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**M.A. Box**
*The Suasive Art of David Hume.*
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1990. Pp. xii + 268. US$29.95.
ISBN 0-691-06828-3.

M.A. Box, Assistant Professor of English at the University of Alaska, has written a useful study of Hume's philosophical style, which has been a relatively understudied aspect of Hume's work. The first chapter puts Hume in context, and shows how his views on style relate to those of Pope, Swift, and Addison. This is the best chapter of the book, and should be required reading for all Hume scholars.

Less successful is Box's narrative of Hume's alleged struggles with style after the *Treatise* 'fell dead-born from the Press.' It may be that Hume took to heart Hutcheson's complaint that the *Treatise* lacked a certain 'warmth in the cause of Virtue'; but does the second *Enquiry* genuinely attempt to mix the moralist with the anatomist of human nature? And does Hume, in the first *Enquiry*, attempt to combine, or to effect a compromise between, the disparate styles of philosophizing which he there dubs 'the accurate and abstruse' and the 'easy and obvious'? Metaphysicians such as Locke, Hobbes, and Malebranche adopted the former style. Authors such as Cicero, La-Bruyère, and Addison wrote in the latter style, which is restricted to representing 'the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours'. Box argues that, after the failure of the *Treatise*, Hume was 'feeling his way through imperfectly modulated oscillations between the poles of accurate abstruseness and easy obviousness' (165). His main thesis is that Hume was progressively able to mix more and more of the 'easy and obvious' style with the 'accurate and abstruse', culminating in the 'great achievement' (238) of the second *Enquiry*. But we need to ask whether Hume *ever* thought the two kinds of philosophy could be combined. Mightn't he have tried his hand at both without ever mixing them?

The seven Addisonian essays of the *Essays, Moral and Political* (1741-42) were 'easy and obvious' philosophy calculated for a popular audience. Following the work of Norah Smith, Box gives a sensitive discussion of these relatively neglected works. But most of the other essays, together with the first *Enquiry* and the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, seem undeniably 'abstruse and accurate' philosophy. Box, however, argues that the first — and even more the second — *Enquiry* is a 'hybrid' (51) of these two styles. His case is inspired by a reading of the first section of the first *Enquiry*. This essay, 'Of the Different Species of Philosophy', appears to be a *defence* of 'accurate and abstruse' philosophy against the Addisonian variety, which requires no defence as it is preferred by most people. However Box resists this natural reading and instead finds Hume here giving 'a kind of precedence to this belletristic philosophy' (41). But perhaps Hume artfully only appears to make concessions to the Addisonians, and believes that the *'boundaries'* of these disparate styles can unite without overlapping: i.e., the true meta-

physician will not only uncover novel truths but will clearly and elegantly illustrate and express them. The false metaphysicians, detested by both the true metaphysician and the Addisonians, will fail miserably on both fronts.

Box sometimes concedes that the first *Enquiry* remains firmly within the 'accurate and abstruse' style: 'In the end — there is just no getting around it — abstruse inquiries will be abstruse' (80). Even if the first *Enquiry* remains 'accurate and abstruse', however, perhaps the second *Enquiry* significantly moves away from it? This issue tends to get entangled with another one, namely whether Hume's writings subsequent to the *Treatise* better fulfill his conception of good style. Hume raised Addison's description of good writing into a definition: 'Fine writing, according to Mr. Addison, consists of sentiments, which are natural, without being obvious. There cannot be a juster, and more concise definition of fine writing.' Box dubs this criterion 'natural novelty'. Did Hume ever move away from his early view (expressed in a letter to Hutcheson and at the end of the *Treatise*) that one should not mix the 'easy and obvious' style of philosophy with the 'accurate and abstruse'? Couldn't Hume have honestly (though perhaps mistakenly) believed that the second *Enquiry* best satisfies his criterion of good writing, without thinking that it mixes the two styles of philosophy? Box attempts to support the opposite view by comparing the *Treatise* with its recastings in the two *Enquiries*, but his comparison is less detailed and less insightful than that in John Stewart's *The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume* (325-39), a work to which Box never refers.

Box sheds considerable light on the question of Addison's influence on Hume's style. He correctly claims that, of English authors, the two that probably influenced Hume the most were Addison and Pope. One of the best parts of the book is the subtle way in which Addison's influence is downgraded. Box might well have gone even further in this regard. He does not mention that Hume was viewed by some contemporaries as the ringleader of an anti-Addisonian movement based in Edinburgh and known as the Select Society. As an anonymous pamphlet states: 'Addison, till those gentlemen appeared, was universally esteemed as the finest writer ever England produced; but they *Cast him like an useless weed away*. If you believe them, there are ten errors in every page of his *Spectators*; and [Hume] has a copy of them, in which this decalogue of errors in every page is marked with his own hand. They have taken so great pains to inculcate this doctrine, that now every boy at school, if you praise Mr. Addison, will perk it in your face, and tell you, that he is not a *correct* writer.' The fact that some of Hume's contemporaries regarded him as Addison's detractor supports Box's contention that for Hume Addison was simply an early model to be virtually cast away upon reaching stylistic maturity. But Box pays no attention to Hume's obsession with *correctness*, and instead argues that Hume composed Addisonian essays because he wished to extend to Scotland Addison's programme of bringing philosophy down to the level of the masses in the coffee-houses. This is implausible, for by the 1740s Scotland probably was not behind England in this regard. Box, however, wishes to whitewash Hume of the common charge

that he stooped to cater for popular tastes by adopting the essay genre, and in particular by writing seven 'imitations' of Addison. 'Why would a man of Hume's intellect imitate Addison's triviality as well as his tone?', asks Box (125). The simplest explanation is that Hume did so in order to obtain recognition as a writer, and, ultimately, an audience for his harder but more durable 'accurate and abstruse' metaphysics. Yet Box rejects this explanation: 'The superficiality of the seven apprentice pieces turns out to be neither a lapse in Hume's genius nor a prostitution of his talents for the applause of the multitude, but simply a result of his attempt to write easy and obvious philosophy' (129). But this isn't an alternative explanation at all; for it merely asserts that Hume wrote Addisonian imitations because he wished to write like Addison! So the whitewash has not worked, and we are left with the traditional explanation that Hume wrote these seven essays in order to satisfy his dominant passion of literary fame. It is no wonder, then, that he wished to withdraw them once he had become famous.

Thus, while Box makes several worthwhile contributions to our understanding of Hume's concerns with style, he sometimes misses the mark. For example, he claims that in the second *Enquiry* Hume didn't 'confront religion', and that for Hume 'morality and religion are entirely separable topics' (226). Many of Hume's clerical opponents would have strongly disagreed. Another instance is Box's claim that 'the *Treatise* was no *eirenicon*' (149). This claim is based on a single example, namely 'Of the Immateriality of the Soul'. But while Hume denigrated all who assumed that the self was a simple substance, in other respects he sought to harmonize conflicting viewpoints. An obvious case in point is his 'reconciling project' over the issue of determinism. Other instances are his desire to reconcile innatists and their Lockean opponents, and the mathematicians and their opponents — both of which are emphasized in the *Abstract*. On the question of innateness Hume there writes: 'I am persuaded, whoever would take the question in this [i.e. Hume's] light, would be easily able to reconcile all parties.' And he also there asserts, regarding the issue of the infinite divisibility of matter, that he hopes his solution is acceptable, for " 'Twere certainly to be wish'd, that some expedient were fallen upon to reconcile philosophy and common sense, which with regard to the question of infinite divisibility have wag'd most cruel wars with each other.' Usually Hume tried to conciliate and promote peace between warring philosophical factions. Box is simply mistaken to suggest otherwise.

In *My Own Life* Hume praised his second *Enquiry* 'which, in my own opinion (who ought not to judge on that subject) is of all my writings...incomparably the best.' Box asks: 'Was Hume right in disliking the *Treatise* and favoring the second *Enquiry*?' (254) One expects an affirmative answer. But what criteria are to be invoked? For Box they are: 'natural novelty *and* moral improvement'. Thus the assessment doesn't depend solely on the impartial application of Hume's criterion of 'fine writing', for Box has surreptitiously added another, thereby smuggling in his conclusion, that in the second *Enquiry* Hume aimed at the moralist's end of 'moral improvement'. We therefore might expect the second *Enquiry* to win hands down in this contest

over the *Treatise* and first *Enquiry*. But Box surprisingly claims only a qualified success for the second *Enquiry* in achieving a compromise between the 'easy and obvious' and 'accurate and abstruse' styles of philosophy, which is assimilated to the attempt to mix the moralist with the metaphysician. That work's moralism 'might easily be missed': 'because it is not conspicuous it goes unnoticed': 'it registers in us almost subliminally', and 'Hume is not wildly successful in communicating his warmth [in the cause of virtue]' (239). After this we are not so surprised to be told that 'Even if we adopt these criteria, the second *Enquiry* compares less than favorably with Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, which might serve as a good example of what Hume wanted to achieve' (255). This assessment is preposterous, given Hume's implicit criticism in a letter to Smith that the *Theory* is *too popular*. Nor is any argument offered for it. One consideration which might support it is that Hume wrote a favorable review of Adam Smith's book (see *J. of the Hist. of Phil.* (1984), 51-79; and (1990), 271-81). But Box seems to have been unaware of this fact. The elevation of Smith's first book as a model of what Hume wished to achieve amounts to a *reductio ad absurdum* of Box's main thesis.

Box has not given us a complete study of Hume's philosophical style. Dr Johnson said that Hume's style was French. But this Anglocentric study scarcely mentions any French authors (e.g., Malebranche, Montaigne, Pascal, Fontenelle, or Saint Everemond) who might have influenced Hume's style. Gibbon said that the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* was Hume's best work. What must we think of a study of Hume's style which totally ignores the judgements of two of the greatest stylists of the period? Nevertheless there is much of interest in this book. Students of Hume's style cannot afford to overlook it, and all Hume scholars will benefit from engaging with its main thesis and subsidiary claims.

**David R. Raynor**
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**Karen Schweers Cook** and
**Margaret Levi, eds.**
*The Limits of Rationality.*
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990.
Pp. ix + 426.
US$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-74238-5);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-74239-3).

Rational choice theory has long served as the dominant model within economics for explaining and predicting market phenomena. The model as-

sumes, as a descriptive claim, that individuals are rational in the sense that economic behavior maximizes benefits and minimizes costs. *Homo economicus* is a utility maximizer. The resulting theory possesses the virtues of simplicity, formal elegance and mathematical precision. The paradigm prevails because most economists accept the (guarded) claim that this assumption of *individual* rationality generates the best available theoretical account of how the *market* operates.

One persistent criticism of the rational choice paradigm is that its claims are vacuous and untestable, being true by definition. If so, then the extraordinary power of the model is simply an illusion. Whatever accommodates everything explains nothing. A second familiar (albeit diametrically opposed) criticism is that while the model may genuinely work well at the level of macroeconomic analysis, it provides a simplistic, grossly inaccurate account of both individual decision-making and non-market social and political relationships. Rational choice theorists, by this account, operate with unrealistic and naive (predominantly behaviorist) assumptions about human nature and the environment within which actual decision-making takes place, thereby ignoring highly relevant but 'soft', formally intractable notions such as context, trust, culture and ideology.

'The major theoretical task' of Cook and Levi's excellent anthology 'is to strike a balance between the elements of the rational choice model that make it realistic with those that make it powerful' (15). Most of the volume's twenty-six contributors are social scientists (principally economists, political scientists and sociologists) who remain convinced of the overall explanatory utility and resilience of rational choice theory while being acutely aware of the fact that there are serious limitations to its applicability, at least in its present form. On this view, the first of the above criticisms is fundamentally misguided while the second is radically premature at best.

Part one of the book includes a discussion of the pioneering claims of psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman that the axioms of rational choice theory are not only empirically testable but systematically violated by individual decision-makers. These deviations include violations of the expectation rule by overweighting outcomes obtained with certainty (the Allais paradox), choosing dominated outcomes in nontransparent contexts, and failures of invariance (the requirement that different representations of a choice problem yield the same preference) due to framing. Tversky and Kahneman conclude that, insofar as these rules are normatively indispensable, 'the dream of constructing a theory that is acceptable both descriptively and normatively appears unrealizable' (82). Mark Machina replies to this growing body of experimental work by attempting to render such seemingly aberrant behavior intelligible within a generalized non-expected utility model which incorporates unorthodox, nonlinear preference functions. Charles Plott argues in a rather different vein that widespread individual irrationality is compatible with, and therefore irrelevant to the predictive efficacy of classical economic theory.

Part two concentrates on explaining how, through the emergence of norms of cooperation, actors can escape collective action problems (such as the Prisoner's Dilemma) in which individual rational action can lead to a Pareto-inferior outcome. Michael Taylor offers a critical taxonomical discussion of various solutions to these problems and James Coleman employs iterated game theory to examine the structural conditions under which sanctions against noncooperative behavior work effectively. While the formal treatment of this material is fascinating, Michael Hechter and Stephen Majeski argue convincingly that, due to the existence of multiple equilibria, assumptions of perfect information and the lack of a genuine social component, game-theoretic analyses cannot ultimately explain the resolution of real-world collective action problems. Russell Hardin offers an altogether more plausible social evolutionary account wherein the possibility of cooperative behavior rests upon random, spontaneous occurrences of more primitive states of coordination.

Part three examines rational choice explanations of the emergence and transformation of institutions. Positions run the gamut all the way from Arthur Stinchcombe's Weberian analysis positing institutional utility functions — the social embodiments of reason designed to guide professional behavior and explain why 'people are more rational than they used to be' (315) — to charges that utility analyses of such phenomena as institutional evolution, power relations, norm compliance and social unrest are a 'fairy tale' (321) since 'neoclassical economic theory ... simply assumes away all the relevant issues' (400). Despite this diversity of viewpoints, each of the contributors to this volume would likely assent (more or less enthusiastically) to its overarching thesis that 'rational choice is not simply economics applied more generally' (416).

Philosophers may respond that they have known this all along. But philosophers, of course, have been most interested in rational choice theory because of the prospect of its providing a normative account of rationality — an account of how we *ought* to act. Unfortunately, this topic is largely overshadowed here by a concern with which theory best fits observed behavior. In fact, many contributors appear to consider the distinctively normative problem empty, or at least uninteresting. For those engaged by it, however, the brief discussions of Jon Elster and John Broome constitute required reading. Elster's commitment to the normative privilege of the theory of rationality even in the face of serious 'indeterminacy' and 'inadequacy' is familiar from his many recent books. Broome deftly defends the intriguing thesis that the axioms of rational choice theory are normatively binding because based upon noninstrumental 'rational principles of indifference' (140) which constrain the substantive content of the preferences of rational actors in a way that traditional decision theory has failed to recognize.

This anthology developed from a colloquium series at the University of Washington in 1985. Two-thirds of the twelve core papers were quite recently published elsewhere. The papers and nine commentaries are uniformly of high quality, but vary greatly in technical sophistication, accessibility and

appeal to a philosophical audience. However, even a rough perusal of the book will give philosophers new to the field a good sense of the interdisciplinary breadth of rational choice theory and the decidedly healthy state of certain vigorous current debates.

**Mark Vorobej**
McMaster University

**Bruce Detwiler**
*Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism.*
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990.
US$24.95. ISBN 0-226-14354-6.

Detwiler's basic thesis — that Nietzsche's thought has serious fascistic implications — challenges the current consensus that such charges have been definitively laid aside. To make his case, Detwiler addresses his explication of Nietzsche's thought to the main points raised by the authoritative body of scholarship contributing to this consensus since World War II. The result is a masterful and highly original contribution to Nietzschean studies, quite apart from the provocative challenge of its central thesis.

Detwiler develops a persuasive argument for the interpretation of Nietzsche's thought as a continuous dialectical development from *The Birth of Tragedy* which introduces the Dionysian/Apollonian theme; through an intermediate period (including *Human All Too Human* and *The Wanderer and its Shadow*) which scarcely mentions Dionysius; to his later work dating from 1886, in which a significantly revised Dionysian theme becomes focal. According to Detwiler, this revision reflects a decisive change in Nietzsche's metaphysical position after *The Birth of Tragedy*. Nonetheless, Detwiler argues, both *The Birth of Tragedy* and Nietzsche's more mature thought take the interdependence of Dionysian and Apollonian influences to be essential for the vitality of culture.

This analysis of Nietzsche's work as a whole allows Detwiler to go beyond Walter Kaufmann's influential interpretation of Nietzsche as basically apolitical. More particularly, Detwiler takes issue with Kaufmann's interpretation of Nietzsche's mature thought as implicitly concerned with the power to form one's own character by integrating reason and passion. Detwiler argues that Kaufmann's dualistic concept of the self in terms of reason and impulse is excluded by Nietzsche during his middle period in favor of a monistic concept that is further developed in his later work. Crucial to this concept of the self is the ontological analysis of 'man' as (1) 'the indeterminate animal'

and (2) basically a chaotically disorganized conflict of multiple drives, each generating its own perspective and each striving to dominate the others.

Detwiler claims that the intermediate period of Nietzsche's thought takes a positivistic turn, manifested by his rejection of the artistic metaphysics of *The Birth of Tragedy* as illusory self-deception and, further, his express admiration of the intellectual rigour of modern science. According to Detwiler, it is only during this period that Nietzsche seems to be at all favorably disposed to democratic institutions and even then only out of begrudging acknowledgment of the modern political drift.

Indeed, according to Detwiler, the Dionysian shift of Nietzsche's thought during his third period is clearly anti-democratic even as it reflects Nietzsche's continued commitment to intellectual rigour as a commitment to intellectual honesty free of positivistic restraints. Whereas in the first period, the artist is taken as revealing, through his artwork, metaphysical insight into the underlying creative ground of appearance; in the last period, the privileged position of the artist as the true disciple of Dionysius is accorded to the genius philosopher, who destroys illusions to recover creativity by destroying and creating the values at the core of culture. Thus Nietzsche's genius philosopher, as the artist philosopher, belongs to a higher type of man of decisively strong will. Indeed, Detwiler points out: Zarathustra (with whom, Detwiler surmises, Nietzsche identifies) is preparing the way for a new breed of man belonging to this higher type who can surpass moralism and so 'freely' create values. However, according to Detwiler, Nietzsche does not take this task to be apolitical or anti-political. Rather, Detwiler argues, Zarathustra is dedicated to bringing about the existence and political domination of this higher type as the only possible justification for the existence of man as a species and, indeed, as society itself.

In support of this analysis of the role of Nietzsche's artist philosopher, Detwiler presents a particularly interesting and convincing description of Nietzsche's geneological analysis of Western culture as the psychological development of character, historically associated with political authority and social order from its early Greek Dionysian/Apollonian tension (which is still aristocratic) to the contemporary nihilistic destruction of values linked to the 'death of God'. Modern nihilism is thus a historical development out of Greek culture by way of 'the discipline of truth' further developed through Christianity (the culmination of the first great 'revaluation of values' [Detwiler's phrasing]) and modern science.

In effect, the politicised Dionysian role of the artist philosopher marks the contemporary culmination of Nietzsche's geneological history of Western culture. For only the intellectually honest philosopher is strong enough to face the historically real nihilistic destruction of values. Detwiler points out: Nietzsche claims, as early as his middle period, that democratic institutions promote nihilism by contributing to widespread weakness of will. It then falls to the philosopher, having apprehended this destruction, also to understand it is 'man', as the intrinsically indeterminate animal, who creates values and so to take on the task of the creation of values as 'revaluation' with, indeed,

a 'good conscience' in the face of his destiny. Accordingly, Zarathustra, understanding that the nihilistic destruction of value is in the service of creativity, retains the original Greek understanding of the relation of Dionysius to Apollo.

Moreover, by taking account of Nietzsche's work as a whole, including his early unpublished work, *The Greek State*, Detwiler marshals evidence that, according to Nietzsche, the lower type — the herd animal — is essentially different from the higher type both physiologically and culturally. This theme is articulated in Nietzsche's mature work as the thesis that the development of 'noble' character through 'overcoming' is ineluctably linked to the Dionysian will to make — 'sculpt' — man (as the indeterminate animal) in the image of oneself. Indeed, Detwiler argues: according to Nietzsche, without imposition of the created values of the higher type, the lower type lacks the decisive orientation of a cohesive will. Thus, according to Detwiler, both society and the herd animal are, for Nietzsche, always justified only by the existence of the higher type.

Detwiler implicitly suggests that, for Nietzsche, values as basically oriented will to power are ineluctably perspectival in the sense that the oriented will to power wills its own worldly appearance (embodiment?). But if the artist philosopher, as Dionysian creator of values, seeks as disciples other philosophers who are alike artist philosophers creating values that imply a transformed world, then philosophy involves the ongoing creative devaluation (in effect, nihilization as deconstruction) and 'revaluation' of our cultural world to transform the real world as the task of 'Great Politics'. Detwiler points out: in *The Greek State*, Nietzsche identifies the cultural transformation of the real world as the work undertaken by the Greek polis.

In the light of Detwiler's fascinating treatise, it is difficult to avoid being impressed by the depth of Nietzsche's influence on Heidegger. Certainly, Heidegger's ontological turn (centered about the self-disclosure of Being to a Dasein that is already Mitsein) is systematically opposed to taking culture as breeding and, moreover, implicitly achieves a decisive critique of absolute creativity. Nevertheless, Heidegger retains Nietzsche's distinction between the lower and the higher type of man as the distinction between the authentic few who can act out of the disclosure of Being and the merely conventional many who can only speak stereotypically — and so can only behave blindly. Thus for Heidegger, as for Nietzsche, democracy is intrinsically nihilistic and only hierarchically ordered social rule — to be sure, for Heidegger, authentically informed by the self-disclosure of Being — can render human life meaningful.

In effect, Detwiler, by facing the fascistic implications of Nietzsche's thought, exposes the paradox inherent in Nietzsche's conception of man as the indeterminate animal: on the one hand, man can shape himself; on the other hand, man can be shaped. Has Nietzsche, then, rather uncovered the paradox of fundamental ethical evaluation inherent in the ontological status of human being as the indeterminate animal and misunderstood that paradox as a distinction between two breeds out of his own political motivation?

For Nietzsche, the nobility of human being as the indeterminate animal becomes manifest (though only in the higher 'breed') as the capacity to shape oneself with intellectual integrity. Is Kaufmann, then, after all fundamentally correct in his interpretation of Nietzsche as, in effect, only claiming that for human being the will to power implies the power to form one's own character? We cannot, however, ignore the following question: is not the test of authentic ethical evaluation precisely 'its' will to worldly appearance? Thus ethical evaluation, insofar as it is implicated by the self-formation of character, cannot be separated from political implications. Indeed, as Detwiler points out, Nietzsche himself explicitly traces the general association of character and political life to Plato. Kaufmann's depoliticised interpretation of Nietzsche's mature thought ignores the political thrust inherent in radical self-formation through serious 'revaluation'.

Whereas Kaufmann depoliticizes the ethics of authenticity, Nietzsche and Heidegger — despite their differences — insist on its radical political originality. However, both Nietzsche and Heidegger discount the importance — indeed, are deeply suspicious — of ongoing serious discussion of political opinion in a pluralistic context. Finally, it should be noted: this is precisely the issue addressed by Hannah Arendt's stunning analysis of the inherently democratic relation of political judgement to political life.

**Mildred Bakan**
York University

**John Dunn**
*Interpreting Political Responsibility.*
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1990. Pp. vii + 274.
US$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07872-6);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-02329-8).

This collection of essays will be of interest chiefly to those who have been following Dunn's on-going work in political theory: *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future* (1979), *Locke* (1984), *The Politics of Socialism* (1984), and *Rethinking Modern Political Theory* (1985), to list some of his more salient contributions. The essays span the decade from 1980 to 1990 and include a lecture, papers read at conferences, and chapters contributed to a variety of books addressing topics of specific interest more to the political scientist than the political philosopher. As such, the essays fall prey to many of the pitfalls of work presented in such venues: geared to particular audiences, they contain a healthy share of colourful asides, bold, tantalizing

claims which go largely undeveloped and undefended, and points the full cogency of which must be supposed to rest with those to whom they were directly addressed.

To be sure, several common themes do tie many of the essays together, but none is particularly well developed over the course of the collection. Throughout the volume, Dunn casts himself as a political theorist, one whose task it is to bridge the gap between the ideals articulated by political philosophers and the real world studied by political scientists. His chief message for philosophers is straightforward: political ideals must address political and economic realities. The main political reality that such ideals must face is that of the division of political labour: given the complexities of the modern world, most citizens are not capable of exercising the duties of political office, or even understanding, in particular cases, what it might be for such duties to be responsibly discharged. The complexities that Dunn has in mind are largely economic, and they centre on the main problem of economic responsibility: politicians must discharge their duties within a global economic order, many of the vicissitudes of which are simply beyond their control. In answer to this last problem, Dunn calls upon politicians to exhibit prudence; in answer to the former, he calls for trust and dialogue. In neither case does he offer much in the way of elaboration.

The first four essays are most directly relevant to political philosophy; several of the main claims of the first, 'What is Living and What is Dead in the Political Theory of John Locke', are further developed in the subsequent three. What's dead in the political philosophy of Locke are natural rights, a theory of ownership based on initial appropriation, and contractarianism. To the political philosopher, these are, of course, exciting claims. Furnished with arguments, they might even be interesting. But with regard to natural rights, for example, all we are told is that such a basic moral category is simply a non-starter without a foundation of natural duties, something available to Locke but not the secular modern philosopher. Theories of hypothetical contract, we are told, camouflage appeals to some prior theory of the right or the good. The mystery as to why this might be so never gets cleared up, although we are told a bit more about rights in one of the following essays, 'Rights and Political Conflict'. Dunn's argument is that popular appeals to rights, where these are grounded in morality rather than positive law, do little to advance public debate because the rights invoked typically depend for their cogency on the unarticulated moral, political, and social theories of their advocates. The typical problem is that neither these theories, nor the causal beliefs with which they are paired, are widely understood or shared. Although it has little immediate bearing on the previous philosophical claim about rights, this is an important point.

Something of a connection between the two points is perhaps forged in 'Liberty as a Substantive Political Value', where Dunn's argument seems to be something like the following. The point of rights is to protect private enjoyments, or more broadly, individual liberty. Basic political rights are instrumentally important for this purpose, but once these have been guar-

anteed, the more important question is how the basic economic institutions of a society are to be structured. Philosophical answers to this question, however, are rendered otiose when we consider modern economic reality: neither laissez faire liberalism nor socialist central planning have proved able to deliver, to the majority of their citizens, anything close to the full ideal of individual liberty espoused by many contemporary rights theorists. Nor is it at all clear what sort of relationship between the state and the economy *would* guarantee such liberty.

In what is perhaps the most important of the first four essays, 'Trust and Political Agency', Dunn returns to what he takes to be living in Locke's philosophy, the foundational role of trust in human affairs and government. In a roundabout way, this essay might also be seen as giving a bit more substance to his rejection of appeals to hypothetical contracts. The general Lockean idea, according to Dunn, is that contracts can only work where there is already a background of mutual trust. More particularly, then, a legitimate state is one in which citizens' trust in the responsible performance of the duties of political office is well-founded. The upshot of both points is that we must take as the principal problem of political theory that of how best to construct, reproduce, or repair basic institutional structures of mutual trust (41). All three of these points are certainly of great significance; but interested readers might do much better turning to Annette Baier's 1986 *Ethics* article, 'Trust and Antitrust', in which similar points are more powerfully developed. As Baier points out, what is most astonishing with regard to the concept of trust is the amount of philosophical attention it has received, the extreme paucity of which stands in direct contrast to its importance.

This collection of essays will thus be of some interest to philosophers. The problems it raises regarding trust, the division of political labour, and the difficulty of formulating economic policy within a global economy are important ones for political philosophers to consider. Dunn's own responses to these problems, however, phrased in terms of 'dialogue' and 'prudence,' remain too vague to be of much help in such considerations. But perhaps one should hold such collections of essays to no higher a standard than the one commonly applied to folksingers: both have responsibly discharged their political duty when they have succeeded in bringing to our attention glaring faults in our political thought and action. Facing the faults is the responsibility of all of us together, a point with which Dunn would surely agree.

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**Peter Geach, ed.**
*Logic and Ethics.*
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
1991. Pp. viii + 318.
US$69.00. ISBN 0-7923-1044-6.

This book is a collection of papers by Polish and British philosophers on a wide variety of topics which are only loosely tied together by their theme of logic and ethics. Some of the fifteen papers are previously published. The level of technicality of writing ranges from elementary to fairly advanced. The term 'logic' seems to mean logic, linguistics, game theory, and utility theory. 'Ethics' means both metaethics and normative ethics but in a reasonably well-defined sense. There are a large number of misprints, some innocent, some repeated, some destructive of whole sentences. The grouping of papers does not seem to follow any ethical or logical plan: the papers are arranged alphabetically according to the author's name. No biographical information about the authors is offered to the reader, although that would certainly be useful in this kind of book. Neither is the reader offered any motivational idea behind the decision to publish such a book, except that its editor visited Poland in 1985. The volume is simply not very carefully edited.

If one wants to identify one common theme which shines through it is that of the objectivity and truth of moral discourse. Several of the authors support this idea, and certainly no one argues explicitly against objectivity in this context. This important theme is touched in the very first paper by Renford Bambrough. He echoes some of the themes of his book *Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge*, namely the close connection between science and ethics which makes it necessary to try to justify our moral beliefs in a strict and straightforward way. This leads him to accept the idea of moral truth, too. His paper contains a spirited attack against Bernard Williams's ideas.

There is at least one dissenting opinion, namely, Ija Lazari-Pawlowska who claims that 'indeterminateness and incompleteness, though clearly failures in the case of other systems, turn out to be merits in an ethical system' (233). Bambrough would certainly disagree with this. But since Lazari-Pawlowska's purpose is to argue against the use of very general norms in the rational justification of moral views, it is still possible that some more concrete norms and values have something like an objective foundation.

It seems that papers number 2 and 15 belong together. First, Henryk Elzenberg discusses 'Negative values' and then Boguslaw Wolniewicz 'Needs and values'. Elzenberg argues that negative values are values in a very curious sense: certainly if something is a value, it is of value, and thus a negative, or valueless value is an impossibility. The result of the analysis seems to be this: 'Any property which excludes some positive value-generating property is itself a negative value-generating property' (27). Wolniewicz refers to Elzenberg's work but he himself is mainly occupied by the distinction between the naturalistic and non-naturalistic theories of value, or axiologies, as he wants to call them. He criticises naturalism of logical circularity in its definition of values: 'value is what satisfies some valuable

human needs and desires. And we are back to where we started' (297). He argues that values have an autonomous side to them.

Of the papers that deal with language, Mary Catherine Gormally's 'The ethical root of language' is of particular interest. She argues against Hume that one's actions may be lies because 'we express a belief by performing an action which would only be right if we had that belief' (64), so that for instance by means of stealing one expresses the belief that the stolen object is one's own which one knows to be a falsehood. The result is that dishonest actions presuppose some true values, otherwise they would not be dishonest. To tell a lie presupposes that one can know the truth, regardless of whether it concerns a fact or a value.

Jennifer Jackson writes 'Against tolerating the intolerable'. It is indeed clear that if you take ethics and moral values seriously, and especially if you think that some values are objective, you cannot be 'liberal' towards the cases where those values are violated. Interestingly enough, the liberal attitude towards other people's opinions seems to be justifiable, and at the same time such liberalism has its strict limits. Certain things are beyond compromise. Another paper that introduces the crucial issue of truth is Marian Przelecki's 'Truth-value of ethical statements' where he argues that there is no reason why Tarski's definition of truth would not apply to ethical sentences. If it applies, it is certainly tempting to say that moral sentences are true or false in the most literal and straightforward sense. But it is not easy to believe that the case could really be as simple as Przelecki suggests. All in all, these contributions develop the theme of objectivity in ethics.

The rest of the papers include Jonathan Harrison's large-scale demolition of the once popular view that ethics is the field of imperatives put together by means of imperative logic. (But unlike imperatives, moral judgments may be true or false.) This is a very long and sophisticated paper whose target is who else but R. M. Hare. Geach deals with deontic logic and Stephan Körner with the logic of practical evaluation, developing some themes which are familiar from his 1976 book *Experience and Conduct*. There are two papers on games and decisions, J. Holowka's discussion of the Prisoner's Dilemma and Klemens Szaniawski's 'On fair distribution of indivisible goods'. Szaniawski concludes his technical and rather difficult paper in a manner which is so characteristic of his style: 'What practical use could be made of these ideas? Very little, I am afraid' (288). Perhaps this is true, — his simple premises do not yield much profit in social life, but the paper is still impressive.

The book contains much philosophical material, both new and old, familiar and less well known. It is of interest largely because it offers a glimpse to the Polish side of our ethical tradition. But at the same time the book tends to lack uniformity and solid argumentative backbone.

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**David Goicoechea, John Luik, and Tim Madigan, eds.**
*The Question of Humanism: Challenges and Possibilities.*
Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books 1991. Pp. 341.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-87975-614-4.

**Howard B. Radest**
*The Devil and Secular Humanism: The Children of the Enlightenment.*
Westport, CT: Praeger 1990. Pp. 170.
US$39.95. ISBN 0-275-93442-X.

*The Question of Humanism* is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with the varieties of, the challenges to, and the enigmas of humanism. Collections are proverbially varied in quality, and this one is no exception; but it contains several excellent things. The term 'humanist' bears at least three meanings, one learned in the Greek and Latin classics, one who values human fulfilment and self-expression very highly, and one who repudiates religious faith as at once rationally indefensible and harmful to human beings. The connection between the first and the second conceptions is brought out in one of two superb papers by Martin Andic, which shows how authors of the Renaissance went back to their Greek and Roman predecessors as a means of finding out how to achieve a fully-realized human life for themselves; for all that it often 'seems to us that they have nothing much to say, but say it with style and grace, and a rich display of learning' (85). Of the two papers on Thomas Aquinas, that by Edward A. Synan is devoted to the rather trivial end of showing that that philosopher was not a humanist in our first sense, while the other, by R. J. McLaughlin, has the much more interesting aim of demonstrating that the fact that he was not a humanist in the third sense by no means prevented him from being one in the second; on the contrary, according to the Thomist account of the matter, a humanist ought to be religious, and a religious person ought to be a humanist. Andic asks whether Plato or Aristotle were humanists, and answers, very reasonably, that this depends upon one's definition of the term. Both were concerned to delineate and promote the best possible life for human beings, but both regarded this as a matter of some kind of conformity with the divine. This last implies that they cannot be considered as humanists on the definition proposed by Allan Booth in his very learned paper on Roman humanism.

John Luik asks whether Kant can really be considered an Enlightenment humanist, and concludes that he cannot owing to the place of radical evil in his thought. A very useful account is provided by Cecil Abrahams of what Northrop Frye called the 'apocalyptic humanism' of William Blake; oppression and destructive rebellion (Urizen and Orc) will go on engaging in fruitless and bloody strife until both are redeemed by the poetic imagination (Los). According to Robert Perkins, Kierkegaard was a Christian humanist; I myself would have thought that it was more appropriate to see that very

dangerous thinker as one who indeed set a high value on the human, but finally repudiated it in favour of the Christian as he saw it. An important development in Marx's thought is pointed out by Danny Goldstick, from an early phase in which he deplored capitalism as contrary to human nature or the human essence (157), to a later one in which he ceased to use this criterion, largely because of what he regarded as its conservative tendency. James Lawler and Zaid Orudjev relate the ideals of humanism, and particularly Marxist humanism, to the problems set by the ecological crisis. They ask whether it is of the essence of humanism to be excessively concerned with human welfare, as opposed to that of other creatures with which we share our environment. In one of the most thought-provoking pieces in the collection, Samuel Ajzsenstadt points out that there is a tension between two human ideals, that of the realization of a contented, well-fed, and sexually fulfilled human life for as many people as possible, and that which regards such satisfactions as themselves essentially soporific and so dehumanizing. In attempting to relate humanism to existentialism and positivism, Calvin Hayes raises a question which is surely central to humanism, that of whether, and in what sense, there is a factual basis for testing rival ethical theories, and so for rationally preferring one to another. Specifically secular humanism is defended with force and conviction by Paul Kurtz and Tim Madigan in the last two papers of the volume.

*The Devil and Secular Humanism* is an impassioned defence of the values of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Certainly, as Radest admits, the Enlightenment had its inadequacies and limitations; he says that it is up to the humanists of the present day, who have the benefit of hindsight, to reconstruct it. As to those persons of good will who do not think of themselves as humanists, Radest assures them that his criticism of the various traditions does not imply disparagement of those who still find in them something which is meaningful and valuable. But he does urge that as many persons as possible should be at pains clearly to affirm and implement democratic and scientific ideals, at a time when so many seem ready or even eager to capitulate to sectional interests or to irrationalism. I strongly agree with Radest that, for all the vagueness of the term 'humanism', for all the uncertainty as to what it includes or excludes, and for all the sectarian disputes between 'secular and religious, Marxist and non-Marxist, socialist and libertarian' (2) varieties of humanism, it is something well worth defending. It certainly has many enemies who are both influential and vocal; for example, moral nihilists who say or imply that what is good and bad, right and wrong, is in the last resort merely a matter of arbitrary choice; or those theists who proclaim and enforce supposedly divine ordinances without regard to anything so trivial as their consequences for human happiness or fulfilment.

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**Sidney Hook**
*Convictions.*
Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books 1990. Pp. 310.
US$24.95. ISBN 0-87975-473-7.

This volume represents the fruition of a project — or rather, two projects — which Sidney Hook proposed, but was unable to complete, before his death in 1989. First of all, he had assembled a collection of what he called his 'fugitive essays' — pieces published during his lifetime in various anthologies and periodicals, which he feared would be inaccessible to the general reader. Then in 1988, he became involved in the public controversy over the compulsory course in Western civilization given at Stanford University, a dispute which had implications for similar courses taught at other colleges. Hook wrote a series of polemical articles defending Stanford's existing course against critics who labelled its content 'racist' and 'sexist', and were insisting that literature from non-Western cultures, as well as books written by women and persons of colour, be included. Hook's project of publishing a selection of these articles was realized, not by releasing them as a separate volume, but by incorporating them as Part Three of *Convictions*. Parts One, Two and Four contain essays, rebuttals and book reviews on topics ranging from voluntary euthanasia to the ideals of liberal education, academic freedom, and the virtues of democracy.

Some years ago a philosophical wag proposed, as an eponymic definition of the verb 'hook', 'to swerve to the right.' (I saw this 'definition' in a list, most of which eventually made its way into Daniel Dennett's *Philosophical Lexicon*, but this particular entry does not appear in the current edition of the *Lexicon*.) To suggest, as a joke, that Hook swerved to the right in his views on social issues is understandable if one recalls that in the 1930s he was upholding Marxism, and by the end of his life he was championing American democracy, deploring the excesses of the New Left, and warning of the 'Communist threat to the free world' (101, 299). But as a serious assessment of Hook's thought, the 'definition' is not merely superficial; it is very unfair. Hook did not swerve; he stood firm while historical circumstances changed and the issues shifted. While altering his mind about particular matters as much as any honest enquirer may be expected to do, he remained from first to last a democratic socialist and a tolerant secular humanist.

*Convictions* should help contemporary readers to appreciate Hook's intellectual constancy, despite the fact that most of the pieces included were written in the latter half of his life. The book opens with an engaging autobiographical essay in which Hook describes his early disillusionment with organized religion, his horror at reading — as a young Jew — how the Jewish people have been persecuted throughout the Christian era, and his eventual commitment to the ideas and values of the three thinkers who appear to have influenced him the most: Karl Marx, John Dewey, and Thomas Jefferson. It becomes plain how Marx engaged his very strongly felt desire to alleviate human suffering, Jefferson appealed to his sense of the dignity of each individual, and the pragmatism of Dewey found an echo in

Hook's own intellectual modesty and abhorrence of dogmatism. After this introduction to Hook's thought, it does not appear the least surprising that, having started out as one of the first American scholars to study Marx seriously, Hook was one of the first Marxist scholars to notice, and denounce, the 'transformation of the socialist dream into a totalitarian nightmare in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries' (19). Not surprising, and certainly not a matter of swerving.

At the same time, these essays make it apparent that Hook was a child of his age: his sensibilities were shaped by the Cold War and the political norms of the mid-twentieth century. His responses to issues of the late eighties spring from these older roots; they do not reflect the historical context in which they were, in fact, written — when the Cold War was winding down and the threat to the environment had displaced the threat of Communism as a subject of public concern.

The ideas found in *Convictions* owe more to Dewey and Jefferson than to Marx. We find Hook presenting the classic liberal case against reverse discrimination, on the Jeffersonian ground that 'it is the individual who is the carrier of human rights and not the ethnic or national or racial group' (68). When he is outlining what he takes to be the essentials of a liberal education and encouraging the universities to have the 'intellectual confidence and courage' to insist that these essentials be in the curriculum (75), we find him endorsing Jefferson's claim that a crucial function of liberal education is 'to strengthen faith in a free society and safeguard it from the corruptions of human ambition and power' (96). What makes this an urgent matter, in Hook's opinion, is that 'faith and belief in the principles of liberal democracy have declined in the United States' (103). In a piece which was originally an introduction to a volume of Dewey's works, we find Hook defending Dewey against critics who have misunderstood what Dewey meant by a 'democratic' philosophy of education.

Academic freedom was a major concern of Hook's. To him it was a recent, rare, and hard-won achievement, still apt to come under siege, and needing to be defended against assailants of different colours: Communist Party members during the age of Stalin, student radicals in the 1960s, and in the present day the New Left and others trying to politicize the curriculum. As for his fellow liberal academics, he comes out swinging in support of those who were willing, during the McCarthy era, to see colleagues dismissed from their posts on account of membership in the Communist Party, because 'the assumption behind the grant of academic freedom is that the professor is a scholar not a propagandist' (109), and Party members were committed to being propagandists (280-7). But he aims some of his heaviest blows at academics who have failed to uphold academic freedom in more recent days. 'Scholars cannot entrust to others the chores of intellectual hygiene,' he writes (115); there is no substitute for academics exercising their academic freedom '*publicly* to criticize its violations on the campuses on which they occur' (115), and insisting on the enforcement of the right of free speech in academia.

Three essays defending the idea of voluntary euthanasia are included in the collection. The shortest and best written of the three contains an account of a painful, near-fatal illness Hook suffered, during which he asked to have his life support systems disconnected, and was refused. Despite having made a good recovery, he still maintains that his request ought to have been granted. Here and elsewhere Hook displays a gift for allowing strong feeling to show clearly through a calm, scholarly surface.

Thanks largely to this estimable talent, Hook is at his best when he is being cool, principled, and didactic. The overriding values are plainly spelled out, the arguments rigorous, the conclusions generous and nuanced. Not so, unfortunately, when he becomes heated, personal, and polemical. The more he goes after particular opponents who have riled him, the more his verbal scalpel becomes dulled; his *ad hominem* arguments, though frequently colourful, are always less trenchant, and the writing less effective. He even succumbs, more than once, to the temptation to use *'[sic!]'* as an exclamation of feigned astonishment — a puerile gesture which will detract from any author's credibility. Despite these flaws, and despite the tedium which may be induced by a serial reading of *all* Hook's contributions to the debate over the Stanford course in Western civilization, the collection stands as an accessible and highly readable record of the personal convictions of one of America's most notable social philosophers.

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**John Kekes**
*Facing Evil.*
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1990. Pp. xii + 250.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-691-07370-8.

Kekes presents a provocative and sometimes profound challenge to contemporary moral theory and the moral sensibility it informs. Our moral theories have failed, for understandable but culpable reasons, to plumb fully the facts and nature of evil (defined as undeserved harm) and formulate appropriate responses to it. This theoretical failure is also a moral failure because it both manifests and contributes to character defects that promote the evil it refuses to face squarely. Post-enlightenment moral philosophy in particular has been soft on evil because it fails to acknowledge how thoroughly evil pervades our lives as a constant potentiality and frequent actuality. K advocates the

'harder' response of a 'character-morality' that exhibits pervasive sources of evil in 'the essential conditions of life,' exposes the many ways we fail to acknowledge the evil we produce, and promotes more serious attempts to control the forces of evil in our own breasts, in others, and in our moral institutions. We need nothing less than a change in theory, in sensibility, and in practice.

Aspirations to a good life are most reasonable when conformed to the Socratic ideal that moral merit and personal satisfaction shall converge in a good life. The 'secular problem of evil' is the fact that our reasonable aspirations to a good life are in tension with evil's prevalence, which provides reasonable grounds for pessimism. A proper morality should address *both* of these reasonable expectations equally. Evil stems from the contingency of life, the indifference of nature, and human destructiveness. Because moral theory has often been reluctant to face evil, we need the more profound tragic view of life to remind us that evil can defeat our best efforts.

Since Kant, moral philosophy has been reluctant to consider *unchosen* deeds, vices, and character to be morally evil. We have adopted a 'choice-morality' with its Kantian principle that 'ought implies can', which holds that evil must be chosen to be censurable. Yet people's lives are riddled with the unchosen vices of insufficiency (inadequate development of moral capacities), expediency (pursuing life's goods without regard to evils the pursuit may cause), and malevolence. To let ourselves and others off the hook when these are unchosen is to excuse most of the evils that humans commit. That we should not do because it works so powerfully against human welfare. And once we have abandoned Kant's principle, we will also reject moral egalitarianism and the fundamental goodness of human nature in favor of the evident facts that people have unequal moral merit (and thus desert) and a mixed natural potential for good and evil.

K's version of character-morality is summarized in nine theses: the objectivity of simple evil (i.e., undeserved harm is caused independently from intent); the irrelevance of choice to simple evil; the reflexivity of simple evil (i.e., vices are character traits that regularly produce evil actions and evil people are those with vices as dominant character traits); the importance of character (more than choice) to moral judgment; the unavoidability of moral agency (i.e., it is not a result of contingencies like choice, contract, good will, commitment, or deliberation); the significance of moral achievement (rather than mere moral improvement or intention); the centrality of moral desert (people deserve benefit or harm proportional to the good and evil they have caused); the dependence of moral desert on moral merit (which depends on moral achievement); and the mixed view of human nature.

Human nature is a mixture of good and evil dispositions (*not* fundamentally good), and the 'balance [between them] shifts historically, culturally, socially, and individually' (156). Character-morality's burden is to shift the balance of good and evil in us towards human welfare. It thus requires two aspects, the good-producing and evil-avoiding, which give it 'two sets of goals, two sets of requirements, two sets of justifications for conforming to the

requirements, and thus two different tasks' (157). The evil-avoiding aspect seeks to institutionalize deep prohibitions against simple evils and to promote a reflective temper to illuminate the sources of evil within and increase self control.

K is particularly adroit and illuminating in his use of literature to explore the phenomenology of evil and in his dissection of the ways that philosophers have disowned evil. Much less convincing and potentially threatening to human welfare is his focus on desert, particularly in the negative prescription that 'moral demerit results in the appropriate harm' (57). Granted that it is good to recognize evil and good to stop evil for the sake of human welfare, it is not clear that it is good to harm the evildoer unless one could demonstrate that this is the most effective way of promoting human welfare overall. Indeed, one could argue that the retributive spirit is one of the major sources of evil. But we shall never respond effectively to evil unless we first face it in all its dimensions, within us and in our world. John Kekes powerfully challenges us to do just that.

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**Matthew H. Kramer**
*Legal Theory, Political Theory, and Deconstruction: Against Rhadamanthus.*
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1991. Pp. xiii + 335.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-253-33148-X.

The main theme of this intriguing book — objectivity in legal theory — is suggested in its subtitle, 'Against Rhadamanthus'. As Kramer explains, Rhadamanthus was 'incorruptibly and unfailingly just' and so is a symbol of objectivity in judgment (1). Kramer aims to pull off an astonishing deconstructive feat. He wants to show that objectivity is both the unattainable end and the necessary presupposition of legal or any theorizing. And he wants to show that this conclusion is not nihilistic — there is a constructive moment in every authentic deconstruction.

His raw material is (in this order) G. A. Cohen's analytical Marxism, in particular Cohen's treatment of the base/superstructure problem, H. L. A. Hart's theory of the rule of recognition, Hume's doctrine of human nature, and the idea of reification in Marx, Lucaks, Sartre and the Critical Legal Studies Movement. In most of the chapters, he starts with a close reading of

relevant texts and then puts the material relentlessly through a Derridean blender to reach his deconstructive/constructive conclusions.

The book should have been heavily edited to remove its irritating features such as: a frequent use of French phrases when banal English ones would do the job just as well or better; an unappealing *hauteur* about the work of others ('the glib and futile critique by ...' (278 n.36); his tendency to seek out the more obscure Latinized verbs and adjectives; his constant striving for expressive effect which more often than not ends up being distracting and ponderous ('this chapter focuses on a set of writings grouped under the signature of G. A. Cohen' [44].)

Careful editing could also have dealt with the many side discussions which seem more like notes for Kramer's future research than intended to inform the reader and the discussions which seem to amount to themes but which go nowhere, most significantly, the constant pointing out of the ocular Cartesian imagery of analytic philosophy without any real attempt to show why this is problematic or interesting. Most important of all, Kramer should have been required to knit more tightly the dense theoretical scheme he outlines in his introductory chapter with the rest of the book. Indeed, he expressly acknowledges that the account of deconstruction in his introductory chapter is obscure, gives an (ocular) promissory note that all will become clearer later, and then fails to deliver on that promise; a failure which is to some extent signalled when he says in the same chapter that his deconstructive insights will not be 'applied' in the arguments to follow (2-3).

All this is a great pity because there is much that is fruitful and exciting in this work buried under the weight of jargon-laden wordiness. Kramer is at his best using close textual reading to uncover fundamental problems in the material he considers. His analysis of G. A. Cohen's analytical Marxism makes a compelling case against Cohen's attempt to present a clean base/superstructure model of law in which legal ideology plays no real role in structuring the power relations of the base. (But I wonder if he really takes this argument any further than did Steven Lukes in an essay which Kramer does not cite on this issue — 'Can the Base be distinguished from the Superstructure?' in D. Miller and L. Siedentop eds. *The Nature of Political Theory* [Oxford: Oxford University Press 1983].) He successfully prosecutes a charge of vicious circularity against Hart's attempt to avoid grounding the rule of recognition, the fundamental rule of a legal system, in anything other than the alleged fact that it is the fundamental rule accepted by the officials of the system. Against Hume he argues that the empiricist project self-destructs. Empiricism requires the presence in the world of brute empirical data. But any empirical datum can only be individuated by a process of differentiation from other data. That is, since the presence of these data can only be established through differences between them, and since difference has therefore to preexist presence, nothing can be grounded in presence. And he warns the Critical Legal Studies Movement that they should be aware that their quest for utterly plastic, that is, unreified social relations, might conceal the same dangers of domination as the utopian projects they distrust.

Does Kramer then succeed in pulling off the feat of showing both that objectivity is the unattainable end and the necessary presupposition of legal or any theorizing and that this conclusion is not nihilistic? Here he is largely successful. First, he does show that, to use rather old-fashioned jargon, every attempt to ground political or legal theory in nature or facts about the world is doomed since one's inevitable starting point and thus inquiry is not value-neutral. Secondly, he shows that despite the inevitable recognition of the way that our inquiries and the very language we use to describe them are value-laden, we cannot give up on the hope and assumption of objectivity. Finally, he seems to argue that a commitment to engaging in a free play of self-criticism in which one's values and convictions would be subject to continual testing and evaluation makes what sense can be made of the hope of objectivity.

But if this description of Kramer's major arguments is accurate, one might wonder about the whole deconstructive project. For then deconstruction goes no further than the philosophy of social science outlined by Max Weber, a philosophy which, with a couple of notable exceptions, has received little attention in French social and political theory.

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**Alan Millar**
*Reasons and Experience.*
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1991. Pp. x + 226.
Cdn$75.95: US$49.95. ISBN 0-19-824270-0.

Millar tries to develop an account of justified belief that explains how experience can help justify beliefs about the world, how beliefs about behaviour can help justify beliefs about the mental states of others, and how global scepticism can be answered. The book obviously addresses important issues. It is clear, literature-sensitive, and particularly challenging for internalist epistemologists who think they have to choose between a foundationalism that grounds everything and coherentism. Occasionally his discussions of the literature take on a life of their own, diverting him from his main task. But when he sticks to that task, and he usually does, he makes a distinctive contribution, one worth careful study.

He offers four conditions of a belief's being justified.

*The Basing Condition*: The believer must hold the belief because of something, $x$.

*The Rational Connection Condition*: $x$ must provide a complete reason for the belief.

*The Competence Condition*: The believer must have mastered the constituent concepts.

*The Basis Condition*: The believer must be able to take it for granted that any beliefs or assumptions involved in $x$ are sound.

A justification is based on experience when $x$ combines an experience with the assumption that there are no countervailing considerations. Otherwise the justification is derived from other justified beliefs.

His defence of the four conditions is nicely complex, and there is much to discuss. I shall limit myself to three main concerns here.

(i) The Competence Condition requires a believer to be guided by inference patterns, or quasi-inference patterns, of the type mentioned in the Rational Connection Condition. The requirement is similar to the Wittgensteinian notion that concepts-users must be governed by criteria of application. But unlike criteriologists, Millar does not think the patterns must be regarded as fixed. He thinks a believer can treat them as contingent without displaying conceptual incompetence. And, although they are contingent, he does not think they have to be justified. In his view, 'groundless' beliefs in contingent evidential links are legitimate as long as they reflect the way we think and internalize the norms that govern our actual practices. His answer to disgruntled sceptics is that to demand anything more than this is to set a condition on our evidence that is inconsistent with our actual system of justification.

I'm afraid I share the sceptic's disgruntlement on this one. I think a sceptic can properly demand something that our actual practices fail to deliver, provided the demand is based on the epistemic goal that guides those practices. The sceptic can agree with Millar, for example, that our goal is to have adequate evidence for our beliefs and then argue that our practices fall short of this goal because our nondeductive evidence can't be utilized without adopting groundless inference patterns. If the sceptic is right, beliefs that satisfy Millar's conditions are unjustified. I don't think it's enough to say, in response to this argument, that an account of justification 'is correct if and only if (by and large) beliefs which we would ordinarily and on careful reflection think of as justified satisfy the stated conditions' (207). If our ordinary judgments about the justification of our beliefs are mistaken because our beliefs fall short of the epistemic goal on the basis of which they are judged, our ordinary judgments provide no benchmark for a theory. And this is precisely the kind of mistake the sceptic claims we make. So Millar has to dig deeper, in order to show that his conditions capture our epistemic aspirations and do not just describe our practices.

(ii) When a belief is justified nondeductively, the $x$ that satisfies the Rational Connection Condition is a combination of two things: a reason to hold the belief, and the absence of countervailing considerations. According

to the Basis Condition, the belief is justified only if the believer is in a position to take the absence of countervailers for granted. Anyone sympathetic to scepticism will wonder how a believer can get into such a position, without an awkward regress being generated. Millar shares the wonder, but the way he removes it is pretty quick. He thinks that a believer may simply take 'for granted that there are no countervailing facts in circumstances in which nothing occurs which suggests that such facts might obtain' (118). But the move from 'Nothing has happened to suggest that countervailers exist' to 'Countervailers do not exist' looks alarmingly like the fallacy of *ad ignorantiam*, and Millar does not explain why it isn't. All he does is appeal to ordinary practices: 'Any account of justification which is to be psychologically realistic and reflect our ordinary evaluative practice must allow that this is legitimate and suffices to meet [the conditions of justified belief]' (118). But again, if this is the best we can do, our best probably is not enough to meet the standards we impose on ourselves when we set our epistemic goals.

(iii) Setting sceptical issues aside, I like Millar's case for experience-based justified beliefs. His argument is more thorough than John Pollock's similar case for nondoxastic justification (*Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*), and he avoids having to take a best-explanation approach of the kind found in Bertrand Russell (*Problems of Philosophy*) and Paul Moser (*Knowledge and Evidence*). One question about justification and experience might give him some trouble, however, unless he enriches his account of kinds of justification. Although beliefs about the world are based on experiences and not on beliefs about experiences, a complete theory of justification would tell us how beliefs about one's own experiences are justified. Since their justification is not usually derived from other beliefs, Millar's theory, as it stands now, suggests that they would have to be based on introspective experiences. For anyone suspicious of introspection, this itself is a problem. But there is also the more serious problem of explaining how reports of introspective experiences are justified, how reports of experiences of introspective experiences are justified, and so on. At some point, an appeal to 'experiences' starts to wear a bit thin. So an entirely new kind of justification seems to be required.

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**Edo Pivčević**
*Change and Selves.*
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1990. Pp. vii + 151.
Cdn$56.50: US$36.00. ISBN 0-19-824249-2.

Pivčević's stated aim in this essay is 'to elucidate the conditions under which the supposition that changes do occur makes sense' (vi); near the end of the book (141-2) he summarizes the position he has defended in this way: 'First, change is unintelligible without the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity, and the latter distinction cannot be made clear without a reference to selves. ... Secondly, the existence of an objectively changing world demands not just the possibility but the actual existence of selves. ... Thirdly, and directly following from the preceding two points, no description of the world is complete that does not include the linguistic instruments of self-reference ...'.

If the position itself is somewhat unclear in its meaning, the arguments for it are even murkier. Although he never uses the word, it seems that Pivčević wishes to defend a form of *idealism* deriving from his conviction that 'real' change requires 'real' properties of pastness, presentness, and futurity which in turn require the existence of selves. While the book is very rich, perhaps overrich, in the metaphysical issues it touches upon, one is bound to conclude that its author would have benefited from more focus, detail, and precision in his arguments and less attempt to indicate the connections, real though they be, of his topics with other metaphysical issues.

Pivčević begins by arguing that Zeno's arguments against the reality of change cannot be answered within what he calls the 'naturalistic' conception of the universe — that presupposition of science and most of Western metaphysics that the universe can be adequately described without indexicals, that is, without implicit or explicit reference to the person doing the describing. Furthermore, Pivčević argues, the 'naturalist' is defenseless against the sceptic who says that there may be no change. In his second chapter, Pivčević considers a 'naturalistic' account of change that would make change 'causal'. His refutation of this account amounts to insisting that the 'naturalist' must regard causation as gradual (24), that gradualness requires infinite divisibility, and that infinite divisibility is impossible. So change would be impossible (25). But change is real. Just why the 'naturalist' or anyone must hold that causation requires gradualness so conceived is never made clear.

In the pivotal third chapter, Pivčević rehearses and accepts McTaggart's argument that 'real' change and 'real' time require pastness, presentness, and futurity (and not only succession). In rejecting McTaggart's conclusion that time and change are therefore impossible, he concludes instead that 'past, present, and future are not properties of naturalistically conceived events' (57) but are 'certain temporal modes of experiencing'. Lest one think that this is just an idiosyncratic way of formulating the theory that 'objective' time consists in the mere succession of events (the 'B-theory'), Pivčević's

idealism is evident nearby: '... if there is no observer-related time, there is no time' (63). It is also in this chapter that Pivčević rejects monism (50-1) and begins his argument that attributive change requires 'that there is an enduring, identical subject of change' (45).

The fourth and fifth chapters, on teleology and development, continue this argument with the claim that because the required particulars 'must be capable of internal development' (98), 'it is living organisms themselves that represent the basic particulars and the only enduring subjects of change' (94). But these astonishing theses fit with an earlier argument that '... unless it is possible to treat purposes as essential properties, there is no hope of providing a rational account of the possibility of change' (73), presumably because '... it is only from the point of view of a target state that we can have an adequate grasp of what it is for a sequence of events to be part of a homogeneous and structured process of change rather than representing merely a series of fortuitous happenings that ontologically may not be linked with each other at all' (76-7). And again '... a theory of development as a process in which the observer plays no part ... leads ultimately to a denial of change' (86).

In the final two chapters, Pivčević develops his positive theory including, most importantly, his theory of the self. For '... one cannot significantly speak about things changing independently of the selves who posit them as changing, and hence in assuming the existence of change one is committed to assuming the existence of selves' (115). From the very plausible idea that consciousness and the self require temporal duration Pivčević moves to the problematic thesis that 'a general condition of the intelligibility of any form of change is that it should be possible to attribute, or reflectively appropriate, certain states or experiences as part of one's own biography, and that, therefore, the notion of the self (*qua* extended in unidirectional time) is fundamental' (111). This would seem to be trivially true if it just repeats the premise that selves can exist only in a temporal universe (that is, a universe with change) but implausible if it means that time and change cannot exist without the existence of conscious beings.

Pivčević closes with the insistence that, despite their being the paradigms of enduring particulars, 'Selves are neither substances nor attributes of substances' (144). Instead, they are 'focal points within the broad range of the cognitive activity that is integral to the world's own structure, and, in a sense, helps sustain the latter in being' (144).

If there is a root error in Pivčević's metaphysics of change, it is the only too-widely held belief that time cannot be distinguished from space unless time is more than succession, the increment being pastness, presentness, and futurity. It is this belief that underlies Pivčević's notion of 'real' change just as it did McTaggart's. The mistaken idea is that if time is the mere succession of events, then the 'change' involved is exactly like the spatial 'change' in the landscape one observes as one drives from Iowa to Oregon. But if one fully appreciates the *phenomenological* fact that time as the mere succession of events is entirely consistent with our experience of the world and the

*ontological* facts that not all differences can be grounded in further differences and that the relation that distinguishes temporal order is *just different* from any spatial relation in the same sense that red and green are just different, then one will not be tempted into the reasonings that can lead to Pivčević's unbelievable metaphysics.

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**John Post**
*Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction.*
New York: Paragon House 1991. Pp. xvii + 213.
US$16.95. ISBN 1-55778-204-0.

Post introduces metaphysics at a level intended for undergraduates. In an introduction and three opening chapters, the sheer possibility of metaphysics is defended against recent attacks. Chap. 1 says many attackers wrongly think metaphysics must be a search for essences, or a priorist, or Platonist, or transcendentalist, or opposing all varieties of physicalism. Post instead favours a wide definition which makes 'metaphysics' of every very general account of the world. Chap. 2 considers language-based attacks: logical positivism, and Quine's attack on determinate meanings, and the structuralism of Saussure (which may end in conceptual relativism) and Derrida's deconstruction thereof (which makes texts the only reality). The chapter stresses that metaphysical theories need not involve unknowable things-in-themselves, neither need they be dogmatic, simple or commonsensical — although we should be more confident in the reality of rabbits than in our pet theories of meaning. Chap. 3 considers how recent linguistic theories could help us to fight off anti-metaphysicians. As causal theories of reference show, the moral of Putnam's Twin Earth need not be that determinate meanings, since they are not in the head, cannot be anywhere; but these theories of reference may be superseded by Millikan's biosemantics, which finds clues to the meaning of various symbols, whether words or the dances of bees, in the historical successes of their users.

We then get four chapters on actual metaphysical themes: 'Why Does Anything At All Exist?' (much impressed by quantum-tunneling of the universe out of chaos); 'Unifying the Phenomena' (on the Thales Project of saying what the world is made of); 'Metaphysics and the Human Being' (asking whether any version of physicalism can account for intentionality, value, and experiences of colour etc.); and 'God' (considering some standard

arguments). An Epilogue then insists that a 'non-reductive' approach can give us a universe not 'dead' or 'indifferent to us'.

Post tries hard to be fair to widely varying views, both 'analytic' and 'continental'. He allocates much space, though, to the themes of his *The Faces of Existence: An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics*, and this results in rather a limited introduction to metaphysics. Often he delves so deeply into his own theories that only advanced students could follow him. His opening chapters defending the possibility of metaphysics could baffle and bore anyone not already well acquainted with actual metaphysical themes, too many of which (such as the nature of time or of the spinozistic absolute) get little or no discussion in his pages, ever. Learning much from the book and coming away with much respect for its author, I still feared it would be an unsatisfactory main text for undergraduates. I was bothered, too, by much of whatever metaphysics it gave us. Take its treatment of God. Post suggested that the Argument from Design argues just for a designer of particular plants and animals — which, I protest, monstrously disregards all those writers who instead find Design in the basic plan of a world in which organisms can arise in Darwinian fashion. Again, why does Post think that the existence of something and not nothing, if it could be explained at all, could be so only by a deity who existed outside the universe and whose necessity-of-existence followed from his definition? What about, say, the neoplatonic theory that God is an aspect of the universe, namely, its creative ethical requiredness, a requiredness able to produce it without aid from any divine person?

Perhaps the main interest of the book was its defence of a 'non-reductive' physicalism: even if everything is physically based, new properties 'supervene' in a way uncapturable by simple generalizations. Post emphasized Millikan's view that the long history of a thing, not just its present-day physical structure and operations, would enter into its present-day nature. There was one bizarre main use to which he put this view. Imagine, he said (113), that by some cosmic accident your exact physical double coalesced next to you. Although its physical behaviour would be just like yours, the double could have (and he here quoted Millikan respectfully) no ideas, no beliefs, no intentions, no aspirations, no fears, no hopes — just because it would lack a past. Nonsense, say I. Imagine dragging that double to a cliff edge. The double kicks, screams, protests about not wanting to die. Yet Post-Millikan would hurl him or her to destruction, if not with a clear conscience then at least with a conviction of not having blighted hopes or given rise to fears.

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**Daisie Radner** and **Michael Radner**
*Animal Consciousness.*
Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books 1989. Pp. 253.
US$39.95. ISBN 0-87975-459-1.

*Animal Consciousness* is a detailed scrutiny of the arguments offered, from Descartes onward, against taking the mental life of nonhuman animals as a subject of serious scientific and philosophical study. To this extent the book performs the same kind of useful, barrier-destroying function as Donald R. Griffin's critique of scientific method in *Animal Thinking* (1984) or Bernard E. Rollin's conceptual-analytic treatment in *The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science* (1990).

The Radners' strategy is to lay out the Cartesian roots of the problem in meticulous detail. According to this discussion (which occupies Part I or half of the book), animals were held to be mere automata because they fail two tests which can be used to distinguish humans from mechanical contrivances that resemble them. These are the 'language test' (being able to make intelligible utterances that are judged humanly appropriate to diverse contexts) and the 'action test' (being able to act appropriately or understandingly in a variety of situations wherein the reference standard for such appropriateness is typical human performance). As the Radners show, however, 'from the fact that animals differ from people in [specifiable relevant] ways, all that follows is that animals are not people, as machines in human form are not people. It does not follow that animals are totally lacking in consciousness. In order to arrive at this conclusion, another premise is needed, namely, that having pure thought or reason is somehow a necessary condition for having thought at all' (57-8). They demonstrate convincingly that this additional premise cannot be justified on Cartesian grounds. Nor is it applicable to all actual circumstances in which consciousness is ascribed to humans: 'Looking at [a] drawing, we recognize a face because we have prior knowledge of the human face, but this knowledge does not consist in intellectual apprehension of what it means for something to be a face' (70). It is therefore open to us to assert, against Cartesian objections, that (some) animals have consciousness.

Now if human consciousness is capable of being studied scientifically, then so is animal consciousness. This at any rate is the thesis that the second half of the book explores. The crux of the matter here is that: (a) consciousness is currently undergoing redefinition as a process that is neither necessarily incorrigible nor necessarily self-aware; (b) hypotheses about consciousness (including animal consciousness) can generate observable consequences; and (c) the hypothesis of animal consciousness is not superfluous from an explanatory standpoint, or at least has not been shown to be so. Part II also contains excellent discussions on the impact of evolutionary theory on comparative psychology, of the strengths and weaknesses of ape language experiments, and of some well-known attempts to prove the 'mindlessness' of apparently rational animal behaviour. With respect to the first point it is argued that psychology must accept the centrality of animal cognition as a

force in evolution. In relation to the second the authors observe, interestingly, that 'To conduct a fair test of an animal's ability to learn a language, one must give the animal the means and the opportunity to talk about what an animal would want to talk about' (158), for instance dominance relationships. The absence of such 'fair tests', they suggest, has flawed this type of research throughout. Concerning the second and third points, arrogant and condescending theorizing about animal cognition by luminaries such as Anthony Kenny, Jonathan Bennett, Donald Davidson, and Daniel Dennett is exposed and effectively countered.

Undoubtedly *Animal Consciousness* makes a significant contribution to the history of ideas, and to Cartesian studies in particular. The overwhelming impression one gets from Part I is that the extent of Descartes' writings on animals is prodigious; that the ingenuity he put into denying the obvious facts of animal psychological life is nothing short of astounding; and that the influence of his mechanistic project of explaining animal behaviour is indeed as profound as one had thought.

While it may be true, as the Radners state, that 'much of what Descartes said about animals and their difference from people is still widely considered to be obvious and right' (119), it may be questioned whether an exhaustive examination of Descartes' views on animal consciousness will be enlightening to most readers — even professional philosophers — looking for a resolution of conceptual and methodological issues surrounding the cognitive description of animals' mental processes. One has even greater misgivings concerning this approach in relation to the final chapter, in which the authors seek to draw out ethical implications from their conclusions about animal consciousness. Contemporary ethical discussions typically concern not whether animals are capable of suffering, but the extent to which their suffering should be taken into account in our deliberations and the conditions (if any) under which this suffering is 'necessary' — that is, outweighed by benefits to humans that are allegedly contingent upon it. Whatever may be the case in cognitive science, therefore, there remain very few parties to ethical debates about the treatment of animals and their use for furthering human ends that would not agree to relegate Descartes' views to the ash heap of intellectual history.

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**C. Wade Savage** and
**C. Anthony Anderson, eds.**
*Rereading Russell: Essays on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology.*
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. XII.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1989. Pp. xii + 320.
US$29.50. ISBN 0-8166-1649-3.

This collection of 15 essays 'evolved' (the editors say) from a conference on Russell's later work which was held in the early 1980s at the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science. Not all of the papers derive from that source, however, some (unidentified) having been invited afterwards. Although the focus of the conference was Russell's metaphysics and epistemology from *Analysis of Matter* through *My Philosophical Development*, with special attention to his philosophy of science, the resulting volume extends to Russell's early logic and philosophy of language as well as to his epistemology before 1921. Its distinctiveness for Russell scholars, however, lies in the attention given to philosophy of science, which doubtless reflects the wishes of the late Grover Maxwell, the Center's Director for a decade until 1981, who first suggested the conference. Nine of the papers fall within this area, with the fortunate result that *Analysis of Matter* and *Human Knowledge* gain the exposure long denied them in other collections. The contributors deal with Russell's views on his own ground, with obvious sympathy and respect, even when their endorsements are withheld. Mostly the essays avoid discussing major influences on Russell, such as Bradley, Meinong, Moore or early Wittgenstein, or parallel developments in philosophy contemporaneous with his own, such as logical positivism or Whitehead's philosophy of science; nevertheless, a good many papers locate their discussions within an ample framework of critical views that have accumulated on Russell's thought over the years, thus providing an introduction to somewhat different networks of research. Overall, the collection forms what would certainly have been an attractive *Festschrift* to complement the dated Schilpp volume.

Most of the essays were written, of course, without the benefit of the early volumes in the McMaster series of Russell's collected papers. The major exception is David Pears's piece on Russell's 1913 manuscript, *Theory of Knowledge*, which provides both a précis of this work and some suggestions about what flaws in it led Russell, at the prompting of Wittgenstein, to abandon the project. Because this paper is in some ways an addendum to an earlier essay by Pears, however, and no other paper in the collection concentrates on *Theory of Knowledge*, the editors have missed an opportunity of promoting this work as one of the most important statements of Russell's early epistemology. In terms of scholarly time, our picture of early Russell, the young logician, the idealist turned realist, is a fast-changing one. Major books by Hylton and Griffin have now appeared which make full use of the Russell Archives, and the process will likely continue with the publication of

material related to the *Principles* and *Principia*. This fact should be kept in mind when approaching the papers on logic in this collection by Cocchiarella, Goldfarb (both on Russell's theory of types), Hochberg (on Russell's paradox) and Hylton himself (on the motivation behind 'On Denoting'); these studies, nevertheless, are excellent. The papers on philosophy of science include discussions of induction (Sainsbury; Earman), probability (Hawthorne), causation (Eames), time (Anderson), structural realism (Demopoulos and Friedman), and the nature of Russell's profound commitment to science itself (Blackwell). One paper overlaps with philosophy of language: Smith on indexicals and scientific knowledge; another — Fumerton on causal theories of reference — ignores Russell's use of behaviourism and thus falls squarely within philosophy of language. Russell's familiar writings from 1927 onwards are the focus of these discussions, with the exception of the Anderson paper which concentrates on his less well-known 1936 essay, 'On Order in Time'.

With so much material to be mined, it is understandable that hardly more than slices of Russell's major writings are served up for discussion in these papers, but all the same the result is regrettable, for Russell's tendency was to address philosophical problems in a systematic manner and to offer solutions tied to contexts recognized to be imperfectly understood (whether of common sense or of science). Russell sought to show that human knowledge itself is partial in nature and that, for the philosopher, it is much easier to become aware of its complexity than to discover tools for the exact descriptions of what we know. The sharp focus established in many of these papers tends to eliminate the perspective of tentativeness and progressiveness which Russell sought to infuse into philosophical discussion.

Russell reread is not Russell rehabilitated. Nothing like a school or doctrine emerges from the reappraisal of his later work offered by this collection. Commendably, the defects identified by these papers belong to Russell's arguments and have little to do with the fact that his views seem dated, and the problems cited by several authors are serious ones with which Russell would have wanted to grapple in a 'Replies to My Critics' section. According to Sainsbury, for instance, the problem of scepticism is not met by Russell's postulates of inductive reasoning but re-arises in a new form about whether the credible beliefs we might infer are true. To Demopoulos and Friedman, there is little empirical content that scientific theories, as conceived by structural realists like the later Russell, can provide. To Eames, Russell's later account of causality is circular. Also circular, according to Smith, is his account of egocentric particulars (that is, especially, the attempt to eliminate 'my'). The majority of these papers are worth careful study and reply; the false impression should not be left that this rereading of Russell has produced the final word.

The editors' Introduction provides a useful résumé of the papers and, less helpfully, an interpretive classification of the major phases of Russell's philosophical development; not surprisingly, it reflects the pattern followed by one of the editors (Savage) in his own lengthy paper on the development of Russell's epistemology which examines the status of sense-data and

related claims of certainty. The editors have not furnished the papers with a single system of footnoting, cross-referencing and abbreviations, but this causes little difficulty since the volume is likely to be read selectively. Two of the essays (by Earman and by Demopoulos and Savage) have already appeared in journals in 1985. Grover Maxwell is mentioned in three of the essays and discussed extensively in a fourth (by Hawthorne). Canada is represented in the collection by William Demopoulos of the University of Western Ontario and Kenneth Blackwell of the Russell Archives at McMaster University.

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**Hubert Schwyzer**
*The Unity of Understanding: A Study in Kantian Problems.*
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1990.
Cdn$56.50: US$32.50. ISBN 0-19-824829-6.

In his book on Wittgenstein's later philosophy, H. L. Finch remarks that Wittgenstein successfully completes the overthrow of Cartesianism that Kant began; but he does not show in detail what Kant's shortcomings are nor exactly how Wittgenstein's work succeeds in overcoming those shortcomings. Schwyzer's brilliant little essay is rather the obverse of this: it shows how Wittgenstein's later work overcomes the deficiencies in Kant's premises and presentations, but without making any historic claims for Wittgenstein.

Schwyzer focuses on three questions about the understanding: how and why the categories are, and must be, derived independently of any empirical input; how these nonempirical categories nonetheless apply to empirical objects; and how and why the categories are essential to consciousness. Readers will recognize that these are problems Kant discusses in the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding, in the Schematism, and in the Transcendental Deduction, respectively. Each of Kant's discussions claims that these pure concepts are essential to some aspect of what is generally (not just by Kant) called understanding: coherence and communicability of thoughts, objective thinking, and self-consciousness. At each crucial juncture in his essay Schwyzer argues in detail against those who claim that these are not real problems. He restates the problems and shows how they are present for anyone who looks closely at the matter, just as Kant

said they were, in spite of Kant's sometimes misleading way of formulating them.

But Schwyzer argues that Kant fails to demonstrate a unity in the understanding. That is to say, he fails to show that these three essential accounts of functions of the understanding are accounts of one and the same thing. The three sections of the *Critique* remain three separate accounts of the categories rather than three aspects of one unified account. One aspect of Kant's failure, for example, is that Kant's account cannot overcome the problem of privacy: it claims but does not *show* that there cannot be self-consciousness without the capacity to communicate what one is conscious of.

The essay begins with an introduction: the book is an attempt to get clear about the philosophical aims and convictions that are embedded in Kant's account of the nature of human understanding, and about the problems that it is designed to solve. Schwyzer finds these to be genuine problems, and Kant's account attractive, but that 'Kant's theory, as it stands, does not and cannot succeed in solving these problems.' The second chapter discusses the Schematism, which is Kant's account of how concepts of objects are possible. Schwyzer insists on distinguishing this question from the question how functions of unity are possible, and he therefore (unlike Strawson, Bennett, Warnock, and others) sees the Schematism as addressing a genuine and important problem, one that is connected with Kant's distinction between understanding and judgment (also disdained by the same scholars). Here and in the next chapter he argues (with Bennett) that the understanding has dual complementary aspects, a 'vertical' dimension realized in the recognition of objects and a 'horizontal' dimension realized in the coherence and intelligibility of thoughts; and he finds that Kant fails to unify his accounts of these two dimensions.

The fourth chapter discusses the Transcendental Deduction, where Schwyzer again finds that Kant's text addresses a real rather than a spurious problem. He takes up the problem in the long fifth chapter, 'Sentience, Apperception, and Language.' One large barrier to reading Kant right on these matters is the conception (most recently argued by Guyer) that Kant holds all consciousness to be self-consciousness. Schwyzer very carefully and convincingly refutes this reading, leaving Kant with a much more plausible view about the three functions of pure concepts. It is nonetheless an unsatisfactory view, because of a rather too Cartesian flavor to Kant's conception of following rules, the topic taken up in the long sixth chapter.

Kant rightly conceives understanding to be both spontaneous (that concepts cannot be generated through confrontation with what is given) and rule-governed. Schwyzer locates a main failure of Kant's elaboration of this conception in his mistaken understanding of rules. Kant holds that all consciousness, since it conforms to the categories, involves following rules. He requires, however, that the rules (categories) be 'in the understanding' without being objects of consciousness (for they would then require further categories to conform to), and this seems a contradiction. Schwyzer, following Wittgenstein, argues that the only way out of the difficulty is to view

following rules as ineluctably and irreducibly practical. This gives him the basis for constructing a unified account of the three essential aspects of the understanding identified by Kant.

The scholarly quality of the essay is impressive. Schwyzer's reading of Kant differs from those of Bennett, Strawson, Stroud, Guyer, and others, and he reports and analyzes their views judiciously. There is never a survey of the literature; indeed, in the critical sixth chapter, which discusses consciousness as rule-governed and therefore engages, implicitly, the vast literature about Wittgenstein on privacy, there is only one parenthetical reference to Kripke. Instead Schwyzer makes use of these other authors when it is essential for his argument that a common misreading of Kant be refuted. He cites Bennett and Strawson in this manner in the second and third chapters, Stroud briefly in the fourth, and Guyer in the fifth. With Bennett and Guyer he engages in extensive discourse, quoting them generously and confronting their readings of Kant at length. He is so forthright, so respectful, and so focused on his central theme in these confrontations that I would expect Bennett and Guyer to feel more honored than abused by his treatment of them.

Schwyzer's style is elegant throughout. Not only does he take great pains to explain clearly what Kant means; he also articulates in relatively simple terms, employing a minimum of jargon, what the difficulties are that must be faced in the next stage of the essay. I found no transitions that were abrupt or unintelligible, and very few that depended on special terminology. The book really is, therefore, a unified essay, and in its combination of faithfulness to both texts and problems it is a model contribution to philosophy.

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**Hugh Silverman, ed.**
*Writing the Politics of Difference.*
Albany: State University of New York Press
1991. Pp. xvi + 372.
US$59.95. (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0497-8);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0498-6).

Philosopher kings (and queens) on this continent often tend to use their still considerable power and prestige to foster and maintain an authoritarian 'us-them' distinction. 'They' — continental philosophers — are those who are more interested in subject matter which does not allow the sort of precision and rigour which logical and linguistic analysis reportedly provides. Conti-

nental philosophy is North American philosophy's Other. Like the return of the repressed, however, European philosophers, and the philosophers and philosophical commentators who make reference to them, manage to make their presence felt here. A measure of that presence can be found in the strength and size of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) which has recently opened itself up to its own Other — feminism and poststructuralism. As I recall, the 1986 meeting of the Society was an important and lively event. Half of the fifty or so papers presented there have just been published under the title *Writing the Politics of Difference*.

The title alludes to the wide variety of philosophical positions which are often lumped unceremoniously together under the generic term 'continental philosophy'. In this book, however, the notion of difference (and of its politics) has far too broad a range of meanings to serve as a useful organisational tool. It recommends itself inasmuch as it suggests the pervasive presence of Derrida throughout the essays, but, except on an extremely general level, it fails to provide a thematic which accurately reflects its contents. In his introduction, Hugh Silverman writes that he has grouped together the essays in Part One ('Rereading the Traditions of Difference in Continental Philosophy') in terms of their appurtenance to Hegel and the Hegelian tradition. Silverman claims that '[t]he inscription of Hegel in continental thought can be regarded as central. And yet the multitude of readings of Hegel is nothing short of dispersive' (xii). Silverman is certainly correct about Hegel's centrality but, unfortunately, he does nothing more than to posit this 'inscription'. He neither attempts to analyse it nor to account for it. Such an analysis would have been helpful to those less familiar with the trends represented in the essays. The essays in Part Two ('Writing Differences in Continental Philosophy') focus 'more specifically on the writing of difference in contemporary thought' (xiii). To be *even more* specific, they deal with issues related to the philosophy of language, feminism, politics, aesthetics and, finally, with the future of continental philosophy itself.

Silverman refers to the rather belated inclusion of trends other than phenomenology and existentialism within SPEP's yearly meetings. One sees evidence of SPEP's wider embrace in Section Six of Part Two ('The Politics of Difference') in which three feminist essays have been published. Curiously, though, despite the express intention of the Society to include debates in poststructuralism and 'postmodernism' (x), one finds little corroboration of this in the book. Although Derrida's work figures in many of the essays, there is no section on his work — not to speak of the work of Foucault, Baudrillard, Lyotard, Deleuze and others. This absence is particularly glaring in light both of Silverman's remarks and of the title — since the (ostensibly Hegelian) problem of difference gained currency as the result of its revival by poststructuralists. It would have been appropriate to have included in the meeting (and, by extension, in the book) work devoted specifically to the problem of difference (and *différance*) in poststructuralism and 'postmodernism.'

Despite these very general problems, the work published here is of very high quality. I was particularly impressed by the Canadian contributions.

John Michelsen's 'Kierkegaard's Stages on Life's Way', Patricia Mills' 'Women's Experience', and Claude Piché's 'Art and Democracy in Habermas', are very well-written and insightful papers. Michelsen finds a surprising dichotomy in Kierkegaard's work between the aesthetico-religious and ethical stages (53). He suggests that Kierkegaard's phenomenology of the ethical could serve to establish a secular ethics based on intersubjectivity. Mills' discussion of critical theory and its treatment of women's experience shows the strength of that theory in its formulation of women's experiences as 'experiences of the dialectic of desire and recognition within the civilizing process' (133). It also criticises the theory for its lack of specificity and for failing to analyse the role of women as historical agents (126). Piché discovers a line of development in Habermas' work which leads to the rejection of the cognitive element in art (273). 'It is as though Habermas considers aesthetics in terms of its etymological sense of *aithésis*, as an object of pure sensibility' (272). Apart from these papers, there are important contributions from a number of well-known American and European scholars like Claude Lefort, Bernhard Waldenfels and Terry Winant, to name only a few.

The final section of the book deals with the future of European philosophy. Following Heidegger, Joan Stambaugh urges that we 'cultivate and be open to nonmetaphysical thinking' (275). Gianni Vattimo recommends that contemporary philosophy's move towards secularisation also become a 'task for our moral and theoretical self-consciousness' (289). Finally, David Wood hopes that we recover 'the philosophical power of the English language' in order to enrich it and make it capable of translating 'those who swim in other waters' (295). These are, to be sure, timely suggestions. I am, however, surprised that no one gave more practical advice. The situation of European philosophy in North America is a political one. Not only does European philosophy dare to address political issues in neo-conservative America from, generally speaking, a left-wing perspective, but its suppression by the powers-that-be is politically motivated. If the writers of this book are indeed writing the *politics* of difference, they should certainly be capable of applying their understanding of difference, of otherness, to their own situation and of challenging the hegemony of the equally misnamed but politically conservative 'analytic philosophy'.

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**Robert C. Sleigh, Jr.**
*Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on their Correspondence.*
New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1990. Pp. xv + 237.
US$28.50. (cloth: ISBN 0-300-04565-4).

Bertrand Russell felt that his understanding of Leibniz had been transformed by reading the correspondence with Arnauld, together with the *Discourse on Metaphysics* which gave rise to it. Subsequent readers may have rejected many of Russell's interpretations, but they have generally agreed with him about the importance of the exchange between Leibniz and Arnauld. In later works, such as the *Monadology*, Leibniz tends to serve up his metaphysical doctrines in a 'take it or leave it' fashion. In correspondence with Arnauld, by contrast, Leibniz is forced to clarify and defend his theories in response to the objections of a first-rate philosophical critic. Moreover, as Robert Sleigh shows in this scholarly, penetrating, and closely-argued study, Leibniz was still making up his mind on a number of central issues. In the letters to Arnauld we see a philosopher at work.

Arnauld's talents as a philosophical critic were known to Leibniz before the exchange began; Arnauld had already gone public with his powerful objections to the theories of Descartes and Malebranche. It might seem, then, that there is no mystery about why Leibniz sent the *Discourse* (or rather a summary thereof) to Arnauld; he wanted to try out his philosophical ideas on an extremely able judge. In the early chapters of his book Sleigh argues that this is not the whole story. According to Sleigh, Leibniz's motives in approaching Arnauld were, at least in part, theological. Leibniz intended the *Discourse* to lay the intellectual foundations for his cherished project of Protestant-Catholic reunification, and in sending the work to Arnauld he sought to gain the assurance of a leading Catholic that there was nothing heretical about his views. Sleigh fails to notice, however, that there is an obvious problem with this explanation. For as he himself observes, and as Leibniz must have known, Arnauld was in serious trouble with the Catholic hierarchy because of his Jansenist leanings. If Leibniz wanted the support of influential Catholics for his ecumenical project, there was no reason for him to turn to Arnauld. Perhaps Sleigh would argue that Leibniz was politically naive, but it is surprising that he does not address this problem.

The heart of the book is to be found in Chapters 4 through 7 which analyze the philosophical debate between Leibniz and Arnauld; here the main topics are freedom and contingency, substance, and causality. Sleigh treats the first of these topics with all the rigour and care we would expect from him. In contrast to some scholars, such as Mates, he argues that Leibniz on the whole did not favour superessentialism — the doctrine that all the properties of an individual are essential to that individual — although he did accept a weaker thesis which he calls superintrinsicalness. These issues have of course been extensively discussed in the literature, but Sleigh breaks new ground, I think, by arguing that the 'possible free decree' defence of contingency which

Leibniz develops in correspondence with Arnauld is not in competition with the notorious account in terms of infinite analysis; rather, the latter is intended to put the former on a firm, non-circular footing. Sleigh's discussion also includes a very helpful explanation of hypothetical necessity.

In the chapters on substance and substantial forms Sleigh criticizes both old and new orthodoxies. Sleigh has little sympathy with the Russell-Couturat thesis that Leibniz derived his metaphysics from his logic. In an admittedly speculative section Sleigh argues that the metaphysical thesis of spontaneity is actually built into the concept of an individual substance. It is of the nature of an individual substance that it is an entity which remains numerically the same through time, and on Sleigh's reading of Leibniz, this requires that 'each noninitial state of an individual has as its real cause some predecessor state of that individual' (131); in other words, it requires the spontaneity thesis. Sleigh also challenges the more recent view that in the *Discourse* and correspondence with Arnauld Leibniz was straightforwardly committed to the existence of corporeal substances. Making good use of manuscript material Sleigh shows that Leibniz flirted with a number of options around the time of these two works, and that though on balance he may have favoured a version of the corporeal substance theory, there are also hints of the later monadology.

In some ways the most lively and original section of this book concerns the topic of causality. In a chapter entitled 'Action' Sleigh analyzes a number of Leibniz's objections to Malebranche's occasionalism and argues that they tend to miss the mark. This does not mean that in Sleigh's view there are no problems with occasionalist teaching; in a penetrating discussion he shows that Malebranche has difficulty arguing that God is a real cause of changes in the world. But what is striking about this chapter is that Malebranche is treated as a worthy adversary of Leibniz. Surely the time is now past when scholars could get by with a caricature of Malebranche's views.

*Leibniz and Arnauld* is not an easy book to read. Sometimes Sleigh seems to go out of his way to make life difficult for his readers. Chapters tend to begin without any indication of the direction in which the argument is headed; interpretations are put forward, seemingly with the author's endorsement, only to be discarded a few pages later. Moreover, the methods of analytical philosophy are sometimes carried to excess. Surely it is not really necessary, for instance, to explain Arnauld's views on grace (in what is clearly a scene-setting chapter) in the following way: 'By [efficacious grace] he meant a kind of grace such that whenever a human agent S performs a meritorious action A at some time $t$ (provided $t$ is after the Fall), S freely chooses to do A at $t$. Nonetheless, there is a grace $g$ of the efficacious variety such that $g$ occurred in S at $t$, and the occurrence of $g$ in S brought it about that S chose to do A' (28). But if reading *Leibniz and Arnauld* requires an effort, it is an effort which all serious students of Leibniz will have to make, for the book is richly rewarding.

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**Tony Smith**
*The Logic of Marx's Capital: Replies to Hegelian Criticisms.*
Albany: State University of New York Press 1990. Pp. xii + 271.
US$54.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0267-3);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0268-1).

Authors often succeed at secondary tasks even when their explicitly stated goals go unrealized. Moreover, they sometimes make a great contribution in executing secondary tasks despite being unable to realize their own more ambitious goals. Tony Smith is a writer of considerable intellectual power and perspicacity. So one would anticipate an important contribution from him in this work. And indeed he doesn't disappoint us with the contribution he makes, but is has to do with what for him are secondary tasks rather than with the goal he sets himself.

This goal was to show that a Hegelian-style method of generating categories out of one another can be fruitful and that in particular it was fruitful in the application Marx made of it. He shows that Marx's sequence of categories in *Capital* can be seen as unfolding according to the Hegelian method of going from simple unities to differentiated complexes and finally to unifications of these complexes. But he wants to show that this was more than an expository device; he wants to claim that this was the core of the Marxian method. In this I think he failed. He does though succeed admirably in putting the economics of Marx's *Capital* in its strongest light against critics of a variety of kinds, including Hegelians such as Klaus Hartmann in *Die Marxsche Theorie* (1970) and Richard Dien Winfield in *The Just Economy* (1988). Yet he does this in a way that doesn't really depend on the Hegelian theory of categories. In short, Smith's carefully constructed and imaginative arguments bolster the Marxian critique of capitalism without convincing us that Marx's reliance on Hegel's category theory added anything to the force of that critique.

Smith's book has two parts, the first being a discussion of the dialectical logic that makes up the Hegelian theory of categories and the second being an interpretation of the high points of the system of *Capital* in terms of that logic.

Smith's handling of dialectical logic avoids the common pitfall of treating it as being the heart of an imminent development of categories detached from an empirical object domain. Nonetheless, the intelligibility of an object domain — such as capitalism in the case of Marx — depends on reconstructing it through categories. And for Smith the categories of an object domain admit of an ordering by way of the distinction between unity, difference, and unity-in-difference. For example, money as a measure of value, money as a medium of exchange, and money as an end in itself are categories in *Capital* that are ordered by this distinction. Such an ordering, though essential for getting at what is intelligible, is not, Smith insists, to be confused with the ordering of historical events.

Smith is concerned with several issues when relating dialectical logic to *Capital*. Does it apply to *Capital*, or is Marx's work better understood in some other way? If it applies, is it correctly applied, or did Marx make assumptions that are arbitrary from the standpoint of dialectical logic? Did *Capital* present a purely Hegelian analysis, or did Marx and Hegel differ on the way dialectical logic should apply? Smith lines all the possibilities up in an analytical *tour de force*, and then devotes the second part of his book to discussing them in the context of dealing with Marx's categories of value, money, exploitation, capital, accumulation, circulation.

What Smith doesn't show to my satisfaction is that the ordering of categories by the unity-difference dialectic adds to the explanatory power of Marx's method. Consider the transition from money as a medium of exchange to money as an end. As a medium money stands between a commodity that is sold and a commodity that is bought. Thus we have the circuit C-M-C. But this circuit can, if sale is not directly followed by purchase, split into different moments, C-M and M-C. This fragmentation can be overcome through replacing it with the unitary circuit M-C-M, a circuit in which money is the beginning and end but no longer the medium of exchange. What is one to make of this transition from difference to unity-in-difference?

If we look at the transition as based merely on the abstract possibility of *commercium interruptum* then we cannot appeal as Smith does to a 'structural tendency' for the moments C-M and M-C to come apart, leaving us with money as the end of the process. A structural tendency is based on something more than such an abstract possibility. Marx does, however, talk about a split between sale and purchase in more concrete terms, terms that would allow us to identify a structural tendency. The producer may take a long time to complete a production project, but in the meantime he or she must make continual purchases of the means for life. Thus such a producer will save the money from the sale of his or her product, spending it only gradually on the means for life. The M-C-M circuit may, then, seem more appropriate for such a producer.

What I intend to show by this is that the operative factor in the account of money as an end is not the conceptual drive from C-M-C to its moments C-M and M-C and then to the unity-in-difference of the circuit M-C-M. As far as I can tell there simply is nothing compelling the intellect to move along such an axis. What does move the intellect in a case like this is the fact, mentioned above, that though one eats every day one doesn't harvest every day. (Marx also remarks that since the velocity of the circulation of commodities varies there will be a need for a hoard of money that can be put into circulation in periods of more rapid commerce.) Where Smith seems to me to exaggerate the importance of Hegelian category theory is in his assumption that categories themselves establish structural tendencies leading to other categories. The most we can say is that certain categories, like money as a medium, leave open the possibility for other categories, such as money as an end. A structural tendency leading from one to the other will bring into play concrete features underived from the categories themselves.

The next step in the Marxian dialectic is the transition from money as an end to capital, from M-C-M to M-C-M', where M' > M. Here there is an advance from a simple unity to difference, from money to different quantities of money. But the operative factor in the transition is, as Smith himself says, something more concrete. It is the self-interest of individuals that motivates them to pursue, not just money, but more money.

A self-interest that leads to making more money can't, though, be claimed to be a universal, for we have just seen that in some cases hoarding makes perfect sense. The self-interest that is behind this transition to capital is fashioned by the object domain of capitalism itself. So it is really the structural tendencies of capitalism as the object domain that lead us to organize these categories as we do.

Similarly, the derivation Smith gives of exploitation from labor power as a commodity is supposed to rest on the break up of the unity established by the labor contract as a result of the disparity of wealth between workers and owners. Introducing wealth here goes beyond the category of labor power as a commodity. In fact, in introducing wealth Smith goes beyond pure value concepts, which are the basis of the alleged derivation, to a concept that involves the idea of control as well. The assumption at this early stage of wealth differentials is characteristic of Weberian and Analytical Marxist treatments of the economy. But I would argue that in Marx wealth can be articulated only on the basis of control within a mode of production and that, hence, control introduces a break in the sequence of pure value concepts.

Smith treats the numerous transitions of *Capital* as exemplifications of the unity-difference dialectic. As an expository device such a treatment has merits. But we should not claim more for it. There are, I believe, structural tendencies within an object domain such as capitalism — the law of value, the division of classes, the accumulative tendency, the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. These tendencies are articulated in terms of economic and social categories, and the tendencies and categories are subject to direct or indirect empirical check. There are many ways in which categories are related in the articulation of these tendencies; one cannot begin to illustrate the specificity of their relations through a dialectic of unity and difference.

Smith has a reply to this that is disarmingly simple. He says that category theory does not mirror historical developments. Category theory gives more than contingent connections with its structural tendencies. But as only tendencies, these connections need not be what we actually observe. For example, in category theory capital derives from value, yet historically capital often came from outside the exchange process through forcible primitive accumulation.

This reply, though, doesn't touch my objection. I too want structural tendencies to be based on something harder than mere contingency. My objection is that the necessity encapsulated in these tendencies does not come from a dialectic or unity-difference. These tendencies are indeed the framework in which we place contingent events in order to understand how they

will develop. This framework is not generated from Marx's central concept, value, plus dialectic. We form the crucial categories and with them their connections not by a dialectic of unity and difference but by an iteration of tries at giving an account of the outstanding problems associated with the object domain. The necessity of those connections comes not from such a dialectic but from the greater reliability reached with successive iterations.

Not only is the dialectic of unity-difference unhelpful in establishing tendencies. It is also dangerous if it is taken as more than an expository device. For example, Smith takes it that the dialectical steps leading from exchange value to capital makes any talk of market socialism suspect. If indeed all the transitions in this dialectical chain were based solely on unity and difference, then there might be something to such suspicion. The market would lead to private capitalism, which repels socialism. But those transitions were, as I pointed out, based on other things as well. For the key transitions to hold it is necessary to presuppose attitudes and behaviors that are characteristically capitalist. Once the object domain is socialism rather than capitalism the assumption of these attitudes and behaviors is illicit. The transition to capital in the socialist-market context would, were it inevitable, depend on other factors. My misgivings about the market stem not from belief in a dialectical logic that necessitates private capital. They stem, rather, from its undesirable direct effects on humans.

Now for an illustration of a major way Smith succeeds. This has to do with the very timely issue of the freedom of the market and the implications of it for civil society and the state. Hegel and his followers like Winfield emphasize freedom as the substance of economic value. Civil society as a domain of the market is then a domain of freedom, which the state merely takes to a higher level. This allows the Hegelian to locate the economy and the state beyond the level of essence, where imposition and subordination are the key notes, at the level of notion, where freedom and the overcoming of restrictions are the key notes. Moreover, it leads to an interpretation of profit as the result of free exchanges rather than of Marxian exploitation.

In response to this currently popular refrain about market freedom, Smith carefully and systematically points to the ways the market system is constrained and to the ways the state is itself constrained by the market and accumulation. The way in which, in the long run, commodity exchange is regulated by labor productivity gives the lie to the view that individuals are free to make just any exchanges. There is to be sure an element of freedom in exchange, but it is a freedom that works out of the context of this tendency for commodity exchange to be regulated by productivity. This being the case, profits don't come from the fact that producers get buyers to agree to give them more than their production costs. It is not the creativity of free will that begets profits, but the tendency of buyers and sellers to be constrained by what went into the production process.

Without resorting to a determinism, Smith dispels the Hegelian idea of civil society and the state as regions of freedom, pointing to the need for the widely shared control promised by socialism before freedom in the

Hegelian sense can be realized. But he accomplishes this important task without having to rely on the Hegelian dialectic of categories.

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**Ernest Sosa**
*Knowledge in Perspective:*
*Selected Essays in Epistemology.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.
Pp. xi + 298.
US$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-35628-8);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-39643-3).

This collection presents Sosa's most important epistemological essays. Part 1 consists of four essays on propositional knowledge. Part 2 includes four essays on epistemic justification. Parts 3 and 4 together consist of eight essays that motivate and develop Sosa's 'virtue perspectivism', a distinctive approach to justification and knowledge that incorporates some familiar themes from reliabilism and coherentism. Previously unpublished essays include the collection's Introduction and the essays 'Testimony and Coherence' and 'Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue'. Two other essays, 'Theories of Justification: Old Doctrines Newly Defended' and 'Intellectual Virtue in Perspective' draw on some of Sosa's recently published papers not reprinted here.

Sosa objects to standard versions of foundationalism as follows: 'Something is missing in a believer who accepts a necessary truth that is too complex for that believer to know it *just* on the basis of believing it; ... something is also missing in the introspective belief that one has visual experience of a dodecagon when this figure is too complex for one to discriminate it and identify it *just* by introspection' (9). What is missing, according to Sosa, is a certain faculty, or intellectual virtue, involving the distinguishing of necessary truths and dodecagons. Foundational knowledge, on this view, rests on a noninferential faculty that enables reliable belief-formation. Sosa faults standard versions of foundationalism for 'a wide scattering of diverse principles [that] does not make for a satisfactory epistemology' (73). He seeks 'systematic epistemology': 'principles that will play a role in epistemology analogous to the role played in utilitarian ethics by a principle of utility...' (75).

Sosa faults standard versions of coherentism too, on the ground that 'our ordinary bodies of belief as we know them depend essentially for their

warrant on the special character of some of their contents. First-person beliefs and present-tense beliefs have a special role' (77-8; cf. 96-7, 184-6, 203-6). Sosa also questions the common coherentist assumption that only propositional attitudes can provide warrant for propositional attitudes (170).

Sosa's virtue perspectivism invokes a kind of reliabilism to account for *unreflective* 'animal' knowledge. It construes such knowledge in terms of 'aptness' of belief: i.e., truth-conduciveness of a belief's generating faculty relative to a field, *F*, of propositions in circumstances *C* (where such *Fs* and *Cs* are 'appropriately usable by us for reasonable generalizations about our intellectual aptitudes') (291). The latter condition regarding what is 'usable by us' leads Sosa to stress a social component of knowledge (27, 275-6). An intellectual virtue is a competence to acquire truth and avoid error within a certain socially determined field of propositions and set of circumstances. *Reflective* knowledge, arguably depending on unreflective knowledge, requires justification of a reflective sort; it requires the use of 'coherence-seeking reason' relative to one's epistemic perspective. 'The justification of a belief *B*', on Sosa's view, 'requires that *B* have a basis in its inference or coherence relations to other beliefs in the believer's mind...' (289; cf. 247-8).

Sosa holds that 'one is justified in believing [an] ostensible memory or intuition because one justifiedly attributes the belief in question to one's trustworthy memory or intuition', and that 'since the products of such faculties are very likely true, this helps in turn to sustain our faith in the particular beliefs in question' (280). One's meta-belief in the virtue of memory, on this view, justifies one's accepting an ostensible memory. What, however, can effectively justify one's meta-belief in the virtue of memory? What can effectively justify the claim that 'the products of such faculties are very likely true'? These questions do not ask whether one's *coherent beliefs* entail, or otherwise support, that memory is reliable. They rather ask what, if anything, can provide a cogent defense of the alleged reliability of memory against familiar skeptical queries. Sosa has suggested that '*by one or another route* what the skeptic ends up demanding is absolute proof...' (193). The previous questions ask not for absolute proof, but for a non-questionbegging reason supporting the alleged reliability of memory, a reason that does not beg a key question against the skeptic. It is doubtful that we can deliver such a reason; coherence of mere beliefs will surely not do the job. If we lack resources to defend against skeptical queries, we must ask whether we are entitled to disavow skepticism about the reliability of memory, perception, and the like. Virtue perspectivism evidently does not entitle us cogently to disavow such skepticism. It does not differ, however, from other epistemological accounts in this respect.

Perhaps a reply from virtue perspectivism is that a notion of *effective* justification, relying on talk of non-questionbegging reasons, is not socially useful for 'reasonable generalizations'. We must, however, be careful in our use of 'reasonable' now; for the skeptic is questioning what exactly is reasonable. The skeptic will typically be unmoved by considerations of social utility; she will demand effective justification for claims to reliability regardless of

its contribution to our social projects. If we cannot deliver such justification, we should acknowledge this, and concede that a cogent defense against the skeptic may not be forthcoming. Appeals to subjective coherence, social utility, and common sense will not cogently answer the skeptic's queries; nor, apparently, will anything else. Perhaps, then, we need to concede that claims to reliability are questionbegging against the skeptic.

Suppose we employ a particular *notion* of knowledge on the basis of its usefulness in sustaining the sorts of generalizations we seek. If someone else finds utility in a different notion of knowledge, we have a kind of *conceptual relativism*: different people wield different notions of knowledge. Such relativism seems to characterize contemporary epistemology. At any level of specificity, various epistemologists seemingly wield different notions of knowledge and of justification. This conceptual divergence is rarely acknowledged, but raises important meta-epistemological questions: How can we adjudicate varying conceptual theses in epistemology? Must we invoke variable pragmatic considerations? If so, what sort of universality or objectivity, if any, is available in epistemology? Once we introduce a social component for knowledge-ascription, such questions arise immediately. Their answers are, unfortunately, less immediate.

Sosa's collection is required reading for contemporary philosophers. It presents and assesses leading epistemological views with remarkable skill and insight, and develops an original account of knowledge and justification that improves on previous views. This collection illuminates a vast area of epistemology, an area vastly improved by Sosa's careful work.

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**Christine Sypnowich**
*The Concept of Socialist Law.*
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1990. Pp. xiv + 195.
Cdn$62.50. ISBN 0-19-825246-3.

If Rousseau's claim that 'men are born free but everywhere are found in chains', is to be read with a pair of universal quantifiers and so would be applicable to a socialist utopia, one may well ask what the chains would look like in this utopia. This is the purpose of Christine Sypnowich's book.

The argument of this book is to challenge the claim that in such a socialist utopia, law will somehow 'wither away'. Her point is although due to the abolition of capitalist institutions such as private property (but not personal 'effects': 129) some of capitalist law will become irrelevant, yet law as an

institution will still be present, albeit in a form different from its capitalist predecessor.

The book contains six chapters which cumulatively establish her thesis. The first chapter is a careful discussion of various Marxist perspectives on the function of law and how these perspectives may shape the 'withering away' thesis. The claim is that law should not be viewed as a means of regulating capitalist market relationships, perpetuating the domination of one class over another, conning the proletariat by offering formal legal 'rights' with little or no meaningful content, or the like. Rather, a better conception of law is that it is an institution which mediates interpersonal conflicts. That conception is present in the bourgeois conception of law (though motivated by selfishness); and given — as Sypnowich rightly assumes — 'conflict will outlive classes and disputes will need regulation long after the demise of bourgeois market relationships' (27) an arbiter of these conflicts is necessary. These are the chains of socialist society: socialist law.

Chapter two is a discussion of justice and the sources of socialist law. Sypnowich begins this discussion by examining both the natural lawyer's and legal positivist's accounts of the sources of law. Both are rejected: the former, because Marxists find problematic the natural lawyer's 'attempt to offer a moral standard that transcends the different moral situations which may arise in a society, not to mention those posed by different cultures and historical epochs' (31). The rejection of the latter is more puzzling. Her conclusion is 'It [legal positivism] fails to consider that the tyrannical system may not be law precisely because its procedures lack the moral dimension intrinsic to the procedural sources of valid law' (41). I had always believed that concerns of morality (whether procedural or substantive) were irrelevant to the concerns of legal positivists in their attempt to identify valid law. To make claims that 'the immorality of its [a bad law's] procedural source bears on its validity as law' (39) seems to require further elucidation, before — at least — I accept her argument as refuting legal positivism.

Sypnowich's concern with procedural morality gives us a hint at what she believes to be the moral source of socialist law: a set of procedural standards in the framing of the law which will make 'it a fair and rational guide for citizens' behaviour' (57) including nonretroactivity, promulgation, consistency, etc. It is somewhat ironic that her standards look very much like Fuller's.

The third chapter is very interesting. Entitled 'Freedom and the Rule of Law' it is a discussion of the possibility of conflict between the goals of freedom and social justice. She argues that these in a socialist society are compatible, indeed more so than under capitalism. The socialist conception of law ought to recognize the negative conception of freedom as absence of constraints, but recognizing the 'multifarious forms constraints may take' (82) which are too often ignored by those who in the name of worshiping liberty argue that capitalist freedom is the only way of obtaining liberty. Her target is Hayek.

The two key chapters of her work are chapters four and five, in which Sypnowich discusses what human rights in a socialist society would look like. Contra the usual Marxist dogma that rights are a poor instrument for achieving socialist change (vide Marx's own claims in this regard quoted on p. 87), she argues that rights are indeed necessary in a socialist society. View rights not as some presocietal set of natural rights, but as something which protects and forwards human dignity, autonomy and/or any other goal for which socialism may wish to strive. These are the sort of rights which would be found in a socialist society and be protected under socialist law.

In order to establish this thesis, Sypnowich argues that even under a socialist government there will still be conflicts among individual interests in society. Rights in the above sense will therefore be necessary to mediate among these conflicts. Accordingly she concludes, 'Rights to privacy, security of person and effects, and the right to form cultural, political, and economic [!!] associations outside of the public decision-making forum, are just a few examples of how rights would secure the socialist citizen's interest in autonomy' (129).

While I have my reservations about the extent to which economic rights should be protected in a socialist society, I have no similar reservations with other aspects of her claim. Unless the society is composed of a monocultural group of people all of whom share exactly the same interests (hardly a realistic assumption), interpersonal conflict will arise. And rights (moral and legal), viewed as Sypnowich views them, provide perfect arbiters of disputes.

The final chapter examines the obligation to obey socialist law. Sypnowich rightly rejects the claim that due to the differences in the participation of citizens in the formulation of socialist law (absent in capitalist law), socialist law generates an intrinsic obligation of obedience. Participation in the law-making process is not sufficient to generate this sort of obligation.

I have only two other reservations about this book. The first is the 'withering away' thesis itself. It seems patently absurd to suppose that a socialist utopia will contain no law. Though its emphasis will rely less on property than a capitalist system does, some governmental structure and means of social organization must be present: after all, we need to decide whether to drive on the right or left, and a way of ensuring — whatever the decision is made — we all drive on that side.

The second minor concern is her overreliance on (eastern) European sources, at the exclusion of e.g. Chinese writings. I am no expert on Sino-socialism, but perhaps that experiment may shed some light (whether good or ill) on her project.

These reservations aside, this work is excellent. It is a must read for anyone interested in ethics, social and political theory, socialist theory and philosophy of law. It is accessible, yet not superficial, and very informative.

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**Souren Teghrarian, Anthony Serafini, and Edward Cook, eds.**
*Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Symposium on the Centennial of His Birth.*
Wakefield, New Hampshire: Longwood Academic 1991. Pp. xxvii + 239.
US$37.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-89341-593-6);
US$18.50 (paper: ISBN 0-89341-594-4).

The quality of the papers collected in this poorly produced book ranges from excellent to fair. In the latter category is Cook's 'Biographical Sketch' and in the former is the colloquy with Robert Ackermann, Gary Gleb's piece on Tractarian solipsism, and an insightful essay by Michael Quirk on Heidegger and Wittgenstein. The section on rule following is good, and the papers on philosophy of mind read very well, but I must defer to those more qualified for a judgment about the final merits of the arguments.

A third of the book is devoted to the nature of the sociolinguistic practices and the role of philosophy concerning them. If we are to understand Wittgenstein's thoughts on the social, we must first ascertain what he means by the phrase 'forms of life'. This is the most important concept in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, and commentators acknowledge this fact by abundant, but unclear references to it. While first implying that forms of life and language games are coextensive (4,6), Ackermann corrects himself by realizing that the latter are derived from and 'embedded' in the former (10). (Also avoiding linguistic reductionism, other writers in the volume establish this important point [xxv, 32, 227].) I like Ackermann's characterization of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a 'linguistic phenomenology', as long as we always keep in mind that language games arise out of human activities, and as long as we realize that Wittgenstein's idea of phenomenology was far less ambitious than Husserl's attempt to describe every possible horizon of meaning.

Ackermann implicitly supports Gertrude Conway's interpretation of forms of life in *Wittgenstein on Foundations* (reviewed in CPR 11, June 1991). Conway's view is that various cultural life styles are grafted onto specific forms of life such as language, hope, pretending, being certain — all elements of the 'common behaviour of mankind' (PI, §206). Ackermann aptly explains the proliferation of cultural styles with a biological metaphor: 'The human form of life shows itself in the entire range of possibilities of seemingly quite distinct specific forms of life. Like Darwin's finches, speciation may produce variants from a common stock that can seem sharply different, that can no longer backcross and that are adapted to local circumstances ... (10). This ultimately leads to the phenomenon of encountering tribes with which we cannot 'find our feet', and even if we learn their language we could, according to Wittgenstein, not understand them (PI, p. 223). Ackermann also teaches us that a specific life form, such as piety and its many cultural expressions, is not just an 'extension of primitive behaviour' (Z, §545) but a significant 'refinement' of that behaviour, an adaptation so subtle and nuanced that we stand unique in the realm of living beings.

The most engaging essay of the volume is Dale Jacquette's 'Metaphilosophy in Wittgenstein's City', a response to Ackermann's recent book. (Jacquette also has the best understanding of 'forms of life'.) Jacquette attempts to solve the puzzle of why philosophy does not have a place in Wittgenstein's 'City' (PI, §18). It is certainly 'not the acropolis, not even a tiny slum. This is extraordinary, since philosophy as much as mathematics or the language games of color and pain has a grammar embedded in a form of life, a set of shared practices, training, and conventions by which philosophers conduct their business' (34). One by one Jacquette rejects explanations such as: (1) a domesticated philosophy could not exorcise nonsense; (2) Wittgenstein was grossly inconsistent in not allowing philosophy a place in the City; (3) Wittgenstein did not succeed in completing a philosophical grammar that could stand with the other formal science residents; and (4) Ackermann's suggestion that philosophy is the sanitation corps of the City. In response, Souren Teghrarian claims that Jacquette overworks the city metaphor, and Ackermann chides both for assuming that Wittgenstein would accept anything that now goes by the name 'metaphilosophy.'

The cleverest paper in the volume is Gary Gleb's 'Solipsism in the *Tractatus*.' Gleb proposes that there is (1) the 'village' solipsist, who assumes his mind to be a Cartesian ego encountering its ideas; (2) the 'post-village' solipsist, who accepts Kant's critique of Descartes, takes on a transcendental ego instead, but rejects Kant's empirical realism; and (3) the Kantian solipsist, who 'accepts Kant's empirical realism, but unlike Kant, holds that there is just one thing-in-itself, a single transcendental ego' (172). It is generally assumed that Wittgenstein, following Schopenhauer, embraces (3), because of this famous passage in the *Tractatus*: 'solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism' (5.64). Gleb shows that Wittgenstein's arguments against the village variety are rather weak, because he is so intent on eliminating the phenomenal ego (which Gleb revives using Husserl's semantics) that he ignores that ego's problematic knowledge claims. Furthermore, Wittgenstein seems to ignore post-village solipsism altogether, and Gleb does not find convincing David Pears' reconstruction of a Wittgensteinian response.

Michael Quirk contributes much to the ongoing comparative work on Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Quirk begins by noting the paradox of two philosophers, both famous for rejecting traditional moral theorizing, yet both proclaiming a moral vision of the world. Both thinkers have shown us the way out of the false dichotomies of self and world, inner and outer, subject and object. This in turn allows us to transcend the debates between dualism and behaviorism, essentialism and conventionalism. In terms of moral theory, Quirk phrases the point well: 'Only that picture — call it "the spectator theory," logocentrism, and subliming of logic — gives power to the relativistic, skeptical and nihilistic denial of moral objectivity, truth, and rationality' (193). This means that skepticism, as Wittgenstein taught us in *On Certainty*, is parasitic on Cartesian demands for super certainty; and once the latter is removed, the former becomes a chimera. Such a view gives hope for projects

such as Alasdair MacIntyre's, in which our traditions can stand as normative even though we realize their contingency and historicity.

This book is so poorly produced and edited that it ought to be reprinted. There are far too many misprints, missing lines (9,12), and overlapping lines (11,15), and uneven pages. There is no consistent citation format and sometimes one is not sure if the reference is to a section or a page number.

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**Mark Thornton**
*Do We Have Free Will?*
New York: St. Martin's Press 1989.
US$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-312-03146-7).
Newbury Port, MA: Focus Info (for Bristol Classical Press) 1989. Pp. viii + 135.
US$10.95 (paper: ISBN 1-85399-019-1).

This book is part of a series called 'Mind Matters', in which, according to the cover notes and preface, the authors were asked to write 'specifically for the general reader' yet also to 'make their own contributions to the subject'. Mark Thornton opens this book on free will with a short introductory chapter followed by a bit of historical overview, from the Greeks through to the 18th century.

The discussion of more contemporary debates is entertainingly put in terms of 'eighteen reasons for not believing in free will', followed by 'four reasons for believing in free will'. Most of the reasons for not believing, however, (such as predictability, unchosen character as source of our actions, the role of luck, the unconscious, compulsion, and the notion that we always act from our strongest desire), keep coming back to the first one, the 'argument of determinism'. This argument is given its most formal formulation as follows: '(1) All our choices and actions are causally necessitated in accordance with deterministic laws. (2) If all our choices and actions are causally necessitated in accordance with deterministic laws, then we do not have free will. Therefore, (3) We do not have free will' (40).

The argument of determinism gets two chapters devoted to it. The first sets out the basic issues without getting too bogged down in detail. The second tries to present a more systematic and detailed discussion. Thornton warns the beginning reader that this 'is the most difficult chapter in the book' (40), and suggests that it 'can be skipped on first reading' (26), yet in many ways this chapter contains the crux of the discussion.

Thornton explains how the different positions commonly taken on the issue of free will can be understood in terms of different attitudes toward the

specific steps of this main argument. People who accept the first premise (that all choices and actions are causally necessitated) are determinists. 'Libertarians' accept that the truth of determinism would mean we do not have free will (as stated by the second premise), but reject the first premise. People who accept the second premise are called incompatibilists, while those who reject it are compatibilists. A determinist who is also an incompatibilist (one who accepts the whole argument), is a 'Hard Determinist'. Determinists who are compatibilists can reject the conclusion (that we have no free will), and have usually fallen under the heading of 'Soft Determinist'. It is possible to be a compatibilist without being a soft determinist, but the main discussion is couched in terms of the three most common positions: libertarianism, hard determinism, and soft determinism.

Thornton reviews various arguments for each of these different views. For example, he points out places where one might watch for equivocation on the part of the incompatibilist (e.g., in expressions such as 'we can act otherwise than we do act'), and there is some useful discussion of things such as what it could mean to say a person 'could have acted otherwise'. Unfortunately, many of the attacks and counter-attacks seem to be making a very similar point in an only slightly different way, so it is easy to nod one's head in agreement when Thornton suggests one may be 'getting the impression that the argument is going round and round in the same tracks' (50).

After discussing the other reasons against free will and arguing that they add little to the first reason, Thornton considers four reasons for free will: consciousness of free will, presence of choice and decision, second-order desires, and powers of reasoning. His conclusion about these is that, although none of them is convincing on its own, and the argument about determinism still needs to be dealt with, the cumulative effect of these sorts of reasons might indeed 'provide some positive considerations in favour' (116) of free will.

Thornton includes a 10-page chapter on free will and responsibility, in which he concludes (following Strawson) that the issues should be kept separate because responsibility is a normative question whereas free will is an ontological one. The concluding chapter of the book is a very short 'personal postscript' in which the author's own views are spelled out. Thornton follows Kenny in opting for a 'physiological determinist' view, which falls within the compatibilist camp, but is to be distinguished from the traditional soft determinist's 'psychological determinist' view. There is no attempt to give more than a sketch of this view. The book closes with suggestions for further reading, a fairly comprehensive bibliography, and a glossary of terms which is likely to be very useful for beginning readers.

Thornton approaches his subject with wit and sensitivity. Although the waters remain somewhat muddy at the end of the book, that is more the fault of the subject than the author. The book will be challenging to beginning readers, but the challenge is a rewarding one.

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**Cornel West**
*The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism.*
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1989.
US $42.50 (cloth: ISBN0-299-11960-2);
US $18.25 (paper: ISBN0-299-11964-5).

How could I possibly *like* a book by someone with such strong linkages to Marxism, Christianity, Romanticism and Blackness? Reading Cornel West silhouettes (to more conspicuousness than I would ordinarily care to acknowledge) my own secularism, cynicism, neoconservatism and ethnicity. It inclines me to many particular, and particularist, objections.

And yet, irritated as I was by parts of this work, I came to admire the whole of it. All profound thinkers since Heraclitus have been involved in the particularist-universalist dilemma, which means striving to see distantly and transcendentally, while at the same time caring very humanly and specifically. West straddles the dilemma well. While his fighting particularisms are never concealed, there is a tentativeness and graciousness about them. Militant though he sounds, West is more likely to see his enemies as misguided rather than as wicked. In a word, West is genuinely warm, open, thoughtful and considerate — unlike some embattled philosophers and culture critics. The revolutions he wants are conceived in glowing, romantic terms. He tells us of the angers of the wretched of the earth, and he might even think he is providing them with the intellectual wherewithal to do battle. But West himself is remarkably free of vituperation. He generates a philosophical vision which stands as its own reward — might even satisfy a metaphysical itch! For all his efforts to place his vision historically, and to give it practical purpose, it has elements of transcendence and detachment.

This vision is of a 'prophetic pragmatism,' an eventual, even an eschatological, fulfilment of the tradition he carefully examines, and which he wants to 'deepen and enrich.' West's book is at once a history of American pragmatism and a reinvention of it. His title is not pejorative. American philosophy *properly* evades 'epistemology-centered philosophy' with its concerns about transcendence and foundations. Pragmatism (launched by Emerson, a 'petit bourgeois libertarian' concerned with 'power, provocation, and personality') connects ideas with action and can deal with political crisis. In West's account, pragmatism is now in its second great rise, one might even say its second coming.

It is major philosophical feat to produce a coherent portrait of something as esoteric and varied as 'pragmatism'. It required much detailed study and discovery, along with much selecting and emphasizing, to give the account overall tautness and structure. Before returning to the virtues of the book, I attend to some particularisms that caught my eye. For example, 'I am disturbed by the transformation of highly intelligent liberal intellectuals into tendentious neoconservatives owing to crude ethnic identity-based allegiances and vulgar neonationalist sentiments. I am disappointed with the

professional incorporation of former New Left activists who now often thrive on a self-serving careerism while espousing rhetorics of oppositional politics and little seriousness and integrity.' Well now, just how does one spot crudeness, vulgarity and careerism? West's very big brushes can be used to tar *or* to whitewash, depending upon where they are dipped and how they are wielded.

West is 'depressed' by nihilism, drugs, violence in 'working class' and 'underclass' communities. Isn't it just possible that these things occur, or become aggravated, because 'leftist' empowerment of the 'underclass', which is his political aim, prevents action against, and indeed furthers, the evils? The New York City school chancellor tries to deny power to, tries to create accountability in, 'decentralized' officials — who then complain. Boston University directs Chelsea schools, and a teachers' union official said 'this is a colonial kind of relationship.' Might not these 'undemocratic' guidances be the better route to go? Haven't we learned, in so many areas of colonial, civic and family life, that showerings of money and freedom do not empower but actually destroy?

West asks us whether we are to infer that 'abject poverty' precludes a capacity for justice. No, not inevitably, but such poverty, conjoined with ill-treatment, denial of education, etc. can elicit understandable revenge and violence and can inhibit a concern about justice. Phrases like 'the wretched of the earth' (or even 'blessed are the poor') bring rhetorical attention to persons needing help, but hardly bring wisdom to them or honor to their conditions. The complaints of the wronged easily become so bitter and excessive that they produce more wrongs than were ever suffered. The examples are legion (produce legions!) — the Germans after Versailles, the exiled Palestinians, Marxists almost anywhere. Hearing, and hearing about, the hurts of the poor and the wretched is always appropriate. But the alternative to abusing and exploiting is *not* automatic and unlimited 'empowerment'. For then the wretched will misrule themselves and harm others. The notion that the hurts in and of themselves provide wisdom about what is to be done is false and pernicious. The 'wisdom' of battered persons (unless there have been other decisive influences on them) is to batter others.

West writes of Niebuhr's 'Zionist politics' and 'Zionist blindness,' but then quotes a passage in which Niebuhr largely complains about abuse of Arab 'masses' by Arab 'overlords.' Does West provide us with a sense of measure and proportion in these complicated matters? For surely the undemocratic rule of Arab 'overlords' over Arab 'masses' is far more extensive (in terms of numbers of people and territories involved) than anything the most wicked of Zionist racists might aspire to accomplish.

Is our practical task to extend democracy — in the sense in which West seems to mean it? The capacity for self-government, even in the United States, is being *generally* eroded. Students, more and more of them, are no longer required, nay coerced, to acquire literacy, and student resistance to such coercion (supported by 'careerist' New Left professors) is presented as an issue of democracy and freedom.

West's devoted examination of the American tradition 'valorizes' (as he likes to say) ways of thinking and living. His book is part of a body of writing that belongs to the very highest levels of intellectual elitism. But the empowerments West furthers would end in a general incapacity to read newspapers — let alone to read him. West certainly accomplishes much 'provocation,' but it is a stirring mostly in the arena of thought. It is ironic that West faults Dewey for philosophizing 'to scratch a metaphysical itch,' and says that 'few people other than professional philosophers would ever bother reading and grappling with...*Experience and Nature*'. Who will read West? There is the new phenomenon of the intellectual coffee-table book (e.g., by Stephen Hawking, Allan Bloom) more talked about than perused. West's readers will be *rare* because the book is genuinely *difficult* — in the best (Spinozistic) sense of those words. What is needed to save the world, if that is still possible, is not some fanciful empowerment of the wretched with esoteric 'philosophy' but practical attempts to educate and extend literacy.

For the rest, West provides exciting and detailed descriptions of how individual thinkers — James, Peirce, Dewey, Hook, Niebuhr, Trilling, Quine, Rorty and Foucault — fit into his large picture. At one point he characterizes Sidney Hook as someone who 'walks one through the central developments and various figures of German idealistic philosophy.' West himself 'walks us through' the story of pragmatism. The rich summary accounts, never textbookish, are reminiscent of how Andrew Reck has done this, and even constitute a good general introduction to American thought. The sections on C. Wright Mills, W.E.B. DuBois, Roberto Unger, Gramsci and Veblen were for me especially helpful and informative.

West sees academic philosophy as 'unsettled,' and indeed it is. He sees it as in an 'interregnum,' which also might be the case. And while it could be moving from what West calls 'transcendental modes' (analysis, existentialism, etc.) it is hardly clear that it is moving toward a new or revised pragmatism, and even less clear that it is heading in the direction of 'updated radical democratic thinking...'

West's primary, and worthy, interface with the practical world is as an exemplar of intellectual effort. Philosophers these days largely think and labor and scratch in their own vineyards. Understandably they sometimes hope, against all odds, that along with the wine they produce for their own inebriation there might be a few nourishing grapes they can share with others.

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**Fred Wilson**
*Psychological Analysis and the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill.*
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1990.
Pp. 390.
Cdn$45.00. ISBN 0-8020-2714-8.

In *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* Mill writes, 'Our senses, which on all theories are at least the avenues through which our knowledge of bodies comes to us, are not adapted by nature to let in the perception of the whole object at once. They only open to let pass single attributes at a time'. (Quoted by Wilson, 143.) This is a puzzling passage. Is Mill really suggesting that in perceiving something which is round and yellow our sense of sight does not 'let in' both these attributes at once? Be that as it may the important claim is that the senses do not let in the *whole* object. Even if roundness and yellowness were to enter simultaneously this would not guarantee that the subject perceives the thing in question as a *structured whole*.

How is it then that when we perceive a tree we may perceive it as a tree and in so doing acquire a belief that it is a tree without making any inference from prior beliefs about its colour, shape and so forth? According to Wilson one of the most important themes in Mill's psychology is how to provide a satisfactory answer to this and kindred questions within the framework of associationist principles. Associationism dictates that the ability to perceive a tree as a tree is learned. On the simplest model the perception of a structured whole is analysable into simple parts brought together by antecedent conditions operating in accordance with associative laws. Hamilton thought that the phenomenal facts were at odds with this model. Consider a visual memory of the face of a friend. Hamilton argued as follows. '[We] have the fullest knowledge of the face as a whole ... we are familiar with its expression, with the general result of its parts. On the [associationist model] how accurate should be our knowledge of these parts themselves. ... You will find [however that you] may probably be unable to say what is the colour of the eyes, and if you attempt to delineate the mouth or nose, you will inevitably fail. (Quoted by Mill, *Collected Works* vol. IX, 256.) The character of your memory would reflect the character of ordinary perceptions of the face. It is not just because memory is partial that the features of the face are not recalled. It is because in ordinary perceptions they are not noticed. The central contention of Wilson's interpretation is that Mill modified the simple model. The mistake of the simple model was to suppose that introspective analysis should 'distinguish integrant parts of a whole' (110), that is, parts which are 'literally *in* the wholes of which they are said to be parts' (111). A more adequate model would recognise that, as Mill puts it in the *Logic*, a 'complex idea, formed by the blending together of several simpler ones, should, even when it really appears simple (that is, when the separate elements are not consciously distinguishable in it,) be said to *result from*, or *be generated by*, the simple ideas, not to *consist* of them...' (Quoted by Wilson, 111).

The simple associationist model also raises analogous problems in the psychology of human motivation. Consider the state of desiring something as an end. The simple model has it that desiring A as an end is explained in terms of a past association between A and feeling pleasure. Indeed, *desiring A as an end* is taken to be logically equivalent to *desiring A as a means to feelings of pleasure* (233). The problem is that this makes apparently non-egoistic motives egoistic. An appeal to the phenomena, the fact that we just do desire things other than the feeling of pleasure, might lead one to argue that there is something wrong about the associationist attempt to explain motivation in terms of pleasure, pain and laws of association. Wilson's case is that Mill's more sophisticated associationist model gives him a way out. Mill accepts, for example, that virtue may be 'desired disinterestedly, for itself' (quoted by Wilson, 235) while insisting '*that there are processes of learning involving the association of pleasures and pains of which our moral sentiments, with their objects, and as qualitatively distinct, are the products*' (239). When Mill says that virtue is desired as a part of happiness he means, on Wilson's account, that virtue is a pleasurable object. Moreover, Mill wants to explain its being pleasurable in terms of a past association between virtue and pleasure.

There remain problems with Mill's view. (1) Granted that, if desired, virtue pleases, it does follow that when it is desired it is under the description that it pleases. This latter proposition is just false but seems to be implied by Mill's own reading of the claim that virtue is desired as part of happiness (*Collected Works*, vol. X, 237). (2) On Wilson's reading virtue pleases because of a past association between virtue and some pleasure which, presumably, has no intrinsic connection with virtue. It might be the pleasure of parental esteem. But it is not obvious that such pleasure accounts for the pleasing nature of virtue for one who admires virtue for its own sake. For these reasons I am less sanguine than Wilson that Mill has an adequate answer to those of his critics who objected that he could not consistently hold both that happiness is the only thing desirable for its own sake and that, among other things, virtue is desirable for its own sake. Still, Wilson may well be right to read Mill's discussion of motivation in *Utilitarianism* in the light of the modification of the simple associationist model to which he gives such prominence.

This book is aimed most directly at those who have an interest in the early history of psychology, and particularly in its links with radical nineteenth century thinking about society, economics and politics. It has suggestive things to say about some of the most debated topics in Mill's moral philosophy. I found it rather heavy going, however. Wilson's practice of expounding Mill while making extensive comments on a large range of Mill's predecessors, contemporaries and successors is not conducive to the crisp, concise outline of main themes or to systematic critical analysis of them. Even so, the wealth of material will make the book a valuable resource for Mill scholars and for philosophers of mind prepared to think afresh about early psychology.

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**Kathleen Wright, ed.**
*Festivals of Interpretation. Essays on Hans-Georg Gadamer's Work.*
Albany: State University of New York Press
1990. Pp. ix + 257.
(cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0377-7);
(paper: ISBN 0-7914-0378-5).

The title of this book calls on Hans-Georg Gadamer's understanding of festival as giving us an immediate communal experience of what we are. The ten essays, which celebrate the experience of community that the authors have had with Gadamer, are organized into three parts 'corresponding roughly to the true, the good, and the beautiful' (1).

Part I is 'Situating Gadamer's Hermeneutics and Its Problems'. 'Schleiermacher's Hermeneutics' by Reiner Wiehl, is a translation by Kathleen Wright of the first section of 'Schleiermachers Hermeneutik — Ihre Bedeutung für die Philologie in Theorie und Praxis', originally published in 1979. Wiehl outlines two features of the effective history of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics: the methodological hermeneutics of Dilthey and the existential hermeneutics of Heidegger. He suggests that Gadamer tries to bring the two 'heterogeneous concepts of truth into a constructive relation' (35) and explores the significance of the generated ambiguity. 'Hermeneutics and Relativism' by Jean Grondin was originally published in 1987 and is translated by Mildred Mortimer. Grondin identifies finitude as the 'new universal of philosophy' (47) and argues that hermeneutics 'can lay claim to universality' (59) because philosophical hermeneutics thinks the essential relativity, recognizing every individual to be 'anchored in the hermeneutical universe of the social practices of a linguistic and historical community' (59). 'Philosophical Discourse and the Ethics of Hermeneutics' by Robert J. Dostal calls for philosophers to carry out 'faithful productivity' (64). This involves developing a hermeneutics of trust and humility. Distinguishing philosophy from literature, he takes the task of philosophy to be 'to give voice conceptually to that which binds the self to the other in our common human experience' (81).

Part II, 'The Practice of Hermeneutics', inquires into the political implications of Gadamer's hermeneutics. In 'Hermeneutics and Justice', Fred Dallmayr focuses on two of Gadamer's early essays on Plato. He finds in these commentaries on Plato's *Republic* important insight for our age of mass culture. We need to portray violence as violence not as routine behavior, corruption as corruption rather than as the way of the world, and suffering as suffering so that it can have cathartic effect. 'Without this cathartic effect, imitation becomes readily an invitation to apathy or self-indulgence' (105). 'Legal Hermeneutics: Recent Debates' by David Couzens Hoy was originally published in 1987. Hoy focuses on the issue of the United States' Supreme Court's powers to interpret the Constitution. He considers Gadamer and Dworkin as allies in a critique of originalism and then draws a distinction between critical monism which 'is the view that all the questions about all

the features of a text must be postulated as resolvable, at least at the ideal limit' and critical pluralism which holds that 'disagreements can be reasonable without necessarily being resolvable' (128-129). He argues for critical pluralism as neither relativism nor nihilism. This topic is continued in 'Walzer, Rawls, and Gadamer: Hermeneutics and Political Theory' by Georgia Warnke. Warnke outlines the problem of subjectivism in both Walzer's communitarian understanding of our political traditions and Rawls' liberal understandings. She uses Gadamer's work to ask if such subjectivism can be avoided and argues that Gadamer's work leads us to conclude that we need to understand ourselves as both 'rational life-planners' and citizens. We need to accept both 'as part of a multifaceted tradition and try to extend each to incorporate what we have learned in conversation with others' (156). Dieter Misgeld, in 'Poetry, Dialogue, and Negotiation: Liberal Culture and Conservative Politics in Hans-Georg Gadamer's Thought' concludes this part with a caution. He reminds us that Gadamer has clearly rejected 'emancipatory politics as a real possibility of social transformation' (170).

Part III, 'Hermeneutics and the Challenges of Poetry and Postmodern Thinking' begins with 'Paul Celan's Challenges to Heidegger's Poetics' by Veronique M. Foti. She offers a reading of Celan's poetry as articulating the 'temporality and topology of the Other' (201) and so challenging Heidegger's poetics. In 'Poetry and the Political: Gadamer, Plato, and Heidegger on the Politics of Language', Dennis J. Schmidt returns to some of the issues raised by Dallmayr. He views 'speaking about language as the starting point for political reflection' (212) and explores the political role of poetry as showing us 'the lability and mobility of the borders of the *polis*' (224). Kathleen Wright, the editor, concludes with 'Literature and Philosophy at the Crossroads'. Wright evaluates Gadamer and Derrida's presentations on text and interpretation given at the 1981 Paris colloquium as at cross purposes. Her essay is an attempt to place these two thinkers in conversation on the future of literature and philosophy such that the continual crossing of the two can become clearer.

The volume is a good selection of essays that carry on the task of contemporary hermeneutics. The editor's introduction sets out the structure of the volume, but the book as a whole would benefit from a concluding chapter that addresses some of the themes (community and festival) that give unity to these works. The book would also be strengthened for classroom use by the addition of a final bibliography.

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**Iris Marion Young**
*Justice and the Politics of Difference.*
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990.
Pp. 286.
US$45.00. (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07832-7);
US$12.95. (paper: ISBN 0-691-02315-8).

**Iris Marion Young**
*Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory.*
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In the last ten years, Iris Marion Young has written a series of consistently interesting and provocative articles on topics in feminist political philosophy and social theory. Part of their interest lies in the sheer diversity of Young's subjects (the psychology of racism, the sociology of new social movements, the experience of female embodiment, the meaning of exploitation, the depoliticization of the welfare state, even the economics of municipal zoning) and her influences (critical theory, postmodernism, Marxism, existential phenomenology, psychoanalysis, civic republicanism, socialist feminism). Because of this diversity, it has often been difficult to identify the unifying threads or directions in her work, or to see how the different threads fit together. The recent publication of these two books helps put the pieces of the puzzle together.

As Young explains in the introduction to *Throwing Like A Girl*, which collects together eleven of her articles from the 1980s, her work has largely been shaped by her involvement with the American feminist movement. This 'second-wave' feminist movement grew out of the New Left, and inherited its commitment to Marxist analysis. However, the limits of Marxism quickly became apparent (explored in 'Socialist Feminism and the Limits of Dual Systems Theory'). Feminists have been searching for a more adequate understanding of women's oppression ever since. Psychoanalysis overcomes the limits of socialization theory in explaining the depth of women's gender identity, but lacks an adequate theory of social relationships and institutions ('Is Male Gender Identity the Cause of Male Domination?'). Critical theory and civic republicanism overcome the limits of liberalism in allowing women to raise political questions about the allegedly 'personal' issues of sexism in the general culture and in the family. But they lack an adequate theory of group differences, and so impose an artificial homogeneity on the distinctive voices of women and other oppressed groups ('Impartiality and the Civic Public'; 'Polity and Group Difference'). Existential phenomenology overcomes the limits of Cartesian dualism in explaining the importance of human embodiment ('Throwing Like A Girl'). But it presupposes too unitary and coherent a conception of the human subject, and so denigrates women's bodily

experiences. Postmodernism, on the other hand, provides a telling critique of the idea of a unitary and transcendent subject, but in the process threatens to dissolve the self as a site for creative resistance to social oppression ('Pregnant Embodiment'; 'Women Recovering our Clothes'; 'Breasted Experience').

Reading these essays provides a glimpse into the intellectual developments of the American feminist movement as seen through one of its most active and inquiring minds. The essays themselves are somewhat uneven. The best articles, such as 'Humanism, Gynocentrism, and Feminist Politics', are excellent. Some articles, such as 'Socialist Feminism and the Limits of Dual Systems Theory', seem outdated. Others, such as 'Women and the Welfare State', are rather insubstantial, and do not go much beyond the surface of the subject. But the articles are invariably informative and well-written. Young has a talent for presenting other people's ideas sympathetically, and her critiques are always fair. The reprinting of these articles, many of which were initially published in hard to find anthologies or alternative journals, should help make Young's important work more accessible.

While Young finds some merit in each of the theoretical frameworks she studies, she also sees each of them as inadequate in one of two ways: either they ignore the reality of women's difference, and thereby assimilate women's experience to a male model; or if they do recognize difference, they do not explain how this difference is connected to institutional practices of oppression and domination. The first problem requires an adequate theory of sexual difference which can affirm women's distinctive relationships to their bodies and to each other as a source of value (Young calls this 'gynocentrism'). The second requires an adequate theory of the institutional mechanisms which can accommodate difference in a non-oppressive way, including various mechanisms of group representation and group-specific rights (she calls this the 'heterogenous public').

This idea of a heterogenous public is developed more fully in Young's *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. In this book, she examines the issues of justice raised by a wide range of group differences. She looks not only at the women's movement, but at the 'new social movements' more generally, including Black and Chicano liberation, American Indian movements, gay and lesbian liberation, movements of the disabled, the old, and the poor. Her aim in the book 'is to express rigorously and reflectively some of the claims about justice and injustice implicit in the politics of these movements' (7).

Each of these groups has historically been excluded from full participation in public life on grounds of their difference. Most people today accept that this was unjust, and that these groups should be included in public life. However, Young notes, these groups are being invited to participate in public life only as individuals, or as 'citizens'. They are being told that they should leave their distinctive perspectives behind when entering public life, and should instead adopt the 'impartial' point of view, and be concerned solely with 'universal' rights and principles. In other words, the mainstream of society will be blind to their differences if, in return, these groups agree to

be silent about their differences; the mainstream will not use these differences as grounds for exclusion so long as the groups do not seek special recognition or rights for their distinctive needs.

This, Young persuasively argues, is oppressive to these groups. Genuine equality requires affirming rather than suppressing group difference, through various forms of group representation in democratic publics, and through group-differentiated policies. According to Young, eliminating group-based oppression requires both certain universal rights (e.g., 'general civic and political rights of participation and inclusion'), and various special rights (such as the land rights of American Indians, or language rights for Hispanics) (174).

As Young points out, the claims raised by new social movements fall outside the scope of traditional theories of justice. They raise issues of 'decision-making, division of labour, and culture that bear on social justice but are often ignored in philosophical discussion' (3). For example, many of these groups (including women, blacks, gays, disabled) want changes in the way they are portrayed in the media (19). While clearly this is an issue of justice, it is hard to situate within the traditional philosophical discourse on justice.

If political philosophy is to contribute to these debates, Young argues, it must shift away from its current 'distributive paradigm', and instead take 'oppression' as the basic concept for thinking about justice and injustice. Oppression, Young argues, has 'five faces': exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence (chap. 2). None of these are reducible to the distribution of material goods, but rather raise a range of disparate issues including the myth of culturally neutral expertise (chaps. 3 and 7), and the unconscious aversion to racial, sexual or physical differences (chap. 5). The appropriate response to these problems is not the ideal of impartiality favoured by liberals (chap. 4), or the ideal of community favoured by communitarians (chap. 8), since both of these deny the reality of group difference. Rather, it is a participatory democracy, premised on the idea of a heterogenous public, modelled in part on the lively diversity and group-based politics of contemporary city life (236-56).

This is a superb book which opens up many new vistas for theorists of justice. Young makes a number of insightful arguments both about the issues that need to be addressed by a theory of justice, and about the kind of theory capable of addressing them. The only weakness of the book is that it tries to cover too many debates, and so moves too quickly over some difficult topics. The discussion of group-specific policies, for example, provides little guidance about identifying which groups should have specific rights (e.g., which ethnic groups should have the right to publicly-funded bilingual education?), or about how these specific rights are compatible with the universal rights to civil liberty and non-discrimination (e.g., are these special rights constitutionally protected, and if so, how?). Young provides some suggestions on these topics, but they are often sketchy, and some are inadequate (e.g., her over-simplified distinction between social groups and aggregates and asso-

ciations on pp. 42-8). It is unfortunate that Young pays no attention to the experience of other countries with group-specific representation and policies. She claims that there are 'no models' in other countries for the kind of heterogenous public she envisions (191). However, while the various forms of consociationalism and minority rights found in Canada, Europe and elsewhere may not be models of participatory democracy, they do provide evidence about what kinds of group-based politics are workable, and about what kinds of legal and philosophical issues need to be addressed by any 'politics of difference'. Young's book suffers from the parochialism found in most recent American political philosophy.

Young's criticisms of traditional theories of justice are also sketchy in places. It is impossible to deny that political philosophers have ignored some fundamental issues of justice raised by the reality of group difference. But Young also argues that contemporary theories of justice are *incapable* of dealing with these issues; that the conception of justice underlying the heterogenous public is 'incommensurable' with that of liberalism, civic republicanism or communitarianism (39). These approaches, Young claims, are committed to either (a) the 'distributive paradigm', which reduces justice to issues of the distribution of material goods; or (b) the 'logic of identity', as expressed in ideals of impartiality or citizenship, which values sameness over difference. According to Young, the concept of distribution cannot be extended to include issues of rights and decision-making (24-33), and impartiality cannot be extended to include respect for group difference (104-5). Hence these traditional approaches cannot accommodate the demands of the new social movements, and indeed unintentionally serve to obscure fundamental injustices in society.

However, Young's account of the limits of the concepts of distribution and impartiality is very sketchy. For example, she claims that the concept of distribution cannot make sense of issues involving 'rules and relationships', such as individual rights or decision-making authority, and so should be restricted to issues involving 'things', such as the distribution of material goods (25-33). But this is a false dichotomy. Distributing 'things' (i.e., property) involves distributing property *rights*. Giving people shares in a company is not a matter of giving people a handful of 'stuff'. Rather it is a matter of giving people the authority to make certain decisions and exercise certain entitlements, according to various specific and constantly changing legal rules. Young claims that distribution is about 'having', whereas rights and opportunities are about 'doing' — i.e., about acting in accordance with institutionalized rules and relationships that constrain or enable various actions (25). But having and doing presuppose each other. If there is no problem in talking about the distribution of property (33), then the concept of distribution must be capable of comprehending rights, rules, and relationships.

There are similar problems with Young's critique of impartiality (chap. 4), which rests on a questionable dichotomy between seeking an impartial point of view and joining a dialogue between different partial points of view. Hence

Young may have underestimated the ability of various traditional approaches to justice to accommodate the issues she raises. However, even if these approaches can accommodate 'the politics of difference' associated with the new social movements, it is clear that they have not yet done so. Young has performed an invaluable service in showing the necessity of listening to the voices of these movements, and in explaining the claims of justice they raise.

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## Editors' Note

The anglophone editors of

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*R.A. Shiner*