

Canadian Philosophical Reviews Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

Editors • Directeurs

Robert Burch
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

J. N. Kaufmann
Département de Philosophie
Université du Québec
à Trois-Rivières, C.P. 500
Trois-Rivières, Québec
Canada G9A 5H7

As a rule, the editors publish only invited reviews. However, they will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English. They should be submitted to the francophone or an anglophone editor as appropriate.

En général, les rédacteurs ne publient que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, ils prendraient en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais. Les manuscrits devraient être envoyés au rédacteur francophone ou à un rédacteur anglophone selon le cas.

Subscription prices for a volume of twelve issues

<i>Institutions</i>	<i>Individuals</i>	<i>Students</i>
\$88 (Canadian)	\$44 (Canadian)	\$32 (Canadian)
US\$82 or \$98 Cdn (Foreign)	US\$45 or \$54 Cdn (Foreign)	US\$28 or \$42 Cdn (Foreign)

Prix de l'abonnement à un volume de douze numéros

<i>Institutions</i>	<i>Individus</i>	<i>Etudiants</i>
\$88 (Canadian)	\$44 (Canadian)	\$32 (Canadian)
US\$82 or \$98 Cdn (Foreign)	US\$45 or \$54 Cdn (Foreign)	US\$28 or \$42 Cdn (Foreign)

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing & Publishing
P.O. Box 4834, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 5G7

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X
c 1989 Academic Printing & Publishing

Table of Contents · Table des matières



Iham Dilman , <i>Mind, Brain, and Behaviour: Discussions of B.F. Skinner and J.R. Searle</i>	259
Deryl J. Howard	
Melvin Feffer , <i>Radical Constructionism</i>	261
Donald Levy	
Robert Hahn , <i>Kant's Newtonian Revolution in Philosophy</i>	267
Jacques N. Catudal	
Deal W. Hudson and Matthew J. Mancini, eds. , <i>Understanding Maritain: Philosopher and Friend</i>	270
Frederick J. Crosson	
Michael S. Littleford and James R. Whitt , <i>Giambattista Vico, Post-Mechanical Thought, And Contemporary Psychology</i>	273
Thomas O. Buford	
Alasdair MacIntyre , <i>Whose Justice? Which Rationality?</i>	276
Garry M. Brodsky	
John McMurtry , <i>Understanding War</i>	280
George H. Hampsch	
J.C. Nyiri and Barry Smith, eds. , <i>Practical Knowledge: Outlines of a Theory of Traditions and Skills</i>	283
Fred Adams	
Kenneth Seeskin , <i>Dialogue and Discovery: A Study in Socratic Method</i>	285
Michael L. Gillespie	
Stuart G. Shanker, ed. , <i>Gödel's Theorem in Focus</i>	287
John F. Post	
Mark C. Taylor , <i>Altarity</i>	290
Wilhelm S. Wurzer	
Neil Tennant , <i>Anti-Realism, and Logic: Truth as Eternal</i>	293
Alan Weir	
J.E. Tiles , <i>Dewey</i>	296
Morris Grossman	
A.T. Winterbourne , <i>The Ideal and the Real</i>	300
R.R. Wojtowicz	



SPINDEL CONFERENCE
1989
HEIDEGGER AND PRAXIS

Opening address

Speaker: *Charles Taylor*, McGill University
Commentator: *Charles Guignon*, University of Vermont

On the Limits of Praxis in the Early Heidegger

Speaker: *Joseph Fell*, Bucknell University
Commentator: *Dennis Schmidt*, SUNY Binghamton

Disclosedness in Being and Time

Speaker: *John Haugeland*, University of Pittsburgh
Commentator: *Mark Okrent*, Bates College

**On the Ordering of Things:
Being and Power in Heidegger and Foucault**

Speaker: *Hubert Dreyfus*, University of California/Berkeley
Commentator: *Ron Bruzina*, University of Kentucky

Heidegger and Aristotle on Praxis

Speaker: *Robert Bernasconi*, Memphis State University
Commentator: *Walter Brogan*, Villanova University

Heidegger and the Essentialization of Evil

Speaker: *John Caputo*, Villanova University
Commentator: *Michael Zimmerman*, Tulane University

Heidegger and Freedom

Speaker: *Michael Haar*, University of Paris
Commentator: *Kathleen Wright*, Haverford College

For more information please contact:

Tom Nenon
Department of Philosophy
Memphis State University
Memphis, Tennessee 38152
(901) 678-2535

Ilham Dilman

Mind, Brain, and Behaviour: Discussions of B.F. Skinner and J.R. Searle.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1988. Pp. xiv+142.

Cdn \$62.00: US \$49.95. ISBN 0-415-00006-8.

In this little book Dilman undertakes an exposition and critique of both Skinner's behaviorism and Searle's account of the mind-body relation. He is critical of both, basing his criticisms heavily on Wittgensteinian-type arguments.

The first part of the book is devoted to Skinner. In the opening pages of the book Dilman both gives an admirably succinct account of Skinner's views on conditioning (especially as opposed to Pavlov's), and establishes his bases for critical attack. The latter include the thesis that Skinner assumes that there are dualist presuppositions in our ordinary language concerning human behavior – whereas Dilman thinks our ordinary language is neutral between rival theories of mind (10). A second thesis is that we cannot get rid of the teleological and purposive categories for speaking about behavior in the way that seventeenth-century scientists deteleologized physical nature, since 'our being is bound up with the language in which we speak of ourselves' (12). Dilman argues that Skinner's mistaken attempt to 'purify' language lands him in the difficulty posed by the second thesis.

Dilman uses these fundamental assumptions of Skinner's to launch a more detailed attack on Skinner's notions that the mind is 'a little man within' (14), and that 'consciousness is a state' (15). The mental, on Dilman's view, is more to be found 'in action,' rather than as a state mediating between environment and response.

The view that the mental is intrinsic to an action rather than a Cartesian state gives Dilman the premise for attacking Skinner's attempted reduction of purpose, intention, will and action to a matter of operant conditioning. Operant conditioning relies on causal-external relations, whereas Dilman would have it that these features of our thought and behavior are bound up in 'internal' relations with each other in ways *constitutive* of the same.

The same assumption that the mental is a Cartesian inner state brings Skinner to a defective account of freedom of the will, according to Dilman (45): it causes Skinner to see randomness as the only alternative to determinism, and since randomness is mysterious and

unhelpful, this leads Skinner to embrace determinism. This, in turn, leads him to his *Walden Two* vision of a controlled society in which the conditioning is such that the inhabitants do not *feel* the control and hence have no sense of restraint. This, of course, as Dilman points out, leads to the famous questions of who controls the controllers, etc. These reflections, in turn, lead Dilman to well-known and well-worked criticisms of Skinner's notions of education (behavioral engineering), the good life (comfort and absence of responsibility), and punishment (behavioral modification without 'self-transformation').

The second, and smaller, section of the book is devoted to a critique of John Searle's 1984 Reith Lectures, *Minds, Brains, and Science* (BBC Publications). He calls Searle a 'materialistic dualist,' and tries to show that in trying to reconcile the scientific world-view with our commonsense pictures of ourselves, Searle is reduced to incoherence. I think the charge is well-founded.

Searle, in rejecting Cartesian dualism, argues that the mind is caused by, and realized in, the brain much as steam, water, and ice are caused by, and realized in, collections of H₂O molecules. Or, in another analogy, Searle says that there is no more of a mind-brain problem than there is a digestion-stomach problem: the digestion is caused by, and realized in the stomach. Yet Searle wants to say that there is some mental or intentional causality at work within this framework: that the mind has causal efficacy over the brain. It is as though there is an interaction between *levels of description*. Dilman finds this unsatisfactory for much the same reasons he finds Skinner's notion of the mental unsatisfactory—namely that it is some 'inner' state, rather than being 'in' action, etc: i.e., the mental does not cause action, it is an internal relation (à la Wittgenstein). Whether one wants to agree with Dilman's particular style of attack, one has to admit that Searle's attempt to have a materialism and a mentalism made compatible by his conception of the mental as a level of description of the brain must lead to difficulties. Strangely enough, after criticizing Skinner, Dilman says that 'what Searle needs is a dose of behaviourism' (126) (Rylean, I suppose).

Thus, for Dilman, pains, thoughts, intentions, etc. are not the effect of a series of physiological causes in the brain, rather they are phenomena persons manifest in their behavior. The behavioral phenomena are *criteria* for these things. Searle has tried to 'close the gap between the mental and physical' in one way, Dilman would say there is no gap; Searle has one dual language theory, Dilman seems to have another. For Searle, mind is brain, for Dilman it is the be-

haviors of persons in social contexts in a life-world. So, when Searle argues that computers cannot have intentionality since they are not biological (and intentionality is for him a biological phenomenon), Dilman counters that indeed computers are not capable of intentionality and mentality—but for another reason: they are not persons in social contexts.

Dilman takes Searle's admission that he has no satisfactory solution to the problem of free will as the final *reductio ad absurdum* of his approach, and I think he is right about this (but perhaps for different reasons). Searle does not, in the end, seem *that* far from an identity theory, his two levels of description of the brain notwithstanding.

Dilman's writing is clear and crisp, his chapters succinct. The treatment of these two particular thinkers in one short book might seem odd, and so it struck me at first. But there does emerge the unifying theme that both Skinner and Searle are still haunted by the Cartesian ghost of the mind as an inner state, and hence need a priestly Wittgensteinian exorcism to relieve them of their problems.

The treatment of Skinner rehashes a lot of well-worn criticisms, but the treatment of Searle is timely and interesting. I wish Dilman had given more space to the latter and less to the former.

Deryl J. Howard

University of North Carolina-Asheville

Melvin Feffer

Radical Constructionism.

New York: New York University Press

1988. Pp. 224.

US \$35.00. ISBN 0-8147-2590-2.

This book tries to explain how cognitive development is possible. Its starting point is the inadequacy Feffer finds in what he takes to be the psychoanalytic explanation of such development. According to Feffer, psychoanalytic theory claims that the human infant develops from a state of mind in which it is 'governed by the pleasure principle,' namely it is 'mechanically reactive, fragmented, and blind with respect to the consequences of its actions' (7), to a state in which it

is governed by the reality principle—i.e., it is purposive, capable of delay, and integrated (8). According to Feffer, Freud thought the transition comes about as the result of instinctual frustration. But, following H. Hartmann, Feffer finds a problem here, the problem of discontinuity—mature functioning, involving anticipation and delay, cannot be derived from mere instinctual frustration. Furthermore, the developing child is supposed to accomplish this transition by ‘identification in the context of the oedipal relationship’ (8). But in order to identify, e.g., with its mother, conceived as a whole person, the child must already conceive the mother as a whole person; yet when the child is governed by the pleasure principle, this he is supposed to be unable to do. Following R. White, Feffer calls this the problem of immutability; psychoanalytic theory ‘was attributing to the organism, before conflict, the very attributes that conflict was to bring about and, accordingly, that would have served to avoid such conflict in the first place. The child, as it were, had to “know in order to know”’ (12).

According to Feffer, these difficulties in the psychoanalytic theory of cognitive development can be traced to a systematic tendency in Freudian thought, namely ‘the Cartesian epistemology presumed by Freud’s conflict view of personality development’ (12). What that epistemology is, who, if anyone, ever held it, whether it necessarily implies the defective view of personality development Feffer thinks it does, whether Freud in fact accepted that epistemology, whether Freud’s supposed acceptance of that epistemology alone accounts for his holding the view of development Feffer ascribes to him, are all matters left more vague than they ought to be. The reader might infer that Feffer means by ‘Cartesian’ an allusion to views of Descartes, although no quotes, citations or bibliographical references under that name are provided. Anyway, the views Feffer treats as Cartesian epistemology are only loosely related to those of Descartes; more important, they are incoherent views. For example, Feffer claims that as a result of accepting the primary/secondary quality distinction, the Cartesian view ‘characterizes the subject in material terms—in terms of his physiological senses—such that he can never know the “real” or primary qualities of the independently constituted object; he contaminates the object in the course of knowing it’ (4). Yet in support of this account of Cartesian epistemology, Feffer quotes extensively from E.A. Burtt, who characterizes the alienation between subject and object that epistemology involves as alienation in which the world outside the mind is ‘hard, cold, colourless, silent, and dead; a world of quantity, a world of mathematically computable motions

in mechanical regularity' (4). Presumably, if motions in the world can be known to exist, and can be computed, at least some primary qualities of independently constituted objects can be known, despite the primary/secondary quality distinction, contrary to what Feffer just said Cartesian epistemology implies. Feffer is here expounding an inconsistent account of Cartesian epistemology. It is, of course, possible that that epistemology is incoherent, holding incompatible things at different times. That does not seem to be Feffer's point, however; in any case, he does not say or imply this. Rather, he treats Cartesian epistemology as a stable position whose implications for developmental psychology alone need to be criticized. He opposes the Cartesian view for the 'isolation between the subject and object' he thinks it requires (3), not because it is incoherent.

There are two defects constitutive of Cartesian epistemology, according to Feffer, defects which are also implicit in Freud's view—(i) according to it, the mind distorts reality in some essential way, and (ii) it treats the object of knowledge as constituted independently of the mind. Feffer's own view is meant to oppose both of these claims. His 'Constructionist' assumption, which he shares with Gestalt and Piagetian positions, is this—'we know our world by actively organizing our experience—by literally forming our object of knowledge' (35). Feffer criticizes Köhler and Piaget in great detail (chapter three) for their failure to fully carry out the consequences of this shared assumption; indeed, both are said to be inconsistent, to contradict themselves for asserting the constructionist assumption while also assuming 'the independently constituted object/event' (82, 84, 88). Whether or not Köhler's and Piaget's views are defective or inconsistent in the ways Feffer claims (the quotes he provides from their works sometimes seem to belie the interpretations he places on them), it would have been better if Feffer had explained what he takes the inconsistency itself to be. It is not at all obvious, as he seems to think it is, that (a) 'objects exist independently of our knowing them' is inconsistent with (b) 'we form our objects of knowledge'. One proposition inconsistent with (b) is 'objects of knowledge exist independent of our *forming* them'. However, if we are really forming our objects of knowledge without knowing we are forming them, or if there are real objects we think exist but which are neither known by us nor formed by us, then (a) and (b) would not necessarily be inconsistent. Perhaps (a) and (b) really are inconsistent on some interpretation it is reasonable to expect developmental psychologists to accept, as Feffer seems to assume; and perhaps Köhler and Piaget really are incoherent on this

point. But Feffer needs to say more about this whole matter. For (a) and (b), by themselves, are little more than slogans, without arguments attached to them. It is practically impossible to discuss the question whether (a) and (b) are consistent or not, apart from any and all supporting arguments; each time we attach different arguments to these claims, their sense can be expected to change, and therefore their relationship to each other can be expected to change, too.

Admittedly, this criticism becomes problematic, if Feffer is really using such terms as 'contradictory' and 'inconsistent' in some much looser, non-logical sense than I have assumed—if he uses these terms, to signify mere tension or conflict, e.g., as between individual people and social groups. Such usage is objectionable in itself, I think (i.e., treating propositions as people, with wills of their own), and makes Feffer's critiques of Freud, Köhler and Piaget much more obscure than they appeared. What suggests that Feffer really intends this looser usage comes toward the end of the book, when he contrasts his own 'Radical Constructionism', the complexities of which defy brief summary or paraphrase, with Freudian thought (chapter 7). It is remarkable that in his account of his own view he repeatedly asserts that it cannot avoid the problems of immutability and discontinuity which he found so objectionable in Freud (199-200), and which led to his alternative view. Thus, Feffer writes, 'If Freudian theory encounters the immutability of giving the primitive subject those attributes that serve as a precondition for their own acquisition, so too does my alternative ascribe the same cognitive characteristics to all levels of maturity' (199)—as if immutability were no longer a problem, in itself. Feffer continues the comparison, writing 'where Freudian theory can only connect primitive and mature forms of behavior by unwittingly ascribing contradictory qualities to the same primitive state, my formulation explicitly posits that, as functional invariants of scheme activity, contradictory ways of knowing are encountered at all levels of maturity' (204). It is far from clear what 'contradictory ways of knowing' are, or what encountering them in a subject would consist in. It is unproblematic to assert of someone that he thinks or acts in ways that are genuinely inconsistent; if that is all Feffer means to say about his own view, that it asserts that we all think and act in these ways, his own view seems not to be inconsistent on that account. There is no inconsistency in claiming that someone (maybe everyone) thinks inconsistently. But why then was it a problem to start with that Freud's view asserts the same sort of thing? What did the criticism of Freud amount to that led to the need for

an alternative? Where is the defect in Freud's 'unwittingly ascribing contradictory qualities to the same primitive state'? It is hard to see how Feffer can have it both ways. We reach a similar impasse, it seems, if we assume Feffer means some looser sense of 'contradictory', in the quote above. There is no logical objection to claiming that ways of thinking that are, say, hard to engage in at the same time become easier to do together as time goes on; nor is it problematic if some people claim that we all really engage in both all the time, right from the start. Which, if either claim, is true is, of course, the sort of question that would need empirical study. But Feffer seems to want to treat it as a defect for Freud to claim something which is not a defect when he himself claims it. It looks as though, regardless of which sense of 'contradictory' we ascribe to Feffer, he winds up making inconsistent claims—claiming that something both, and is not, a defect in any theory of personality development. If a coherent account of how cognitive development is possible can be produced at all, this is not it, it seems.

Despite these flaws, if that is what they are, and the very obscure style making every page of this book an obstacle course for readers, one feels in it an impatience with conventional patterns of thought, and the wish to produce something better, simpler, more humane on this difficult subject. It is quite possible that original and valuable insights are to be found in this book, which have slipped from view, in focusing as this review has, on logical problems in the structure of its argument. The suggestion is that this book has a sub-text, its real subject, to which all of the author's worrying about Cartesian epistemology, primary/secondary qualities, discontinuity-immutability, etc. are not central. Perhaps I can give some sense of this other agenda by referring to Feffer's response to the work of K. Goldstein, to which he is evidently much indebted. Writing of his concern 'with the effects of experimental constraints on developmentally productive dovetailing [between the subject and the object of knowledge]' (183), Feffer refers to a study (by Held and Hein) on dark-reared kittens run in pairs in a carousel, where one was attached to a harness allowing it to walk on its own, the other strapped into a gondola and unable to walk of its own accord, wheeled around by the active member of the pair. Feffer writes 'When tested after a period of time under these conditions, the active kittens were decidedly superior to the passive kittens in their perception of depth. In Cartesian terms, then, both the active and the passive kittens experienced identical external events' (184). According to Feffer, from the radical

constructionist viewpoint, 'the experimental conditions prevented the passive kitten from experiencing the priming consequences experienced by the active kitten, namely, the consequences of its activity in bringing these external events into being' (184). It is hard to see here why Feffer thinks the Cartesian viewpoint would say that both active and passive kittens experienced identical external events; perhaps, at most, they shared the same visual experiences, but clearly their kinesthetic sensations would be radically different. One might also pause to wonder what Feffer could mean here by 'external events' aside from 'independently constituted events'. The main puzzle, though, is why Feffer thinks he needs to make the legitimately interesting point he is trying to make by bringing in the Cartesian viewpoint at all, and why he thinks he needs to formulate his ideas about this experiment and its significance for human development in terms of the extravagant-sounding claim (unsupported by any argument) that objects and events constituted independently of the subject do not exist. I do not mean to argue the point, insisting that such object and events do exist; the point is that the question is irrelevant to the kinds of things Feffer genuinely cares about. Here is Feffer, making a similar point, but without the apparently irrelevant philosophical machinery – 'for reasons as diverse as externally imposed isolation, anxiety, and disease, the subject has a reduced capacity and, accordingly, is encountering unsolvable problems. Moreover, in accordance with our constructionist formulation, we can say that even though the capabilities of the subject are indeed so reduced, he is still constructing the problems he encounters' (193). That a person constructs the problems he encounters may be true, and profoundly so; the point can surely be made without regard to Cartesian epistemology. Whatever obstacles there are to our seeing this truth cannot depend upon acceptance of that epistemology, for people have been failing to grasp that truth for very much longer than that epistemology (whatever it is) has existed. The attempt to characterize those obstacles, as well as the attempt to test the claim that people construct the problems they encounter, is a formidable enterprise; what emerges when we try to discuss these things without the philosophical machinery with which we habitually think about them cannot fail to be illuminating.

Donald Levy
Brooklyn College

Robert Hahn

Kant's Newtonian Revolution in Philosophy.
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press 1988. Pp. xiv+146.
US \$16.95. ISBN 0-8093-1441-X.

Hahn argues that we seriously misunderstand Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* if we interpret it as effecting a Copernican revolution in philosophy. Kant's goal is to set metaphysics 'on the secure path of a science.' What is revolutionary in Kant's project is the method he uses to achieve his goal, the method of analysis and synthesis employed by Newton in the *Opticks*. Thus, Hahn's central thesis is that Kant views his own project as effecting a Newtonian revolution in philosophy (3). Secondary objectives include exposing the Kantian origins of our contemporary conception of a scientific revolution, and rejecting Kant's argument that certainty in science is possible by recourse to the a priori dimensions of our knowledge.

In Chapter 2, Hahn examines forty-three occurrences of the term 'revolution' in the works of Kant with the aim of determining why Kant envisioned the *Critique* to be revolutionary. However, his 'hypothesis' that Kant is mainly thinking about the American Revolution, and thus thinking in terms of 'a political model of revolution,' is unconvincing. Nonetheless, the chapter comprises an interesting review of the literature on Kant's apparently shifting attitudes towards the morality of political revolution.

Kant claims to understand how mathematics and natural science reached the secure path of a science, an understanding that enables him to place metaphysics on the same path (Bxv-xvi). In Chapter 3, Hahn argues that Kant's understanding is mistaken. Kant's mistake consists in downplaying the a posteriori dimension of the experiments of Galileo, Torricelli, and Stahl, and in misrepresenting their 'expressed intentions' (39).

Chapter 4, a review of the secondary literature on the expression 'Kant's Copernican revolution,' succeeds in establishing the importance of the expression by showing its wide-ranging and often mistaken use by many important philosophers and Kant specialists alike. Hahn usefully reminds us of Hanson's observation that Kant nowhere refers to his own work as effecting a Copernican revolution. (See Norwood Russell Hanson, 'Copernicus' Role in Kant's Revolution,' *Journal of the History of Ideas* 20 [1959] 274-81.) Hahn shows that there is little consensus regarding its *precise* meaning (51).

In concluding Chapter 4, as well as in Chapters 5 and 6, Hahn advances a number of arguments to dissuade us from viewing the project of the *Critique* as effecting a Copernican revolution. His main point is that while Copernicus' heliocentric hypothesis is indeed novel, it is the rigorous deductions of Kepler and Newton that establish the revolutionary character of astronomy. Similarly, Kant's claim 'that objects must conform to the conditions of cognition, which we bring to and impose upon experience a priori' is 'an hypothesis only' and constitutes 'no revolution at all' (55); it is Kant's rigorous deduction of the hypothesis that effects a revolution in philosophy. The point is pursued in Chapter 5 in terms of the apparently inconsistent uses of the term 'hypothesis' in the A and B Prefaces, respectively. The inconsistency is removed by noting a distinction between hypotheses, like Copernicus', that admit of demonstration (B Preface), and those, like the hypotheses of dogmatic metaphysics, that do not (A Preface). Kant's revolution in philosophy consists in having *demonstrated* his Copernicus-like hypothesis. In Chapter 6, he argues that Kant's knowledge of the method of demonstration (Bxviii, note) was based on Christian von Wolff's 'Commentationem de Studio Matheseos Recte Instituendo.' The 14 excerpts he provides give rich meaning to Kant's intention of following 'the strict method of the celebrated Wolff' (Bxxxvi), and to Kant's recognition (Bxxii) of the indispensable role of the two part (hypothesis/deduction) method of demonstration.

The objective in Chapter 7 is mainly to show Copernicus' and Galileo's contributions to Kant's method of demonstration. The chief consequence of *De Revolutionibus* was to transform the very notion of what was to count as a scientific demonstration by appealing to the mathematical part of astronomy instead of its physical part. It is the appeal to mathematics that allows Newton to advance a mathematical deduction of Copernicus's hypothesis, thereby giving full expression to the two part method of demonstration so crucial to Kant's project. His second claim, following William A. Wallace (*Galileo and his Sources: The Heritage of the Collegio Romano in Galileo's Science* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984]) is that Galileo transforms Aristotle's model of demonstration to make permissible the necessary inference of premises from conclusions, i.e., the demonstrative regress form of argument that influences the form of Kant's transcendental argument.

Chapters 8 and 9 represent the core of Hahn's argument. Chapter 8 seeks to explain the 'revolution-making' (but not 'revolutionary')

nature of Kant's novel hypothesis in terms of 'the new conceptual framework' (93) required by Kant's account of the analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions. In regard to the analytic/synthetic distinction, Hahn relies on L. W. Beck ('Analytic and Synthetic Judgements before Kant,' in W. K. Werkmeister, ed., *Reflections on Kant's Philosophy* [Gainesville: University Presses of Florida 1975] 7-27) to argue that 'Kant's novel hypothesis consisted in reinterpreting the range of synthetic propositions' necessary to preserve the ampliative nature of science. Kant also 'reinterpret[s] the domain of the a priori by driving a wedge between statements that were analytic and those that were a priori'; the concern with the a priori is a concern for preserving certainty (95).

Chapter 9 provides an account of Kant's deduction of the novel hypothesis, and thereby of his revolution in philosophy, by examining the nature of transcendental argument. Hahn identifies two stages in Kant's argument, '(a) a metaphysical deduction or deduction *quid facti*, and (b) a transcendental deduction or deduction *quid juris*' (101). Kant's metaphysical deduction is presented on analogy with the first part of the method described by Newton in the *Opticks*, namely, 'analysis.' 'The end of the method of analysis [in the *Critique*] is the presentation of the fundamental and exhaustive table of categories' (111). The transcendental deduction is examined by analogy to the second part of Newton's method, 'synthesis.' Hahn's account here relies on Barry Stroud's famous study ('Transcendental Arguments,' reprinted in T. Penelhum and J.J. MacIntosh, eds., *The First Critique: Reflections on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* [Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company 1969] 54-69). Hahn suggests that Kant's transcendental argument has two levels. 'The first level attempts to demonstrate that use of the categories is necessary...' to account for experience. 'The second level seeks to show the necessary employment of the categories presupposes a unity of consciousness and an external world' (113). Thus, he interprets Kant's 'Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding' and 'Refutation of Idealism' as mutually reinforcing parts of the 'Analytic.' As Allison has noted (*Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense* [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1983], 294), this is to take a Strawsonian view of Kant's transcendental argument.

In large measure, the persuasiveness of Hahn's account ultimately rests with a common interpretation of Kant's *Critique*. Thus, those who accept the Strawsonian-Stroudian account of the deduction of the categories may be persuaded that Kant effected a Newtonian revo-

lution in philosophy. However, those who prefer Allison's more recent account may see things differently; for like Hahn, Allison argues that even if 'the analogy with Copernicus is not particularly apt,' there still remains the task of determining the nature Kant's philosophical revolution (Allison, 28-30). It is unfortunate that Hahn did not address Allison's work, for the latter carries out the task in a way that challenges several of the interpretations Hahn depends upon.

Jacques N. Catudal

(Department of Humanities and Communications)

Drexel University

**Deal W. Hudson and
Matthew J. Mancini, eds.**

*Understanding Maritain:
Philosopher and Friend.*

Macon, GA: University of Mercer Press
1988. Pp. xv+334.

US \$39.95. ISBN 0-86554-279-1.

Fifty years ago, T.S. Eliot could say of Jacques Maritain that he was 'one of the most powerful voices in contemporary philosophy.' His books were widely read, his name was familiar in intellectual circles—especially in France in the twenties and thirties, in North America in the forties and fifties—as well as in the fora of public discussion, of political principles and practical politics. He introduced Thomas Aquinas in modern dress to philosophers and intellectuals, he opened up a dialogue between the church and twentieth century artists, he taught a generation that one could be a liberal and a Catholic without any compromise. If (as his student Yves Simon said) a scholastic is a philosopher who deals with 'academic' questions, who talks to and writes for students and professional philosophers, then Maritain was certainly not a scholastic: he belonged, like Socrates, to the agora.

Then he seemed to fade steadily from sight. He retired from Princeton where he had finished his long teaching career and returned to

France, only to lose his beloved wife Raissa. The theological and philosophical climate of the Catholic Church loosened its ties to Thomism, and despite the honors accorded Maritain at the Second Vatican Council, it seemed that he and his loyalty to Thomas Aquinas belonged to a period now eclipsed. At the age of 79 he went to reside with the Little Brothers of Jesus in Toulouse, and kept in touch only with a few friends. He died, a member of the order, in 1973.

At the time of his death, only a half-dozen of his 35 or so books were in print. It seemed that he would belong only to the past, like a Maurice Blondel or Josiah Royce. Yet today, nearly all of his books are once again in print. Alasdair MacIntyre in *After Virtue* paid tribute to him as one of the two contemporary thinkers from whom MacIntyre had learned most. A flourishing Maritain Association meets regularly in Canada and the United States, and has catalyzed half a dozen books in the last decade.

This volume gathers together seventeen essays, only one previously printed, intending to serve as a critical appreciation of the man and his *oeuvre*, both an introduction to the remarkable person that he was—with a quite extraordinary capacity for inspiring deep friendships—and to the range of his inventive reshaping of the thought of Thomas Aquinas. It is perhaps not misleading to compare his philosophical writing in this respect with the early dialogues of Plato, in terms of the way in which each took inspiration from a mentor and remoulded that inspiration into a creative retrieval of what might otherwise have remained unheard.

The essays are grouped into three areas: 'Friendships', 'Contemporary Themes' and 'Philosophical Foundations'. Of the first section, I found the expositions of Bernard Doering on Maritain's American friends and William Bush on the spirituality of Raissa and Jacques the most informative and the most insightful. Doering draws almost exclusively on unpublished and voluminous correspondence, with literary figures such as Allen Tate and Frances Fergusson and, most extensively, with the radical social organizer Saul Alinsky. This seemingly unusual friendship endured over thirty years, ending only with Alinsky's death, and deepened into an affection which makes their letters sound like those of close brothers. As Martin Marty says in his foreword, it is hard to read some of them without tears coming to one's eyes. William Bush's sensitive but critical treatment and commentary on (especially) Raissa's writings on the spiritual life are insightful and thought-provoking.

'Contemporary Themes' includes two essays on Maritain's conception of humanism and culture and two essays on his influential political writings. Of the former, John Hellman's analysis of the humanism of Maritain's life and career is an informed and vivid sketch. Of the latter, Paul Sigmund's 'Maritain on Politics' is, as one would expect, a skillful presentation of his thought which locates it in the course of Catholic political theory from the Syllabus of Errors to liberation theology. Mancini's article deftly lays out Maritain's critique of bourgeois democracy and his gradual appreciation of the democratic resolution to the problem of human rights.

'Philosophical Foundations' is the longest section (7 essays), as might be expected. Two pieces stood out for me: Deal Hudson's discussion of the esthetic theory (next to his political writings, the most widely read of his works) marked by sobriety and firm articulation of the very rich insights which Maritain developed, and Thomas Flynn's very penetrating conspectus of the philosophy of history which Maritain began to formulate late in his career.

There are aspects of the volume as a whole which might be viewed as imperfections. Some essays reject the very notion of a Christian philosophy (one of Maritain's firmest theses), others assume its validity without question. There is no mention of philosophers whom he did not discuss, but one might expect current authors to allude to, e.g., Heidegger or Wittgenstein or Husserl. There is little or nothing on Maritain's late books (such as *Approches sans entraves*) or on his many theological writings (the latter justifiable perhaps in a book on the philosopher).

Overall, however, this is a very useful indeed valuable attempt to let us hear a unique and powerful voice which still has much to say to us. It is balanced, appreciative without being hagiographic, and relatively free of the jargon of neo-scholasticism. Its contents (and its appearing now) give evidence that Maritain does not belong only to the past, to the history of philosophy, but to philosophy.

Frederick J. Crosson

University of Notre Dame

Michael S. Littleford and James R. Whitt
*Giambattista Vico, Post-Mechanical
Thought, And Contemporary Psychology.*
New York: Peter Lang 1988. Pp. xi+320.
US \$40.00. ISBN 0-8204-0589-2.

Since the eighteenth century philosophers have sought a comprehensive and unified human science only to find their hopes dashed on the rocks of mind-body dualism, free will and determinism, personal identity, and the possibility of knowledge of the external world. Armed with a new paradigm taken from the thought of Giambattista Vico Littleford and Whitt begin 'the task of synthesizing an inclusive Vichian Theory for the unification of diverse psychological trends, both those of the mechanical mainstream, and those that are more peripheral... In this sense, psychology serves as an example and a tool for the wider end of a comprehensive and unified human science' (3). More specifically, however, they are interested in finding a paradigm for the unification and legitimation of humanistic psychology. The authors believe that most psychologists have adopted the mechanistic paradigm and have excluded any psychological movement outside of that paradigm as illegitimate and unscientific.

To accomplish their task Littleford and Whitt contend that the mechanistic paradigm underlying traditional psychology is eroding and that a post-mechanical scientific view is emerging. What requirements must be met for a post-mechanical paradigm to be successful? It must account for four central insights: the field theory of the mind, 'the radically creative nature of human beings', 'the priority of forming over form', and 'the constancy of change' in the human and broader natural world (250). By field theory, anticipated by Vico, the authors see 'the human psyche as a vast, indefinitely located, and primarily non-rational field' (238). Using this metaphor they hope to account for not only the ethical, democratic personality but also the insane and demonic activities of people. The authors believe that the paradigm provided by Vico meets these requirements. They show this by discussing the work of the three most prominent humanistic psychologists: Amedeo Giorgi, Robert Romanyshyn and Rollo May. Each has insights worth keeping, but only Vico provides the perspective to incorporate and extend them. Specifically, only Vico makes a place for *fantasia*; they note the near absence of any sense of original *fantasia* in major contemporary psychological trends. (By *fantasia* they mean the 'radical creativity of humans' and 'the primacy of forming power

over temporary forms' [351].) In addition they call attention to Vico's stages of history, the Gods, the heroes, and barbarism, to help us understand the impact of Cartesianism or mechanical thought on our lives.

Does Littleford's and Whitt's thesis ultimately hold together? I do not think it does, at least in this form. They seek a post-mechanical paradigm. To clarify what they seek we must ask what post-mechanical means. The universe is 'intrinsically dynamic and inter-related,' a constantly evolving whole in which all parts are fluid and interconnected' (7). It is not 'a great machine, which can be explained by any mechanical or any fixed and final set of laws or principals' (7). Or, we no longer live in the era of Newton; we live in the era of Einstein. Whereas the Enlightenment developed a mechanical paradigm we in the late twentieth century have not developed an adequate paradigm for the post-mechanical age. Littleford and Whitt believe that in Vico we have the necessary paradigm, and among the alternatives it is the *best* one. But why should we believe that? At least two other thinkers meet the double requirement of being post-mechanical and the four central insights, William James and Ernst Cassirer. The authors mention only James' *Varieties of Religious Experience* and completely ignore Cassirer. Why is Vico's paradigm *better* than theirs? They claim James is Vichian in spirit but one could as easily claim that Vico is Jamesian and Cassirerian in spirit. Indeed, if the reading of James by Eugene Fontinelli (*Self, God, and Immortality: A Jamesian Investigation*) is correct James provides the much sought-after paradigm. Succinctly, it may be true that Vico provides the best paradigm, but the authors have not shown that. But this weakness belies a more basic problem.

Littleford and Whitt spell out the mechanical paradigm in Cartesian terms. It appears they want to leave behind the Cartesian form of the mechanical paradigm in search of a more adequate one. Two comments are in order. First, it is curious they would choose Descartes' thought as the core of the mechanical paradigm. Though Descartes had a role in developing it, the specific paradigm the authors attack is a scientific one. It is rooted in the work of astronomers and physicists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, most prominently Isaac Newton (See E.A. Burt's *Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*). Indeed when David Bohm and Werner Heisenberg discussed the rejection of the mechanistic paradigm they called attention to the work of scientists rejecting certain elements of the Newtonian theory. It is fair to say that science raises the issues that

Descartes expresses in philosophical terms. Einstein was not attacking Descartes. But that's a historical point to be discussed elsewhere. Second, Littleford and Whitt do not avoid a central element of the cartesianism they reject. This is clearest in their contrast between the rational and the non-rational. The rational is what the Cartesian paradigm says it is, apparently logical, mathematical and responding with public evidence to the incessant demands of the skeptic. The modern example of barbaric rationality is supposedly the computer. In contrast, the Vichian 'images the human psyche as a vast, indefinitely located and primarily non-rational field' (238). The authors leave the Cartesian meaning of rationality in place and call for an emphasis on poetic imagination to fill out the non-rational and to enrich our lives. But the core of the Vichian paradigm is the rejection of that understanding of rationality. Vico's great discovery, the imaginative universal, is a call for enriching *rationality* and not simply the mental life. Relations are rooted not only in concepts but more profoundly in images. It is fantasia in this sense that Vico emphasizes and the authors ignore. But in so doing they have missed the core of Vico's thought. It is not that they do not discuss the imaginative universal. It is rather that they do not make explicit the radical implications of the imaginative universal for rationality. And in so doing they do not focus on the key element in the Vichian paradigm. One cannot simply leave in tact Cartesian rationality and bolster the remainder of the mental life with a strong dose of Vichian thought and say that one is following the Vichian paradigm. On the contrary, in that case one is closer to Descartes, he is setting the parameters for the discussion.

In summary Littleford and Whitt have written a provocative book. They have again brought to our attention Vico's life and thought. In their exploration of the possibilities of Vico's thought for modern psychology, particularly humanistic, they have certainly advanced the search for a paradigm that takes persons seriously.

Thomas O. Buford
Furman University

Alasdair MacIntyre

Whose Justice? Which Rationality?

Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press 1988. Pp. xi+410.

US \$22.95. ISBN 0-268-01942-8

MacIntyre claims that while our culture contains social groups in conflict with one another, we do not subject disputes to rational inquiry because we cannot agree on rationally justified views of practical rationality and justice (5-6) and lack 'institutionalized forums' in which to carry on such inquiries and resolve our differences (2). This is largely the legacy of the Enlightenment which sought to put reason in the place of tradition and authority but in fact blinded us to the significance of tradition and undermined reason by foisting upon us standards of rationality which cannot be met (6-7). To extricate ourselves from this situation and recover what the Enlightenment deprived us of, we must recognize that concepts of justice and practical rationality are based upon and embodied in traditions, i.e., arguments 'extended through time' in which agreements concerning the meaning of a tradition are 'defined and redefined' as a result of conflicts among its partisans and between its partisans and external critics (12). Also, traditions must be understood in terms both of their socio-historical settings and their quasi-autonomous dialectical developments (389-90). Since there is 'a diversity of traditions,' there also are 'rationalities rather than rationality' and 'justices rather than justice' (9). In view of this and of MacIntyre's denial of the Enlightenment's view that there are principles of rationality available to all sane people (6) and the thesis that there are principles of rationality neutral between traditions (205, 346, 367), we might expect him to argue that there are no rational grounds by which to assess a tradition or resolve conflicts between traditions. But MacIntyre, while insisting that his position is anti-Cartesian (for, traditions begin with 'the positivity and contingency of some set of established beliefs') and anti-Hegelian (for, the mind can't achieve Absolute Knowledge by demonstrating its adequacy to its objects) (360-1), argues against this view and against relativism and perspectivism (352-69).

Contending that his position 'cannot be elucidated apart from its exemplifications,' MacIntyre sketches four traditions (10). These are the Aristotelian (12-146), the Augustinian-Thomistic (146-209), the Scottish blend of Calvinistic Augustinianism and Aristotelianism 'which at its climax of achievement was subverted from within by

Hume' (10 and 209-326) and the modern liberal traditions (326-405 and *passim*). He does this to arrive 'at a true account of justice and of practical rationality' (368) and concludes by claiming to have shown that, at least, the rationality of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition 'has been confirmed in its encounters with other traditions' and that it can account for its failures and successes on its own terms better than other traditions (402-3).

Unfortunately, in the absence of a schematic overview of these four accounts of practical rationality and justice we cannot see at something of a glance the differences the differences MacIntyre finds so important. Hence, it is difficult to judge whether what he identifies as arguments extended through time constitute traditions, much less ones having contemporary viability. Nor are MacIntyre's historical outlines of the Augustinian-Thomistic and the Scottish traditions particularly helpful. So, MacIntyre claims that Aquinas integrates an Aristotelian account of action within a theological framework in which Augustine's view of the will and its role in action looms large (188-9) and thus not only corrects Aristotle's omissions but 'affords a new and enlarged perspective on the relationship of choice, action and character' (191). But he does not explain why Augustine's concept of the will (which, he allows, may be an 'invention' rather than a discovery [156]) deserves a place in a philosophical psychology not serving rather special theological ends. The same can be said for his treatment of the alleged virtue of humility and the doctrine of the natural law which, presumably, correct Aristotle's omissions. Since MacIntyre does no more than assert that Aquinas demonstrates that Aristotle's account of the teleology of human life is defective because of a 'radical defectiveness in the natural human order of which Aristotle gave his account' (205), it is not clear why this is an episode in which a conflict between traditions was met and overcome by incorporating the ideas of one tradition within a different and richer one (363).

MacIntyre's treatment of the Scottish tradition is equally unconvincing. For while he outlines an approach to questions of practical rationality and justice which seems to be somewhat distinctive, his treatment of the ideas of this tradition and the historical conditions from which it emerged is simply too schematic to establish that its chief spokesmen, Stair and Hutcheson, formulated views of more than local significance.

Not surprisingly, MacIntyre's account of the 'argument' beginning with Homer and coming to completion with Aristotle (who is treated

as Plato's heir rather than his rival) is, if not novel, understandable and philosophically interesting. This argument is between those who believe that human beings aim at excellence and think that to understand justice we must primarily see how to promote and increase 'a shared understanding of and an allegiance to the goods of the *polis*' and only secondarily concern ourselves with conflicts of interests between citizens (39) and their opponents who hold that human beings aim at the power of making the natural and social worlds conform to their own desires and who connect the notion of justice with a view of politics as an arena where competing citizens try to get what they want, given the constraints of political order (88). It is carried on by Plato and Aristotle who hold that human beings can only be rational if they participate in a community in which there is a 'supreme, albeit perhaps complex human good' (134 and cf. 73, 98) in which the goods of practice are systematically and hierarchically ordered (141, 105-7), and the Sophists who deny this.

The most recent version of the argument is between MacIntyre and the modern liberal individualist whose culture is a 'certain kind of rootless cosmopolitanism' (388) and who believes that: actions are expressions of desires and preferences which are prior to moral judgment and discrimination (22, 75); there exist no moral standards independent of individual preferences (74) which often are heterogeneous and incompatible with one another and hence impossible to order uniquely in a rational scheme of life (133); public arenas are, consequently, not places of public debate but of bargaining between individuals each with his or her own preferences (338); we can and should fashion a socio-political order in which the government secures minimal order, exercises no interference in morality (201) and in which people with incompatible views of the good life live together peaceably and enjoy the same political status and economic relationships (336); individuals can free themselves of the contingency and particularity of traditions by appealing to universal, tradition-independent norms (335) and thus achieve rationality without engaging in a dialogue with a tradition (393-403); liberalism is not a tradition even though it has all the trappings (elites, hierarchies, etc.) of one (345); there is no single overriding good even though liberalism pursues one, namely, the sustenance of the liberal order (345); 'continuous and limitless growth' is a fundamental good (112); 'Justice is *prima facie* egalitarian' (344); truth is an idealized form of warranted assertibility (169); since cultural phenomena are potentially translucent to one another he confronts no traditions he is unable to understand (387).

Has MacIntyre shown that thought about justice and practical rationality must take place within traditions and is his work free of relativism and perspectivism? Moral objectivists would argue that since he has not demonstrated that there are no universal standards of justice and practical rationality he has not established the former point and sophisticated relativists, perspectivists and ethnocentrists would claim that since MacIntyre insists that no Cartesian foundations for knowledge exist and that we can't attain Absolute Knowledge or know in the midst of an epistemological crisis that we are not blindly defending an outmoded tradition (365), he embraces a form of their position. And both objectivists and relativists could join in the observation that MacIntyre doesn't show that no new major tradition-initiating ideas about justice or practical rationality can ever be advanced.

Nor is MacIntyre's attack on the liberal tradition credible. For the liberal believes that because we do not know that there is a supreme good by means of which to order the human community, much less what it is, and because we do know that those with power who believe and have believed otherwise perpetrate and have perpetrated the most appalling evils, it is of the very first importance to run the state so that people can determine and pursue the good as they see fit, living peaceably together and enjoying the goods secured to them by freedom and equality while practicing the virtues of tolerance and civility. This implies not that reasoning should be replaced with bargaining, but that when rational people run out of reasons they can and should bargain rather than war with one another. MacIntyre shows neither that these doctrines imply the ahistorical, asocial philosophical psychology along with the other outmoded views he identifies with liberalism nor that classical liberal texts imply such errors. And finally, MacIntyre provides no reasons for thinking that states governed by non-liberal conceptions of justice would avoid being provincial or oppressive in nature.

Garry M. Brodsky
University of Connecticut

John McMurtry

Understanding War.

Toronto: Science for Peace/Samuel Stevens
1989. Pp. viii+68. n.p.

(cloth: ISBN 0-88866-633-9);

(paper: ISBN 0-88866-630-6).

Nietzsche in one of his many trenchant aphorisms states: 'Madness is rare in individuals; but in groups, parties, nations and ages, it is the rule!' McMurtry, in his own trenchant style, picks up on this theme as it applies to the phenomenon of war and carries it forth to its logical and stark conclusions. His thesis is simple enough: War is a natural and appropriate phenomenon in human affairs; attempts to ban it are seriously misplaced. The human capacity to make war is a species-distinctive ability upon which humanity's survival and development depend. The social insanity emanating from war-making derives from the transcultural, almost universal limitation of the understanding of war to its military paradigm, wherein war is defined as organized armed engagement that seeks by maximally efficient means to kill or mutilate large numbers of other human beings. What in the context of individual behaviour would be judged criminally insane is taken to be the dictate of rational choice within the military mode of war. Convention normalizes the pathological; madness becomes the rule. Military war can never be just because of its irrationality. It must be banned, if necessary, by declaring a war on war.

War can be just. If war is a deliberately organized campaign to obliterate the existence of perceived enemies, then we are not inhibited as humans or as a nation from waging war against insect infestations, pestilence, disease, official lies, drugs, plagues, political corruption, toxic pollution, etc. These are not merely wars in metaphor, but deadly serious wars in the strictist sense of the term.

Just wars can involve conflicts between humans as well. Here, though, there must be a careful evaluation of the enemy that one intends to eradicate if these wars are to be enabling rather than pathological. A moral judgment as to the precise evil to be expunged is crucial. Since the capacity for choice in humans allows for the enemy's option of another course, it is the destructive pattern of values pursued or embraced by the enemy that must be fought against, not the homicide of those espousing them. The military mode of war overlooks this distinction, and, at best, settles for the distinction between combatants (the diseased ones) and civilians (those who do not *actively*

advocate the values). Yet, holds McMurtry, we do not have the right to kill even those who are militarily determined to kill us. Rather, our war is properly to be waged against the pattern they bear, which is typically imposed from above, and by a command which is structured to be untouched by military attack. Mass homicide, which can easily include the actions of genocide or terrorism, destroys not the pattern but the human persons, the vast majority of whom on both sides are involuntarily imprisoned by the underlying form of social coercion represented in the military form of war. The fight for justice must proceed through the use of other long-term or short-term strategies.

McMurtry views the underlying causes for the use of the military form of war from an analytical Marxist perspective. Ultimately, the causes are to be attributed first to the ancient patterns of hostility to extra-tribal groups, and now also to the political economy of military production, that is, to the profitability it brings to the economic and military leaderships of the nations. This political economy of military production continues unabated in spite of it becoming ever more obvious that it contradicts the very interests of civilian peace and security for which it is said to be pursued. It is clearly a mechanism of economic and political rule in spite of the ideological mystifications which conceal its real function.

The established criterion of national legitimacy is the recognized power of authority to impose its will on a population by demonstrated monopoly of organized armed force. This type of economic and political control has now become most dangerous. Under the guise of 'deterrence', it has redefined national priorities, multiplied public debts to crisis proportions, and expanded military industry to a normalized race of kill-capacity beyond the limits of planetary life itself. This situation must be struggled against by non-military options of every description. The human struggle for survival is, at this juncture in history, no longer against natural or foreign enemies or even war as such, but against the military program itself.

There are two criticisms which may be brought against this otherwise insightful, valuable and, indeed, important monograph. McMurtry, as is the case with so many Western Marxists, equates in a somewhat facile manner the intentions of the leadership of the Soviet Union and other socialist states in the arms race with those of the economic, political and military leaders of international capitalism. Surely, the *stated* intentions of the two camps diverge widely. If they are to be equated, this must be proved, not just assumed on the basis

of a rejection of the means used to obtain the respective goals as equally inauthentic. McMurtry is correct in pointing out that the prejudice for the use of the military mode of war is transcultural, and by implication, trans-ideological. He is also correct in asserting that the socio-economic structures needed to prepare for or to conduct a military war remove power from the people. It does not follow, however, that the purposes of war, be it in the military mode or otherwise, are necessarily identical. The socialist states have always claimed to have Marxist intentions. McMurtry's claims to the contrary in this monograph as in an earlier work, *The Structure of Marx's World View*, are unconvincing.

The second criticism has to do with a lack of politically practical suggestions to move us away from the military mode. It is true that on p. 26 McMurtry mentions certain collective actions designed to fight the economic-military program, and on p. 42 and p. 45 he suggests an approach similar to Gene Sharp's civilian-based defense proposal. Nonetheless, these suggestions are not yet politically viable options, although they may eventually become so. What is needed now is an intermediate option, a waystation on the long journey to general disarmament. More realistic for the present is some form of alternative defense by which nations reduce and restructure their military forces to the point where surprise attack, offensive action or projection of power beyond their own territorial borders become impossible. With the addition of such pragmatic measures and given a realistic time frame, McMurtry's thesis must then be taken very seriously.

George H. Hampsch

College of the Holy Cross

J.C. Nyiri and Barry Smith, eds.

Practical Knowledge: Outlines of a Theory of Traditions and Skills.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1988. Pp. vii+213.

US \$45.00. ISBN 0-7099-4477-2.

The title of this book may mislead. It may tempt one to expect something approaching a common theme or outline of a theory about practical knowledge. The terms 'practice', 'tradition', 'theory', appear often, but there is little by way of an *outline* or a *theory* of practical knowledge. One may expect some contrast between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge to be drawn in some detail, but there is little to explain differences between them. Indeed, there is little discussion, in any chapter of the book, about what this distinction comes to or how far it can be pressed. There is much in the book about *phenomena*—in several areas—that people call 'practical knowledge', but, sadly, there is little in the book about what that comes to and why practical knowledge can or cannot be resolved into theoretical knowledge. Basically, we are presented with a collection of essays that grew out of a 1985 Symposium on 'Kunstgefühl, Sprachgefühl, Rechtsgefühl: Zum Problem des praktischen Wissens'.

The book is divided into nine independent chapters. In chapter 1 Barry Smith indicates that the goals of the volume are to cover: (1) general theoretical problems associated with knowledge and practice; (2) habit, learning, technique and skill as social phenomena; (3) practical knowledge involved in language use; (4) practical knowledge in the sphere of art. Smith reminds us of the historical dualism between knowing how (skills) and knowing that (propositional knowledge) and of attempts by Gestalt psychologists, Merleau-Ponty, Polanyi, Dreyfus, and even Ryle, to eradicate the false perception of a radical chasm between knowledge and action (thinking and doing)—but, as indicated, this is an unfulfilled promise throughout the remainder of the book.

In chapter 2 J.C. Nyiri analyzes practical knowledge as knowledge passed on by tradition and defends a position that he calls 'strong traditionalism.' This is the thesis that *what* knowledge or tradition is handed down cannot be distinguished from *how* it is handed down (24-5). Strong traditionalism also seems to imply some sort of relativism about rationality—that 'rational' is a honorific label used to certify the traditional way that we (the relevant group) reason. Nyiri

makes much of the idea that the passing on of knowledge by tradition requires *authorities* to hand the knowledge down (27f). The Kuhnian notion of a *paradigm* is the embodiment of a tradition, according to Nyiri (33). Nyiri stresses that much of the actual practice of what scientists do is handed down through tradition and that theorizing itself can be seen to be a part of the tradition (not separate from it as knowing that vs knowing how). An interesting claim here is that much of the tradition is unintended but passed on nonetheless (35).

In chapter 3 Roderick Chisholm explains that his idea of theory making contact with practice is explained by the role of *belief* or attitude (the theory part) plays in intentional action or *endeavoring* (the practice part). Endeavoring, for Chisholm, is itself an intentional act or attitude that translates into practice (or action) by making propositions true or bringing objects to have properties—such as endeavoring to bring a thief to be caught.

In chapter 4 Roger Scruton turns his attention to the legal process. The operation of the law certainly involves practical knowledge, but this chapter only addresses how *rules* of law transform into practice. Emphasis should be, I think, on how society is *guided* by rule of law. Scruton does trace an interesting role for tradition and practice in common law and legal precedent—where law governs *not* from rules or principles that are set down, but by abstracting from concrete legal decisions in practice.

In chapter 4 Eva Picardi considers the role of propositional knowledge in understanding linguistic utterances. Specifically, she considers the relation between knowing the meaning of a sentence and the ability to use it. She offers a contrast between knowing T-sentences and having the skills involved in recognizing sentences as true.

In chapter 5 Rudolf Haller discusses *Sprachgefühl*. It involves, in part, the *feeling for language* that one has in being able to choose the appropriate form of expression—not merely grammatically appropriate, but with style and grace. We can sense, in an ill-formed sentence, that something is awry long before or even if we *never* can cite a rule that is broken. One's *feeling* for language is portrayed as a non-conceptual form of knowledge that monitors and corrects language production.

In chapter 6 Joachim Schulte also discusses *Sprachgefühl*. Schulte characterizes it as a sort of 'linguistic intuition.' Yet, like Haller, Schulte treats it as a facility or skill that one can acquire—finding the most adequate turn of phrase in the right situation, etc. Schulte

finds two versions, one the detecting of something linguistically not right and the other the coining of radically new formulations.

In chapter 7 Johan Wrede writes about the creative process in poetry: the extent to which a poet knows what he is doing in the creative process, the circumstances that affect the creative process (whether or not the poet could know of or control them all), the goals and means chosen by the poet to produce his work (including the common theme about *Sprachgefühl*). Wrede asks how poetry can inspire feelings of nationalism and gives a suggestive answer. If linguistic expression can express emotive feeling, then people of a common cultural tradition may share not only the same language, ways of life, and patterns of thought, but their intersubjective feelings as a group may be expressed in poetry.

In chapter 8 Barry Smith investigates the conditions necessary for an object to become art—which actions turn an object into an art object. Smith applies Marx's analysis of work to art(work). Art works depend not only on a creator (who produces it) but on an audience (that 'consumes' the artwork). Smith then shows how his theory overcomes obstacles, such as explaining how artistic creativity can be determined, in large part, by consumption in the art world. Practice and tradition influence the artist in ways in which he may not notice, and Smith claims that this may even be empirically testable.

Fred Adams

Central Michigan University

Kenneth Seeskin

Dialogue and Discovery:

A Study in Socratic Method.

Albany: State University of New York Press
1987. Pp. viii+179.

US \$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-337-3);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-336-5).

In this important and insightful book, Kenneth Seeskin succeeds in two things. First, he presents a reading of the Platonic Socrates that comes to grips with both literary and philosophical aspects of the texts.

Second, though his points are well-argued and grounded in numerous references to ancient texts and modern commentaries, he has written a very readable and brief book that should prove useful to general readers with a serious interest in Socrates and Plato as well as to specialists.

Seeskin's Socrates is not the dialectician of absolute knowledge, humanist triumphant, beat-all instructor we have come to expect from critical opponents and an unfortunately large number of would-be friends. This caricature is avoided through an emphasis on the near-skeptical, enigmatic and tragic figure that emerges from the texts once due weight is given the literary and dramatic qualities of the dialogues.

In the opening two chapters, on dialogue and essence respectively, Seeskin lays out an interpretive approach. In it, he emphasizes dialogue and conversation and their roots in the search for virtue. Efforts of individual persons to come to some understanding of themselves (and the many ways of failing to do so) are put at the center so that dialogue as a social process and as self-discovery are closely connected. Recollection plays a large role in Seeskin's interpretation and provides the framework for the discussion of 'Virtue and Knowledge' in the final chapter. That this topic is taken up in the final chapter (and is not a beginning premise) and that this 'conclusion' leaves intact the necessity for inquiry by the reader, are indicators of Seeskin's method.

The intervening four chapters sketch profiles of the figure of Socrates by focusing on specific dialogues. 'Socrates as Speech Maker' and 'Socrates as Hero' center on the *Apology* and explore Socrates' speech both as a general view of speaking and rhetoric in relation to the connection between morality and epistemology, and as a depiction of Socrates as moral and religious hero. These themes are interwoven with an interesting and provocative thesis that the *Apology* may also be understood as a parody of a standard 'defense' of the time, Gorgias' 'Apology of Palamedes', a translation of which is included as an appendix.

'Socrates as Teacher' and 'Socrates and the Teaching of Virtue' emphasize possible connections among moral improvement, inquiry, teaching, and learning. The main dialogue here is the *Meno*, and the underlying claim is the centrality of recollection to the overall interpretation of the Platonic Socrates.

The *Apology* and the *Meno*, then, are key dialogues in Seeskin's interpretation. There are numerous references to other Platonic dia-

logues as well: the *Gorgias*, the *Protagoras* and the *Republic* are frequently used as guides to problems, and the *Laches*, *Phaedo*, and *Seventh Epistle*, among others, are cited at important junctures. In the case of each dialogue as well as on more general questions, there is a running discussion with other scholars. Key interpretive references are made in the text, though many matters of dispute or detailed exposition are wisely left to fairly extensive notes that accompany each chapter.

What Seeskin shows, at another level, is that, if one accepts a complex interpretation of the Platonic Socrates, then there is a new relevance of these matters to debates in our own time. In particular, such themes as 'conversation' as a model of discourse, whether philosophic inquiry has a 'method', and the connection of knowledge and morality, are close to the core of Socratic inquiry. Seeskin is able to show that these topics are already there at the root of western philosophy and yet what is meant by them is not necessarily what *we* mean by them. If this complexity were attended to more frequently, we might avoid some of the caricatures of Socrates and Plato that have typified some recent discussions.

There are an inordinate number of typos and misspellings in these pages. While such errors are not uncommon in the age of rapid publication, in this case they are frequent enough to mar an otherwise excellent book.

Michael L. Gillespie

University of Nebraska at Omaha

Stuart G. Shanker, ed.

Gödel's Theorem in Focus.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
(for Croom Helm) 1988. Pp. ix+261.

US \$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7099-3357-6);

US \$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7099-3399-1).

Eight papers make up this collection. All but one have appeared elsewhere, four in either *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* or *The Journal of Philosophical Logic*, three in less accessible places. The first is a

short biographical sketch of Gödel, 'Kurt Gödel in Sharper Focus' (1984), by John W. Dawson. This is followed by Gödel's 'On Formally Undecidable Propositions of *Principia Mathematica* and Related Systems I' (1931; van Heijenoort translation) and Stephen Kleene's overview of Gödel's work in 'The Work of Kurt Gödel' (1976).

Next we hear again from Dawson on 'The Reception of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems' (1984). Dawson discusses how and to what extent 'one of the most profound discoveries in the history of logic and mathematics was assimilated promptly and almost without objection by Gödel's contemporaries.' Then Solomon Feferman, in 'Kurt Gödel: Conviction and Caution' (1983), considers why Gödel was so guarded about the platonism he credited for his successes during the 1930s, and speculates on how this caution 'might have affected his work and choice of problems.' This is followed by Michael Resnik's 'On the Philosophical Significance of Consistency Proofs' (1974), Michael Detlefsen's 'On Interpreting Gödel's Second Theorem' (1979), and the editor's 'Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Significance of Gödel's Theorem' (published here for the first time).

There is a two-page preface, an incomplete index (e.g., Detlefsen is omitted, as are some references to Dummett, Kitcher and Resnik), no bibliography and no suggestions for further reading, beyond what can be gleaned from each contributor's footnotes and references. The book would be useful in intermediate and advanced courses in mathematical logic, in philosophy of logic and mathematics, and in certain specialized courses in epistemology and metaphysics.

The longest paper by far is the editor's own, at 101 pages (the next longest being Gödel's, at 31), or nearly 40% of the whole. The book's usefulness therefore depends heavily on this paper. It was written to 'discharge a self-imposed obligation' from the editor's *Wittgenstein and the Turning-Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics* (London: Croom Helm 1987), and 'should thus be read as a sequel to this earlier work.'

In the preface to the earlier book, we learn that 'Wittgenstein's attack on Gödel's interpretation of his second incompleteness theorem could not be dissociated from his proposed resolution/dissolution of the "foundations crisis"' (viii). The earlier book is designed largely to clarify both the proposed resolution and Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics generally. The present paper explains in detail how Wittgenstein's 'critique of Gödel's theorem was merely a by-product of the much larger investigation into what Wittgenstein regarded as the conceptual confusions inspiring the foundations dispute' (earlier

preface, viii). Placed in this larger context, many of Wittgenstein's otherwise puzzling and sometimes embarrassing remarks about Gödel's theorem make much more sense than his detractors allow. 'What were presented [by detractors] as *corrections* were, in fact, covert *philosophical objections* which ... were developed without any effort to clarify, let alone challenge, the philosophical background on which Wittgenstein had based his approach to the foundations dispute' (earlier preface, viii). In particular, Wittgenstein had already registered severe misgivings about the whole philosophical framework of Hilbert's Programme, and much of the significance Gödel and others alleged for his theorem depended on that framework.

The core of Wittgenstein's critique of Hilbert's Programme is a conception of mathematics according to which 'the meaning of mathematical propositions [is] determined by intralinguistic rules rather than a connection between language and reality' (211). Mathematical propositions are not referential. Rather, their meaning is determined by the totality of rules governing the use of their constituent concepts in a calculus. This underlies Wittgenstein's insistence that 'there are no gaps in mathematical systems.' What appears to be a gap (say in Euclid's system) that is closed in another (in Hilbert's axiomatization of Euclidean geometry) is not a gap. Instead there are really two distinct networks of geometric concepts, each concept being defined by the axioms and rules of the system in which it appears. The relation between the two systems is only one of family resemblance. Thus Wittgenstein says, 'The edifice of rules must be *complete*, if we are to work with a concept at all—we cannot make any discoveries in syntax.—For, only the group of rules *defines* the sense of our signs, and any alteration ... of the rules means an alteration of the sense.' The resemblance to structuralist and post-structuralist theories of meaning is striking, and should make us uneasy.

In any case it follows from Wittgenstein's account of meaning that 'Mathematics cannot be incomplete,' and that 'In mathematics, we cannot talk of systems in general, but only *within* systems.' Hence we cannot meaningfully raise the question of their consistency. In this way Wittgenstein felt free to regard Gödel's theorem as an illustration of the confusions inherent in a certain conception of mathematics, without going through Gödel's proof in any detail and indeed without rejecting any of Gödel's strictly *mathematical* reasoning.

As Shanker says, 'The brunt of Wittgenstein's argument is that to describe a mathematical expression as unprovable is to deny that it is a *mathematical proposition*: i.e. that it is intelligible' (230). But

whether this view of meaning is correct or even plausible is another matter. There is after all the unsettling resemblance to structuralist and post-structuralist theories I remarked above. For the most part Shanker is silent on this crucial issue, though his sympathies seem to lie with Wittgenstein. Those who wish to grapple with the crux of the matter will have to look elsewhere.

John F. Post

Vanderbilt University

Mark C. Taylor

Altarity.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987.

Pp. xxxiv+371.

US \$42.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-79137-8);

US \$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-79138-6).

If 'logocentrism' is indeed the home of Hegel's *Vernunft*, then Taylor's writing on *Altarity* is, perhaps, the most engaging and seductive reading of contemporary French intellectual thought. But can we be certain that Hegel's idea of *Vernunft* is singularly aligned to a metaphysics of system as Derrida, Taylor et al. argue? Since Hegel's dialectic is a phenomenology of reason, and, as such, a genealogical decentering of *logos* in its own right, it is improbable that the philosophic form of his 'all-inclusive identity ... [merely] negates, reduces, absorbs, or swallows up otherness' (44) as Taylor contends. It seems more likely that Hegel's writings, in particular, *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes*, reveal a philosophy of reflection which is aware of the 'altarity' structure of *Denken*, that is, 'a certain blindness' and a dialectic 'vision ... riddled with obscurity' (81). For one, Hegel invariably underlines 'the disparity which exists in consciousness between the 'I' and the substance' (*PS [Phenomenology of Spirit]*, 21) so that difference is not simply overpowered by 'the dominating imperialism characteristic' (203) of self-consciousness. Against the prevailing view that Hegel's philosophy is Hegelianism, and, thus, more or less, logocentrism, it is necessary to resist the tendencies to read Hegel's way of thinking in this one-dimensional, it seems, re-

constructive rather than genuinely deconstructive manner. I ask Taylor (and Derrida) whether it is really necessary 'to introduce the forces of resistance to *Aufhebung*' (292) if we can show that Hegel's speculative philosophy does not merely 'watch' over the domain of Western thought but observes the mirror ('*speculum*') of reflection in a manner which allows 'the play of forces' in thought to clash with identity without presuming to confine difference within a purely abstract conceptuality. 'It must be said,' Hegel writes, 'that nothing is *known* that is not in *experience*' (PS, 487). Although it is absurd to affirm that Hegel's dialectic phenomenology is released from the essentialities of subjectivity, it is fair to say, I believe, that the concept of *Geist* exceeds the claim (so often made) that 'speculative philosophy...[is] all-seeing and all-knowing' (97) in the strenuous attempt to grant a theory of reflection which really does not end in absolute knowledge per se but continues in an infinite process of knowing. Hegel concedes that spirit has shown itself to us to be neither merely the withdrawal of self-consciousness into its pure inwardness, nor the mere submergence of self-consciousness into substance (PS, 490).

Indeed, spirit is 'altarity' in Taylor's elegant ten-chapter transformation of Derridean *différance*. And yet, spirit, for Hegel, at least, is more than *différance* or *altarity*. It is this 'more' which appears so problematic to the deconstructive mind. It is this 'more' which in Hegel's appropriation of reason slips and falls, 'stuttering and stammering' (143) so as to suggest that the dialectic 'fails, always fails, inevitably fails' (340). Taylor's radical doubt of Hegel's 'speculative more' introduces a compelling alternative to the dialectical mode of thinking. In each of the ten chapters of *Altarity*, Taylor never loses sight of the Hegelian *speculum*. Whether the discussions concern the intricate issues of the writings of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Lacan, Bataille, Kristeva, Levinas, Blanchot, or Derrida, the Hegelian dilemma of identity runs throughout his investigation.

In contrast to the Hegelian mediation of difference articulated in chapter I, Taylor develops a deconstruction of otherness which culminates in nondialectic, literary spacings of difference or 'altarity'. 'Altarity' is Taylor's genealogy of disruption, philosophically contextualized in relation to Heidegger's *Riss* in chapter II and Merleau-Ponty's dehiscence of reflective carnality in chapter III. In these two chapters Taylor provides a brilliant account of Heidegger's and Merleau-Ponty's critique of the philosophy of reflection. In chapter IV, the Hegelian *speculum* of reason is further 'shattered' on the basis of Lacan's exploration of 'the rift between the universal (the uncon-

scious) and the particular (the conscious) [which] forever splits the subject, thereby rendering transparent self-consciousness unattainable' (91). Always close to Abraham's gaze of otherness, a distinctive mystical orientation, Taylor shows that Lacanian discourse is delivered from 'the magical power' of Hegel's systematic assimilation of human existence.

In the next chapter on George Bataille, Taylor argues that a performative rather than a 'descriptive, referential, or representational' understanding of language is more amenable to an *expérience intérieure* in which 'altarity' is 'neither objective nor subjective, exterior nor interior' (143). This anti-speculative, nondialectic struggle (*la bataille*) advances the deconstructive reading of *Vernunft* to Kristeva's claim in chapter VI that the other is the abject whose 'name' is 'woman' (167). Kristeva's 'feminine operation' of subverting philosophical discourse is shown to threaten any system of thought which constructs or excludes abjection as altarity. Again, the Hegelian dialectic seems to repress 'the totally other' whose truth Nietzsche playfully conceived to be 'woman'.

Taylor makes explicit Kristeva's 'desemantic' turn of language in his dynamic reading of Levinas's attempts to strip the subject of its Hegelian pride by showing that the subject can never return home, that it has no place of its own, and that it is left to wander and roam. From Hegel's work (*œuvre*) of identity to Blanchot's idleness (*desœuvrement*) of *l'espace littéraire*, the 'movement' of 'altarity' emerges as an 'infinite conversation' (*L'Entretien infini*) capable of negating nothingness without seeming to elevate this negation into a shining watchtower (*specula*) of reason. Taylor's peculiar emphasis on an unmediated 'thirdness' in the genealogy of difference approaches Derrida's 'literary displacement' of philosophy which always already writes otherwise than being, otherwise than spirit as chapters VIII and IX clearly show.

Receding far into the text of Derrida, Taylor repeats Kierkegaard's call towards (and against) Hegel: 'Philosophy fails (from the beginning) because it cannot translate particularity into universality without destroying the particular as such' (341). In conclusion, this reader asks whether Taylor's 'altarity,' Derrida's *différance*, or Kierkegaard's *ganz Andere* is 'infinitely and qualitatively different' from Hegel's 'becoming of spirit' which 'presents a slow-moving succession of spirits, a gallery of images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of spirit, moves thus slowly just because the Self has to penetrate and digest this entire wealth of its substance' (*PS*, 492)? Hegel's discourse

on the subject signifies 'ein verschwundenes Dasein,' a being dispersed in thought, far from a purely 'logocentric' subject. Giving itself over to recollection ('*Erinnerung*'), or 'altarity', Dasein (as Hegel adds) appears 'sunk in the night of its self-consciousness' (*PS*, 492).

Provocatively unfolding a 'postdialectical vision' of difference based on a complex and creative etymology of concepts, Taylor's *Altarity*, beautifully written, serves as a spirited and erudite inquiry into interdisciplinary modes of postmodern thought. It is of great value not only to philosophers, theologians, and literary theorists but also to social critics and historians.

Wilhelm S. Wurzer

Duquesne University

Neil Tennant

Anti-Realism and Logic: Truth as Eternal.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford
University Press 1987. Pp. xii+325.

Cdn \$106.50; US \$64.00. ISBN 0-19-824925-X.

Michael Dummett has given the name 'anti-realism' to his metaphysical and logical views, inspired by the constructivism of the intuitionist mathematicians. In this book, Neil Tennant seeks to extend Dummett's rejection of classical logic and the standard semantics which accompanies it; like Dummett, he tries to enlist the technical concepts and results of logicians such as Gentzen and Prawitz in the service of constructivist ends.

The fundamental tenet of anti-realism, with respect to some given sector of language L , is the rejection of the principle of bivalence: for all sentences s of L , s is true or s is false. (The denial of bivalence does not entail, in intuitionist logic, that there exists a sentence which is neither true nor false; in fact, if we equate ' s is false' with ' s is not true', the latter yields absurdity in intuitionist logic with a standard truth theory.) The sentences which they refuse to assert are either true or false are those for which there exists no effective method for determining which truth value the sentence in question has. The outcome, therefore, is a form of constructivism tying determinate truth

value to provability. Dummett's contribution has been to generalise this approach from mathematics to all human discourse.

Tennant adduces four main principles in support of anti-realism: the *publicity* principle in effect rules out telepathy in the acquisition or communication of grasp of language; the *compositionality* principle is a Fregean principle to the effect that the meaning of complex expressions is determined in a rule-governed way by the meaning of their parts; the *determinacy* of meaning principle maintains against Quine that meaning is determinate; and finally a *manifestation* principle, which states that there is no aspect of meaning which cannot be made publicly manifest in behaviour.

How are these principles supposed to lead to an abandonment of bivalence? The argument against realism seems to require not just the four principles but also, and most crucially, a rather extreme form of empiricist epistemology. Acquisition and communication of meaning clearly proceed via manifest signals received by ordinary sensory means. An extreme empiricist, minimising any innate component in knowledge, holds that the content of the meanings transmitted cannot transcend the sensory materials of the vehicle of transmission and its environment whereas for an anti-empiricist the latter merely act as triggers or catalysts of knowledge—here sentence understanding. There is no obvious incompatibility in an anti-empiricist holding to Tennant's four principles yet maintaining that ordinary observation of a linguistic community can trigger, in an individual with the appropriate genetic endowment, grasp of propositions whose truth-conditions are not empirically accessible in the way in which the stimulations which inculcate and transmit those truth-conditions are. Curiously Tennant seems to see the naivety of the empiricist position and the strength of the alternatives (15-19, 167) yet not that it undercuts the inference from his four principles to constructivism.

Even if bivalence is false, need this require abandonment of either the classical rules for the logical operators, or the general structural principles of classical logic? Tennant argues for both isolating a new logic which he calls Intuitionist Relevant Logic as the correct organon of reasoning. In the natural deduction version of IRL, a proof in IRL is a normal form intuitionist proof in which no applications of the rule 'from absurdity anything follows' occurs (and with a slightly liberalized form of disjunction elimination). Tennant shows that this is equivalent to a variant of Gentzen's sequent system of intuitionistic logic, minus the structural rules cut and dilution. The most radical feature of the system is the failure of cut, or transitivity of

entailment. Nonetheless, if we drop the conditional from the language, transitivity only fails if the overall premisses are inconsistent or the conclusion is a logical truth, just where one would want it to fail, Tennant argues. On the other hand, disjunctive syllogism holds in IRL; yet, because of the way transitivity is restricted, the Lewis paradoxes are not derivable. Thus whilst Anderson and Belnap think abandonment of transitivity is crazy and reject disjunctive syllogism, Tennant thinks the latter is crazy and abandons the former.

This serves to raise the question: what intuitions ought we to accept as authoritative? To Tennant's credit he does not rest with intuition but tries to provide a general theory of entailment on the basis of the concept of normal form proofs plus the idea of introduction rules as canonical (though he appears to waver on this—compare 101 with 135 and 150). But everything hinges on one's taste in normality: there are natural deduction formulations of classical logic, and notions of canonical proof close to Tennant's, in which there are canonical normal form proofs of all classical theorems; in sequent systems classical (multiple conclusion) proof exhibits a pleasing symmetry lacking in intuitionist systems.

Nor is it clear that the argument from normal forms for intuitionism converges with standard relevantist considerations (188). In fact, it is very doubtful whether Tennant's logic really is a relevant logic since to get the meta-theorems he wants, one has to drop the conditional (with its standard intuitionist rules, anyway). But relevant logic is all about formalizing entailment as an object-language conditional; Tennant's relevant logic is a bit like Hamlet without the Prince.

Tennant tries to fill the gap left by the absent conditional with his very radical 'transitional atomic logic' where all logical operators are allegedly eliminated. But the discussion is rather compressed and perhaps confused, leaving me unsure whether we have anything more than a notational variant on calculi which simulate meta-linguistic entailment relations or inference rules at object-language level.

In addition to these central logical and metaphysical topics there are also very interesting discussions of such issues as holism in philosophy of mind and the logicist programme in foundations of mathematics (but if IRL is *the* correct logic for mathematics, how can Tennant be justified in abandoning it, as he does, for free logic? The latter is not the only solution to the problem of denotationless terms.)

The book itself has a rather modular structure of 26 chapters somewhat lacking in organic unity and the technical details may be hard

going for some readers. Nonetheless it contains a wealth of argument and is informed by a comprehensive knowledge of the relevant literature. For anybody interested in the Dummettian 'school' in logic and metaphysics, this book is therefore essential reading.

Alan Weir

The Queen's University of Belfast

J.E. Tiles

Dewey.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1988. Pp. 256.

US \$35.00. ISBN 0-415-00908-1.

Philosophers do battle in the philosophical arena only when they see each other as worthy of critical attention. Some quarrels are essentially *hors de combat*—denials, sometimes vitriolic, that others are truly philosophers and deserving of critical examination. But rapprochements do occur, sometimes as a gained willingness to pay initial attention and to do battle, and sometimes as a consequence of chivalric and philosophical appreciations that develop during critical study. This has happened with respect to Anglo-American analytic philosophers toward both continental philosophers and philosophers of the older American tradition. One happy result has been initial and reawakened attention to James, Peirce, Dewey and Santayana.

Such rapprochements have doubtless come about in different ways, and for different reasons, in the United States and in the United Kingdom. J.E. Tiles's *Dewey*, a case in point, is a surprisingly appreciative and exemplary study by a contemporary British philosopher of the older American. It is the kind of study which is emblematic of improved relations between the warring traditions.

The book is part of a series of volumes called, 'The Arguments of the Philosophers,' edited by Ted Honderich. The series title is itself 'analytic' in spirit, and might be looked upon as a deliberate narrowing of the scope of attention that philosophers ought to be given. The title hints that they sometimes do other things—moralize and

poetize perhaps—but not in their function as philosophers, and that only their arguments deserve attention. In conciliatory fairness, however, the word ‘arguments’ might be sympathetically broadened to take into account the full panoply of things that philosophers do. Certainly Tiles, in looking at Dewey’s arguments, and in presenting his own, does not treat arguments in a narrow and delimiting way. His approach is remarkably comprehensive and sympathetic. At one point he refers to ‘argumentative articulations to convey a vision,’ with the implication that the vision is no mere sum, or accumulation, of atomic arguments.

Tiles distinguishes analytic from Deweyan philosophy, but he also does something which is Deweyan (or may we say, philosophical) in spirit. For he undermines, or undoes, his own distinction and his nominal adherence to the analytic tradition. Doing both of these things, at different times and in different ways, is the rich burden of the book. It is at once an analytic challenge to Dewey but also one that does not terminate in demolishing arguments. Tiles might even be said to have allowed himself to be gradually and graciously coopted by Dewey. He sees Dewey as having worked to undermine the intellectual beliefs and patterns of thought associated with analytic philosophers, while at the same time he acknowledges that the latter can ‘profit from familiarity with Dewey’ (xi).

Tiles indicates his fundamental, or perhaps we can say initial, sympathy when he writes of the ‘contemporary [habit] of thought which leads it to reduce wholes to parts and to treat parts as prior in the order of understanding to the wholes which they form, to neglect context and to seek to examine things in isolation from one another, and to deny the relevance of temporal development and to view things ahistorically’ (xi). This stakes out the analytic claim, to be sure, but is it all that contemporary any longer, and is it in accord with what Tiles himself does? His practice of philosophy, in this very work, runs far afield of his occasional expressions of summary allegiance to analysis. He does not reduce Dewey to his parts, or view his arguments ahistorically. He goes well beyond a look at the arguments alone.

With respect to arguing, Tiles notes that Dewey countered his opponents not ‘by deductions of contradictions in their positions but by the development of an alternative perspective from which their doctrines appeared insufficiently comprehensive...’ (101). This touches on the issue of whether philosophy suffices with (faultless) arguments, or whether the aim is ‘perspective,’ or ‘vision,’ or ‘view.’

Tiles notes how one can argue against opponents by showing 'that they have made crucial use of a distinction in developing their position and at the same time undermined the very distinction on which they have placed important weight' (101). Philosophies can be (perhaps need to be) constructed on logical faults, the way cities can be built on natural faults. The making and unmaking of distinctions can be part either of a witting or an unconscious strategy. This has been a regular way of dealing with distinctions—appearance and reality, culture and nature, etc. Dewey made and unmade distinctions. *And Tiles himself does*. Tiles is not 'consistent' in his deployment of the distinction between analytic and Deweyan philosophizing, since he makes and unmakes it. But both are phases of his task and of his vision.

The book is organized into nine parts, I Legacies, II Sensation, Emotion and Reflex Action, III The Emergence of Mind and Qualities, IV Language and Self, V Truth and Inquiry, VI Dewey and the Realists, VII Objectivity, Value and Motivation, VIII Art, Intelligence and Contemplation, and IX Ideals. Each part is about 25 pages and has five sections. Despite, or because of, this extensive grid a lot of territory is covered. Part VI has sections 'a: Meaning and means of verification, b: What truly represents the past, c: Perception and the old realism, d: The new realism, e: The new idealism?' It is an especially effective clarification of problems of truth and verification. As always, Tiles develops Dewey's position by way of contrast to other views—Williams, Lovejoy, etc. Tiles's sympathy for Dewey's account is not, as it were, a spontaneous one. It is over and over again an emergent view, developed by way of contrast to views which might initially have been more congenial to Tiles. The gained view of Dewey, developed in this way, gives the reader insights and perspectives which might not have occurred in an account that was more direct, straightforward and originally sympathetic.

Tiles moves back and forth between loyalty to analytic philosophy and appreciation of Dewey. His protestation that he has not written a developmental biography, or an intellectual history, is belied by his achievement. His accumulated and insightful vision of Dewey goes beyond analytic arguing, and is marked by a decidedly wavering and hesitant entrenchment in the analytic tradition. Tiles has sought to 'interpret Dewey sympathetically.' He adds, 'I have not had the space to mark where I depart from other interpreters, nor to engage in disputes with them' (xii). In fact, he does engage in such disputes, and usually to Dewey's advantage. Tiles has Dewey countering endless

numbers of philosophers, even recent ones. For example, he indicates how 'Dewey could well argue' (73) against Thomas Nagel, to whom Tiles replies 'on behalf of Dewey.'

At times Tiles recognizes varieties and changes within the analytic tradition. It has 'moved away from the thorough-going atomistic approach which Russell favoured. But it has not (yet) arrived at the sort of holistic method which Dewey favoured and did his best to practice' (23). There is a touch of archness in the 'yet'. Would anything be left of the analytic tradition if it got anywhere near Dewey? Tiles grapples with the relationship between Dewey and analytic philosophy, sometimes seeing them as essentially opposed, and sometimes as capable of accommodations. His own study sometimes glances backward at the essential inviolability of analytic philosophy, which for him is still the one that is 'commonly practiced in English speaking countries today...' (19). But he also moves forward, or at least away from it. Tiles distinguishes sociological, psychological and historical questions from logical ones, but not all that sharply, and his gained appreciation of Dewey is a tribute to his awareness of the risks of pressing such distinctions too hard—even if one can thereby win arguments. It is an awareness, as I have suggested, that the making and unmaking of distinctions, while logically problematic, is a heuristic and needed step in philosophy-making.

Tiles's gracious ambivalences are perhaps revealed as much by an introductory acknowledgment as by any nexus of arguments. In his tribute Tiles reports how his wife Mary Tiles kept his spirits up and his 'efforts from becoming lost in minutiae. There were times when as a result of not grappling with Dewey's texts she saw more quickly and more clearly what he was saying. I am grateful for all she put into this book.' How intriguing it would be to deconstruct this expression of gratitude, to disentangle deference from condescension, and to explore the considerable implications of such a remark for what the book is largely about. It is necessary to attend to minutiae (mere arguments) but also to know when to dismiss them and to animate the larger vision.

Morris Grossman
Fairfield University

A.T. Winterbourne

The Ideal and the Real.

Norwell, MA: D. Reidel Publishing 1988.

Pp. xi+137.

US \$50.00. ISBN 90-247-3774-5.

Winterbourne's *The Ideal and the Real* is ostensibly an introductory text concerning Kant's philosophy of mathematics. The monograph focuses primarily on the relationship between ideal mathematical objects and, what Winterbourne calls, real mathematical constructions. Winterbourne also suggests that this relationship is merely a special case of the more general problem regarding the manner in which pure concepts and intuitions relate. Hence, if a solution to the former 'special case' problem can be found, then a foundation for a solution to the latter problem is at least set in place. Hume and the antinomical conflicts aside, Winterbourne asserts that 'it was the recognition of the difference in kind between mathematical and philosophical knowledge that first stimulated Kant's imagination' (36). Thus, Winterbourne offers more than a simple examination of Kant's philosophy of mathematics; indeed, there is much more at stake than this. In this vein, some relevant background discussion regarding Leibniz and Newton is provided, as well as other aspects of Kant's philosophy—in particular, the notoriously difficult Schematism, and the importance of the mediative function of schemata regarding both ideal objects/real constructions and pure concepts/intuitions.

The introductory nature of the text should be emphasized. As Winterbourne points out, introductory texts face a dual problem: (i) they must avoid over-simplification; and (ii) secondary literature must be accessed without making the project appear 'so fragmented as to make the average book of chess openings seem positively austere' (ix). It is not clear, however, how successfully Winterbourne resolves this dual problem. After all, the primary purpose of a book on chess openings is to indicate which lines are promising, which lines are viable, which lines have been refuted, and which lines lead to 'poisoned' pawns, etc. While brevity does not entail over-simplification, the lack of detailed argumentation, and the absence of reference to the wealth of secondary literature (even in footnote form) are, at least, indicative of over-simplification.

Aside from the ubiquitous and sometimes annoying typographical errors (for, example, footnote 15 on p. 18 should read footnote 13,

etc.), permit me to note two specific objections to Winterbourne's arguments. In his discussion of the Transcendental Aesthetic, Winterbourne lists a set four propositions for which Kant argues in the *Metaphysical Expositions*. Although I generally agree that this set of propositions is identified correctly, the issue is certainly debatable. For example, even a cursory examination of the secondary literature would reveal that most commentators and critics now take the proposition, 'space is represented as an infinite given magnitude,' as a premiss of the fourth argument, and not, as Winterbourne claims, as a conclusion. Thus, one is owed either an account of why most commentators are wrong, or at least a footnote indicating that the point is contentious. Moreover, if one wishes to assert that the proposition, 'space is represented as an infinite given magnitude,' is not just a claim or premiss, then surely this proposition ought to follow, somehow, from the rest of the A- or B-edition argument. Yet Winterbourne does not discuss, in this context, the relevance of the distinction between the intension and extension of a concept (as does Kant in the B-edition argument), and he only obliquely refers to the A-edition argument. I do believe Winterbourne identifies the correct conclusion with respect to the fourth *Metaphysical Exposition*; however, I find no sufficient supporting argumentation to justify such an identification.

Winterbourne's discussion of infinity and the antinomical conflicts is quite puzzling. He wishes to distinguish between the notions of mathematical and non-mathematical infinities, and to defend Kant against criticisms that conflate these notions (79). Now, Winterbourne is clearly aware of the importance of the Antinomy of Reason. He points out that when assuming cosmological Ideas as 'objective and constitutive, we generate antinomies' (89). He also notes that 'the inadequacies of alternative accounts of metaphysical knowledge, as examined in the *Dialectic*' (90) represent an element in the Kantian doctrine of transcendental idealism. Yet, the inadequacy of the transcendental realist account is shown only by assuming some of the results of transcendental idealism. Winterbourne's arguments only by assuming some of the results of transcendental idealism. Winterbourne's arguments are therefore subject to the same classical criticism raised against Kant, namely, that Kant begs the question. Kant clearly states that an indirect proof of transcendental idealism is supposed to follow from an analysis of antinomical conflict (A506/B534), and antinomical conflict is a natural phenomenon indicative of the contradictions into which human reason unavoidably

falls (A407/B433-4). Hence, if Winterbourne is correct in claiming that antinomical conflicts arise, in part, from a confusion 'between what can be mathematically defined in respect of infinite complexes, as against what can be executed as an actual procedure' (82), then one could perhaps render valid the arguments of the conflicts by generating a contradiction through the use of a non-mathematical notion of infinity. There is no reason, however, why the proponents of the thesis and antithesis position, i.e., the transcendental realists, would find a non-mathematical notion of infinity as acceptable. The indirect proof of transcendental idealism thus fails, and no conclusions can be drawn. What is more, Winterbourne makes no attempt to show how the transcendental realist, utilizing the notion of mathematical infinity, does, in fact, naturally fall into contradiction. Hence, again, no conclusions can be drawn.

In a positive vein, Winterbourne does make several points which should promote further discussion. Chapter 1 provides some intriguing background information on Newton and Leibniz. Of particular interest is Winterbourne's suggestion that Newton's original thought experiments concerning the existence of absolute space have been idealized and changed by commentators. Winterbourne further argues that Newton's examples have decidedly more epistemic import than previously supposed. With respect to Leibniz, Winterbourne counsels care in properly distinguishing among the ontological, epistemological and intellectual levels which characterize Leibniz' arguments regarding the relationist nature of space and time.

Chapter 2 develops the 'historical links' between Kant's transcendental idealism and the philosophical positions held by Newton and Leibniz outlined in Chapter 1. To this end, Winterbourne briefly examines various aspects of Kant's theory of space and time as a response to the problems found in the Newtonian and Leibnizian positions. He discusses both the Transcendental Aesthetic and the antinomical conflicts, gives a brief analysis of the argument from incongruent counterparts and offers a preliminary examination of construction and schematism. This latter examination of construction and schematism is of the most interest. Winterbourne claims that, for Kant, 'pure constructions in space (and time) are symbolic instantiations' (55), and also argues (somewhat contentiously) that the science of number is algebra. Algebra is thus the 'pure science of time' (61), and serves as a condition for the possibility of both arithmetic and geometry. Therefore, it is schemata which link 'algebra to the intrinsically temporal character of construction by means of the symbol' (61-2).

Chapter 3 applies the conclusions of chapters 1 and 2 to Kant's philosophy of mathematics. Winterbourne correctly emphasizes the role of construction in mathematics, and argues that schemata are rules for construction. He further suggests that 'it is the act of construction, via schemata, which links concepts and intuitions' (106). Many things are logically possible for Kant; however, it is the act of construction, Winterbourne argues, which turns logical into real existence.

There is much that is suggestive in Chapter 3. Although Winterbourne mentions Brouwer only in passing, it might be fruitful to specify the axiom schemata governing the constructive act (or the creative subject). Perhaps a careful examination of Kant's philosophy of mathematics could, indeed, provide the basis form which the more general application problems of relating pure concepts and intuitions could be solved. Winterbourne's analysis helps give impetus to such an attempt. *The Ideal and the Real* should prove valuable to two particular sets of readers: (i) those with an interest in Kant and little or no background in the philosophy of mathematics, or (ii) those with an interest in the philosophy of mathematics and little or no background in Kant.

R.R. Wojtowicz

University of California, San Diego

The *MONIST* An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry

Editor, John HOSPERS

Editorial Board: Henry E. Allison, John M. Cooper, Dagfinn Føllesdal, R. Barcan Marcus, Joseph Margolis, Wallace I. Matson, Joseph Owens, Wilfrid Sellars, Anita Silvers, John E. Smith, Bruce Vermazen, Richard Wasserstrom.

Managing Editor: Sherwood J. B. SUGDEN

EACH ISSUE IS LIMITED TO ARTICLES ON A SINGLE GENERAL TOPIC. Communicate in advance with the Editor for special instructions. Two nonreturnable copies (one copy outside the U.S. and Canada) should be submitted NINE MONTHS PRIOR to the announced publication date. Papers should be prepared for anonymous submission to readers, and should be from 10 to 20 double-spaced typewritten pages in length, including notes.

SCHEDULED PUBLICATION DATES:

Vol. 73, No. 2	Apr., 1990	The Theory of Interpretation
Vol. 73, No. 3	July, 1990	Systematic Pluralism
Vol. 73, No. 4	Oct., 1990	Property Rights
Vol. 74, No. 1	Jan., 1991	Morality and the Self
Vol. 74, No. 2	Apr., 1991	The Ontology of History
Vol. 74, No. 3	July, 1991	Hegel Today
Vol. 74, No. 4	Oct., 1991	Heracleitus
Vol. 75, No. 1	Jan., 1992	Teleology & the Foundation of Value
Vol. 75, No. 2	Apr., 1992	The Intrinsic Value of Nature
Vol. 75, No. 3	July, 1992	Christian Philosophy

**Editorial Office: 8229 Lookout Mountain Ave.,
Los Angeles, CA 90046**

Business Office: Box 600, La Salle, Illinois 61301

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: United States: Annual (4 issues): Institutions, \$28.00; Individuals, \$18.00.
2 years institutions, \$50.00; 2 years individuals, \$32.00.

Single copies: \$7.00. Foreign postage: Add 75 cents to single copy rate or \$2.00 per year of subscription.

The Philosophical Review

A Quarterly Journal Edited by the Sage School of Philosophy

January 1990

The Priority of Reason in Descartes.....*Louis Loeb*

Descartes on Time and Causality.....*J.E.K. Secada*

St. Thomas Aquinas on the Halfway State of

Sensible Being.....*Paul Hoffman*

327 Goldwin Smith

Cornell University

Ithaca, New York 14853-3102

U.S. Subscription Rates:

\$13.00 per year for students,
the retired, and the unemployed
\$22.00 per year for other indi-
viduals; \$6.00 per single issue
\$38.00 per year for institutions
\$10.00 per single issue

Rates outside the U.S.:

\$18.00 per year for students,
the retired, and the unemployed
\$27.00 per year for other indi-
viduals; \$8.00 per single issue
\$43.00 per year for institutions
\$12.00 per single issue

VISA and MasterCard Accepted

Editors' Note

The anglophone editors of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

are pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

The E-mail address of CPR/RCCP is

CPRS@UALTAMTS.BITNET

Any institution's computing services department will be able to advise on how to access the address.

R. Burch
R.A. Shiner