Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

Editor • Directeur

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

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Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing & Publishing
P.O. Box 4834, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 5G7

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X
c 1991 Academic Printing & Publishing

Volume XI, No. 2
April • avril 1991

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Jeffner Allen and Iris Marion Young, eds.
Thinking the Muse: Feminism and Modern French Philosophy.
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1989. pp. vi + 215.
US$32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-35980-5);
US$11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-205026).

The aim of this book is to provide a forum for feminist appropriations of existential and post-structuralist philosophy. It achieves this aim admirably well. If De Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre dominate the early articles, the second half of the collection features the work of Cixous, Derrida, Foucault, Irigaray, Kristeva, and Wittig. Not only is the range of figures covered considerable, this variety is reflected in the different styles of writing represented. Some of the articles are highly-structured, tightly-woven and constructed according to fairly traditional models of philosophical arguments. Others attempt to break away from the standard procedures of philosophy, preferring to experiment with voices which reflect the influence of French feminists, or feminist poets, who inspire several authors, for example, Julien Murphy who examines vision in Sartre and Rich, and Namascar Shaktini who explores lesbian sexuality in a neglected work by Wittig. Of the eleven articles, six are reprints, some of them revised and expanded.

Jo-Ann Pilardi analyses female eroticism in De Beauvoir's work, focusing mainly upon *The Second Sex*, but also referring to her novels and essays. She argues that De Beauvoir's thought remains entrenched in phallocentrism and belies its avowed existentialist aim of balancing facticity against freedom. For De Beauvoir, there are two ways in which women can overcome the passivity that is normally required of them in eros: homosexuality and reciprocity. Pilardi, who thinks De Beauvoir is 'too cavalier . . . about the ease of achieving' this latter state (27), suggests that erotic passivity is not merely negative. If women choose it as a form of resistance it can be a protest against patriarchy. This, she says, is just a start. What is needed is an elaboration of female eroticism that is not dominated by patriarchal assumptions.

Eléanor Kuykendall, who has a second essay in this volume, on Kristeva, also writes about De Beauvoir, but with a different focus — ethics and linguistics, the same theme of her questions to Kristeva. 'Linguistic ambivalence' is the name she gives to the ethical problem of women using language that is constitutive of male domination. She distinguishes two kinds of ambivalence. Primary ambivalence is a concept she borrows from Kierkegaard, which she associates with the solitary heroines of De Beauvoir's early novels. She finds secondary ambivalence in De Beauvoir's later writings, in which one's intentions are 'blocked by circumstance' (34).

Iris Marion Young begins her article by recalling Erwin Straus's comment upon the different ways in which boys and girls throw a ball. The girl does not use the whole of her body, which remains fairly static, and she therefore achieves little control over the action of throwing. A boy prepares to throw

the ball by twisting, turning, bending, moving, and supporting the throw with almost all his strength. Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty, Young goes on to develop three modalities of feminine motility, and three modalities of feminine spatiality. The modes of bodily comportment she designates as specifically feminine are ambiguous transcendence, inhibited intentionality, and discontinuous unity (62-3). Young characterizes the lived space of feminine experiences as enclosed (women frequently do not use all the space available to them), dual-structured (the continuity between 'here' and 'yonder' is severed), and positioned (rooted in space, irrespective of intentional movements).

Allen discusses Camus, among others, and claims that existentialism, is 'in principle' patriarchal (78). She calls for 'the turning of women to one another' and differentiates her position from that of feminist deconstruction which 'dismisses too quickly lived experience of connection and wholeness' (81). Judith Butler argues that the 'potential openness of Merleau-Ponty's theory of sexuality is deceptive.' It is in fact 'heterosexual,' 'disembodied' (86), and 'devalues gender as a relevant category' (98).

Linda Kintz asks if Derrida's advice that feminists refrain from identifying a 'specifically female subject' is not posed from the 'very terrain of binary oppositions he warns us against' (113). She correctly suggests that to describe a specifically feminine subject is not necessarily to remain within the metaphysical opposition male/female and therefore to continue the tradition of logocentrism. Let me offer two comments. First, it is questionable that Derrida does unequivocally advise feminists not to describe femininity, and furthermore Kintz does not acknowledge that Derrida never claims that one cannot step outside metaphysical language — but one can use it self-consciously.

In a careful comparison, Linda Singer discusses the theories of sexuality and power offered by Cixous and Foucault and examines the implications each has for the other. Domna Stanton, fearful of essentialism (170), provides a critique of the maternal in Cixous, Irigarary and Kristeva.

Kuykendall argues that Kristeva's conception of language clashes with her conception of ethics. She examines in turn how Lacan, Kristeva, Irigaray and Derrida take up Freud's Fort-Da example, and concludes by criticizing Kristeva for retaining from Lacan and Freud a 'masculine' ethics (190).

The balance of articles in this collection are critical of post-structuralist feminism. More representatives of feminists sympathetic to contemporary French theorists would give the book even wider appeal. Nonetheless, it deserves attention for concisely presenting a variety of feminist perspectives, a diversity of philosophical approaches, and maintaining a fairly high standard of scholarly discussion.

Tina Chanter
Louisiana State University

W. Peter Archibald
Marx and the Missing Link: 'Human Nature'.
Atlantic Highland, NJ: Humanities Press International 1989. Pp. viii + 313.
US$39.95. ISBN 0-391-03649-1.

Until a few years ago, the established view was that the historical materialism of Marx's post-1845 corpus, in particular the volumes of *Capital*, was devoid of any theory of human nature. The social-reflex theory of orthodox Marxism, buttressed by the 'theoretical anti-humanism' of Louis Althusser and structuralist Marxism in general, was dominant in the academy. Now the widely accepted view is that even Marx's most scientifically oriented works posit throughout an undergirding concept of human nature. It is in the relatively new theoretical context that Peter Archibald has written *Marx and the Missing Link: 'Human Nature'*, a voluminous study which seeks to check out the suppositions of Marx's underlying idea of human nature against the twentieth-century findings of the social sciences.

Archibald's book is divided into four main sections, Part I 'Re-reading Marx for the Individual and the Psyche'; Part II 'Human Nature as Modified in each Historical Epoch'; Part III 'Human Nature in General'; and Part IV 'Evaluating Marx's Theories of Human Nature Empirically'. It begins from four major 'premises' — that (1) Marx had 'an elaborate conception of human nature — which was not simply philosophical and sociological, but psychological'; that (2) he 'believed these psychic processes to be common to individuals in all periods of history'; that (3) these inner workings include 'complicated structures such as need hierarchies and processes such as social comparison and "frustration-aggression" '; and (4) that for Marx 'the explanatory importance of such general processes is by no means restricted to Marx's explanations for most of the structural social processes with which he was concerned' (2-5).

These general principles define the theoretical framework for all of Archibald's analysis, and his study is essentially concerned not to justify them on the basis of Marx's own texts, but to assess empirically their constituent claims in the light of the anthropological, psychological and sociological evidence. No-one that I know of has attempted such a broad social-scientific check of Marx's theory of human nature before, and Archibald's work is impressively prodigious and well-informed in the sources it brings to bear on his project. It is basically sympathetic and faithful to Marx's position, but is not afraid to criticize it nor to propose desired amendments. It is a book which seems to represent an immense amount of work.

The main compositional drawback of the book, perhaps difficult to avoid in such an enterprise, is its sprawling, rambling structure of presentation which piles point on point and reference on reference with no clear through-line of argument, no cumulative development of theoretical case. Nevertheless, useful points are frequent, especially on counteracting factors not taken into account by Marx's too simplified doctrine of class struggle. The book's

most valuable contribution lies, I think, in its recurrent exposure of psychological processes preventing worker class consciousness and collective action, inhibiting factors which Marx was inclined to overlook in his overriding commitment to social revolution (e.g., people's tolerance of deprivation and frustration, and their disinclination to function on a level of rational class action).

There are, however, some major gaps and lapses of explanation in Archibald's analysis. For example, the basic concept of 'hierarchy of needs' is one which Archibald attributes to Marx throughout his study. Yet he never defines need in such a way as to distinguish it from want (despite a chapter on the subject), nor explains at all what 'hierarchy' means in framing the relative motivational place and importance of different 'needs' (e.g., 83ff, 235). Marx's concept of the *historical development* of needs also lacks here any systematic theoretical integration, though it is in this direction most of all that historical materialism has a contribution to make in understanding what needs are and how they change. As with other central concepts — 'knowledge,' for instance (e.g., 120) — the meaning of even very basic ideas is left unexplained at the general level. A looseness of theoretical bearings becomes in consequence pervasive. Since Archibald's analysis does not concern itself either with justifying his concepts on the basis of Marx's texts themselves (where 'hierarchy of needs' for example, never occurs as a concept Marx uses), things become rather unstuck. There is much talking around points without much getting down *to* them with any rigour of defined principle — continually moving from what Marx's positions allegedly are to empirical testing of them by the subsequent scientific literature without really explaining *what* precisely these positions are.

There are also some fundamentally misleading formulations spotted through the book. On p. 98, Marx's belief in 'classical conditioning' is said to be shown by his famous question: 'How could the worker come to face the product of his activity as a stranger, were it not that in the very act of production he was estranging himself from himself?' Marx's point here is, rather, that the worker's alienation from his product, which is owned by the capitalist, is determined by a deeper, overlooked alienation from his labour power itself, which is owned by the capitalist prior to the product. This is not a point about classical conditioning, but about ownership structures. On p. 33, Archibald states that 'the value of the specific commodity, labour power, is heavily determined by the needs of individual workers.' In fact, the value of labour-power is *not* determined by needs, for Marx, but by the socially necessary hours of labour-power required to reproduce it. Workers need air, but that does not figure in the cost of their labour-power on the market. Again, on p. 217 Archibald reports that Marx's awareness of the problem of proliferating 'unproductive' workers was confined to 'a few overseers, clerks and engineers.' This is doubly wrong. First of all, Marx saw the labour of 'overseeing' and 'superintendence' as productive in its planning and directive functions, and conceived of 'engineers' as primary bearers of 'society's greatest productive wealth, scientific labour-power.' He also more than once

declared (in *Capital* and the *Gotha Program*, for example), that clerks in the form of 'accountants' would be essential workers in any post-capitalist social order. Second, Marx *did* frequently refer to the problem of proliferating unproductive functionaries in modern capitalism, from soldiers, judges and capitalist apologists to jugglers and prostitutes, 'a horde of unproductive parasites' he called them in *Theories of Surplus Value*, and he attacked the problem as politically significant in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*.

In all, despite its problems, this is a book whose sense of direction is sane and reliable and whose scholarship is industrious.

John McMurtry
University of Guelph

Antoine Arnauld
On True and False Ideas, New Objections to Descartes' Meditations *and Descartes' Replies.*
Queenston, ON; Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press 1990. Pp. xxxiv+198. Cdn $59.95: US $59.95. ISBN 0-88946-287-9.

The appearance of this work is important for at least two reasons. The philosophical exchange between Arnauld and Malebranche is much more often referred to than understood, and it holds the key to some of the most essential epistemological and metaphysical issues of their period. But second, and even more interestingly, the exchange sheds absolutely essential light on the work of Descartes; in fact, it would not be unreasonable to maintain that awareness (and ignorance) of the details of this dispute marks — in large measure — the important difference between Continental and Anglo-American interpretations of Descartes today.

There have been several recent studies linking the Occasionalist branch of Cartesian philosophy to the works of the British Empiricists. For the sake of brevity, I shall restrict my comments to Locke. A defense has been mounted, especially by Yolton, to assure us that Locke did not view ideas as a 'third thing' which would itself be the exclusive object of knowledge, effectively barring any direct awareness of actual entities. Yet Locke himself makes Yolton's task very difficult. Not only does he maintain that ideas are the objects of our awareness; he also insists that our knowledge can extend only so far as our ideas permit. Thus, we have knowledge of the attributes of objects because we have ideas of these attributes. But, because we have no idea of physical substance, we can have no knowledge of a given object as a substantial entity. In this area, therefore, we can have knowledge of nominal

essences, but not real essences; and a genuine science of physical nature is quite beyond our grasp.

All of this fits in perfectly with the position of Malebranche, who maintains that the idea is indeed a third thing (a representative being, 9 and *passim*) by which we are able to grasp 'physical objects' within the infinite intelligible extension in (the mind of) God. Of course, Malebranche would insist that we *can* have genuine knowledge of physical objects; but such 'knowledge' is ultimately based upon faith, and therefore the science which it provides could offer no philosophically respectable advantage over Locke's acknowledged ignorance.

If, in contrast, Locke had adopted Arnauld's position on ideas, the result would have been remarkably different. Arnauld assures us that he follows Descartes' conception of ideas: that they are not at all a third entity standing between the mind and its object, but rather the form of the entity known — or, more precisely, the form of the mind as it considers the object (26-7). Thus the perception and the idea are the same thing; but the term 'perception' more directly indicates the mode of the mind, while the term 'idea' more directly indicates the object as it is objectively in (i.e., present to) the mind when the perception occurs (20). In effect, Descartes is claiming that we know (specific aspects of) the actual object by means of ideas, rather than simply knowing ideas. This permits him to agree with Locke that we do not have direct knowledge of substance, but only of its attributes; and yet he can maintain that the more attributes we know, the better we know the substance. The idea (i.e., the form) of the substance lies not merely in the collected ideas of the properties, but rather in the fact that a determinate configuration has been established when these elements are put together in a certain way by the mind (Descartes' *Reply to Objections V*). It would be inappropriate to defend this position in the present context, but essentially the issue is the contrast between a potentially viable epistemology and none at all. The controversy between Arnauld and Malebranche already displays the seeds which will grow up to determine the achievements of Classical Empiricism, both with respect to its epistemological and its metaphysical aspirations.

With respect to the interpretation of Descartes' own work, the matter is less obvious. But Arnauld provides a variety of information which helps us to understand Descartes' thought. For example, there is a discussion of the doctrine of ideas offered by Thomas Aquinas in which a distinction is drawn (67) between the idea as means (that by which something is understood) and the idea as object (*reflectively*, that which is understood). The discussion reminds us that there is not merely a Platonic framework to which Descartes is indebted, but an entire scholastic tradition which requires a careful attention to the precise terminology employed. This insight is especially useful for resolving the problems found by many commentators in Descartes' treatment of 'material falsity.' Arnauld gives an explicit discussion of this problem without employing the term (43).

Arnauld's reminder that ideas are forms is helpful in another way. As already indicated, this traditional doctrine is explicitly accepted by Des-

cartes, but largely ignored by his commentators. When this point is kept in mind, it is possible to see new perspectives offered by Descartes' distinction between 'objective' and 'formal' reality, and between a 'formal' and an 'eminent' source for our ideas. Arnauld employs these distinctions when he insists that there must be an actual extension which characterizes physical objects, in contrast to the purely intelligible extension offered by Malebranche. For these reasons, this volume may encourage English language commentators to recognize the legitimacy of some of the standard French readings of Descartes' work. Because the exchange of letters between Arnauld and Descartes (which concludes this translation) is not really new in English, it merely reminds us to reconsider this material within the context of Arnauld's more detailed treatment of relevant topics.

As a translation this work is quite sound. There are the usual questions of precise significance. On p. 3, line 15: 'to be a certain quality of it' should read 'to be certainly a quality of it'. On p. 21, point 13, line 2: 'the author of its being' should read 'the author of its nature'. On p. 30, line 23: 'the idea of perfect being' should read 'the idea of the perfect being'; and similar petty details. But in general the translation is correct and the English reads well. There are almost no misprints, and only the omission of 'is' on p. 29, line 18 is enough to interrupt the line of thought. The book is certainly a valuable addition to our resources on Arnauld (and on Cartesianism generally), and the Introduction provides a helpful summary of the controversy.

Frederick P. Van De Pitte
University of Alberta

Margaret P. Battin
Ethics in the Sanctuary: Examining the Practices of Organized Religion.
New Haven: Yale University Press 1990. Pp. xiii + 291. US$23.50. ISBN 0-300-04547-6.

Margaret Battin recently has worked primarily in the area of bioethics but has had a general interest in matters of business and professional ethics. In her preface, she describes for us how while taking a drive in the country with her husband, she had an 'instantaneous idea, like the proverbial light bulb turning on' (ix). That idea was that since organized religion has much of the structure of a professional institution, some of its practices can be clarified and assessed by means of the techniques of the kind of 'applied professional ethics' that has shown itself to be so successful in recent years in relation to the examination of professional practices in such fields as medicine and law.

Somewhat puzzled yet not altogether displeased by the fact that no academic before her had recognized the potential value of such an enterprise, she undertakes the imposing task of breaking new ground. After speculating a bit about why the professional practices of religious workers have been able to escape the keen analytical eye of the applied professional ethicists, she points out that organized religion shares various specific structures and roles that characterize the secular professions. A few methodological notes and caveats then bridge the gap to what is her main project in the volume, the examination of three central ethical issues related to confidentiality, 'high-risk' religion, and proselytizing strategies. The content of these analyses is largely sociological, although Battin attempts to draw out, in stages, various methodological principles that can be applied to determining when and to what extent it is appropriate to subject the behaviour of religious professionals to secular-ethical appraisal.

Acknowledging that in her case studies she has concentrated largely on religious groups widely regarded as outside of the religious mainstream, Battin provides a chapter devoted to an analysis of potentially problematic professional practices in 'mainstream' churches. She then brings together the principles derived from her earlier case studies in a detailed analysis of a final case, one involving the questionable pastoral counseling of a young man who eventually took his own life. With admirable caution, she warns us that we must not expect anything simple in the way of a conclusion: 'It is a ubiquitous misconception, especially among observers of applied ethics, that applied normative ethics *solves* ethical problems. This is not always the case; on the contrary, careful ethical analysis often lets us see why a case is difficult, even when we may not have noticed the difficulty before. Applied ethics is a way of making trouble, not avoiding it, and showing where complacency about received, ordinary practices is unwarranted' (252). In a concluding chapter, Battin provides an interesting typology to explain differences between the kinds of professional religious practices the ethicist may be called upon to clarify. There are some final remarks in defense of the value of the project she sees herself as having initiated, which she characterizes as the 'ethical critique of organized religion' (269).

Although this volume is apt to be of more interest to sociologists than philosophers, Battin makes several suggestions that merit the consideration of students of religious ethics. The principles that she derives in the course of her case studies, while rather broadly drawn, may well prove serviceable in attempts to resolve certain kinds of concrete problems that arise in religious life. Battin is certainly right in arguing that being 'a matter of religion' does not in itself render a religious worker's behaviour immune from secular ethical criticism. Battin's principles are at least worth careful appraisal. Her typology in the final chapter also sheds light on the matter of resolving problems of religious ethics in a theologically neutral way. Nevertheless, most of the theologians and philosophers of religion who regularly address problems of religious ethics will probably be disappointed on the whole with Battin's approach; and considering that Battin teaches in a

philosophy department at the University of Utah, they are apt to be more than a little puzzled by the narrowness of her vision.

At the risk of offending some of our colleagues, I must observe that among philosophers and theologians, the jury is not yet out on the status within the humanities of applied professional ethics. Despite the respectability of the Westminster Institute, Hastings Center, and kindred institutions, and the apparent fondness of granting agencies for a genuinely 'practical' sort of humanistic scholarship, many old-fashioned humanists have been heard to grumble that too many practitioners in this growing field within ethics do not know enough about traditional philosophical (and theological) ethics. While prepared to turn a blind eye to the work of people who write about medicine and law, many of these traditionalists are apt to be rather less indulgent when confronted with the work of someone writing on religious ethics who seems to be unfamiliar, for the most part, with the significant contribution that has been made over the centuries by philosophers and theologians to the ethical critique of religious practices. It is no coincidence that from ancient times philosophers and liberal theologians have quite consistently incurred the wrath of religious 'authorities.' Having neglected that tradition, Battin is forced to operate with what most students of religious ethics will regard as curiously shallow and arbitrary conceptions of the nature of religion, the nature of religious vocation, the relation of religious morality to secular morality (and faith to reason), the differences between churches, sects, and cults, the nature of religious authority and hierarchy, proselytizing strategies, perverted religious commitment, and religious experience. Even those sociologists of religion who were nursed with the wisdom of Weber, Durkheim, Spencer, and Simmel may see Battin as having failed to do her homework before embarking on her great adventure. And at least one more form of narrowness on her part is noteworthy. Despite the title of this volume, she is exclusively concerned among 'mainstream' denominations with Christian denominations, and more specifically, Christian denominations in the United States.

Jay Newman
University of Guelph

Martin Benjamin
Splitting the Difference. Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics.
Lawrence: University of Kansas Press 1990.
Pp. x + 195. US$22.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7006-0414-6); US$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7006-0455-3).

What is the place of compromise in ethical disputes? Can we make compromises without sacrificing integrity? These are the issues addressed in Martin Benjamin's lucid and passionately argued study.

Benjamin builds on recent work by Bernard Williams, Richard Rorty and others who hold that moral values are not derivable from some single principle which would 'enable us to resolve all disagreements without remainder' (75), but are rather embedded in contingent world views and ways of life that are particular to specific societies. There is no common yardstick, such as a Kantian respect for persons or a utilitarian concern for the general good, that would allow us to adjudicate between opposing world views; even after some ethical beliefs have been dismissed as unsupported by the facts, as inconsistent or as leading to unwarranted suffering, differences between world views will remain (87). In pluralistic societies such as ours, then, compromise is necessary in order to accommodate 'a multiplicity of conflicting, rationally irreconcilable world views and ways of life' (101). Compromise gives both sides some of what they want in return for concessions to the other side (7). Both sides still disagree, but accept compromise as a way of managing their disagreement in situations where some immediate decision is required and where both sides desire to maintain an on-going cooperative relationship (32).

Benjamin's chief concern is not, as the title misleadingly suggests, quantitative compromises which involve 'splitting the difference', but compromises on issues of moral principle (15). Moral compromise may be necessary in a pluralistic society, but is it possible to compromise on questions of principle without sacrificing integrity? Yes, argues Benjamin. Modern individuals are committed to different and sometimes incompatible values deriving from different societies or different historical stages of a particular society (57-8). We may sometimes have to sacrifice some of our values for the sake of other ones, or for the sake of an overarching commitment, but this 'internal compromise' is a way of preserving the relative coherence and comprehensiveness of our complex set of values (73). Compromising with others, similarly, may involve placing the value of discussion and continued cooperation above the values that form the basis for the dispute. Or it may be that the disputants share the same values but give them different weight (13), in which case accommodating those values in another is in a sense a recognition of another aspect of one's self.

Benjamin makes a good case for the possibility of 'integrity-preserving compromises', but sometimes loses sight of how the incommensurability of values can make compromise both necessary and impossible. Some conflicts

do not allow for the 'internal compromise' of sacrificing less important values to more important ones; there may be no ultimate value that would allow the ranking of one value as more important than the other. The same would go for interpersonal conflicts. What if the disputants do not rank cooperation and its associated benefits higher than the disputed values? What if I recognize the legitimacy of an opposing viewpoint but find no way of accommodating it that would not require that I sacrifice something supremely important? There may be situations where it really is a matter of 'all or nothing'. For good or ill, the conflicts within and between ourselves, and between our social and personal commitments, still leave room for tragedy in modern life, and make political and social life something more and something other than, as Benjamin would have it, 'the art of compromise'.

Bruce Baugh
University of Victoria

Patrick L. Bourgeois and Frank Schalow.
Traces of Understanding: A Profile of Heidegger's and Ricœur's Hermeneutics.
Atlanta, GA: Rodopi 1990. Pp. vi + 186.
US$30.00. ISBN 90-5183-145-5.

Bourgeois and Schalow have provided a much needed systematic study of the tensions between Heidegger's ontology and Ricœur's hermeneutics, an important and current theme in the development of 20th-century Continental philosophy. Their study is based on a masterful knowledge and discussion of the entire corpus of each philosopher, though their emphasis is on the early works of each. To the reader's relief, they avoid a lot of unexplained usage of Heidegger's own often cryptic jargon, though a familiarity with both Heidegger's and Ricœur's thought is presupposed and sometimes makes for dense, though rewarding reading.

Their general approach, outlined in the Preface and also in Chapter 2, is twofold. First: focusing on themes inspired by Kant (for example, freedom, evil), each of which is the focus of one of the eight chapters, they highlight the conflicts in the two philosophers' approaches, conflicts which reflect underlying disagreements as to what the basic orientations and methods of philosophy should be. These can be summarized as follows: 1) philosophy oriented to the Being of human existence and, ultimately, to Being itself, which logically precedes and provides the theoretical grounding for a concrete philosophical anthropology (Heidegger) versus philosophy oriented to the human subject (Ricœur); 2) such a Heideggerian general ontology versus a philosophical dialogue with the sciences, especially ethics, theology, psycho-

analysis, and literature (Ricoeur); 3) an orientation towards a given pre-reflective or pre-theoretical understanding of being (Heidegger) versus an orientation towards a reflective, analytical, and critical type of understanding (Ricoeur). The other major concern in each of the chapters is to argue for the complementarity of the two philosophers' approaches. More specifically, Ricoeur's concerns are seen to be grounded in those of Heidegger's (for example, reflective thought in pre-reflective understanding), whereas Heidegger's thought is seen to be somewhat abstract and incomplete without the type of concrete investigations which Ricoeur pursues (for example, into the dialogue between philosophy and the human sciences).

For example, in Chapters 1 and 6 on the Kantian antinomy of freedom and nature (necessity), Bourgeois and Schalow show that Ricoeur's response to this problem, especially in his early works, involves an orientation 1) towards the unity of freedom and nature as a regulative ideal posited as a task of the human subject's will, 2) towards ethics, literature, and theology as the metaphorical and symbolic representation of this ideal, and 3) towards the reflective, critical type of thought involved here. Heidegger, on the other hand, cuts below this purportedly founded level of treatment to a deeper level of analysis, which is oriented 1) towards freedom as the original disclosure and 'pre-comprehension' of meaning (Being) that precedes and makes possible the freedom-nature or subject-object distinction, 2) towards a 'fundamental ontology' of this pre-comprehension of being, and 3) towards the latter as an originally pre-reflective and pre-scientific understanding. As the authors argue in Chapters 1 and 2, Ricoeur investigates the problem of evil as a problem of the will in the context of ethics and Christian theology, whereas Heidegger undercuts this level of analysis with his ethically and theologically neutral ontology of the Being of human existence as a pre-volitional 'care' for oneself which is essentially prone to an escapist 'fallenness' away from active care. The shortsighted view of Ricoeur's investigations is thus seen to be corrected by Heidegger's ontology. On the other hand, however, Ricoeur's thought represents a way in which ontology can be concretely developed and made relevant for human affairs especially within the particular Christian-Calvinist faith option implicitly adopted in Ricoeur's writings.

Bourgeois and Schalow pursue similar interpretive strategies in the remaining chapters. Regarding the Kantian theme of the role of the imagination (Chapter 3), Heidegger's ontological interpretation of it as the 'common root' of both understanding and sensibility, which makes possible our initial openness to and encountering of entities or objects, provides the underpinning for Ricoeur's more epistemological investigations of the imagination as the reflective synthetic activity which strives to fulfill indirectly through art (metaphor, symbol, narrative) the demands of reason for totality, the unconditioned, and ultimately God. Likewise, Ricoeur's investigations of the different levels of language (signs, discourse, symbol, metaphor, narrative) and his attempt to integrate conflicting theories of language (semiotics, semantics, speech act theory) are premised on a Heideggerian type of ontology of language as a pre-given disclosedness of being or meaning (Chapter

4). Similarly, Heidegger's ontological notion of the world as the product of an original 'poiesis' provides the philosophical basis for Ricoeur's more literary concerns with 'the world of the text', i.e., the possibilities of self-understanding opened up for the reader through the text (Chapter 5). Regarding the theme of time (Chapter 7), Ricoeur's focus on how history is configured and unified though the synthetic activity of emplotment in narratives and his orientation towards conceiving history in terms of Christian eschatology presuppose Heidegger's religiously neutral investigations into historical time as the very Being of human existence. Finally, Ricoeur's approach to ethics in the context of the humanistic tradition and as it is expressed also in religious myths and symbols has to be buttressed by the concern of Heidegger's 'original ethics' with an 'ethos' or 'dwelling place' found in the relationships between human being and Being (Chapter 8). On the other hand, however, this Heideggerian deep ethics is sterile and empty without relating it to the type of concrete concerns pursued by Ricoeur. It is here that the reciprocal supplementing of Heidegger's and Ricoeur's thought is perhaps most pressing.

This Heidegger-Ricoeur debate, elegantly sketched out by Bourgeois and Schalow, will be not only thought-provoking for Continental philosophers, but also of interest in its basic philosophical issues, to Analytical philosophers concerned with similarly configured problematics, for example, Wittgenstein's difficult musings on the relation of interpretation and pre-scientific customs and linguistic practices, or the resurgence of conservative political philosophy and its debate with the liberal tradition.

John van Buren
Fordham University

Duane L. Cady
From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1989.
Pp. xvii + 159. US$19.95. ISBN 0-87722-603-2.

Alex C. Michalos
Militarism and the Quality of Life.
Toronto: Science for Peace/Samuel Stevens
1989. Pp. v + 55. Can$8.95. ISBN 0-88866-632-2.

The Gulf War rages forth to possible calamity and the promised peace dividend is off the political agenda, both in the United States and in Canada. If anything, these books are more pertinent today than they were two years ago.

Cady's *From Warism to Pacifism* charges North American culture with unconscious warism — a nearly ubiquitous acceptance of a view of the world regarding war as an inevitable, natural, and appropriate response to international conflict. We see state violence and its glorification as normal aspects of life while tending to regard pacifism as naive and impracticable. Cady seeks to counter our unconscious warism by describing a variety of positions regarding morality and war so as to emphasize the moral continuity between the just war tradition and pacifism. He points to various different versions of pacifism in the hope of countering familiar caricatures. The book describes a spectrum of positions, ranging from extreme 'Realism' — the view that war is beyond the scrutiny of morality, hence immune from any moral critique — to extreme pacifism — the view that war is beyond the moral pale in another sense: it can absolutely never be morally justified. Between these positions are various versions of Just War Theory.

Few philosophers are likely to be attracted by so-called Realism, though it is regarded as traditional, orthodox, and clearly right in much mainstream thought within political science. Leaving Realism, Just War Theories share with all versions of Pacifism the view that engaging in war requires serious moral reflection and justification and that the deliberate taking of innocent life is an evil to be prevented if at all possible. The conditions imposed by Just War Theory on the recourse to war and the methods of waging it are open to a variety of interpretations and have been applied with varying amounts of elasticity and different demands of certainty. Just War Theory sees war as a regrettable but sometimes necessary means of responding to evil, as a means whose employment can sometimes lead to peace and a better world ('a new world order'?) in the end. Pacifists share with just war theorists an insistence on applying moral values to issues of peace and war and the valuing of peace, life (especially 'innocent' life), and justice, and the necessity of combatting evil. They differ on the means to implement these values: pacifists deny, while Just War Theorists accept, the claim that general collective violence can sometimes be a morally appropriate route to a better and more just world.

Just War Theory has sought to respond to two fundamental questions about morality and war. Under what circumstances can the recourse to war be justified? What are the moral limits to the means of waging a war? These questions presume that war is under some circumstances permissible, thus avoiding the more fundamental issue of whether war as such is ever morally justified. To the Pacifist deliberate killing and destruction on a massive scale are the essence of war; these cannot be morally justified and are never appropriate means for seeking peace or a more just world order.

Much of the moral debate between Just War Theory and Pacifism is about means and ends and the logical and practical relations between them. Gandhi and other pacifist thinkers have urged that ends and means are intertwined: it is as absurd to think that one can win peace by violence as to think that one might grow an apple tree from an acorn. Cady makes interesting but inconclusive comments on the topic.

The moral continuum between Pacifism and Just War Theory exists because of the varying emphases and degrees of strictness within each theory. A Just War Theory which imposes strict standards for evidence and certainty in the meeting of such conditions as Discrimination, Proportionality, Likelihood of Peaceful Outcome, and Exhaustion of Alternatives, will come close to Pacifism in its practical conclusions. Similarly, there are various versions of Pacifism ranging, on Cady's account, from fallibility pacifism to technological and nuclear pacifism to purely pragmatic pacifism. The latter would be based on the claim that, as a matter of practical fact, no one really wins wars.

The continuum idea is supplemented by useful accounts of various types of non-violent action which have been used successfully by pacifist activists and by a brief but fascinating summary of the views of some pacifist thinkers in the western tradition ranging from the ancient Greeks to Martin Luther King.

Cady's book is striking in its clarity and succinctness. Unlike so many philosophical works — even some purportedly written for students or general readers — this book is elegantly simple in style and a joy to read. Cady's sympathies are towards the pacifist end of the continuum he describes, a fact he makes clear in his introductory comments. Some philosophers may find the book just too tantalizing in its brevity — there is so much more that could and should be said — and the lack of direct arguments for one particular version of pacifism is somewhat disappointment. Cady describes himself as 'backing into pacifism' but does not tell his readers which version is his.

From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum is true to its title. Cady's main message is existence of a moral continuum of reflection on morality and war. He hopes to inspire a debate less blinkered by warism; more awake to the existence of pacifist traditions, activities, and diverse positions; more sensitive to the complexities and uncertainties of situations and theories; more tolerant and open. 'In an era when political expediency encourages polarization of views, exceedingly complex and subtle problems can receive crude and simplistic treatment. The morality of war is not a simple choice between good and evil' (75).

Michalos' book deals with another aspect of militarism: weapons production and the quality of life. He argues against increased production and export of arms by Canada, offering statistics to indicate that the Canadian quality of life is higher than that in the United States and positing far lower military expenditures (two to four times lower) as an important part of the explanation. Canadian arms production has been largely for export to one main customer: the United States. Michalos cites statistics showing that such exports increased dramatically in the eighties and argues that policies supporting them (much defense production is subsidized by the federal government) are unwise: they increase Canada's commitment to violent approaches to conflict resolution; lessen her foreign policy independence; and take resources of goods, funds, and talent away from such socially essential goals as improving the environment and alleviating poverty at home and abroad.

Michalos takes a bold initiative. 'I review arguments that may be offered by Canadians in favour of the production and export of military arms, and I try to show that every one of them is defective' (29). As one sympathetic to his politics, I found the book generally persuasive — but it is almost certainly too brief and selective in its statistics and sources to convince establishment economists or strategic analysts. The relevance of Michalos' book is more affected by the shifting political scene than Cady's. As Michalos says, throughout the Cold War Canadian arms production was largely tied to demands and policies within the United States. But now, with the use of the army at Oka and the Quebec government expressing interest in acquiring tanks to handle Mohawk uprisings, and with Canadian participation in a hot war, arguments for and against militarism and military production in Canada will arise in a very different context. Militarism in Canada now involves much more than arms production and arms exports: we have seen our troops deployed in our own country and are spending 90 million dollars a month to participate in a war of doubtful necessity and possibly calamitous effect while social programs and such central national institutions as the CBC are jeopardized by funding cuts.

Are there any just wars? If so, what price should Canadians pay in domestic development to participate in them? Painfully pertinent questions, these. The books considered offer valuable introductions.

Trudy Govier
(Peace and Conflict Studies Program, Faculty of General Studies)
University of Calgary

Stanley Cavell
In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of skepticism and romanticism.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1989.
Pp. xiii + 200. US$19.95. ISBN 0-226-09817-6.

The book is a collection of lectures and essays by Cavell from 1981 to 1986. They reflect the Harvard philosopher's interests and reiterate his themes concerning the interplay of literature and philosophy. They do not, however, present the student of either philosophy or literature with new positions on Cavell's part. This collection, as is usual, is marred both by the repetition of points already well made and by neglects in tandem to amplify points that require elucidation and argument. The obscure regions of the collection may, in part, be illuminated by Cavell's prior works in philosophy and literary criticism. In this regard his peculiar, almost idiosyncratic, angle of interpre-

tation focusses on the interface of romantic literature and ordinary language analytic philosophy.

Cavell's contribution to the development of ordinary language philosophy has been singular. Here his major publications have been essays collected in *Must We Mean What We Say?* (1969, 1976), and his book, *The Claim of Reason* (1979). A follower in the tradition of the later Wittgenstein, advanced, with modification, by J.L. Austin, Cavell has concentrated on the problematic of skepticism posed by modern philosophy and the strategies of ordinary language analysis for coping with this problematic. His argument is not easy to grasp. Essentially he seems to be affirming that, while ordinary language analysis may for a while stay the terror of skepticism, this terror may also stalk us at any moment in our philosophical reflection, spurring us to escape it by a recovery of the ordinary, the possession of which is enriched by the ever-renewable possibility of its loss. The ordinary, while right at hand for plain folk, demands that we philosophers go in quest of it or go mad, remaining somewhat unbalanced even when we gain it. Cavell's point of view, if I understand it correctly, should be unnerving to any student of philosophy who holds that there are arguments or methods which finally resolve ultimate questions about knowledge. Students of ordinary language philosophy are, I think, already aware that Cavell has shifted the concern of this method with word usage to the natures or things about which words traditionally have been thought to refer or correspond.

Cavell's contributions to literary criticism and, additionally, to art criticism have been many. His major works so far have included studies of romantic literature, topped perhaps by his book on Thoreau, *Senses of Walden* (1980), and his examination of films, culminating in *Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage* (1981). Shakespeare, too, has been a special subject of his interest, as his book *Disowning Knowledge: In Six Plays of Shakespeare* (1987), testifies. The present collection reflects and advances these literary materials. Shakespeare continues to preoccupy Cavell in respect to epistemological problems, as his probing discussion of *The Winter's Tale* in the present collection demonstrates. While Cavell draws upon his earlier work on Thoreau, fresh interpretations of Emerson, Coleridge (especially *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*), and Edgar Allen Poe are presented here. To read Cavell's readings of these authors is inspiriting. He is extraordinarily sensitive to the nuances of the language, impressively capable of grasping the meanings and their connectedness with philosophical themes.

The role of Kantian philosophy in the formation of romanticism, the apprehension of the transcendental in the everyday, and the perpetuation of the Cartesian problematic in confident expressions of idealism, are unveiled in Cavell's diligent but original interpretations. The transcendental of romanticism is, in a sense, the obversion of the ordinary and the opposite of skepticism, itself an obversion of the ordinary. Logical motion in either direction, impelled by passionate moral and aesthetic considerations, may spring from the ordinary, and also in time invite a recourse to the ordinary.

A question posed for Cavell's enterprise recurs in this collection — namely, how is his sort of literary criticism related to deconstructionism? For the most part he sidesteps the question, offering such excuses as that he had begun his course of literary criticism before deconstructionists appeared or that he has not sufficiently understood them. There is, I think, a better answer to be found in Cavell's writings, although it may be academically impolite to state it, since it implies that deconstructionism is nihilistic. Cavell, though haunted by the negative and vulnerable to the skeptical problematic, is 'in quest of the ordinary', and therefore of all the affirmations so required. After all, what less (or more?) can we expect of a disciple of Wittgenstein and Austin who persistently asserts that Emerson and Thoreau are the founders of American philosophy? Now that assertion of his surely invites further elaboration.

Andrew J. Reck
Tulane University

Kelly James Clark
Return to Reason.
Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans 1990.
Pp. 158. US$10.95. ISBN 0-8028-0456-X.

This short book is subtitled *A Critique of Enlightenment Evidentialism and a Defense of Reason and Belief in God*. Clark, an assistant professor of philosophy at Calvin College, is concerned to refute the allegation that theism is not rational because there is insufficient evidence for belief in God. He aims to do this not by reassessing the evidential support for theism, but rather by attacking the claim that it is irrational to maintain belief in God without the support of evidence or argument. Drawing on the work of Plantinga, Wolterstorff, Mavrodes, Alston and others, Clark argues that 'the evidentialist objector is simply wrong when he claims that one needs evidence and arguments in order to rationally maintain belief in God' (8, 9).

A key component of Clark's attack on evidentialism is his claim that we need a complete rethinking of the concept of rationality. According to Clark, the Enlightenment ideal that belief ought to be constantly and precisely proportioned to evidence does not do justice to how belief is acquired and maintained and the classical foundationalism upon which this demand is based is philosophically indefensible. In its place, he proposes Reformed epistemology, an epistemology which accepts that belief in God is a fundamental belief which one reasons from and not to. What this epistemology amounts to in detail he never makes clear, but to insist that he should would be unfair, since it is still in seminal form and in the process of being worked

out by Reformed scholars, most notably Plantinga. Clark does, however, canvas insights from the work of William James, C.S. Lewis and Thomas Reid that he feels must be included in any adequate account of knowledge.

Clark is to be commended for providing a survey of an important movement in the epistemology of philosophy of religion and for doing so in non-technical language. The book is not without flaws, however. One is Clark's easy wedding of natural theology and the Enlightenment. He speaks, for instance, of 'classical natural theology and its assumption of Enlightenment evidentialism' (53). This is to ignore that natural theology has been around a lot longer than the Enlightenment, and that it is far from clear that natural theology depends on the Enlightenment version of foundationalism that Clark is so concerned to refute.

Another flaw, perhaps a less serious one in a short book such as this, is that Clark does not consider the possibility that many of the epistemological insights he so admires in C.S. Lewis, William James and others need not find their home in the Reformed epistemology he advocates. If I understand Clark correctly, he claims that we must recognize that there are no indisputable foundations for any of the beliefs that we normally and rationally accept as true and that basic beliefs are always relative to an individual, i.e., no belief has a foundation that must be admitted by all on pain of being irrational. Many, including myself, cannot follow Clark so far and have a suspicion that such an emphasis in epistemology is not so much a healthy alternative to an Enlightenment view of rationality, but the inevitable outcome of following the mistakes of the Enlightenment to their logical conclusion. This does not, of course, invalidate the genuine insights that Clark's Reformed epistemology contains, it only signals that they need to be developed somewhat differently.

Perhaps the best way to read this book is as an introduction to the contemporary movement within the Reformed tradition being pioneered by Plantinga and Wolterstorff. It would be a mistake to take it as speaking for the whole of Reformed tradition, however. Other able representatives of this tradition, such as John Frame, are never mentioned. Those wishing to investigate a Reformed theory of knowledge in more detail would do well not only to read Plantinga and Wolterstorff's works, but Frame's excellent work *The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God*. Those interested in critical reaction to contemporary Reformed epistemology will be interested in *Thomistic Papers IV*, (edited by Leonard A. Kennedy, CSB, Center for Thomistic Studies) a collection of papers issued in response to the volume of essays produced by Reformed scholars and entitled *Faith and Rationality* (edited by Alvin Plantinga, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).

Robert A. Larmer
University of New Brunswick, Fredericton

Jane Flax
Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West.
Berkeley: University of California Press 1990.
Pp. ix + 277. US$25.00. ISBN 0-520-06586-7.

In *Thinking Fragments*, Flax examines three contemporary western philosophical schools of thought, and critiques each school from the perspectives of the other two. The three schools of thought are psychoanalysis, feminism, and postmodernism. Her premise for this project is that western culture is currently undergoing a radical alteration (5). The three views Flax chooses to discuss represent collective intellectual projects that offer critiques of western culture, and also distinct ways of understanding the present transition. However, each view, according to her, is a partial view and stands to benefit by insights offered by the other two. Since scholars of each camp have ignored and neglected work in the others, Flax's aim is to begin a conversation between all three schools.

In the main part of the book, Flax sets out the basic themes, concerns, assumptions, and methods of each school by examining primarily classic writings and major figures within each group. For example, she focuses on Freud, Lacan, and Winnicott in examining psychoanalysis; Derrida, Rorty, Lyotard, and Foucault in discussing postmodernism; and de Beauvoir, Dinnerstein, Chodorow, Cixous, and Irigaray in discussing feminist theory. Though her discussion takes into account the works of numerous other theorists, one has to read the footnotes carefully to follow her discussion of most other authors. In her last chapter, titled 'No Conclusions', Flax reiterates 'stances' defended in earlier parts of the book, but draws no additional or larger conclusions. Here she sums up her observations about each view's treatment of issues of gender, and of the nature of knowledge, the self, power, and justice. Also, she identifies questions that she feels remain unanswered by her discussion, although this seems unnecessary given that throughout the book she has cautioned her readers not to expect answers to general theoretical problems.

Indeed, Flax is unduly modest about the promise of her enterprise. She maintains that she is not trying to offer a grand synthesis of these distinct styles of thinking, nor is she trying to resolve tensions within or between them (42). Having accepted many of the tenets of postmodernism, she is content to live with uncertainty and ambiguity, and without truth, theories, or an epistemic battle plan. Her role as an author, as she sees it, is to enable some readers to enter the dialogue she is initiating, and which has been conducted in bits and pieces elsewhere.

Yet, as modest as she professes her aims to be, this is really an ambitious book. For contrary to her postmodern convictions, the scope, organization, and purpose of the book suggests that she is somehow in the position to give an unbiased overview and summary of not one but several large areas of

scholarship, to identify their primary spokespersons and claims, and to see omissions and blind spots in their intellectual products. While Flax comments repeatedly on the obstacles to theorizing or producing knowledge, she seems insensitive to the pitfalls of her global, metascholarship project. For example, can she fairly represent each school by reducing each to a small sample of practitioners? Has she oversimplified the intellectual terrain she is covering by concentrating primarily on writers in the mainstream of their school, and less on those in the margins where the schools often overlap: e.g., feminist postmodernists?

Moreover, in her role as author/enabler, it is unclear what group of readers Flax hopes to serve. I suspect she is trying to reach scholars who fall in one or more of the three areas she critiques. As someone who fits that description, I found her antipathy to drawing conclusions (though she spends a great deal of time leading up to them) tedious and frustrating. My reaction is, in part, due to the fact that, in bits and pieces throughout the book, Flax provides many insightful, provocative, and well argued analyses of important and influential writings and ideas. Yet she seems to take postmodernism to mean that one cannot introduce a thesis without demonstrating Enlightenment false consciousness. Thus she always backs away from drawing out the implications of her discussion, and she fails to pull all or even some of the threads of her discussion together. Indeed, the metaphor of 'fragments' that Flax employs to represent the present western intellectual landscape adequately represents the outcome of her endeavors in this book. I suppose one has to be a more dedicated postmodernist than I to appreciate this accomplishment.

Laurie Shrage
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

Larry Gostin, ed.
Surrogate Motherhood: Politics and Privacy.
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Pp. xiii+366.
US $29.95. ISBN 0-253-32604-4.

In his introduction, Gostin directs this volume to 'all who may once have felt that the issue of surrogacy was, after all, quite straightforward' (xiii). Straightforward it certainly is not. Indeed, what is strikingly revealed in this book is the multi-level pluralism operating in any responsible discussion of surrogacy. The chapter headings reveal a pluralism of relevant perspectives: 'Civil Liberties', 'Legal Status', 'Ethics', 'Women's Autonomy', 'Public Health'. Within each chapter critical essays by U.S. scholars from a number of

disciplines — law, bioethics, theology, medicine — represent various points of view on the balancing of the many relevant interests. And a theoretical pluralism, concerning not competing interests but competing models for resolving them (e.g., contract law vs. family law) emerges in the chapters on civil liberties and legal status.

There is, however, some resolution of these perplexing pluralisms, at least to the extent that crucial questions at each level are identified. For instance, in the legal debate it becomes apparent that the important questions for U.S. jurisprudence (and they are surely illuminating for those in other legal traditions too) are: i) does surrogacy differ from coital reproduction significantly enough to remove it from protection under an appeal to the constitutionally protected right to privacy and reproductive freedom?, and ii) are children of surrogacy arrangements harmed by their origins? These key questions in turn give rise to further questions. With respect to i), is it the unique value of marital intimacy and its relation to family life that founds the right to privacy, and if so, will this value support the right to noncoital contractual reproduction? If not, then the legitimacy of state intervention in regulating or banning surrogacy must be denied on other grounds. And these grounds must, in turn, outweigh possible harms to contracting persons and their offspring.

The legal tensions discussed in the book are mirrored by moral conflicts, as demonstrated in the section on Ethics. The values of autonomy, happiness for the infertile, and privacy in exercising reproductive freedom must be balanced against a range of possible disvalues — the exploitation of poor women, the commodification of children (a return to the slave trade, alleges George Annas in the spirited article 'Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell'), the commercialisation of reproduction, and the reinforcement of elitist class values and economic disparities.

That these disvalues are likely consequences of recognising surrogacy is disputed in the section, 'Women's Authority'. This section contains a sensitive and thorough examination of the ambivalence within feminism towards surrogacy, and a rejection of alarmist opposition to it based on 'moralistic and symbolic' reasoning. The dilemma of the feminist is in being caught between the demand for gender equality and the rejection of paternalism on the one hand, and the affirmation of the special value of motherhood and the economic, social, and emotional vulnerability of women, on the other. Lori B. Andrews calls for feminists to work for consistency between the demand for reproductive freedom and bodily control, and their desire for paternalistic protection for contracting surrogates. Can feminists afford to have doubt cast upon a woman's capacity for informed consent in surrogacy arrangements while demanding autonomy with respect to, say, abortion? 'Will women have to go before a court when they are considering having an affair — to have a judge discern whether they will be psychologically harmed by, or later regret, the relationship?' asks Andrews (175), questioning the wisdom of a submission by the New York State Coalition on Women's Legislative Issues calling for judicial paternalistic intervention in surrogacy agreements.

As well as calling for consistency and alerting feminists to the dangers of inviting paternalism, Andrews examines an impressive range of 'harm' arguments against surrogacy — harm to society, to women, to children. With respect to each, she argues that the dangers are overrated and poorly supported, and therefore not decisive.

The section 'Public Health' raises a number of questions not usually central to the surrogacy debate, but nevertheless important. What are the rights and responsibilities of health care professionals in surrogacy arrangements? From the initial psychological evaluation of candidates (What should the physician look for? Will she be liable if some telling instability emerges?) to the disposition of the child (Should the birth mother hold or suckle the baby? Whose permission must be sought if medical procedures on the child are required?), health care workers must make decisions which affect the parties involved, but which also leave the workers vulnerable to criticism and perhaps liability. These issues are illuminatingly discussed, in a way that reveals the complexity of the social dimension of surrogacy and the urgent need of policy formation.

As well as the critical essays referred to above, Gostin has compiled an extremely useful collection of interpretive and documentary material, included in the Appendices. There are excerpts from and discussions of 'Baby M'; examples of state legislation and model Surrogacy Acts; statements of policy from such groups as the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Medical Association, and the Institute on Women and Technology. There is a wealth of information here on the current 'status questionis' in the United States, and anyone involved in the surrogacy debate, in the U.S. or otherwise, will find working through this material very worthwhile.

Elisabeth Boetzkes
University of Alberta

Patricia S. Greenspan
Emotions and Reasons.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1988. Pp. x + 197.
Cdn$34.00: US$30.00. ISBN 0-415-90049-2.

Patricia Greenspan has given us a subtle and satisfying account of the emotions which is reminiscent of both Aristotle and Hume. She maintains that emotions are states of 'comfort' or 'discomfort' — characterized in terms of whether 'an agent would naturally seek or avoid a given affective state' (31) — which are directed towards propositions or thoughts: they are affective states with intentional content. Thus although they have proposi-

tional content they are not to be identified with beliefs or judgments, as some recent commentators have suggested. Greenspan defends this view in three ways. First she describes a series of examples in which, she claims, the propositional content of an emotion is merely born in mind or attended to without being believed. For example, after a nasty experience with a dog I may fear Fido, a dog I know to be harmless: I *entertain the thought* that Fido is dangerous even as I know it to be false. Secondly she draws attention to the possibility that a basically rational person can have conflicting emotions with the very same propositional content, a situation impossible if this content were genuinely believed. In particular, she argues for the importance of identificatory emotions. If my friend and I have competed for some honor which my friend has achieved at my expense, I may be simultaneously sorry that she has won it and glad that she has (because I identify with her), and both these responses may be rationally justified even though the corresponding judgments could not both be. Finally she distinguishes emotions from judgments by the difference in their justification. From a 'backward-looking' perspective, appropriate emotions do not require justification by *all* the evidence, as justified beliefs do; they need only be based on 'a *significant subset* of the perceptual evidence available' (88). Moreover, in 'forward-looking' terms emotions can be justified as *reasons for action* in addition to the reasons provided by the acceptance of their evaluative (propositional) component. 'This man has insulted me' may be the evaluative component of my anger, for example, and this provides one reason for me to attempt to take my revenge on him, but a more powerful additional reason is the affective 'discomfort' I feel at the thought that I ought to take revenge on him: 'the need to escape discomfort provides a reason for action from emotion' (154).

Greenspan avoids the more usual examples of extreme emotion (fear of the advancing bear; anger at the current insult) and chooses milder examples. Part of her point seems to be to demonstrate the range of emotional phenomena, including the 'calm passions': in claiming that emotions involve states of comfort or discomfort she is implicitly allowing that the comfort or discomfort may be of varying degrees. Part of her point is to emphasize the adaptiveness of emotions. In focussing on such emotions as dread, grief or anger that are so powerful as to be paralyzing, many writers have characterized emotions as basically maladaptive and irrational. By contrast Greenspan argues that although *particular* instances of emotion may be counterproductive, emotions in general are adaptive in the sense of instrumental to either individual or social goals. Thus, for example, identifying with another's sorrow (perhaps even that of a character in a novel) may not further my self-interest but the ability to identify imaginatively with another's psychological state is a trait that is socially useful.

Although Greenspan attacks 'judgmentalism', her own account of emotion is also highly cognitive. She recognizes that there are in animals and infants states of mere arousal but argues that until there is also a 'thought' which is born in mind if not actually believed there can be no emotion, properly speaking. She also claims that animal and infant varieties of some emotions

may be very different from their adult varieties because of a difference in the required thoughts. Thus infant anger may have a diffuse propositional object — 'the world in general is bad and needs to be punished' — whereas mature anger is normally directed towards a particular object — 'Jones has stolen my car and needs to be punished'. Yet it is unclear whether infants and animals have 'thoughts' of this diffuse sort or even how we should go about telling whether they do. Moreover, although Greenspan rarely cites the psychological literature on the emotions, there is some evidence (from the work of R.B. Zajonc, for example) to suggest that proto-emotions at least may precede thoughts, even thoughts that are merely 'held in mind'. Greenspan cites an incident in which she herself gasped out of fear during a slight skid on a slow drive in safe conditions as the result of a previous skidding accident in a blizzard. This, she says, was the result of a 'thought' of danger. However, an equally plausible possibility would be that an incident of severe 'discomfort' has fixed the response in motor memory so that the response is purely behavioral and does not involve any *thought* of danger.

Greenspan's anxiety to demonstrate the justifiability and adaptiveness of emotions in general also leads to strained conclusions at times, for example, her claim that envy is a morally useful emotion since it 'provides an agent with a basis for an identificatory reaction to inequalities involving others' (121) and her argument that the expression of grief — seemingly a counter-example to the thesis that in acting out of an emotion one attempts to alleviate discomfort — allays grief insofar as it provides an outlet for grief and thereby avoids the worse discomfort of bottling up the emotion. Once again these conclusions seem to be highly speculative.

Greenspan also introduces the notion of adaptiveness in her attempt to distinguish the *appropriateness* of an emotion from the justification of a belief. At first it seems as if appropriateness is a matter of fidelity to and causal generation by a significant subset of the perceptual evidence: my gladness and my sadness at my friend's success are both appropriate since they are both based on (different) subsets of the evidence. However, Greenspan also wants to claim that a lower evidential standard is permitted for emotion if the emotion is in general adaptive. Thus in her example, my wary suspicion of a 'hard-sell' broker may be appropriate even if quite false provided that (1) it fits a subset of the perceptual evidence (he sounds young and insistent over the phone) and (2) the emotion promotes my self-interest, as it does. This notion of emotional warrant is indeed different from that of belief warrant but the question is whether it amounts to warrant of any kind at all. Even in Greenspan's own broker example, it is arguable that the emotion is inappropriate and based on a 'delusion' (89). (Is it really true that young insistent brokers tend to be untrustworthy?) Moreover, other emotions which appear far more irrational (even if understandable) also turn out appropriate on this criterion. Thus my neurotic fear of open spaces (discomfort directed towards the proposition that open spaces are places where I can be seen and threatened) seems to turn out appropriate since it is founded on a subset of the evidence and is based on perceived self-interest.

Greenspan's account of emotion is painstakingly worked out and in broad outline highly plausible. It explains the attraction of the judgmentalist position while pointing out its limitations. It also explains the attraction of the view that emotion involves a certain focus of attention, for, as Greenspan points out, comfort and discomfort serve to *fix in mind* the evaluations to which they are directed. Most importantly it places affectivity at the center of the analysis where it belongs. In general, Greenspan's book is a very useful contribution to the increasingly sophisticated philosophical literature on emotion.

Jenefer Robinson
University of Cincinnati

John Heil, ed.
Cause, Mind and Reality: Essays Honoring C.B. Martin.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
1989. Pp. xii + 290.
US$67.00. ISBN 0-7923-9462-4.

This book comprises sixteen essays together with a biographical sketch of C.B. Martin and a bibliography of his writings. Martin is notable as a philosopher who, while publishing little, has been a major influence in a number of areas. He has been a staunch opponent of any form of verificationism or anti-realism, reflected also in his strongly realistic conception of dispositions. Perhaps the most influential of his views is that of the role of causation in our concepts of the mental, in this he anticipated Grice's 'The Causal Theory of Perception', although he himself only published on the subject, in 'Remembering' co-authored with Max Deutscher, a number of years later. The title of the book reflects the areas of Martin's main interests, it also provides the three section headings under which the essays fall, more or less appropriately. Of the sixteen only four actually aim to provide any comment on Martin's own views: D.M. Armstrong offers a brief survey of Martin's views of phenomenalism, singular causality and dispositions, noting on the way his disagreements with Martin; Ullin Place describes some of Martin's early views of introspective reports; J.J.C. Smart is concerned with Martin's view of verificationism; the fourth paper, by Max Deutscher, is discussed below. The other twelve are concerned simply with issues of interest to their authors. A consequence of this is that the book lacks much sense of unity: the papers vary widely in content, style and quality. Nevertheless, within these covers there are a number of essays well worth reading, which can be taken as indeed honouring Martin.

David Charles, in 'Intention', sets out a new theory of intentions. He rejects the attempt to reduce them to beliefs or desires, claiming that there are rational constraints on consistency of intention which exceed that of either beliefs or desires. He also rejects Michael Bratman's attempt to explicate intention in terms of planning, instead suggesting that intentions are a kind of commitment resulting from an agent's attempt to control what she does. The discussion is clear and generally convincing, but one might question what the conception of self-control involves, for instance, whether it faces the same charge of incoherence as has recently been laid against libertarian conceptions of self-determination.

Deutscher's contribution, 'Remembering "Remembering"', is a critique of the seminal paper he co-authored with Martin. Although Deutscher still avows the causal conception of remembering, he rejects an assumption of that paper, that remembering might be analysed as recounting past experiences, together with appropriate causal connections to that past experience. Instead, Deutscher suggests a richer phenomenology for genuine memory which includes, 'a return of that past which was perceived' (67), and that '[t]o be engaged in remembering is to be engaged in re-entering the past in some fashion' (71). This, he claims, cannot be reduced to mere recounting. Deutscher's suggestions here are quite convincing, but it is not entirely clear what he expects them to show. For instance, would he accept the possibility of 'hallucinatory' memories which appear to involve a re-entering of the past, although no such past experience occurred? If so, the main point of the original paper stands intact, and does not require supplementation with Deutscher's somewhat unconvincing argument for a causal condition as presented in this paper.

Frank Jackson's short paper, 'A Puzzle About Ontological Commitment', outlines his approach to ontological commitment, an apparent puzzle that results from this approach and a solution to it. Jackson claims that ontological commitment should be seen in terms of what existential claims one's theories entail. A puzzle arises, given the necessary existence of any controversial class of objects, such as numbers or sets, for in such a case all theories can be taken to be committed to the existence of such entities, whether or not they are relevant to the subject-matter of the theory in question. Jackson suggests that this is just an instance of the general problem of entailment: the relevance of conclusions to the premises that entail them. He then offers his own solution to the problem of entailment, which turns on the relevance of a conclusion to one's acceptance of the premises of the argument and applies it to the case in hand.

Graham Nerlich, in 'Motion and Change of Distance', offers a fascinating discussion of the interplay between apparent truisms concerning the world and what physics reveals to be the case. Starting with Locke, he considers two theses about motion and change of distance: the *Bodies thesis*, which takes 'the relations of place, rest and motion to be defined on physical bodies' and the *Distance change thesis*, which, in its weak form, claims, 'If two bodies are changing the distance between them, then at least one of them may be

taken as changing place' (222). He first argues that although these principles appear near platitudinous, they embody a certain theoretical assumption, namely that there is 'a global space in which every body is located and for which any scheme for identifying places at different times must be defined globally as well as locally' (226). He then argues that, while the theses are perfectly acceptable at a local level, they cannot be held consistently at a global level with respect to Special Relativity and General Relativity, the guilty partner being the distance thesis. Nerlich then draws certain epistemological consequences from this example, in part that one can come to be wrong with respect to what appears currently obvious in ways as yet beyond comprehension, just as Locke's definition of motion turns out false on grounds not then available.

In addition to these four, one should also mention the contributions of Daniel Shaw, 'Freedom and Indeterminism', a discussion of free will which covers a surprisingly large number of topics, and Paul Snowdon, 'On Formulating Materialism and Dualism', a somewhat cautious attempt to outline the most general issues here. A bibliography of works cited and an index are supplied. The latter of these contains some minor errors.

M.G.F. Martin
Christ Church, Oxford

Patricia Illingworth
AIDS and the Good Society.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1990. Pp. vi + 197.
US$12.95. ISBN 0-415-00024-6.

AIDS and the Good Society is a discussion, informed by the liberalism of John Stuart Mill, of some of the moral and social issues raised by the AIDS epidemic. Illingworth is particularly interested in the types of interventions to limit the epidemic that are permissible from this perspective.

After some preliminaries in the first chapter, Illingworth is concerned to argue in Chapter 2 that HIV infection is *now* transmitted by sex and IV drug use in ways that do not inflict unconsented-to harm. It is now well known that unprotected anal intercourse and needle-sharing are high-risk behaviors. There is no recognized duty or expectation that needle-sharing partners or casual sex partners will disclose their HIV status and so no moral responsibility for transmitting infections to one's partner. Consequently, HIV infection is now generally a self-inflicted harm. According to the Strong Harm Principle — Mill's central principle in *On Liberty* — individual liberty may be limited only to prevent harm to others. Illingworth concludes that on the

Strong Harm Principle social policies for controlling AIDS that are liberty-limiting will not be justified.

In Chapter 3 Illingworth considers the case in the light of the Weak Harm Principle which would allow limitation of liberty when actions are not autonomous. This leads to an interesting discussion on the autonomy of 'fast track' impersonal sex and IV drug use. Illingworth believes that an act can be voluntary when it is in accordance with the agent's desires, but not autonomous if the agents does not or would not endorse those desires. She sees the high-risk behavior of gay men and drug addicts as non-autonomous because a response to narrowed life choices produced by social hostility, poverty, and racism. When desires of one sort are very likely to be frustrated a person will develop adaptive preferences, substitute desires that can be more easily satisfied. Action on the latter may not be autonomous, however, if one would prefer not to have those desires.

The non-autonomy of high-risk behavior is important to Illingworth's discussion in the last chapter. She makes a reasonable case for IV drug use not being autonomous. Her conclusion about fast-track sex is more questionable. Gay men value long-term relationships as much as straight men do. It does not follow, however, that frequent impersonal sex is an adaptive preference formed because society puts obstacles in the way of anything else. Many of the same obstacles are faced by lesbians, but who ever heard of fast-tack sex for lesbians? Perhaps in fast-track sex we are only seeing unbridled male sexuality.

Once Illingworth has argued that the high-risk behavior of some gay men and IV drug users, though voluntary, is not autonomous, she considers what interventions might be warranted on the Weak Harm Principle. Since in both cases social conditions produce the desire for high-risk behavior, Illingworth concludes in Chapter 4 that it would be a mistake to intervene in ways that may limit autonomy further. Respect for individual liberty and autonomy require that the external conditions that frustrate autonomy be changed.

Illingworth's argument in the first four chapters will be found generally convincing to many liberals. A short review cannot do justice to the complications and details of her case against liberty-limiting policies for coping with AIDS. There are two respects, however, in which the case could be more developed. Autonomy for gays means the abolition of the closet and the laws, attitudes, and institutions that maintain it. Were it not for these, according to Illingworth, gays would not choose the fast track and would not be tempted to engage in high-risk behavior. So autonomy requires equal treatment, equal respect, and most of all visibility, not just decriminalization of gay sex. This is a prospect that makes many people uneasy and Illingworth should address it so it does not provide a motive for rejecting part of her case. The other omission has to do with the legalization of various recreational drugs. The drug laws compound the problems of poverty and racism which are an important factor in drug use. They limit the autonomy of users still further and increase their misery. Autonomy here requires repeal of drug laws, a

conclusion that many will find hard to accept. Illingworth needs to say more about legalization.

The final chapter addresses the issue of compensation for persons with AIDS as a group that have been injured through wrongful attempts to limit their autonomy. This is likely to seem the least convincing part of the discussion, perhaps not because of anything intrinsic to it, but because it is an unreal proposal in a world where gay sex and IV drug use are so frequently criminal.

Illingworth's book is a well-argued addition to the work on the social and ethical issues of the AIDS epidemic.

Jeremiah McCarthy
College of Staten Island/CUNY

Douglas Kellner
Critical Theory, Marxism, and Modernity.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1989. Pp. x + 270.
US$36.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8018-3913-3);
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8018-3914-9).

The burgeoning English-language literature on the Frankfurt School continues to expand. Douglas Kellner, one of the most visible figures in the young generation of North American critical theorists, now adds to the list with a strong claim for the continued relevance of the School's tradition to the political and intellectual questions of the 1990s.

From its start, that tradition has operated on the basis of a self-conception in which theory has been linked to concrete political practice in a specific way; it was 'empirical philosophy of history with a practical intent', as Habermas called it. Kellner shares this sense of Critical Theory's vocation: theory for him is only of interest to the extent that it can assist in contemporary political struggles. But he recognizes the difficulty of this task — and recognizes, too, that even in the best days of the Frankfurt School the 'practical intent' was honored more in the breach than in the observance. Indeed, as he points out, Critical Theory's relation to concrete political developments was always ambiguous at best. In reality — and with Marcuse a significant exception — Critical Theorists have typically not had much (or much encouraging) to say of immediate relevance to those engaged in day-to-day political struggles. This failure to make good on the claim to put theory in the service of political practice Kellner sees as the tradition's great weakness.

Kellner calls for a return to what he views as the Institut für Sozialforschung's earliest understanding of its project as a 'supradisciplinary, materialist social theory' attempting to combine empirical investigation of contemporary society with the philosophical attempt to make sense of disparate phenomena as a whole. The tradition moved away from this project as time went on — exemplified for Kellner by Adorno's increasingly exclusive concern with the 'critique of philosophy' and by Habermas's 'linguistic turn' in the 1970s. The result, Kellner argues, was that the work of the later Frankfurt School become 'overly theoretical' (232) and began to suffer from an increasing 'political deficit' (204).

Kellner's book will not replace Jay's *The Dialectical Imagination* nor Held's *Introduction to Critical Theory* as standard works on the tradition. It is disappointingly sketchy on chronology and spotty in coverage — details of the Institute's founding and early leadership changes are given, but then next to nothing is said about the decision to emigrate, or to return; Adorno's positions of the 1960s are discussed, but his final work on *Aesthetic Theory* is barely mentioned. Themes such as the impact of the emigré experience on the Institute's work are introduced as important, but then disappear from view. The overall structure of the book remains vague.

Still, Kellner makes some valuable contributions. He criticizes the tradition's tendency to conceptualize modern society as an impenetrable monolith in which conflict is flattened out and critique becomes impossible, and he skilfully shows how this prevented theorists from discerning issues and complexities that might lead to social change. Thus against Adorno's conception of the 'culture industry', which found nothing redeeming at all in mass culture, Kellner counterposes what he calls a more 'dialectical' view in which mass culture develops on a fundamentally 'contested terrain' (141), where the economic imperatives of capitalism struggle with indigenous expressions of popular dissatisfaction, producing a popular culture beset by tensions and contradictions.

A similar tendency towards an undifferentiatedly negative view, Kellner argues, can be found in the Institute's accounts of relations among the economy, the 'public sphere', and the state — especially in theories such as Pollak's of 'state capitalism' as a stage marked by the 'primacy of the political' in which a ruling elite successfully manipulates an increasingly planned economy in its own interests. He has much more sympathy for recent work of Habermas and Offe on these themes, with their emphasis on the state as a 'zone of conflict' in which the technical logic of the market, rather than eliminating the normative logic of the public sphere instead runs up against it, resulting in a potential for 'legitimation crisis' that may reopen the possibility of social change.

Concerned with the question of whether Western industrial society has moved into a 'post-capitalist' stage where traditional Marxist categories are no longer relevant, Kellner proposes a theory of 'techno-capitalism' as an account of contemporary society — not a new stage, he says, but rather a transitional one (217). Techno-capitalism is still capitalism, but now in a 'new

configuration' (182), the product of the rapid development of electronic and information technologies. These technologies, associated with the increasing centralization (and internationalization) of capital, with possibilities for automation of labor on a massive scale, and with the development of a global mass culture based on the instantaneous transmission of information, produce a new set of social constellations that Kellner thinks the tradition of Critical Theory can help to elucidate — although again with an emphasis on 'crisis tendencies' and conflicts, instead of a one-dimensionally critical view.

Unfortunately, Kellner's more-or-less explicit distaste for 'abstract philosophy' means that much of great interest in the Frankfurt tradition is omitted, or described only superficially. The notion of 'domination of nature', for instance, and Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of Enlightenment in general, get only scant discussion, as do Marcuse's and Habermas's debates about technology and ideology, or Marcuse's and Adorno's work in aesthetics. The most curious omission is of Habermas's theory of communicative ethics, which attempts to reconceptualize Critical Theory's normative basis in a way that has crucial implications for political practice, but which Kellner blithely dismisses in one sentence (211) without ever explaining. This is particularly surprising since Kellner does devote some space to recent post-modern *critiques* of Habermas, which seem to come from left field given the absence of an account of the position being criticized.

In general the book's approach to 'postmodernism' is disappointingly superficial. There's very little account of the content of the critique people such as Foucault or Derrida have offered of Enlightenment ideals such as universality, autonomy, reason — ideals that Critical Theory has taken for granted, albeit critically, but that have now been put fundamentally in question. By the end of the book Kellner is calling for a grand alliance of various 'new social movements' — environmental, feminist, racial, anti-nuclear, etc. — but doesn't see that at just this point the postmodern critiques (both of 'universalism' and of 'essentialism') and the debates they have engendered become directly relevant. In these areas at least Kellner has not helped much, I'm afraid, to move the discussion along; this is too bad, because in many other ways the book is a useful and timely one.

Steven Vogel
Denison University

John F. Kilner
Who Lives? Who Dies?:
Ethical Criteria in Patient Selection.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1990.
Pp. xiv + 359. US$29.95. ISBN 0-300-04680-4.

From the beginning of the bioethics boom some twenty years ago, the concept of autonomy has dominated the agenda. However, escalating health-care costs have forced some hard thinking about decision-making under conditions of scarcity, and accordingly philosopher/ethicists have been applying their trade more and more to issues of distributive justice.

Kilner limits his analysis to issues of justice in the micro-allocation of lifesaving resources. The question he puts is simple enough: when lifesaving resources are limited such that demand exceeds supply, how ought we to decide which persons among those in need should receive lifesaving treatment? Should the young be given preference over the elderly? Should patients with a history of non-compliance with medical regimen be rejected in favour of those more likely to be cooperative? The tragic face of such decisions is that by implication they amount to decisions about who will die.

On the basis of a thorough review of the literature, including empirical studies of how patient selection decisions typically do get made in various jurisdictions, Kilner identifies sixteen main criteria for such decision-making. Each of these — e.g., 'value of patient to society', 'likelihood of medical benefit', etc. — is the subject of one of the book's nineteen chapters.

Each chapter begins with a definition of the criterion under consideration and some indications as to how it is or might be used to select patients for lifesaving treatments. With reference to institutional policy statements and surveys of decision-makers, Kilner reports on how highly regarded and widely accepted that particular criterion is. This sociological information serves as background against which he summarizes the major philosophical arguments — organized under the headings 'justifications' and 'weaknesses' — for and against its adoption. Assuming the neutral role of reporter, Kilner presents these with an air of objectivity or matter-of-factness. However, his own voice is audible enough to cast doubt on his claim that 'the various justifications and weaknesses . . . speak for themselves' (23).

Kilner is generous with examples that help to flesh out the issues and arguments discussed. In addition, each chapter concludes with a detailed illustrative case exemplifying the application of the criterion in question. Some of these cases based on actual incidents are now classic, and therefore of historical as well as didactic interest (e.g., the infamous Seattle dialysis case in which social value considerations were explicitly used to screen candidates for a limited number of dialysis machines).

All of the criteria analyzed in the book are to varying degrees controversial. Some, moreover, are highly ambiguous and extremely subtle. Kilner does a good job bringing this out. For example, he shows how 'likelihood of medical benefit' — a widely accepted criterion — may in effect lead to discrimination against certain minorities, who for a number of reasons do

not fare well under this criterion. Further complicating matters, criteria overlap and encroach upon one another such that justifying reference to a widely accepted criterion may rationalize or mask the actual use of a less acceptable one.

It is not until the final chapter that Kilner assumes an explicitly normative standpoint and puts forward his own position on patient selection. His 'proposal' combines several criteria dealt with individually in the previous chapters, while explicitly forbidding the use of others. As presented, his eclectic approach sounds reasonable enough, and, as he points out by way of market assessment, most of the criteria it combines 'are likely to receive widespread approval' (231). However, having covered so much ground in the mainly descriptive chapters leading up to his proposal, he leaves too little space for articulating it and arguing on its behalf.

Ultimately, the crucial issue for Kilner is not so much between various criteria for patient selection as it is between the kinds of arguments that may be adduced pro or con. In the main, these fall into one of two categories: productivity oriented and person oriented arguments. The former are 'concerned with promoting the achievement of some good, such as efficiency or happiness'; the latter 'with respecting people per se, irrespective of the goods they produce' (227). This distinction approximates the classical distinction between teleological and deontological arguments, which Kilner wisely avoids for its cumbersome baggage.

Some criteria lend themselves more readily to one type of supporting argument than the other, but both types may be deployed in defense of (or against) the same criterion. Kilner grants both types of arguments a legitimate place, but leans more toward the side of person oriented arguments. He is critical of the 'current drift toward utilitarian thinking in medicine' evident in some Western countries, his own view being that 'person oriented concerns should be given clear priority over productivity concerns' (227).

Kilner says little in defense of the priority of persons over productivity, but what little he does say is interesting, albeit highly contentious. Ethical analysis, he argues, is possible only in light of some shared understanding of the meaning of key terms in ethics. The meaning of these terms — e.g., 'the human' — must in turn be rooted in some 'ultimate account . . . of the way things simply are in the world' (233). Echoing Alasdair MacIntyre, he claims that such an account is what we get from stories. What defines the ethical predicament of Western society today is that the story that until recently gave ethical discussion meaning — the Judeo-Christian story — has lost its force. Kilner laments this loss, and hopes for its restoration. Absent this larger frame of reference, he believes, there is no firm basis upon which to argue issues of justice in allocation: 'The only appeal left is to people's preferences, with a utilitarian (essentially productivity oriented) approach representing a democratic way of allowing the preferences of the majority . . . to prevail' (234).

Who Lives? Who Dies? is less valuable for Kilner's own somewhat sketchy opinions, however, than for the wealth of information it brings together.

Exhaustive references to the literature on micro-allocation, including comparative research on the situation in Kenya undertaken by Kilner himself, are informative, and provide direction for the reader who wants to learn more.

Michael Yeo
Westminster Institute for Ethics
London, ON

Berel Lang
Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990.
Pp. xi + 245.
US$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-46868-2);
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-46869-0).

In this philosophical book about the Holocaust, there is a sadness and sobriety of voice which is so rare an attainment for a contemporary philosopher as to be something in the nature of a gift to the reader. It is also *very* well written. Here, for example, is its disclaimer of any desire to participate in that sort of writing about the Holocaust where 'the need to feel displaces reflection or substitutes even for feeling itself' (xi). In a few brief strokes Lang has shown how refined is the feeling that he brings to his undertaking.

A few more such disclaimers are given in the introduction, each more differentiated and wider in its implications than the one before. They combine to show that Lang's perspective is finally an ontological one. This book will be a reflection on the nature of being with special attention to a — shall we say? — defect in being: the Holocaust. The book is alight with moral courage. While it is certainly possible to disagree with it and, in places, it almost invites disagreement, it is almost consistently *interesting*.

First, a word about the book's purposes. They are two-fold and complementary. The first is to 'retell the story', as Lang's own contribution to the defining Jewish act: the rendering of memory into something sacral. By remembering the past, one inserts one's own life into a continuum in which the past offers its anticipatory comments on the future. The act of self-insertion into this continuum is the deepest and most real kind of human self-expression. It comes from the well-springs of expression itself. There can be no objective and neutral plateau from which such memory acts can be dispassionately surveyed, Lang contends. Rather, the event itself gets its most telling voice through these acts.

The second purpose is to understand the Nazi genocide from within, 'to construct a framework within which the evidence of [it] can be imagined and

thought' — meaning here both its 'conceptual assertion and historical experience' — since it was not a 'thoughtless or accidental series' but rather an occurrence in which we see a 'convergence of act and idea . . .' (xviii).

The two purposes, the one of Jewish retelling of the salient and consequential moments of the past, and the other of objective divination of the enemy's purposes and frame of mind, are asymptotically linked. For Lang, all Jewish existence today is — at least from the standpoint of effective Nazi purposes — accidental. What was envisaged was a total erasure. If anyone Jewish is still standing, it may be because his or her grandfather happened to take a train or a boat to a place that — because of the accidents of war — remained out of reach. One is here, if one is Jewish, because a certain plan didn't *entirely* succeed. But one's intrinsic vocation, if Jewish, is to remember how and why one got here. Hence, the retelling of the Holocaust and the understanding of its aim and structure, is essential.

Two questions naturally follow. What *was* the Holocaust? Can the answer be given in universal terms?

With regard to the first question, Part I, 'The Presence of Genocide', works out its identification in the moral landscape as an intentional act of a special kind. Part II, 'Representations of Genocide', shows the usefulness of the definitions in Part I to the project of decoding the language the Nazis used, and also the special difficulties that attend literary and imaginative representations of the Holocaust. (There is nothing denunciatory here, only an aesthetic sensibility of a high order.) Part III, 'Histories and Genocide', applies the earlier analysis to three domains: Kant's Enlightenment, Zionism, and the present institutional phase of commemoration, for example in academic Holocaust studies and in books such as Lang's. The question of universality is touched on all through the discussion, but perhaps more particularly in Part III.

What were the Nazis up to, according to Lang, and was it so very different from all the other human excesses that resemble it? In his view, it was somewhat different, and somewhat new. Genocide, in Lemkin's definition, ranged over a gamut of acts — from varieties of cultural demoralization to extermination. The Jewish case is genocide's 'most explicit and fully determined occurrence' (8), because there ethnocide combined with physical genocide; the attacks were unconstrained by geographical boundaries; no specifiable negative passions were being gratified; no alternative means of satisfying the attackers was made available; no 'punishment' for some alleged common 'crime' for which the group's members 'are held responsible' (20) was in play; the self-interest of the perpetrators was actually jeopardized by the genocidal undertaking; and inventive acts tending to bring about the dehumanization of the victims characterized every phase of the genocidal project. Also, at every phase, there was a deliberate coverup. This is a case of genocide done for its own sake, genocide as the very principle of the action. So, an extraordinary example of evil as such.

Lang deftly and expertly disposes of every argument that I know of to the contrary. Robert Lifton's 'doubling effect' is really the effect of invidious

distinctions drawn within a single universe of discourse. *Of Course* the Nazis treated their own children and Jewish children differently. That's the whole point about genocide. As to the view, promoted by Arendt and others, that no fully-formed prior intention to commit genocide can be isolated in its best known agents, Lang replies that 'an intention "occurs" as an aspect of the act itself, not as independent and prior to it. . . . [I]t is the intelligibility of the decision to act as purposive (and its unintelligibility otherwise) that is crucial to its identification as intentional' (24).

Lang's views on universality in moral discourse — that that perspective is unavailable — tempt the would-be philosophical critic to engage in routinized target practice. But they also invite a more thoughtful reflection about their sources, namely theological commitments that would call for an effort toward decipherment in universal terms more delicate and sensitized than they are likely to get any time soon.

This is a valuable book.

Abigail L. Rosenthal
Brooklyn College, City University of New York

Oliver Leaman
Moses Maimonides.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1990. Pp. xii+190. Cdn $59.95: US $49.95 (Cloth: ISBN 0-415-3481-7); Cdn $19.50: US $15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-03608-9).

In the *Guide of the Perplexed* Maimonides lends himself to divergent interpretations. One is to consider him predominantly a Jewish thinker, interested more in theological issues and religious concerns than philosophical ones. Another approach is to consider him predominantly a philosophical thinker but one whose philosophy is by and large an esoteric, secretive teaching overlaid by traditional, religious views with which it is often inconsistent. By way of example, the introduction to the thought of Maimonides by Yeshaiahu Leibowitz, *The Faith of Maimonides* (NY: Adama 1987) takes the former approach; the exposition of issues in the *Guide* by Leonard S. Kravitz, *The Hidden Doctrine of the Guide of the Perplexed* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen 1988) illustrates the latter.

Oliver Leaman in his latest book eschews both approaches. He takes issue with those influenced by Leo Strauss, who on the basis of the *Guide's* intended audience and style considered it 'a book written by a Jew for Jews' ('How to Begin to Study *The Guide of the Perplexed*' in *Guide*, trans. S. Pines [Chicago: U of Chicago Press 1963]; and 'The Literary Character of the *Guide for the*

Perplexed' in J Buijs, ed., *Maimonides* [Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame Press 1988]). In the extreme, Strauss' reading virtually renders an adequate understanding of the *Guide* inaccessible to the contemporary philosopher (J Buijs, 'The Philosophical Character of Maimonides' *Guide* — A Critique of Strauss' Interpretation' in *Maimonides*). Leaman's intent — and result — is just the opposite: to present the views of Maimonides in a way that is both intelligible and significant to the contemporary philosopher. He does so, on the one hand, by situating the *Guide* in the historical context in which it was written and which shows that Maimonides absorbed the concerns of the Islamic *falāsifa*; and, on the other hand, by focusing on what he takes to be the philosophical argument in the text, rather than being excessively preoccupied with style. Thus Leaman argues 'by contrast that the *Guide* is entirely philosophical in both content and form' (7). I believe he succeeds in showing that the *Guide* 'presents within the context of a particular religion issues and problems which are universal in scope' (7).

In the introductory chapter ('The Cultural Background' ch. 1) Leaman lays out the historical context of the *Guide*. Not only does this sketch the influences on Maimonides' thinking, it also purports to defend Leaman's approach. The culture milieu of the *Guide* combines the Jewish, rabbinic tradition into which Maimonides was born, with the Greek philosophical tradition in which he was educated and the Spanish, Islamic tradition in which he lived. From these Maimonides drew both the issues he needed to address and the style in which he addressed them. His insistence and use of metaphorical language, according to Leaman, is not so much indicative of a secretive teaching as it is of a legitimate concern with different audiences and correspondingly with different languages, in parallel fashion to Averroes.

Subsequent chapters draw out eight philosophical issues from the *Guide*. The issues Leaman lays out are the problem of divine attributes and of the meaningfulness of human language about God (ch. 2); the problem of explaining prophecy as implying objective truth (ch. 3); the problem of eternity versus creation of the world and of explaining the creative power of God (ch. 4); a critique of the methodology employed by theologians in the tradition of the *kalām* (ch. 5); the problem of divine knowledge and providence (ch. 6); the problem of human knowledge, especially in relation to tradition and faith (ch. 7); the question of survival after death (ch. 8); and the problem of rational justification of social structures, ethical norms, and religious ritual alongside an account of human perfection (ch. 9).

Leaman approaches each issue by first laying out the problem, usually as it presented itself to Maimondes from the Islamic tradition. He then presents Maimonides' response, explaining his meaning and casting his argumentation in the most plausible light. The problem of how to talk about God, for example, constituted a theological controversy in Islam. But it posed the philosophical problem of how to use ordinary language to describe what is clearly beyond the scope of human experience. Maimonides' solution differs from both Alghazali's argument for a univocal use of terms and Averroes' for

an analogous use of terms that implied a relation between God and creatures. Since Maimonides argued that there is no intelligible relation between God and creatures on the basis that God must be quite different from any other creatures, he concluded that terms are used in a totally equivocal sense when applied to creatures and to God. In effect, Maimonides implies that human language is simply inadequate for religious discourse, which purports to describe divine realities. Both the problem of language and Maimonides' radical solution pervades the other issues Leaman explores.

In the concluding chapter ('Persisting Problems' ch. 10), Leaman offers an independent philosophical assessment of Maimonides' views. This chapter is among the most interesting for the contemporary philosopher, for it scrutinizes Maimonides' central philosophical views in light of current issues in the philosophy of religion. Those issues touch on an understanding of ourselves and the world in relation to a transcendent, divine cause. Maimonides' general approach, Leaman concludes, is that 'he is thoroughly sceptical of all the attempted dissolutions of this gap by the theologians and philosophers, and yet at the same time the reader becomes aware of how passionately he searches for a bridge which will span the great divide' (180). The significance of Maimonides' views, according to Leaman, is that he urges 'an entirely new orientation' towards religion: while we can only speculate on the precise nature of what is beyond our experience and while we are limited to drawing conclusions from premises we can at best establish to be possible, we can nevertheless base practices on a rational foundation but one that is short of knowledge (180).

There are points with which to cavil. To mention only one, Leaman suggests that Maimonides' theory of divine attributes entails the conclusion that there is 'no connection at all' between religious language and ordinary language (23). But there must be a connection. Religious language, after all, is *human* language used to talk about transcendent reality. The logical and semantic implications of Maimondes' theory, I take it, is precisely to render religious language intelligible in ordinary terms without compromising the ontological gap between God and creatures.

Leaman's book is an excellent philosophical introduction to Maimonides' thought. It can be profitably read by both undergraduate and advanced students, as well as the more specialized philosopher.

Joseph A. Buijs
St. Joseph's College,
University of Alberta

Theo C. Meyering
Historical Roots of Cognitive Science: The Rise of A Cognitive Theory of Perception from Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989. Pp. xix + 250.
US$69.00. ISBN 0-7923-0349-0.

The guiding assumption of cognitive science is that perception and thought involve complex computational processes which are opaque first-personally. The central problem is how to make these processes transparent for the purposes of the science of the mind. Lively contemporary debate surrounds the question of what level of explanation is most profitably exploited in constructing theories about these underlying processes. The most plausible view is one which admits the legitimacy of functional level approaches, as well as neuroscientific ones. We need a description of what the system is doing and for what end before we know what to look for at the physical level. Conversely, functional descriptions if they are to avoid being unhelpful, just-so stories need to be constrained by emerging knowledge about the nervous system.

Herman Von Helmholtz, the hero of this monograph, helped lay the substantive foundations for cognitive science by arguing for the view that perception involves judgement orchestrated by unconscious inferences. Representationalists will find this aspect of his thought congenial, connectionists will not. Helmholtz also helped lay the methodological foundations for cognitive science by rejecting the canonical introspective procedures of the psychology of his contemporaries. 'It is hard to determine the nature of the mental processes which transform the sensation of light into a perception of the external world. Unfortunately, psychology is of no assistance, since up till now psychology has used introspection as the only method for obtaining knowledge, whereas in this case we are concerned with mental operations about which introspection is utterly silent' (182).

Meyering provides a fascinating interpretation of Helmholtz. First, Helmholtz was less of a Kantian than he himself claimed. Second, he was more influenced by the romantic picture of the mind as creative than most anyone has noticed. The first claim is defended in the following way. Helmholtz saw himself as a Kantian because he interpreted Kant psychologistically. Helmholtz thought that work done by himself and his teacher, Johannes Müller, on the specialized cognitive functions of various nerves, provided substantive detail to the research program initiated by Kant aimed at uncovering the a priori structures of mind. But in conceiving of his project in this way, Helmholtz misunderstood Kant. Kant's project was transcendental. The a priori structures of reason Kant uncovers are logically a priori. 'In Kant's view, the a priori forms of perception cannot simply be reduced to any psychological or physiological substratum. They are logically necessary conditions of any perception as such . . . By contrast, the principle of specific

sense-energies and its various applications, even if universally valid, would still not be necessary' (144-5).

One wonders whether Meyering isn't being overly fussy in calling Helmholtz's interpretation of the Kantian Project 'plainly false' (144). Helmholtz's interpretation might be thought of as involving an application of the principle of charity. Unless Kant is read Helmholtz's way, Kant's project is fundamentally irrelevant to that of the psychologist or physiologist. Assimilating Kant, as best one can to the cause of naturalized epistemology, may in the end be the best way of keeping his project alive for us.

But if we allow Helmholtz his Kant and read him as a Kantian, then a different problem arises. We are in danger of not seeing one of Helmholtz's truly important contributions. If we interpret the Kantian a priori psychologistically, the picture is one of fixed cognitive structures. The a priori structures of mind can only assimilate the world to their innate and unchanging structure. But Helmholtz latched on to the insight that Piaget (who also saw himself as a Kantian) was to make famous. The mind not only assimilates new experiences in terms of mental structures that are in place at the time of the experience, it also adjusts these mental structures when practical feedback indicates that so doing will improve function. To be sure, there is assimilation of experience in terms of the a priori. But there is also accommodation of the a priori structures to experience.

By allowing for an assimilation-accommodation dialectic, and this for the idea of mental development, Helmholtz is able to solve a serious epistemological problem caused by a psychologized Kant. If the a priori mental structures necessitate seeing the world in a certain way, then we can be realists about only the phenomenal world. If there is some way the world really is, how it is, is beyond us. We see the world through a lens and that lens is fixed. The a prior structures of mind do not accommodate the world, they actively assimilate it.

Enter Helmholtz's romanticism: 'because on the level of *psychology* he regarded perception as a hermeneutic, creative, and even artistic enterprise drawing on largely subconscious intellectual resources, on the level of *epistemology* Helmholtz managed to maintain realism . . . the mind gradually "tunes in" to the structures of reality as it develops' (219). We adjust our lenses as we experience the world, and develop, or so we trust, better pictures of that world. Meyering makes a convincing case for the actual influence of romantic thinkers such as Fichte and Goethe on Helmholtz. But if we follow the subsequent development of Helmholtz's picture of mind and his associated hypothetical realism it comes to rest most visibly in work in genetic epistemology and pragmatic functionalism, in work in the Piagetian mold, on the one hand, and in the work of Baldwin, James, Mead, and Dewey, on the other hand. But Helmholtz would not have been satisfied with either genetic epistemology or functionalism. These theories incorporate the right picture of mind and the right sort of pragmatic realism, but they are too resolutely psychological. Helmholtz insisted on the need to eventually provide the story of the mind from the physical stance.

The analysis of Helmholtz comprises more than half of this book. It is by far the most useful part. The early portions of the book are devoted to a desultory survey of optical theories from Aristotle through the seventeenth century. The material here might be useful to an advanced student who wants to find out where to look for interesting historical work on optics. The sections on Helmholtz have depth and substance and will be of interest to scholars interested in his work. Meyering tells his history from behind. There is almost no looking back on Helmholtz, or any of the other thinkers discussed, from the point of view of contemporary work in cognitive science (Baldwin and Piaget are mentioned, but not Marr, for example, or any major contemporary philosopher of mind or cognitive scientist). This unfortunately keeps the book from shedding any more than purely historical light, and a narrow light at that, on the foundations of cognitive science.

Owen Flanagan
Wellesley College

Linda J. Nicholson, ed.
Feminism / Postmodernism.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1990. Pp. viii + 348. Cdn$54.00: US$45.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-90058-1); Cdn$17.95:
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-90059-X).

Feminist theorists and postmodernists both attack some of the same features of the Western philosophical tradition, for example, its emphasis on objectivity and its belief that it is possible to describe reality from a 'God's eye view'. However, many feminist theorists are deeply troubled by features of postmodernism that appear to undermine feminist theory and practice. Linda Nicholson has brought together a very good collection of both new and reprinted articles to address some of the tensions and controversies. Its audiences should include feminist theorists as well as philosophers and others interested in (or at least curious about) feminism, postmodernism, or both.

No one ever promised that postmodernism could be made easy. The articles are not light reading, but many of the authors write more clearly than do most people with postmodernist inclinations. Readers willing to do the work will become familiar with the range of positions feminist theorists take about postmodernism, learn a great deal about different feminists' mixed feelings toward postmodernism, and, along the way, pick up some of what postmodernism offers. I particularly appreciated the explicit dialogue

among many of the authors. However, take me very seriously when I say that the book is difficult.

Nicholson's introduction and article co-authored with Nancy Fraser, 'Social Criticism without Philosophy', together constitute a good introduction to the volume. After laying out some of the shortcomings of Lyotard's postmodernism and of several feminist theorists, Fraser and Nicholson argue that a postmodern feminism is possible, even politically advantageous.

The other essays in the first section of the book, entitled 'Feminism as Against Epistemology', are by Jane Flax, Christine di Stefano, Sandra Harding, and Seyla Benhabib. Worth careful reading, they give a picture of the ways in which feminist theorists are both attracted to and repelled by the Enlightenment tradition and its postmodern critics. Flax, in 'Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory', acknowledges that feminist theorists 'are necessarily ambivalent' (42) about postmodernism, but exhibits few mixed feelings herself; she maintains that feminist theory should be seen as a form of postmodernism.

Di Stefano and Harding are not willing to place feminist theory squarely into any category. In 'Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and Postmodernism', di Stefano argues that none of the major positions — rationalism, antirationalism, or postrationalism — treats gender, specifically the female subject, appropriately. Women tend to become invisible in each. In 'Feminism, Science and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques', Sandra Harding maintains not only that feminists have one foot in the Enlightenment camp and the other in the postmodern, but that both agendas are necessary for feminists at our point in history.

Seyla Benhabib's 'Epistemologies of Postmodernism: A Rejoinder to Jean-Francois Lyotard', is one of two pieces not focused specifically on the feminist/postmodernist connection. Benhabib sets postmodernism in context and provides a more general critique of Lyotard and of the politics of postmodernism. The other general article is Andreas Huyssen's 'Mapping the Postmodern', a lengthy account of literary and artistic postmodernism and their relation to various French and German philosophers. I assume that these two articles were included, at least in part, to provide background; however, any reader with scant background would remain a bit in the dark. For example, Huyssen does not define 'poststructuralism' although he discusses it for pages.

Part II, 'The Politics of Location', contains the most dense reading of the book. Although there are some good essays here, others border on unreadability. Given the difficulty of this section and even the unfamiliarity of 'the politics of location' to the uninitiated, Nicholson should have done more to help the reader in this part of her introduction.

In 'Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Scepticism', Susan Bordo continues the discussion of the themes begun in Part I. Bordo (in a very readable style) warns us not to give up gender as an analytical category, not to let the modernist social critique slip away before our institutions have

absorbed it. Although she counsels pragmatism rather than theoretical purity, she is not proposing that we can 'have our cake and eat it'.

Nancy Hartsock is perhaps the least tempted by postmodernism of any of the authors represented here. She uses her detailed examination of Foucault in 'Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?' to illustrate why women should not be taken in by postmodernist social criticism. She advocates transforming power relations rather than resisting them à la Foucault (or ignoring them, à la Rorty).

The title, 'Travels in the Postmodern: Making Sense of the Local', gave me hope. Maybe Elspeth Probyn was going to make sense of postmodernist language. Alas, not. Her central question is, 'Can the subaltern speak?' The answer required detailed distinctions among locale, location, and local. The ordinary-language philosopher hidden inside me revolted. I read it three times, but felt no better.

Donna Haraway's well-known article, 'A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s', follows Probyn's. While it is more interesting and inventive than Probyn's, it is much longer and just about as rough sledding. Andreas Huyssen's piece rounds out Part II.

The essays in Part III, 'Identity and Differentiation', I see as postmodernism in action (or applied postmodernism). The first is sociologist Anna Yeatman's 'A Feminist Theory of Social Differentiation'. Yeatman found that she needed postmodernist insights as she tried, then realized it was not possible, to develop a feminist theory of social differentiation.

Iris Marion Young's 'The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference', and Judith Butler's 'Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic Discourse', are the final two articles and among my favorites. Young rejects the ideal of community after a postmodernist logical and metaphysical critique, then proposes that radicals develop a politics based on differences among human beings using the ideal of an unoppressive city instead.

Butler confronts a question many feminists avoid: do the categories of women and of gender have an ontological basis? She argues that gender coherence is a regulatory fiction of heterosexuality rather than a 'common point' of liberation. The 'us' that we pull together for feminist theory has a much more complex cultural identity, or lack thereof, than we have been willing to admit.

Is the book worth the effort to read it carefully? Yes.

Ann Garry
California State University, Los Angeles

Gayle L. Ormiston
From Artifact to Habitat.
Cranbury, NJ: Lehigh University Press 1990.
Pp. 221. US$32.50. ISBN 0-934223-09-2.

Gayle L. Ormiston and **Raphael Sassower**
Narrative Experiments.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
1989. Pp. xi + 155.
US$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1820-8);
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1821-6).

Narrative Experiments approaches technology studies in a manner that is at the same time bold and challenging. The boldness of its experiments lie in the denial by Ormiston and Sassower that there can be any precise definition or characteristic of technology and in their insistence that the reciprocity between science, technology and the humanities 'obliterates all traditional disciplinary boundaries' (14). The authors tell us that they have gone beyond the merely interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary, to a stance that is *meta*disciplinary. They challenge us to labour along side of them as they explore the 'labyrinths' of cultural and linguistic usage in which are embedded the fictions, the legacies, and the legends generated by past and present attempts to understand human making and doing.

The book is organized around four themes. The first, which is the subject of the second chapter, concerns the role which fictional visions — both literary and philosophical — have had in the cultivation of various attitudes toward science and technology. The authors explain that they have chosen the term 'fiction' both because of its connotation of artifactuality and because it has wider application than those narratives whose primary reliance is on a cognitive core. The 'fictions' they explore in this section are those of Bacon, Hobbes, Galileo, Rousseau, Mary Shelley, and Orwell.

A second theme, developed in chapter three, is an analysis of the multiple enlightenments that occurred between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Ormiston and Sassower read the responses to the scientific revolutions of those centuries articulated by Kant, Rousseau, and Hume as simultaneously exhibiting confidence and skepticism, optimism and pessimism. They argue that the works of Marx and Nietzsche should be read as a continuation of these enlightenment themes, since they 'illustrate explicitly the tenuous nature of enlightenment critique and the diversity of techniques by which a critique is applied' (15).

A third theme, the subject of chapter four, is an analysis of the models of authority engendered by the various enlightenments discussed in the previous chapter. Primarily theoretical in their emphasis, 'classical-canonical' models seek to replace chance and subjectivity with objectivity, truth, and attempts to 'mirror' nature. 'Modern-assessment' models of authority are more practically oriented; they attempt to replace objectivity and truth with success, namely fruitfulness and positive benefits. The failure of these

models, according to the authors, is that both presume a foundation for authority, a (capital 'M') Meta-narrative, a way out of the labyrinth of narratives. What the authors offer in their place is a narrative that is anti-foundational and anti-reductionist. It recognizes no particular privilege for any one interpretation or discourse, and it prefers to speak of *displacement* rather than *replacement*. It relies on (small 'm') meta-narratives, that is, on narratives that 'place themselves at the boundaries of existing discourses' (16). In the model advanced by the authors, then, 'there can be no "centers" in which power is concentrated nor figures in which authority resides. There are only techniques — the deployment of narratives for specific purposes that define the context of their use' (110).

The fourth and final theme is taken up in chapter five. Ormiston and Sassower introduce yet another model of authority, the 'contemporary linguistic' model which finds expression in the works of Rorty, Quine, Kuhn, and Feyerabend. 'In spite of its focus on a plurality of narratives and interpretive strategies', the authors claim, 'this view employs the standards of replacement associated with the classical-canonical and modern-assessment views, and finds authority concentrated in certain privileged accounts' (16).

In the remainder of chapter five Ormiston and Sassower sharpen and offer support for their alternative to 'replacement' models of authority. They claim that their model of 'displacement' is self-legitimizing because it utilizes only two *ad hoc* and *post hoc* rules: (1) 'use creates', and (2) 'all learning is re-collection'. By appealing to their first rule they mean to privilege the pragmatic as heuristic, as Wittgenstein and others have done, and to deny foundations and essences. Use-warrants are presented as temporary, transitional, and in need of continual reconstruction. By appealing to their second rule they underscore the 'performative aspect of interpretation' (127). Language becomes, in lieu of a matter of *who* speaks, primarily a matter of presentation, 'the provision of connections in the remaking of possible traditions' (127).

In all this the authors of *Narrative Experiments* exhibit a broad understanding of the texts that have conditioned thinking about science and technology over the past 500 years. It is clear that their greatest sources of inspiration come from contemporary European thought, especially that of Foucault, Lyotard and Derrida.

From Artifact to Habitat is a collection of nine essays whose subject is one or more of the current issues in the philosophy of technology. In his introductory material to this volume, as he did in *Narrative Experiments*, Ormiston eschews outright definitions of science and technology and opts instead for the construction of an interpretive framework by means of which the reader can do for him or her self the work of coming to terms with technology as ubiquitous and mediate, or put another way, as simultaneously artifice, artifact, and habitat.

Carl Mitcham's essay 'Three Ways of Being-With Technology' is a clever and well written taxonomic study of historical approaches to technology. He

characterizes and evaluates what he calls the skepticism of the ancients, the optimism of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, and the 'romantic ambiguity' of much of current thinking on the subject. His essay is illuminated by imaginative readings of works as diverse as those of Sophocles, Wordsworth, Milton, Cicero, and Edmund Burke.

In 'Technological Consciousness and the Modern Understanding of the Good Life', James L. Wiser examines three models of technological consciousness: technology as machine, technology as bureaucracy, and technology as replacement of contemplation, that is, as 'the ultimate means for human self actualization' (17).

In 'Technology and the Denial of Mystery' David Lovekin takes up a theme that has been central in the work of Jacques Ellul. He, like Ellul, laments what he takes to be the fact that human life no longer exhibits any sense of mystery, or that which lies beyond the reach of reason and the methods of technique. Taking his cue from Vico, he calls for a new literature that can give rise to a 'sense of being and purpose, meaning ritual and a sense of place'.

Ormiston's own contribution to this collection, 'Issue and Presentation: Technology and the Creation of Concepts', takes up once again the overarching theme of *Narrative Experiments*. He argues that technology is only comprehensible as 'a relay within a series of relays or an assemblage of concepts that always transforms itself, translating over and over again our concern with the conditions under which we would like to live' (18).

In 'The Autonomy of Technology' Joseph C. Pitt utilizes an extended study of the work of Galileo to support his view that technology is not autonomous, as Ellul and others would have us believe. He goes further to argue that the problem of autonomy is itself a bogus one, a category mistake.

Edmund F. Byrne's essay, 'The Labor-Saving Device: Evidence of Responsibility?', also addresses the alleged autonomy of technology. His assumption is that workers are in fact harmed by technological displacement. He attempts to establish that such harm is not just automatic and unintended, but most often the direct result of actions whose results have been calculated in advance. He proceeds by considering four strong arguments for the thesis that displacement is unintended, and then provides a forceful and cogent counterargument for each.

Frederick L. Bender argues, in 'The Alienation of Common *Praxis*: Sartre's *Critique* and the Weberian Theory of Bureaucracy', that mainstream theories of management and organization have failed to provide an adequate analysis of why bureaucracies are dehumanizing. He suggests that the work of Jean-Paul Sartre provides an analysis of these matters that is both more acute and more cogent.

The final two essays in this collection address current thinking about artificial intelligence (AI). Both essays conclude that advances in AI will depend on more extensive understanding and appropriation of processes that occur in natural evolution.

Philip A. Glotzbach's essay 'Artificial Representationalism: Necessary (?) Constraints on Computer Models of Natural Language Understanding' ar-

gues that AI must abandon representational models for those that are discriminative and relational. At the very least, AI researchers will have to rethink widely held assumptions about intentionality and the internal states of intelligent organisms.

In a similar vein, 'From Artificial to Natural Intelligence: A Philosophical Critique', by Lawrence Davis, draws our attention to several difficulties with traditional logical models of thought and discusses two alternative ways of representing knowledge. The first alternative involves what he calls 'connection networks'. These eschew traditional concerns with representation and concern themselves instead with techniques for encoding experience and for the discovery of new hypotheses. This model thus seeks to come to terms with the dynamic, adjustive quality of human thought in ways that classical logic has been unable to. The second alternative, which he calls 'genetic algorithms', functions by creating populations of individuals that 'represent a solutions to the problem to be solved. Each individual's "fitness" is assessed by evaluating how well it does in the environment of a problem. A new population is created by reproducing members of the old, with the fittest tending to reproduce often and the least fit tending not to reproduce' (205).

Both of these books are exceptionally well done, and both deserve to receive the attention of everyone who takes technology studies seriously.

Larry A. Hickman
Texas A & M University

Allen Pearson
The Teacher:
Theory and Practice in Teacher Education.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1989. Pp. 168.
Cdn$36.00: US $30.00. ISBN 0-415-90088-3.

In the '60s and the '70s, largely due to the efforts of the British philosopher R.S. Peters, analytic philosophy of education flourished. Its practitioners shared a commitment to conceptual analysis as a technique which could be used to improve our understanding of educational issues. In the '80s, the number of people active in the field declined dramatically. In part this was due to disillusionment with analysis; debates about the boundaries of concepts were proving fruitless, and all too often analyses were little more than a dogged spelling out of the obvious. But a few people have clung to the uncritical and narrow conception of philosophy which some early analysts espoused. Pearson i. one of these. His book *The Teacher* may further undermine the limited credibility of analytic philosophy of education.

Ironically enough had Pearson read Peters with care he might have avoided some of the more serious misconceptions evident in this book. The most important of these are his assumptions about conceptual analysis and the relations between analytical enterprise and empirical studies.

In his introduction to *The Philosophy of Education* (Oxford University Press 1973), Peters warns that a conceptual analysis is 'not just a neutral map of possible contours of concepts' (4). He asks rhetorically 'Is it separable from arguable assumptions and deep seated presuppositions?' (4). In his 'General editors note' which prefaces volumes in Routledge & Kegan Paul *International Library of Philosophy of Education* series, Peters comments that because it is an 'applied field' philosophy of education may fall into one of two extremes: 'The work could be practically relevant but philosophically feeble; or it could be philosophically sophisticated but remote from practical problems' (ix). Regrettably Pearson's book possesses neither of the potential strengths identified but both of the weaknesses.

Even the title of the book is misleading. In fact, no conception of 'the teacher' as person is developed. Rather, the teacher enters the discussion as an abstract agent whose job it is to transmit knowledge and employ logical principles to ensure consistency among held beliefs and between those beliefs and teaching intentions. The teacher's role is supposed to be derived from an analysis of teaching — 'a clarification of its essential features, those features that make an activity a teaching activity' (63). Pearson declares that 'When looking for such necessary features or conditions, a philosophical analysis is the approach best suited for achieving the purpose' (63). He tells us that 'empirical truths and contingencies of teaching are not going to provide direction to the discussion' (63).

The confusions which vitiate Pearson's enterprise are evident in these passages. First, he assumes that there is a 'nature' to teaching which he can capture by analysis. Yet no such 'neutral' analysis is possible; it is his preferred concept that is offered, based upon basic assumptions about education. In Pearson's case the conservative bias is starkly evident. He asserts: 'When teaching takes place, students find themselves in situations where someone else is engaging in activities designed to make them learn something. They are expected to submit themselves to the situation ... the teacher's intention sets the framework for their activity ... Their intentions can be quite irrelevant in deciding the nature of their experience in the classroom. The teacher determines the nature of their experience. The decisions a teacher makes about what is to be learned set the situation for the students' (66). Pearson conjoins to this concept of teaching an account of the concept of a practice derived from Alistair MacIntyre's analysis, to obtain his concept of the practice of teaching. He then goes on to treat his results not only as conceptual truths, but also as embodying criteria by which to determine if a given practice or set of practices actually employed in a classroom qualifies as teaching. Thus is theory of teaching 'related' to the practice of it.

In fact Pearson is not even consistent in the way he describes his resolution of the theory-practice 'problem'. For juxtaposed to the purely analytic approach one finds a quite different way of relating theory to practice advocated.

Pearson states that his 'thesis' in the book is 'that the concern for relating theory and practice in education is met when teachers use their knowledge and beliefs to make reasonable, and reasoned decisions about what to do in their classroom' (3). Later he says that his contribution to the theory-practice debate is to show it is a question of 'how the teacher's knowledge is used in daily life and practice' (126). But in deriving his account Pearson does not consider what living teachers do in actual classrooms.

Apparently Pearson has failed to distinguish among three levels of discussion. One can talk of what practising teachers are observed to do and the way they describe the mental processes involved. One can then theorize about that empirical research. This is what Donald Schon does. As he explains in his preface to *The Reflective Practitioner* (New York: Basic Books 1983), he develops an epistemology of practice 'based on a close examination of what some practitioners ... actually do' (viii). Pearson discusses Schon's book at some length but apparently misunderstands its character. At a higher level, one can develop a meta-theory to explain or describe the theories which have been advanced concerning the theory-practice relation. In the case of education, the contributions of O'Connor and Hirst are well-known examples rehearsed yet again by Pearson. But although he discusses issues at all three levels, Pearson fails to recognize the differences among them. This is particularly surprising because he states that the inspiration for the book was his desire to demonstrate the importance of educational theory for the practices of teachers. In chapters two to five, in which he critiques conceptions of the theory-practice relation which he rejects, and in the subsequent two chapters of the book in which he attempts to construct a theoretical justification for his own conception, this failure to acknowledge fundamental distinctions induces a disturbing mental vertigo. The final chapter, on the teacher education which his position 'implies', is a restatement at unnecessary length of the obvious grounds for wanting teachers to possess specialist subject knowledge as well as pedagogical and general knowledge. On the account Pearson offers, it seems that educators and educated are mental mechanisms which require logical programming.

Pearson works with an uncritical and outmoded conception of philosophical analysis; he ignores the numerous empirical studies of teachers' theorizing about their practices (often identified as 'action research'). *The Teacher* will fail to enlighten because its author lacks what he says all teachers must possess — a thorough grasp of the subject about which they propose to inform others.

Catherine Beattie
McMaster University

Igor Primoratz
Justifying Legal Punishment.
Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc. 1989. Pp. x + 196.
US$39.95. ISBN 0-391-03574-6.

This book is the best defense to date of a retributive theory of legal punishment. Its greatest strengths are in the clarification of that position and in the demonstration of the failure of attempts to mediate between retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment. It succeeds in setting aside common misunderstandings of retributivism and in showing that many of the traditional criticisms are misdirected. But it fails morally to justify legal punishment on retributive grounds alone.

In the Introduction, after a conventional definition of legal punishment, Primoratz sets out the utilitarian and retributivist views. Retributivism in its most complete form, the form he defends, is said to contain the following five 'tenets':

(1) The moral *right* to punish is based solely on the offense committed.

(2) The moral *duty* to punish is also grounded exclusively on the offense committed.

(3) Punishment ought to be *proportionate* to the offense (the lex talionis).

(4) Punishment is the *'annulment'* of the offense.

(5) Punishment is a *right* of the offender (12).

'Offense' is to be understood 'only [as] a violation of a *morally legitimate* criminal law' (13).

The second and third chapters present the utilitarian theory of punishment and criticisms of that theory. To the punishment of the innocent argument in its usual form, Primoratz adds what he calls the 'argument of the self-sacrifice of the innocent'. This is that the innocent who is punished in the interest of overall good ought, if he is himself a utilitarian, 'collaborate assiduously in his own condemnation and punishment by "confessing" to the false charge and perhaps by pretending to be repentant as well. From the utilitarian standpoint, any insistence on his innocence and any attempt to change the outcome of the trial would be morally impermissible. The only morally right thing for him to do under the circumstances is to sacrifice himself for the common good' (44).

In the fourth and fifth chapters, Primoratz presents the retributive view and defends it against critics. Hegel is the paradigmatic retributivist, for Primoratz, and the fourth chapter is devoted entirely to presenting Hegel's theory. We are left to learn, in Primoratz's answers to criticisms of retributivism, how much of that theory Primoratz accepts or rejects. The rejections seem to be marginal ones. For example, he does not accept the theory of the general will upon which Hegel founds the supposed right of the criminal to

be punished. Instead he offers a Rawlsian argument to the effect that, were we designing institutions in the 'original position', behind a 'veil of ignorance', we would not likely design one in which we could be punished for any other reason than that we deserved it. This argument turns out to be central to Primoratz's project, and needs expansion so as to show that original-position reflection does not simply beg the question at issue between retributivists and utilitarians. Does not the design of the original position render utilitarian considerations irrelevant?

The sixth chapter considers attempts to find a middle way between retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment. Primoratz argues (most persuasively in his discussion of rule utilitarianism, 118-28) that, since the theories are fundamentally inconsistent, no such attempt succeeds. Perhaps the most interesting of these critical appraisals of attempts at a middle way is Primoratz's discussion of H.L.A. Hart. Unlike other middle-wayers, Hart does not try to set off distinct spheres in which either utilitarian or retributive considerations are exclusively appropriate. Rather, he argues that the principles that punishment should bear reasonable proportion to desert and that it should serve some defensible forward-looking purpose are independent and can and do conflict. Justice constrains utility, but only negatively. That is, it curbs the excessive punishment that utility might otherwise justify. Primoratz objects that to take justice seriously is to demand not only that excessive punishment be constrained but also that punishment should be commensurable with desert, even when no utilitarian purpose is served. Once Hart grants independent weight to the principle that offenders should be punished according to desert, it seems arbitrary to interpret the principle only negatively, as a rein on utility.

At this point, Primoratz contends, in Chapter 7, that '...the Rawlsian choice between alternative societal responses to crime, discussed in connection with the retributivist thesis that punishment is a right of the offender, rules out the therapeutic response and utilitarian punishment (and, by implication, all views which collapse back into utilitarianism), but seems to be undecided between pure retributivism and Hart's theory' (145). The decision must be made, more exactly, between Hart's theory revised to acknowledge the weight of considerations of justice not only as a limit on utility, but also positively. 'It is unjust to "punish" the innocent, or to punish the guilty by disproportionately harsh punishments; but justice is also not being done when the guilty go unpunished, or when they are punished in a disproportionately lenient way' (148).

While Primoratz sketches a denunciatory version of retributivism, his more central view is simply that justice demands that the guilty be punished in accordance with their desert. But a full defense of retributivism requires an account of desert and of why criminals deserve to be *punished*, as opposed to deserving whatever unhappiness they may suffers as a 'result' of their crime. It is not enough to show that the criminal can have no morally legitimate complaint about his being made to suffer proportionately to the seriousness of his crime (75-9). The retributivist must also show that we, who

would inflict the suffering, have the moral standing to do so. Desert alone does not authorize us to beat backs or clang iron doors. Or does it? May we anoint ourselves the instruments of cosmic justice? An answer to that question is what seems necessary if we are to agree that the sole purpose of legal punishment should be retribution. Primoratz fails to provide it.

In the final chapter, Primoratz speculates on the possibility that a retributivist might consistently reject capital punishment. Here he finds that he must reach beyond the appeal to justice. 'I do think that punishments ought not to be *cruel*. They ought not to be cruel in the relative sense, by being considerably more severe than what is proportionate to the offense committed, what is deserved and just; but they also ought not to be cruel in an absolute sense — that is, severe beyond a certain threshold' (168). But if non-cruelty is to be allowed here as a principle independent of justice, it is hard to see why it should not limit the demands of justice elsewhere as well, thus opening the possibility of a more humane non-utilitarian theory than unqualified retributivism.

Edmund L. Pincoffs
University of Texas at Austin

David H. Sanford
If P, Then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1990. Pp. ix + 265.
Cdn$42.00: US$35.00. ISBN 0-415-03012-9.

Sanford's book is a recent entry in the Routledge series, The Problems of Philosophy: Their Past and Present. Each book is to address a significant problem in a manner accessible to undergraduates. Each book consists of two parts: an introduction to the problem with which the book is concerned and a history of it, followed by the author's preferred way with it.

Sanford's book is a model for the goals of the series. First, it deals with the nature of conditionals, an issue which permeates nearly every philosophical inquiry. It has provoked as much recent controversy as any other. Second, Sanford has his audience in mind. The book has a clean, spare style. The chapters are succinct, averaging fifteen pages. The sentences are simple and direct with little jargon. Technical terms are defined in everyday terms. No formalism appears; no numbered lines of symbolism.

Accommodating the constraints of Routledge's series, Sanford has nonetheless produced an often provocative, sometimes original, philosophical discussion of sustained interest. Sanford's goal is to capture the sense of

dependence so typically carried by indicative and subjunctive conditionals. Accessible to undergraduates, this book will interest advanced students and teachers as well. It can be used with, or antecedent to, a standard first graduate course in logic. It contains materials sufficient to engage, to exercise, sometimes outrage philosophical logicians who have prior commitments concerning conditionals.

The first half of the book, Part I, is a selected, but schematic and cursory, history of conditionals. The initial chapters deal with ancient and medieval formulations of a material conditional (close to the truth-functional conditional of beginning logic texts today) and a strengthened conditional (which anticipates today's systems of strict implication). This survey closes with chapters lapping at the edges of contemporary discussions. There is mention of covering laws; of Goodman and Chisholm on subjunctive conditionals; of Stalnaker, and David Lewis, and possible worlds; of belief and probability. Earlier on, there is even mention of Gricean conversational implicatures, invoked to explain discrepancies between ordinary indicative conditionals and the material conditional.

'Part II: A New Treatment of Conditionals', is that, a discussion, not a theory (formal or informal) of indicative and subjunctive (but not imperative or interrogative) conditionals as (often) expressing certain dependencies. Material and strict conditionals fail to capture these dependencies. Sanford offers invalid commonsense examples of classically valid material or strict conditional inference forms, and valid instances of classically invalid forms. (He notes 'The Paradoxes of Material Implication' but also other classical theorems flout the sense of dependence carried by natural language conditionals: Contraposition; Hypothetical Syllogism; 'Q if P, if both P and Q'; 'Q if P, only if Q if both P and R'; and more.)

The bulk of Part II is negative. Sanford criticizes contemporary attempts to shore up, or replace, classical theories of the conditional. Reviewing entailment theories, Relevance Logics for instance are pretty summarily dismissed. (After two pages of characterization, Sanford writes, 'Relevance logic rejects more traditionally valid forms than most of us meant to ... Relevance logic rejects too much. We should turn to alternative[s] ...' [132].)

Possible-world theories of conditionality get more attention. An interesting chapter covers 'the Ramsey test', (generalized by Stalnaker [88] as 'First, add the antecedent [hypothetically] to your stock of beliefs; second, make whatever adjustments are required to maintain consistency ...; finally, consider whether or not the consequent is then true'). Sanford concludes (154) 'Conditionals with antecedents of zero probability, [ones] with antecedents difficult to [add to one's] beliefs by revision, [ones] so different from the actual world that judgments of comparative similarity are difficult, all come in degrees of acceptability, unacceptability, and undecideability. We draw more distinctions between conditionals than most theories can explain'.

Sanford next devises a clever alternative (which he sketches in terms of limited, causally connected, spatio-temporal regions) to David Lewis' modal (possible world) realism. Sanford exploits it to support his intuitions that

there is really only one possible world ... and (170) that 'the relevant facts ... do not depend upon the circumstances being duplicated [in another 'possible world'] ... Facts about this world ground both the conditional and possible-world treatment of the conditional. The possible-world treatment ... requires references to facts about this world which ... make reference to possible worlds unnecessary.'

Sanford's positive account largely comes in successive chapters, 'Patterns of Dependence' and 'Objective Dependence'. Conditionals primarily express dependencies between circumstances and states of affairs dependent upon them which are expressed in their main clauses. Since dependence is an asymmetrical relation, conditionals express a certain direction of dependence (not always causal, not always temporal, and not always running from antecedent to consequent. There remain 'backtrackers' [183-91] to account for).

Sanford holds subjunctive and indicative forms of conditionality do not express conditionals with different meanings. They may, in different circumstances, express different types of dependency, but they express alike a single logical notion of conditionality. A theory of that logic, with a companion semantics, is not developed in this book. Developing one is not a trivial matter. It requires solving two substantial problems. There is the important task of capturing formally, and characterizing semantically, the relation of dependence. And there is the important task of capturing the contextual, circumstantial aspect of conditionals which Sanford also stresses. Ordinary occurrences of conditionals are often defeasible. They carry, often, tacitly or explicitly, *ceteris paribus* riders. The logic of these is not at all well understood (think of the 'frame problem' in studies in Artificial Intelligence).

Since Sanford eschews a semantic characterization of conditionals in terms of their truth-conditions, favoring instead 'assertibility' or 'acceptability' conditions, it is by no means clear how an adequate logic capturing the dependence and defeasibility of ordinary conditionals is literally to be semantically justified. Sanford, I think, would agree. He concludes his essay, writing, 'I hope that some genuine logician, persuaded that my approach to conditionals is worth formalizing, takes [the next step] before me' (239).

Romane Clark
Indiana University

Bruce G. Shapiro
Divine Madness and the Absurd Paradox: Ibsen's Peer Gynt and the Philosophy of Kierkegaard.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1990. Pp. xix + 245. US$39.95. ISBN 0-313-27290-5.

In literary circles as divergent as the recently-deceased Walker Percy to that of Henrik Ibsen, Kierkegaard's influence has been profound. In *Divine Madness and the Absurd Paradox*, Bruce Shapiro further documents this legacy; he provides a detailed commentary on each of the scenes from *Peer Gynt* by drawing upon Kierkegaard's powerful analyses of the development of human character. Certainly Shapiro succeeds in interweaving Kierkegaard and Ibsen with sufficient mastery. Yet ultimately one might question the broader philosophical relevance of such a study.

Shapiro advances the thesis that the evolution of Peer Gynt's character reflects the moments of the esthetic, ethical and religious which Kierkegaard outlines in *Stages on Life's Way*. 'It has been my contention that the drama of *Peer Gynt* is about its title character's experience of the three existential spheres: the esthetic, the ethical and the religious' (209). Yet, there is a subsidiary claim operative in Shapiro's commentary which merits attention; specifically, Ibsen, who was well versed in Kierkegaard's writings, consciously constructed his drama around the motifs of spiritual development which the latter so eloquently describes (8). This contention needs to be further explored because 1) it perhaps too closely identifies Kierkegaard with the pseudonymous authorship of his works and 2) it implies an 'objectivist' stance of Ibsen toward his own writings in a way which denies what, according to the hermeneutic tradition, is the integrity of the text over against the 'author's' intentions.

The commentary that Shapiro offers is one which provides a topography of human development as epitomized in Peer Gynt's struggle beyond the romantic fixation of the esthetic stage. Appropriately, Shapiro appeals to Kierkegaard's description of 'despair' from *The Sickness unto Death* in order to describe Peer Gynt's condition, which at the same time is somewhat symbolic of the atrophy of modern humanity's spiritual life. Despair seen both as an unconscious or conscious lack of selfhood entails a denial of 'spirit' and hence a flight to the finite to the exclusion of the infinite. As such, the vertigo and confusion associated with this spiritual malady takes the existential form of circumventing all choice, as opposed to initiating the act of choosing. 'In the first instance, the esthetic, there is really no choice occurring. The first real choice is to choose choice, to choose the ethical' (95). It is the deliberateness of such choosing which constitutes the backbone of the ethical stage and marks the transition to the religious stage of acknowledging the infinite. The cultivation of the infinite, however, can alone elevate the self beyond the fragmentation of its involvement in conflicting desires and point to a deeper source of integration, i.e., through the intervention of the

eternal. Though his employment of Kierkegaard's analyses is predictable, Shapiro does succeed in showing their relevance for evoking the subtleties in the portrayal of Peer Gynt's maturation.

As suggested in the title of his book, Shapiro describes the crescendo of Peer Gynt's spiritual fate as a twofold encounter with paradox and madness (184, 192). Taking a cue from Kierkegaard, the paradox stems from the dual destiny of the self in *seeking* a redemption which is not at its disposal to achieve (despair as a '*willing* to be oneself'), only to relinquish a fixated concern about its nature for an expansive unfolding of its eternal origin. The madness lies in the self's abandonment to its finitude, making it a prisoner of its own petty desires while reserving the option for inverting the traditional way of distinguishing the sane and the insane. Shapiro thereby has in view a 'divine madness' that breaks the bounds of the conventional wisdom of what constitutes the 'good' for the self. While this perspective is compelling, there remains some doubt as to why *Peer Gynt* provides the backdrop for a creative appropriation of Kierkegaard's thought, or conversely, how the philosophical and literary horizons intersect. To be sure, a concern for the hermeneutic implicit in Shapiro's commentary may lie beyond the scope of his detailed analysis; yet its ultimate importance can hardly be denied.

The most glaring instance of this omission comes in the way that Shapiro addresses the phenomenon of anxiety without adequately distinguishing it from despair. 'Anxiety and despair are closely related — the difference being only that anxiety is the internal experience of despair' (128). Strictly speaking, anxiety constitutes an awakening to spirit and to possibility (rather than the outgrowth of spiritlessness), and is the existential condition for the transcendence which rescues the self from despair. Thus, the claim of the infinite becomes expressed in anxiety, in contrast to the mere despondency of being bound to the finite. While this criticism appears minor, it really calls into question the juncture for presenting Kierkegaard's thinking in a literary guise. Ultimately, Shapiro points to the exchange between the eternal and the temporal (from the *Philosophical Fragments*) in order to elucidate Peer Gynt's impending spiritual transformation at the close of the drama (201). Kierkegaard clearly has in view more than the psychology of religious conversion in offering an alternative to the Platonic vision of truth. Yet it seems as if in his rendering of *Peer Gynt* Shapiro aims to explore a specific agenda of human hope, as if to provide a manual of personal growth. As such he transgresses a boundary which Kierkegaard meticulously observes. Despite the strength of his analysis, Shapiro assumes a commitment to a spiritual outlook which diverges from the goal of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship in leaving the 'verdict' of faith open to the reader him/herself.

Shapiro may very well succeed in providing us with a thoughtful experiment of literary exegesis. But he may not extend our understanding of Kierkegaard's writings as fully as possible.

Frank Schalow
Loyola University, New Orleans

C.T. Sistare
Responsibility and Criminal Liability.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
1989. Pp. 173. US $67.00. ISBN 0-7923-0396-2.

We believe that our criminal justice system would not be defensible if it did not ensure that most of those who were convicted and penalised were responsible for their offences. But what do we mean by 'responsible' here? In this book C.T. Sistare proposes a certain conception of responsibility, which she calls 'the capacities model', as the best one to use for purposes of criminal liability determination. The capacities model sees personal responsibility for some conduct or outcome as residing in the person's ability to control or regulate the occurrence of that conduct or outcome. People are responsible, on this model, for what they are able to control as agents. Whether an instance of conduct is within the agent's control depends not only on the capacities and competencies of the agent at the time but also on what opportunities the agent has to exercise those abilities. The capacities model says that we are responsible for those things whose occurrence was within our control, and what we can control is a matter of our powers and our opportunities.

Most jurisprudents, however, seem enamoured of the cognitive model of responsibility, which requires that the agent act with some conscious mental state such as knowledge or intention in order to be responsible for what she does. Aware mental states are important because they indicate what choices an agent is considering, and it is for one's choices that one is most undeniably responsible. Supporters of the cognitive model reject liability for unintentional omissions and for inadvertently negligent conduct, and insist on intentions or recklessness as the only legitimate forms of *mens rea* in the criminal law.

Against this jurisprudential trend, Sistare argues persuasively that a more satisfactory way of respecting individual responsibility in our criminal law is to make criminal liability conditional on the exercise of our abilities to author and regulate actions and events, rather than to restrict liability to chosen behaviour. Choosing is only one prominent way in which we exercise our abilities to author and regulate actions and events — it does not exhaust those abilities, or the range of behaviour for which we can be personally responsible through the exercise of those abilities.

Even amongst jurisprudents who recognise that liability requires responsibility, there is often some confusing of responsibility with culpability or censurability. So Sistare distances her account from theories like Jerome Hall's which insist on moral culpability as the main ground of liability. She sees that these theories tend either to conflate responsibility with culpability, or else to ignore responsibility when it is actually the prior and more fundamental ground of liability. Her own account of being responsible is careful to distinguish that condition from being culpable, being censurable and being liable.

The body of her book is given to demonstrating how her conception of responsibility is implicit in, and throws light on, the traditional elements required for criminal liability — voluntariness, *mens rea* conditions such as intentionality and recklessness, negligence, the notion of prior fault, the role of excusing defences and mitigating conditions. Sometimes we are invited to reconceptualise certain elements, as when Sistare argues that voluntariness should be regarded as a dimension of basic control over conduct rather than as an exercise of some mysterious faculty of will or as a feature of actions which express a free conscious choice amongst alternatives. Sometimes, responsibility gives us a useful perspective from which to appreciate the normative role that is played by certain legal requirements, such as intentionality and foresight, in ensuring direct and close forms of personal responsibility as conditions of guilt. At other points, this conception of responsibility enables us to explain and justify the imposition of omission and negligence responsibility, even if we wish further to argue that such liability should be limited in its scope in the interests of maximizing individual freedom and ability to predict the bite of the criminal law. Sistare also shows how we can wield responsibility as a potent tool of reform; for instance, it can help us to see how defences like duress and necessity could be reshaped so as to make them more sensitive to concerns about individual responsibility than they now are.

There is no doubt that Sistare appreciates that the capacities model of responsibility is a valuable resource for understanding and reforming the law. But alas, readers may find that uncovering this resource from her text is often too much like hunting for buried treasure. Because the style of presentation is extremely compressed, and there are almost never sufficient (unambiguous) cues in the text to enable us to know what the intent or force of a discussion is supposed to be, we are obliged to undertake a great deal of speculation and translation in order to come up with preferred readings of her principal discussions. This is genuinely unfortunate. It may preclude the ideas in this book from reaching those jurisprudents whose thinking would benefit from them. This book contains important positions that deserve to be assessed on their merits, and it should have received firmer editorial direction before publication, in order to ensure that its major proposals were more clearly explained and more successfully communicated to its intended audience. In its present form, the book is frequently frustrating to read, but does repay patience with interesting and valuable ideas to explore.

Brenda M. Baker
University of Calgary

Stephen Toulmin
Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity.
New York: Free Press 1990. Pp xii + 228.
US$22.95. ISBN 0-02-932631-1.

Toulmin's book is a lovely piece of history for philosophers: short on tedious detail and long on the long view. It looks at the idea of modernity since the seventeenth century, and teaches that Modernism is not one but two traditions. One stems from the skeptical tolerance of Humanism, represented by Montaigne, Rabelais, Bacon, Shakespeare; the other from the dogmatic, somewhat constricted rationalism represented by Descartes and some of the figures standardly associated with the 'scientific revolution'. This duality lives on into our own age's 'Two Cultures' of humanism and science. Renaissance Humanism was characterized by its skeptical tolerance and its conception of knowledge as contextual. The 'Cosmopolis' of seventeenth-century rationalists 'took pride in decontextualizing' rationality (21; 30). But that tradition itself, once recontextualized, can be seen as 'a timely response to a specific historical challenge — the political, social, and theological chaos embodied in the Thirty Years War' (70).

Toulmin draws intriguing parallels between the need for certainty in the chaotic and anxious 17th century and the need for certainty in the chaotic and anxious mid-twentieth century. He compares Cromwell to the Ayatollah, and instructively interleaves the texts of Donne's *Anatomy of the World* and Yeats's *Second Coming* (66). His claims, however, tend to overshoot his evidence. Neither Donne's nor Yeats's text bears out the thesis that what was wrong with their respective ages, 'the very axle of the Modern World View ... [was] the separation of reason from emotion' (151). Nor, for that matter, do they bear out the (surely not *equivalent*) claim that the basis of the Cartesian form of modernity is the 'opposition between the (supposed) "mechanical causality" of natural phenomena and the (supposed) "logical rationality" of human action' (163).

Toulmin sees, in the late twentieth-century intellectual climate, a return to Humanist preoccupations squelched by the hyperrationalist tradition: to the oral (with the influence of Vygotsky and Wittgenstein); to the particular (with 'case ethics' reviving something like the tradition of casuistry brought into disrepute by Pascal); to the local (with the current emphasis on anthropological authenticity and the equal legitimacy of different forms of life); and to the 'timely' (especially in medicine). We have now 'come full circle'. The mid twentieth century (typified by the scientism of the Vienna Circle and the architecture of Mies van der Rohe), saw a recrudescence of rationalism; now, thanks to the new Renaissance of the 1960s, what was once '*stable and predictable*' now looks '*stereotyped and unadaptable*' (184), and the 'demolition' of the rationalist 'Cosmopolis' is now almost complete (167).

The future lies, then, in the transcending of narrow concepts of rationality. Yet there is no 'clean slate': no question of doing away with science and rationality. But the models to adopt are biological and ecological, with their

inherent sensitivity to context, in preference to the model of physics, which aspires to absolute universality.

In the political realm, the spirit advocated by Toulmin is on the side of what he calls 'Lilliputian' or non-governmental institutions. These transnational or subnational institutions (193) make up in prestige what they lack in military power. Like their analogues in the intellectual sphere, they stress reason in the sense of *reasonableness*, rather than reason in the sense of *formal rationality*.

This is a plausible idea. Surely, by now, we know that no argument ever compels us to believe its conclusion: we always have the option of questioning its validity or rejecting some premise. I too would rather be reasonable than narrowly 'rational.' Yet I am suspicious of this idea that salvation may come from rejecting the quest for universal understanding. Understanding seems to me, almost by definition, to aspire to universality. It will always be a legitimate intellectual aspiration to ask: How does this local understanding relate to universal truths? Or, more modestly, how does this local truth relate to other local truths? The rejection of *stupid* 'rationality' remains an ideal of rationality itself.

I have also another, more vaguely methodological worry. What, after all, does it mean to define an age, or period, as modern, or postmodern, or anything else? My resolutely retrograde *modern* mind cannot suppress this iconoclastic thought: The effort to define the essence of a *person* is just doomed to be an exercise in self-deception; a fortiori, the attempt to define an age, to say what it is and when it began, is an exercise in fantasy. Out of the multiplicity of genuine properties I might pick out about myself the small number I come up with have no claim to objective salience beyond the very fact that I have picked it. At least that, in speaking about myself, is better than nothing. But in attempting to define an age we are much worse off: for an age's self-definition is never more than the self-advertisement of some of its thinkers. Surely there will always be individuals, and maybe groups, who care about rationality, and others who are obnubilated by religion, not excluding the 'religion of reason'. There will always be individuals and groups that will want to impose their implausible ideas on others, perhaps because of the very fear they have of seeing the childishness of their superstition exposed. But will there not always be others who face all that fanaticism with as much tranquil and skeptical tolerance as their means and social position allow? By characterizing an age as if it were one, or belonged to just one of those groups, the grand historian in the style of Toulmin commits the very sin he deplores. He simply identifies a certain view held by a particularly influential subgroup of those in power, and sticks on it the label of an Age. But perhaps, though we can still look for Truth, it is futile to look for the essence of an Age.

Ronald de Sousa
University of Toronto

Richard L. Velkley
Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of Kant's Critical Philosophy.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
1989. Pp. xxi + 222.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-226-85260-1.

In this scholarly study, Velkley argues that Kant's notion of the highest good (*summum bonum*) as the (final) end of reason is central not just to Kant's ethics but to his whole critical philosophy. This thesis is not new. The thesis is defended, for example, in Lucien Goldmann's admirable but still neglected *Immanuel Kant* (1971), Yirmiahu Yovel's *Kant and the Philosophy of History* (1980), and my own *Kantian Ethics and Socialism* (1988). What sets Velkley's study apart from these works, however, is that he examines how the notion of the highest good as the ultimate aim and directive force of the critical enterprise evolved in Kant's precritical writings in response to Rousseau and the 'crisis' of instrumental reason (cf. 171-2n.13).

Velkley maintains (6) that the most important record of Kant's 'dialogue' with Rousseau is *Remarks to the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*. The book-length *Remarks* consists of numerous notes written during 1764-65. Although these notes might have been intended by Kant as preparatory notes for a new edition of the *Observations*, Velkley holds that they are 'better regarded as notes to Rousseau's writings' (50). On the basis of a detailed discussion of the *Remarks*, Velkley shows that Rousseau's impact on Kant goes beyond the often noted idea that the categorical imperative is a moral and 'internal' version of the general will. Notably, what Kant learned from Rousseau is that the emancipation project of the modern age (the Enlightenment) was doomed to fail because it was based on a view of reason as an instrument for the satisfaction of the passions. Instrumental reason had set human beings free from the restrictions of the old religious order with its dogmatic teleology but also had contributed to a new human enslavement to egoistic insatiable passions, precluding the realization of a society of civic virtue. Arguing that the passions are mediated by reason and thus culturally influenced, Rousseau showed Kant a way out of this 'crisis' of instrumental reason: Kant developed the idea of reason as legislator of its own moral ends, and held that this form of reason can regulate and modify the passions so that the pursuit of happiness will no longer give rise to social conflict and can be reconciled with the pursuit of virtue.

On Velkley's account, then, it was Rousseau who led Kant to construct a new kind of moral idealism in which reason projects the highest good as a harmony of autonomous beings 'with an appropriate satisfaction of natural desires' (14). The *Remarks*, however, only intimates the ideal of the highest good, and Velkley next discusses how Kant further developed this ideal between 1765 and 1780 in response to both Rousseau and the ancient Cynical, Epicurean, and Stoical accounts of the *summum bonum*. Velkley deals in most detail with the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Explained by the Dreams*

of Metaphysics (1766), giving less attention to the *Lectures on Ethics* (1775-80). He further shows that during this period Kant also was concerned with developing a metaphysics in accordance with the highest good. Interestingly enough, as early as in the *Remarks* and the *Dreams*, Kant defined metaphysics as 'the science of the limits of human reason' (113). The *Dreams* strikingly anticipates the three *Critiques* in some other regards: it views the limits of reason as beneficial in that Kant held (as Velkley puts it) that 'insight into highest realities is not necessary, and is even distracting, to a firm grasp of the ultimate end of human life' (112). Also, the *Dreams* introduces the 'morality of postulations' in that the belief in immortality is seen as grounded in the infinite task set by ethical demands (110).

In the final chapter, Velkley turns to Kant's critical period and examines more commonly explored areas: the highest good as 'the ultimate end of theoretical inquiry' (136ff.), and the highest good as the resolution of 'culture's contradictions' (152ff.). What is puzzling (although this has its own merits) is that Velkley limits his discussion of the highest good as cultural ideal primarily to Kant's view in the *Reflexionen* (cf. 214n.75).

Velkley formulates in his Preface and Introduction three major aims of his study. He successfully realizes his first aim of demonstrating that the impact of Rousseau on Kant is much more extensive than is commonly thought. One would wish, though, that Velkley had made his discussion more accessible so that it would not presuppose a thorough familiarity with both Kant and Rousseau.

Velkley less successfully realizes his second aim of showing that his analysis of Kant's precritical works clarifies various aspects of the critical writings, in particular, the doctrine of the highest good. To be sure, Velkley's analysis has the merit of underlining that the highest good in the critical corpus is to be seen primarily as a cultural or social ideal because Kant began to develop this ideal in response to the 'crisis' of instrumental reason (cf. 153). However, Velkley notes but does not really analyze such problems as that the Kant of the critical period offered conflicting conceptions of the highest good and that the highest good as a social ideal does not seem to warrant the postulate of a future life. For a discussion of these problems, one must turn, for example, to Lewis White Beck, Yovel, and Thomas Auxter, to whose writings on the highest good Velkley pays surprisingly little or no attention.

Velkley's final objective is to show that Kant's 'dialogue' with Rousseau is important to our contemporary understanding of human emancipation and reason. Although this project seems tenable and worthwhile, I find Velkley's own execution of it in his Epilogue too brief and suggestive to be very helpful. Velkley's interesting historical study should have ended with an equally interesting detailed contemporary conclusion.

Harry van der Linden
Butler University

Mary Ellen Waithe, ed.
A History of Women Philosophers, Volume II: Medieval, Renaissance and Enlightenment Women Philosophers / A.D. 500-1600.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989. Pp. xxxviii + 349.
US$89.00. ISBN 90-247-3571-8.

Mary Ellen Waithe has put together her second volume in a collection of essays on women philosophers. This particular volume contains studies of seventeen women who wrote philosophical texts in the medieval and Renaissance periods. In addition to serving as the general editor of the text, Waithe authors lengthy chapters on Murasaki Shikibu (970-1031), a Japanese literary writer; on Heloise (1100-?), a French writer on love and friendship; on Oliva Sabuco de Nantes Barrera (1562-?), a Spanish writer in natural philosophy; and a short summary chapter on Roswitha of Gandersheim (c. 935-1001), Christine Pisan (1365-?), Margaret More Roper (c. 1506-1544), and Teresa of Avila (1515-1582).

Joan Gibson, co-author of the introduction to the text with Waithe, raises some methodological issues of writing about women philosophers who lived during the years 500 to 1600. More specifically, she seeks to determine which women could accurately be described as philosophers, since nearly all women were cut off from access to institutional higher education from the beginning of the universities in the 13th century to the 17th century. Therefore, they did not have the opportunity to receive formal training in academic philosophy. Giving a very loose criterion of inclusion, she concludes: 'These women are not women on the fringes of philosophy, but philosophers on the fringes of history' (xxxviii).

The chapters on the encyclopedia of Herrad of Hohenbourg (fl. 1176) and on the mystical texts of Mechtild of Magdeburg (1207-c. 1282) are written by Joan Gibson. The German author Elisabeth Gossmann writes on the mystical thought and natural philosophy of Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179). Cornelia Wolfskeel examines the religious treatises of Beatrice of Nazareth (122-168), Hadewych of Antwerp (fl. 1260), Brigitta of Sweden (1302-1373), and Catherine of Siena (c.1347-1380). Elizabeth N. Evasdaughter contributes a chapter on the English anchoress Julian of Norwich (1342-?); and Beatrice Zedler writes about Marie le Jars de Gournay (1565-1645).

Each chapter in the text is self-contained, so there is no interactive writing among the contributors. Consequently, the book reads more like an anthology than a cohesive study of an historical period. However, occasionally the contributors refer to an influence that one writer may have had on another writer considered in the text. All chapters give biographical introduction to the woman being considered, use original source material written by the authors, and give a solid general description of the central philosophical themes found in their works. For this reason alone the text can serve as

a good introduction to the thought of these authors, particularly because several of their works are not yet available in English.

In addition, most chapters take a particular philosophical area of study to consider in relation to the author. For example, Murasaki is studied from the perspective of the existential import of her theories, and Hildegard as a philosopher of religion. Heloise's philosophy of love and moral responsibility, Herrad's philosophy of nature, Beatrice's and Mechtild's epistemology of religious experience, and Hadewych's and Brigitta's concepts of God and human nature are all emphasized.

An effort is made by some contributors to compare the woman philosopher's theory with those of better known men philosophers. For example, there is a discussion of Julian of Norwich's epistemology in comparison with Duns Scotus and William of Occam, of Catherine of Siena's theory of the freedom of the human will with that of St. Augustine, and of Oliva Sabuco's scepticism with Descartes' methodical doubt.

One evident criticism from anyone familiar with the women writers of the period 500-1600 is that there is a strange selection of authors which leaves some extremely significant women philosophers out of the text while other less significant ones are included. Christine de Pisan, who engaged in systematic philosophical argumentation about many issues, and St. Teresa of Avila, whose writings are the most sophisticated of any woman reflecting on the epistemology of religious experience, have significant material that could be discussed in a full chapter rather than a cursory mention at the end of the text. In addition, Lucrezia Marinelli (1571-1653), whose systematic arguments against the Aristotelian view of woman place her high in the ranks of the male philosophers of her time, also merits a chapter. Tullia of Aragon (1506-1565) and Isabella Sforza Rossi (1471-1524) and Isotta Nogarola (1418-1466) also bear mention along with the impact of the Italian Renaissance on women philosophical writers.

A History of Women Philosophers: Volume II constitutes an initial way to organize source material that is not readily available to the English-speaking public. Therefore, it would be extremely useful as a text in complement with traditional sources in medieval and Renaissance philosophy or the philosophy of religion. It contains many passages in which women seek to describe in their own words their experience of the self and of God. Its main value is descriptive rather than evaluative, and it has a good bibliography and index for philosophers of religion.

At the same time, there is a lack of consistent rigor of argument by the various contributors of the different chapters. There is also no conclusion to the book, which might have been used to integrate the various themes developed in relation to such varied historical philosophers as analyzed by so many different contemporary writers. It is to be hoped that in the third volume of this series, there would be greater attention paid to these methodological considerations. For it is not enough to identify and make available the significant writings of women philosophers. There is also an equally important contemporary demand for intensive philosophical scrutiny of these writers' thoughts.

To summarize then, even with the methodological limitations just mentioned, the second volume of *A History of Women Philosophers* is a significant text for the beginning of this new field of research. It will serve as an important resource for libraries, scholars, and students in the areas mentioned above. In addition, it will call for further rigorous study by those who discover in it new authors worthy of consideration.

Sr. Prudence Allen, RSM
Concordia University

Richard A. Watson and
James E. Force, eds.
The Sceptical Mode in Modern Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Richard H. Popkin.
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
1988. Pp. xiv + 164.
US$65.00. ISBN 90-247-3584-X.

This is in some ways an unusual *Festschrift*. For one thing, the editors in their Acknowledgements thank nine authors whose papers they did not use. Delays in publication were partly to blame for this; yet one wonders what their principle of selection was. I would have welcomed contributions from several of the authors on the list. Perhaps the principle of selection was to use contributions that all in one way or another deal with scepticism. In fact, the volume does have this general theme.

Another unusual feature of the volume is that by far the longest contribution in it is an 'Intellectual autobiography: warts and all' by Popkin himself. It is not common for a scholar to contribute to his own *Festschrift*, but I found this the most interesting thing in the book. Popkin does not spare us the details of some of his personal health problems, but the main theme of his autobiographical essay is an account of his sceptical challenging of received views that readers and scholars have come to take for granted. This and a desire to fill in the details of the historical context of philosophical theories have led him to some unusual researches and to the positing of claims that have been controversial, although many of Popkin's interpretations have eventually won the day and historians of philosophy ignore his work to their obvious peril. The sceptical challenge has also led him to entering public debate on matters that are not philosophical, as we see in his contributions to the controversy surrounding the Kennedy assassination. Sometimes philosophers of an analytical bent have questioned whether his more strictly academic work ought to be properly called philosophy. Popkin says that he doesn't really care, but he has throughout his professional life refused to

abandon philosophy departments to those who take too narrow a view of the nature of philosophy. One regret that I feel about this volume is the fact that there are no contributions to Jewish intellectual history, a subject to which Popkin has devoted much of his energy in recent years. But I now turn to the papers in the book.

Richard A. Watson in 'Foreword: Richard H. Popkin, scepticism and history' gives us a very good guide to the motivation and method behind all of Popkin's work, showing how his sceptical temperament and sceptical examination of received hypotheses of historians of philosophy have time and again challenged views complacently held, to the great enrichment of our knowledge of the history of philosophy.

In ' "No long time of expectation": Hume's religious scepticism and the apocalypse' James E. Force shows that in spite of Hume's religious scepticism, which attempts to destroy the view that anyone can know for certain that God has been providentially involved in human and natural history in the past or will be in the future, there is an important basic affinity of outlook between Hume and the millenialist. Both combine a this-worldly practicality and planning with theoretical views about the future that might seem not to warrant this practicality in their daily affairs.

Yuen-Ting Lai in 'Religious scepticism and China' shows how European understanding of Chinese thought, especially of Confucianism, constitutes part of the story of Europe's circumvention of religious scepticism. It is an interesting account of a subject too little known, although the author sometimes produces dubious oversimplifications like the claim (admittedly ascribed to Randall) that in medieval Christendom laws of custom were equated with laws of God, which ignores the common scholastic distinction between divine law and human law.

In 'The two scepticisms of the Savoyard vicar' Ezequiel de Olaso argues that Pyrrhonism is not completely reducible to academic philosophy and that Rousseau argues against materialists as an academic sceptic and that he ends as a revolutionary settler of a new Pyrrhonism.

The late Charles B. Schmitt describes 'John Wolley (ca. 1530-1596) and the first Latin translation of Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Logicos* I' and in an appendix describes the manuscript and gives us an edition of a portion of the text. Schmitt's death was a great loss to historians of philosophy, and what must be one of his last contributions to scholarship is a very welcome addition to this volume.

In 'Excluding sceptics; the case of Thomas White, 1593-1676' Beverley C. Southgate gives an interesting account of a little known English author who in his *Exclusion of Scepticks* (1665) shows by the very vehemence of White's repudiation of scepticism the strength of the sceptical tradition by the latter half of the seventeenth century.

Finally, Craig Walton writes on 'Montaigne on the art of judgment; the trial of Montaigne'. He proposes a reading of the famous essay on Raimond Sebonde as a trial (taking his clue from the literal meaning of *essayer*) in which Montaigne takes the role of judge with Sebonde as defendant and

Sextus Empiricus's Pyrrho the plaintiff. Thus he proposes to consider the text as if Montaigne were also sympathetic to Sebonde and above both sympathies sits as judge, listening to the powerful case for the plaintiff and the weaker case for the defence, but trying his own judgment in the course of the trial.

On the whole this is an interesting book, but in a book to honour Popkin I miss something on Jewish contributions to intellectual history.

J.A. Trentman
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