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Nikunja Vihari Banerjee

Towards Perpetual Peace.

Delhi: Motilal Banardidass 1988.

Pp. xii+233. n.p. ISBN 81-108-0536-4.

In this posthumously published volume, Banerjee rejects several received accounts of peace and, in a neo-Kantian vein, sketches a positive, humanistic alternative.

Banerjee characterizes the attainment of lasting peace as a peculiarly human problem to be resolved by integration of man with himself and his fellows. Man's twofold alienation, from self and others, is a condition of bondage which has not been effectively tackled by other treatments of peace, functioning as they do largely within the framework of that bondage. Religion, myth, science, technology, statecraft and even most meditational disciplines support or relieve man's alienation without attacking what Banerjee regards as its source.

Religions and myths, in relegating peace to some earlier Golden Age or heavenly hereafter, sidestep the problem. Statecraft operates with the fiction of absolutely sovereign nations, which frustrates peacemaking and stymies the apparatus of international relations and law. Science and technology, although greatly enhancing understanding and management of the world's objects, are incapable of handling the question of human destiny that must be resolved for lasting peace to be achieved. Contemplation, meditation, and yoga, while helping to alleviate a particular individual's perplexities, lack proper insight into the universal nature of man's anomalous nature.

Man is said to be anomalous on two counts: he is both a part of and apart from nature; and he is driven by both self-regarding and other-regarding impulses. 'The degeneration of the human individual into an ego is but another name for his alienation from himself in the manner of the suppression of his other-regarding vital drives which are essential to his inner constitution. And, on this very account, he is alienated from his fellow at the same time' (174).

The reintegration of man's conflicting impulses and the achievement of lasting peace among nations, which modify their claims to absolute sovereignty, can be achieved by conforming actions to three regulative principles aimed at bringing about a realization of 'man's mutual essentiality with his fellows.' The first and fundamental principle directs, 'So behave in any given circumstance that your behaviour is not determined by ego-consciousness but presents itself

to be, as it were, anyone's behaviour in the same or a similar circumstance' (213). This principle relates to the Buddha's program of self-annihilation.

The second principle derives from the teaching and death of Socrates: 'So behave that your behaviour is in no circumstance determined either directly or even remotely by the dread of death and the desire for personal immortality' (216). Banerjee believes that the desire for immortality is man's most dehumanizing impulse, probably because it exalts continuation of (presumably illusory) ego-consciousness.

The third principle is based on the life of Jesus: 'So behave that your behaviour is in no circumstance either *directly* or *remotely* determined by aversion to bear the Cross' (217). That is never avoid suffering '*with* and *for* others.' These principles are Ideas of Reason which man 'must accept as *objectively valid*. For it is by acting in conformity with these Ideas that he brings about the elimination of his habitual alienation from himself and his fellows ... And it is his rebirth thus brought about which is the *conditio sine qua non* of the establishment of perpetual peace amongst mankind' (221).

Banerjee does not delineate what relational and institutional transformations would flow from conformity to these principles.

William Eastman

Victoria, B.C.

Philip Clayton

Explanation from Physics to Theology. An Essay in Rationality and Religion.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
1989. Pp. ix+230.

US \$26.50. ISBN 0-300-04353-8.

This book has been, one reads, written and rewritten at least three times. If I understand Clayton, he is asking questions about the compatibility of being a rational enquirer with still coming down in favour of some clearly religious account of the world, and even of accepting some plainly Christian theological answer to questions like 'Why does

such a universe as this one exist?' and 'Does it have an ultimate justification?' The titles of crucial chapters seem to bear this interpretation out, although parts of these chapters are a good deal obscurer than the titles. Chapter 1, 'Explanation in Science and Religion' leads to Chapter 2, 'Explanation in the Natural Sciences: The Contextualist Shift', and to Chapter 3, 'Explanation with Understanding: The Problem of Rationality in the Social Sciences'. Chapter 5 is 'Religious Beliefs as Explanations' and Chapter 6 is 'Theology as Explanation and the Question of Theological Method'.

When one is offered such an attractive list of topics, one may well be inclined to expect a nicely balanced and extremely lucid book. But it is only fair to caution most intending readers against entertaining such hopes: there is too great a display of erudition and too inconsistent an effort at elucidation. Often a chapter offers a vertiginous piling up of professors, titles, quotations and references. The pages swarm with mentions of those whom Clayton takes to be relevant *authorities*. More pages and much more comment in very plain words might have helped the book immensely—or a little more space for illumination and many bridging introductions of possible authorities. But the present balance is not a happy one.

Perhaps Clayton believes that what a John Passmore or Father Copleston often achieves in striking ways is easily imitated: that the ideas of many demanding books and articles will form a luminous constellation, if one but labours faithfully to cite, and comment on and compare those whom one venerates. He would have done better to heed the modest, as well as the authoritative. Three years earlier, in 1986, Duke University Press had issued Edward Schoen's *Religious Explanations: A Model from the Sciences*. This was hailed by William P. Alston as 'strikingly original'. Alston praised Schoen's book for its beautiful clarity, 'in showing similarities between religious and physical explanations.' Clayton lists Schoen's work, but seems reluctant to discuss it, except briefly in a footnote (204). Yet such a clear and relevant publication might well have elicited Clayton's best thoughts in discussion within his *Explanations from Physics to Theology*.

The chapter on 'Explanation in the Natural Sciences' is, perhaps, the clearest and most readily rewarding. After paying tribute to the skills of developing formal structures shown by Hempel and others, Clayton writes: 'It is hard to specify exactly when (or for what reasons) the pendulum began to swing away from formal analyses' (35). He contrasts the early Toulmin, for whom 'physical theories are most like maps, with the function of representing the world in ways that

will guide us' (35), with Hanson's words: 'inquiry is directed not to rearranging old facts and patterns into more elegant formal patterns, but rather to the discovery of new patterns of explanation' (36). Hanson's words are next compared by Clayton with the later thinking of Toulmin in 1960: '*To this turn of interpretation we bring principles of regularity, conceptions of natural order, paradigms, ideals, or what-you-will: intellectual patterns which define the range of things we can accept (in Copernicus' phrase) "as sufficiently absolute and pleasing to the mind"*' (36). Much later, after taking from Cardinal Newman the character of bringing a sense of total *coherence*, Clayton comments 'Religious beliefs supplement claims to knowledge with a general holistic sense of fit of meaningfulness' (119). He cites also John Hick's speaking of a sense of 'global impressions' (119). By stressing examples like these, which come from philosophers of science and philosophy of religion, in the course of touching on a number of others, Clayton is able to start a case that *some* scientific and *some* theological explanations are similar.

To make fully plausible his claims about a considerably more *general* similarity between scientific and theological 'methodology', Clayton would have to achieve a great deal in his sixth chapter, 'Theology as Explanation and the Question of Theological Method'. But many of this chapter's pages perplexed me. Does he mean that a theist *ought* to sound something like a humble fallibilist in matters of supposed knowledge and epistemology? Does he mean that theists *ought* to be tentative and open-minded, though willing to suffer or die for their core-beliefs? Does he hold that theologians *ought* to try offering a cosmological account of our lives which brings not just far greater intelligibility (as scientists offer), but purposes and goals which make those lives worth living joyfully? Is William James' focus on 'live options' part of the optimism which the theologian has to offer and an antidote to doctrinaire naturalism? If a 'Yes' to each of these questions is somehow to be squeezed from the book's sometimes puzzling mentions of such items, then the arguments should have been clearer and stronger, less bibliographic. If Clayton's answer is sometimes 'No', then it would be agreeable to know where indeed he *has* dug his tenuous toeholds 'within such dark terrain'.

Chapters Three and Five are especially notable for their references to Continental German thinkers. The book was written, one is told, first during two years of study in Germany, then rewritten during times of doctoral work at Yale, and finally re-written while Clayton was teaching at Williams College, which eventually subsidized

Yale's publishing the book. When Clayton quotes Wittgenstein or Popper, he takes pains to quote something clear. But when he cites a more 'Continental' German, the accessibility of the thinker becomes unpredictable.

An author who finds a German (or Greek, or Chinese) thinker relevant, should do that thinker and the readers the courtesy of providing an effective bridge of understanding. If one cannot be bothered to do this, the result is less likely to be intellectual community, more likely to be the spreading of incipient xenophobia.

John King-Farlow

University of Alberta

**Michael Allen Gillespie and
Tracy B. Strong, eds.**

*Nietzsche's New Seas: Explorations in
Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Politics.*

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988.
Pp. vii+240. US \$24.95. ISBN 0-226-29378-5.

The 'question of style' has been an issue for English-language Nietzsche scholarship since the appearance of Jacques Derrida's essay by that name in the publication of the proceedings of the Cerisy conference on 'Nietzsche aujourd'hui' in 1973. Gillespie and Strong have edited a volume of nine essays plus editorial introduction with this question in mind. For the editors, this question leads to a new approach in the reading of Nietzsche's texts. Rather than looking first at the 'content' of what Nietzsche says, 'the new approach to Nietzsche begins rather with the claim that we can best understand the meaning of what Nietzsche says by coming to terms with how he says it, that the meaning of Nietzsche's enigmatic utterances can best be understood by examining the style or structure of his thought' (1). The editors justify this new approach in terms of their own interpretation of Nietzsche, specifically Nietzsche's relationship with nihilism. For Nietzsche, they claim, nihilism is not just the end of the Western (philosophical) tradition; it also initiates a new beginning. Because Nietzsche characterizes 'the history of the West [by the]

separation of philosophy and poetry' (8), nihilism, as the end of this history, will thus be overcome by reuniting philosophy and poetry, a reunion that Nietzsche himself suggests with the figure of the philosopher-artist, Socrates playing music.

The essays gathered together in this volume all, in one way or another, explore this figure; that is to say, they explore the connection between Nietzsche's philosophical insights and the ways they are expressed. They have been chosen to draw attention to the relations that exist between text and reader, relations that 'transcend the traditional distinctions between philosophy, aesthetics, and politics' (9). Some of the selections are long overdue in English translation. Eugen Fink's 'Nietzsche's New Experience of the World' (1973) is a good example of his general response to Heidegger's claim that Nietzsche remained fundamentally a metaphysical thinker. Fink argues, *pace* Heidegger, that Nietzsche's Dionysian celebration of the world as dance and play (*Spiel*) escapes the logic of metaphysics' traditional categories. Sarah Kofman's 'Baubô: Theological Perversion and Fetishism' (1973), on the other hand, examines the connections between the seductive arts attributed by Nietzsche to women and those he attributed to Dionysus as she problematizes the easy characterization of Nietzsche as a misogynist. And Jean-Michel Rey's selection, 'Commentary', from his *L'Enjeu des signes: Lectures de Nietzsche* (1971), while not abridged as felicitously as it might have been, is a good representative of the sorts of readings of Nietzsche produced in France in the 1970s, focusing as it does on the relationship between genealogy, philology, and perspectivism in Nietzsche's texts.

Of the more recent contributions, two come from important German authors. Hans-Georg Gadamer's 'The Drama of Zarathustra' (1981, 1986) has been re-translated for this volume, and is one of the few pieces where Gadamer devotes his attention directly to Nietzsche's thought. Curt Paul Janz, the author of the definitive three-volume biography of Nietzsche and an expert on Nietzsche's music, supplies an interesting essay on 'The Form-Content Problem' in Nietzsche's conception of music, arguing that Nietzsche was as concerned with questions of musical style as he was concerned with questions of textual style. The other selections, from Karsten Harries, Robert B. Pippin, Gillespie, and Strong, address questions of Nietzsche's textual styles and the relations between aesthetics and politics in Nietzsche's writings. Harries examines Nietzsche's project of questioning the foundations of our self-understanding, arguing that Nietzsche's demand that we must *zu Grunde gehen* (42) remains ultimately a

moralistic project of seeking our own essence. Pippin examines irony and affirmation in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, arguing persuasively that Nietzsche maintains a critical ironic distance from his main character, and he suggests that many of the so-called major themes of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* (e.g., eternal recurrence, *Übermensch*) are stages in Zarathustra's own process of self-overcoming and not central conclusions for Nietzsche. Gillespie, in what is perhaps the most original of the essays collected here, offers a musical reading of *Twilight of the Idols*. That is, he argues that *Twilight* is not an aphoristic and unsystematic work. Rather, it is organized according to the rigorous logic of classical sonata form. Gillespie offers a close reading of the structure of *Twilight*, showing how it mirrors the structure of a classical sonata and arguing that it serves as a model of the union of philosophy and poetry. Strong links Nietzsche with the thought of Schopenhauer, Burckhardt, Wagner, and Emerson as he examines Nietzsche's thinking on the relation between individual and community. For Strong, this fundamentally political question does not, in Nietzsche, take the traditional political form of 'regulating the encounters of independent selves' (13). Instead, Nietzsche's 'aesthetic politics' aims at the process of constructing or transfiguring the sort of selves we ought to have. Strong concludes, however, that Nietzsche's epistemological assumptions ultimately lead him to despair of successfully transfiguring the self and this, in turn, results in his turning, late in his life, to a more crude 'politics of domination.'

By bringing together proponents of a deconstructive approach to the reading of Nietzsche with more traditional hermeneutic interpreters of Nietzsche's works, and by drawing from the works of philosophers, musicologists, historians, political theorists, and aestheticians, this collection offers a broad range of perspectives on the reading of Nietzsche. Although many of these 'new seas' may not appear so novel to readers who have followed the French and German literature on Nietzsche over the past two decades, Gillespie and Strong have compiled an excellent selection of recent work that merits serious examination by scholars of Nietzsche and individuals interested in examining interdisciplinary Nietzschean reflections on the problems of modernity and postmodernity.

Alan D. Schrift
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Paul Owen Johnson

The Critique of Thought: A re-examination of Hegel's Science of Logic.

Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing Co. 1989.
Pp. xii+276. US \$54.95. ISBN 0-566-05765-4.

In his Preface, Johnson sets out his objectives for this book. It is to be a commentary, not on a part of Hegel's larger *Logic*, but on the work as a whole. However, he is not particularly concerned with explicating the way Hegel moves from one concept to another. Rather, he intends to connect what Hegel has to say with substantive epistemological discussions, both within the philosophical tradition and in the present. In this way he hopes to bring to the *Logic* 'the complete transformation of our conception of Hegel's philosophy' (vii), which has been achieved by students of his *Phenomenology*.

Johnson devotes three chapters to each of the first two books of the *Logic*, expanding his discussion of the third book by dedicating one chapter to each of the three final sections: on life, on cognition and on the absolute idea.

Because of his interest in relating Hegel's thought to his contemporaries, Johnson's commentary spends more time on Hegel's Remarks than on his main text. For it is here that Hegel applies his conceptual analysis to traditional philosophical discussions. When Johnson does venture into the dense and difficult prose of Hegel's argument, one receives a rather superficial sense of what may be present. All too often the reader is told: 'I do not want to say too much about this, however, since I am not sure if I understand it' (29).

The twentieth-century philosophers with whom he compares Hegel are few. Bertrand Russell is referred to the most, although Popper, Strawson, Ryle and Wittgenstein are mentioned. Secondary sources on recent science also provide Johnson with analogies. In most cases, the reference is not to a complete argument, but to a thesis which appears to correspond, or conflict, with something attributed to Hegel.

The result is something that does not really advance Hegelian scholarship very much. The only secondary sources about Hegel cited in the Bibliography are the works by McTaggart and Mure on Hegel's *Logic*, and general works by Mueller and Stace. Johnson seems blissfully ignorant that E.E. Harris had published a commentary on the whole work (albeit in the shorter version) in 1983 (*An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel*, University Press of America). Because he focuses simply on philosophy done in England, Johnson does not know

about the full commentaries by Léonard in French and Lakebrink in German, nor about many other European and American discussions which are more limited in scope.

Therefore this book will not really do much for students of Hegel. The analysis does not take them much further than they could go themselves; and it provides little help with that most difficult task of comprehending just what Hegel is about in his dense and difficult prose. The neophyte usually can make some sense of the remarks and the introductions. It is precisely the reasoning contained in his substantive arguments that have raised 'the same boring questions about his method, his beginning, his various transitions, etc.' (viii).

But how successful is Johnson with regard to his own professed objective: to present Hegel's ideas 'in a way in which the scientific community in general can profit from them' (265)? In a book where barely 23 pages is allowed for each chapter, and the chapter must discuss both what Hegel is about and suggest connections to other philosophical discussions, one cannot expect much. And one is not disappointed. Wittgenstein's position in the *Tractatus* is presented in a most schematic way. And while one may sense analogies or disanalogies, one cannot really see in detail the relevance of what Hegel is saying to the discussion as elaborated in Wittgenstein's cryptic prose.

Johnson wrote this book as a thesis for submission to the University of Kent. As a thesis it shows that he has himself struggled with Hegel's text, and made some sense of it. But it was a serious mistake of the editor of the Avebury Series in Philosophy and its publishers to assume that it could be translated without further ado into the arena of philosophical scholarship. That requires much more of a wrestling with the tradition, not only of Hegelian scholarship but also of contemporary thought, than this book displays.

John Burbridge
Trent University

Hans Kelsen

Théorie pure du droit. Adaptée de l'allemand par Henri Thévenaz. Deuxième édition, revue et mise à jour.

Neuchâtel: Editions de la Baconnière

1988. Pp. 296. FF 144.

ISBN 2-8252-0753-5.

Hans Kelsen est le père de la 'théorie pure du droit'. Cette théorie a connu des modifications importantes au cours de la longue carrière de son auteur. Pour bien connaître les détails de cette évolution, il faut consulter les quatre exposés systématiques qu'il en a faits: *Reine Rechtslehre* (1934), *General Theory of Law and State* (1945), deuxième édition de la *Reine Rechtslehre* (1960), et *Allgemeine Theorie der Normen* (1979).

En 1953, Henri Thévenaz publiait une élégante traduction française du premier de ces livres, la *Reine Rechtslehre* de 1934. Mais il s'agissait de bien plus qu'une traduction, puisqu'on y trouvait des pages entières qui ne figuraient pas dans l'original. Comme les idées de Kelsen avaient changé depuis la parution du texte allemand vingt ans plus tôt, celui-ci tenait à ce que la traduction reflète ces changements. Ainsi, la 'traduction' de 1953 était plutôt une adaptation de l'œuvre, comme l'expliquait la préface. Malheureusement, rien dans le texte français ne permettait de départager les passages qui dataient de 1934 et ceux qu'on avait ajoutés en 1953.

Des deux œuvres maîtresses de Kelsen postérieures à 1953, seule la deuxième édition de la *Reine Rechtslehre* (1960) a connu une traduction française: *Théorie pure du droit*, 1962, traduite par Charles Eisenmann. De la dernière œuvre du maître, l'*Allgemeine Theorie der Normen*, il n'existe à date qu'une traduction anglaise (par le sous-signé) qui doit paraître en 1990.

Voilà maintenant que M. Thévenaz nous livre une 'deuxième édition, revue et mise à jour' de sa traduction de 1953. Si l'édition de 1953 était déjà une adaptation du texte allemand, celle de 1988 l'est encore davantage. Car pour pallier à l'absence de textes français de Kelsen datant des dernières années de sa vie, M. Thévenaz a cru bon de remanier à nouveau sa traduction de 1953 afin de refléter les derniers développements de la pensée kelsénienne. Quelquefois, une note au bas de la page nous signale le remaniement du texte, mais dans bien des cas rien ne permet de repérer les modifications. Ainsi, dans un même livre se trouvent juxtaposés trois niveaux de textes: le fond

est de Kelsen et date de 1934; ensuite il y a les passages ajoutés par Kelsen en 1953, et enfin les interpolations de M. Thévenaz visant à présenter la pensée de Kelsen durant les dernières années de sa vie. Pas surprenant donc que l'édition de 1988 porte la mention 'adaptée de l'allemand' et non plus 'traduite de l'allemand'.

Malheureusement, ce n'est pas ce qu'il nous fallait. Le monde juridico-philosophique de langue française a besoin (1) d'une traduction de l'*Allgemeine Theorie der Normen* afin de connaître l'état final de la pensée de Kelsen, et (2) d'une traduction fidèle de la *Reine Rechtslehre* de 1934 afin de pouvoir mesurer le chemin parcouru par Kelsen durant les quarante dernières années de sa vie. Une monographie sur l'état final de sa pensée aurait été plus 'scientifique' et plus respectueux de l'auteur que le remaniement d'une traduction.

Ce qui fait la valeur de cette nouvelle édition de la traduction de Thévenaz, ce sont les annexes bibliographiques où l'on retrouve une liste des principales œuvres de Kelsen, une liste de ses œuvres parues en français, et une liste des auteurs ayant écrit en français sur Kelsen, ainsi qu'un article précieux de Michel van de Kerchove sur l'influence de Kelsen sur les théoriciens du droit francophones.

Michael Hartney

University of Western Ontario

Nicola Lacey

State Punishment.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1988. Pp. xiii+222.

Cdn \$65.00: US \$59.95. ISBN 0-415-00171-4.

This book is one of several recently published on the topic of punishment. It makes no attempt to offer a general theory of punishment but rather takes state inflicted legal punishment as its sole topic of concern. At the same time, it is a book with a difference. First, it quite consciously sets the discussion of punishment in a much wider context than is common. If punishment can be justified at all, Lacey argues, it will only be within an understanding of the social and political context of state-imposed punishment where its practical effects can

be gauged and evaluated. Second, Lacey explicitly rejects liberal individualism as providing an adequate foundation for understanding the nature and function of punishment, replacing it with a communitarian political philosophy. Finally, the approach taken builds on a functional or purposive analysis of punishment arguing that punishment can be understood and justified only if its function is properly identified.

Lacey begins by building a definition of 'punishment'. She rejects a number of available options on the grounds that they are either too restrictive or alternatively beg questions about the justification of punishment. She concludes by defining legal punishment as:

the principled infliction by a state-constituted institution of what are generally regarded as unpleasant consequences upon individuals or groups adjudicated, in accordance with publicly and legally recognized criteria and procedures, correctly applied, to have breached the law, as a response to that breach, as an enforcement of the law and where that response is not inflicted solely as a means of providing compensation for the harm caused by the offence. (11-12)

Chapter two examines the two traditional approaches to the justification of punishment, backward-looking or retributive accounts and forward-looking or utilitarian accounts. What are for the most part familiar arguments are carefully canvassed. Both approaches are found to be unsatisfactory. The chapter concludes with a careful review of what Lacey regards as the most promising mixed theories, theories that attempt to combine backward and forward-looking features into a single account of punishment. Hybrid theories that justify the practice of punishment on utilitarian grounds but argue that the distribution of punishment should be constrained by retributive criteria fail because they assume that Hart's three basic questions, namely, why have rules, to whom should they be applied and to what extent, are genuinely separate when in fact they are not. A second type of mixed theory regards desert as a necessary but not a sufficient condition of punishment. Hybrid theories of this type are essentially backward-looking in as much as they argue that a necessary but not a sufficient condition of punishment is that it is deserved. On the other hand, punishment should be inflicted only where doing so will have beneficial consequences. Lacey rejects this approach on the grounds that it has all the problems associated with traditional desert theories. But in addition, those that have advanced it fail to

show how desert-oriented and welfare-oriented principles can be coherently combined within a single theory.

Lacey begins the construction of her own theory by assessing the relevance of responsibility to punishment. She argues that the favoured view of responsibility which requires both that 'a person must understand the nature of her actions ... and have a genuine opportunity to do otherwise than she does' (63) cannot provide a coherent account of important aspects of modern western legal systems, which, for example, insist on holding people responsible for criminal negligence and vary the penalty in proportion to the harm caused by an act even where the actual harm caused is a matter of bad or good luck. What is more, the capacity view of responsibility sits very uneasily with evidence pointing to determinism.

The view that Lacey favours grounds assessments of responsibility on character. 'Actions for which we hold a person fully responsible,' she suggests, 'are those in which her usual character is centrally expressed' (66). This approach to responsibility is not undermined by determinism; integrates the complex character of ascriptions of responsibility in modern legal systems more easily than its rival; is consistent with hybrid accounts that incorporate both backward and *forward-looking elements in allocating punishment; and is consistent* with accounts that give a central place to notions of autonomy.

Lacey quite correctly sees that an account of the nature of legal obligation and its relation to morality must play a central role in any justification of punishment. She rejects the view that law is conceptually linked to morality. The legal point of view, she argues, need have no moral content. What is more, there is no prima facie moral obligation to obey the law (83-91). She also rejects the view that if law is justified, punishment too must be justified. It follows that whether punishment is justified is an empirical question.

Lacey builds her justification on a functional analysis of law combined with an attempt to assess the role of punishment in an ideal legal system (98). She argues that the function of law in an ideal world is to protect and enhance the autonomy and the welfare of individuals. A system of law that had these two objectives would warrant a general but not unconditional attitude of obedience (126). In such a system there would be 'on the face of it' a good reason for some form of state response to breaches of the law (126). The situation is considerably more complex where what is at issue is a less than perfect system and less than perfect laws. In such cases, whether disobedience is justified will have to be assessed on a case

by case basis and will be a function of its side effects and its long term implications (142).

What does all this imply for punishment? 'The community,' Lacey argues (177), 'is entitled to take such steps as are necessary to ensure its own continued existence and development.' Further, given the social structure of human life, there are general reasons to uphold the framework values of the community (178). Punishment, it is argued, is essential to this process as a 'significant and necessary symbol of the assertion of the community's own entitlement to enforce, to respond severely to breaches of its democratically determined central values' (185).

Who then should be punished? The principle of autonomy requires that only those who are guilty of an offence can legitimately be punished. Further, punishment should be inflicted only on those who represent a settled threat to the community and its values. On the other hand, not all offenders need be punished though the threat of punishment must be evenly or equally distributed. The extent to which the state must go to apprehend and punish offenders should in the end be determined by whether failure to punish will undermine the credibility of the law (192).

Inevitably the rich texture of a book like this one is lost in a brief overview of the positions defended. Suffice it to say that there is much here that warrants careful reading. On the other hand, I think the argument fails to be convincing. To begin with, Lacey constructs her account around an ideal political system (169). Yet the justification she offers of punishment in the less than ideal world in which we live seems to stand quite independently of the general ideal world account that she builds, as she herself seems to acknowledge (196). Three reasons are offered to support the view that punishment is an inescapable necessity and therefore justified in the real world. It is needed to support the core values of society that it is the function of the legal system to defend. Further, since the options to what exists are likely to be worse than the status quo, punishment whose purpose is to support the legal status quo is justified. Finally, a failure to punish would likely lead to harm and disorder. From this it would seem to follow that there is a *prima facie* obligation to obey even bad laws, a view that Lacey explicitly rejects in her discussion of ideal systems. The argument almost seems to suggest that the better the system, the less the damage that will be done by disobeying it and therefore the less onerous obligation to obey.

Second, Lacey bases her justification of punishment on what she describes as 'the argument from necessity' which in turn is supported

by the 'potency of intuitions' that 'may be difficult to explicate purely in terms of rational judgements' but which reflect 'the role of punishment in our emotional and affective lives.' This has all the character of an admission that punishment cannot be justified rationally but at the same time cannot be avoided because the public could not tolerate its elimination. What is particularly surprising is that Lacey uses her argument from intuition to justify punishment even in an ideal legal system. But why is she entitled to assume that the intuitions that would form under ideal legal conditions would also judge punishment to be a necessary response to breaches of the law? (182 & 185) The root problem here is that all Lacey ever demonstrates is that a society with laws must react in some way to breaches of its laws. This certainly does not in itself justify the practice of punishment as she defines it.

Third, Lacey rejects rehabilitative or curative responses to criminal behaviour as unacceptable encroachments on autonomy. On the other hand, she acknowledges that the law itself and punishment whose goal is general deterrence also encroach on autonomy, and that what the law is morally obligated to respect is not autonomy in the wide sense but rather what she describes as residual autonomy. She also takes the view that there is no sharp distinction to be drawn between individual and public goods, that human welfare is unavoidably dependent on social factors and that punishment can be thought to be in the offender's interests. Finally, character responsibility, which ought to underlie criminal responsibility, is defended in part because it is compatible with determinism. Furthermore, character responsibility takes as its focus dispositions which presumably are a part of the individual's character and are undoubtedly deeply ingrained. If this general picture points in any direction, surely it is in the direction of a rehabilitation model of sentencing. Coercive rehabilitation is intrusive, but no less so than manipulation through threats of punishment. Furthermore, deterrence-oriented punishment is inevitably negative and repressive in nature. Why, then, should it be regarded as superior to rehabilitation-oriented sentences?

Finally, though Lacey does discuss moral education models of punishment in her criticism of traditional theories, she ignores it completely in her own account. Yet of all the approaches to punishment, moral education seems most compatible with her own position. Legal systems protect and nourish core community values. A stable community is essential to human welfare. Her communitarian outlook implies that the relation between individuals and collectives is at root

a positive and supportive one, and not an antagonistic one. All of this implies in turn that obeying the law is both natural and rational in most situations. If this is so, surely a basic task for those assigned responsibility for enforcing the law is to set these facts out clearly and persuasively to those who are drawn into conflict with the law. I assume that such an approach would focus on moral education, a process which, given Lacey's communitarian stance, need not encroach on individual autonomy and need not be particularly punitive or repressive.

In short, it is not at all clear that Lacey succeeds in her admittedly ambitious project. Nevertheless, her project is eminently worthwhile and her strategy well worth careful evaluation.

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Michael Luntley

*Language, Logic, and Experience:
The Case for Anti-Realism.*

La Salle, IL: Open Court 1988. Pp. x+278.
US \$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9061-3);
US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9062-1).

This book spells out and defends an argument for anti-realism which Luntley finds in the writings of Michael Dummett. Luntley claims that the literature on Dummett—and sometimes Dummett himself—confuse two distinct issues, only one of which is the core issue for anti-realism. These Luntley calls the objectivity-of-content issue and the objectivity-of-truth issue. The former concerns whether a subject S could have thoughts whose content transcends S's experience, actual or potential. The latter has to do with whether it makes sense for S to assign any determinate truth-value to propositions whose content thus transcends experience.

According to Luntley, Dummett's opponents have either conflated these two issues, or have focussed on, and criticized (correctly) the thesis that content cannot transcend experience. But it is no part of anti-realism, properly conceived, to maintain this thesis. Rather,

according to Luntley, it is the objectivity-of-truth that an anti-realist must be concerned to deny. That is, anti-realists must deny that experience-transcendent propositions have a determinate truth-value: they must deny the principle of bivalence, and hence classical logic. Luntley does deny this principle, and with it, the rule of inference $\sim \sim P \vdash P$. What results is a 'logic of experience' that formally replicates intuitionist logic.

What does this come to? A proposition is assertible only if it is effectively decidable. Effective decidability is to be understood in terms of what Luntley calls a manifestation constraint (constraint C): For any content P if it makes sense to say that subject S knows that P , P must be an experienceable state of affairs and this entails that S 's knowing that P makes a detectable difference to experience (46). The governing idea is that a state of affairs is experienceable if and only if its obtaining rules out certain experiences. So P 's being experienceable, if P is logically compound, comes to P 's being falsifiable; i.e., entailing the negation of some experienceable atomic proposition. (Here ' P ' does duty both for a proposition and for the state of affairs in virtue of which it is true.)

A proposition lacks a determinate truth-value, then, just in case neither it nor its negation is effectively decidable. The interesting cases are sentences that are meaningful and do not contain empty terms, but where the reference of some term(s), or the applicability of some predicate(s) cannot be determined by experience. In such cases, $\sim \sim P$ is true (for we can show that $\sim P$ is unprovable), but P fails to be true.

Luntley calls a knowledge-claim *dislocated* if it cannot be backed up by grounds that satisfy constraint C; an area of discourse is similarly said to be *closed* if its constituent propositions, while perhaps mutually supporting, give no purchase to constraint C. Such knowledge-claims may well have an intelligible meaning, but what they lack is criteria which make intelligible the application of the relevant concepts.

Luntley's conception of effective decidability is falsificationist, but this might easily mislead. Strict falsificationism faces a well-known problem: few empirical propositions, if any, can be decisively falsified. Thus few would be, by Luntley's lights, effectively decidable. But here (103 and Chapter 5), Luntley proposes a 'radical break with traditional philosophical thinking.' Given an experienceable notion of truth, why subscribe to a 'realist picture of evidence gathering'—a picture according to which evidence often at best allows us to *approach*

knowledge of the truth-values of propositions—truth-values that are determinate but involve something independent of our knowledge? Luntley refuses to identify decidability with observability. For the present purpose, his concern is not with the decidability of atomic propositions, but with the role of experience in constraining decidability with respect to the determination of truth-values for logical compounds. Chapter 5 is largely devoted to showing how logical compounds—e.g., conditionals whose antecedents and consequents are logically independent contingent claims—must not be thought to have truth-values that transcend our means for establishing what they assert. Thus, a proof of *A*: ‘If it is raining, the ground is wet’ would presumably consist in a proof of the consequent, given the antecedent. The ‘proof’ of *A* that experience can afford at best renders it defeasibly warranted; and such a warrant cannot tell us what is being asserted by *A*. On Luntley’s diagnosis, the problem raised for the anti-realist by the apparent unprovability of much in empirical discourse is a problem precisely and only because we adhere to the realist’s conception of the objectivity-of-truth. Instead, the truth of *A* *must* be so conceived as to fall within the domain of what can intelligibly be asserted—hence, what is decidable. But does this not require adjusting the *content* of *A*?

Luntley’s program requires defining a notion of assertibility which is neither reductionist—that is, involving some novel content-specification of empirical compound—nor skeptical—that is, rendering (many) such compounds unassertible. This trick is performed as follows. First, a distinction is introduced between the *meaning* of a statement and its *role*. *Role* is constituted by the inferential relations of a statement to others—hence, which other statements it rules out. Meaning (content) determines role, but is not identical to it. Next, assertibility is a function of role, not meaning. Specifically, a statement *P* is assertible if, in the face of potential defeaters (determined by the role of *P*), it survives undefeated: ‘An assertion is a claim to rule out defeating evidence... understanding [its] meaning... consists in our ability to support the utterance once launched upon an often hostile public’ (148). Much now hinges on the notion of survival, for both *P* and $\sim P$ may remain undefeated; are they then both assertible? No; a sentence is assertible—i.e., it survives—‘just in case its sense succeeds in providing a *role* that rules out certain experiences in such a manner that the consequent undefeat of this sentence does not also allow for the undefeat of the negation of the sentence’ (155). Finally, the notion of objectivity is spelled out in terms of the continuing openness of an assertion or domain of discourse to defeat.

In Chapter 6, Luntley takes up a defense of his theory of meaning which, as I indicated, is Fregean. Here the main issue is whether the primitive units of meaning are sentential or sub-sentential. Chapter 7 defends a representational characterization of perceptual experience, with a view to arguing, in the final two chapters, that perception involves the development of perceptual skills which, once developed, permit us to perceive, among other things, the mental states of others, and submicroscopic particles. Luntley argues, convincingly to my mind, that perceptual contents can be representational without being conceptual, though he does so by appealing to informational states that have representational content but are non-conscious. In Chapter 8 we have an argument to the effect that others' pain can be perceived. The argument is inspired, in part, by Wittgenstein's argument against the privacy-in-principle of sensations.

For lack of space, I shall not discuss Luntley's final chapter, which argues that such singular and existential claims about 'theoretical entities' (i.e., microparticles) as science requires can be accepted by his anti-realism as effectively decidable. What, then, is excluded? Surprisingly, there is almost no mention of laws of nature; what Luntley would say about them might be gleaned from his discussions of negation, conditionals, and existential claims, but I shall not make *the attempt. Explicitly excluded are propositions about God, the ether, and Lockean substance—a rather motley assortment. Finally, there are two appendices: one gives a formal development of Luntley's non-classical logic, the other briefly discusses the status of secondary qualities.*

This is a provocative, tightly argued, systematic essay in epistemology—one that will repay readers' efforts. Realists who are unprepared to accept Luntley's conclusion that realism is a myth will, I think, find the book deserving of a reply.

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Colin McGinn

Mental Content.

Boston: Basil Blackwell 1988. Pp. vi+218.

US \$34.95. ISBN 0-631-16369-7.

'Internalism' about the mind—the view that nothing in the world beyond the mind either partially or fully constitutes the content of mental states—is without a doubt under siege. An emerging consensus on behalf of anti-internalism (as found in the recent writings of Lynne Rudder Baker, Tyler Burge, Hilary Putnam, and Steven Schiffer, to name only a few) appears to be telling us that neither classical Cartesian internalism nor recent physicalist internalism will do as an adequate framework for understanding mental content. This rejection of internalism is precisely the starting point of Colin McGinn's *Mental Content*. McGinn's project is to provide the outlines of a unified theory of content starting out from the assumption that 'the mind is not in the head but spread out across the world' (29). Nevertheless at the same time McGinn wants to preserve as much of internalism as possibly can be saved from the externalist's critical scalpel; hence McGinn eventually arrives at what he calls a 'qualified externalist position' (118).

By way of stage-setting, McGinn stipulates a strategically important distinction between 'internalism' and 'individualism' (the latter term is Tyler Burge's). The former term indicates the exclusion of a mentally-constitutive role for environmental or worldly items *alone*, while the latter term indicates the exclusion not only of worldly items but also of sociolinguistic facts and social conventions. McGinn's qualified externalism is thus intended to be a treatment of *anti-internalism only: he thereby leaves out of consideration a mentally-constitutive role for community-invoking facts*. I note this particularly because I will want to raise a critical point about it later.

McGinn's overall account is divided into three parts. In the first (and, I think, most important) part, 'The Location of Content,' he distinguishes between two kinds of externalism: 'weak' and 'strong' (7-9). Weak externalism says that something or another somewhere in the world must play a constitutive role in mental content; but the item need not be in the causal local environment of the subject. Weak externalism thus asserts the *existence-dependence* of mental content upon external items. *By contrast, strong externalism says that a particular object or property in the causal local environment of the subject must play a role in constituting content*. So strong externalism

asserts not only the existence-dependence of mental content upon external items, but also the *direct involvement* of those items in the content.

This is quite clearly an extremely important distinction not often noted by philosophers of mind. It enables McGinn to hold that while certain sorts of mental content (such as those referring to natural kinds) are subject to strong-externalistic individuation, still other sorts of content are subject only to weak-externalistic individuation. Unlike strong externalism, weak externalism can support a considerable amount of subjectivism. Certain quite basic concepts are, according to McGinn, essentially weak-externalistic: secondary-quality concepts, mathematical and logical concepts, artifactual concepts, and most psychological concepts. Hence the domain of concepts for which strong externalism holds is fairly narrow. One of McGinn's most striking claims is that while in general some form of externalism must be correct, nevertheless most externalists go too far in defending a thoroughgoing strong externalism. This leads to the untoward and unintuitive consequence that first-persons are never in the best position to know the contents of their own minds.

McGinn therefore wants to defend for the most part (the exception being intentionality directed to natural kinds) a weak externalism about the mind. This means that a goodly part of mental content is resistant to Twin Earth strategies of environmental variation. At the same time McGinn wants to insist upon a rather healthy complement of purely internalistic concepts—for example: bodily sensations such as pain, character-traits, and selfhood. Weak externalism together with these internalistic concepts amounts to a partial vindication of what McGinn in an earlier book calls the 'subjective view' (see *The Subjective View* [Oxford: Oxford University Press 1983]).

The epistemological consequences of these moves are striking. McGinn's weak externalism is just strong enough to rule out universal skepticism about the external world (the 'evil demon' variety in which the external world fails to exist at all) but still too weak to prevent unreliabilist skepticism (the 'brain-in-the-vat' variety in which the external world still exists, but radically unlike what we believe it to be). The skeptic is thus given his due and the common sense realist left wringing his hands.

We have now before us the kernel of McGinn's account of mental content. Let me briefly indicate the thrust of parts 2 and 3, however, before going on to some critical remarks. The second part, 'The Utility of Content', develops an argument for a biological approach to men-

tal content. Here McGinn lays out what may be called a 'wide functionalism' that combines a causal-role functionalism about mental representations with an evolutionary story about how the human organism is ineluctably embedded in, and adapts itself to, the local environment. Mental content is determined by the biological role of a given mental item, that is, its proper function for the survival and satisfaction of the organism in which it realized. Here McGinn joins forces with Ruth G. Millikan's *Language, Thought, and other Biological Categories* in order to develop the rudiments of a teleological theory of intentionality.

McGinn completes his philosophical triptych in part 3, 'The Basis of Content'. Here he tries to answer the following question: 'What sort of mechanism is required to enable the human representational system to do what it does?' McGinn's answer amounts to an ingenious exercise in speculative empirical psychology – or what he (with tongue somewhat in cheek) calls 'psychotectonics' (171). The main idea is that the brain constructs analogue models of the world in order to steer itself about in pursuit of its purposes, rather than framing inner sentences by means of innate syntactical rules.

I would like now to cash in my earlier promissory notes about some critical remarks. What I want to focus on is McGinn's explicit avoidance of an external and mentally-constitutive role for social facts. As Lynne Rudder Baker (in *Saving Belief*) and Hilary Putnam (in *Representation and Reality*) have recently pointed out, even wide functionalism is susceptible to Twin-Earth-type counterexamples in which social conventions alone (in particular, semantic conventions) are varied. Thus it is quite possible to imagine internal states, environmental causes, and wide-functional interactions held fixed, while varying community-wide semantic conventions – *thereby* modifying the truth-conditions of mental states. Therefore McGinn's biofunctionalism still lacks a crucial individuating feature for mental content.

In any case, *Mental Content* is replete with interesting and important arguments, formulations, distinctions, and speculations. And the proposed model of the mind as an environmentally-embedded organically-realized teleological entity is undoubtedly a real advance over the Establishment's innatist/solipsist/computationalist model. Nevertheless, McGinn's picture of mental content is still, intuitively, inadequate to the phenomena. Mental content is neither merely in the head, nor merely spread out across the world; nor is it merely some judicious biofunctional blend of these – it is irreducibly *social* as well.

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Roderick Frazier Nash

*The Rights of Nature: A History of
Environmental Ethics.*

Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press
1989. Pp. xiii+290.

US \$27.50. ISBN 0-299-11840-1.

Roderick Nash, who is well-known for his seminal masterpiece *Wilderness and the American Mind*, has now attempted a history of environmental ethics. Although the book is interesting and well worth reading, it is also likely to mislead readers who are approaching the subject for the first time, confuse those who have some familiarity with the field, and outrage those who have followed the contemporary debate in environmental ethics closely.

Nash claims at the beginning of his book that he is not taking any position of his own; rather he is merely reporting as a historian the history of ideas behind environmental ethics: 'In *The Rights of Nature* I am not trying to write philosophically about environmental ethics or natural rights or liberalism; I am not prescribing ways to think about the rights of human beings balanced against those of nature. I am not endeavoring to find universally acceptable definitions of tough words like "nature," "liberalism," and "rights." Many of the people I discuss do offer such prescriptions and definitions, but their ideas are not necessarily my ideas—or at least that is not the issue of concern of this book. I am, then, less concerned about whether a particular ethical position is politically responsible, philosophically correct, or scientifically valid than I am with the fact that it was expressed, the context in which the expression occurred, and its consequences for further thought and action' (xi-xii). While this passage on the surface suggests a reasonable approach to the history of environmental ethics, it is not, for Nash's decision to take seriously whatever has been 'expressed,' whether or not it is 'politically responsible, philosophically correct, or scientifically valid,' has produced a book that is far from being completely objective and unbiased. The end result is a history that either consciously or unconsciously has been written to support the dubious claim that environmental ethics is inevitably moving toward the recognition of rights for animals, plants, life, rocks, ecosystems, the planet, and finally the universe (5). It is true that many people have in the past and today still do claim that nature has rights, in terms of its parts and collectively, but this view is hardly a mainstream theme of contemporary environmental ethics

research. Quite to the contrary, after much debate over the last ten years, the rights approach to environmental ethics has been abandoned by virtually all major figures in the field.

While a rights approach remains viable in the parallel field of animal liberation or animal rights (as applied to the treatment of domestic animals), it has dropped out of sight in environmental ethics for two principal reasons. First, rights have traditionally been used to protect the interests of individuals and those parts of nature with which environmentalists are most concerned, ecosystems and species, are not individual entities with specific interests. Second, those natural entities that are individuals with specific interests, plants and animals, because of environmentalist concern for the preservation of systems and species, are usually treated as less valuable than the system they inhabit or the species they represent. For example, the death of an individual animal, provided that it is a natural death independent of human interference, goes unlamented and is usually regarded as making a positive contribution to the well-being or health of the species (promoting a healthy gene pool and keeping the species evolutionarily on track) and the well-being or health of the system (keeping predator/prey ratios in balance and preventing herbivore irruptions that may reduce the carrying capacity of the system).

Although Nash is aware that many philosophers have rejected rights theory in environmental ethics, he passes over this technicality with two quick sentences: 'Of course, nature does not demand rights, and some moral philosophers even question whether anything so general as the "rights of nature" can exist at all. But, as we shall see, others use the term confidently' (10). In the first sentence, Nash dismisses *without even footnote reference* a host of philosophers who have provided careful arguments against the employment of rights terminology in environmental ethics: Richard A. Watson, J. Baird Callicott, Bryan Norton, Scott Lehmann, Mark Sagoff, Ernest Partridge, Holmes Rolston, III, Mary Midgley, and Mary Anne Warren, to name only a few. In the second sentence, he fails to justify his decision to write these arguments out of his 'history of environmental ethics,' for these philosophers are certainly as *confident* in their rejection of the use of rights talk in environmental ethics as those who continue to use such language without bothering to muster theoretical defense.

At this point, only ten pages into the book, many readers, familiar with recent environmental ethics research, may feel the urge to *stop reading because of the misleading direction the book is going.*

To do so, however, would be a mistake, for the book, though not a history of professional environmental ethics, is a useful and *very well researched* history of nonprofessional environmental ethics—specifically, the deep ecology movement and the controversial Earth First! movement—elements of environmental ethics that are often underestimated and even ignored by mainline environmental ethicists, but which nevertheless are playing a major role at the practical level, where professional writing in the field is currently having little or no impact.

Seen in this way, the book's problem is not what Nash has written, but rather the subtitle that he has used to characterize the book's contents. Although the book, because of its omissions, is beyond doubt a *bad* 'history of environmental ethics,' it is nevertheless a *very good* 'history of radical American environmentalism.'

Environmental ethics as an applied discipline within professional philosophy is a very peculiar field. To be frank, professional environmental ethics is the least applied of the applied philosophy subdisciplines: it offers little or no practical application in environmental affairs and it provides no inspiration to those who wish to live an environmentally sound life.

If professional environmental ethics is to ever play a major role in environmental management and in the life philosophies of environmentalists, it is important that professional philosophers keep in mind that there is a second kind of environmental ethics winning the day outside of the classroom, in the field, in the woods, and on the river. Nash's book admirably provides us with a look at and a history of this kind of environmental ethics, and he shows us the degree to which it interweaves with and rejects professional work in the field. Professional environmental ethics, if it is ever to rise above the esoteric, will someday and somehow have to overcome or reconcile with its nonprofessional variants. It is difficult to predict how this task will be accomplished, but very likely one good first step for most professional philosophers is reading Nash's book and trying to take seriously (or failing that, at least trying to take into account) the positions he chronicles and praises.

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Jan Patočka

Le monde naturel et le mouvement de l'existence humaine. Trans. Erika Abrams. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988. *Phaenomenologica* 110. Pp. xxiii+276. US \$89.00. ISBN 90-247-3577-7.

Divided into two parts, this volume contains seven essays of the Czech philosopher (1907-77) written during the period from 1955 to 1976. Of these essays only 'La Phénoménologie du corps propre' (1967) has previously been available to readers in the French language. These essays were drawn from volumes I and II of the four-volume Prague edition *Přirozený svět a pohyb lidské existence* compiled in 1980. This collection, together with the previous translation (*Le monde naturel comme problème philosophique*. Transl. J. Danek and H. Declève. The Hague: Nijhoff 1976. *Phaenomenologica* 68), provides French readers with a virtually complete version of the first two volumes of the Prague edition. The Preface of H. Declève (vii-xxiii) provides useful information on the chronology of the texts, on their tentative, systematic unity and on the philosophical exigencies to which they respond. Abrams' translations from the Czech and German original versions have been rendered in a readable if inelegant fashion.

The three essays in Part One allow us to see Patočka's emerging 'doctrine' of the fundamental movements of human existence in an extraordinarily rich and sensitive way. First from the perspective of a critical reflection on Aristotle and Descartes 'Notes sur la préhistoire de la science du mouvement...' (1-12) centering on the problems of objectivation and corporeality. Then from the perspective of a refinement and redefinition of the tasks of a phenomenology of the natural world 'Le monde naturel et la phénoménologie' (13-49), which proceeds from descriptions of the earth, the heavens and others to an outline of a 'theory' of movement in the strongest and most primordial sense of that term. Finally from the perspective of an auto-critique of the author's own habilitation thesis 'Méditation sur "Le Monde naturel comme problème philosophique"' (50-124) which proceeds by way of a reflection on the successes and failures of modern philosophy's treatments of 'reflection', to a critique of Husserl and Heidegger centering on their inability or unwillingness to deal with human corporeality, culminating in stunning descriptions of human finitude, individuation and reciprocity.

Together, the three essays comprising Part One allow us to see the outline of an original philosophical project as a rapport with the world, as an initiative that traces its own possibility and necessity in the history of philosophy, and as a return to the perceptual experience of carnal subjects whose being is always already the being of co-subjects.

The seven essays which comprise Part Two show Patočka at work on a number of different themes ranging from Aristotle's conception of motion to Fink's proposal for modalizing the concept of 'everything'. The essays on the body-subject 'La Phénoménologie du corps propre' (139-54) and Medard Boss' *Grundrisse der Medizin und der Psychologie* 'Cartésianisme et phénoménologie' (180-226) illustrate Patočka's subtle and profound sensitivity to the snares of Cartesianism in European philosophy and science. The third essay 'Le "point de départ subjectif" et la biologie objective de l'homme' (155-79) provides a terse but rather penetrating treatment of the general theme of the proper limits of scientific explanation vis-à-vis objective, schematic representations (155-62) coupled with a brief outline of the proper role of phenomenological description (165-8) and a proposal for how these former themes elucidate how we must proceed in establishing a positive and concrete understanding of the 'subjective' and its 'transcendental' character (175-6). The fifth essay in this Part provides a brief, critical treatment of Husserl's conception of the 'Lifeworld' which Patočka felt was a decisive step in outlining a new conception of rationality and understanding; but a step which Husserl himself was unable to take clearly. The sixth essay 'Qu'est-ce que l'existence?' (243-64) outlines the notion of a 'truthful life,' 'la vie dans la vérité,' a life where being and truth are 'shown' but never demonstrated or proved, a life which thinks existence without objective concepts. This is effected by a reflection on the literary creations of Mann, Faulkner and Dostoyevsky.

The essays here assembled in this French-language edition provide an excellent introduction to the over-all project of Jan Patočka. Serious students of phenomenology will find much of interest in the essays in Part Two where Patočka explicates his relationship with the thought of Husserl and Heidegger. Serious students of temporality, corporeality, and the relations of philosophic and scientific thought will find in Patočka a subtle and penetrating collaborator.

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Terry Pinkard

Hegel's Dialectic:

The Explanation of Possibility.

Philadelphia: Temple University Press

1988. Pp. xi+236.

US \$34.95. ISBN 0-87722-570-2.

This is an interesting, intelligent, and well-written book. The first, and somewhat larger half of it, is about something that Hegel himself called 'dialectic.' But that 'dialectic' only belonged to Hegel in a rather diminished sense. In its application to conceptual *possibilities* it was invented by Zeno and Socrates; and it was already used in a way very similar to Hegel's (or at least to the way of Pinkard's Hegel) by Plato. Only the second (smaller) half of the book is about 'Hegel's dialectic' in the proper sense. Let me say at once, that this second part is excellent. (There is a danger, I think, that many students who recognize that Pinkard's conception of Hegel's *logic* is a misguided one—as indeed it is—will put the book back on the shelf and forget it. But anyone who is interested in Hegel's 'philosophy of spirit' should simply begin at chapter six—and no one should ignore chapters six to eight.)

Pinkard's approach to Hegel is inspired by Klaus Hartmann. For years Hartmann has been propagating the view that there is such a thing as 'dialectical logic'; and further that Hegel—if we shear away the ontological pretensions that belonged only to his world and time—will be recognized (and properly appreciated for the first time) as a master of it.

I am inclined to believe—in spite of the scepticism of C.S. Peirce who was as good a philosophical logician as we are ever likely to see—that there *is* a 'dialectical method' which can be set free from Hegel's systematic use of it. I even think that it can be (and sometimes materially or unselfconsciously *is*) used to throw light on particular philosophical disagreements—and to dissolve pseudo-conflicts. But one cannot build a 'system' with it except in the context of what Hegel called 'speculation.' So whenever the 'speculative' insight into the goal of the inquiry fails, the application of this liberated 'dialectic' to Hegel's 'science of logic' only produces what dialectic is supposed to produce: contradiction and breakdown. Thus, for instance, Pinkard's discussion of Hegel's philosophy of mathematics is one of the best things in his treatment of the logic. But he cannot rescue the transition from Quantity back to Quality from condemnation as 'slight of

hand' (sic, 51); and Hegel's classification of mathematical ratios is dismissed as mere 'idiosyncrasy' (52). Odd it certainly is; but someone whose goal was simply 'the explanation of possibility' would not have thought that a developmental ordering of arithmetical relations provided any insight. So Pinkard should think again about what Hegel was doing.

Sometimes, Pinkard even misdescribes his own real insights into the Hegelian Logic. For instance, he shows very neatly how the dialectic both of 'Being' and of 'Essence' moves in a circle. But he calls these circles 'bad infinites' (56). The circle, however, is the 'good infinite' model of endlessness; it is the straight line sequence that is a 'bad infinite.' *These* circles are, of course, still subject to the dialectic. They are not *truly* closed. But that imperfection is not what Hegel calls 'badness.' That sort of talk is a relic of the 'Anglo-Hegelianism' which rejected dialectic as a *method* altogether.

According to Hegel himself, the object of philosophical inquiry is 'the actual cognition of what truly is' (*Phenomenology* sec. 73). But I suppose Pinkard thinks that there is no intelligible sense in which this is a *possible* goal (once we have added the stipulation that 'Truth is the whole'). In his view Hegel does not have a viable concept of 'goals' at all: 'Hegel's concept of true teleology is empirically vacuous' (91). Thanks to the 'cunning of Reason' we *cannot* know what the 'goal' is (as a 'whole') while we are still seeking it. So the concept of 'true teleology' will not serve to explain anything. Hegel's actual explanation of the world is through 'the postulation of an entity—Spirit, *Geist*' (102). Here I think we can detect the baleful influence of Charles Taylor. But the view fits Pinkard's Kantian model: from 'possibility' we advance to 'postulation.'

At this point, however, the 'bad infinite' part of the book ends, and the 'good infinite' takes over. We stop 'explaining possibility' and start comprehending what is actual. This is what Hegel was always doing, even in the logic. His concept of absolute teleology, for example, does not explain the possibility of an absolute purpose. It shows us what free purpose absolutely *is* (and must be) as a dialectical identity of knowledge and ignorance—rather than a finite coincidence of intending and achieving. The singular agent will be aware of coincidence (or failure). But the 'true Concept' refers us to the substantial community that sustains all of our finite willing. Pinkard displays a very insightful grasp of Hegel's logical concepts as 'social categories'; and in so doing he shows that 'spirit' is not a postulated 'entity' but the actual logical context of scientific understanding. 'These social uni-

ties,' he says, 'are the very soul of self-determination. As deployed in a philosophical theory, they explain how self-determination is concretely possible' (140). At this point he has the *telos* of the Logic itself in his hands. But even here, he cannot hold on to it; his footnote (223) 'puts the point in a different way' which makes it uselessly abstract once again. In the chapter on the philosophy of history, the abstract Kantian question 'How is history possible?' invades the text itself (153, 160); and it may prevent some readers from appreciating the insight that is to be found here about Hegel's real problem of how our history has produced the logical concept that comprehends it—and by so doing enables us to understand what historical understanding actually is. 'There is certainly no *a priori* reason to suppose that philosophical history must always demonstrate that progress has occurred' (166) says Pinkard. But he knows that, only because progress in understanding *has* occurred; and now that the *Vorstellung* of 'Providence' has been replaced by the *Begriff* of 'absolute teleology' we know logically why 'progress' in understanding is no longer necessary (or even possible, except in the sense of a continual enrichment of actual comprehension).

This book both illuminates Hegel's 'real philosophy,' and derives something from Hegel's logic which will be valuable for non-Hegelian kinds of philosophical inquiry. The pity of it is, that Pinkard has a different conception of the task of philosophy than Hegel did; so that his own logical theory has obscured and partly corrupted his contribution to the concrete interpretation of Hegel.

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Howard B. Radest

Can We Teach Them?

New York: Praeger 1989. Pp. xii+150.

US \$35.95. ISBN 0-275-92857-8.

In Plato's *Meno* Socrates is asked if virtue can be taught. True to form, Socrates declares that he does not know even what 'virtue' is, let alone whether or not it is teachable. Nonetheless, he is willing to engage

in dialogue with Meno, and eventually the two examine the hypothesis 'if virtue is knowledge, then it is teachable'. At one point in their conversation it seems that virtue is indeed knowledge and hence teachable, but Socrates wonders if this could really be true given that there are no teachers of this supposedly teachable subject. He notes that there are many virtuous men about and, by hypothesis, these are knowledgeable men who ought to be able to impart their knowledge of virtue to others. But they seem unable to do so. Is this because virtue is not, after all, knowledge and therefore is unteachable? While this would seem to be the conclusion of the *Meno*, surely we must ask if we must accept it and abandon all effort to teach ethics.

Howard Radest in *Can We Teach Ethics?* discusses the possibility and nature of moral education. While he does not contradict Socrates and claim that virtue is knowledge, he does claim that virtue can be taught, albeit not in the way in which shoe-making and mathematics are taught. Radest begins by recognizing the value of Socratic ignorance and the inevitable presence of ambiguity in our moral experience, and ends by advocating the Socratic dialogue as that by means of which virtue can be taught. Still in keeping with the form of the early Platonic dialogues, he claims that this teaching is essentially always unfinished business.

The book is described by Radest as a report on the progress of his project of understanding and enhancing moral education in schools by uniting the philosopher's world of word and idea with the messy 'existential' reality of students and teachers in the classroom. Each chapter of the book represents a step along the way to understanding the moral education that already goes on in schools, and the possible ways in which we might go about improving it. What Radest discovers along the way is illusion, evasion, ambiguity, unexpected interruptions, hidden presuppositions, implicit and explicit curricula and also, fortunately, the blending of reason, understanding and passion in the dialogue between teachers and students that is the teaching of virtue, the coupling of moral understanding and moral action.

Radest's 'unended odyssey' begins with reflection on the illusions surrounding the teacher's goal: the 'well-behaved' student. He finds that the typical 'well-behaved' student is not necessarily a virtuous character: 'good' behaviour may well be a mask behind which stands a morally bankrupt opportunist. How has this come to be? In their efforts to produce well-behaved students teachers are all too often pressured to divorce the classroom from real life, to isolate students from

the ambiguity and uncertainty of everyday moral experience and to try to protect them from the disturbing complexities of life by engendering in them 'good' habits of behaviour. This protective isolation is impossible to maintain, however, for virtues collide and the unexpected always intrudes. In the classroom the 'play and inter-play' of persons and their problems does not cease; the classroom is not a morally neutral world. In it moral experience, ambiguous though it may be, continues to be disruptive and provocative and cannot be evaded. Indeed, moral values are brought into the classroom in a variety of ways: they are hidden in what Radest calls the first curriculum—the presuppositions of teachers and students that enable us to understand anything whatsoever. They are alternatively implicit and explicit in the organization and structure of the school and in the roles of the various participants—the second curriculum. They are obviously present in the material, e.g., literature and history, studied by the teachers and students—the third curriculum. In the fourth curriculum they are themselves the object of study, as in courses on ethics.

Moral education, then, does go on, but even together these four curricula are not sufficient for the teaching of virtue. What must complement them is a fifth explicitly philosophical curriculum which calls for critical reflection on the material supplied by the other four. This critical spirit can, and according to Radest, should exist in the classroom because the classroom occupies the 'middle ground' between private and public life. The personal may intrude into the classroom but there it is, in a sense, de-fused: it is transformed into material for reflection. Also, in the classroom public expectations can be subjected to critical examination without fear of reprisal. In the classroom one is free to reflect on the play and inter-play of persons, on the ways of acting and the ranges of emotional response that are in fact the reality of the classroom itself. In the exciting classroom one is free to engage in personal Socratic dialogues without fear of execution. It is in this fifth curriculum, the dialogue, that moral education really comes to be. Moral education, according to Radest, lies in the teaching of it, in the dialogue which develops moral intelligence and couples it with personal interests and motivations, making possible the growth of a virtuous character. Virtuous students, and not merely well-behaved students, are possible only if moral doubt—Socratic ignorance—is regarded not as that which is to be dismissed evasively but rather as that which can act as a stimulus to critical reflection about what really 'matters.'

Radest's book is essentially an unmasking of what actually goes on in schools. It is a response to those who are demanding that ethics be taught in schools. Moral education is and always has gone on in classrooms, and he claims that neither values-clarification courses, nor courses of philosophy for children can substitute for what is already present there. If the way in which we educate ourselves morally is to be improved, then we must become Socratic. We must add the fifth curriculum and engage in an always unfinished dialogue. Hence Radest's book is described well by him when he says of it: 'This essay is an invitation to renew the discussion that is at the heart of moral education and to go on doing so' (xi). If those who are trying not to slip into the slough of cynicism and despair along the brink of which the teacher always seems to walk feel encouraged by this discussion of moral education and want to continue it, then Radest's modest goal has been attained.

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Harry Redner
The Ends of Science:
An Essay in Scientific Authority.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1987.
Pp. xiv+344. US \$39.50. ISBN 0-8133-0452-0.

Redner's book combines a sociology of science with a critique of contemporary scientific method. He claims that 'the old science of the last few centuries ... is coming to an end in the sense of approaching the limit of its potential scope' (3). This old science is divided into two phases. The first phase is the 'classical science', which supplanted the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian approach and initiated the 'Newtonian-Einsteinian' epoch (19). Classical science is characterized by, among other things, outstanding individual achievement, a search for grand unifying theories, and well-defined areas of enquiry with their own explanatory goals. This is, in other words, the science with which we are familiar, and which we imagine is still the science of today.

It isn't. Classical science has given way to 'World Science', a much less appealing enterprise. Its characteristics are, first, technification: 'a process whereby techniques—frequently, though not always, involving technology—become preponderant over earlier ... methods ...' [As] a result of technification, theory construction has to some extent been rendered redundant through the systematic application of techniques and technical procedures to the given materials of research ...' (64). Second, World Science is, to an unprecedented degree, abstract. It gets so far away from common experience that one can no longer speak of evidence for many theories, which are no more than complex hypothetical constructions of never-to-be-perceived entities. Hand in hand with abstraction goes a third characteristic, formalization. World Science pursues what Redner calls the 'arithmetic ideal': not the use of mathematics to explain phenomena, but the construction of mathematical worlds with their own logic and no purpose but to display their elegance (71).

Two other characteristics of World Science make explicit its new social presuppositions, which grow out of its genesis in the giant wartime and postwar megaprojects. First, the search for a unified theory has given way to piecemeal 'problem-solving' (80): seeing one's work as 'mainly specialized problems to be solved by set technical procedures,' as opposed to the problems concerned with the development of unifying theories. The narrowness takes on a sinister character of what Redner refers to as 'finalization': 'research is promoted and guided by external ends and purposes rather than by the intrinsic explanatory goals of science itself, as in the Classical sciences' (86ff.). Scientific research is no longer something which an individual can undertake. The ambitious scientist must now subordinate his intellectual curiosity to the desires of various collective entities—the government bureaucracy, the research team, the academic authorities, the company—whose search may simply be for any flashy achievement that will keep the money and glory coming in.

The latter sections of Redner's work deal with the reformers, and with the prospects of a new and more useful science. The forces of change include conservative 'methodists', who want to revive positivism as a counterweight to technology-driven abstraction, and 'high church' critics who 'advocate an approach to science based on a study of traditions of informal procedures or the art and craft features of practical scientific work' (211). The radical reformers consist of Marxists and conservationists.

What do these reformers propose, or oppose to the achievements of World Science? In the first place, they seek to reunify disciplines all too fragmented by bureaucracy and technocracy. 'The integration of the sciences is at yet in its beginnings, but already alliances are being forged which would have been unthinkable in World science with its separations and specializations.' The purpose of these alliances is to 'focus in common on the large and complex objects of scientific investigation' (301). An integrated science can perhaps solve the problems of understanding large systems, which so far have escaped the investigations of compartmentalized science. The new science would employ everything from the highly mathematical techniques of chaos theory to the 'feel for the organism' that pervades Barbara McClintock's revolutionary and long-neglected work in genetics to understand such large-scale entities as ecosystems and even social units.

Redner's book is a brave assault on an unattainable objective. The problem is simply that Redner has virtually no evidence—indeed very little *notion* of evidence—for what he says. He combines questionable methodology with the unrelenting application of pessimistic bias.

On the methodological side, Redner is as aware as anyone that 'today no-one can claim to have a close knowledge of all the sciences' (xi). But he goes on to say that 'only those who are intimately acquainted with a science—frequently only those who have contributed to it at a high level—have the necessary understanding and standing to pronounce upon it' (xi). This is methodologically Pollyannish. First, to have achieved something in, say, physics, shows a good understanding of how to do physics, but not a grasp of the sociology of physics, nor even a comprehensive knowledge of what is going on in that enormous field. Moreover, though Redner initially promises to cite scientists as authorities only on their own fields, he later adopts the indefensible practice of citing specialists (e.g., the biochemists Chargaff and Stent) as if they were authorities on science in general. Finally, it is inconsistent to claim that, on the one hand, science has gotten too big to understand with any degree of confidence and, on the other hand, that science can be understood well enough to know that it is at some sort of 'impasse' (6).

Is science at some sort of impasse? Redner's pessimism is continually at work, slanting every piece of evidence to the contrary. Computers are cited as devices for technification, but never as personal tools which might help individuals reclaim some of the territory they have lost to teams. When Redner discusses the reformers and innova-

tive researchers who point the way to a 'future science', they seem so numerous and so eminent that one wonders if science could really be in such decay: the possibility that these people are really contributors to *current* science is never examined.

More fundamentally, suppose that science has indeed become more centralized, more bureaucratic, less free, less individual, more technological. None of this implies, nor has Redner shown, that science has gotten *intellectually* worse. The authorities cited display just the sort of inexpertise one fears. Heisenberg says it's all coming to an end, but discredits himself through his inexplicable confidence: he pronounces, with no sign of embarrassment, on 'the ecological limit on the growth of civilization' and the 'consummation' of European music. gamov less pompously speaks of fat and lean years in physics, but Redner will have none of this, quoting Kapitsa's comment that 'science has lost its freedom' (5). Why should this be relevant: could not a loss of freedom actually make science more productive? How could anyone *know*?

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**John C. Sallis, Giuseppina Moneta,
and Jacques Taminiaux**

*The Collegium Phaenomenologicum,
The First Ten Years.*

Norwell, MA: Martinus Nijhoff 1989.

Phaenomenologica 105. Pp. vii+339.

US \$89.00. ISBN 90-247-3709-5.

The Collegium Phaenomenologicum, meeting every summer since 1976 in Perugia in northern Italy, is as much an experience as it is a program; and the experience and the program are that of *community*. In this respect, a book comprising selected contributions prepared for the Collegium could not be representative of the phenomenon itself. These are one-person addresses to the anonymous public of us the readers, rather than offerings cast into the give-and-take of colloquium participation. Nevertheless, while not conveying the reality

of the Collegium itself, they do provide us with the product of the intellectual labor that went into it, and thus initiate those of us who were not there into something of the ferment of those meetings in Perugia.

It also displays for us the way philosophical enthusiasms tug at and shift disciplined philosophical work, or even give it unwonted shape. Thus the list of programs at the rear of the book (321-9) shows how study moved from an initial dedication to the classic postures of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology on through their transformations (or displacements) in later thinking, whether that of Heidegger himself or of Derridean deconstruction. The sequence of selections in the book, however, seems to follow no clear order of either time or topic, but is meant to exemplify the varieties of philosophical experience from the Collegium in both accord and contrast, unruly by systematic or dogmatic requirement. Thus after Moneta's brief chronicle of founding and continuance through the ten first years of the Collegium (3-9), the selections open by sandwiching papers by Rudolf Bernet, Taminiaux, and Thomas Sheehan between those by David Farrell Krell and Sallis; the contrast is extreme.

Krell's piece, 'The Crisis of Reason in the Nineteenth Century: Schelling's *Treatise on Human Freedom* (1809)', is an example of philosophizing done by a 'reading' (the term is frequent in Krell) rather than by analysis or explication. The question he focuses on, that of the *organic* dimension of the origin of reason, is a fascinating and important one, and all too overlooked in philosophic work. Krell's paper is a setting into play of images from philosophers' texts (Schelling, Kant, Nietzsche), mainly the images of *scission*—birth and self-mutilation—by which origination proceeds from some antecedent life-source. He constructs a tissue of texts, or of parts of them, as his 'reading', and remains within this web, refusing any resolution by positive conceptual formulation.

In contrast, Bernet's paper, 'Perception, Categorial Intuition and Truth in Husserl's Sixth "Logical Investigation"', is explication in classical philosophic form. It aims to formulate as exactly as possible Husserl's position on the relationship between thinking and language in his analysis of truth as categorially structured 'evidence'. Bernet tells us unambiguously that 'Husserl, in contrast with a broad current in present-day philosophical thinking, refuses to conclude ... that all cognitive performances, as a matter of necessity, presuppose language from the very beginning' (45). Instead, Husserl suggests 'the necessary founding of acts of lingual cognition in nonlingual cognitive performances' (45).

Similarly, totally unlike Krell, Taminiaux in 'Immanence, Transcendence, and Being in Husserl's Idea of Phenomenology' offers a detailed analysis of these concepts, working it out progressively through his study of Husserl's 1907 lectures, 'The Idea of Phenomenology'. Not least important in Taminiaux's masterful paper are the concluding pages (67-74), where he treats the way Heidegger, discovering the 'blind spots' in Husserl's concept of phenomenology (67), radicalizes Husserl's decisive discoveries (intentionality, categorial intuition, and the original sense of the a priori) to redirect phenomenology into inquiry into Being.

Sheehan, with his contribution, 'Heidegger's *Lehrjahre*', stands in contrast to both Krell and the others in being a historical account aiming to fill out details in Heidegger's education and intellectual development, only briefly sketched out by Heidegger's own 1915 curriculum vitae. The publication of Hugo Ott's book, *Martin Heidegger; Uterwegz zu seiner Biographie* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag 1988), gives directly the material on which Sheehan bases much of his account; but the greater emphasis and detail Sheehan provides on the philosophic import of the same factual material makes his essay a useful accompaniment to the Ott book.

Yet Sheehan's paper stands together with those of Bernet and Taminiaux in being a *kind* of philosophic treatment, namely, in embodying a dedication to accuracy in conceptual content as a positive aim. With Sallis's brief contribution, 'Time Out ...', something of the textual play Krell depends upon as a matrix for inciting philosophic questioning reemerges; yet with Sallis playful meditateness does allow some conceptual refinement. Sallis reflects on Heidegger's 1924 lecture, 'The Concept of Time', in order to appreciate an early emergent form of the interlinking in 'Dasein' of time and the meaning of Being. The question here is how to think time in this interlinking when Being as well as Dasein are to be thought 'out' (= on the basis) of time. Must not time itself be thought of 'out' of (= from beyond) time, and thus as *beyond Being*? 'How is one to think together the character of time as beyond Being *and* its being brought back to a being, Dasein, with which it would be identical?' (146). Sallis's essay ends with this dilemma, leaving open the way in which thought, in pursuing the issue, might become a very different kind of thinking—different, that is, from that represented in the papers by Bernet, Taminiaux, and Sheehan.

Some of this difference in the way thinking would be pursued may be presumed to be indicated in the papers by Walter Brogan,

'Heidegger's "Searching Suggestion" Concerning Nietzsche', Charles Scott's 'The Middle Voice in *Being and Time*', and Paris Emad's 'Reference, Sign, and Language: *Being and Time*, Section 17'. What is to be attempted now is to think 'beyond metaphysics,' yet in 'persistent dialogue with the tradition of metaphysics' (Brogan, 154, 155). Thus a self-affecting that is operative disclosure rather than observation and definition is set in motion (though not fully achieved) in *Being and Time*, as a kind of 'middle voice' of thinking (Scott, 159, 163). This same book of Heidegger's, in analyzing 'the sustaining ground of language ... involved in the disclosure of the world,' rather than as the medium of assertion standing as it were above that implication (Emad, 187, 184-5), can be taken to prepare for its own displacement in favor of another form of wording.

Treatment of Heidegger thus from a point of view purely internal to his thinking is not, however, the only kind represented in this collection. Robert Crease's 'Narrow and not Far-reaching Footpaths', examining Heidegger's reflection on art in 'The Origin of the Work of Art', both validates an essential insight in Heidegger's work and critically locates its limits and tentativeness. 'A work of art *is* the happening of truth' (195), and therein lies its authenticity, yet 'there is always an ambiguity regarding what is authentic and what not' (197). (Crease's essay is a model for what serious work on Heidegger can be.) Reginald Lilly's superb 'Toward the Hermeneutic of *Der Satz vom Grund*' shows with remarkable clarity how the program of fundamental ontology that is the base and starting point of Heidegger's mature thinking runs up against the basic difficulty of transcendental inquiry as such, forcing him to try to go beyond any such methodic understanding into a radically new 'hermeneutic.' Lilly's essay is vivid proof of the way intelligibility in explicating Heidegger (or in explications by Heidegger!) is achieved on the methodological and conceptual basis precisely of the very philosophic tradition Heidegger wishes to move beyond.

Amid all this effort to understand the necessity, and manner, of the Heideggerian move beyond the philosophic tradition, that tradition is nonetheless represented assertively by Alphonso Lingis's 'The Sensitive Flesh'. Here is a stunning example of what phenomenology, exemplified in Merleau-Ponty's work on the perceptual achievements of the experiencing body, can say positively on this side of self-muting efforts to think Being. In the collection, however, this kind of classically productive philosophy yields immediately to the final series of papers again on post-phenomenological thinking. The first

of these for the most part treat one or another element in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas—thus Edward Casey in ‘Levinas on Memory and the Trace’, Robert Bernasconi in ‘The Silent Anarchic World of the Evil Genius’, and John Llewellyn in ‘Jewgreek or Greekjew’. Bernasconi’s is a beautiful treatment of Levinas on Descartes—with an obbligo on Derrida on Levinas—wherein ‘the necessity of destroying or rather deconstructing philosophical language’ is followed as ‘a task which can only be undertaken by lodging oneself within that language’ (264). Llewellyn, on the other hand, highlights Levinas’s move beyond traditional phenomenology into the ethical dimension of the absolute Other.

Finally, rounding off the collection are the papers by Jeffner Allen, ‘The Economy of the Body in a Post-Nietzschean Era’, and J. M. Heaton, ‘The inevitable and slips of the tongue’. Allen treats the shift from a ‘metaphysical economy to a philosophical economy’ (289), that is, to one that ‘retrieves that which has been suppressed by metaphysics: difference and absence’ (290). Through a treatment of Foucault, Merleau-Ponty, and Barthes, Allen’s aim is to show that ‘interpretation of the human subject as embodied individual constitutes both a way out of metaphysics and a critical step in the formulation of non-metaphysical social philosophy’ (290). Heaton, finally, returns to Heidegger to argue, *pace* Freud, that ‘by attending to slips of the tongue we may learn that language is that which holds and sustains things in their being’ (317).

The excellence of many of the essays recommends this book, while the very contrast in its selections demonstrates the curious ambivalence and parasitism of current philosophic trends. The self-annulling and paradoxical character of much of post-phenomenological effort shows that it can only be sustained as long as the positive philosophic tradition it combats retains a vitality. In many ways, then, the collection is testimony that living philosophy was practiced at the Collegium in Perugia.

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Sybil Wolfram

Philosophical Logic: An Introduction.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1989. Pp. xiv+290.

Cdn \$71.50: US \$55.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-02317-3);

Cdn \$19.50: US \$14.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-02318-1).

This could have been quite a good book. Its subject-matter is well-suited for its intended audience: undergraduate students who know little philosophy or logic. It is well-organized, with subject-headings, summaries, cross-references, suggested readings, bibliography, glossary, complete index, review questions, and a list of Oxford-style examination questions. Even professionals might benefit from being reminded of some of the historical material discussed. Other virtues include useful maps of differing uses of philosophical terms.

Yet this is not a good book. Every chapter is marred by instances of carelessness, confusion, and apparent lack of comprehension of matters discussed. I shall note some of the more serious.

Chapter 1 gets off to a particularly bad start. On page 2 Wolfram tells us that the propositional calculus 'lays down axioms (definitions) which cannot be questioned within the propositional calculus (they are ruled to be true)' and, by way of example, cites such metalogical assertions as '*not-p* is true if *p* is false and false if *p* is true.' Not only does this confuse the propositional calculus with its interpretation, and syntactic questions with semantic ones; her confusing use of brackets (to which one needs to be alert throughout the book) here suggests that axioms are to be *identified* with definitions. Then there are muddles about validity: sometimes defined in terms of the *impossibility* of premises being true and conclusion false (10), sometimes without the modal (11); the confusing (because inadequately explained) claim that the argument from 'All ...' to 'Some ...' is both valid 'ordinarily' *and* invalid 'in the predicate calculus' (10); and the mistaken claim (11) that the premises of a valid argument must be consistent with its conclusion (as if the derivation of arbitrary *Q* from *P* & $\sim P$ were invalid). Finally, in a passage which gives a foretaste of things to come, Wolfram says that a necessary truth is both true 'in all possible worlds' *and* 'derives its truth from the meaning of words' (19). She doesn't give an argument for her identification of necessary truth with analyticity but merely legislates this 'conven-

tionalist' (83) meaning for 'necessary truth.' Yet all this, she tells us, is 'relatively uncontroversial' (22).

Chapter 2, 'Reference and Truth-Value', starts with a useful treatment of type-token distinctions and problems of reference-failure, draws a somewhat deviant distinction (35) between propositions and statements (often blurred in later chapters), and then comes to grief when Wolfram claims that Kripke's rigid designators are ones whose *meanings* (sic) determine their reference (60). This is but the first of several bouts of incomprehension involving Kripke.

Chapter 3, 'Necessary Truth and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction', immediately runs into trouble over the a priori-empirical distinction. Wolfram understandably wants to treat it, like these others, as an exclusive dichotomy, and sometimes does so, (e.g., on p. 81 where she defines it in terms of whether or not it is *necessary* for us to investigate the world). Yet on that same page, and elsewhere, she often drops the modal and so finishes up (125 and 153) allowing that some truths can be known in both ways! Wolfram's misunderstanding of Kripke's theory of reference and of essentialism reappears in this chapter when she claims that on his theory *all* true identity statements (including ones, such as 'Kripke is the author of *Naming and Necessity*', which involve nonrigid definite descriptions) are necessary (119), and then (probably as a result of her earlier stipulation that necessity derives from meanings of words) admits that she doesn't know what to make of Kripke's 'weak' sense of 'necessary' (the sense in which 'Kripke is Kripke' is necessarily true even though Kripke doesn't exist in all possible worlds).

Modal muddles and confusions about the a priori-empirical distinction reappear (153) in Chapter 4, 'Aspects of Truth'. They are compounded when Wolfram tells us that contingent statements are 'defined as non-necessary *and* such that there could be a state of the world in which their truth-values could be known' (154), (as if there were no need to distinguish between metaphysical and epistemic matters). And one's mind boggles when Wolfram assures us that from the second clause of her definition 'it does *not* [emphasis added] follow that the truth-value of every contingent statement can be known' (154).

Chapter 5, 'Negation', runs into trouble over the notion of contradiction. First Wolfram characterizes it semantically, and modally, as a relation between statements which 'not only cannot both be true but also cannot both be false' (163). But then, succumbing to the desire for a Fregean syntactic criterion and the desire to disqualify the

necessarily true '9 is greater than 7' from being the contradictory of the necessarily false 'Measles is blue', she insists on adding the condition that 'one must be true, even if neither statement is necessarily true or necessarily not true' (181). What then is the relation between the above two statements? The question isn't even raised, let alone answered in a way which would enable us to preserve the full range of our logical intuitions about such cases.

The treatment of existence in Chapter 6, 'Existence and Identity', is helpful. But as for identity, Wolfram makes no mention of Leibniz's Principle(s) or Frege's puzzle while unquestioningly indulging her own predilection for a relativized account. Not surprisingly, therefore, she maneuvers herself to the point where she has to confess 'it is extremely difficult to get a grip on what is stated by the examples of propositions/statements of identity particularly favoured by logicians, "a=a", or indeed why they should be so extensively discussed' (224). Not surprisingly, too, she fails in Chapter 7, 'Aspects of Meaning', to understand in what sense natural kind terms (242) and proper names (250) are rigid designators. They do not, she complains, provide a 'superior, foolproof mode of reference' (250). True. But who ever supposed they did?

Were these, and other lesser, defects remedied in a new edition, *Philosophical Logic* might yet become quite a good introduction to the subject. From the evidence, however, it seems that having a co-author might help.

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