The book abounds with examples in fact and fiction where the mechanisms of procedural justice fail to remedy injustice. Shklar goes so far as to liken the logic of 'perfect procedures' to adoption lotteries which raffle off abandoned children (124).

The idea that not abstract rules of justice but a sense of injustice is the mainstay of a fair political system has an attractive, if paradoxical, ring to it. And Shklar's warning that formal justice can be done while leaving the victims of injustice no better off suggests a good measure by which to assess and revise our conception of justice. But this book suggests justice is not worth even revising. Why is not clear. If Shklar's contempt is directed at

legalistic methods which 'simply match complaints against the rules and come to a quick conclusion' (82) then everyone is agreed. (Indeed, even Rawls insists that justice as fairness requires attending to individuals' particular disadvantages, the origins of which he, too, finds morally indifferent.) But if Shklar means to go further, and abandon all theories of justice (as her railing against formal procedures *per se* seems to suggest [124-5]), she offers no hint of an alternative for remedying injustice. We may well agree with her that the victims of injustice often want, not formal retribution, but revenge. But in the absence of a theory of justice, Shklar gives us no resources with which to withstand the pressure to reduce politics to the sating of vengeful desires. That justice 'causes us so little gratification' (101) compared to the passions of vengeance, patriotism or tradition is surely what commends it to us. Without institutions such as a separate judiciary and the rule of law to check the passions of popular sovereignty a constitutional democracy would be powerless to prevent the manipulations of power which can deny the discontented a hearing. We are not likely to want to speak up against injustice where, in the absence of fair trials and predictable rules, our only recourse is the vagaries of the will of our fellows. Further, impartial procedures of justice provide at least a mechanism for repairing the injuries of the wronged without jeopardising the rights of the accused.

Shklar applauds Rousseau's republicanism, but it is Rousseau who was among the first to develop the rule of law ideal and insist that law be general in its content as well as its source for it to have the predictability of a self-prescribed rule. To be fair, Shklar is not oblivious to the dangers of majority rule. She is suspicious of mere lack of dissent as an adequate criterion for justice and she looks to opportunities to check the 'shared social meanings' of a community to combat the evils of passive injustice. But her repeated emphasis on 'crediting the voice of the victim' ends up looking like little more than nice talk in the absence of a more developed argument. This is a perceptive and erudite study on an important and intriguing theme, but it may leave us unarmed in the struggles against injustice.

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Mark C. Taylor
Tears.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1990. Pp. xvi+263
US $54.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0102-2);
US $17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0103-0).

This work consists of twelve essays which are a series of reflections on a wide-ranging number of different, and sometimes not so different, matters. By Taylor's own admission in a letter to his publisher, the order of the essays is wholly arbitrary and they are without any unifying theme. Moreover, Taylor states that he has struggled not to write a book having spent twenty-five years learning how to write one. In a word, this 'book' is not *about* anything; or, possibly better, it is about nothing.

Undoubtedly, many of us are confused concerning what postmodernism is. Lumped into this generic term are structuralism, poststructuralism, deconstructionism, hermeneutics, death-of-God theology, A/theology, and (sometimes) even phenomenology. One of the main results of the work is a considerable clearing up of the philosophical, theological, and artistic geography of this confusing landscape. It is with considerable scholarly ease that Taylor moves through the thought and art of Blanchot, Wallace Stevens, Altizer, Levinas, Ricoeur, Nancy, Bataille, Gaschae, Gadamer, Rorty, Merleau-Ponty, and Derrida. He compares, contrasts, and examines their thought on one another, always with an eye to their difference.

These reflections run through almost every essay with the *persona dramatae* changing. Essay No. 8, 'The Nonabsent Absence of the Holy' (105-21) is almost exclusively on Heidegger who is to some extent present throughout all the essays. Also present in varying degrees throughout are Derrida, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. One philosopher stands out as a dominant presence and that is Hegel. This is not surprising since postmodernism is precisely that which falls into the world post-Hegel *Mortuum* and must always be reflected upon against that background. Postmodernism attempts to think what Hegel left unthought.

If there is a systematic theme running through these essays, it is that of *difference* — what Hegel left unthought. Although it is admitted that Hegel's identity is an identity-in-difference — the union of union and non-union — it is nevertheless an *identity*. As Taylor says (21) 'the goal of speculative philosophy is *concord*.' Thought in postmodernity attempts to think difference as rupture, erring, 'disaster (which) takes place (without taking place) *in* art *as* art' (10). In reflecting upon the reflections of one thinker on another, Taylor consistently asks what the one has left unthought about the other.

I suspect that much of this writing (non-writing?) is Taylor's attempt to come to grips with his own place in postmodern thought while at the same time attempting to give us a good example of postmodern thinking/writing. Clearly he is concerned with the possibility or impossibility of postmodern theological reflection. He is convinced that if it is possible, it must fall in

between Hegel and Kierkegaard. Given his reading of those two thinkers, he is correct, but he admits that he cannot see the direction. Where *difference* is everywhere, Otherness prevails, and radical Otherness arrests the possibility of theologico/philosophical discourse. Is this why the Disaster takes place (without taking place) in art? It cannot be *told*, only *shown* which showing is a telling.

Presumably under the influence of Kierkegaard, there is good deal of the ironic in Taylor who recognizes irony as the only (?) possible stance in a world where we must patiently await 'what never arrives' (12). One of his reasons for refusing to write an Introduction to the work is taken from Kierkegaard who said that the writer must make things harder for the reader, not easier! This also explains his last essay, 'How to do Nothing with Words' (203-31), the placing of which at the end I do not believe was arbitrary and the title of which is obviously a take-off on Austin's 'How to do things with words'. The attempt not to write a book through the writing of one can only be achieved if one can do nothing with words. Such a non-book — a failed text — is a religious act. Taylor states (231) that 'the failure of God betrays the sacred. The site of this betrayal is the (literary) text inscribed in parapraxis. Through parapraxis, the a/theological writer struggles to restage the sacrifice of the word ... (which) is the betrayal of language that mourns the death *of* God.'

What has Taylor himself left un-thought in this text? He has left aside (forgotten ?), despite the fact that he refers in several places to Jabes, the one event that radically brings into question any restaging of the sacrifice of the Word. I refer to the Holocaust and find it amazing that in a work which speaks of difference, otherness, rift, rupture, the death-of-God, night, etc., there is no mention at all of the historical event between 1933 and 1945 of the anti-world — the world of Auschwitz. If postmodern theological reflection must locate itself between Hegel and Kierkegaard, it must also pass through that Night which some believe to have been a *novum* in history. Taylor would do well to reflect, not upon, but in the face of that event which remains a thundering silence. This is especially true if one is going to write a text entitled *Tears*, not the water that runs out of the eyes when saddened or in pain, but what happens to your coat when caught upon a nail. The *tear* in the soul produces the 'tears' of mourning which are words with which one can do nothing.

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Dabney Townsend
Aesthetic Objects and Works of Art.
Wolfeboro, NH: Longwood Academic 1989.
Pp. ix + 299.
US$30.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-89341-561-6);
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-89341-566-9).

Philosophy of art has been aesthetics, and aesthetics has been the contriving of theories of aesthetic experience. But such theories have failed. Philosophy must turn, therefore, to a theory of the aesthetic object: to considerations of what such a thing is, how it enters into criticism, and what relation one has to works of art.

Townsend sees aesthetic experience in every philosophy of art, partly because he holds 'the essential thesis that aesthetic experience is what aesthetic theory would have to be about if there is such a thing as aesthetic theory' (70). But is it true that 'philosophers have been concerned with aesthetic experience under some description since the beginnings of Western philosophy' (25)? Aesthetic experience has achieved a certain meaning which, as Townsend describes it, 'is ... the product of significant form, aesthetic distance, or aesthetic surface' (55).

It is likely that anyone theorizing about art will at some point address our experience of art; but it will not follow that he will perforce speak about aesthetic experience. It is queer to extend the concept backwards and find that 'Aesthetic theory plays a significant role in classical and medieval philosophical writings' (25). Can we rightly call the effects of mimetic art on the emotions, as Plato described them, an aesthetic experience? Is catharsis an aesthetic experience as we understand either concept?

There are twentieth-century theorists clearly ensconced in aesthetic experience theories: Bullough and Bell, of course. Others are settled there less comfortably. Frank Sibley claimed aesthetic concepts relied on 'taste' for their application. Is his, then, a theory of aesthetic experience? It seems simply wrong to put in this camp Morris Weitz's famous essay, which is said to argue that 'Defining conditions for a "work of art" ... are not appropriate because they misconceive how aesthetic terms work' (64) — but 'aesthetic' turns up in Weitz's paper only as the name of a branch of philosophy.

What is wrong with theorizing about aesthetic experience? Two things: 'when one looks for it, one does not find it; and the characterization of experience itself cannot do without reference to objects ... ' (76). The first is supported mainly by the arguments of Marshall Cohen and George Dickie that 'aesthetic' names no interesting category of experience. The second depends on a line Townsend traces in Dickie. Suppose experience is aesthetic in virtue of its having a property, x. If x turns out to be a property of objects (e.g., x is coherence), then experience is aesthetic only in the uninteresting sense of being an experience of an aesthetic object; and we need to shift from experience to giving an account of why this object is aesthetic.

This point motivates Townsend's move towards delimiting the aesthetic object. However, Townsend apparently never gives up the view that aesthetic theory must be about aesthetic experience. Consequently, the aesthetic object is 'what is embedded in the experience as an objective part of it' (90).

Consider the film, *Tom Jones*. We might expect that there are at least as many aesthetic objects as there are viewers in the audience. Yet Townsend claims, 'In spite of the subjective conditions of viewing, there is a common object' (106). The aesthetic object is what is said to be 'neutrally present' in all members of the audience, regardless of their further experiences of it. However, that there is such a neutral ur-cognition underlying experience is a sort of postulate Townsend advances without argument — and a postulate that strikes me as wrong. Will the color-blind person and the normal person have the same aesthetic object when viewing a Poussin? Will the adult steeped in European music and the teenager steeped in Madonna have the same aesthetic object when confronted with Mahler's Ninth? Do two critics with very different views of a work share at any level the same aesthetic object?

I doubt it, but there is another kind of objection to Townsend's program. He has given himself a hard row to hoe, given the neutral status of the aesthetic object. Once it becomes experienced, it is no longer neutral. Sometimes he sees this: 'The aesthetic object is neutral. But if it is neutral, no belief is involved. Yet I cannot refer to something specifically without some mode of belief to account for its singularity' (126). Sometimes he does not: 'Critical activity is essentially the move from subjectivity to objectivity on the basis of a subjectively experienced singular object' (170) — but this 'is still not a very large move' (173)! Yet what could be larger than the move from pure experience to descriptions and interpretations thereof?

Townsend's adherence to aesthetic objects as objects of experience wreaks havoc with his theory of art. 'Art is not in the mind,' Townsend writes. 'Its objects are not simply objects of experience in the way that aesthetic objects are ... Paintings are hung on walls ... ' etc. (209). Yet the matter becomes hopelessly confused in such pronouncements as, 'Art is ... made up from aesthetic objects' (213). For then, artworks *are* aesthetic objects, and art is precisely 'in the mind.'

Why do some aesthetic objects (say, the experience of Raphael's *Sistine Madonna*) lead us to believe them to be — constitute them as — artefacts that are works of art, while other aesthetic objects (say, the experience of a certain pencil) do not so lead us? '[O]ne cannot answer that question without examining the structure of the work' (259), a structure given primarily by 'imperatives'. What 'imperative' is embedded in Raphael's *Sistine Madonna*? 'A painting is a direction for constructing visual patterns' (255), an odd claim, as if we had a choice about what visual patterns we should see when looking at a painting. This is quite a literal reading of the commonplace that paintings command our attention. But why should 'imperatives' make Raphael's work a work of art, when we can say with equal plausibility that the pencil commands, 'Write with me'?

I agree that theorizing about aesthetic experience can lead us away from theorizing about art. But theorizing about neutral objects in experience seems to raise more problems than get solved. Why not talk about aesthetic objects as certain kinds of *things*? And if one feels this is not really aesthetics, then give up aesthetics and do philosophy of art.

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Jerald Wallulis
The Hermeneutics of Life History: Personal Achievement and History in Gadamer, Habermas, and Erikson.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press
1990. Pp. xv + 158.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-8101-0967-0.

Wallulis contends that Gadamer's thesis that "'history does not belong to us, but we belong to it" and so "the self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life" (*T&M*, 245)' (4), eliminates 'individual life history as an important subject' and argues against 'an essential role for personal achievement within the consideration of that history' (134). Therefore, philosophical hermeneutics needs to be complemented by another concept of consciousness, 'the consciousness of having been enabled' (134). Such a "'hermeneutics" of life history ... contributes to the "defense" of subjectivity rather than its demise' (9).

In the first half of his highly readable discussion, containing summaries and anticipations in every chapter, Wallulis establishes his interpretation of Gadamer's concept of appropriation as event. The initial discussion of play concludes that 'play is an event which happens to its players' (18) and the embeddedness of effective historical consciousness within tradition leaves the subject in a purely passive role. The process of learning is then examined using the Gadamer-Habermas debate and focusing on the issue of consciousness. Gadamer's analysis of experience as essentially 'negative and disappointing' points to the way understanding is 'conditioned by the historicity of human finitude' (38) and so limits 'the omnipotence of reflection' (39). While recognizing the historical situatedness of consciousness, Wallulis finds that both Gadamer's 'claim that the subject is an effect of a larger event and the belief that subjectivity must be criticized and limited for the sake of the event are important obstacles to the development of a conception of individual achievement' (58) for which he will argue. The sense in which the

'experience of personal *co*-authorship or of mutual formation both *of* and *by* the self' (65) can be 'balanced' (in a Habermasian sense) with 'hermeneutical situatedness' (66) is demonstrated by referring to Geertz's description of the Balinese cockfight. In this manner Gadamer's critique of self-reflection can 'be conceded, so long as a sufficient power of self-reflection remains for it to play its attributed role in the rectification of the socialization process' (67).

However, Wallulis's interpretation of philosophical hermeneutics appears to side with Gadamer's critics concerning the passivity of effective historical consciousness. He ignores Gadamer's protestations that he nowhere denies the critical aspect of appropriation and that acknowledgement of the authority of tradition is not the blind acceptance of traditional prejudices. Wallulis omits any mention of the essential concept of application where the active role of the so-called subject is most evident as it also is in Gadamer's discussion of *phronesis*. On one page (57) Wallulis considers and dismisses such an interpretation and his reference there to Grondin appears questionable.

In the second half of the text Wallulis argues for an enabling consciousness of personal identity, which is to complement Gadamer's analysis. Habermas's theory of ego development and identity are shown to have changed in the analysis of communicative action. Wallulis discovers his philosophical position concerning the balance between the active and passive to be best expressed in the following statement by Habermas: '"Action, or mastery of situations presents itself as a circular process in which the actor is at once both the initiator of his accountable actions and the product of the traditions in which he stands, of the solidary groups to which he belongs, of socialization and learning processes to which he is exposed" (*TCA*2, 135)' (85). Erikson's analysis of ego development and identity is introduced as best illustrating the idea that humans are both 'products of and initiators within tradition' (86). Erikson's analysis of play and learning are to complement Gadamer's. Erikson exemplifies the action as opposed to the happening structure of play (98). In childhood play models are created where the past is re-lived, the present re-presented, and the future anticipated (101-2). In adolescent social play one learns one's place in society and tradition as well as one's future goals. It is an active experience of 'individual achievement and ... a growing awareness of individual competence' (107). So the player 'not only "is played" but "plays" in individually characteristic ways' (109). In the final chapter Wallulis's reading of Erikson (111) leads to a new sense of self-consciousness. Gadamer's description of experience which refers 'to disappointments of expectations that result from experience acquired without being sought or intended' (119) is contrasted with Erikson's idea of learning '*through* and *because of* positive experience in regard to our personal lives' (120), 'an experience of having earlier been enabled to be the subject that one is' (121). This is not Habermas's concept of emancipation through self-reflection. It rather complements Gadamer's analysis. Wallulis concludes that 'to become cognizant of both "consciousnesses" and the different important roles that they play in life history and the larger event of tradition is to gain awareness

of how we are both products of our tradition and initiators within that tradition at the same time' (126). What is stimulating and creative in this work is the wedding of Gadamer and Erikson through their analyses of play and learning and the development of 'the consciousness of having been enabled' (134).

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Jonathan Wolff
Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State.
Stanford: Stanford University Press 1991.
Pp. ix + 168.
US$32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-1855-5);
US$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-1856-3).

This book is a quite competent, though not an especially original or penetrating compilation of criticisms of Nozick's modern-day classic, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. Wolff is avowedly opposed to libertarianism ('ideas like those of Nozick have had, to put it mildly, a huge and destructive effect on the lives of a great many people' [viii]), yet he succeeds admirably in treating his subject fairly and reasonably.

Wolff begins with an overview of Nozick's theory, presenting it in Chapter 1 as a single-value (non-pluralist) political philosophy based on 'inviolable' private property rights (rather than on liberty). In Chapter 2, he delineates the structure of Nozick's libertarianism and explores its possible foundations — understandably, finding them wanting. The intriguing suggestion is made that we cannot 'always distinguish between harming another and failing to help them', and thus that 'some rights are not obviously either positive or negative' (19). Wolff's example of the latter are rights to self-defense and to punish offenders (34), which permit 'interference'. However, these rights clearly do not (necessarily) involve any positive duties on the part of any others: if someone breaks a contract or aggresses against another, these harmful actions call for redress; but nobody is required to aid the victim in defense or in seeking redress.

Chapter 3 examines Nozick's defense of the minimal state against the anarchist. Nozick must show that the dominant protection agency (DPA) may prohibit the self-enforcement of rights by 'independents', provided compensation is paid to them in the form of free protection. Now Wolff poses the following dilemma: 'Does [the independent's] right to punish offenders clash

with the procedural rights of the accused or not? If not — if we view the right to punish as already limited by procedural rights — then there is nothing for which compensation needs to be paid. ... But if there is a clash, then why should [the independent's] rights always give way?' (72). However, this is a false dilemma. It could be that the procedural rights of the accused and the rights of independents to self-enforcement are *mutually* limiting, such that neither right simply defeats the other. In this case, it would be wrong for independents to use methods which are not certified reliable to enforce their rights, but equally wrong for the DPA to prohibit self-enforcement without compensation.

This raises the question of the adequacy of Nozick's principle of compensation: 'No purely rights-based considerations appear capable of discriminating between the epileptic driver [who imposes unacceptable risks on other drivers, and therefore must be prohibited from driving but compensated for this disadvantage] and the drunk driver [who may be prohibited without compensation], and driving generally and playing Russian roulette on the unwilling' (70). Surely the libertarian has a ready answer to this puzzle. Prohibiting Russian roulette on the unwilling is clearly wrong because it violates an individual's 'protected moral space'. When it comes to driving, the owner of the road has the right to decide who is prohibited from imposing what risks; and other subscribers to the service decide for themselves if they are prepared to accept the risks allowed by the owner. Thus the issue of compensation does not arise in this context. In short, Nozick says enough about activities which impose a risk of rights violations, and enough about activities which produce a generalized fear, to suggest that his compensation principle can be defended by the resources allowed to a libertarian. As usual, much more needs to be done to demonstrate the precise contours of rights which Nozick ascribes to individuals; but Wolff has not shown that Nozick's position is internally inconsistent or necessarily inadequate to the task at hand, either.

Chapter 4 assesses Nozick's criticisms of the more-than-minimal state, centering on the perennial question of whether redistribution is necessarily incompatible with liberty. In the famous Wilt Chamberlain example, Nozick argues that if distribution D1 ('your favourite') is just, and distribution D2 arises from voluntary transfer from D1, then D2 must also be just, and attempts to re-impose D1 would interfere with liberty. Wolff argues in opposition that, whether we understand liberty in the Lockean or the Hobbesian sense, some redistributive measures do not obviously conflict with liberty. Hobbesian liberty exists in the absence of any duties (93-4); but since all property rules impose duties, the entitlement theory is as incompatible with liberty as a redistributive system would be. On the other hand, Lockean (and Nozickian) liberty consists in being permitted to do whatever does not violate the rights of others. On this view, everything depends upon what rights people antecedently have. Now Wolff argues that it is tendentious to assume that the rights of voluntary transfer include the full catalogue of

libertarian rights; if they are circumscribed by a system of taxation, it violates no rights to restore D1, and hence does not limit liberty to do so.

So far, so good; and so familiar. But is it really so 'tendentious' to think that the rights of voluntary transfer can be arbitrarily circumscribed without restricting liberty (in some different sense)? Here Wolff ignores important analytical work on the connection between property rights and liberty which has taken place over the past decade, most notably by Jan Narveson. That work may, in the end, fail to establish the link Nozick needs, but the real debate has already advanced much further than Wolff takes us. Similarly, in his later discussion of the Lockean Proviso, Wolff succeeds well in showing the inadequacies of Nozick's discussion, but fails to consider how (e.g.) David Gauthier's interpretation might help to solve some of the problems with this aspect of the entitlement theory.

The final chapter discusses Nozick's place in political philosophy, and attempts to explain the attractions as well as the limitations of his views. After a brief discussion of Nozick's criticisms of Rawls, egalitarianism, and Marx, Wolff concludes, '[his] arguments against the anarchist and the defender of the extensive state have not established the truth of libertarianism, but nevertheless Nozick has registered strong and important criticism of some of his most important rivals' (133). This unexciting but accurate statement is followed by a peroration extolling the 'great enrichment of political philosophy' which has followed the publication of Nozick's book.

Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State brings together in a lucid and readable manner most of the important critical responses to *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* which have appeared over the past decade and a half. It could serve as a useful ancillary text for a senior undergraduate or graduate seminar course on libertarianism, or as a refresher for philosophers with a professional interest in the debate between equality and liberty, or socialism and capitalism.

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