

Canadian Philosophical Reviews Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

Editors - Directeurs

Robert Burch
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

J. N. Kaufmann
Département de Philosophie
Université du Québec
à Trois-Rivières, C.P. 500
Trois-Rivières, Québec
Canada G9A 5H7

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Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing & Publishing
P.O. Box 4834, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 5G7

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X
© 1989 Academic Printing & Publishing

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Werner Callebaut and Rik Pinxten, eds.

Evolutionary Epistemology:

A Multiparadigm Program

Norwell, MA: D. Reidel 1987. Pp. xii+458.

US\$68.00. ISBN 90-277-2582-9.

This book is a collection of loosely related papers resulting from a conference on Evolutionary Epistemology at the University of Ghent in November 1984. It contains selections from a variety of fields by authors of various nationalities. The selections generally assume a good background in the particular disciplines considered, as well as in the loose field or collection of fields called 'evolutionary epistemology.' The editors provide an extensive introduction, but it is certainly not for the neophyte. A large number of sources are cited, with very little connecting exposition. This book will be of interest primarily to specialists in evolutionary epistemology or the particular fields considered.

Perhaps the most useful element of the book is an extensive bibliography assembled by Donald Campbell, Cecilia Hayes and Werner Callebaut. It is divided into two parts, one specifically on evolutionary epistemology, and the other on related areas in philosophy, biology, psychology, and other fields. Despite its size, the bibliography has gaps. This was recognized by the editors, who apologized in advance due to the rapid growth of the field. I could not find some references made by authors of selections in the book. Nonetheless, the bibliography will be helpful to many researchers.

Although the theme of the legitimacy of evolutionary epistemology surfaces in several articles, in general the authors are among the converted. There is very little of the stuffy narrow focus on the relevance of evolutionary epistemology to traditional epistemology that makes up most of the debate in North American philosophical circles. Instead, the articles pursue a wide range of conceptual and empirical research projects generated by evolutionary analogies and biological considerations. Unfortunately, the immaturity of the field is very apparent; many seemingly clashing assumptions, interests, and methodologies are in evidence. This is probably healthy, but it is frustrating to anyone who likes their analyses cut and dried.

The introductory section of the book makes some attempt to define evolutionary epistemology, but succeeds largely in demonstrating that a definition is premature. One thing that does become clear is that there are two distinct projects. The first is an application of

general evolutionary principles to epistemology, and the second is the investigation of the biological (and hence evolutionary) basis of knowledge. The relationship between the two is very muddy, though it is one worth investigating. The two should not be confused, however, and it is laudable that most of the authors do not make this mistake.

Two papers of special note are by René Thom and Ilya Prigogine, if only because of the authors' fame. The Thom paper proposes a definition of evolution that is astoundingly vacuous. Perhaps I missed his point. Prigogine's paper is the best account of his views on entropy I have seen, but its relevance to the topic of the book is not made clear in any specific way. These two papers epitomize the immaturity of the field. It seems that just about anything can be included.

Later papers deal with more specific issues. There are some definite gems here, as well as some chaff. Expertise is required to separate the two. Philosophers will find close attention to the paper by Donald Campbell rewarding. Many other papers are interesting if only because they show the vast scope of the field and the need to be able and willing to deal with obscure and difficult data.

There is a section on the relation between genetic and evolutionary epistemology that should interest both fans and opponents of Piaget. Although the debate is again inconclusive, it would be hard to come away not thinking that here is something here that deserves deeper investigation. The overall effect of the book is like a cross-cultural smorgasbord: enticing, but not satisfying.

I should note that the text of the book is very difficult to read. It was apparently made from computer-produced camera-ready copy. The print itself is quite legible, but is not proportionally spaced. I found that the gaps created by right-justification broke the text up enough to confuse the eye. It is understandable that a conference volume is less than optimal, but given the long time from the conference to publication, and modern methods of desktop publishing, the average reader expects better.

John Collier

University of Calgary

Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen, eds.
Science, Morality & Feminist Theory
Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press
1987. Pp. vii+434. Cdn\$14.00. US\$12.00.
ISBN 0-919491-13-8.

Introduced by Marsha Hanen with an Afterword by Kai Nielsen, this volume contains sixteen essays, including ones by such well-known feminist authors as Alison Jaggar, Annette Baier, Sandra Harding, Marilyn Friedman and Virginia Held. Topics range from the virtues and pitfalls of an ethics of care and the possibilities of a non-contractually based society to theories on the nature of self, bias in sex difference research in the sciences and the debate between standpoint theories of science and post-modern approaches. While the essays in general do not open new ground either in terms of new topics in feminist theory or significant advances of current debates, overall the quality of the essays is high and the discourses of the authors rich in ideas. What is said is said well. Alison Jaggar, for example, beautifully articulates the symbiotic relationship that others have less succinctly characterized between societal differences in sexual equality and scientific investigations into sex differences: 'Indeed, on both the practical and the symbolic level, I now think that social equality or inequality may be the major determinant of our scientific conclusions about sexual similarity or sexual difference' (30). Virginia Held provides another example when she astutely remarks in her essay, 'Non-contractual Society: A Feminist View,' 'at some point contracts must be embedded in social relations that are non-contractual' (125). I choose only two examples; however, many of the other essays are equally good at focusing current debates and offering what may be considered definitive statements on the issues in question.

According to the editors, a primary goal of the volume is to show the interrelations between the different branches of philosophy, most specifically ethics/politics and epistemology/philosophy of science. If this theme is achieved, and I am not sure it is, it is achieved at the level of individual essays. Certainly, with only three of the pieces explicitly dealing with issues in science, one cannot claim that the volume deals equally well with themes in science and epistemology. Indeed, Alison Wylie's review of Sandra Harding's *The Science Question in Feminism* and Harding's reply would not suffice if one were thinking of ordering this book for a course on Feminist Epistem-

ologies. Yet, some of the essays, especially those dealing with a theory of the self, do show the mutual interaction between questions of knowledge and those of values and action.

Since the preponderance of the essays are concerned with care versus justice ethics and non-hierarchical, non-contractual societies, perhaps I too should focus the remainder of my comments in this area. The volume offers a variety of positions and reflections on the issues raised by Carol Gilligan's challenge to Lawrence Kohlberg and more generally the ethical tradition of Western Philosophy. Annette Baier lends her voice to correcting misreadings of Gilligan and identifying exactly what it is in moral theory that Gilligan's ideas have given us access to and have been ignored in traditional liberal theory; 'Put baldly, and in a way Gilligan certainly has not put it, the liberal morality, if unsupplemented, may *unfit* people to be anything other than what its justifying theories suppose them to be, ones who have no interest in each others' interests' (53). Marilyn Friedman, on the other hand, worries that we may be erecting a false dichotomy of care and justice. She works to show that 'the care/justice dichotomy is rationally implausible and that the two concepts are conceptually compatible' (97). Undoubtedly, Friedman is right, at least from a theoretical perspective. Historically, however and as she too notes, the two different perspectives have been separated and seen to be antithetical to one another. Consequently, even as we work to reweave a care-based ethic into our current conceptions of moral theory, we must not forget that care requires justice and justice care.

As in the essays I have discussed, the other essays focus the debate and extend our understanding of central issues in feminist theory. Overall, it is a solid collection which can serve a variety of readers. However, it will be most useful to those who are already familiar with the issues from primary sources and who seek to extend their perspectives by attention to a plurality of voices.

Judith Genova

The Colorado College

David Hilbert

Color and Color Perception: A Study in Anthropocentric Realism

Center for the Study of Language and Information, No. 9. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987. Pp. ix+146.

US\$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-937073-15-6);

US\$11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-937073-16-4).

There must be a chromatic zeitgeist wandering the world of Anglo-American philosophy. Between 1950 and 1987 there were but two philosophical books in English that centered on problems of color: Wittgenstein's *Remarks on Colour*, and Bernard Harrison's *Form and Content*, both published in the 1970s, both seriously flawed. But since the beginning of 1987 there have been three book-length treatments of the subject: Jonathan Westphal's *Colour: Some Problems from Wittgenstein*, my own *Color for Philosophers*, and David Hilbert's *Color and Color Perception*. Despite significant differences in outlook and choices of issues to discuss, all three authors share a commitment to bringing a knowledge of color science to bear on philosophical problems. In each case, the science is not mere window-dressing, but is made to do substantive work.

David Hilbert has written an essay on the ontology of color, in which he defends the proposition that colors are objective characteristics of physical objects, albeit anthropocentric in character. He effectively undercuts some of the stock arguments against objectivism. To the objection, propounded by Aune and others, that colored objects must have colored parts, but since atoms aren't colored, tables as collections of atoms can't be colored either, he replies that all one can legitimately demand is that the minimally visible parts of a colored object be colored, and that condition is not affected by the uncoloredness of atoms. To Berkeley's microscope argument he responds that one should take the color of an object to be the average color of its visible parts. And to Campbell's claim that there is no single microphysical feature that red objects share, Hilbert counters that there is a higher-level physical feature that is common to red objects: being a member of a certain class of spectral power reflectances.

Spectral reflectance is Hilbert's candidate for objective color, and he defends it against its two objectivist rivals, the reflected wavelength pattern of light, endorsed by Armstrong, and the disposition to affect normal observers under standard conditions, espoused by

Smart and others. The former he rejects on the empirical ground that it correlates poorly with perceived color. The latter receives a more extended treatment. Hilbert ultimately rejects it because it has the undesirable consequence of assigning the same color to surfaces that, for the standard observer, match under the standard illuminant, even though they may not match for many normal observers under the standard illuminant, nor match for the standard observer under other, quite common, illuminants. Such a consequence can be avoided if we take object color to be identical with spectral reflectance. Under this more finely-grained conception of color, objects with different spectral reflectances will have different colors, and any two surfaces with the same reflectance will always match if they are viewed under the same conditions.

Hilbert proceeds to address an obvious problem with his conception of color: surfaces may have very slightly different reflectances, and thus be differently colored, even though they may be indistinguishable by every normal observer under the widest variety of illumination conditions. So objects that we would normally pronounce to be the same in color will turn out, according to the reflectance account, to be different in color. Hilbert's response is simple enough: many objects are perceptually indistinguishable in length for every normal observer, but we do not thereby conclude that they cannot differ in length. The question should be decided by measurement. To suppose that it is different for color since sameness and difference in color must always be decided by purely visual means is just to beg the question against an objectivist account.

But the matter must not be left there. Hilbert owes us an explanation of our ordinary visual practices of color discrimination and identification, wherein we commonly lump together wildly different reflectances under the same color category. He discharges the debt by explaining that this visual grouping of diverse physical stimuli – the phenomenon of metamerism – is to be understood as a direct consequence of our having only three types of color-sensitive receptors in our retinas. Differences in color perception between members of the same species and across species lines are typically due to differences in the numbers of receptor types and their spectral response characteristics. The actual color classifications made by members of a particular species are highly contingent in character.

A full and proper account of color will thus, according to Hilbert, have two parts: a theory of objective, physical colors, i.e., spectral reflectances, and a theory of how human beings perceptually repre-

sent them. Edwin Land has proposed a computational scheme to explain why it is that human visual systems respond to reflectances rather than to the wavelength distribution of the light that strikes the eye. Land takes the colors of human experience to be triples of integrated reflectances. Hilbert follows him in this conception of the nature of 'anthropocentric' color, but would replace Land's computational scheme by a recent, more adequate theory propounded by Maloney and Wandell. He argues that the adequacy of a Land-type representation of human color experience is shown by the fact that the resulting order structure of integrated-reflectance triples is the same as that of the resemblance ordering of perceived colors.

I find most of Hilbert's arguments to be both well-informed and sound. Certainly if there is any viable candidate for objective color, it must be some suitable extension of spectral reflectance. (However, the extension is far from trivial – neither Hilbert nor anyone else that I know of has satisfactorily generalized the position to cover such cases as the colors displayed on color television screens.) But can spectral reflectances, suitably 'anthropocentrized' as triples of integrated spectral reflectances, do full duty for the colors we all know and love? The Land triples can yield, pretty nearly, the resemblance orders of perceived colors. But we need more. Orange is red-yellow, and purple is red-blue, but red is *not* orange-purple, nor could it be. (This has nothing to do with physical mixing operations.) These are fundamental truths about red, orange and purple, but they are not truths that are derivable from facts about triples of integrated reflectances or the ordering relations that obtain among them. We may, if we like, say that Hilbert has given us a theory of 'color', as long as we are prepared to recognize that it is not a theory of such qualities as red, orange, and purple – i.e., a theory of color.

C. L. Hardin
Syracuse University

David Ingram

Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press

1987. Pp. xvii+263.

US\$24.50. ISBN 0-300-03680-9.

Ingram's *Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason* provides a lucid and stimulating contribution to the recent Habermas literature and will occupy a distinctive niche within it. Other studies with introductory intentions do not range as widely and deeply: Michael Pusey's *Jürgen Habermas* (London and New York: Ellis Horwood/Tavistock 1987) offers a brief introduction directed toward a sociological audience which requires a very selective focus and the suppression of many important philosophical issues; Rick Roderick's *Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York: St. Martin's 1986) attempts to provide an introduction to Habermas's work as a whole which limits the depth of coverage of the most recent writings; Stephen White's *The Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988) covers much the same ground as Ingram, but is more introductory in intention and stresses issues of concern to social scientists, focusing on the notion of a 'critical research program'. On the other hand, Ingram's strategy allows for a more comprehensive treatment of the later work, unlike the more specialized studies such as Peter Dews' *Logic of Disintegration* (London: Verso 1987) which defends Habermas against poststructuralism, or Robert Alford's *Science and the Revenge of Nature* (Gainesville: University of Florida 1985) which plays off Marcuse and Habermas against each other on science. In short, Ingram provides a sequel to Thomas McCarthy's *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1978) and picks up where the former leaves off: a sympathetic, advanced introduction to Habermas's most recent work which also surveys the secondary literature with an eye to drawing out the most serious immanent problems in his theoretical program, and offers some suggestions for dealing with them. Only the considerably more ambitious undertaking of Seyla Benhabib's *Critique, Norm and Utopia* (New York: Columbia University Press 1986), along with Jean-Marc Ferry's *Habermas: L'éthique de la communication* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1987), compare as major contributions to a fully critical 'reconstruction' Habermas as of the mid-1980s.

Ingram's study will thus likely serve as the most influential advanced study guide for the reception of the translation of Habermas's

most recent work: the second volume of the *Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System* (Boston: Beacon 1987), *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (Cambridge, MA.: MIT 1987), the forthcoming translation of *Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln* (1983) and perhaps eventually the fifth volume of the *Kleine politische Schriften* (1985). These translations, along with that of the earlier *Logic of the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT 1988), will define a new stage in the reception and critique of contemporary critical theory.

Following an introductory chapter which historically situates Habermas's theoretical development, chapters 2-5 focus on a reading of the first volume of the *Theory of Communicative Action*: the defense of Occidental reason over mythopoetic forms of thinking (ch. 2), a defense of hermeneutic sociology and aspects of the contributions of various schools of linguistic philosophy to this project (ch. 3), a critique of Weber's pessimistic theory of rationalization (ch. 4) and the problematic appropriation of Weber's theory by the first generation of critical theory (ch. 5). Chapter 6 is concerned with an excursus on Habermas's confrontation with the post-modernist debate in relation to Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, Bataille and Foucault. Chapters 7-10 develop the more specifically sociological themes in the second volume of the *Theory of Communicative Action*: the use of Mead and Durkheim as the basis of a theory of symbolic reproduction and identity formation (ch. 7), the lifeworld/system distinction underlying his theory of evolution (ch. 8), the critical appropriation of Luhmann and Parsons (ch. 9), and the implications of the resulting bi-level model of society for reinterpreting the social pathologies of advanced capitalism (ch. 10). The final chapter addresses the shift in Habermas's work from a hermeneutic ideology critique to a more holistic criticism and its implications for the theory/practice problematic underlying critical theory.

Ingram's commentaries are guided by a distinctive theme: the aesthetic dimensions of Habermas's thought which have emerged following his abandonment of grounding reason transcendently. 'Theorie presupposes a holistic conception of rationality that cannot be adequately articulated by a formal notion of procedural justice, one that implies an intuitive integration and dialectical harmonizing of substantive values. If I am not mistaken, Habermas's conception of aesthetic rationality constitutes a significant effort to reinvest his theory with hermeneutic content, thereby bridging the gap between discursive reflection and lived experience that has bothered so many of his

critics' (xii). More specifically, 'the remarkable convergence between Habermas's communication theory and Schiller's aesthetics is a clear indication ... that Habermas might be willing to extend the concept of communicative rationality to include a pre-discursive moment of practical reason (*phronēsis*)' (xvi).

Though specialists in various fields – sympathetic or not – might point to other problematic elements in either Habermas or Ingram's rendition and cautionary proposals, social and political theorists (as opposed to philosophers) might find two interrelated areas of ambiguity requiring further elaboration by Ingram: the evaluation of Habermas's theory of society and social evolution and the more specific political implications of Ingram's own stress on the aesthetic and pre-discursive moments of practice.

Despite a remarkable evenness of presentation on the whole, Ingram's own disciplinary background in philosophy is betrayed at moments, in particular a certain hesitancy and evasiveness when confronted with the issues of the empirical social sciences. For example, the otherwise elegant reconstructions of Habermas's relations to Marx, Weber, Parsons, etc., along with his bi-level model of society and theory of social evolution, are not coupled with comparable assurance with respect to assessing the ambivalent (McCarthy) or negative (Misgeld) assessments of the shift from a hermeneutic to a systems theoretical framework (168-9). Nor do we find any reference to the counter-attack of 'analytic' Marxists such as Jon Elster who fall back upon rational choice models of action, completely rejecting holistic, systems-theory-type explanations as functionalist.

Similarly, the discussion of the theory/practice problematic in critical theory is illuminating as a general theoretical discussion, but leaves the reader groping for a sense of the more strategic political implications with respect to contemporary social movements and social research. In particular, Ingram may push Habermas much further in a hermeneutic direction than is consistent with the latter's intentions, as is evident in the very humble concept of reason which is taken to follow from his backing off from transcendently grounded ideology critique: '... the truth of holistic critique, like that of truth and truthfulness in mimetic art, is circumscribed by its own pre-understanding and thus can never be grounded discursively. This means that practical reason could admit only of degrees of being more or less appropriate, more or less convincing, more or less free from constraint' (186). In short, counterfactual regulative ideals of consensus 'can function as regulative ideas guiding local practices ... but they

cannot serve as operational criteria for evaluating the justice of large-scale, complex societies without succumbing to utopian extremism' (187). Such politically timid conclusions can probably be traced back to the author's own position that 'there is no absolute opposition between an ontological hermeneutics of appropriation and an epistemological, or methodological hermeneutics of suspicion' despite 'the very real differences in emphasis between the two positions' (241, n. 34). Clearly, the author is caught between the demands of a sympathetic expository treatment and the pursuit of certain concerns which would lead beyond the constraints of an advanced introductory account. Hopefully, Ingram's own position in response to Habermas will be further elaborated in future publications.

Raymond A. Morrow
(*Department of Sociology*)
University of Alberta

Ray Jackendoff

Consciousness and the Computational Mind
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1987.
Pp. xvi+356.
US\$27.50. ISBN 0-262-600007-2.

What is consciousness? The beauty of Ray Jackendoff's *Consciousness and the Computational Mind* lies in the way it combines the empirical findings of a variety of disciplines into a theory that may offer some of the most promising insights currently available for answering this age-old puzzle. Of particular interest to those in cognitive science, psychology, and philosophy, it develops a topography of the mind sufficiently rich in detail that we begin to 'see' a way to solving some of the most basic questions about the nature of mental experience.

A rigorously crafted work of clarity, sophistication, and scope, Jackendoff explores the degree to which our conscious mental experiences can be explained in terms of the computer analogy that regards the mind as a device for storing and processing information. Consciousness is conceived of as a projection that is caused and supported by

these activities. Thus, while he rejects interactionism, his theory of mind as a computational process reaffirms Lashley's observation that no activity of the mind is ever conscious. He is sensitive that this approach may be considered too mechanistic, failing, as Searle has objected, to tell us what consciousness is *for*. Nonetheless, he rejects the pervasive associationist view that totally denies the mind's internal contribution to awareness. 'Rather, awareness reflects a curious amalgam of the effects on the mind of both thought and the real world, while leaving totally opaque the means by which these effects come about' (300).

The uniqueness of his approach resides in interpreting consciousness as a form of information representing an *intermediate-level* between sensation and thought, what he calls the 'intermediate-level theory of consciousness.' While information processing theories are an important part of this view, Jackendoff focuses primary attention on the *structure* of information that is processed. Central to this claim is the hypothesis that the variety of sensory experiences requires the existence of discrete structural levels in order to account for the mind's ability to integrate information from various sensory faculties. While this helps to explain the apparent unity of consciousness, it also suggests as equally obvious, though universally denied, the *disunity* of consciousness, illustrated by our capacity to distinguish visual from auditory experiences. The hypothesis that emerges is that for each sensory faculty there are different levels of information representing distinct repertoires of structured distinctions that together constitute our conscious experiences.

In support of this contention and as a way of fleshing out the different dimensions of the computational mind, Jackendoff devotes the greater part of his book to a detailed examination of recent theoretical developments in the analysis of linguistic, visual, and musical awareness. His discussion, here, is the most enlightening and interesting part of the book because of the fluency and scope of his presentation. Despite the theoretical complexities involved and the difficulty of weaving together views derived from a variety of disciplines, the discussion is always articulate, accessible, and consistently punctuated with revealing examples. The analysis leads to results that resemble and reinforce Fodor's modularity thesis, but with some interesting differences. The resulting synthesis provides both convincing empirical evidence and a valuable overview of theoretical developments that explain why a computational model of mind may be highly plausible.

In particular, following the generative linguistics first proposed by Chomsky, Jackendoff investigates recent revolutionary developments in phonological theory that have lead theorists to distinguish syntax and phonology as independent levels of representation. Following on this discussion is a detailed inquiry into how linguistic information is processed, with special attention to the role played by short-term memory and attention. These developments are complemented by an analysis of 'conceptual semantics,' based on Jackendoff's previous well-regarded book *Semantics and Cognition* (1983), that helps to explain how the meaning of language is conveyed.

Although the idea of analyzing language in terms of levels of representation has long been a standard in linguistics, the application of this method to such non-linguistic faculties as vision and music cognition is more recent. His focus on music perception is unique and provides an interesting contrast to linguistic and visual perception. While there are obvious differences in the content of information we derive from these modalities, Jackendoff's review of the research of such vision theorists as Marr, Shepard, Kosslyn, Cooper, and others, together with his own work with Lerdahl on tonal music, suggest that the overall details in the organization and processing of this information are similar. 'The thrust of the generalization will be that awareness in general is supported by neither the most peripheral nor the most central representations in the computational mind, but by a collection of modality-specific intermediate levels' (292).

The concluding chapters extend the analysis to such perennial philosophical problems as appearance and reality; introspection and privacy; self-knowledge and personal identity; and the role of the unconscious mind. These problems stand as significant tests of the explanatory power of his intermediate-level theory of consciousness. Among the several noteworthy conclusions he draws, is the assertion that while language has a significant role in facilitating thought, it cannot as traditionally assumed constitute the essence of thought. The mind is, thus, not a thinking thing but a sophisticated processor of integrated levels of information.

Consciousness and the Computational Mind is an impressive work of exceptional clarity and breadth. It sets the study of mind on a new and exciting course for which Jackendoff deserves praise and admiration.

Albert Flores

California State University, Fullerton

Gavin Kitching

Karl Marx and the Philosophy of Praxis

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1988. Pp. xii+265.

Cdn\$64.50: US\$49.50

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-00713-5);

Cdn\$19.50: US\$14.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-00714-3).

K.'s book belongs to what must now be considered a genre whose authors are detaching themselves from interpretations of Marx that were influenced by the Soviet version first promulgated in the 1930s. Works of the genre usually do not distinguish as sharply as is common today between Marx himself and the Soviet version of him, so that evaluating the latter is usually thought to be evaluating the former too.

K. evaluates Marx in historiography, philosophy and economics. He takes Marx's theory of history to be largely occupied with the 'correspondencies' between 'base' and 'superstructure' which loomed so large in the Stalinist version. They are a small part of Marx's theory, and his concern with them is mostly confined to the *German Ideology* where he deals with the Young Hegelians' exaggerated view of the efficacy of abstract ideas in producing historical change. K. claims to resolve the problems of this interpretation at a stroke by recourse to the eponymous 'philosophy of praxis', about which he says astonishingly little. Its main purport is that acting involves thinking, and thinking is an act. This insight is of 'immense significance', and if it were grasped 'many debates in contemporary Marxism would cease overnight' (29). It is introduced with a potted history of philosophy from Locke onwards in which 'idealism' is defined in a way that would equally fit 'empiricism'; Hegel described in terms that would equally fit Hume and Kant, and 'empiricism' confused with 'materialism' (12-14). K. claims to have been influenced by Wittgenstein, though there is little evidence of it, unless one counts his insistence that words are tools (169, 174), and that Marxists think classes to be real because they believe all nouns to be names (169).

K. goes badly astray on the labour theory of value, exchange-value and abstract labour (which he thinks could exist outside a market economy [94]). Among the most important contributions in this field is the work of I. I. Rubin, and it is a lamentable defect in his scholarship that K. seems to know nothing of it. In the tradition of G.D.H.

Cole, Schumpeter, Howard-King, et al., K. takes Marx's concept of labour to be, as Ricardo's was, natural or useful labour, and its measure to be natural units of time. He thinks that Marx arrived at a notion of abstract labour, which could serve as the substance of value, by performing a mental operation of 'abstraction' to strip away the differences between one natural labour and another (71, 90), thereby landing himself with the problems of 'reducing' skilled and intensified labour to simple labour. It is extraordinary that such a primitive mistake should have gained the currency it has. (K. cannot be blamed for it; only for repeating it). Marx set up the problem of value as one of explaining how different natural things like corn and shoes can be commensurable, as they must be since they are *equated* in proportions in the market. He was hardly likely to suggest, therefore, that natural labours, averaged or otherwise, were the commensurable element since they are naturally as incommensurable as their products. Ricardo missed the problem in the first sentence of I. ii of the *Principles* (Sraffa edn., 20). Marx thought this a great mistake (TSV iii, 500), as indeed it is, and everything profound in his own theory of value was designed to avoid it.

K.'s failure to get value, use-value and exchange-value right, weakens much of his exposition. Thus, the distinction between labour and labour power seems 'tendentious, not to say hair-splitting' (110); K. is unaware of the world of difference between the realms of use-value (real natures) and exchange-value (an artificial nature), and cannot see the import of the fact that labour power is the exchange-value bought by capital, and that its use-value to the purchaser is labour.

The genre sometimes has a bitter quality not often found even in Marx's more usual critics, and K. does well in keeping this near the minimum. It is, nonetheless, a disrespectful book. Disagreeable epithets abound, and one wonders what purpose is served, when quoting an author of the nineteenth century, by inserting '*sic*' after the author's use of the pronoun 'he' to refer to humans generically (74, 110). Marx's mistakes are seldom silly, but K.'s Marx is a fool capable of any stupidity. Thus, the gravest flaw in his theory of value is this: in holding that machines can only transfer to products the value they embody, Marx overlooked the possibility that a machine might go on participating in the creation-value after it has helped created exchange-value equal to what the owner paid for it (97, 111). As in this case, the errors are not always Marx's, and there are too many such cases: Marx's teleology is put down to his inability to avoid the

use of popular metaphors (59); he thought *Capital* to be true for anyone, rather than true for the working-class (64); and he failed to appreciate that one cannot 'see' the value process because it is not 'physical', and if it goes on at all, it goes on 'in Marx's mind' (108).

Scott Meikle

University of Glasgow

John Losee

Philosophy of Science and Historical Enquiry

2nd. edn. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1987. Pp. x+153. Cdn\$17.95: US\$8.95. ISBN 0-19-824946-2.

Philosophers of science have naturally sought historical episodes of scientific inquiry as sanctioning instances for their normative theories of scientific rationality. Yet, the history of science, like any history, is inescapably informed by prescriptive standards specifying which aspects of the historical manifold are part of an accurate description of scientific endeavor and which are coincidental dross. Thus, there is some danger that the historical narrative of an episode of scientific inquiry used to validate a philosophical principle can be so shaped by that very principle as to be of little independent evidentiary value. In short, the philosophy of science (PS) and the history of science (HS) do not stand in a simple relation of normative theory to justifying evidence.

John Losee's book *Philosophy of Science and Historical Enquiry* is in large part a history of the attempts by historians and philosophers of science to work out the proper relationship between PS and HS. The philosophical analyses that he reports on and evaluates throughout the book all grapple with the contrast between HS as primarily a descriptive activity and PS as a normative one. This disparity of aims has led some philosophers, including Ronald Giere, J.J.C. Smart, Paul Feyerabend, and Thomas Kuhn, to argue that the two activities are mutually exclusive. Early in the book, Losee rejects this conclusion, saying: 'Indeed, there are a number of reasons

to believe that the association of PS and HS is a genuine marriage in which each partner is affected by changes in the other' (15).

Losee devotes Chapter 3, 'More Than a Marriage of Convenience,' to a *prima facie* argument for the inseparability of PS and HS. His strategy is simply to show that in disputes about criteria of theory confirmation and the reducibility of scientific theories to their successors, disputants have *in fact* appealed to HS to substantiate their own philosophical positions and to provide counterexamples to those of their opponents. Of course, a rhetorically valuable methodology is not necessarily a rational one. Moreover, if both sides of a debate can find historical examples to buttress their arguments, the evidentiary value of HS for PS is thereby called into question. This chapter, along with Chapter 4, 'Prescriptive PS: A Historical Survey,' summarize for the reader vignettes from the history of philosophy of science. That these episodes 1) often appeal to historical examples and 2) are intended to have normative force is clear from Losee's summaries. What is not clear is whether these facts by themselves constitute any significant support for the contention that history and philosophy of science are interconnected in principle.

As suggested above, the fundamental obstacle faced by anyone trying to define a rational relation between HS and PS is the threat of an incestuous union in which the normative demands of a PS are always satisfied by examples from HS just because those very *normative principles were used in identifying these confirming episodes as canonical instances of scientific rationality*. Losee's contribution to an assessment of this danger comes primarily in Chapter 5, 'Prescriptive PS: Inviolable Principles,' and Chapter 6, 'The Justificatory Hierarchy.' In the former, he argues that a PS cannot have prescriptive force unless it contains at least one principle not subject to variation under application to different episodes in the history of science. Such principles are seemingly immune from *historical* refutation and are, therefore, the source of the extreme logicist's claim that PS can be detached from HS. In Chapter 6, Losee reminds us that any PS is, after all, not a single evaluative principle, but a network of methodological tenets which bear complex justificatory relations to one another. Given this portrayal of PS, it seems plausible to suggest that certain parts of the network cannot be impugned (or supported) on purely historical grounds.

Losee portrays any PS as a hierarchy of evaluative principles, each level stipulating how the level below is to be judged adequate. The lowest level, Level 1, contains the basic normative claims about scien-

tific rationality that constitute the primary substance of a PS. Level 2 contains principles on which the Level 1 claims are to be warranted. Losee sees two polar stances at this level: extreme logicism and extreme historicism. He also admits higher levels containing meta-principles and cites Laudan's suggestion that the opinions of a 'scientific elite' be used to select 'standard cases' of scientific progress as an example of a Level 3 criterion (110). Erecting this classificatory scaffold allows Losee to make some interesting points about past efforts to establish the relation between HS and PS. He suggests that failure to recognize the existence of such a hierarchy in PS is what makes its normative character seemingly irreconcilable with historical test. Further he shows that in some cases, namely in the philosophies of Lakatos, Laudan, and Holton, significant attempts to relate PS and HS hinge on distinguishing certain parts of the hierarchy as inviolable and from others which *are* subject to being tested by historical data. Indeed, the differences amongst the many accounts of the relation between HS and PS can be characterized in terms of exactly where in the network each kind of principle is placed.

This is not a book with a major new thesis on how PS and HS interact. It is a good source for information about the history of the debate. I take Losee's suggestion that PS must be viewed as a complex set of claims about science *and* about metascience as an important perspective from which to view the problem. It seems that what is needed to make a new contribution to the analysis is a much more detailed account of how principles at various levels of the hierarchy interact with one another. Losee often seems to treat the levels as equivalence classes and the relations between them as relations between these classes. Surely a Level 2 principle for the evaluation of definitions of scientific progress bears a different relation to such definitions than the relation born by Level 2 evaluative principles for theories of explanation to those theories. If Losee's schema is used as a impetus for exploring these relations in detail, it might play a valuable role in resolving the controversy.

Joel M. Smith

(History and Philosophy of Science)

Indiana University

Patrick Monahan

Politics and the Constitution

Agincourt, ON: Carswell Legal Publications
1987. Pp. xv+260.

Cdn\$44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-459-30321-X);

Cdn\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-458-81600-0).

Patrick Monahan teaches law at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto. In this book, he examines the recent activity of the Supreme Court of Canada in two of its roles, as interpreter of the Canadian Charter of Rights and as arbiter of federalism disputes. Most of the material is of interest mainly to constitutional lawyers and political scientists—e.g.: statistical analyses of the types of cases heard by the Court and of the success rate of the various issues; identification of approaches taken by the justices in the first few years of Charter litigation; analysis of the reasoning of the Court in certain constitutional cases. But chapters 5 and 6 address normative issues of political and legal philosophy—the legitimacy of a Charter and the way in which the Supreme Court should interpret it.

Chapter 5 surveys the legitimacy issue in the American literature, and examines (and then rejects) two theories of interpretation advanced there: that courts should give effect to the intent of the authors, and the Dworkinian theory that courts should enforce basic moral rights. In chapter 6 Monahan sets out his own theory of judicial review under the Canadian Charter. These are his main normative claims:

1. Value-judgments are subjective. Moral and political concepts are essentially contestable. Hence, there is no such thing as one right answer in moral, political and legal disputes.

2. Consequently, judicial decisions are a matter of will and choice, rather than reason and logical inference. There is no real distinction between political reasoning (which is subjective) and legal reasoning (supposedly a matter of inferring the correct decision from the facts and the law). (This distinction is also wrong because there is no hard and fast distinction between fact and value.) Hence, members of the Supreme Court should give up the fiction that when they interpret the Charter they avoid questions of policy and limit themselves to strictly 'legal' considerations.

3. Liberalism is wrong in that it has a weakened, individualistic, conception of the human person. The human person is not something prior to, or opposed to, the community, but is constituted by the community.

4. Liberalism is also wrong in its fear of the State. State intervention can create freedom by protecting the weak against the strong; indeed, in modern States social progress and the protection of the underprivileged have come from the political process and not the judiciary. Hence, the whole thrust of the liberal conception of fundamental rights and of the function of a Bill of Rights is wrong, i.e., to set up a judicially-policed fence preventing the State from interfering in the private sphere of life.

5. Unlike the US, there are many communitarian and 'statist' elements both in Canadian political culture (e.g., an active socialist party) and in the Charter of Rights (e.g., protection for denominational schools, the 'reasonable limits' of section 1 and the 'notwithstanding' clause of section 33). Hence, the Canadian Charter must not be understood along the lines of the American Bill of Rights (which comes from an 'alien culture,' 74), as a judicial control of the State. Our tradition recognizes the centrality of the political process (and rightly so): the righting of wrongs is a matter for politicians and not judges. Therefore our Charter is not directed against the State as such. And so the Supreme Court is wrong when, in applying section 1 of the Charter, it puts the burden of proof upon the State and sets up very stringent tests to be met in order for an infringement of a right to constitute a 'reasonable limit.'

6. The Charter is not intended to overturn political decisions arrived at through the democratic process, as if judges possessed some absolute truth about justice. It is intended to ensure that the political process is *fair*, that all citizens are able to participate in collective deliberation and debate. The communitarian (Canadian) view is that it is the community, operating through the political process, which defines its own values and determines the kind of community it wishes to be. The function of the Charter is to keep these channels open and allow the community to shape its own destiny. The only political decisions the Charter is intended to control are those which limit the democratic process, not the substantive decisions which issue from the process. There is thus no conflict between the Charter and democracy.

The author is familiar with the most recent developments in political and legal philosophy (e.g., Dworkin, communitarianism, critical legal studies, economic analysis of law), and with the American literature on the legitimacy of judicial review of political decisions (e.g., Ely, Perry) as well as the 'Canadian identity' literature. He does not provide much in the way of original argument in support of the

normative claims listed above, but refers instead to the standard authors (e.g., Sandel, Walzer, McIntyre on communitarianism; Unger, Kennedy on critical legal studies). Thus the philosopher familiar with these works will learn little from this book, except perhaps for the theory of Charter interpretation Monahan extracts from them.

Indeed, more attention to argument would be helpful. Thus, while we are told that there are no 'right answers' to value questions, and elsewhere that there is no firm distinction between fact and value, it would be helpful to know if this means there are no right answers to factual questions. Another example: Dworkin is criticized (86-7) for the moral objectivism implicit in the rights thesis, and then two pages later for the view that the community must not enact its moral beliefs into law because 'questions of morality and value are inescapably relative' (89). Indeed, Monahan's statement of Dworkin's position is sometimes wrong, as when he attributes to him the view that 'political debate is purified when individuals frame arguments solely in terms of their personal interests' (90). And the discussion of liberalism is marred by the tendency to caricature which seems to characterize most communitarian literature: e.g., 'abstract, bloodless individuals' (93).

Michael Hartney

Collège de l'Abitibi-Témiscamingue

Patrick Murray

Marx's Theory of Scientific Knowledge

Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press

International 1988. Pp. xx+279.

US\$49.95. ISBN 0-391-03371-9.

The debate over Marx focused for decades on the presumed scientific nature of his claims. At one point it seemed as if the difficulties of establishing a coherent textual basis to support this presumption could be solved by simply cancelling the continuity of Marx's endeavour. A wedge was introduced between his early humanist interests and his late scientific work, from which, as Joan Robinson put it, the 'Hegelian stuff and nonsense' was excised. Murray, by

contrast, wants to affirm the unity and continuity of Marxian thought. His aim is to show that Marx's advocacy of scientific knowledge was a very early development never to be abandoned. Murray admits that his task is made easier by recent developments in the philosophy of science which 'have called positivism into question' (xiv). It is not a positivist version of science that determines Marx's entire course of thought but a new conception of scientific knowledge which does not exclude historical and practical interests. By bringing out this continuously held non-positivist view of science, Murray expects to 'provide a sound basis for the appropriation of Marx by philosophers of science' (xiv).

Murray preserves the continuity of Marx's thought by exposing the politico-economic aspects of his early philosophical development, and the philosophical nature of his mature methodological reflections and scientific practice. His argument has two corresponding parts. The first one studies, in historical sequence, the unfolding of Marx's critique of Hegel and liberal Hegelianism. Marx, Murray argues, inherits Hegel's project to develop an immanent *Wissenschaft*, one that penetrates the logic of things themselves. Wary of the hardened dualism of Enlightenment thought, a conflation of utopian rationality and conservative positivity, Hegel sought for the rationality immanent in actuality. Marx's suspicion that the mediation implied by this immanence is spurious, is confirmed by his early analysis of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. The rational syllogism which Hegel employs as his instrument of mediation, only 'expresses, rather than reconciles, the contradiction between the political state and civil society' (32). The reconciliation sought by Marx requires a democratized civil society which can only come about by 'revolutionizing its logical atom, the abstract, egoistic individual' (32). In the *Paris Manuscripts* Marx exposes the shared logic of political economy and Hegel's idealism. Money and logic, the products of abstract labor and abstract thought, point towards the egoistic individual as their abstract substratum. Both Hegel's logic and the logic of capitalism express the externalizing activity of the subject of civil society, the abstract individual. The essential features of historical materialism are contained in this observation. In fact, historical materialism forms the argumentative groundwork on which Marx's critique of political economy is built. But *Capital* must wait until Marx fully probes that groundwork.

Marx does not conceive of historical materialism as a crude form of materialism in which consciousness is reduced to being. On the contrary, Marx remains faithfully committed to immanence. This

should undermine any hardened dualism of being and consciousness. It should also eliminate the Kantian dualism of theoretical and practical reason. A moralistic dictation of ideals denotes the 'separation of circumstances and consciousness' (81) typical of idealism and moral and political terrorism. Marx's immanent science searches in reality for 'the satisfaction of previously unmet human needs and aspirations' (84). But historical materialism does not exhaust Marx's theory of scientific knowledge; it is merely 'a propaedeutic to science' (xx).

The second part examines Marx's shift towards a critique of political economy already visible in 1846-1847. Murray focuses on Marx's mature methodological writings and on *Capital*, 'his only scientific work' (221). Historical materialism owes its critical sway to Feuerbach's invertive method, which expresses his empiricist distrust for abstractions. But Marx never loses sight of 'Hegel's criticisms of both radical sense-data empiricism and scientific empiricism' (113). Neither does he depart from Hegel's method of proceeding from the abstract to the concrete. Yielding to Feuerbach would mean surrendering the scientific impetus of his theory; yielding to Hegel would mean the naturalization of historically determined categories, a defining 'characteristic of classical bourgeois thought' (147). Marx, according to Murray, solves this dilemma by distinguishing between general and determinate abstract categories. The point is that Marx is not at all inimical towards abstractions, but simply wants 'to replace those abstractions which are prefabricated and subjectively applied to a particular object of scientific scrutiny with abstractions that take shape according to the specificity of that object itself' (113). The latter are determinate abstractions. On this basis Murray ascribes to Marx an 'empiricism in second intension' (113).

Marx's emphasis on determinate abstractions solves the sticky issue of selecting a point of departure for *Capital*. His final choice is the commodity. On the one hand, it satisfies his materialist posture in that the commodity is the 'actual unit of bourgeois wealth' (141). On the other hand, it satisfies his scientific standards in that it constitutes the substratum of the determinate category exchange-value. Marx moves then from exchange-value, as predicate of the commodity, to value 'as the ground of exchange value' (148). Then, applying Hegel's logic of essence, he proves the necessary appearance of value in exchange-value. Within capitalism money is the third party that mediates between use-value and exchange-value. Marx, however, finds this kind of mediation inadequate. His early critique of Hegel presented reconciliation as his own alternative. At that point,

reconciliation resulted from the revolutionizing of essence itself, viz., of civil society. Now, in the context of the political economy of capitalism, reconciliation means 'the cessation of production governed by the law of value' (159). The continuity of Marx's scientific enterprise is evident. His immanent conception of scientific knowledge, which 'hopes to reconcile reason with actuality' (222), does not fit a positivist or determinist mold.

Murray has written a truly philosophical book. He claims that there is a coherent and unified theory of scientific knowledge under the torrential dispersion of Marx's writings. Their subliminal unity is the result of Marx's life-long debt to one author – Hegel. The strength of Murray's book lies in the rigorous and encompassing way in which it exposes this heavy debt, particularly visible in Marx's critique of empiricism, his immanent conception of science and his attention to the content and logic of abstractions. Its weakness is the manner in which he attempts to put some distance between Marx and Hegel's absolute idealism. Marx's retrieval of Kant's epistemological position (117-20), which separates thought and actuality, theory and practice (225), constitutes a retreat towards Enlightenment dualism. Was it not Hegel's struggle against this sort of thing that fired Marx's Hegelian enthusiasm in the first place?

F.R. Cristi

Wilfrid Laurier University

Josef Seifert

Back to 'Things in themselves':

*A Phenomenological Foundation for
Classical Realism*

New York: Routledge Chapman & Hall

1987. Pp. xviii+364.

Cdn\$39.00: US\$59.95. ISBN 0-7102-0711-5.

'Phenomenology' is understood in this book as 'the method which leads us to see essences in what they *themselves* are' (24; cf. 10-11, 30, 321f). Thus, 'The Aristotelian distinction of four types of causes is a masterful example of phenomenological analysis of things themselves, as

they give themselves from their own nature' (26). Working within 'Phenomenology' thus understood, 'this essay attempts to refute ... transcendental idealism in any form or shape' (316). Positively stated, the aim is to reaffirm an ontology of substantial individuals, including the human self, realms of universals, a causally ordered real world (including final causation in human history), and a personal God – all open to a corresponding realist and foundationalist (61) epistemology.

Historically, Seifert aligns himself with the first wave of 20th-century phenomenologists that formed around Husserl in his Göttingen years, including especially Reinach, Scheler and Pfaender, but, more than anyone else, with Augustine (323) – and with Descartes, insofar as he coincides with Augustine in arguing from the self and self-knowledge.

The book is divided into three Parts: the first a critical re-thinking of the Husserlian slogan, 'back to the things themselves' (5-117), the second an examination of the 'motives' which moved Kant and (allegedly) Husserl to idealism (121-215), and the third a 'further critique' of Husserl and Kant through a more detailed discussion of the meanings of 'things in themselves' and knowledge thereof.

The only sustained piece of philosophical argument occurs on pp. 303-17, where Seifert purports to prove 'an inner contradiction in any idealist position' (319) This argument is phrased in terms of acts *constituting* their objects, where 'constituting' means *making*, not just making-present. The author argues that any act of constituting an object presupposes, precisely, an act and a subject which is not constituted, and hence is 'in itself'. And: 'if the evident fact that at least the subject and act of transcendental constitution is "in itself" is recognized, then the idealist position collapses ... Then it would be precisely recognized that there is a "being in itself" which is independent of constitution and autonomous' (308). But if this argument proves anything, it only proves that a given act constitutes an object only if that act already exists. It does not prove that the act is not itself constituted ('made') by another act directed upon it, nor does it prove that there is no all-constituting consciousness such as a personal God of the Berkelian variety. And in any case, the 'being in itself' which the author purports to prove is itself of quintessentially idealist type.

As to the deeper criticisms which have been brought against *cogito* arguments for the existence of a self, the author shows no awareness of the vast literature. He simply re-runs the Augustinian/

Cartesian arguments, and proceeds to deduce (or at least suggest) the general world view of classical realism therefrom.

By far the larger part of the book is devoted to attacks upon the later Husserl, with somewhat less attention paid to Kant. In truth, there has never been a better friend of Seifert's objectives than Husserl, but he here seems to be concentrated upon, not because he has anything to *contribute* to the main thesis of the book, but because his supposed errors are regarded as most threatening to Seifert's position. The charges brought against Husserl are really quite astonishing, especially in the light of the fact that the earlier Husserl is conceded to have largely avoided the errors in question. It is hard to imagine how anyone who could make such mistakes as are here attributed to Husserl could also be worthy of extensive critical attention, or how he could have had any significant historical effect. He is charged with developing a method (*epochē*) which leads to 'the radical suspension of *any* link of the order of essence to existence' (85), and with separating the ideal from the real in such a way that real events can be 'subject only to empirical laws,' so that 'it seems unthinkable that the real acts of thinking of empirical subjects could ever attain the sphere of the ideal' (142; cf. 171-2). These points, like numerous others brought up by Seifert, are old points to which Husserl convincingly replied (see, e.g., *Husserliana* XXII 152-61). They, and others about the relations between concepts and species (165-7), indicate to my mind that Seifert simply does not understand Husserl's basic ontological schema and how it applies to mental acts and their objects.

This may be related to the fact that, in this book, Seifert provides no careful expositions of Husserlian texts, nor does he engage in actual phenomenological description of cases. It seems to be his view that such is not required, that all that is needed is abstract argument on various points, together with appeals to alleged immediate revelations of essence-connections to consciousness. This, it seems, is what he takes phenomenological method to be. He *quotes* at considerable lengths, but his lack of exposition permits him often to quote as Husserl's views statements clearly intended by Husserl to represent views he actually opposes. This is most notable with the repeated references to *The Idea of Phenomenology*, where statements of 'natural' or even 'sceptical' thought on the impossibility of knowing what is not immanent to our mind are taken as expressions of Husserl's 'later' position (25-6, 63, 116, 137, 143, 312), even though in this very work Husserl proceeds to explain, precisely, how we may understand the

possibility of such knowledge of the transcendent. The last three chapters of *Ideas I* are wholly given over to explaining how the rational grasp of reality 'in itself' is to be understood.

What I regard as Seifert's misunderstanding – widely shared – of the world according to Husserl, as noemata, without real existence, and as the only objects of consciousness, has to be placed over against Husserl's clear claims (i) that objects *simpliciter* stand under radically different genuses, while noemata all belong in one genus (*Ideas I*, subsection 128), and (ii) that the noema (appearance) and the act of consciousness have the same object (*Ideas I*, subsection 129) – which will obviously not be the noema itself. Seifert's suggestion that Husserl even allows 'some corporeal image' to make knowledge of transcendent objects impossible certainly goes much further than most who adopt his interpretation.

But the most basic issue between Seifert and Husserl lies in the interpretation of 'constitution'. Seifert is aware of the reading of constitution as 'making present' (348), but rejects it, and insists that 'the many quotes in this essay demonstrate' that Husserl means *making* when he speaks of *constitution*. Against this one must assert that the quotes do not demonstrate this at all, and that we should have been very much obliged to the author if he had somewhere stated the argument by which the quotes demonstrate his view of Husserlian constitution.

In fleeing from constitution, Seifert himself fails to have any account of the structure of the act of consciousness and intentionality. As a result, though he speaks of phenomenological method, there really is very little in his book that can be identified as such, except his appeals to direct insight into essences. In this regard he remains faithful to that naivety for which Husserl criticized his own early followers.

Dallas Willard

University of Southern California

Richard Shusterman

T.S. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism

New York: Columbia University Press 1988.

Pp. xii+236.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-231-06742-9.

This study of Eliot's critical theories traces his development from 19th-century idealism, through a brief period of objectivism under the influence of Russell's logical atomism, to a complex and continually revised notion of criticism centered on the idea of tradition, a notion Shusterman himself supports and defends. Shusterman wants to show that Eliot's views are misrepresented in the now standard tale which portrays Eliot as a champion of absolutism in criticism as in other areas. To do this he devotes most of the book to setting forth Eliot's views and exploring their relationship to a number of theoretical perspectives (e.g., Gadamerian hermeneutics) which are opposed to foundationalist notions of philosophy and criticism. The upshot of this is to locate Eliot's theory of criticism in an Aristotelian tradition of practical wisdom. The heroes are Aristotle himself, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, Margolis, Rorty, and American pragmatism generally. Anthony Savile is one of the few villains. This is a balanced, nuanced, and lucid account; it is both a rich redrawing of our portrait of Eliot as critic and a contribution to historicist hermeneutics.

The book divides into three parts. In the first (Chapters 1 to 3) Shusterman sets forth Eliot's initial effort to make criticism objective and his subsequent sense that 'impersonal objectivity or pure appreciation would greatly deplete our experience of poetry' (45). Shusterman's account of Eliot's encounter with logical atomism is unusually illuminating. Eliot used Russell's objectivism as a weapon against a critical tradition which encouraged vagueness and attention to persons not poetry. Shusterman then shows that Eliot's move from critical objectivism to a call for a criticism that includes the critic's broader commitments is not a simple consequence of his new religious beliefs, but stems from the recognition that a strict objectivism deprives poetry of the very grounds of our concern with it and thus weakens its hold upon us. Later he claims that Eliot's relativizing historicism can be reconciled with his prejudice in favour of orthodoxy in the early thirties (expressed in *The Sacred Wood*) if we understand the latter to be a strategic move in a time of cultural instability (108). Taking critical theory as part of a continuing struggle to transform and thereby maintain the literary tradition, rather than as an effort

to establish a way to get a true account of poems, will become both a pattern and principle, as Eliot, even after reaching his mature position, adopted new emphases in order to correct for intuitively perceived imbalances.

In the middle section (Chapters 4-6) Shusterman focusses on the relationship between Eliot's criticism and some major theoretical problems. The titles of Chapters 4 and 5, 'History and Essence, Pluralism and Critical Reasoning' and 'Historicism, Interpretation, and Hermeneutics' indicate the topics discussed. Chapter 4 offers, first, an account of Eliot's move to pluralism (which was not without doubts and hesitations) and, second, a Wittgensteinian theory of critical reasoning which makes aesthetic concepts radically indeterminate (91), sees critical discourse as logically pluralist (95), and emphasizes the '*historicity of art and art-appreciation*' (97). Wittgenstein's ideas are, according to Shusterman, the developed forms of Eliot's beliefs. Chapter 5 begins with an attack on Anthony Savile's criticism of Eliot's historicism and moves from there to parallels between Eliot's idea of tradition and Gadamerian hermeneutics. Chapter 6 is entitled 'Eliot on Reading: Pleasure, Games and Wisdom,' and in it Shusterman discusses the connection between pleasure and understanding and the poet's beliefs and ours. The central notion here is Eliot's idea of a 'two-stage response in reading literature' (144). We begin by accepting the 'work's world and the beliefs which inform it' (ibid.) and then we detach and 'measure it against our own views and experiences' (145). Appreciation and enjoyment are dependent on the first stage taking place, but the getting of wisdom springs from the second. The last two chapters locate Eliot's critical theory in a tradition of practical wisdom (*phronēsis*). Eliot's concept of tradition is distinguished from mere orthodoxy, and criticism is understood as part of an effort to 'make things better'; it ought not to be rooted in an obsession with the chimera of objective truth.

The main contribution of Shusterman's study is to show how rich, flexible, and complex Eliot's notion of tradition is. He does this both by tracing the changes the concept undergoes in Eliot's work and relating it to the ideas of other theorists. This frees Eliot's theory of criticism from both adulation as the source of critical authority and the belief that it is simply part of a reactionary cultural program.

As regards the question of objectivism I did not find my prejudice shaken. My guess is that pluralism and historicism look plausible because we play out current controversies and indulge our interpretive preferences by talking about books. However, a few people are

interested in recovering – tentatively, partially, and probabilistically – old meanings. That is what occupies scholars and not what makes books live. Re-writing through criticism accomplishes that. The effort to recover meanings seems more and more like archaeology as our concern with old meanings recedes, and we end up with fragments and conjectures, rather than full signifying works. The historicist describes what does in fact overwhelmingly happen, but I was not persuaded to stop believing that certain accounts of books correspond more closely than others to what the author probably meant. Whether we happen to be interested in such tentative reconstructions is another matter.

It is at times a little hard to know where Eliot leaves off and Shusterman begins. Eliot does not write as a philosopher (is that a mark of his inherent pragmatism? is a pragmatist philosophy an oxymoron?), and Shusterman often extends what he calls the ‘principle of charity’ (making an author’s works coherent) into amplificatory largesse. The reader at times has to remind himself whether a position is being explained, developed or advanced by Shusterman himself. Shusterman is quite aware of the mixed nature of his project, but that, I take it, is precisely the sort of thing a pragmatist ought, under certain circumstances, to produce.

Roger Seamon

(Department of English)

University of British Columbia

Martin Sicker

*The Judaic State: A Study in Rabbinic
Political Theory*

New York and Westport, CT: Praeger 1988.
Pp. 161. \$37.95. ISBN 0-275-92845-4.

This study of the ideal political order envisaged or implied by traditional Jewish sources is something of a *tour de force*. Consider the oxymoron ‘rabbinic ... theory’ in Sicker’s subtitle. Strictly speaking, according to the longstanding or orthodox meaning which Sicker intends, rabbis are neither theorists nor beholden to theory (whether

in a modern or in a premodern, e.g., Aristotelian, sense). A rabbi is an authoritative interpreter of the Torah – of its written text together with certain oral traditions promulgated since Pharisaic times – which he accepts as divinely revealed, binding, all-encompassing Law. Rabbis as such rarely write treatises, let alone on politics. Rabbinic thinking characteristically assumes the form of casuistic arguments (or Talmud), scripturally-inspired homilies (or Midrash), textual commentaries, legal codes, etc., as well as, occasionally, quasi-philosophical or apologetical works (e.g., Moses Maimonides' *Guide of the Perplexed*, c. 1185-90). Political teachings evidently populate and permeate the rabbinic writings, but they must be culled, distilled, construed, and generally inferred by way of the dialectical casuistry practiced by the rabbis themselves.

Where then does 'theory' fit? Its place seems problematic at best. Of Sicker's fourteen brief but informative chapters, for example, only his last eight treat rabbinic discussions of political institutions proper: priesthood (61-72), prophecy (73-86), monarchy (87-122), judiciary (123-40), and their interrelations (141-50). Here, in the most engaging part of his book, Sicker documents how the rabbinic teachings, or in many cases controversies, derive from the putative understandings of pertinent biblical texts. Yet the rabbis traditionally understand themselves as striving after a justice and peace made possible by universally valid precepts and principles which the Torah provides (149). Hence, as Sicker rightly implies, mere hermeneutical analysis of rabbinic discussions is not enough. Sicker's first seven chapters therefore try to ground those discussions in more fundamental premises concerning, e.g., human nature (7-16), society's origins (17-30), individual and polity (31-42), authority and obligation (43-51), and the general structure of the rabbinic polity (52-9). In other words, for Sicker as for any intelligent exponent of rabbinic thinking, intelligibility requires an appeal to some underlying 'theory' concerning, say, politics. The difficulty – scarcely recognized by Sicker, however – is the extent to which that 'theory' may be alien to, and ultimately at odds with, the character of rabbinic thought itself.

Sicker's account of rabbinic political 'theory' will remind philosophical readers of modern social-contract doctrines, which would derive de facto political obligations from antecedent apolitical rights. Accordingly, the 'biblical paradigm of quintessential man' endows the individual with two conflicting but reconcilable tendencies: a 'good' (or ethical) impulse and an 'evil' (or self-destructive, though controllable) one (7ff.). Created singly, humans nevertheless find that they

must cooperate in order to 'muster the resources necessary to master and subdue nature' (17). Society is therefore intrinsically egalitarian; yet because it subserves the 'true interests' of its members, justice in turn requires not mere majority rule but rule by the majority of those learned in the Law (31ff). Political authority is thus divinely delegated: Deuteronomy 16:8-21:9 'may be considered a basic constitutional framework for the Judaic polity,' mandating and regulating the conduct of its priests, prophets, kings, and judges (54). Even so, the Torah according to its rabbinic interpreters is not theocratic. Priests, exclusively the direct male descendants of the biblical Aaron, are said to represent the people before God, not vice versa; hence, however eroded their purely sacerdotal function since ancient times, their 'purposive segregation from the mainstream of Israelite society' continues to enhance their primary functions as an 'educator class' and as public servants (63). Prophets are *ad hoc*, divinely selected, outspoken critics of deficiencies in the public observance of the Law – to whom the public is unequivocally bidden by Law to pay heed, on the grounds that prophetic criticisms would ultimately strengthen Law-abidingness (79). Kings, as chief 'national executive[s]' (87), may abrogate particular laws temporarily to ward off 'any threat to the stability and well-being of the polity' (108); it follows that a king must, to say the least, practice personal moderation concerning possessions, pleasures, etc. (114f.) Finally, the 'constitutionally decentralized' judiciary is perforce hierarchical, culminating in a national high court as 'the ultimate repository of the authoritative interpretation of the Torah' (123ff., 128). Needless to say, judges, even more than other branches of the polity, must acquire competence in the Torah's broadly political as well as its narrowly legal wisdom.

Sicker fails to stress that, for the rabbis, Jews as Jews remain a nation in exile. His unwary reader may thus all too easily forget the obviously 'ideal' (i.e., somewhat counterfactual) character of the rabbinic polity. At the same time, one may wonder whether Sicker's manifestly liberal or individualistic premises can account for the continuing severity of political life as understood by the rabbis. Does Sicker adequately consider the rabbis' recognition of the deeply rooted need for strong political authority (e.g., 'Pray for the peace of the government, for without the fear of it, a man would swallow his neighbor alive.' *Pirkei avot* 3.2)? Perhaps because he draws extensively from rabbinic biblical commentaries rather than from works like Maimonides' *Guide*, Sicker here overlooks the close kinship – and of course tension – between rabbinic thought and Platonic-Aristotelian

political philosophy. According to Maimonides, for example, the Torah not only fulfills the 'ideal' political-philosophical requirements stipulated by, say, Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, but also possesses supreme political authority in the light of its being revealed Law. Perhaps the best recent corrective to Sicker's book in this regard is Leo Strauss's *Philosophy and Law: Essays Toward the Understanding of Maimonides and his Predecessors*, trans. F. Baumann (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society 1987).

Martin D. Yaffe

University of North Texas

Joe Simmons

*Vision and Spirit: An Essay on Plato's
Warrior Class*

Lanham, MD: University Press of America
1988. Pp. iv+55.

US\$16.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-6885-8);

US\$8.25 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-6886-6).

Simmons attempts to do three things: (1) to present some aspects of Greek thought which contribute to what he calls 'Plato's warrior ethos'; (2) to bring out Plato's thinking about the nature of the warrior class; (3) to compare Plato's ideas with Indian, Japanese, and medieval philosophy and with Homeric thought.

Simmons' major claims regarding Plato's conception of the warrior ethos and the training of warrior-guardians may be summarized as follows. Plato's conception of the warrior ethos exemplifies the view, held by Simmons, that one's spiritual (religious) vision is a most important component of any warrior ethos (1). Military training is a preparation for the mystic vision and is essentially ethical (iv). There is a close connection between physical discipline and spiritual training. Warriors must be trained to face the dangers of war, to develop self-control regarding their passions and appetites, and to exemplify the Platonic ideal of the integration of the self with the divine *agathon*. Preparation for war is merely a means to a specific philosophic end – 'the philosopher mystic who would enrich the polis with a tran-

scendent wisdom' and 'the emanation of this wise vision and noble character throughout the Greek community' (19, 25). Simmons concludes by stating that for Plato the development of a warrior ethos must be grounded on the life of reason, the life of the spirit, and the hard mastery of the self and weapons of war. This ethos avoids two possible mistakes. The first error would be to create a military class which is technically proficient but has no real values. The second erroneous approach would produce warriors who cannot meet the contingencies of combat because of a false spirituality or moral sensitivity (38). As indicated above, the views attributed to Plato are compared and contrasted with those found in other philosophies. Thus, for example, Simmons sees Nagarjuna's Buddhist thought as similar to Plato's insofar as both hold that initiates must be prepared for the beatific vision by moral training, but different insofar as Plato, but not Nagarjuna, holds that the capacity for this vision is to be developed by military and athletic discipline rather than meditation (14).

Simmons offers three appendices. Appendix I is a very brief, unsatisfactory defense of his understanding of Plato's concept of the Good and of the religious and mystical interpretation of Plato. Simmons begins with a restatement of some of Dodds' contentions about Plato. He then cites a story used by C.S. Lewis in his novel *Till We Have Faces* to illustrate the difference between a religious view of life and the tasks of moral philosophy. Finally, he draws on passages in Plato's *Ion*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, *Politicus*, and *Timaeus* to support his claim that Plato's vision is a religious and not simply a moral one. Appendix II presents some of Plato's criticisms of democracy and advances a speculative answer to the question, 'What would Plato think of American democracy and its ability to produce a successful military class?' (42-4). Appendix III is an annotated bibliography of some of the works used in the text.

In developing his arguments, Simmons relies heavily on others' interpretations of primary sources. Thus relatively large portions of this short work are devoted to explicating interpretations. This is especially true of the third chapter in which Simmons' account of the Homeric Greek warrior and warrior ethos is a summary of some of the work of Greek classicists. In presenting Plato's views, Simmons frequently quotes from scholars such as Friedlander, Vlastos, and Dodds, often omitting page references as well as other pertinent bibliographical details. He also uses the fiction of J.R.R. Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, and Richard Cavendish to illustrate or elaborate views he attributes to Plato. Simmons himself describes his work as a small

mosaic. This seems to be an appropriate metaphor. Unfortunately, perhaps, too many of the pieces of the mosaic are taken from secondary rather than primary sources. Yet when he takes his bits directly from Plato, Simmons sometimes distorts what Plato says and attributes views to Plato which may not be textually sound. The result may be a less than viable presentation of Plato's views and of the similarities between his warrior ethos and the views Simmons attributes to medieval, Indian, and Japanese philosophy.

Simmons intends this book as an introduction for people 'who are knowledgeable and intelligent but may not have a formal background in philosophy' (v). Those who have read Plato may have difficulties with the attribution of views such as the following to Plato: 'Time and place in war are the shadows of justice in the eternal dimension. Battle is the cosmic gateway for the birth of peace, order and justice. ... War is the sacrificial offering of all that is most dear in the redemptive process of historic fallenness' (22). Furthermore, Simmons too frequently attributes views to Plato without offering any textual support. He says, for example, that the knowledge of 'the archetypal essences of things' is 'a remembrance of that which we once knew but have forgotten through some moral fault. ... Because it is a moral fault which has caused our loss of the ideals it must be by moral training that the self is re-bound, re-spiritualized' (4). Simmons offers no account of this moral fault. Nor does he give any arguments to justify reading the remembrance (*anamnēsis*) view of learning into the *Republic's* account of the training of warrior-guardians.

As some of the above comments indicate, this is a flawed book. However, Simmons does develop an imaginatively patterned mosaic for those interested in comparing and contrasting Plato's ideas on the training of warrior-guardians with those found in eastern philosophy. Intrigued readers can begin with Simmons' mosaic and appendix III as well as primary texts, replace bits that will not stand up under careful scrutiny, and develop a better one. It is to Simmons' credit that he describes his work as a 'small beginning mosaic,' indicating his awareness of the need to do more work on the topic.

Jane S. Zembaty

University of Dayton

Walter Soffer

From Science to Subjectivity: An Interpretation of Descartes' 'Meditations'

Westport CT: Greenwood Press Inc. 1987.

Pp. xv+183. \$35.00. ISBN 0-313-25571-7.

This work is an attempt to resolve the question of Descartes' sincerity in the *Meditations*. That Descartes is dissimulating has been a minority view beginning in this century perhaps with M. Leroy, *Descartes, le philosophe au masque* (1929) and most recently with Caton's *The Origins of Subjectivity* (1973). Soffer attempts to advance the insincerity thesis while criticizing recent 'literalist' analytic interpretations (Curley, Frankfurt, Kenny, Williams, Wilson, and Beck). He also opposes Caton's view of the demise of metaphysics as a worthwhile discipline.

On Soffer's reading, the *Meditations*, despite appearances, subordinate theology and metaphysics to scientific ontology and epistemology.

Descartes's grand vision for philosophy according to Soffer is the acquisition of technological control over nature that originates in the pre-philosophical soul from the desire for mastery of nature created by self-esteem. Theoretical philosophy (method, physics, metaphysics[?]) mediates between the desire and acquisition. Is metaphysics required as a foundation for the physics, that is, to make it science? Not if the *Rules* already supply that foundation in the identification of method and physics which is precisely Soffer's argument. The corporeal world is transformed into objects of mathematics in the *Rules* thus physics is self-grounded. However, the *Meditations* and Part IV of the *Discourse* raise the interpretive problem of whether the true foundation of Cartesian science is method or metaphysics. Soffer argues that a proper reading of the *Discourse* reveals the method as foundational, while the *Meditations* is an exercise in prudence concealing Descartes's true rationalism that renders God superfluous.

In the first meditation Soffer adopts a reading in which a non-omnipotent evil genius replaces the omnipotent God in the doubt thus allowing mathematics, and thereby body as extension, to escape the doubt. Further the critique of ordinary experience smuggles the doubter in as *res cogitans* presupposing Cartesian science's elaboration of body. The doubt is not universal nor is it genuine or methodological skepticism. As Soffer explains "The methodological significance

of the doubt argument was ... the critique of cognitional powers on the basis of a dogmatic intrusion of Cartesian science' (155).

The second meditation is a dual critique of Aristotle: A critique of soul as form of the body and of substantial forms and real qualities of bodies. The first is accomplished through the establishment of *res cogitans* as the soul and the second through the establishment of *res extensa* as body in the piece of wax passage. The continuing theme is the concealed but central role of Cartesian science in both critiques. The soul as *res cogitans* derives from the presupposition of Cartesian science of body as automata that abolishes soul as form (mover of the body). The second critique, directed at substantial forms and real qualities, is carried out in the wax argument that masquerades as a phenomenological critique of prescientific experience, but unmasked operates with the same scientific presupposition as the first meditation, namely, the notion of body as extension that excludes substantial forms and real qualities.

In the central chapter, 'Theodicy', Soffer offers a wide-ranging critique of the received view that a non-deceiving God is required as the ultimate foundation for science for Descartes. He attempts to reveal how it is an insincere cover-story provided by Descartes, while, in fact, reason and theology come into conflict in the third and fourth meditations with reason prevailing. The conflict comes about because (1) the non-omnipotent evil genius who replaced God in the doubt of the first meditation is subsequently defeated by the *cogito*, and (2) God properly reappears only in the third meditation. Whether God (theology) or *cogito* (reason) is the foundation is the crucial question. That reason prevails and God is superfluous, Soffer contends, is shown by the way in which Descartes undermines the possibility of demonstrating God's veracity, for since his will is incomprehensible there is no way of determining whether goodness is an attribute possessed by God. The upshot is that reason needs no external foundation.

In the last chapter, 'Mind and Body', Soffer has another surprise for the reader. The epistemological argument for the real distinction of soul and body in the sixth meditation is not an argument for a dualism of substances. The clear and distinct ideas of soul and body are products of abstraction from the unity of soul and body, which are then employed to support the claim that they represent the real thus fulfilling certain apologetic purposes concerning immortality. The startling result of Soffer's reading is that the union of soul and body is something like an epiphenomenalism in which the soul is simply the living and thinking activity of an organic body. Soffer thinks that

the problem for Descartes is not how to explain the interaction of two entirely different substances, but how a single organism can have such diverse activities as intellection, perception, passion, etc.

Soffer's radical reading of Descartes is an intelligent, complex, unusually provocative work that in many of its individual textual forays uncovers material that startles the reader into attention. Nevertheless, I have deep reservations concerning both the overall thesis and a number of important interpretations used to support the insincerity thesis. First, Soffer's presentation of Descartes's grand project for philosophy ignores his deep and life-long concern with the theme of wisdom beginning with his earliest writings through the *Rules* to Preface to the French edition of the *Principles* in 1647. He does not wish to replace wisdom with science and technological control, thus rejecting the past and its discussions of the ideal of wisdom. He explicitly investigates this ideal and provides a theory of its nature and attainability. Second, concerning the impossibility of demonstrating God's veracity because his will is incomprehensible, it has been plausibly argued by M. Gueroult, *Descartes' Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons*, I 23, that for Descartes a proper understanding of omnipotence excludes the possibility of deception in God, thus opening another way to God's veracity. Finally, Soffer's contentions that soul and body in the sixth meditation are abstractions from the unity of the organism and there is no dualism of substances are contradicted by a letter to Mesland, 2 May 1644, in which he explicitly both rejects the abstractionist account and embraces the soul as substance.

Thomas L. Prendergast
Marquette University

Gregory J. Walters

Karl Jaspers and the Role of 'Conversion' in the Nuclear Age

Lanham, MD: University Press of America
1988. Pp. xxviii+300.

US\$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-6836-X);

US\$15.75 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-6837-8).

Since the mid-40s philosophers have regularly provided insightful analyses of nuclear weapons. During the 40s, the initial essay was published by Camus on August 8, 1945 and the initial book was published by T.V. Smith in 1946. By the mid-50s this area of applied philosophy began to enter the public debate. Of course, the best known contributions came from Russell, especially his 1959 book *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*. Nevertheless, until quite recently, the most extended treatment was Jaspers' 1958 book *Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen*. That book precipitated a debate in Germany that had parallels to, but was much more substantive than, the Russell-Hook 'debate' of 1958. Walters' book provides the first full account in English of Jaspers' positions from 1950 through 1966. In fact, his book is the first to be devoted specifically to the analysis of a single philosopher's understanding of nuclear weapons.

Jaspers' thesis regarding 'conversion' and Walters' own concern with 'christian faith' provide, respectively, the theoretical and perspectival structure of the book. Overall, Walters convincingly counters the standard interpretation of Jaspers' position in the nuclear debate. Jaspers is often presented as preferring to risk all of humanity in nuclear war to avoid the loss of freedom under totalitarianism. As such, Jaspers is frequently classified as a right-wing critic of the Soviet Union. Walters situates Jaspers' remarks in the historical context of Germany during the Cold War era and the systematic context of Jaspers' entire philosophy. Moreover, on the basis of Jaspers' own shifts during the 60s, as well as his qualifications even in his 1958 book, Walters is able to use Jaspers' position to argue against the use of nuclear weapons.

The first three chapters give background material. The first chapter shows how Jaspers' persecution under Nazification led to his turn to political philosophy in the post-war years. Although Jaspers was initially a leading voice in debates over the proper post-war political path for Germany, he increasingly addressed the problems posed by the atom bomb. In the second chapter, Walters begins reassessing

characterization of Jaspers as 'the philosopher of NATO.' Jaspers actually viewed the threats of nuclear annihilation or totalitarianism as symptomatic of a spiritual crisis. In presenting Jaspers' view of history, Walters brings out that Jaspers actually regarded socialism positively. His reservation concerned its implementation, especially the dangers associated with total planning. The third chapter broadens the focus by addressing Jaspers' 'foundational thinking.' This overview can be skipped by those familiar with Jaspers' philosophy; it does little toward directly clarifying Jaspers' position on nuclear weapons.

The fourth chapter is the core of the book in relation to Jaspers' pronouncements on nuclear weapons and the reactions of the German academic community. In his notes, Walters meticulously traces the various sources, providing valuable quotations from key German texts, as well as his own quite competent translations. Hereby, Walters greatly aids scholars interested in exploring how the topic of nuclear weapons was debated philosophically in the German literature of the 50s. Equally important is Walters' demonstration that Jaspers saw as uncertain the thesis that humanity was fated to be destroyed by either nuclear war or totalitarianism. For Jaspers, rational communication might allow humanity to escape these alternatives.

Walters is particularly concerned with Jaspers' concept of 'conversion' and devotes the next three chapters to the changes in politics, science, and religion that Jaspers felt were necessary. Perhaps most relevant is Walters' treatment in the seventh chapter of Jaspers' call for a philosophical faith which regards all absolute creeds as relative historical symbols. Also interesting is his brief treatment in the sixth chapter of the prospect for shifting from violence to 'loving struggle.' Nevertheless, these chapters primarily provide a fairly general exposition of Jaspers' position and will not add much to the understanding of those familiar with Jaspers' work.

The eighth and final chapter is an important one. In this critique of Jaspers, Walters stresses some very basic experiences with others that receive insufficient attention in Jaspers' analyses. In citing the phenomenon of unconditional belief in others, Walters calls for a 'theology of the enemy' which stresses 'the otherness of Christ and God's unconditional love for all people, including the Soviet people' (237). Enriching his analysis by drawing upon contemporary philosophical writings on the nuclear debate, Walters applies Jaspers' critique of totalitarianism to its technological manifestation in pursuits such as

Star Wars. 'Nuclearism' itself functions for the superpowers as an absolute worldview and may represent 'the far greater threat to humanity' (240). For this reason, those who value freedom and oppose totalitarianism as much as Jaspers must now direct their struggle primarily against nuclearism.

Anti-Soviet arguments still abound, and Jaspers' work continues to be cited in support of or as an example of these arguments. Given the on-going nature of debates over US-Soviet relations and the threat of nuclear war, a careful analysis of Jaspers' supposed classic formulation of the anti-totalitarian position was long overdue. Walters' analysis shows the rather limited validity of the standard interpretation of Jaspers' view on nuclear weapons. And in his critique of Jaspers, Walters has provided fresh insights into the philosophical and religious bases for overcoming the image of the enemy. For these reasons, this book will be of considerable value to those who write on Jaspers' political thought and to those who are involved with issues of war and peace as an area of philosophical research.

William C. Gay

University of North Carolina at Charlotte

Alan R. White

Methods of Metaphysics

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
(for Croom Helm) 1988. Pp. 203.

US\$37.50 (cloth ISBN 0-7099-5234-1);

US\$11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7099-5233-3).

M.M. consists of three sections presenting 1) the systems of five classical metaphysicians (Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, Leibniz and Bradley); 2) three rejections of metaphysics (Kant, the Logical Positivists, Wittgenstein); and 3) attempts by three recent writers (Collingwood, Wisdom and Lazerowitz) to rehabilitate metaphysics. Each essay on an individual philosopher displays White's usual synoptic flair, painstaking accuracy, balance, clarity without oversimplification, and utter absence of waffle. The book thus achieves its first aim of being a substantial aid to students: it could safely and profitably be recommended

to any student as furnishing a high quality précis of the main doctrines of Plato, Leibniz, or whoever – not so much an introduction to each as a full outline to structure revision or help sort out issues before essay writing.

M.M. is not just a brief history or encyclopaedia of philosophy, however. White intends: to see how far metaphysics has been an attempt to go beyond and below science; to examine the strength of the claim that (particular fallacious arguments apart) metaphysics errs fatally in trying to discover knowledge of what is beyond our experience (perhaps because this notion is unintelligible); and finally to assess attempts either to bypass the objections to metaphysical system-building or to find a defensible alternative to it. In Section I, he finds in his five metaphysicians a pattern which is analogous to, though in crucial respects importantly different from, that of science (7). This consists in starting from a particular problem (for the scientist the *empirical* problem of explaining an aberrant observation; for the metaphysician the *logical* problem of accounting for the nature and behaviour of certain concepts) attempting to solve it by applying 'a certain principle or principles of whose power and efficacy they have been convinced for other reasons' (8) (e.g., Newton's law of gravity; Plato's principle that particulars must be instances of general things) and concluding with 'the hypothesising or postulating of the existence of unobserved items additional to or underlying those observed items with which the enquiry started' (9). In the last step metaphysics parts company with science since *its* hypothesised unobserved items are supersensibles, observable, if at all in any sense, only 'after death, by the eye of the mind' (9).

The elegant essay that forms the conclusion of the book contains the thesis for which the rest is solid preparation. Kant and Wittgenstein have been seen to have some powerful criticisms to make of metaphysics. (And of course Kant has retained his own supersensibles – the noumena.) The rehabilitators, Collingwood, Wisdom and Lazerowitz, have been given their day in court but found to be misguided and ambivalent. Now White presents his own case against the transcendent conclusions of the classical metaphysicians, setting it out against a careful refutation of the mistaken, anything-but-careful, criticisms of the Logical Positivists.

White's case is that the metaphysicians have always prosecuted their enterprise with assurance and tenacity because they knew themselves to be employing 'a valid pattern of argument' (183) – the same pattern which is admirably employed by the scientists in hypothesis-

ing entities not actually experienced. Admittedly, there are differences between the scientific positing of unobserved entities and that of the metaphysician. The metaphysician sees his unobservables as 'the *necessary* explanation to account in a logical way for the existence of what we normally experience' (180) whereas scientists typically just say the phenomena *could* be explained if there were Xs. The scientist invokes an empirical law as a second premise (the first states the given phenomenon needing explanation): the metaphysician invokes what he regards as an obvious or proved conceptual principle. Scientific theories positing unobservables allow predictions which in turn test rival theories: there is no such predictive adjudication of metaphysical rivalries. Finally, the metaphysician's supersensibles are not in physical space, though neither are they simply models: scientific unobservables may even ultimately be agreed to be in-principle-unobservable but this will not rob them of spatial location.

White's argument is that none of these differences between scientific unobservables and metaphysical supersensibles offers any support to the positivists' claim that talk of Forms or Monads is either meaningless or unverifiable (or one because the other). 'If the metaphysicians' principles are ... intended to be conceptual, not empirical, then it is, although true, not a fair objection that, in this respect, metaphysical statements are unverifiable *by experience*' (184). 'The terms for metaphysical entities gain a meaning from the system somewhat as the terms in, for example, Euclid's geometry or Newton's dynamics gain a meaning from their system' (194). Not observation then, but good argument, could verify a conceptual conclusion, so White devotes care and time to what the positivists neglected, testing the conceptual principles upon which the classical metaphysicians relied in arguing for the existence of their supersensibles. It is with regret that he concludes that all the conceptual principles advanced by Plato et al. are guilty of 'specific logical fallacies peculiar to each metaphysician' (200). The issue of verifiability, then, was never more than a red herring. The reason the existence of Forms, Monads, etc. cannot be proved is *not* that these terms are meaningless (though they may have a lamentable tendency to conjure up misleading analogous pictures): rather it is that such things *could not* exist (as a cube equal in volume to other cubes cannot be). They are 'conceptually false, not something nonsensical' (194). While White has not seen an argument that convinces him that any metaphysical entity is rightly posited, neither can he see that 'belief in extra entities or in different features must necessarily be mistaken' (200).

Offered a list of five purportedly representative anything's, it is always tempting to ask 'Why was so-and-so left off?' and 'Is such-and-such *really* representative?' It would be interesting to know why White does not focus on Descartes. And perhaps White would have some difficulty portraying Cartesian created minds as 'supersensibles' in his use of the term. (For one thing, they would seem to have spatial location.) But this is cavilling. White has given us an excellent and meticulously supported account of the classical metaphysician as 'superscientist'. He has taken metaphysics seriously; exposed the weaknesses of its celebrated critics; presented his own far more trenchant (if less flashy) critique and left a heady challenge to anyone who aspires to establish the *bona fides* of any transcendent entities to be accepted with the unobservables of science.

Janice Thomas

Heythrop College, University of London

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