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Editors • Directeurs

Robert Burch
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

J. N. Kaufmann
Département de Philosophie
Université du Québec
à Trois-Rivières, C.P. 500
Trois-Rivières, Québec
Canada G9A 5H7

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Franz Brentano

Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time and the Continuum.

Stephan Körner and Roderick Chisholm, eds. Trans. Barry Smith. New York:

Routledge, Chapman and Hall (for Croom Helm) 1988. Pp. xxvi+202. US \$49.50.

ISBN 0-7099-4476-4.

In the mid 1970s, Felix Meiner published a selection of Brentano's later work on space and time edited by Körner and Chisholm. That book has now been translated from German into English by Barry Smith.

Smith's translation is thoroughly reliable, and the editors have provided a useful introduction. Nevertheless, *Space, Time and the Continuum* makes difficult reading. The most important reason for this is that the writings collected in it were never prepared for publication by Brentano himself. Many of them are dictations which were afterward annotated by his student Alfred Kastil. The result is a series of shorter documents: repeated struggles to master a set of problems rather than a single polished work. The editors' introduction (rewritten and reduced in the translation) does a good deal to compensate, but first time readers of Brentano will often be puzzled by a terse style and by allusions to views explained more fully elsewhere.

To understand Brentano's later work, including his later theory of time, one must understand his view that whatever is or exists is a *thing*, which, in his technical usage, means something individual and non-abstract. Souls on this theory may be things but abstract objects are not, and they cannot even be objects of thought. All things are temporal. There is, he holds, no such thing as a time in addition to temporal things. Further, he believes that strictly speaking only what exists at the present moment exists. The speaker who utters the word 'now' is later than what *was but is not* and earlier than what *is not but will be*.

Every temporally extended thing exists continuously and every body is spatially continuous. A theory of continua is an important part of Brentano's theory of space and time. Taking his cue from Aristotle's *Physics* he maintains that the concept of a boundary and of a coinciding of boundaries is necessarily involved in the concept of a continuum. Here he departs from classical mathematical descriptions of continuity, and some of his polemical remarks are directed

at Richard Dedekind, whom he accuses of mistakenly holding continua to be built up from an actual infinity of units. Boundaries cannot exist apart from what they bound, though they need not be connected in every direction. A point which is connected in more or fewer directions to continua is said to have greater or less fullness or *plērōsis*. The endpoint of a line segment will have one-sided plerosis, a point on a line will have two-sided plerosis and so on. The nature of a point thus differs according to whether it bounds in one direction or more. Brentano seems to hold that one can in this way distinguish something like parts of a point.

A puzzle arises for him in the following manner: the present temporal moment of a thing is a boundary having two-sided plerosis. A boundary depends for its existence on the continua bounded; yet we saw that past and future things do not exist. It appears to follow that there is no present moment.

Some of the book's interest comes from the maneuvers taken to avoid this problem. I do not think Brentano actually avoids it, but he does say something about what it is to judge that a thing is past or future. To do so is to accept a thing that exists now and another thing that is somehow related to it. However, the past or future thing need not exist to be so related. The case is a little like that of intentional objects. Suppose one were to represent a thinker representing a thinker who in turn ... etc. Successive thinkers 'exist' at a greater distance, but the thinkers presented need not exist in the proper sense, and neither do things presented in temporal relation to what is now. We represent to ourselves temporal things differently according to whether they are nearer or further away from us in time. Differences in the object itself are not presented; rather, the mode of presentation varies continuously. That is not to say that the objects do not actually vary. In fact, says Brentano, attached to all things which exist must be a real specific difference distinguishing them from what is earlier and later. This difference is completely transcendent to us.

The book contains many sketches and criticisms of previous philosophical views on space and time, including the views of Aristotle. In addition to his treatment of spatial and temporal continua, Brentano also makes a number of original remarks about memory and perception.

Brentano's technical vocabulary is unlikely to widely adopted, and his attacks on Poincaré and Dedekind are certain to be controversial. Those who read him will be able to decide for themselves how

much of his theory of continua can be saved. But most students of metaphysics will find ideas in these pages to interest them, ideas moreover which they will not find elsewhere.

Glen Koehn

University of Alberta

Joseph A. Buijs, ed.

Maimonides: A Collection of Critical Essays.

Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 1988. Pp. vii+317.

US \$29.95. ISBN 0-268-01367-5.

Maimonides' philosophical masterpiece the *Guide for the Perplexed* has itself notoriously been a cause of perplexity since its appearance in 1190. It was followed by *A Guide to the Guide*, and philosophers still seek to resolve perplexities that it has caused. It has set the agenda for practically all subsequent philosophers seeking to make a specifically Jewish contribution to philosophy. But the *Guide* can be considered in relation to two other philosophical traditions. First, Maimonides was greatly influenced by Islamic philosophers, especially Alfarabi, but also Avicenna, Ibn Bajja and others; he was also enthusiastic about the writings of Averroes, though the works of the latter reached Maimonides too late to influence the *Guide*. Second, Maimonides had a profound influence on the philosophy of the Christian west, through the Latin translations of the *Guide*. Thus Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas learned a great deal from him, and he is quoted with respect by Nicolas of Cusa, Meister Eckhart and many others.

In this splendid collection of fourteen papers brought together by Joseph A. Buijs these various approaches to Maimonides' philosophy are well represented. The book is divided into four sections. In the first, 'Issues of interpretation', are papers by Arthur Hyman, Leo Strauss, Joseph Buijs and Warren Zev Harvey. Hyman sets the scene for the rest of the collection by describing two major trends in the interpretation of Maimonides. First is the naturalistic, with which Leo Strauss and Shlomo Pines are associated, which stresses the fact

that there is an exoteric and an esoteric reading of the *Guide*. On this naturalistic reading Maimonides is committed to Aristotelian philosophy, and thus holds that the world is eternal and that there is no special prophetic knowledge beyond the knowledge that is available to a philosopher relying entirely upon his natural powers. Harmonistic interpretations, on the other hand, while not denying that the *Guide* is written on two levels, accept at face value Maimonides' express belief in divine creation, and in the role of divine will in the elevation of a person to the status of prophet, and in the special nature of the prophet's knowledge.

The second essay is Leo Strauss's classic 'The literary character of the *Guide for the Perplexed*', in which he argues for the unexpected thesis that the *Guide* is not, properly speaking, a philosophical book at all, but a Jewish book devoted to an explanation of the secret teaching of the Bible. Joseph Buijs, in a helpful essay, argues against Strauss's description of the *Guide*. But Buijs's essay is not primarily polemical; his purpose is to determine the place of philosophy in the *Guide*. He takes as his starting point the fact that the *Guide* was written for Jews who were acquainted with the philosophical sciences and whose perplexity about religious matters arose precisely from that acquaintance. Maimonides could not resolve such perplexity without himself employing philosophy. The subject of creation is a crucial case. Maimonides does not accept any proposed demonstration of the claim that the world is eternal or of the claim that it had a beginning in time, and in the absence of demonstration he regards himself as free to accept the traditional Jewish teaching. To minimise the appearance of incompatibility with Aristotelian teaching Maimonides even claims that Aristotle had not himself offered a demonstration, that is, an incontrovertible proof of the eternity of the world. And indeed Maimonides makes it plain that if Aristotle had produced incontrovertible proof of the eternity of the world, this would have prompted him to reinterpret the scriptural story in order to square that story with the philosophical proof. The main point here is that Maimonides is engaged in a specifically philosophical enterprise throughout his discussion of the various theories concerning creation. Buijs has many enlightening things to say on behalf of this approach to the *Guide*, and in a sense the rest of the collection underlines his point that the *Guide* must be read as a philosophy book if the purpose of the author is to be appreciated. Buijs's paper is followed by an impressively argued one by Warren Harvey on a much disputed question concern-

ing the parallels between Maimonides' teaching on creation and on prophecy.

The remaining three sections of the book cover topics in the fields of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, law, politics, and the influence of Maimonides on the Christian west. In 'The limitations of human knowledge according to Al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, and Maimonides' Shlomo Pines discusses an apparent tension in Maimonides's system which arises from the fact that he sets a very narrow limit to human knowledge, and yet at the same time holds that man's ultimate goal and felicity consists in knowledge and contemplation, knowledge which appears to be ruled out by the account of the limits to what, by nature, we can know.

In 'Providence, divine omniscience, and possibility: the case of Maimonides' Alfred L. Ivry is concerned with God's knowledge of his creatures. Maimonides states that God's knowledge is different from ours in so many ways that it is 'knowledge' in a merely equivocal sense of the term. But, as becomes plain, Maimonides is committed to the view that God's knowledge is in some respects similar to ours. How similar? Ivry pursues this and related questions with insight and clarity.

I have had space to mention only a few of the papers, but the whole book is invaluable, testimony to the very healthy state of Maimonidean scholarship today.

Alexander Broadie
University of Glasgow

Paul de Bruyne et al.

La justice sociale en question?

Contributions à une recherche réalisée par l'Association des dirigeants et cadres chrétiens (ADIC), avec le concours des Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis (FUSL).

Préface de Jean Ladrière, 1985. 359p. 114FF. ISBN 2-8028-0044-2.

Dans cet ouvrage interdisciplinaire, les auteurs discutent d'un projet de société fondé sur l'exigence d'une plus grande justice sociale et conçoivent à cette fin une argumentation solide qui à la fois dénonce les mystifications des théories néo-libérales et propose des idées intéressantes en regard de la prospective. Cet ouvrage paraît à un moment opportun car on connaît l'intérêt suscité par la parution de l'œuvre récente de F.A. Hayek en traduction française (*Droit, Législation et Liberté*, trad. en 3 vol. par R. Audouin [PUF 1980-83]). Il convenait donc de répondre au défi lancé par Hayek, lequel nous plaçait devant une alternative: ou vous abandonnez toute revendication d'«égalité des situations matérielles», toutes les 'considérations égalitaires' qui définissent l'idée socialiste de la justice, ou bien vous contribuez à engendrer 'un système totalitaire excluant la liberté personnelle' (*Droit, Législation et Liberté*, t. II: *Le mirage de la justice sociale* [1981], 91 ss).

Contre cette antinomie mystificatrice, créée par Hayek, entre la justice sociale et la liberté, la plupart des auteurs du collectif (28, 92, 98, 171, 274, 337) revendiquent la synergie des valeurs de justice, de liberté, d'égalité et de solidarité qui vise à l'actualisation de la 'vie sensée' de la cité selon la formule d'Eric Weil.

Le texte de P. de Bruyne traite des théories de la justice et des politiques économiques. Le modèle le plus courant de la justice distributive exige un principe de juste *répartition* afin que l'on puisse évaluer les politiques possibles d'allocation. Il existe plusieurs principes rivaux proposés à cet égard: la stricte égalité, le besoin, le mérite, etc... Ainsi la version social-démocrate de la juste répartition est fondée sur le principe marxiste de la rémunération en fonction des *besoins* de l'individu au terme de la phase socialiste de transition.

Dans la vision socialiste traditionnelle, la société idéale devrait distribuer les biens en fonction des besoins plutôt que sur la base d'une égalité mécanique car son but primordial est d'instituer la solidarité

sociale en lieu et place de l'aliénation et de la compétition propres à l'ordre capitaliste. (38)

Toutefois, la redistribution effectuée par l'Etat providence ne règle pas toujours le problème de la société duale car les riches et non seulement les pauvres peuvent être bénéficiaires du système. En fait, l'Etat du *welfare*, par le biais des transferts des revenus entre groupes et du transfert des responsabilités entre le citoyen et l'Etat, n'améliore pas nécessairement la condition des pauvres. Car les mêmes personnes peuvent être simultanément taxées et subventionnées, certains recevant grosso modo l'équivalent de leur contribution.

La règle des 'mérites' fonde la conception libérale de la justice, qui exige une réallocation régulière des individus aux divers rôles par la médiation de la mobilité sociale réelle et de l'égalité réelle des chances. Toutefois, dans une économie très spécialisée, les rôles ne sont guère interchangeables. Il devient donc difficile dans une société réelle donc inégalitaire, d'instaurer un *mécanisme de redistribution* des positions axé sur le principe de la loterie comme fondement de la justice. L'idée de loterie peut toutefois tenir lieu de *critère d'évaluation*: 'une bonne société, c'est celle où les chances de tout membre pris au hasard sont vraisemblablement aussi grandes que possible' (44, citation de F.A. Hayek, *Droit, Législation et Liberté*, t. II, 159).

Les théories des choix sociaux, inscrites au centre des politiques économiques, visent à orienter les comportements vers la coopération, la coordination des objectifs et la responsabilité sociale. Pour ce faire, elles doivent tenter de surmonter les incompatibilités majeures entre les logiques de l'intérêt individuel et de l'intérêt commun. Ainsi, les théoriciens du 'public choice' visent à maximiser les utilités en conciliant les rôles conflictuels occupés par un même individu, c'est-à-dire son rôle d'individu privé—mû par l'intérêt personnel—et son rôle de citoyen—préoccupé par l'intérêt social.

Les théories du 'welfare' indiquent bien que l'action collective requiert des contraintes légales ou des interventions qui 'forcent' la coopération par des incitations ou des sanctions: de fait, l'action collective ne peut faire abstraction d'une autorité ou d'une certaine forme de coercition (60). Selon la théorie des 'groupes d'intérêt,' la visée ultime de l'action du gouvernement consiste à satisfaire les intérêts d'une coalition dominante;

les groupes les plus puissants risquent d'être mieux protégés, ou de faire décider des mesures bénéfiques à une catégorie d'individus, quoique

supportées par l'ensemble. Dans cette version, la justice émerge en définitive de la négociation et d'un accord social, souvent précaire. (62)

On conçoit aisément les réticences des théoriciens de l'Etat minimal face à une telle répartition des divers avantages en société, car ces théoriciens contestent 'l'extension des libertés individuelles aux groupes organisés' (ibid). Incidemment Hayek considère 'les actions collectives des groupes organisés' comme une manifestation des instincts ataviques liés à l'«éthique tribale» des sociétés primitives.

Quoi qu'il en soit, dans une société où les différences de pouvoir au niveau des secteurs (corporatisme), des pays (économie duale) et du monde (sous-développement) conditionnent les autres types d'inégalités, les revendications d'une société plus juste deviennent primordiales. Or, selon de Bruyne, ces revendications sont desservies par l'approche individualisante des théories de la justice répertoriées dans sa typologie. De plus, ces théories se limitent 'à la sphère de la distribution, alors que les différences de revenus dérivent manifestement du système de production, de la division du travail et de la propriété des moyens de production' (66).

Le juriste M. Van de Putte évalue la législation sociale (liée, par définition, aux relations de travail et à leur complément, la sécurité sociale) et les politiques qu'elle a inspirées. Une première difficulté se pose à propos 'du prix de revient, pour la société, de la gestion par l'Etat des institutions nécessaires à la mise en pratique des droits sociaux et économiques' (124). Au nom de quel droit subjectif (inné et dont le législateur serait supposément le détenteur) l'Etat serait-il dispensé de l'obligation de bonne gestion?

Une seconde difficulté se traduit en termes d'omniprésence d'une législation appelée à couvrir toutes les dimensions de la vie d'un individu. Appliquée aux situations concrètes, la loi prend la forme de règlements parfois complexes qui, dans le cas des réglementations fiscales, transforment le citoyen en 'auxiliaire non rétribué des administrations publiques' (127). Le 'déficit endémique des finances publiques' et 'la réglementation pléthorique' impliquent donc forcément la diminution de la 'confiance normale en la légitimité des lois' (ibid.).

L'auteur suggère comme solution à ce malaise la revalorisation de la *liberté d'association* (syndicats), laquelle élargit la conception individualiste du droit. Car 'un droit où les rapports entre individus sont ramenés à la seule dimension contractuelle fait d'avance place à l'extension de l'autorité étatique dans tous les champs de l'activité humaine' (151). C'est ce que montre précisément l'histoire de la légis-

lation sociale. Par ailleurs, les modifications de l'attitude des travailleurs à l'égard des syndicats indiquent, selon l'auteur, qu'il est temps de limiter l'intervention de l'Etat dans le domaine des relations de travail, car l'interventionnisme alourdit la négociation et réduit à un commun dénominateur des situations diverses où le cas échéant seul le contrôle étatique serait nécessaire. La législation devrait évoluer selon l'avis des intéressés, dans le sens des conventions par entreprise, par secteur d'industrie ou d'activité économique. Selon ce juriste, le pouvoir judiciaire fait la preuve de l'efficacité et de la souplesse de ses interventions dans les juridictions du travail lorsqu'il existe un différend. Il semble donc que, pour un juriste, les réglementations, conçues par l'Etat, ne peuvent être aussi adaptées au concret que les règlements des différends conçus par les juristes. Peut-on honnêtement blâmer un juriste de défendre la cause de sa discipline?

Le texte de J. Raes montre que la justice sociale est au centre de la crise actuelle de la société industrielle capitaliste. Les explications conjoncturelles et même structurelles indiquent qu'on a atteint une limite qui semble insurmontable: l'innovation et la croissance à la source du déséquilibre et de la destruction rarement créatrice risquent de conduire à une société duale. L'écart entre les riches et les pauvres ne s'est-il pas accru depuis l'envolée des prix pétroliers dans les années 80. Les sans-abri de New York et de Montréal ne symbolisent-ils pas cette possible évolution dramatique de la société?

D'entrée de jeu, Raes récuse les affrontements idéologiques stériles: le régime capitaliste semble captiver l'intérêt des économistes davantage par ses dysfonctions que par son fonctionnement sans mentionner ici les conflits corporatistes dont l'Etat providence devient, en temps de crise, l'arbitre cruel. Quant au socialisme, il accentue le dirigisme, la défense des droits acquis et la tension sociale. Afin de mettre fin à cet imbroglio, l'auteur examine des prévisions et des extrapolations quant à l'avenir de la société industrielle. Selon la première hypothèse, il existerait une série d'impasses liées à la dérive néo-libérale de la société industrielle vers une société duale. La société *duale* engendrerait paradoxalement *trois* groupes: les nouveaux cols blancs, les assistés et les managers que de manière générale l'on oublie. C'est le groupe des managers qui, par sa concentration antidémocratique du pouvoir, rendrait tout à fait aléatoire la solution équilibrée des affrontements conflictuels inévitables.

Selon la seconde hypothèse, une réflexion résolument axée sur la justice poserait les termes de la discussion sociétaire concernant la

mutation vers une société postindustrielle utopique. Un des problèmes concrets énoncés par cette discussion sociétaire indique de manière tout à fait pertinente le bien-fondé du travail partagé et du revenu partagé. Le projet d'une société postindustrielle ne devrait-il pas, comme le suggérait Michel Beaud (Je rapporte ici les conclusions implicites des propos de Michel Beaud [professeur d'économie politique à l'Université de Paris VIII] lors de sa conférence 'Où en est le système étatiste?', prononcée devant l'Association d'économie politique, le 26 novembre 1987.), récuser l'actuel compromis des syndicats, en France, destiné à défendre l'emploi et les acquis contre les nouvelles générations réduites au chômage et à la précarisation?

En somme, cet ouvrage bien documenté et tout à fait actuel a le mérite d'éclairer le débat à propos de l'idée vivement contestée de la justice sociale. Mentionnons, en outre, que la dimension historique n'y est pas négligée et que malheureusement la contribution du philosophe H. Declève demeure floue ou peut-être libérale par manque d'engagement. Quoi qu'il en soit à la lecture de ces textes dont en général les argumentations solides et les analyses subtiles montrent l'importance d'une idée aussi marquante que celle de la justice sociale, il semble malaisé, sinon ridicule, pour quiconque, de réitérer que la justice sociale est un mirage.

France Giroux

Haskell Fain

*Normative Politics and the
Community of Nations.*

Philadelphia: Temple University Press
1987. Pp. xii+244.

US \$32.95. ISBN 0-87722-476-5.

Fain's central thesis seems to be as follows: (1) There is a world political community bound by international law that is faced with a growing body of global tasks that it ought to tackle on an international basis. Yet the community's international law is either maladjusted or insufficiently developed to deal with these tasks. (2) The reigning contractualist view of law and the state is a theoretical obstacle: the

state absorbs all law-making and the international community is left practically lawless. We have therefore to replace the contractual basis by taking law-and-the-state as a system of control by some over others 'by the twin mechanisms of permission-granting and prohibitions' (185-6). Considerable space is given to reconstructing juridical concepts to provide a primary role for these mechanisms. (3) International law is possible without a world state; it is commonly established by treaties among nations, but also grows in nooks and crannies of the state as now operating. The state's legal power to ensure adequate foreign relations needs to be augmented; this will be aided by a shift from a contractualist to a permissions-prohibitions basis.

The general direction of understanding international law in terms of a task-orientation is indeed to be welcomed. Fain does not, however, go into the developments that important particular tasks of the contemporary world would require—for example, how to build up international law for readier settlement of national disputes, how to tackle world problems of famine by systematic international organization, how to counter pollution, and so forth. He devotes a great deal of energy to battling with the contractual idea, working out an alternative way of understanding powers, obligations, duties, rights, privileges, liberties, claims, all in terms of permissions and prohibitions as logically prior ideas. I find some of Fain's moves here perplexing, in the light of philosophical experience with such conceptual reshuffling. For one thing, alternative systems can be (and have been) constructed with different primary ideas (agreement, permission, rights, obligation, etc.). The idea of permission has no natural priority in the family of alternatives. Just as the Cambridge Platonists argued that the morality of promise-keeping was already assumed to make contracts binding, so for a legislature to give permission and impose prohibitions presupposes a right to deal with the given subject-matter. (Recall Paine's argument for religious freedom: the state has no right to grant even religious tolerance, for that is equivalent to giving God permission to hear prayers from Moslems and Jews.) To justify the assignment of priority to one conceptual structure therefore requires an exhibition of the benefits that follow from its acceptance. And such results are usually mixed. Contractualism did indeed become excessively individualistic and grasping—Maitland called contract the greediest of legal categories—but it also helped the growth of civil and intellectual liberties. What are the gains of installing permissions and prohibitions in the driver's seat?

One outcome of making permissions central seems unfortunate. It makes the critical question in the analysis of a social situation for political institutions that of control rather than that of facilitation in task performance. This has of course been the traditional stance of an 'autonomous' political science both in its emphasis on authority and power and in its narrowing law to sanctioning through force. (Compare Kelsen's insistence that only acts of officials according to rules are state actions, thus denigrating state service functions.) But not only has the idea of control and authority changed under the growth of democracy, but a strong contemporary mode of analyzing it gives a constituent place to the conditions of acceptance, not merely the intent of the ruler. The political-legal analysis would then become integrated with the sociological and sociohistorical. The shift from contemporary international law to a task-oriented international law is thus more like the shift in domestic law from a laissez-faire economy to a welfare-state. It is a shift in the tasks undertaken, not in the formal substitution of permissions-prohibitions for contract.

Many of the problems that arise will, of course, be the kind of control issues upon which Fain is focusing. Success, however, may depend less on the legal form than on the practical content: for example, it might prove less possible now to have an international covenant provide a formula for minimum wages than for smooth regulation of international trade. (Indeed, might not international insurance operate by international company cooperation without special state enactments?) Fain's argument that the state now requires greater authorization to build up international law and that its power in these respects should be increased is not specific enough. Does it refer to greater executive power under foreign policy, or greater legislative initiative in international matters, or a greater readiness by the courts to give priority to the implications of international covenants when they run counter to particular implications of domestic law? (We might start by signing some of the covenants that have won general agreement, which is a matter of policy rather than power.) The Iran-contra hearings of 1987 should give us some pause about increasing executive power.

A treatment of international law in closer relation to the international order might also differentiate the kinds of respects in which state powers should be increased and the kinds in which it should keep its hands off. Indeed it would be clarifying if the national state were itself seen in political theory as one of many social agencies which may or may not be used for specific purposes within a norma-

tive outlook. Such a view of the state is implicit in the American conception of the limited state. Where it should be strengthened, where weakened, what controls it should abandon, become then normative issues involving lessons of experience. What if an international postal system were now put under an international agency? (It might set itself up privately and get all the business!) Or an international health agency? Or international scientific cooperation?

Fain's book nevertheless remains of contemporary interest for its firm emphasis on a task-orientation. It is to be hoped that he will go on to give greater attention to the relation of formal problems to the material content of these tasks and that he will carry his sensitive treatment of detail into the specific tasks themselves.

Abraham Edel

University of Pennsylvania

Arnold Gehlen

Man: His Nature and Place in the World.

Translated by Clare McMillan and Karl Pillemer. Introduction by Karl-Siegbert Rehberg. New York: Columbia University Press 1987. Pp. 480.

US \$45.00. ISBN 0-231-05218-9.

The first edition of this book appeared in Germany just about 50 years ago. Its translation into English and the preparation of the present edition took nearly 10 years and was an agonizing experience for both the translators and the publisher. The book claims nothing more than being an exercise in elementary anthropology: yet the English edition presented here is a translation of a second 'sanitized' version of *Man* that appeared after the war when Gehlen had reworked its content and removed the ever so slight bow in the direction of national socialist ideas that can be found in the 1940 edition. Gehlen has been labelled a political opportunist having twice taken up academic chairs that became vacant after their occupants had been forced into exile or removed for political reasons. On the other hand he was lauded as one of the most fertile philosophical and anthropological minds

of the mid-20th century at least insofar as it concerned Germany. So controversial even today is Gehlen, thirteen years after his death, that Inter Nationes, the German-Government-backed financial contributor of German books translated into other languages, insisted that the English translation be preceded by an introduction written by a contemporary social scientist capable of bridging the original edition with the present version. Yet in spite of the political anxiety which surrounds Gehlen's work it was Peter L. Berger who first suggested he be translated into English and Ashley Montagu who read the German edition after reading one of my papers that referred to Gehlen (see 'Sociobiology versus Biosociology' in Ashley Montagu, *Sociobiology Examined* [Oxford University Press], Nick Petryszak co-author.) who together actively supported the publication of the book. Kurt H. Wolff of Brandeis University likewise took a great interest and lent his assistance.

What then is it that, in view of all these difficulties, seems to have made it worthwhile to introduce Gehlen's major work to a North American audience. Gehlen wrote in the tradition of the peculiar German version of 'Philosophical Anthropology' going back to the beginnings of German idealism. Through much of the 19th century attempts were made to explain the emergence of culture and the institutions in which it manifested itself in terms of an a priori system of values as in Kant or through the existence of an objective 'Geist' as in Hegel. In the 1920s it became increasingly obvious that the problem of 'Man and his Culture' was not solvable from a metaphysical position. As a result there was a turning away toward an anthropological position starting with H. Plessner and M. Scheler. 'Philosophical Anthropology' attempted to be an 'Empirical Philosophy' whose task it was to explain man and his culture in terms of man and man alone. Thus the basic problem of Philosophical Anthropology became: How is it possible for man to exist considering the fact, that he has lost most of his instincts and has none of the morphological specializations that characterises animals. What are the tasks that man has to accomplish in order to secure his own existence?

Gehlen elaborates on the assumptions underlying this formulation of the problem by quoting Nietzsche who defined man as the 'unfinished animal' which Gehlen understood to mean that first there is no unambiguous definition of what man is, and second that man seems to be a creature which maintains an unfinished (unfertige) relationship to nature. In Nietzsche man is a bridge to something else, possibly the Uebermensch. Gehlen at least seems to imply that man

is a creature in search of himself or better in search of an understanding of himself. He insists that man must be understood as a *Ganzheit* (a holistic entity). The investigation of any single trait, e.g., upright gait, opposing thumbs, even language etc., does not lead to any understanding of what is peculiarly human. Such traits are found in animals as well.

The holistic approach adopted by Gehlen is reminiscent of General Systems Theory formulated by von Bertalanffy, Boulding and Wiener a decade later. Gehlen maintains that the interaction of all human traits plus their feedback relations are responsible for the emergent product that is man. It is at this point that philosophy meets anthropology. The starting point for Gehlen therefore is the anthropological reality of man not a Hegelian *Geist* or similar metaphysical concepts, and his philosophy consists of placing this type of man into a world which does not owe him a living but wherein he must create the probability of survival through his own actions. Man, therefore, is seen as a creature with a high improbability of existence such that the chances of survival are 'forced out of him' in the form of his own actions. These actions are manifested in the culture and the cultural institutions which he creates. The existence of culture provides 'relief' (unburden) for men in the sense that it makes it possible for him to act in the face of an endless variety and complexity of experiences. It is at this point that the conservative nature of Gehlen's views becomes apparent. The necessity of culture and human institutions all too easily can be interpreted as a justification of existing institutions. But Gehlen was a much too profound a thinker to hold on to such views although as outlined above he might have tended into such directions early on.

The bulk of the book is devoted to demonstrate and investigate this view of man by drawing on a number of sciences. He elaborates on the primitive nature of human organs (primitive in relation to specialized animals); he investigates the nature of human actions and has a most extensive treatment on language, perception and the structure of human action. The latter part shows some influence of Georg Herbert Mead. The last part is concerned with human impulses (Gehlen rejects the theory of drives), human character (referred to as personality in North America), and the problem of the mind.

He summarizes his research by saying: 'The purpose of these efforts is a philosophical examination of social culture, above all of the fundamental institutions including the directing ideas which are embodied in these,' and he projects the results of his inquiries by stat-

ing: 'Enduring institutions are the products of highly complex human social behavior involving ideative acts as well as ascetic acts of self-discipline and restraint.' For the thoughtful observer the last part of the statement might be of particular interest. At a time when individual freedoms increase (at least in certain parts of the world) and when individual rights and indulgences expand under the pressure of special interest groups the problem of self-discipline and restraint is not a very popular one. What Gehlen is saying, however, is that self-discipline and restraint are necessary elements of enduring cultures. (The solution to the drug problem?) It is the investigation of this necessity which in my opinion makes the book worthwhile to read.

Karl Peter

(Department of Sociology)

Simon Fraser University

Michel Herszlikowicz

Philosophie de l'antisémitisme.

Paris: PUF 1985. Pp. 170.

ISBN 2-13-039001-3.

Les préjugés persistent. C'est là leur caractère le plus remarquable. Au fait, peut-on parler d'une philosophie de l'antisémitisme là où l'ignorance prévaut? Telle est la question que pose cet essai qui, à travers la mythologie antijuive de l'argent, du sexe, du sacré ou de la politique, analyse les petits riens, les mauvais goûts, les parties honteuses de la conscience occidentale. L'espoir d'y découvrir en filigrane, les éléments d'une ontologie de la persécution guide l'auteur (16). En fait, c'est lorsque les préjugés (qui relèvent de l'opinion) deviennent préjudiciables que la persécution sous-tend une véritable philosophie de l'antisémitisme. Car c'est précisément à ce stade que les préjugés se transforment en postjugements, aptes à fournir des soi-disant justifications à l'opinion la plus commune. Ainsi existe-t-il une doctrine articulée de l'antisémitisme, véritable science-fiction du préjudice, qui justifie la persécution (et à un moindre degré, chez les esprits bien-pensants l'infériorisation, thème récusé par l'auteur).

Sans doute peut-on toujours justifier par des arguments dits rationnels l'antisémitisme, le racisme et le sexisme. L'histoire a montré que le juif, une fois offensé par de telles pseudo-sciences ou simplement par des attitudes subtiles mais pernicieuses, regagnait en dignité ce qu'il perdait en avantages.

La présence du phénomène de l'antisémitisme est telle que 'les philosophes eux-mêmes n'ont pas su toujours résister aux captieuses questions, ni même aux promesses de lumière' (9). Il ne s'agissait pas simplement de quelques erreurs de calcul. Ecrire une philosophie de l'antisémitisme, en ce sens, semble donc être un projet tout à fait pertinent. Car si l'antisémitisme n'était 'qu'un des visages de la bêtise, de l'hybris ou de la bestialité,' comment pourrait-on expliquer l'odieux itinéraire qui conduit la nation juive de l'émancipation à Auschwitz (9 ss)?

La notion de progrès ainsi mise en échec implique de tirer au clair certaines *confusions*, indices de l'incohérence de l'argumentation philosophique à propos de la question juive. Les aphorismes de Nietzsche parfois contradictoires (pour Nietzsche la contradiction est un signe de santé) laissent se perpétuer le soupçon de son antisémitisme. De ce point de vue, je me demande pourquoi l'auteur n'a pas cité des extraits d'aphorismes où Nietzsche apparaît comme le provocateur du phénomène—par exemple, cet extrait de *La Généalogie de la Morale* (première dissertation, aphorisme 7) où Nietzsche associe les juifs à la morale des faibles, antithèse de son éthique du surhomme à laquelle se référera l'épisode nazi. (Il existe aussi des aphorismes où Nietzsche montre 'ce que l'Europe doit aux Juifs': entre autres 'un peu d'esprit et d'intellectualité' [*Par-delà Bien et Mal*, aphorismes 250 et 251]. Herszlikowicz ne cite que les passages favorables à la judéité parmi les nombreux aphorismes nietzschéens consacrés à la question juive.)

Quatre mythes fondamentaux se situent à l'origine de l'antisémitisme moderne. Le premier est celui d'un viol du sacré, le second concerne les relations entre le juif et l'argent, le troisième coïncide avec la notion de pouvoir, et le dernier porte sur le thème du désir. 'Ces composantes représentent les lémures de la haine du juif' (19).

Le christianisme a certes apporté des éléments au phénomène de l'antisémitisme de telle manière que le peuple juif ne sera que le dernier converti à la foi du Christ bien qu'il ait été le premier à reconnaître le mystère de la Rédemption (47). Mais il n'en demeure pas moins évident que le retour cyclique de l'antisémitisme est 'non seule-

ment banal, mais aussi essentiel pour le changement de la société. Une loi de l'imitation à l'envers, peut-être la première loi antijuive. Petit à petit, la tradition païenne a réussi à imposer le juif comme le miroir déformant des valeurs de toute société' (25). Citons seulement T. Mommsen (Prix Nobel 1902), philosémite de gauche et prédécesseur des historiens contemporains des débuts de l'idée raciste. A propos des juifs de Rome sous César, il écrit dans sa célèbre *'Histoire Romaine'*:

On les eût dit créés spécialement pour les besoins d'un Etat bâti sur les débris de cent citoyennetés vivantes et qu'on devait pourvoir d'une nationalité en quelque sorte abstraite et prête d'avance. Dans le monde antique également, le judaïsme a été un ferment efficace de cosmopolitisme et de décomposition nationale, et en tant que tel, un élément particulièrement qualifié de l'Etat césarien où la citoyenneté n'était essentiellement rien d'autre qu'une citoyenneté mondiale et la nation fondamentalement rien d'autre que l'humanité. (ibid., citation d'*Histoire Romaine*)

La légende antisémite s'y retrouve dans sa plus simple expression. 'Le déraciné, l'abstrait, le ferment de décomposition, l'internationalisme.' Elle reviendra sous la même forme dans le troisième mythe, 'Le mythe a besoin de ces pilotes pour construire sa grande œuvre' (ibid.).

Le deuxième mythe rejoint une thèse sociologique (non complètement fausse) qui repose sur l'idée que toute société se développe à partir des échanges.

Le juif, pour se protéger d'adversaires religieux, a dû utiliser le moyen le plus efficace: la maîtrise des échanges. Sans cesse menacés de persécutions, les juifs investirent tous leurs efforts à posséder ce qui est transmissible rapidement: l'argent et l'intelligence. Par opposition, le non-juif met en valeur ce qui n'est pas transmissible: la terre, les racines. Le moment antisémite est produit par le progrès et le besoin d'échanger. Là aussi, l'explication est séduisante puisque de deux choses l'une: ou bien nous assistons à l'enjuivement' de la société, ou bien les développements et les améliorations de l'homme le rendent incapable de détester le juif. Et, pourtant le monstre anachronique demeure. (12)

Ce n'est pas par hasard si le XIXe siècle emploie le terme de juiverie, à l'origine quartier juif ou rue des juifs, afin de désigner la

finance moderne. Cette métaphore urbaine se réfère à l'image traditionnelle du ghetto juif surpeuplé et en effervescence (par exemple, la juiverie de Francfort regroupait plus de 4000 personnes dans une rue de 3,50 m de large). Rien de comparable avec nos taudis, car la juiverie conserve l'unité de la famille et l'élévation morale qu'en général les compulsions de la misère détruisent. L'auteur affirme ici que la 'péjoration de la juiverie annonce le lien inavoué entre le juif et la société capitaliste: la crise' (55, voir toutefois 85 à propos d'une *politique* de l'antisémitisme). Il rejoint par là Adorno et Horkheimer (*La Dialectique de la Raison* [Gallimard 1974], 181ss), qui montrent de manière tout à fait pertinente qu'en Allemagne il y eut un lien étroit entre l'anticapitalisme et l'antisémitisme; le juif devint le bouc émissaire de la haine du capitalisme bien qu'il ne fût que l'un des représentants, par le truchement du commerce et de la banque, d'un système global de production.

Dès lors que l'exploitation est inexorable ou appréciée comme telle, le mythe devient dynamique et provoque les sentiments. Nietzsche reprend cette idée dans une formule sarcastique: "Les antisémites ne peuvent pas pardonner aux juifs d'avoir de l'esprit et de l'argent. Les antisémites, c'est un nom que se donnent les 'déhérités'." (70, citation de *La volonté de puissance*)

Le troisième mythe considère la nation juive en exil comme un 'Etat dans l'Etat'. Ainsi selon Fichte (*Jugement sur la Révolution française* [1793]) qui utilise l'expression, la nation juive forme un Etat et elle est redoutable en cela, car elle se considère dans une situation de conflit permanent avec l'Etat qui l'accueille.

La révolution serait une aventure voulue et soutenue par les juifs afin d'établir définitivement leur domination sur l'Europe. La Liberté est celle de l'individu ou plutôt celle de l'individualiste dont le juif est l'archétype. (83)

Quant à l'antisémitisme contemporain en France, il est un mouvement politique violent, mené tantôt par la foule, tantôt par les élites. Un auteur comme Maurras essaie pour sa part, de se démarquer de la politique des masses et du racisme: 'Il ne s'agit pas de dire "Mort aux juifs" qui ont droit à la vie comme toutes les créatures, mais: A bas les juifs parce qu'ils sont montés beaucoup trop haut chez vous' (93, citation de *Votre bel' aujourd'hui* [1953]). Quoi qu'il en soit l'an-

tisémitisme n'est ni de gauche, ni de droite. Si l'affaire Dreyfus avait été suivie d'un renversement de l'opinion au profit de la droite, Vichy sonne le glas de l'antisémitisme de droite à la Maurras.

Le quatrième mythe traite du désir comme séduction, puis comme volonté de puissance. A propos de la séduction, on attribue une origine juive à l'intellectualisation de la sexualité. N'ont-ils pas inventé la psychanalyse, le contrôle des naissances, le MLF, etc.? Il existe, par ailleurs, ce charme surnois pour le non-juif dont Nietzsche explique ainsi la cause: 'En Europe, les juifs sont la race la plus ancienne et la plus pure. Aussi la beauté des juives est-elle au-dessus de tout' (100). La puissance du juif est exprimée, aux yeux de l'antisémite, par une volonté politique. 'Le juif est à l'origine de tous les phénomènes qui mettent en danger la société' (104). La conquête de la femme non-juive appartient au domaine des signes de puissance et révolte l'antisémite, car elle symbolise précisément le pouvoir juif, dont la visée serait de modifier les rapports d'autorité dans la famille et, par ricochet, dans la société en général.

Tous les juifs ne sont pas des juifs imaginaires. Le nazisme a prôné la guerre raciale. Bien que les théories racistes se sont greffées à une mythologie préexistante dans la mentalité européenne. Le système de l'antisémitisme repose sur une négation rationnelle qui a pour fin abjecte la cessation chez le juif du désir de vivre. Dans ce système axé non sur le préjugé à l'égard d'une minorité (dont les attitudes sont différentes ou même nuisibles) mais bien sur la persécution (comme une nouvelle dimension de l'être), le nazisme, à l'un des pôles, obtient ce résultat. 'L'assimilation, autre pôle de la négation du juif, est un mélange d'indifférence et de résignation dont les conséquences sont multiples et peuvent aller du dégoût de soi à l'abandon des signes de la vie' (107). Il existe donc une ontologie de la persécution qui, avec la montée des forces politiques nazies, a fait de l'antisémitisme une des institutions les plus solides de notre siècle.

Cet essai, somme toute, réussit à montrer qu'il existe une systématisation du juif qui, à travers les images autoritaires ou vicieuses, conduit à la persécution du 'peuple dont le caractère est le plus proche de l'homme lui-même' (ibid). Si cet essai tombe dans les mains d'un antyoutre de bonne famille qui exerce son art avec la bêtise systématique de rigueur, cela ne confirmera que la pertinence de l'humour juif: le plus grand bonheur c'est de ne pas être né; malheureusement, tous ne peuvent profiter de cette chance.

N.B.: La bibliographie est intéressante. Herszlikowicz cite l'*Histoire de l'antisémitisme* de L. Poliakov. Il aurait été pertinent de citer aussi *Le Mythe aryen* (Calmann-Lévy 1971) du même auteur et de se référer à ce qui est presque devenu le débat Poliakov-Rodinson (M. Rodinson, *Peuple juif ou problème juif?* [Maspero 1981]).

France Giroux

David Michael Levin

The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern Situation.

New York and London: Routledge.

Pp. xii+560. Cdn \$75.00: US \$59.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-00412-8);

Cdn \$26.00: US \$19.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-00173-0).

This book is the second of a projected four volumes. The first, *The Body's Recollection of Being*, was published in 1985 (also by Routledge); Levin tells us that the third will be entitled *The Listening Self*. The present book treats of the phenomenology of vision, while the other two deal, respectively, with our embodiment as a whole, as expressed in gesture and movement, and with our capacity of hearing. Levin argues that we in the West suffer from a cramped and distorted vision that is the legacy of the modern era, beginning with the Renaissance. The task he sets himself is to analyze the causes of this pathology of vision, with its nihilistic consequences, and to lay out the traits and path of an 'opening' of vision for the postmodern era.

Levin sees the principal cause of the nihilistic pathology as an ego-centered ideology of mastery and domination, a narcissistic mania for finely focused, all-controlling seeing that neglects the complex background of embodied experiences and meanings without which a sustaining vision becomes impossible. This modern mode of seeing is ultra-rationalistic, theoretical-instrumental, radically individualistic, contemptuous of the body, and scornful of feelings. One of its paradigms is the Renaissance rediscovery of linear perspective, which abetted not only the scientific vision of a law-bound universe of inert

geometrical space, but also the ideal of the viewing subject's mastering the visible world according to rational principles. But this ideal has turned sour, because its consequences can now be understood, in the light of historical experience, to be such things as a debilitating, subject-centered epistemological and moral relativism; a malaise of loneliness, alienation, and depression that Levin considers to have reached epidemic proportions; a relentless march of technology that crassly manipulates people 'for the benefit of an economy which can only survive through the uncontrollable growth of production and consumption' (149) and that is well on the way to devastating the natural environment; and an unbridled will to power that was brought to climactic expression in the atrocities of the Holocaust.

What is Levin's remedy for this plight of modernity? For what sort of 'opening of vision' does he call? The task he sets for us is partly one of radical deconstruction, of ridding ourselves of historically mediated assumptions, attitudes, and outlooks that have brought us to the impasse of nihilism. But his prescription has its positive side as well; that can be suggested by briefly noting three important, closely connected concepts to which he devotes considerable attention: 'intertwining', 'letting be', and 'shadow'.

'Intertwining' comes from the writings of Merleau-Ponty. In place of the modern emphasis on autonomous subjectivity, critical detachment, and disembodied reason, it pleads for attunement to the wisdom of interconnectedness and wholeness, recovery of an 'archaic' or 'oceanic' awareness of the complex interminglings of subject and object, mind and body, reason and feeling, self and others, beings and Being. According to Levin, this wisdom and awareness are encoded in our bodies; by carefully attending to them, we can be put in touch with a primordial understanding of Being that cannot be swamped by the relativities of history.

'Letting be' is a Heideggerian term. It stands in sharp contrast to the modern preoccupation with mastery and control. It is a mode of vision that is receptive and caring rather than self-assertive, 'a response-ability to the presencing of Being which lets it come forth, lets it be present, *without* needing to master and dominate its presence' (244-5). In an especially illuminating section (Chap. 2, Part I), Levin associates this visionary 'letting be' (or 'releasement') with the spontaneous, overwhelming breakdown of egoistic defences and stubborn habits of thought that can occur with the experience of crying. Our nihilistic age's 'crying for a vision' helps to prepare the way for this new way of seeing.

The concept of the shadow reminds us of the intertwining presences and *absences* that allow us to see, of the relatively hidden or unnoticed backgrounds, contexts, fields, or horizons that make possible our focal acts of vision and consciousness. The contrast here is with the modern concentration on the explicit and exact, that which can be precisely stated in propositions and theory, and which is thought to correspond to clearly discriminable features of the world. In place of this 'assertoric' gaze, which is 'essentially exclusionary' because it 'allows only what can be seen from its own position,' Levin proposes an 'aletheic' way of seeing that is keenly alert to complexity and difference, aspiring 'to see from a multiplicity of standpoints and perspectives' (440). This way of looking is also sensitive to the fact that luminous presences endlessly point 'beyond themselves into the invisible,' i.e., into that shadowy background of tacit, felt awareness that resists clear statement or focal attention. If I may use a humble analogy from my own recreational experience, alpine skiing sometimes becomes extremely difficult when the sun is hidden by clouds and no longer casts shadows. Because all the seeing is now focal, the contrast of light and darkness that formerly showed up mounds and dips on the snow is lost. As a result, one skis 'blind' and is beset with anxiety.

By Levin's account, a similar blindness plagues us as heirs of modernity. In our demand for objectivity, total visibility, and assertoric certainty, we have lost the poetic appreciation for 'the playful gaze, gently relaxed, calm, centered by virtue of its openness to experience' in all its dimensions and its elusive, entwined complexity. We are devoid of that 'delight in being surprised, decentered, drawn into the invisible' that Levin associates with the healing powers of another, more ancient way of seeing (438).

This is not an easy book to read, but it is immensely rewarding. It is lengthy, repetitive, and circumambulatory in its approach. It does not have the concise, linear, tightly argued style that one expects to find in a philosophical treatise. It is meditative and intensely moral in tone, as well as being astonishingly wide-ranging in the sources with which it dialogues—these stretch not only from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to Rilke, Xenophanes, and Freud, but also from Buddhist teachings to Lakota Indian lore. If we are willing to bring to this book the mood of receptivity and patient reflection it requires, it can help to strip the scales from our modern eyes.

Donald A. Crosby

Colorado State University

Jean-François Lyotard

*L'enthousiasme, la critique
kantienne de l'histoire*

Paris: Editions Galilée 1986. 118pp. Collection
'La philosophie en effet'. 62FF.

ISBN 2-7186-0311-9.

'Il doit se produire dans l'espèce humaine quelque expérience qui, en tant qu'événement, indique son aptitude et son pouvoir à être cause de son progrès ... N'attendez pas que cet événement consiste en hauts gestes ou forfaits importants commis par les hommes ... Il s'agit seulement de la manière de penser des spectateurs qui se trahit publiquement dans ce jeu de grandes révolutions et qui, même au prix du danger que pourrait leur attirer une telle partialité, manifeste néanmoins un intérêt universel, qui n'est cependant pas égoïste, pour les joueurs d'un parti contre ceux de l'autre, démontrant ainsi (à cause de l'universalité) un caractère du genre humain dans sa totalité et en même temps (à cause du désintéressement), un caractère moral de cette humanité.' Ces lignes du *Conflit des facultés* de Kant présentent l'objet des propos de Jean-François Lyotard. On pourrait feindre la surprise en voyant Lyotard prendre Kant comme compagnon de route. Les replis critiques des métalangages l'intéressent moins que les discours directs et 'arborescents,' comme dit Christian Descamps. Toutefois, s'il est vrai que la critique kantienne est un métalangage lorsqu'il s'agit d'examiner et de délimiter les oeuvres de l'entendement savant, cette même faculté critique se recueille, revient à soi, par delà la discrimination de la région du savoir, dans un discours où s'abolit la différence entre le réflexif et le direct, où la raison fait valoir sa propre finalité. Il n'y a plus de repli sur une instance plus radicale. L'Auteur interroge ce Kant-là, celui qui cherche à s'orienter dans le domaine de l'universel sans concept.

Et là, le philosophe ne tente pas de subsumer des événements sous des conditions de possibilité constitutives et nécessaires. Il cherche plutôt un rapport entre la téléologie de la raison et certaines réalités du monde, certains trains d'événements marquants. En elles-mêmes, les demandes de la raison sont purement régulatrices et ne comportent aucune détermination qui les ferait apparaître comme objet. Il y a cependant des sentiments directement constatables qui sont des dérivés phénoménaux de leur régulation. Ainsi Kant reconnaît-il le respect, ou la vénération, comme sentiment moral en le reconduisant à son principe dans l'impératif pratique universel. D'autres senti-

ments, comme celui du beau et celui du sublime, sont éveillés par les traces du monde intelligible, soit dans les œuvres d'art, soit dans les grandeurs de la nature. Lyotard attire l'attention sur une autre île, moins remarquée, de cet archipel, à savoir celle de l'enthousiasme que suscitent les hypotyposes, les conjonctures historiques grouillantes et animées qui sont prénantes d'un sens où la raison se reconnaît. Ces hypotyposes sont la partie mondaine d'un rapport analogique entre phénoménalité et principe intelligible. Mais l'évidence du rapport tient à une expérience subjective et cependant universalisable.

Le professeur Kant, donc, a la conviction d'être le spectateur, *Zuschauer*, d'une hypotypose dans la révolution française. Et le sentiment d'enthousiasme est le signe, dans le spectateur, que le genre humain a l'aptitude et le pouvoir d'être la cause de son propre progrès. Ce sentiment n'est pas la *Schwärmerei*, ce délire de l'illusoire percée directe dans le monde intelligible. C'est une exultation qui trahit la présence de la liberté dans l'événement. Sentiment de valeur universelle, analogue en cela au sentiment esthétique. Sentiment désintéressé, analogue en cela au sentiment moral.

Le tribunal de la critique ne siège pas du haut d'un savoir d'où il pourrait déduire le beau, le sublime, le droit, la loi morale. Il siège plutôt du bas de sa tâche, dans la lumière noire du devoir-être. Sa juridiction tient à l'idée de ce qu'il doit accomplir. La connaissance théorique elle-même est seulement une des provinces de sa juridiction. Et l'histoire n'appartient pas à cette province, car nous n'avons pas d'appareil conceptuel qui fonderait des jugements constitutifs portant sur les événements historiques. Ces mêmes trains d'événements peuvent cependant faire l'objet de jugements réflexifs où la faculté du juger établit des rapports entre ce qui se produit singulièrement et ce que la raison se propose comme tâche universelle infinie.

Lyotard: 'Donnée sinon de l'expérience, au moins dans l'expérience, livrée, la *Begebenheit* doit être l'indice ... de l'Idée de causalité libre. Avec elle on doit s'approcher au plus près de l'abîme à franchir entre le mécanisme et la liberté ou la finalité, entre le domaine du monde sensible et le champ du supra-sensible, et l'on doit pouvoir le franchir d'un pas sans le supprimer, en fixant le statut, inconsistant, indéterminé peut-être, mais dicible, et même probant, de l'historico-politique' (56-7).

Marc Renault

Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières

Nicholas Rescher

Ethical Idealism: An Inquiry into the Nature and Function of Ideals

Berkeley, and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1987. Pp. xii+148.

US \$30.00. ISBN 0-520-05696-5.

Ethical idealism, Rescher feels, is closely related to metaphysical idealism, which he has defended elsewhere. Metaphysical idealism 'stresses the importance of value in the world's scheme of things,' ethical, 'in the sphere of human action' (xi). More specifically, the thesis here is 'that ideals are important notwithstanding their impracticality, because of their capacity to guide thought and action' (1). The thesis is developed and defended through six chapters: on the rationality of pursuing unattainable goals; on the moral dilemmas arising from the fact that 'ought' does not necessarily imply 'can'; on the non-identity of rational optimization and quantitative maximization; on the practical advantages of optimism over pessimism; on the need for co-ordination among conflicting ideas including the elimination of 'foolish, hopeless, and crazy' (16) ones; and, finally, on the grandeur that pursuit of ideals confers on human existence.

The case is interestingly and generally well argued. A half-page summary with enumerated theses precedes each chapter; there are nine 'displays' laying out diagrammatically such things as a choice situation or the contrasts between an objective and an ideal; and there are four pages of indices of names and of subjects. Homely examples and familiar maxims and expressions usually make for satisfactory logic as well as effective rhetoric. The not-wholly-persuaded reader may feel simple assertion or repetition sometimes does duty for argument or exemplary evidence. Occasionally Rescher will use a sort of *ad hominem* against the polemical motivation of a possible critic (e.g., 13) when one might feel the charge could be reversed with equal plausibility. Generally, however, he deals very respectfully with fellow moralists, particularly some historical ones (perhaps especially Kant) who do not always get the benefit of such careful and generous readings. Rescher's greatest virtue, it seems to me, is his manifest commitment to, and enthusiasm for, his project. Personally I was increasingly drawn to his authority, because I think Aristotle right about good's being what the good man says it is.

One might, however, share much of Rescher's moral outlook and still have misgivings about the vocabulary with which he chooses to

support it. Far from trying to smooth over junctures where ethical discourse may seem self-contradictory, he takes dialectical pleasure in developing and dramatizing verbal paradoxes: it is not irrational to pursue impossible ideals; 'ought' implies 'can' only under ethically ideal circumstances; obligations continue, for example, even when performance has become impossible; under such circumstances, persisting obligations yet carry no blame attaching to non-fulfillment; moral rules, though presumably intended to guide practical choice, always reach the limit of their utility before the choice is made; though the ideal of an optimizing choice makes sense, there is no normative *summum bonum* by which to decide among incommensurable life-values; and the rational discipline of the good life has generally to concede that the human lot is tragic.

Those, on the contrary, who are persuaded that it can never be 'rational' to operate on other than the most accurate and realistic estimate of the prospects of success, will seek less paradoxical ways of maintaining the necessity of maximal effort to optimal results. They will certainly emphasize more the disillusionments, distortions, and eventual cynicism that can come from a persisting disparity between professions and actual performance: the maxim 'From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs' states an ideal of distributive justice, both on its supply and demand sides, but to what degree should public policy insist on its realization? Such critics would probably feel more comfortable with a vocabulary in which obligations, possibilities of performance, and praise or blame vary more concurrently. In the matter of rules it could be argued that they come, without any obvious points of rupture, in all degrees of generality from the most concrete and particular to the most abstract and universal: I should be interested in knowing under what circumstances Rescher feels there might be legitimate exceptions to such purportedly universal rules as Kant's Categorical Imperative, Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency, Aquinas's *bonum faciendum*, *malum vitandum*, or to Christian love. Nor am I sure that one convinced, like Rescher, of the practical utility and disciplinary unity of ethics can dispense with some conception of a *summum bonum* or that qualitative differences among values can dispense us from the need for quantitative comparisons. Much here invites argument.

When all the qualifications have been made, however, the differences between Rescher and the critics I have hypothesized in my support are often those of verbal strategy. Both sides of the debate probably concur with Antonio Gramsci's maxim, 'pessimism of the

intellect, optimism of the will.' Nor am I wholly sure whose strategy is the better in spite of a greater personal confidence in literal-minded consistency than in dialectical drama. It would be a poor contribution to ethics if the literal-mindedness produced pedestrian platitude instead of the lively and even inspirational voice that Rescher has here contributed.

It is wholly out of character with Rescher's customary erudition that he should in one combined reference make Martianus Capella (fl. Ca. 400-410) 'a late scholastic' and place the death of Albert the Great (d. 1280) in '1390' (114).

Harold J. Johnson

University of Western Ontario

Dennis J. Schmidt

The Ubiquity of the Finite: Hegel, Heidegger, and the Entitlements of Philosophy.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1988.

Pp. xix+241. US \$22.50. ISBN 0-262-19270-5.

Despite the seeming importance of developing an exchange between Heidegger and Hegel, scholars have tended to retreat from this task if only out of recognition of its complexity. With *The Ubiquity of the Finite*, Schmidt proves to be the exception, and both the merits and shortcomings of his work can be traced to the fact that he is a 'pioneer' in this area.

Seeking to show that both Heidegger and Hegel grapple with the issue of finitude, Schmidt initiates a critical dialogue between them. While creating a forum in which to articulate Heidegger's critique of Hegel, Schmidt nevertheless comes to Hegel's defense and tries to show that there are subtleties in his thought which Heidegger neglects.

Ironically, Heidegger, who sides with Kant's attempt to base metaphysics on human finitude, has always seen Hegel as affirming the infinite. Yet, it is part of Schmidt's thesis, in upholding the 'ubiquity of the finite,' to claim that Hegel has just as pronounced concern for finitude as Heidegger. A suspicion arises, however, whether finitude construed in this way is altogether too 'ubiquitous'. Where

for Heidegger finitude takes the form of the elusive concealment of the ontological difference, for Hegel finitude depends upon the self-mediating character of Spirit (143-8). Although Heideggerians may doubt the plausibility of that comparison, it provides an inroad to the labyrinth of a Hegel-Heidegger dialogue. As Schmidt observes: there is an implicit recognition that Heidegger 'only rarely reads Hegel with the same charity and sympathy he reserves for Heraclitus, Aristotle, Eckhart, Kant, or Nietzsche' (214).

To rectify this omission, Schmidt develops parallels between Heidegger and Hegel on specific issues, presenting Heidegger's position first, then outlining an ensuing critique of Hegel, only to develop Hegel's stance and then finally a Hegelian response to Heidegger's criticisms. This point/counterpoint format or 'analytical' approach certainly promotes clarity, but at the same time it inhibits the radicality of Heidegger's critique of Hegel and of the metaphysical tradition.

Schmidt begins by considering the mutual interest both Heidegger and Hegel have in the phenomenon of time, and argues that even while Heidegger charges Hegel with adopting a derivative view of time based on the priority of the 'present', Hegel's vision of Spirit's self-recollection still suggests a deeper understanding of temporality. In a similar vein, Schmidt takes up the central issue of the relation between being and nothing, which forms the cornerstone of Hegel's *Logic*. Once again, Schmidt maintains that Hegel has a better grasp of the reciprocity between being and nothing than Heidegger admits.

The juxtaposition of these two thinkers on these important issues gives way to a profounder concern for the strategies Heidegger and Hegel take in implementing their respective ontologies. Whether one proceeds via the reciprocal implication between being and Dasein (e.g., Heidegger), or considers the necessity of recovering the beginning as the precondition for the dialectical progression of the Absolute (e.g., Hegel), finitude remains the overriding concern for either methodology. Schmidt's discussion of philosophical method (Chapter Three) turns out to be one of the most provocative parts of his book.

When Schmidt in the later chapters tackles Heidegger's critique of Hegel, the limits of his analytic scheme become apparent. Much of the difficulty can be traced to his earlier discounting Heidegger's assessment (in *Sein und Zeit*) of Hegel's analysis of time. Heidegger's emphasis on ecstatic temporality as revealed in being-toward-death cannot be underestimated in his attempt to undo the constraints of a metaphysical 'omnipresence' (155) which flees from transitoriness.

The decline of metaphysics as concealing the original projection of being upon time is part of this fugitive movement.

Even if we grant that Hegel has a more sophisticated view of time, this does not annul the infinite dimension in his view of Spirit as subsisting beyond the span of personal existence. The Hegelian Absolute, even when seen in the finite mode of 'desire' (57, 113), is obviously a far cry from the vulnerable posture of the radically temporal self which for Heidegger defines human finitude. In this case, Schmidt's abrupt dismissal of Heidegger's existential bent further calls into question Schmidt's judgment in weighing certain of Heidegger's texts, especially his 1930-31 lectures on the *Phenomenology*, where he addresses Hegel's 'new concept of being' as 'life.'

The drawback of Schmidt's tendency to soften Heidegger's critique of metaphysics becomes most prominent when he tries to defend Hegel against the interrelated dangers of subjectivism and representational thinking, which are addenda to the dominating force of technology (156). As Schmidt correctly argues, Hegel opposes any Cartesian view of an isolated subject, and his thinking cannot be considered to be 'subjectivistic' in that sense (178-80). Similarly, the very thrust of Hegel's dialectic is to overturn the fixity and onesideness of abstract thinking, which clings to visual descriptions of reality. Heidegger, however, claims to have extended the more obvious sense of these terms in line with his critique of metaphysics. Specifically, when Heidegger says that modern metaphysics upholds a vision of subjectivity, he means that the tradition sees man as emerging within the center of beings in order to impose his own self-serving perspective upon them, to restrict the 'openness' within which beings presence. Similarly, when Heidegger chastises the moderns for representational thinking, he is not renouncing a deficient form of cognition, but instead is opposing the deification of any knowledge which inserts itself between the self-manifestation of beings and the self-gathering of language. Whether attacking the idea of subjectivism or representational thought, Heidegger's point is clear: he opts for the self-effacement of the individual, of an attunement to being which allows for many different ways of manifestation. For him, *Gelassenheit* constitutes the true measure of finitude.

Schmidt cannot be totally faulted for falling prey to the ambiguity in the use of these terms, due to Heidegger's initial vagueness about them. Heidegger's allusion to 'letting be' generates all sorts of mystical images, which cloud his message that the elevation of beings over being gives rise to the manipulation of entities. Does Hegel's think-

ing, also, lead to technology which places beings in 'standing reserve' in terms of their use and consumption? At the very least, Hegel's thinking bears the blunt of a 'totalizing' impulse which grants priority to presence, and hence marks the ontological presupposition for establishing order within the realm of beings. In this respect, the issue is not whether Hegel's philosophy is subjectivistic and oblivious to the threat of representational thought, but whether it remains bound to the metaphysics of presence. Similarly at stake is not whether Hegel advocates technology, but whether he has opened himself to its imminent *danger*.

These criticisms, while not rendering Schmidt's work less important, pertain to the future of any attempt to clarify the dialogue between Heidegger and Hegel. The difficulty of the task which Schmidt undertakes should not be underestimated, nor should his tenacity in approaching the issues be denied. Indeed, contemporary continental philosophy, with its preference for the obscure, might well benefit from the kind of straightforward inquiry which Schmidt exemplifies. In this respect, *The Ubiquity of the Finite* proves to be a courageous book which provides new impetus for serious scholarship in continental thought.

Frank Schalow

Loyola University, New Orleans

L.W. Sumner

The Moral Foundation of Rights.

Don Mills, ON and New York:

Oxford University Press 1987. Pp. x+224.

Cdn \$61.95; US \$45.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-19-824751-6):

Cdn \$27.95; US \$19.95

(paper: ISBN 0-19-824874-1).

This clear and concise book offers the best general account of moral rights along consequentialist lines. Sumner argues not merely that consequentialism is compatible with respect for rights but that it posi-

tively supports it and in fact does so better than some influential non-consequentialist theories.

The book weaves together normative argument and conceptual analysis. Sumner views rights as clusters of Hohfeldian 'advantages' (claims, liberties, powers, immunities) which function to secure autonomy by protecting choices. He seeks a moral theory which can ground such rights while giving a plausible criterion for distinguishing sound rights-claims from bogus ones. The four main chapters treat conventional, natural, contractarian, and consequentialist rights. They are bracketed by introductory and analytical material and by some concluding, mostly programmatic, suggestions about developing a consequentialist theory of rights.

Moral rights, says Sumner, cannot simply *be* conventional rights, for the obvious reason that the rights we have under some set of conventional rules may not be morally justified. Thus, the conditions determining the existence of a conventional (e.g., legal) right cannot be sufficient to determine the existence of a moral right. Nor can they be natural rights, if that means rights which are basic, objective, and grounded in some natural property not too closely dependent on social convention. Like Bentham, Sumner cannot conceive of a rule system that is both natural and normative. The contractarians he chases with a fork. Either the hypothetical choice situation is not morally constrained or it is. If not, then it is obscure why we should attribute moral force to the principles chosen in it. If it is, then the theory needs an independent account of the source and content of those moral constraints. (He rejects Gauthier's theory on the ground that it cannot show that everyone in the original position would have reason accept the constraints.)

That leaves consequentialism, of which Sumner has a very broad definition. It must aim at some global, agent-neutral goal, but beyond that anything goes. It may be ideal-regarding; it may have distributive elements; it may not even require maximizing. Nonetheless, even after making such allowances, one may still find that direct pursuit of the goal is not the most effective strategy. At this point, Sumner defends the familiar indirect argument for rights. Owing to limited information, motivation, time, etc., constraining one's pursuit of the goal by a commitment to other principles may in fact better promote its overall, long-run attainment. The long way round is the quickest way home. That is the moral foundation of rights: they constrain the pursuit of plausible goals in the interest of better attainment of those very goals. The idea is well-known. What is origi-

nal is the detail in which it is pursued, the links made to the function of rights, and the use of a real case to defend it. Sumner discusses the practice of an ethics review committee which assesses proposals for research projects involving human subjects. By a careful examination of its aims, social context, and limitations, he argues that his committee properly recognizes a defeasible right of subjects not to be experimented on without their informed consent.

This argument will repay close attention. The following strike me as points at which debate may be profitable. First, despite his criticism of what he calls 'conventionalism,' Sumner's own theory is in fact a member of the species: he holds that moral rights are *justified* conventional rights. On this view, the function of rights in moral argument is determined not by the form but by the object of justification. It follows directly, then, that there can be no rights-based moral theory. On this account it is not only false, but senseless, to say that the reason for creating a conventional right to free expression is that there is a moral right to it. According to Sumner, rights are not themselves reasons for acting but only statements that there are such reasons. Hence, those who believe that any rights are basic are not just morally mistaken, they are conceptually confused.

There is a second controversial implication: there can be no moral rights which do not warrant conventional recognition, if not in law at least in social custom. But whether some moral principle ought to be enforced by law or custom turns partly on the consequences of legalization or conventionalization. Valid promises generate rights to performance. Not all promises should be legally enforced, however, because the legal system is cumbersome, expensive and invasive. Should they all be conventionally enforced? Again, perhaps not, because even a social practice of enforcement may have unwelcome side-effects. Surely they should at least be conventionally recognized? Indeed, but any sound moral principle should be practised and enter into the life of the community: even supererogatory acts should be conventionally recognized and promoted. But that does not give one a moral right to those acts, even when their performance indirectly helps secure one's autonomy. What then distinguishes rights from other morally justified, autonomy-promoting practices?

Third, Sumner's attack on the three competing theories is actually more powerful than he admits. If sound, his arguments show, not merely that *rights* cannot be explained by those theories, but that no other moral principles (e.g., duties, virtues, ideals) can either. And that leads him to regard his own burden as discharged by showing

that consequentialists can recognize rights as having some kind of moral force. But what kind? From his scattered remarks, (90, 105, 146, 176, 196) I take it to be that the existence of a conventional right indicates that there is a moral reason for acting, which reason constrains goals at least by requiring that marginal and speculative gains be foregone in favour of respecting the right. In my view that is too weak. Claim-rights impose duties on others, and duties purport to be peremptory and exclusionary reasons to act. They are not merely *prima facie* reasons for performance but reasons which exclude from consideration certain otherwise valid reasons for non-performance. It is not clear that marginal and speculative gains are valid reasons for taking the risk of violating rights, and not clear whether indirect consequentialism can exclude pursuit of more substantial gains.

Finally, on Sumner's theory moral rights must vary with empirical features of the environment in which moral reasoning takes place. I believe this to be correct, though it will make Kantians blanch. But on the consequentialist-conventionalist view, this sensitivity to fact is quite fine-grained. What rights we have depends on the cognitive skills and motivation of the particular parties involved and on the circumstances in which their conventions are formed. Thus, while individuals have a right to informed consent before Sumner's ethics review committee, a different committee with more information and leisure should give this right less force. Some possible committees may be justified in giving it none at all. But the function of rights in moral discourse assumes them to have greater stability than this. Perhaps, like the belief that rights are themselves reasons for acting, this is merely a popular error. Perhaps well-motivated, well-informed people really are less tightly bound by rights than the rest of us. (To accept that, however, is simply to bite Gauthier's bullet: not everyone is equally constrained by morality.) But this kind of dependence may still make us a bit nervous. Sumner assures us that important rights will remain universal: 'In this ... category we should expect to find those rights to non-interference, and perhaps also to positive aid, which are commonly presumed to hold against everyone in general. In the absence of this universality it is difficult to see how rights could properly safeguard the several ingredients of well-being which are included in our basic goal' (203). More argument is needed here. The reason for an absence of universality is that there are local pockets of information, expertise, and motivation which make the direct promotion of basic goals a better strategy, or which make the content and force of indirect strategies variable. So even

if there is, e.g., a universal right to free expression, its scope, weight, and content still seems likely to vary among different groups of consequentialists.

This is a valuable book. It defends the choice theory against the currently dominant interest theory of rights. It shows the conceptual resources of a broad form of consequentialism. It is modest in tone but not in ambition or results. Philosophers, political theorists, and jurists should all find it useful. Those who are not consequentialists will also find it challenging.

Leslie Green
York University

Michael Tooley

Causation: A Realist Approach

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford
University Press 1987. Pp. xiv+360.

Cdn \$97.50: US \$65.00 ISBN 0-19-824962-4.

Tooley's objective is to provide a realist account of laws and of causation which presupposes realism with respect to universals and other theoretical entities. Laws are identified with contingent relations among universals and causes are envisioned as irreducible theoretical relations, which are thought to underlie and explain probabilistic ones. He therefore assumes that there are universals; that they may stand in contingent, irreducible relations; and that realism with respect to theoretical entities is a defensible position. The adequacy of this approach thus depends upon the extent to which it affords solutions for these problems while avoiding the difficulties of other accounts.

Tooley maintains that stronger ontological commitments are required than traditional empiricist accounts accommodate, yet asserts that 'other things being equal, the fewer ontic commitments the better.' A relationship is 'irreducible' when it cannot be analysed in terms of properties of or relations between particulars. A theory for which laws are merely extensional, i.e., truth-functional, generalizations (as constant conjunctions or as relative frequencies) between particular

instances of properties or events, therefore, would not be irreducible in his sense. He attempts to satisfy traditional empiricist epistemology without also embracing traditional empiricist ontology.

That he rejects traditional empiricist ontology—especially as it has been associated with Hume—should come as no surprise. Hume, after all, wanted to dissociate himself from any ideas that could not be traced back to impressions in experience that gave rise to them, a requirement that neither Tooleian universals nor irreducible theoretical relations are capable of satisfying. Indeed, his fundamental thesis about the nature of laws is ‘that an acceptable, non-circular, extensional account of the truth conditions of nomological statements [is possible] if and only if contingent, irreducible, theoretical relations among universals are taken as the truth-makers for such statements.’

Tooley differentiates his own position from that of D.M. Armstrong in three basic respects. Armstrong insists, but he denies, (1) that laws must always be instantiated; (2) that non-probabilistic laws always relate universals by pairs; and, (3) that basic laws may be oaken, rather than iron, where ‘iron’ laws are laws of strict necessitation that permit of no exceptions. Their differences here are supposed to be consequences of Armstrong’s commitment to a broadly Aristotelian conception of universals and Tooley’s commitment to a broadly Platonic conception instead. Tooley contends that his position is only ‘slightly more liberal’ than Armstrong’s; but these are crucial issues.

Generally speaking, the basic approach Tooley employs is to attempt to identify lawlike sentences on the basis of a relation of nomic necessitation, NN, where this relation obtains between universals, for example, P and Q :

$$(NN) P \rightarrow Q;$$

where $\dots \rightarrow ______$ represents Tooley’s primitive relation (though it should be observed that Tooley does not employ this formulation). Assertions of nomic necessitation in turn entail corresponding extensional generalizations:

$$(EG) (x) (Px \rightarrow Qx);$$

for example, where ‘ $\dots \rightarrow ______$ ’ represents the material conditional. Thus, nomic necessities entail but are not entailed by extensional generalizations.

During his discussion of probabilistic laws, Tooley maintains that reductionistic analyses cannot provide adequate truth-makers for these laws and that his realist account of non-probabilistic laws can be extended in a natural way to encompass their probabilistic counterparts. He contends that the approach that worked so well for nomic necessitation can work equally well for nomic probabilification by envisioning probabilification as a contingent, irreducible theoretical relation between universals such that when it holds between universals P and Q , then its being the case that x has property P makes it probable, to degree k , that x has property Q . Tooley thus invokes the relation of logical probability here in lieu of that of logical entailment.

There are ample grounds, however, for doubting the intuitive idea that motivates his analysis of causation. In contending that causal relations 'determine the direction of the logical transmission of probabilities' and thereby the 'likelihoods' of different types of events as their effects, he confuses object-language and meta-language distinctions. Logical relations, after all, only obtain between linguistic or quasi-linguistic entities, such as sentences, statements or propositions, whereas causal relations obtain between physical entities, such as events, properties and states-of-affairs. The ultimate inadequacy of the account he provides thus appears to be a category mistake.

There are two familiar conceptions of logical probabilities. For Carnap, logical probabilities are *epistemic* (reflecting degrees of credibility), while for Reichenbach, they are *ontic* (reflecting truth-frequencies among propositions). Both are metalinguistic explications, neither of which provides the foundation for a realist conception. Tooley thus appeals to this notion without explaining its specific meaning. Those who are inclined to believe that the nature of nomic relations and of causal connections are illuminated by characterizing them as 'contingent, irreducible theoretical relations' should find what they are looking for here, but others will have to look elsewhere.

The arguments that are advanced are all too often text-book examples of special pleading fallacies and most of his claims for originality should not be taken seriously. He cites papers by Ducasse and by Anscombe as representatives of 'the singularist view' of laws and causation, for example, as though there were no other, completely ignoring the single-case propensity conception, which he ought to have been discussing. He asserts on his own behalf that 'realist approaches to causation have hardly been considered, let alone seriously ex-

plored', as though philosophers since Aristotle had never written. This work has other shortcomings, but here these must suffice. Some better discussions of these topics may be found in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

James H. Fetzer

University of Minnesota, Duluth

Julian Young

Willing and Unwilling: A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer.

Norwell, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
1987. 169 pp. US \$39.50. ISBN 90-247-3556-4.

To those accustomed to the received view on Schopenhauer, Julian Young's new book will provide some surprises. Schopenhauer, according to Young, abandons far fewer of Kant's views than is generally believed. Most strikingly, Schopenhauer does not claim that the Will is the thing-in-itself. And although himself a perfectionist who sees salvation from this life's sufferings only in a mystical other world, Schopenhauer offers hints at immanent strategies for escape that can be developed into a this-worldly solution to pessimism.

Young analyzes the arguments of *The World As Will and Representation* with elegance and wit. Following the structure of Schopenhauer's work, he responds to probable reader reactions and quandaries in the sequence in which they are likely to arise. Schopenhauer's opening, 'The world is my representation,' may sound dubious to us, but, Young assures us, Schopenhauer's contemporaries would not have been distressed. They were all idealists, for they were all Kantians.

And so, Young tells us, was Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's philosophical views grew out of certain basic philosophical commitments, and the most important of these was a commitment to Kantianism. In this, Young follows both Schopenhauer's explicit self-characterization and the implicit acknowledgement suggested by his tone toward Kant even in his critical appendix on Kantian philosophy.

Young employs Schopenhauer's Kantianism as an organizational principle, locating Schopenhauer's philosophical claims throughout *The World As Will and Representation* on a decidedly Kantian map. The result is a clear, elegant presentation that places Schopenhauer's somewhat eccentric philosophy well within the mainstream of the Western philosophical tradition.

Most excitingly, Young interprets many of Schopenhauer's apparently idiosyncratic claims as consequences of Kantian commitments. Thus, a number of Schopenhauer's views (e.g., his insistence on the groundlessness of the elemental forces of natural science) and even a few near-inconsistencies (e.g., his tendency to suggest and then reject the idea that the will is the thing-in-itself) depend on a Kantian commitment to what Jonathan Bennett has termed 'concept-empiricism.' Concept-empiricism holds that cognitively meaningful thought or discourse necessarily depends on sense-experience.

This commitment to concept-empiricism motivates Young's Schopenhauer to maintain the Kantian line on the unknowability of the noumenal. Young's reading here departs from that of most Schopenhauer scholars, who interpret Schopenhauer's Will as the thing-in-itself and who thus conclude that Schopenhauer believes in experiential access to the noumenal. On Young's reading, by contrast, the Will is an inner aspect of the phenomenal world that remains on this side of the noumenal/phenomenal boundary. Our experiential knowledge of our own wills does not, therefore, penetrate into the noumenal, but only into a deeper level of the phenomenal.

On this interpretation, Schopenhauer is able to consistently maintain Kantian concept-empiricism while avoiding the Kantian conclusion that metaphysical knowledge is impossible. We *can* have metaphysical knowledge—knowledge of the Will—but we can never know the in-itself that lies behind both will and representation. Young's defense of this view is well-argued, and it presents Schopenhauer's philosophical views as internally more consistent than some of Schopenhauer's own statements about the Will seem to suggest. Young's conclusion that the Will is not the thing-in-itself for Schopenhauer will no doubt attract scholarly attention if not agreement.

The World As Will and Representation begins with a thorough consideration of the natural 'world as representation' before any discussion of will. Accordingly, Young contends that Schopenhauer's reasoning throughout the work arises from a naturalistic standpoint. Thus, philosophy is seen to pick up where science leaves off. The universal Will (over and above individual wills) is postulated to ac-

count for the observed harmony in nature. Indeed, even Young's suggestion that his 'this-worldly' solution to pessimism is in the spirit of Schopenhauer implies that naturalism is far more basic to Schopenhauer than is the mysticism for which he is better known.

Young's novel treatment of Schopenhauer's Platonic Ideas is also linked to the naturalistic orientation of Young's Schopenhauer. The Ideas, Young argues, do not occupy a supernatural or supersensible status. The Ideas are only ordinary objects, but ordinary objects perceived in a special way, 'with one's attention focussed on the essential and away from its inessential aspects (92).'

One of the great merits of Young's book is its case for reading the range of Schopenhauer's positions as based on some basic philosophical commitments. Some skepticism might arise, however, regarding the precise articulation of these commitments that Young provides. Because Young focuses predominantly on Schopenhauer's Kantian commitments, Schopenhauer's less Kantian concerns are de-emphasized in his account.

Most conspicuously de-emphasized are those features of Schopenhauer's thought that link him to Plato, another of his acknowledged philosophical ancestors. Despite Young's extensive discussion of Schopenhauer's metaphysical map, the status of the Platonic Ideas is underplayed. And, as already noted, Young sees them as distinguished from ordinary objects only by virtue of the perceiver's focus in observation. The transcendental character of Plato's Ideas is terrestrialized in Young's account.

Another, related de-emphasis is the mystical, Eastern-influenced side of Schopenhauer's thought. Schopenhauer's belief in a 'sphere of illuminism' that 'provides experiential access to ultimate reality' (34) is acknowledged in Young's book, but treated as 'that which lies beyond the province of philosophy.' And in effect, Young's own formulation of an immanent solution to pessimism (a life consisting of a present-oriented outlook, non-ascetic Stoicism, passive aesthetic/intellectual insight, and universal sympathy) replaces Schopenhauer's mysticism.

The relatively minor treatment Young gives to Schopenhauer's mysticism is in accord with the reading of Wittgenstein, who Young considers 'of all of Schopenhauer's readers ... the best at "hitting the nail on the head"' (153). But the judgment that the Kantian and Wittgensteinian themes in *The World As Will and Representation* are ultimately more important to Schopenhauer than the Platonic and Eastern ones is debatable. Presumably this judgment is another of

the reasons why Young's book should provoke interest and controversy.

Young's book is sympathetic toward Schopenhauer, and even enthusiastic in its suggestions for ways in which Schopenhauer's suggestions might profitably alleviate spiritual malaise in our era. Yet sympathy does not preclude sensitive and often trenchant criticism of Schopenhauer's argumentative inconsistencies. Besides offering an interpretation that clashes with previous scholarly opinion, Young provides a close reading that will help the novice to extricate many of the complex strands that run through Schopenhauer's thought. As a consequence, both scholars and first-time readers of Schopenhauer will find Young's book to be of value and interest.

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The University of Texas at Austin

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
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