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MAILED IN NOVEMBER 1989

Darrel E. Christensen
Hegelian/Whiteheadian Perspectives.
Lanham, MD: University Press of America
1989. Pp. xxx+338.
US $28.75 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-7078-X);
US $17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-7079-8).

This volume is intended to develop a 'process phenomenology,' and subsequently to apply this critical perspective to the interpretation of several philosophers (Peirce, Popper, and Wieman), and several important philosophical topics (philosophy of language, cultural relativity, and the problem of skepticism).

Christensen's perspective is primarily derived from his understanding of the notion of 'self-evidence' in Hegel, focusing upon holism, circularity, and *Voraussetzunglösigkeit* ['presuppositionlessness'] in attempting to develop what the author terms 'the a priori status of Knowledge and of actuality' (189). Christensen also regards his perspective as Whiteheadian, in that he adopts Whitehead's notion of the 'perishing' of an actual occasion to develop a broader notion that he labels the 'throb of existence' or, the 'throb of creation': ' ... complete in itself and hence at once self-conscious knowing as well as the world present as known' (124), ' ... that, upon achieving full concreteness ... perishes; in other words, coherence once achieved is not sustained: by perishing, the absoluteness of the truth is saved from an absurd and inflated old age' (310).

Christensen intends that this perspective serve as the basis for a foundational first philosophy, grounded on a theory-free, phenomenological encounter with what he calls 'the concretely actual,' or 'complete facts,' upon which any claims to truth must finally rest. Thus, this 'Hegelian/Whiteheadian (phenomenological) perspective' is to be distinguished from external, theory-laden perspectives *about* facts or about the nature of truth that might be drawn from any of the particular sciences, let alone from contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science (*Wissenschaftstheorie*).

While all the essays evince and contribute to the elaboration of this unique systematic perspective, each is designed to stand on its own by focusing upon some particular issue or problem – for example, the very thorough and interesting analysis of the underlying Hegelian assumptions in Karl Popper's evolutionary epistemology found in Chapter VII. This is, then, not so much a unified treatise

as a collection of the author's independent essays on a variety of themes and issues, not always closely related.

Christensen explicitly disavows any direct interest in or influence from Husserl (xxvi). Nonetheless, readers will find Christensen's quest for foundational certitude – both in the a priori elements of knowledge and in a direct, theory-free, phenomenological encounter with the 'concretely actual' – more reminiscent of Husserl in the *Ideen* or the *Krisis* than of Hegel. Despite the book's title, Christensen's philosophical dogmatism has little in common with the undogmatic, tentatively descriptive and heuristic approach to metaphsics advocated by Whitehead.

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Fred Dretske
Explaining Behavior. Reasons in a World of Causes.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1988.
Pp. xi+165. US $22.50. ISBN 0-262-04094-8.

Explaining Behavior (EB), rightly said by one of its blurbs to be 'admirably crafted and written with clarity and verve,' addresses the question of how our reasons for action are to be accommodated within a scientific world view, one in which our bodily movements are seen as caused by electrical and chemical events in the nervous system. The result is an challenging vision of great scope which is presented in 165 pages, a prolegomenon perhaps, in which we are situated solidly in nature. Given such a project and such a length, there will have to be unanswered questions and unsolved problems. After indicating what I take to be the main line of argument in *EB*, I will describe briefly two dissenting approaches to some of Dretske's central theses.

Dretske draws our attention to a pattern of explanation with wide application and he gives us a step by step view of how, starting with the applicability of the pattern to cases involving plant and artifact

changes, we can build up a picture of how reasons explain human action and of what it is to have a goal. There are four basic elements in this construction. The first element is a conception of behavior. Behavior starts with C, an initiating event inside the thing behaving, and ends with M, some bodily movement (widely conceived) or with E, some external result of such a movement. The behavior is not identical with either the initiating event or with the concluding event; rather, behavior is the process of C's causing M (and external effects, E's). The second element is a distinction between two types of causes of such processes. An *initiating cause* explains why something occurred at the time that it did. A *structural cause* explains why a process ended with effect E rather than some other, E*. A structural cause is a cause of the mechanism which leads from C to E. The third element is an information theoretic notion, that of indicating. To put it roughly, one thing indicates another just in case the first reliably depends on the second and the second exists. The fourth element is the notion of a function. Something has the function of X-ing just in case X-ing is what it is supposed to do.

Explanations in terms of reasons, on this account, give us structural explanations of behavior; a reason causes C to-cause-E-rather-than-E*. According to Dretske, then, 'our familiar way of explaining purposive behavior in terms of an agent's intentions and beliefs does not *compete* with a neurobiological account of muscular activity and, hence, with a mechanistic account of motor output. It is, rather, an attempt to explain something altogether different: *behavior*, not output' (51-2). The neurobiological explanations explain M by telling us what the process from C to M is; reason-based explanations are, in contrast, explanations of why there is a process from C to M – they explain, by giving a cause of, the process and not the movement.

Reasons are intentional entities. C's which start as indicators get intentionality by having functions, jobs they are *supposed* to perform. If C has the *function* of indicating F and yet F does not obtain, then error, the possibility of which is required by intentionality, appears to arise. Dretske's discussion of how (instances of) states which were indicators get functions is intricate and occupies a third of the book. Dretske argues that at least in the case of human action, the relevant C's get their indicator functions through learning. In learning, internal states, C's, get recruited (84) to play a causal role in producing M's because of what they – the C's – indicate. And in this sort of case, the fact that an individual's state C has the func-

tion of indicating F is essential to the way it causally explains behavior. 'This ... is why beliefs are maps *by means of which we steer* ... What you believe is relevant to what you do because beliefs are precisely those internal structures that have acquired control over output, and hence become relevant to the explanation of system behavior, in virtue of what they, when performing satisfactorily, indicate about external conditions' (84).

What we have so far enables us to describe a rat's pressing a bar *because* it believes a red light is on; that an internal state C indicates a red light explains why M and not M* occurred. And this is the core of explanations in terms of reasons. To get fully human, goal-directed behavior more is needed and Dretske will, among many other things, give us an account of just how desires fit into this schema and an account of how we can aim at a goal without previous experience of what we are aiming at.

I will now describe an area for complaint and two areas of disagreement. The complaint: While claiming to give a naturalized account of reasons, Dretske helps himself freely to teleological and intentional terminology. For example, functions are explained in terms of what systems are *supposed* to do (52 and 63). Another example: as we saw above, in learning indicators get functions by being *recruited*. And we are not given enough help in constructing naturalized analogues of such descriptions. The pervasiveness in *EB* of ill-explained terminology to which a naturalist has only arguable access is enough to count as a distracting flaw.

We can see a more serious problem by looking at the individualistic nature of Dretske's project. Dretske at least often talks as though beliefs are structures in one's brain. At the same time, several considerations Dretske mentions could lead us to put such a view into question. For example, Dretske concedes (120-1) Gareth Evans' point that whether some belief of ours is a belief that X is poisonous is a matter of the interconnections that belief has with, among other things, many other beliefs. This leads Dretske to say, 'This may simply show that we should not say that the rat believes the food is *poisonous* ... I don't see why there must be, in our language, a convenient way of expressing what the rat believes' (121). But is it really plausible to suppose our ability to believe that the food is poisonous is entirely independent of the public language we have? If not, it is correspondingly unlikely that what beliefs we have is independent of the teaching of that language and the way it is used by others. In addition, Dretske's own view, in which states become indicators

because of their dependence on other and often external states, also suggests that the identity of beliefs depends on more than internal structures. But motivated by similar considerations, recent work by Kripke, Putnam and Burge argues that, as Putnam has put it, 'meanings ain't in the head.' What one means is in part a function of both how the world is and how a word is used by others. But if meanings are not in the head, are beliefs really there? It may be that one's beliefs are best thought of as supervening on much more than structures internal to one. And if beliefs supervene on more than internal bodily states, they start to look covertly relational. 'Having the belief that P' starts to look like 'being a parent of X'; neither property is identical to some structure internal to an individual. And while it seems true that anyone who is a parent could have existed without parenting, the idea that beliefs could exist without any external determinants of content is not at all obviously true, especially give Dretske's account of semantical content as dependent on indicator relations. But if beliefs are not identical to internal causes, the range of alternative ways they can explain becomes wider than Dretske allows.

Another problem: Dretske, along with many others, holds that 'if a system produces these movements because they result in R, the system's production of these movements is goal-directed and the goal *to which* the production is directed is R' (112) where the 'because' is causal. But there are easily attained counter-examples to this view. For example, Fred the manager is very soft-hearted and he wouldn't be able to fire anyone, particularly Smith who has been with the company for thirty years, were it not for the disgraceful way Smith has treated Fred. As a consequence of Smith's behavior, Fred has a pro-attitude towards his suffering and this prevents Fred's being taken over by the neurotic doubts which prevented him from firing others. Hence, one causally active factor in Fred's firing Smith is the fact that firing Smith will make him suffer; Fred couldn't do it otherwise. But from this it simply does not follow, contrary to the quote just above, that Fred fired Smith to make him suffer. Fred may have just been doing his duty, a duty which was made easier – and so more likely to be done – by the fact that its consequences were harmful to someone he considers an enemy. Having a goal is not easily – and perhaps, as I have argued elsewhere, not at all – analyzable in naturalists' terms.

Despite my reservations, I think *EB* is a valuable philosophical work. It articulates a quite encompassing vision and it should be

the focus of a good deal of discussion and debate. It would be a very good work to take students through, as long as one is prepared to retained some doubts in the face of its clarity and verve.

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Richard Hayes
Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs
Norwell, MA: D. Reidel Publishing Company 1988. Pp. xv+363.
US $124.00. ISBN 90-277-2667-1.

The present study is concerned with Dignaga (also spelt Dinnaga), one of the key figures in the philsophical movement of Indian Buddhism since circa sixth-century AD, providing the foundations of subsequent developments in logic, epistemology and philosophy of language within the larger fold of Buddhist thought. Drawing substantially from Dinnaga's principal work (in Sanskirt), *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* – the classic text of the so-called 'Logical school of Buddhism' – Hayes seeks to demonstrate in his scholarly investigation that the central task of Dinnaga was 'not to construct and defend a rationalized sysem of thought but to examine the fundamental assumption on which all our claims to understanding rest.'

The expository (first) part of the book, consisting of five chapters, basically addresses the theme – which, according to Hayes, stands at the heart of Dinnaga's philosophic reflections – that language conveys information of essentially the same type that inference does. Consequently, the process of interpreting the sentential-linguistic sign of a thought precisely parallels, in respect of conditions and constraints, the inferential process moving from signs of nature. In a classical Indian syllogism (*anumāna*) the latter generally provides the ground (*hetu*), operating as a universal, for connecting the inferred quality to the subject of inference. The question of interpreting the status and role of this supposed universal – in the form of a linguistic sign as much as of a ground of inference – provides Dinnaga the edge for developing a 'nominalistic' position.

In fact, the presence of an unmistakably *nominalistic* strain in the treatment of concepts, language and names right from the earliest phase of Buddhism could hardly escape the attention of a serious student of Buddhist thought. Even further, as Hayes comfortably reads in Dinnaga's theory of inference, nominalism stands combined with empiricism and scepticism in natural consistency. And here again one need not dispute Hayes' contention that all these traits could be found as present in Buddhist thought from the very outset. One might also agree with Hayes in considering Dinnaga's nominalism not merely as consistent with the basic principle of skepticism in Buddhist thought in general but as a corrollary to it.

The question, however, might still arise: how far such characterizations, however inevitable, of the Buddhist position in terms of empiricism, nominalism and skepticism – with their respective *Western* connotations and contexts – would be appropriate? One could, for example, wonder if the parallelism of Pyrrhonism and Canonical Buddhism were essentially supported by a kind of 'doxastic nominalism'. The same reservation might be expressed in respect of Nagarjuna's thought, inspite of all his radical and negative dialictic. In this regard the use of the expression 'rational skepticism' – and even more, 'skeptical rationalism' – could be somewhat confusing in characterizing Pre-Dignaga (specially, Nagarjuna) and post-Dignaga Buddhism. A method of intellectual caution against holding opinions and making judgments of any kind, and reducing certainty to sensations (a sensationalistic thesis, as Hayes demonstrates) would certainly be compatible with a nominalistic repudiation of the reality of verbal and conceptual universals, but hardly with 'rationalistic' epistemology in the strict sense. Hayes's remarks, if they were not casual, might have gone to allay such possible misunderstanding: 'It may have been Dinnaga's aim simply to establish some guidelines for common-sense rationality' (166).

In Chapter Four Hayes thoroughly discusses Dinnaga's theory of knowledge, with reference to his texts, based on the two modes of knowing: viz., sensation (as scrupulously distinguished from perception proper in translating *pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). The theory of inference concerned is elaborated in a relevantly formalistic fashion. In summing up his skeptical reading of Dinnaga's system of epistemology Hayes appropriately raises the question as to the place of logic within the Buddhist discipline at large. But the direct relevance of logical skepsis on meditational praxis and insight (*vipaśyana* – misspelt *vipsyana*) – which seems to be Hayes's

concern too – remains very much an open question. Granted that the primary function of logic is to counter dogmatism of theories (*dṛsti*), rather than to establish concluding positions, could such *logical* realization by itself lead to the supposed deeper insight?

Chapter Five ('Dinnaga's Nominalism') presents the arguments in favour of the central theory of *apoha* – word-meaning and naming by way of exclusion – and its possible implications thoroughly discussed. Part Two of the book contains Hayes's translation of passages selected from *Pramāṇasamuccaya* – dealing with the relevant topics of reasoning and of signs in language. This has certainly added to the value and authenticity of the study, which is in any case well documented.

The book, which displays competent and committed scholarship, deserves intelligent attention not only from the Indic scholars in the field, but also from philosophers – particularly those interested in the issue of language at large. It would be a valuable contribution towards bringing out thematic relevance of classical indic thought to modern philosophical thinking.

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Richard Kearney
Modern Movements in European Philosophy.
New York: St. Martin's Press (for Manchester University Press) 1988. Pp. 346. US $16.95. ISBN 0-7190-1729-7.

By now, most readers will be acquainted, if not familiar, with Kearney's prolific attempts to present the philosophical jargon of the Continent in the plain-speaking terms preferred by Anglo-American readers of philosophy. The results are neither reductions of European thinking to the predilections of analytic logic, nor suspensions of sound reasoning in the service of practiced patois. Kearney consistently steers the even course of an experienced fellow-traveler rather than beating the tired path of a jaded tour guide.

Kearney's aim in this book is to provide a 'systematic if selective overview' of three 'major movements' in Continental philosophy. The 'movements', phenomenology, critical theory, and structuralism, are distinctive in themselves, Kearney notes, for insisting against the traditional 'philosophy of substance,' that 'the truth of a being is only constituted in and through its relationships to beings, or systems of meaning, other than itself' (2). The movements are distinguished from one another, he continues, by methods suited to the particular category of relations that they privilege: a phenomenological method to isolate the intentional relations of consciousness to worlds of meaning, a critical theoretical dialectic to analyze the social relations of political subjects to the material history of production and alienation, a structural linguistics to underscore the relations of particular speech acts to the unconscious structures of language which code their meanings.

In separate sections, Kearney surveys the 'key ideas' of six representatives in each movement with an eye to mapping the broad terrain of modern European thought. Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Ricœur, and Derrida; Lukács, Benjamin, Gramsci, Bloch, Marcuse, and Habermas; Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Foucault, Althusser, and Barthes; are read for their contributions to the movement of phenomenology, critical theory, and structuralism, respectively. This is an enormous undertaking. Kearney exhibits an extraordinary range of knowledge and a special talent for communicating his thoughts. Whatever else may be said about his efforts here, we must credit Kearney with clear and at times quite elegant expositions, especially in treating Merleau-Ponty, Gramsci, and Lacan, of some notoriously terse and difficult discourse and argumentation.

At the same time, the individual commentaries consistently present 'condensations' of the movement these philosophers representatively sample. This strategy produces some more and some less fortunate results. On the one hand, by harnessing Derrida to phenomenology and Althusser to structuralism, e.g., we develop insights into philosophers and pictures of these movements that we might not otherwise discover. On the other hand, as Kearney admits, conscription of notably multi-dimensional thinkers in the service of one-dimensional programs is likely to produce distortions. This proves especially true in the case of Foucault who, Kearney himself reports (295), repudiates the very idea of homogenous continuities in the history of thought. And, relative to Kearney's assemblage of just such

continuities in this book, it provokes some important questions about Kearney's understanding of these movements.

There is, in fact, an uneven treatment of the movements Kearney surveys and, noticeably, a shifting meaning of 'movement' in different sections of the text. The presentation of phenomenology, by far the most satisfying in the book, as the development through critical appraisal of Husserl's original insights, comes close to a 'taken-for-granted' sense of the word. The varied accomplishments of ontology, existentialism, hermeneutics, and deconstruction are recounted as if moments in one continuous way of thinking. (Indeed, the inspiration for Kearney's book is likely drawn from this account.) The exposition of structuralism, remarkably clear on the principles but distracted in the discussion of some applications, seems to read Saussure's semeiology as the synchronic unity against which Lévi-Strauss' anthropology, Lacan's psychology, Foucault's archeology, Althusser's politics, and Barthes' mythologies represent paradigmatic exemplars. Kearney's account of critical theory represents, at best, the attempt to redescribe the history of European Marxism as the development of humanist ideals.

It is difficult to accept an introduction to 'critical theory' which downplays so significantly the contributions of Horkheimer and Adorno and casts Gramsci and Bloch, interesting and important thinkers in their own right, as representing 'the programme of Critical Theory ... inaugurated by Horkheimer and Adorno at the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research' (210). It is also hard to admit an exposition of Habermas mute on the 'universal pragmatics' and 'theory of communicative action', Habermas' most important advances of modern critical theory against postmodernism and deconstruction. And it is not easy to forgive Kearney's reduction of the complex dialectic in Benjamin's 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' to a conflict of allegiances to Adorno and Brecht. Indeed, Kearney's extreme efforts to avoid the 'apocalyptic pessimism' of the Frankfurt School (236, cf. 166, 222, 226) leads him to so idiosyncratic a reading of 'critical theory' as to distort the picture of this 'movement'.

The difficulties with this discussion are exacerbated by the proliferation there of a typographical error that occurs throughout the text. Single quotes are substituted for double at one or both ends of quotations on too many pages. Kearney's English-speaking readers will have to adjust to the French convention adopted to cite the titles of articles (but not books). And some readers may find the absence of page numbers in the citations frustrating.

However, these problems do not undermine the overall value of Kearney's book. Where the text works it works well on several levels. For those unacquainted with Continental philosophy, Kearney fills out clearly the meaning in the 'common sense' use of the relevant terms. For students already familiar with the European philosophical tradition, Kearney informatively situates the thinking of several important figures along unified horizons of interests and concerns and draws intriguing connections between thinkers as well as across horizons. For specialists, Kearney provides instructive examples of uncluttered expressions for introducing these philosophies and philosophers to students.

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Christopher Kirwan
Augustine.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1989. Pp. viii+247.
US $75.00. ISBN 0-415-00812-3.

Initially Christopher Kirwan surveys Augustine's life, works and biblical matters relevant to this study. Then he examines four areas of A's philosophy: 1) A on scepticism and language, 2) the interrelationships of free will, God, and evil, 3) time, creation and eternity, and 4) special moral/political topics.

The evaluation of three of A's arguments against scepticism from the Greek tradition exemplify his procedure: 1) A – Some knowledge of truth must be realizable if man's desire for happiness is not in vain (called unworkable, 17-20), 2) A – The sceptic must somehow know what truth is to deny its attainment (K, rather 'he only needs to know how a truth would seem if there were any', [22]), 3) A – One can attain 'indubitable' knowledge or 'unrejectable' truth (K calls A a 'remarkable pioneer' here [17], but adds A fails to explain how this is a sign of truth, [29]). K grants A's *sum* arguments success against scepticism but notes A doesn't explicitly use them for this reason (32-3).

K reviews the Stoic roots to A's 'theory of language' and observes that A maintains words are signs and every sign signifies something (37). Signs are meant to be 'indicative' (evidential) rather than representative (37) and are 'external' and 'natural' when indicating things but 'internal' and 'given' when indicating men's thoughts or wills (39-40). K's analysis (43-58) brings him to relegate the theory to the 'picture theory of language' that always holds words as representing and which is erroneous (59).

K next studies A's attempts to eliminate Manichean dualism and to defend God's supremacy as creator (61-2). K notes that A inherits a Plotinian notion of evil as a 'privation of good' but contends that treating privation as 'nonexistence' is false and, moreover, A's notion of goodness is unclear. K examines 'good' as 'what a thing needs to be thriving' and after three tests abandons it and comments that evil/bad usually designates external not internal happenings to natures (62-3).

Difficulties raised about the compatibility of God and existent evil are: 1) A's claims that God views all creation as 'very good' still retains evil (66-7), 2) A seems preoccupied with 'moral evil', 3) Is God blameless in the suffering of innocents? and 4) Can God be blameless as the cause of souls which sin (69)?

K deems 'audacious' A's thesis 'no one is innocent' (73). Regarding God's responsibility for one's bad will, K thinks A's distinction between the will's cause and what the will causes unsupportable (74). Lastly, K thinks A obliged to accept God's involvement somehow in any sinful deed (76).

K also sees problems for A's 'free-will defence'. K reasons: 1) sin must be the price A pays to have free will (78), and 2) one might reasonably ask why God does not create man in a state of perpetual innocence (79). A's positions that the will cannot be compelled and that it allows him to achieve a good end (80) supposedly enable him to impute guilt and justify divine punishment. But K calls A's position on God's tolerance of sin unsatisfactory (80) and says that A's doctrine of grace must be called compulsory vis-à-vis the will (80-1). Even A's view that one is free to sin but not to choose the good because of sinful habits counts against the will as a two-way power (88-90).

K now runs the gamut of objections, old to contemporary, against the 'free-will defence': the kinds of necessity, divine foreknowledge, and A's doctrine of prevenient grace (91-120). The related topics of original sin (130-43) and predestination and damnation (144-6) are added. K finds A can only profess ignorance as to why God's favor

alights where it does and yet A insists God's indetectable motives are 'just' (147). K counters that comparative justice (weighing one's merits in relation to others) shows God's actions are unfair. The Parable of the Vineyard is cited as evidence (148-50).

In a third area, K presents A's views of creation as a reworking of Plato's *Timaeus* that fails (153-4). A's positions that time began with creation and that it measures change are rejected (163-5) and A's sense of 'eternity' said to be beyond understanding (167-79). Although K thinks A's account of how time is measured brilliant (by affections of the mind) (183) he will reject A's position on how time has length (181-3).

Oliver O'Donovan's book, *The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine.* (Yale 1980), would benefit K's last section treating 'Love and Loss' and A's 'two cities'. The other topics are treated rather abruptly.

In this fascinating series of logical exercises K surely wins most of the battles and the war. Yet this work is seriously over-ambitious. It is not so much novel as incredible that K addresses the issues of his second section and neglects A's doctrine of 'love'. The rigorous logician will probably not be edified by the presence of four-term fallacies nor the arguments by innuendo; but it is the omission of A's metaphysics, anthropology, psychology and religious context (the supernatural) which ultimately cause this work's disorientation.

For example, K's treatments of evil and free will miss the metaphysical significance of 'nature'. Natures are considered existent beings/things in A's universe and evil/bad not to be a being/thing but rather that which is absent/lacking in a nature and which the proper and normal ordering of the nature requires. (A *De lib arb* III,14 & II,18 as well as *De nat boni* 4) Such disorders, as the missing air from a flat tire, are real and really affect the natures involved but are not themselves things/beings.

Similarly, the treatment of divine foreknowledge misses A's important insight that knowledge of past events and future events show the act of knowing to be 'intransitive', that is, affecting the knower not the thing known (A *De lib arb* III, 4).

Finally, A's continual presentation of God as an immutable being is why God is said to be 'eternal' and 'outside' time while every created existent, as changing, is deemed to be 'in time, subject to change, and created.' This very relation of things to God controls the justice of God in relation to creatures. Their first and primary relation is one of dependence upon and ordering to God and secondarily to each other. This causes the judgment of humans' merits to be 'non-

comparative' rather than comparative since each person's will relates to God as their end in an individual and individually responsible way. Thus the Parable of the Vineyard cannot be read under the rubric of 'comparative justice'.

To his credit, K's work concentrates a great number of A's texts and develops the historical background to many issues raised. What is also to K's credit and a tribute to A's sheer greatness is the fact that one can come away from reading this book with a sense of what an intellectual giant the real Augustine must have been.

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J.K. Mason
Human Life and Medical Practice.
New York: Columbia University Press (for Edinburgh University Press) 1988.
Pp. viii+161.
US $37.00. ISBN 0-85224-560-2)

There has been a shift in attitude in this century from a belief that the preservation of life is the first and inviolable duty of medical practitioners, to one which holds that the prevention and relief of suffering is their primary obligation. This premise forms the basis for Mason's investigation, which delivers more than the title suggests – an examination of the current medical *and* legal situation regarding the medical profession's attitude towards the value of life.

The book is divided into sections on terminal illness, euthanasia, suicide, brain damage and death, the neonate, abortion and embryocide. Relevant clinical aspects of these issues are discussed, and the current legal position is presented. Most of the references (and there are many of these) are to British cases, although some significant American ones appear as well – particularly in the area of brain damage and death. Other countries are occasionally mentioned.

Mason sees the physician's obligations as preserving life and preventing suffering. In cases of terminal illness, the former is no longer possible to any significant degree, and so the relief of pain – even to the extent that it shortens what little remains of life – is

the more compelling duty. The process of death need not be prolonged, but ought not be hastened for the benefit of any but the patient.

Those cases in which the patient is not dying but is in an irreparable condition of intolerable pain are more difficult. Mason sees active intervention causing death, or even assisting in suicide, as outside of good medical practice and the law, although he admits that juries do not convict in the rare cases which get to court. He clearly believes that active euthanasia is murder, even when requested by the patient, and should remain so in the law. Otherwise, he predicts, there would be a deterioration in the care of the terminally ill, and a threat to the doctor-patient relationship.

The definition of death is discussed in the section on patients who are in a persistent vegetative state. Only physicians are qualified to judge when death has occurred, according to Mason, and legislation is only necessary to determine when organs may be removed for transplantation (only after death has been recorded and reported). Otherwise, 'the quality of life of a permanently comatose patient in intensive care is so obviously awful that decision-making is relatively simple' (111). The productive/nonproductive treatment test guides clinical decisions. Mason suggests this is similar to the Catholic Church's ordinary/extraordinary treatment distinction, but fails to develop the comparison, and we are never really told how this extremely promising test – to which he refers throughout – might be performed. While in many places he is careful to distinguish between ethical and clinical judgements, it is not clear which he means here.

While generally supporting parents' rights to control decisions about their children's treatment, Mason interprets the law to forbid nontreatment of those suffering from mental disorders such as Down's Syndrome, although there have been conflicting legal decisions (114-15). Selective non-treatment of neonates is permissible only when that treatment is likely to be painful, will need to be repeated, and will at best result in a life of chronic suffering. As he does elsewhere, Mason admits being inclined to base his judgements on intuition rather than logic, which he says supports active killing of these infants. Presumably he believes we all have the same intuitions in these matters.

In all of these areas, key concepts which must be considered when judging the moral, medical and legal justification for the death of a patient are the intentions of the physician, the wishes of the patient, and, when the wishes are not known, the best interests of the patient. These are familiar concepts to those involved in medical ethics; Mason does not worry about providing interpretation or analysis of them.

There is, in fact, not much new in his consideration of moral and clinical matters – his most interesting and valuable contribution concerns specific legal cases, and certain common law doctrines. This rather short book (122 pages of text) leaves one wanting more in this area.

The tone of the book changes with Mason's consideration of abortion. The large number of abortions performed each year is documented, suggesting that the medical profession as a whole supports the practice. Mason is clearly dismayed and disgusted by this, which he believes violates morality and the intent of the law. He makes 'neither excuse nor apology for regarding abortion as the pivotal issue' (105).

There is some inconsistency in Mason's judgement that it is permissible to perform abortions of fetuses known to be severely defective, since he rejects acts of positive killing in all other areas. Also, an argument against his position might be offered that is consistent with some other principles he in general supports, since to deny an abortion to a woman violates her autonomy, affects her quality of life, and is likely not in her best interests.

These considerations are of no account, however, given Mason's view of when the fetus achieves moral status; he rejects what he terms the 'shrill' and 'strident' pro-choice arguments. Considering the importance of determining fetal moral status, and the persistent lack of consensus on this point, the following conclusions receive sparse argumentation: the fetus attains 'humanity' (and thus rights) at implantation (77); its rights are based upon its potential autonomy; and it is obvious that 'having reached the third trimester, the fetus can rightly be regarded as having an autonomy equal to that of its mother' (86). He attempts to bolster his position by reference to a specious argument that humanity and ensoulment are interdependent (97). Having already argued that humanity begins at implantation, he now claims that ensoulment does as well.

Despite its occasional logical flaws, this book is well worth reading as it explores the relationship between medicine and the law. In summary, Mason concludes that the sanctity of human life is the most important value governing medical practice, and that good medical practice will promote this value, with a few morally justifiable exceptions. In society's interest the law should generally defend this value, but need not specifically intervene in clinical judgements.

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Ernan McMullin, ed.
Construction and Constraint: The Shaping of Scientific Rationality.
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 1988. Pp. xii+250.
US $23.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-268-00764-0)
US $11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-268-00765-9).

Are the meta-standards which define 'scientific rationality' (relatively) constant or are they too subject to the revolutionary changes the standards of 'normal' science show when they are displaced by paradigm shifts? This question, which is the central issue of this anthology, can be rephrased as: Does the historicist thesis apply to what counts as (scientifically) rational as well as to what counts as science?

The essays included in this text, as well as some omitted, were first presented at a conference, 'The Shaping of Scientific Rationality', in April 1986 at Notre Dame. The topic, as well as many of the speakers, are familiars in the current debate, begun some dozen years ago as the 'death of epistemology', continued now more generally under the designations of the 'end of philosophy', 'the crisis of modernity', and their cognates. Although by title the book may appear restricted to the philosophy of science, its topic places it within the general debate just noted and its essays are for anyone interested in that ongoing radical reconsideration of the nature and function of philosophy.

The current 'end of philosophy' debate in Anglo-American philosophy was proximally instigated by Rorty's attack on foundationalism and representationalism in his 1979 *Philosophy & The Mirror of Nature*. That work, though designed as a defense of pragmatism, accelerated the integration of current Continental philosophy into 'normal', i.e., analytic, Anglo-American philosophy. It also reflected the then still novel re-christening of Wittgenstein as a European, and not just nor even primarily a British philosopher. The Continental philosophy in question, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, etc. in its turn, reflected the historicist emphasis especially German philosophy took some 100 years ago with Nietzsche and subsequently, Dilthey. That historicist turn, in its turn, both provoked and was provoked by the wholesale transformation of the intellectual, social and cultural landscape which historians refer to as Modernism, i.e., the pervasive upheaval of Western culture between, roughly, 1890 & 1930.

All these influences are reflected in this anthology, and for this, as well as other reasons, it is a good benchmark of the current debate.

There are two types of projects dominant in the essays: taxonomies of choices on and historical accounts of the character of reason, especially as it is thematic in understanding the status of science. In function the essays range from Gary Gutting's straightforward summary of Foucault and his predecessors to Richard Rorty's contentious defense of pragmatism via an assault on the realist's purported belief in natural science as a natural kind. Of the seven essays, the argumentative design of four, including Gutting's, is primarily historical. The design of three, including Rorty's, is dominantly classificatory. Of the latter type, one principally details options, Richard Foley's 'Some Different Conceptions of Rationality', and another, Mary Hesse's, joins with Thomas McCarthy's historical analysis to critique the so-called 'strong program' in the sociology of knowledge.

Two historical studies deserve special notice. There is a superb essay by Ernan McMullin, 'The Shaping of Scientific Rationality: Construction and Constraint', and an equally excellent and more argumentative article by Richard Bernstein, 'The Rage Against Reason'. McMullin successfully encapsulates 2500 years of interpretation of the functions of scientific reason with clarity, accuracy and, obviously, brevity. Bernstein shows us how to interrogate past philosophers with sympathetic understanding and express disagreement with grace and felicity. The Foreword by Vaughn McKim is helpful in framing the issues addressed by the essays, the closing transcription of a panel discussion by the conference participants lets us see what they thought was going on.

According to McKim (echoing many of the essays), though the instigation of the current debate on scientific rationality came from Kuhn's historicism, the real cause was the collapse of the Enlightenment view of reason's inevitable progress. Not only has humankind failed to eliminate the evil of its own making, as Enlightenment visionaries thought it would; it has, to the contrary, used reason to perpetrate perversities and create potential calamities of a magnitude never before witnessed in history. The beliefs about the character of reason, simpliciter or scientific, couldn't well be maintained when its predicted product was transmogrified. The pressing issue, in the face of such wholesale failure, is what, then, must our view of reason be?

Against this backdrop either deliberately or by default, the authors address the complexion of scientific rationality, that is, the status, the continuity, the intelligibility, of the concern for precision, prediction, control, etc. in our attempts to understand nature. All agree that at least since Kuhn, it's implausible to assume that science is some

ever advancing, self correcting, ever cumulative phenomenon. But although what counts as actual science changes, do the general criteria remain relatively constant?

It's no surprise that this text gives various answers. What is surprising is how tepid are the defenses of even relative constancy in the meta-criteria. This might have been different if the spectrum of views presented had included a couple which are noteworthy in their absence. Realist (à la Bernard Williams) and instrumentalist positions might well have been included. And, further, considering the insightful work feminist philosophers have done on the book's topic, they should have been given a hearing.

In a way these criticisms are irrelevant since the book is a conference's proceedings. But it is relevant that a major conference on a central topic in the philosophy of science could be held and not have the former two positions prominently represented. Their absence is testimony to how significantly historicism has transformed the field and displaced the prior analytic/positivist orthodoxy.

This anthology gets high marks for its analyses of the history of science and for its situating of that concern in the broader purview of intellectual history and the more general topic of the character of reason. No article is less than well crafted, at least a couple are model examples of how to use history for conceptual ends. With the minor caveats noted, the text deserves strong positive regard.

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J. Donald Moon, ed.
Responsibility, Rights, and Welfare: The Theory of the Welfare State.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1988.
Pp. vii+235.
US $30.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-0521-7);
US $14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-0522-5).

This excellent collection of essays, based on papers from a 1986 meeting of the Conference for the Study of Political Thought, is a timely antidote to two decades of political and ideological attack from the

liberal and libertarian right on the welfare state. Most of the contributions argue that the welfare state is compatible with, emergent from, and demanded by liberal principles. Locke, Kant, Hume, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and Mill are enlisted on the side of the welfare state, not on the side of 'classical liberal' critics like Hayek and Friedman.

Valuable discussions by Stephen Holmes and Thomas Horne show the historical linkages between principles of autonomy, free exchange, and property, on the one hand, and principles of welfare, on the other. Horne traces from Grotius through Cobbett the idea of a right to subsistence inherent in the justification of private property (107-30), while Holmes argues that it was wholly within the spirit of liberalism's 'celebration of private property' to curtail property rights when they began to lead to concentrations of private power that produced great insecurities and vulnerabilities (92).

The welfare state, according to Holmes, partly reflects 'liberal guilt' at leaving more or less untouched the inheritance of wealth, with its concomitant maldistribution of opportunities (96). Whereas many liberals seemed willing to substitute an expansive welfare state for a wholesale attack on inheritance (viewing such an attack as too threatening to individual liberty and family ties), John Stuart Mill, as Richard Krouse and Michael McPherson show in their interesting essay, because he conceived of a just property-owning economy as one that severely limited the intergenerational transmission of unequal wealth, was uneasy with the 'liberal guilt' solution. He believed that although a minimal welfare system was necessary in a property-owning regime with unfettered inheritance, more than a minimal system would tread too heavily on legitimate liberties and claims of desert (146-9). Mill also believed that a welfare scheme should stigmatize its recipients (142).

Raymond Plant defends a right to welfare against its critics (grounding it in the preconditions of rational agency) while David Miller's essay asks how much of the welfare state can be explained by altruism. Robert Goodin's fine contribution argues that existing welfare provisions cannot be fully explained or justified without reference to moral values: theories of market failures and collective choice hurdles don't go all the way. The point of the welfare state is to prevent exploitation of dependency (35ff). Claus Offe's chapter closes the collection on a pessimistic note. He argues that structural changes in modern industrial democracies are eroding the necessary moral motivations of solidarity and reciprocity that make the welfare state

and mass democracy mutually supportive rather than mutually antagonistic (199-225).

These essays show that the welfare state is not usefully understood as reflecting a single blueprint or basic principle. Some parts of the welfare state are overdetermined – supported by several different considerations – and the system as a whole aims to solve a variety of problems. There are moral motivations: sheer humanity requires that we relieve distress; social justice insists that the losers in a beneficial cooperative scheme be compensated; the values of independence and self-reliance prompt us to supply their preconditions to all; solidarity means that we won't leave some behind as others of us prosper. There are political motivations: the strength of democratic government depends on widespread literacy and sufficient independence and security among the populace to participate as voters. There are prudential motivations: investments in human capital improve overall economic performance – from which all benefit – and amelioration of poverty reduces social costs (to control crime, suppress rebellion, etc.). And there are collective choice motivations: mandatory state schemes overcome free-rider and compliance worries and enable 'citizens [to] do jointly what they all want to do but cannot do seperately' (100; see 24-9, 168-80, 208-13). These are reasons for state provision of common education, unemployment insurance, medical care, assistance to children, and the many other features of the welfare state. Though no single reason may seem sufficient to justify these features, the reasons taken together are persuasive.

The essays in this book do a splendid job in isolating and explaining the various moral and political impulses that lie behind schemes of welfare. They all repay reading, particularly those by Goodin, Holmes, Horne, Krouse and McPherson, and Offe. Their richness can only be hinted at in a short review.

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Andrea Nye
Feminist Theory and the Philosophies of Man.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall (for Croom Helm) 1988. Pp. 244.
US $45.00. ISBN 0-7099-000-0.

According to recent statistics offered by the Library of Congress cataloguers, 'Philosophy and Feminism' is a rubric that covers only forty-five titles. There are numerous books under the heading of 'women's studies', and there is now a quasi-philosophical category in the notion of 'theory' or 'cultural theory'. In recent years, feminist philosophers trained in the Anglo-American tradition have offered incisive and significant philosophical analyses of misogynist linguistic and institutional practices. (See Sandra Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism* [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1987] and Elizabeth Spelman, *Inessential Woman* [Boston: Beacon Press 1988]). Although 'French Feminism' is alive and well in circles of literary criticism and in some insurgent margins of the philosophical community, there has been very little in the way of a specifically feminist and specifically philosophical consideration of continental philosophical critique, both feminist and non-feminist, from a point of view and within a language fully accessible to the English-speaking reader. Andrea Nye's *Feminist Theory and the Philosophies of Man* is precisely such a book.

Feminist Theory and the Philosophies of Man is noteworthy for its impressive scope. Nye manages to elucidate the philosophical dimension of the feminist and deconstructive critique of humanism and, hence, of 'philosophy' in its canonical modes at the same time that she works within and across the borders of these positions to develop a feminist theory with politically practicable and desirable consequences. Nye is a superb *explicateur du texte*. She lays out the cultural and philosophical history of structuralism and deconstruction in France with a sophistication and ease that is truly rare. And she never loses sight of her own political purposes – to establish a viable feminism – or her philosophical acumen.

Hannah Arendt once defended 'cosmopolitan thought' by which, I think, she meant the capacity to resist nostalgic or parochial solutions in the face of the (post?)modern complexity and indeterminacy of social relations. Nye appears to practice precisely that kind of complex thinking that refuses recourse to separatism or to a fully nega-

tive trajectory for feminism. Indeed, her writing and her vision are exuberant in the sense that she explores and affirms the poetic capacity of language as the site in which new cultural and philosophical possibilities emerge. In her effort to establish a specifically feminist linguistic practice, she is willing to make critical use of Derrida, Lacan, Kristeva, and Irigaray – a crew that, although jumbled in the imaginary of some Anglo-American thinking, are in fact quite disparate in their purposes.

Nye appreciates the capacity of poststructuralist thinking to criticize the basic tenets of humanism, to expose the humanist ideal as a strategy of masculine self-aggrandizement, and to show how the subject-centered view of language suppresses an alternative economy of signification. In her view, poststructuralism does not go far enough precisely because it fails to make an adequate distinction between the *discursive* and the *institutional* sources of oppression. Reclaiming the existential category of 'situation', Nye seeks a woman-centered philosophy that both reflects and enables the pre-discursive situation of women.

Although tempting in its promise of a full break with patriarchal authority, her formulation also raises some critical questions. Although Nye criticizes those anthropocentric theories that place 'man' at the center, she is less critical of theories that would offer 'women' that same place. If the autonomous and self-determining subject is no longer viable, then surely a woman-centered theory is subject to that same critique. What gives the category of 'women' its stability and coherence? Is that a category in question? Is it not an important goal of feminist theory and practice to set that category into critical mobility, that is, open the category to critical contests and resignifications? Does a 'women-centered' theory not tacitly confirm the very philosophy of the subject that Nye appears to criticize?

Although Nye criticizes poststructuralist theory for remaining on the 'symbolic' level and refusing the more practical domain of institutional and historical reality, this particular distinction is far from clear. What is it that establishes 'the institutional' as such? How is the institution of marriage, for instance, defined and legitimated except through the legal-discursive means by which its legitimate boundaries are patrolled? The discursive does not stand to the institutional as epiphenomenon stands to material base. As Althusser and others have shown, the very delimitation of that 'base' requires discourse. Although Lacan and Derrida receive clear and impressive critical attention in Nye's work, where are Foucault and Wittig? And

what would be the possibilities of a feminism that appropriates the Foucaultian notion of discourse or Wittig's view of language as a material reality. In my view, that position would understand discourse as a *site* in which institutional power gains its articulation and legitimacy. A woman-centered feminist philosophy might well prove less desirable than one that decenters that very category, exposing the power-relations that constitute and reify categories of identity in order to conceal and legitimate their own operation.

Andrea Nye's text is an erudite and compelling work that will engage philosophers familiar with feminist theory and those who would like to become familiar. Her knowledge of the philosophy of language across the continental divide is impressive, detailed, and politically focussed. This is a work that deserves serious attention.

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C. G. Prado
The Limits of Pragmatism.
Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press
1989. Pp. ix+191.
US$ 39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-391-03455-3);
US$ 15.00 (paper: ISBN 0-391-03456-1).

The Limits of Pragmatism is a lucid, patient, and somewhat academic description and assessment of Richard Rorty's particular version of pragmatism, as it has been articulated principally in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* and *Consequences of Pragmatism*. Prado's description of this version of pragmatism rightly centers on Rorty's rejection of Platonic correspondism, the view that truths are sentences or thoughts that accurately reflect piecemeal facts. According to Rorty, the rejection of Platonic correspondism, based on arguments elaborated notably by Davidson, Gadamer, Wittgenstein, and Dewey, among others, further entails the rejection of all theorizing about truth and all philosophical, non-innocuous versions of realism. Truth is established consensually, and the real things there are are whatever things we ordinarily talk about rather than philosophically in-

vented atoms or facts or forms or substances. As a result, philosophy's pretensions to have master access to the nature of reality are deflated. Philosophy has no special subject matter, and there is no special, demarcatable kind of writing properly called philosophy. Irony and pervasive suspicion of claims to metaphysical and moral expertise are appropriate attitudes to adopt toward texts of putative high seriousness.

Prado accepts Rorty's rejection of Platonic correspondism, but he is concerned to resist the further conclusions Rorty draws from this rejection. In order to sustain these further conclusions, Prado argues, Rorty would have to show (1) that Platonic correspondism underlies all philosophy, (2) that Platonic correspondism does not underlie our ordinary uses of 'true', and (3) that Platonic correspondism is incoherent. Against Rorty, Prado notes that Davidson has elaborated a systematic metaphysics that does not depend on Platonic correpondism, so that (1) is false. As Davidson has further shown, a non-Platonic, non-piecemeal version of correspondism underlies our ordinary uses of 'true', for we do sometimes rightly wonder whether the claims to which we consent in fact capture how things are. Science, in particular, has built into it procedures for achieving transconsensual validation by introducing new and better theories that are grounded in replicable experiments. Contrary to what Rorty's position requires, philosophy is not readily demarcatable and clearly epiphenomenal in relation to the rest of culture. Rorty's root mistake is to have conflated epistemic foundationalism and the demand for certainty, which ought to be rejected, with all versions of realism and objectivism, where minimal versions of these doctrines can be defended. Since 'we are unwilling to equate the dismantling of Platonic correspondism with the destruction of the very idea of truth as determined by the world' (82), and since 'it makes sense to wonder if our beliefs are true independently of intralinguistic considerations' (81), 'Davidson seems to emerge the hero of the piece' (78), and systematic philosophy can go on seeking 'retrospective objectivity' (viii) in his style.

As view about possible metaphysical stances, these conclusions are well elaborated and sound. It is less clear, however, that they deflate Rorty's wider claims about the role of philosophy in culture. First, if the kind of objectivity that is attainable is always retrospective, then it seems right to attack the pretensions of philosophy to guide inquiries and activities. Second, while Prado rightly criticizes Rorty's misbegotten demarcation of philosophy from the rest of culture, he

fails to see that it is equally difficult so to demarcate science and to hold that its results are grounded in the natures of things. It is true that the scientific theories we accept must survive testing by replicable experiments. But why do we choose to construct some artificial experimental situations rather than others, and what assurance do we have that our particular fairly narrow range of experimentations gets more than some fairly narrow range of reality right? It is unclear, Rorty might well argue, that whatever validity science thus achieves is significantly transconsensual. Against Rorty, one might hope for philosophy still to court the transcendental so as to move beyond mere chat and consensual validity but also still to accept the ordinary as the real. (Stanley Cavell's recent efforts to marry Emersonian transcendentalism to ordinary language philosophy in a kind of critical activity move in this direction.) But this sort of response to Rorty, moving beyond the dominant self-images of philosophy and science, is one that Prado does not take up.

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Andy F. Sanders
Michael Polanyi's Post-Critical Epistemology.
Amsterdam: Rodopi 1988. Pp iv+295.
US $45.00. ISBN 90-6203-000-0.

Michael Polanyi's thought has had, at best, a shadowy influence within contemporary analytical philosophy. The reasons for the minimal attention are not hard to locate. Because Polanyi only turned to philosophy at age 55 after a distinguished career as a physical chemist and (secondarily) a social scientist, his explication of philosophical points is loosely related to the prevailing philosophical discourse. His terminology is idiosyncratic. But most damning of all, his central claim that all knowing involves a personal component was made at a time when philosophers of science were still seeking to establish an objective foundation for knowledge.

In the years since the publication of Polanyi's *magnum opus, Personal Knowledge* (1958), the philosophical world has slowly come around to embrace many of Polanyi's claims. Yet his thought has not yet generally been accorded the respect it is due. Andy F. Sanders' fine book indicates that the period of neglect among analytical philosophers is finally coming to an end. Sanders provides a service to Polanyi scholars by the way he clarifies Polanyi's thought and reformulates his jargon so that engagement with the broader philosophical community is encouraged. But analytical thinkers are equally well served, for now the power of the Polanyian perspective is made accessible to them.

Because Polanyi has a tendency to use such terms as 'logic' and 'demonstration' in a loose, informal way, Sanders concentrates on tightening up Polanyi's arguments concerning epistemology. His special concern is to defend the cogency of Polanyi's theory of tacit knowing. In his first four chapters, Sanders focuses on Polanyi's understanding of belief, assertion, truth, and reality. He shows that Polanyi's thought tends to work in a 'mind to words' direction. Personal knowledge is to be understood as an example of what Grice calls utterer's meaning. Word and sentence meaning are not seen as independent fields; a full analysis of personal knowledge shows word and sentence meaning to be dependent on utterer's meaning.

Perhaps the most illuminating interpretative ploy used by Sanders is his correlation of the tacit dimension with Searle's exposition of illocutionary force and intentionality. One parallel he suggests is this: 'There is a relation of representation between intentional states and the entities, if there are any, represented by them. It is the same relation, I suggest, which holds between the various elements of the tacit component and the content of the sentence to which they are attached' (63). Unfortunately, the parallelism seems to break down because Sanders claims that Searle understands the entities towards which intentional states are directed as being 'ordinary objects in the world,' a relationship of denotation, whereas Polanyian tacit components are *integrated* to form the *meaning* of a sentence, a relationship (insofar as the linguistic particulars are concerned) of connotation.

More helpful is the correlation of the tacit component with Searle's notion of the Background of Intentional Networks (174). The Background consists of fundamental stances, attitudes, and capacities which are not representational or intentional in character but which provide the enabling conditions for the operation of intentional states.

Polanyi's tacit dimension includes skills and beliefs, some of which can be made explicit, but many of which are only manifest as subsidiaries eluding conscious experience (e.g., the skillful operations of eye muscles in perception). Sanders properly points out that Searle misrepresents Polanyi when Searle suggests that Polanyi thinks all physical skills must first be learned via explicit rules (178).

Sanders convincingly shows that Polanyi's notion of truth is best seen as a special version of the non-descriptive or performative theory of truth. Polanyi equates truth with the rightness of mental acceptance, always a personal, fallible act. Even though he emphasizes the personal contributions one necessarily makes to assertions, he is committed to philosophical realism. One's fallible claims of truth concern a world that is discovered, not simply created. Peirce's notion of abduction is shown to have much in common with Polanyi's view of how a fruitful scientific problem is identified and hypotheses developed (17).

Polanyi's philosophy of science is contrasted with the views of Lakatos and Popper. 'Lakatos wants to keep philosophy confined to [Popper's] objective third world of the logical contents of thought and language. Polanyi, on the other hand, may be understood as primarily concerned with the second world of the human mind, its states and capacities to grasp or discern these contents' (145). An implication of Polanyi's commitment to embodied mental activity as the ground out of which knowledge grows is that empirical evidence concerning the genesis and evolution of knowledge contributes important content to his theory. Despite his general sympathy with Polanyi's approach, occasionally Sanders backs away from Polanyi's empiricism as beyond the concern of philosophy and thereby betrays a nostalgia for the logicism Lakatos advocates (179).

In his fifth and sixth chapters, Sanders examines charges that Polanyi's position involves subjectivism, solipsism, relativism, and psychologism. A dissertation written by A. E. Musgrave under the direction of Popper sets forth these charges. Sanders dismisses each of them. 'Polanyi has to be credited for his attempt to broaden the scope of epistemology by elaborating the idea that the veracious inquirer is desperately dependent on his culture, its language, practices and traditions. No God's eye point of view being available, the only thing is to start from where we are, i.e., our own modern, pluralist Western intellectual and moral tradition' (225).

In the last of his seven chapters, Sanders explores the way Polanyi expanded his theory of personal knowing to include the arts and

humaities. A key issue at stake concerns the ontological reach of personal knowing. Polanyi postulates a parallelism between the structures of knowing and being which Sanders helpfully interprets as homomorphic rather than isomorphic in nature (151-4). Sanders notes with concern that in the decade before his death in 1976 Polanyi shifted away from his earlier emphasis on the similarity between science and religion (each products of personal knowledge) to a distinction between natural integrations (science) and transnatural integrations (religion). Surely there is much to support Sanders' scepticism regarding Polanyi's tendency to extrapolate the structure of knowing into an emergent metaphysics of being (240).

Sanders is a reliable guide to Polanyi's philosophy. While the range of issues he considers is restricted, he is successful in clarifying some themes which are central to Polanyi's epistemology. Sanders sets a high standard for subsequent analytical (or any other) interpreters of Polanyi.

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Jean Schneider and
Monique Leger-Orine, eds.
Frontiers and Space Conquest: The Philosopher's Touchstone/ Frontières et Conquête Spatiale: La Philosophie à l'Epreuve.
Norwell, MA : Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989. Pp. viii+255.
US $74.00. ISBN 90-277-2741-4.

This is a disappointing but important collection of twenty-six papers – eleven in French – from a 1987 conference co-sponsored by the European Philosophical University and the European Space Agency.

The book is disappointing on a number of grounds. First, it is full of typographical errors. Second, any conference collection, especially one that includes discussion transcripts, ought to provide brief biographies of all participants. In this case there are many interventions

in which the speakers are no more than names; even the presenters are provided with no more than institutional affiliations. Third, the book never really lives up to its title, that is, it fails to subject the conquest of space to an extended and penetrating philosophical testing or questioning. There is a lot of interesting historical, sociological, psychological, and science policy information along with some suggestions regarding the philosophical implications of the technological venture into space. But there is little sustained consideration of the ontology of space, the epistemology of cosmic instrumentation, the ethics of exploration and conquest, the political theory of planetary colonization, etc.

The book is nevertheless important because it constitutes a first, tentative attempt to raise these questions, to extend philosophy, to think space. It also promotes international and interdisciplinary exchange – with contributions from six countries (although over half are from France) including scientists, social scientists, engineers, and philosophers. Its major weakness in this regard is that the seven philosophers, three of whom are clearly junior members of the group, are somewhat overshadowed by the scientists, all of whom are senior members of the technical community. The science-philosophy balance too strongly favors science.

The metaphors of exploration and frontier are over riding themes of the collection. According to 'Pourquoi ce colloque?' by Jean-Claude Pecker, 'Quand on parle de conquête spatiale, il est automatique de se référer à Christophe Colomb' (3). 'A l'exploration à pied, à cheval, en bateau ou en voiture, voire en avion, succède une exploration en fuséesone; on s'écarte franchement de la Terre' (4). What is remarkable is that this idea goes almost completely unchallenged, unwittingly revealing the extent to which the ancient idea of exploration as journey or pilgrimage has been transformed and secularized by modernity. Benn Finney opens his 'Will Space Change Humanity?' with reference to Hannah Arendt's remark in *The Human Condition* (1958) that 'The most radical change in the human condition we can imagine would be an emigration of men from earth to some other planet.' But his consideration of this transformation is wholly in terms of physicalist biology rather than as one of experience or thought.

Four contributions that do begin to transcend such limitations are: Pierre Hadot's 'La Terre vue d'en haut et le voyage cosmique: Le point de vue du poète, du philosophe et de l'historien,' Jean-Pierre Faye's 'La conquête spatiale, condensation du "songe" philosophique keplerien,' Jean Schneider's 'La Condition prespatiale manifeste pour

une anthropologie spatiale,' and Jean Seidengart's 'De l'espace pensé à l'espace investi: Recherche phénoménologique sur la condition spationautique.' According to Faye, for instance, 'Le voyage spatial, c'est en *effet* ce plan étendu à travers tout le ciel par la pensée, qui le rapporte à des références nouvelles, et qui ainsi se fait captatrices de nouvelles énergies' (66).

With regard to the metaphor of the frontier, sociologist Roberto Pinotti gives an overview of 'The "High Frontier" Concept in Perspective.' More philosophically, Isabelle Rieusset in 'La conquête de l'espace ou les nouvelles frontières de l'inter-dit' argues that 'A l'opposé de ces mythologies terriennes du pionnier ou d'Acéphale, la figure mythologique de Hermès aux pieds ailés, dieu du mouvement, de l'échange et de la communication, dont le milieu naturel est l'espace, semble plus a propre à représenter l'enjeu non seulement européen mais mondial de la conquëte de l'Espace' (120). In response to her further suggestion that just as Americans cut their ties to Europe so in the future Americans in space might want to cut their ties with the earth, Robert R. Brownlee remarks: 'I think you should know that we expect them to do so. We actually want them to do so! ... We have no real desire to export into space governmental controls, or perhaps even worse, governmental bureaucracy' (130). Even more interesting, Pinotti's 'Confinement in Space: The Human Dimension' (the only second appearance by a presenter) records how the third SKYLAB crew actually did rebel against ground control by growing beards and refusing to work.

The international Society for Philosophy and Technology, at its 5th biennial meeting recently in Bordeaux, France, announced that the theme of its 1991 meeting, to be held at the University of Puerto Rico in Mayagüez, will be 'Discoveries of Technology and Technologies of Discovery'. It is to be hoped that the reflections initiated by the volume under review will be continued at such a forum.

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James E. Thornton and
Earl R. Winkler, eds.
Ethics and Aging: The Right to Live, The Right to Die.
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press 1988. Pp. xiii+256.
Cdn $34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7748-0302-9);
Cdn $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7748-0310-X).

Society, both in Canada and the U.S., has begun to face the pressures of an increasingly aged population. In about forty years time, the percentage of the population over the age of sixty-five is expected to double. Such an enormous increase in the presence of the elderly is bound to challenge our thinking about and toward the elderly. Three areas deserve special mention.

First, North American society, at least for the past several decades, has been a youth-oriented culture. That society, however, continues to age. Advances in both public health and medical technology, by dramatically increasing the life-span of the elderly, have served to heighten the presence of, and our consciousness of, the aged. Historically unprecedented, this demographic shift toward the elderly now challenges a society that, because of its previous focus on youth, has but an impoverished philosophy of aging. What does it mean to grow old? What is valuable in old age, both to the elderly themselves as well as to society? These are questions to which we do not have the answers.

Second, medical technology has advanced dramatically in recent decades. Persons who would have died in the past can now be maintained through medical interventions, such as artificial nutrition and hydration, resuscitation, kidney dialysis, and exotic antibiotics. But do we always know when it is appropriate to apply such technology, rather than setting it aside? Does advanced age *itself* make an ethically important difference in making such decisions? Or is it a set of physiological and social circumstances, exemplified in the elderly far more than any other group, that make a real difference?

Third, as the percentage of the population that is over sixty-five increases, the percentage of those who are in the 'prime' of their working years, earning incomes and paying the bulk of the taxes, decreases. Where once there were numerous working persons for every one retired person, in the coming decades that ratio may well approach only two working persons for every one retired and depen-

dent person. Under such conditions, will it be just to demand that the working-age population (and their children) make such disproportionately larger sacrifices to support the elderly?

These are issues that have begun to command our attention and to which scholars, particularly in applied ethics, have begun to direct their attention. *Ethics and Aging: The Right to Live, The Right to Die* is a valuable addition to the growing literature. The volume is a broad collection of essays based upon a conference sponsored by the Committee on Gerontology at the University of British Columbia in 1982. There is an introduction, fifteen contributed chapters, an extensive bibliography, and a detailed index.

The contributions are, on the whole, of high quality. Trying to break the bonds of stereotypes, James Birren and Candace Stacey (ch. 5) open the door to a rethinking of our paradigms of aging. While *certain* physical and mental capacities are diminished, other capacities may well be augmented or emphasized. One suggestion that is explored, for example, is that 'successful aging is characterized by ego integrity, the feeling that one's life has been worthwhile and meaningful' (61). Winkler (ch. 11) offers an excellent analysis of active versus passive euthanasia, applying his critique of the supposed distinction to the ethics of artificial nutrition and hydration, managing to steer gracefully between the Scylla of considering it as a mandatory expression of community with the patient and the Charybdis of thinking of it as only a piece of medical technology whose withholding or withdrawal is of no more ethical complexity than that of a mechanical ventilator or exotic surgery. Alistair Browne (ch. 12) offers a penetrating comparative analysis of the Canadian Law Reform Commission's report on foregoing life-sustaining treatment with the report of the U.S. President's Commission. Is it morally permissible, for example, to withhold antibiotics or ventilator support from a severely demented or persistently vegetative patient who has a potentially reversible pneumonia? Or can such treatment be withheld from incompetent patients only when their death is imminent *and* irreversible *and* treatment would only prolong the dying process? Browne's probing questions bring to light certain ambiguities and contradictions in the Canadian report. Arthur Schafer offers a scathing analysis of the typical process by which elderly persons are all too often and all too easily stripped of their civil autonomy. Though it was not as crisply written as some other selections, one particularly stimulating chapter was that by John Bennett, if for no other reason than that it was authored by an octogenarian. Too frequently,

our philosophical discussion of ethical issues concerning the elderly proceed along without any serious voice from the elderly themselves.

One significantly regrettable feature of the volume is that, while its seeds were planted in the 1982 conference, the volume only came into print in 1988. A great deal has happened in the literature since then. Concerning the question of resource allocation, both Daniel Callahan's *Setting Limits* and Norman Daniels' *Am I My Parent's Keeper* have sparked heated discussion in the U.S. And concerning questions of the ethics of specific clinical technologies, several volumes, such as Joanne Lynn's *By No Extraordinary Means: The Choice to Forego Life-Sustaining Food and Water*, have appeared in the intervening years. It would have been more ideal if this volume had appeared several years earlier, or if a more concerted effort than seems to have been the case had been made to bring the more recent literature constructively into the discussion.

All in all, I found *Ethics and Aging* to be thought-provoking. Because of its chapters on resource allocation, philosophers interested in questions of distributional justice may find it of interest. The strong health-care slant of the volume will make it of interest to philosophers in health-care ethics. More generally, those of us who are interested in developing a 'philosophy of aging' will find the volume a useful contributor to our reflections.

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D.D. Todd, ed.
The Philosophical Orations of Thomas Reid: Delivered at Graduation Ceremonies in King's College, Aberdeen, 1753, 1756, 1759, 1762.
Trans. Shirley Darcus Sullivan. Carbondale and Edwardsville: South Illinois University Press 1989. Pp. 86.
US $12.95. ISBN 0-8093-1468-1).

The 'ingenious Loke' [sic], whom one sometimes wishes Thomas Reid had read more attentively, was in some respects a creature of twilight. By contrast, the Scottish proponent of certain 'maxims of common

Sense' (1765) liked his world bright, direct, and whole. His was not a world which one had to build up out of fleeting glimpses or smells, piece together by comparing their representations and the various relations existing among them, and finally assent to through a proposition confirming these new objects in relation – hence an orderly world of 'ideas' which one might come eventually to believe in, perhaps even to know. Rather, the sensation felt, the simple apprehension entertained, or the judgment rendered were all facets of a perfectly *believing* intercourse between subject and object. By a single 'act of the mind' they were wedded. So immediate was this belief, so deeply was it 'conjoyned by nature to the Apprehension,' indeed did it accompany sensation itself (1765), that Reid held this union to be virtually sacred. In a ms. fragment whose lines find their way into his lectures, into the later *Essays*, and into the fourth of these *Philosophical Orations* – presented here in translation for the first time – Reid portrays the slightly deluded Locke as one who was saved from the very 'brink of Scepticism' after his principles ('of Truth & Virtue & Religion') had 'recoiled at the prospect.' Touchingly moralistic as this is – Berkeley and Hume, incidentally, slip over the edge – Reid is generous without cause. On the matter of Judgment, he was 'simply wrong' in accusing the English philosopher of holding that Judgment is the 'Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas' (55).

'Wrong,' though, seems just that. Todd acknowledges that Reid became more cautious by the time of his *Essays* of 1785, noting the distinction which Locke makes between Judgment and Knowledge. The evidence suggests, however, that Reid's mind was bedevilled by Locke's treatment of Judgment throughout his career. Unable to treat Locke's point as a simple recognition of human 'short-sightedness' and proneness to 'error' in the 'days of this our pilgrimage,' Reid drove it to the brink of dire implication. He urged his students to pour over the Fourth Essay. For argument's sake, he accepted the larger sense in which one might say that Judgment is the 'perception' of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, then beat it into a meaningless tautology. While conceding that the 'Judge' often fails to hear *both* 'litigants' in a dispute, and admitting that 'Judgment,' 'belief' and 'knowledge' often pass on the street as one, he played Augustine with language, maintaining that, if not asked, every man knows perfectly well what Judgment is. In short, he refused to enter the twilight zone with Locke, where, for a toiling humanity, probabilities outstare certainties.

Still, that 'twilight' stalks the brightnesses which Reid undoubtedly wanted his regency charges at King's College to take away with them: clear notions about the place of modern philosophy in the historical sweep of ideas; about certain basic *Philosophandi Leges* (repeatedly translated as 'laws of practicing [sic] philosophy'); about the complex role of 'images' not only in the theory of ideas, but in language generally (Todd's analysis on this point is illuminating and provocative); and about those misused 'hypothetical' instruments of modern science which Reid insists must ever bow to the root maxim of common sense, used in all 'Reasoning from facts,' sc. that 'Nature is governed by fixed laws' (1765). A mind furnished with '*Theses Academicae*' (Turnbull) or 'Advices' (Fordyce) might judge, believe, or know whereof it stands but, as Locke seemed to suggest, these are only so many teasings of the true certainties which lie beyond.

And so it is here. At the end of 'Oration I,' Reid is still weighing 'what strength [his] shoulders [have] and what they would refuse to bear.' He perceives judiciously that on many heads he will have to 'entrust' his conclusions 'to renewed thought.' He does – on many fronts. The philosopher and the poet are not, he learns, necessarily perched upon the 'double peaks' of Parnassus (47), but are rather co-workers in giving dignity to the human propensities for reflection and taste alike and in transmitting discoveries and principles for the benefit of man. (Todd's remarks about the influence of common sense philosophy on American fiction need to be reassessed in the light of Reid's changing sense of the imaginative faculty.) Hence, as Reid recognised of Locke, the rule of caution is to be enjoined in reading either too much, or too little, into these pages.

Caution should also accompany our ingestion of the editorial comments, otherwise characterized by a refreshing flare for the 'down-to-earth,' the startlingly abrupt, and the incisive. Jefferson's indebtedness to common sense philosophy (2-3) has to be weighed against his keen relish for Destutt de Tracy's sensationalism, regarded as the strongest antidote to scepticism. Was American philosophy subsequently the victim of these very mixed (not to say, confused) signals? On another level, should the context of these orations not be broadened beyond a single reference (20) to the Philosophical Society in Aberdeen? Can Beattie be dismissed for his 'outrageous dogmatism' (9) or the likes of Brown, Hamilton, and Ferrier for their 'downright stupidity' (27)? Again, might it not be more worthwhile to re-examine Reid's purportedly 'erroneous' handling (16, 38) of the 'Syllogistic Art' in view of his concern to inure young minds with proper instruments

for the everyday conduct of their understandings? So many shadows inhabit this twilight ... .

Perhaps there are, 'far too many learned allusions' (12) for so limited and, in many ways, so introductory a text. Still, Butler (35 and n.) should be allowed to 'bear the palm' without ambiguity for, 'notwithstanding' (*tamen*) the lines immediately above his name, Reid regarded him as having come 'nearest to the Truth.' Moreover, the mystery concerning Dionysius (44) warrants two considerations: firstly, that Dionysius the Younger (II) was reduced to keeping a *school* in Corinth; and secondly, that Bacon refers specifically in the *Advancement of Learning* (thence *De augmentis*) to the lines of Dionysius of Syracuse – *Verba ista sunt senum otiosorum.* That is very likely Reid's 'source.'

In spite of various other oddities of rendering or datings, Todd-Sullivan's re-presentation of W.R. Humphries' original transcription of the *Orations* is a timely and valuable study which will more than justify the exercise if it cultivates a renewed sense of the twilight effect in historical criticism.

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W.J. Van Der Steen and P.J. Thung
Faces of Medicine.
Norwell, MA: Martinus Nijhoff 1988.
Pp. vii+236.
US $69.00. ISBN 9-0247-3673-0.

This book's titular metaphor is puzzling. Medicine's capacity to harm as well as help is recognized, so a well-worn allusion to Janus would be apt, but beyond that it is hard to see what the authors had in mind. In this respect the title fits the book. Criticism of medicine begins, the authors claim, by appreciating that medicine cannot handle all the chronic ailments endemic to modern life. The aim of the book is 'to uncover philosophical issues behind this criticism as well as

philosophical presuppositions of medicine itself' (2). What never becomes clear, though, is how these background philosophical issues contribute to the limitations of modern medicine or what in general is to be gained from exposing the philosophical presuppositions of medicine.

The authors hold that medicine 'can only be understood in the context of culture' (1), and criticisms of the American 'progressivism' of Pellegrino and Thomasma and the anthropological medicine of Europe in Chapter II are meant to demonstrate this cultural dependency. Both are rejected for being culturally biased–preoccupied with the body as a result of Cartesian dualism–and 'individualistic'–not attentive to the role of the environment in disease and illness. The authors endorse, with minor reservations, the 'pragmatic analysis' of McKeown, which is 'unphilosophical in itself' and 'provides...a matter-of-fact perspective...which may become a basis for a less biased philosophy of medicine' (33). McKeown's view is 'transculturally valid' because 'it tries to overcome one-sidedness associated with our culture' by importing 'ecology' into medicine (43). The need for 'an ecological approach to medicine' is a recurrent theme. Although the cultural context of medicine is mentioned frequently, exactly how culture impinges upon medicine is never detailed.

Chapter III discusses alternatives to orthodox medicine. The general point is that even 'outlandish' options such as spiritual healing cannot be properly evaluated because no adequate methodology exists for making comparisons. The clinical trial at the heart of scientific medicine is flawed, so homeopathy cannot be dismissed '*simply*...for lack of evidence obtained with controlled experimentation' (72, authors' emphasis). Moreover, because orthodox medicine does not deal satisfactorily with the mind, one should be cautious 'in the evaluation of alternative medicines that aim at redressing the balance' (77).

Chapter IV takes up the dispute between normativist and naturalist analyses of the concepts of health and disease. Boorse's naturalism is rejected because his 'typological approach represents bad biology' (86), while the more sympathetically received normativism is regarded as '*philosophically* inadequate' (91, authors' emphasis). Two seemingly disparate conclusions are drawn. On the one hand, the dispute is 'too simplistic' and needs to be replaced by a 'new research program' (106). On the other hand, the disagreement is diagnosed as ultimately being about 'commitments concerning the place of science in medicine, and the role of medicine in society' (116). Both naturalists and normativists are trying to combat the medicalization

of western society. Each 'has got a point,' so they should 'join forces to fight medicalization, and foster modesty in medicine' (117).

How is medicine's fixation on the body to be remedied? The last two chapters discuss proposed solutions to the mind-body problem in science and philosophy and in medicine. The scientific turn, the move to biology and psychology as well as possible integrations of the two, is rejected, along with phenomenological attempts at dissolution. What is the philosophical upshot? It's a matter of personal choice. Both science and phenomenology are 'viable' in their 'proper contexts'; thus, 'one will have to make choices, different ones in different contexts. In our culture, one choice seems to be basic. The choice between looking at life in wonder, searching for its meaning, and analysing it scientifically, in search of control' (163-4).

Nor can medicine produce a 'convincing' solution to the mind-body problem. Biological psychiatry has 'an unduly narrow view of inner experience' and a 'biased methodology,' while existential psychodynamics gives inner experience 'an overprominent place' and 'hardly has any methodology' (178-9). That attempts to deal with the problem by integrating biology and psychology likewise fail is shown through a survey of psychosomatic medicine, Engel's biopsychosocial model, and holistic medicine. And although the authors welcome the practical implications of phenomenology's resurgence in medicine, this revivified phenomenology does not help with the philosophical issues because it is so 'diluted' that it is no more than 'common sense embellished with philosophical terminology' (205). The prospects for the mental finding a more commodious place in medicine are not good – 'Mind and body are seemingly further apart in medical theory than in pure science and philosophy' (205).

The point of this philosophical foray into medicine is as mysterious as the book's title. The authors believe that philosophy can help expose the limitations of medicine, but their wielding of it reveals no new weaknesses. If anything, it has more to say about the limitations of philosophy than medicine. One virtue of philosophy, the authors maintain, is that 'it may reveal the vastness of our ignorance' (113). But what is their response to that ignorance? Either a call for more philosophical work, sometimes accompanied by a sketch of the line they would pursue, or a retreat to personal choice. Their conception of philosophy also is obscure. They reject 'grand' theory and at one point recommend 'common sense *cum* elementary philosophy' (58). Moreover, they insist upon the relevance of context, and their own criticisms display a penchant for a 'pragmatic attitude' (4) and a 'prag-

matic methodological analysis' (169). Medicine and philosophy of medicine are pilloried for not having adequate methodologies. One wishes the authors' house were in better order. Their own eclecticism should not be a cover for the philosophical sin they castigate.

The authors worry that their generalist approach will invite the charge of superficiality, yet the book is more diffuse than superficial. Position after position is summarized at length and criticized in haste. Critical remarks too often rely on secondary literature or amount to little more than an expression of the authors' agreement or disagreement. Side-trips are frequent and seem to be made because the authors feel they have something to say (e.g., 'holism is not specifically concerned with the subject discussed in this chapter. But we had to give holism some place' [195-6].) The book reads more like an anthology than the coherent philosophical study it purports to be.

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Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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