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Mailed in May 1988

Thomas M. Alexander.
John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience and Nature: The Horizons of Feeling.
Albany: State University of New York Press 1987. Pp xxiv+325.
US $44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-425-6);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-426-4).

This admirable book attempts three inter-related tasks. First there is the attempt to produce 'a more coherent understanding' (xiii) of a philosopher who had fallen into neglect. Such an attempt is a timely one when Dewey has been startlingly enshrined by Rorty, along with Wittgenstein and Heidegger, as one of those who 'deconstructed' the absolutist pretensions of 'traditional' philosophy. Part of the interest of the present work, indeed, is that if Alexander's reading of Dewey is correct, the Rorty interpretation may seem less convincing (see p. xi and p. 277 where we are told that the importance of Dewey lies not in his 'negative "deconstruction" of the "tradition"' but in his 'courageous promise of a creative yet critical vision of human life.')

Second, there is the attempt to defend Dewey's centrally important *Art and Experience* against the charge, made by Pepper and Croce, that it rests upon premises more in keeping with idealism than Dewey's avowed empiricism. Third, there is the attempt throughout not merely to give an exposition of Dewey's work, but to advocate the merits of the analysis he offers of the ways in which we exist in relation to the world. Although the work ends with a somewhat hesitant-looking assertion that 'if Dewey's philosophy has been successful' then important consequences follow (277), the tone throughout is one that suggests a belief on the part of the author that Dewey's philosophy is on the right lines.

The first task, the exposition of Dewey's philosophy, is a very considerable achievement. Alexander is a scholar who has immersed himself in the vast corpus of primary and secondary sources, worked through them with sympathy and understanding, and who can tell, with enviable lucidity, the story of Dewey's philosophy, from its earliest idealist leanings through to its consummation in the vision of art and aesthetic experience as the culmination of nature and, to use Dewey's own description, as 'the greatest intellectual achievement in the history of mankind.' I have no doubt that there will be scholarly debates about the details of Alexander's chronicle, but anyone wishing to make a start in acquiring a non-superficial understanding of Dewey's work now has an excellent guide. (Those who like to dip into a book in order to test the waters before purchase might like to try, as an example of what Alexander can do, a few pages from page 129 onwards, where he glosses Dewey's important paper, 'The

Reflex Arc Concept in Philosophy' in a judicious weaving of exposition, quotation and comment. The elegant characterisation of instrumentalism on page 148 is equally admirable.)

Alexander's exposition reveals at almost every turn how Dewey either anticipated or simultaneously discovered things to be found in Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Piaget and Langer. The striking omission is any reference to Goodman. Time and again one is struck by the similarity between Goodman's view that we are not passive in perception but 'take and make' our world, and the attribution to Dewey of the view that 'the organism determines its environment' (133). I find also pregnant anticipations of Popper's view of our intellectual journey as one of conjecture and refutation and MacIntyre's view of the centrality of narrative to the understanding of human behaviour.

I am not sure that I find the completion of the second and third attempted tasks that I have mentioned so convincing, although the positions taken merit the most careful scrutiny and considerable further scholarly debate. Thus, first, I am not sure that Alexander does entirely absolve Dewey from the charge made by Croce that there is an idealism lurking in Dewey's work. Croce was wrestling with the problem, that any dualist has, of what to say about the relation between the mind and the environment with which it is confronted. He resolved that task by eliminating the dualism in favour of the mind, so that reality becomes what the mind makes out of the raw material of automatic sensation. (This, incidentally, leads me to wonder about Alexander's claim on p. 214 that 'both Croce and Santayana, in the last analysis, hold to the division between the inner and the outer.' This seems to be explicitly denied in *Filosofia della practica*, 6th edition, p. 147). Croce's problem with Dewey was whether this philosopher, who wished to preserve both a world and a mind interacting creatively with it, was able to deal with the difficulties inherent in that view. Croce was also, I think, personally piqued that Dewey's work in aesthetics contained many ideas close to his own and, rather unkindly I feel, wondered whether he had 'availed himself of some Italian authors' with the insinuation that Dewey had merely borrowed his ideas – see Alexander, p. 2.

We have seen the imputation to Dewey of the view that the organism creates its environment. The question then remains how this is compatible with the claim, also imputed to Dewey, that there exists a world, independent of the creative mind, with which the mind interacts. We are told, for example on page 169, that the world is not 'unstructured' but that there must be 'a certain order to it' which is 'prior to any activity.' Alexander is excellent at tracing the weavings of Dewey's thought about this problem, and of characterising his answer. But I am not sure that he demonstrates how, on Dewey's ac-

count, knowledge that there is a prexistent order is to be obtained. Hence the claim made by Croce and Pepper that there are incompatible elements in Dewey's work, namely the claim that mind makes the world and the claim that the world exists with an order that it possesses independently of mind.

As to Alexander's third task, the demonstration of the lasting importance and truth of Dewey's philosophy, I can say little on a topic on which Alexander has vigorously re-opened the debate. Underlying this is a respect for Dewey's of art as the consummatory moment which gives us an exemplar of the unity of our experience, purged of all contrary elements, that we always seek in our lives. On this I can only make the short comment that this may take too short a way with the possibility of attaining such a unity (on which see the remarks towards the end of MacIntyre's *After Virtue*). The truth, as Post-structuralists might argue, is that a story of division is the truest reflection of self. One of the great merits of Alexander's excellent book is that by giving so careful an exposition of the contrary position, he has staked out the position against which recent modes of thought must test themselves.

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Jane Bennett.
Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment: Nature and Politics in a post-Hegelian Era.
New York: New York University Press 1987. Pp. x+166.
US $30.00. ISBN 0-8147-1095-6

In her brief essay, Bennett proposes to provide no less than a paradigm for interpreting modernity and, in her last chapter, a solution for all its ills. The paradigm is that of a dialectic of 'Faith' and 'Enlightenment'; the problem to which it is applied is one of homelessness. Modernity, Bennett claims with Nietzsche, longs for a lost sense of belonging integrally within the world. The strategy of 'Faith' is to project an enchanted vision of the world that would make it seem warm and conforting; that of 'Enlightenment' is one of disenchanting the world and mastering it with technology. Both strategies are flawed because they seek to impose an order upon the world. Ben-

nett asks that we 'un-think' both the 'Faith' and the 'Enlightenment' strategy and acknowledge the recalcitrance of nature.

That is the schema which Bennett presents in her Preface and elaborates in the four short essays that make up the book. In the first of those, Bennett presents her reading of the dialectic of 'Faith' and 'Enlightenment' in Hegel. Enlightenment is a critique of the enchanted world of Faith, perceived as value-laden and meaningfully ordered. Since Bennett regards that perception as an arbitrary imposition, she regards it as unstable and vulnerable to a reason which disenchants the world, leaving utility as the sole link between man and the world, and freedom, now understood as mastery, as the sole goal. However, as the longing for home persists, so does faith, albeit modified, launching the ongoing debate of Faith and Enlightenment.

Bennett appears to believe that these two categories provide all the key we need for unlocking the problems of modernity. Thus in the second chapter, devoted to environmentalism, we learn that it is an expression of the longing for a home. 'Environmental Management' approaches (the usual term is 'technocentric,' though Bennett does not use it) represent an Enlightenment attempt at mastering nature while 'Natural Holistic' approaches ('ecocentric' in common usage) seek to reenchant the world. Both, however, are flawed: the first because it treats the world as no more than raw material and so cannot generate an environmental ethic, the second because it does not acknowledge the destructive aspect of nature and because it 'is at odds with the modern institutional network that presupposes and engenders a demystified world' (70) –something, incidentally, that ecocentric thinkers themselves consider a virtue, not a flaw.

The same categorial schema enables Bennett to interpret modern political theory with the same assurance in her third chapter. Political theories prove once more to be of either the 'Enlightenment' or the 'Faith' variety. The first fall into two subcategories, either individualistic (presumably Rawlsian, though Bennett chooses one Theodore J. Lowi as an example) or collectivistic (presumably the Frankfurt school: the author examines Jürgen Habermas). For both, the problem is that when freedom is understood as mastery, it requires an extension of power which threatens freedom. The second variety, here described as 'attuned' and represented by Charles Taylor, rightly points out that the dilemma is a result of the quest for domination, yet to set aside that deeply rooted quest would once again require a massive use of power. Thus here again both the 'Faith' and the 'Enlightenment' approaches prove flawed.

In a brief concluding chapter–24 pages–Bennett tells us that in both cases the flaw is that neither approach respects the 'otherness' of nature. This might come as a surprise to most ecocentric thinkers whose central point is precisely a call for such respect. However, Ben-

nett bases her claim on the authority of Michel Foucault and on her own supposition that since ecocentric thinkers experience nature as meaningfully ordered, they must think of it as existing *for the sake of man*. Bennett apparently takes it for granted that all meaning must be bestowed by humans and so concludes that recognition of nature as meaningfully ordered precludes a recognition of nature as genuinely other. Her own solution, unfortunately only briefly adumbrated, is a 'fractious holism' which gives up the longing for home and harmony as the last vestige of human domination and recognises the recalcitrance of nature.

Bennett's conclusion is somewhat surprising. It seems to depend on her assumption that 'other' must mean 'recalcitrant' and that therefore ecocentric writers, if they wish to think of nature as meaningfully ordered, must deny its otherness and present it as existing *for man*. Yet the writer whom she chooses to represent ecocentrism (or, in her terminology, 'natural holism'), Erazim Kohák, most emphatically denies precisely that. Like all ecocentric thinkers–for instance Neil Evernden, *The Natural Alien*, and others–he insists that nature is meaningfully ordered *for its own sake*, not man's. To do justice to his, Bennett would have to modify her preconceived categorial schema.

That schema is itself highly problematic. A number of writers, as Jan Patoćka in 'The Two Senses of Reason and Nature in the German Enlightenment' (1942) or Morris Berman in *The Reenchantment of the World* (1981), have pointed out the fundamental conflict between a computational and a holistic conception of reason *within* the Enlightenment. Most ecocentric writers in fact treat that conflict, rather than that between Faith and Enlightenment, as basic for interpreting modernity. Why should we choose the Hegelian schema which Bennett favors?

The answer can only come from the respective ability of the two schemata to account for the evidence, and for that we would need the evidence: massive, painstaking scholarship documenting scrupulously and in detail what humans, whether environmental writers or political theorists, in fact thought and wrote, as, for instance, Keith Thomas does in his *Man and the Natural World*. Unfortunately, such scholarship is absent from Bennett's essay. Her bibliographies are surprisingly spotty and idiosyncratic for an author doing research in this area while her presentations of the material she chooses for examination are brief and superficial–Lowi warrants four pages, Kohák six. Nor does Bennett always respect the otherness of the material she reports: her treatment of Christopher Stone is a classic case of material made to fit a preconceived pattern (51-3).

All of that is most unfortunate, since it leaves Bennett's claims–that modern thought is a quest for home by mastery or attunement

but that both those strategies are flawed by a residual tendency to humanise the world one way or another, a flaw that can be overcome by recognising the radical otherness of nature – suspended in conceptual mid-air, without visible means of support. *Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment*, alas, is not a book of scholarshp, but a brief imaginative essay sketching, in bold and extremely general strokes, a particular working hypothesis. Well and good: the proposed working hypothesis, though not self-evidently true, is perceptive and provocative. However, the work is yet to come, and, without it, it is hard to judge whether the working hypothesis works.

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Radu Bogdan, ed.
Jaakko Hintikka.
Norwood, MA: Reidel 1987. Pp. ix+382.
US $89.00 (cloth: ISBN 90-277-2292-7);
US $29.00 (paper: ISBN 90-277-2402-4).

This eighth volume of the *Profiles* series consists of a 'Self-Profile' by Hintikka, a collection of essays (in this case, eleven) on Hintikka's work, and his replies. There is also a bibliography of Hintikka's works.

Some of the included papers are primarily expository and introductory. Notable among these is Veikko Rantala's 'Constituents,' which is the most accessible introduction available to the study of distributive normal forms and constituents. Other papers are exploratory and critical, e.g., Barry Richards on game-theoretical semantics, and David Harrah on Hintikka's analysis of questions. The editorial decision whether to include papers primarily expository or critical apparently was motivated by considerations of familiarity, thus Rantala's piece and Rantala and Tselishchev's 'Surface Information and Analyticity,' on the one hand, and critical papers on possible worlds semantics, questions, different modes of trans-world individuation, epistemic logic, etc., on the other, are present.

Hintikka's contributions to contemporary philosophical thought range over a huge area, and in many cases are quite profound. Portions of Hintikka's work are known to students of ancient philosophy, to mathematical logicians, to philosophers of language and

epistemologists, and to linguists. It is therefore no surprise that not every aspect of Hintikka's work, nor even every important contribution, is represented in the present collection. Still, it would have been nice to see a discussion of Hintikka's use of the model set-model system apparatus in providing a semantics of *quantified* intensional logic, as in his excellent 'Existential Presuppositions and Uniqueness Presuppositions' (in *Models for Modalities* [1969]). Model sets and systems are presented in this volume in Kenneth Collier's 'Hintikka's Epistemic Logic,' but only for propositional epistemic logic. Also notable in their absence are discussions of Hintikka's work on Wittgenstein, and of Hintikka's famous analysis of the logic of the *cogito*.

The reader already acquainted with much of Hintikka's work is likely to be surprised at the editor's selection of contributors and their topics. No one can quarrel with the choice of Rantala to write on constituents, Harrah on questions, Esa Saarinen on cross-identification, or David Woodruff Smith 'On Objects and Worlds of Thought in the Philosophy of Hintikka.' Harrah's paper suffers from its brevity, but remains a stimulating examination of apparent weaknesses of Hintikka's theory of questions, and of possible directions for further elaborations. This paper complements his 1979 *Nous* review of Hintikka's *The Semantics of Questions and the Questions of Semantics*. Saarinen is of course eminently qualified to write on transworld identity, concerning which Hintikka has provided some of our deepest (and most difficult!) thoughts. Smith established his credentials with *Husserl and Intentionality* (coauthored with Ronald MacIntyre) and related papers, and examines the relations of Hintikka's views on intentionality to those of Husserl and Meinong.

Other editorial decisions seem less reasonable. Why did Bogdan have Kenneth Collier write on 'Hintikka's Epistemic Logic'? (Was Risto Hilpinen asked?) Collier's paper is disappointing, focusing on three issues in propositional epistemic logic without shedding much light on them: (i) the KK thesis, (ii) the problem of logical omniscience, and (iii) the claim that Hintikka's epistemic logic fails to capture any pretheoretical notion of knowledge. These are all old issues, and Collier's treatments of them are not compelling. For instance, (i) he fails to consider whether there are any considerations supporting the KK thesis (e.g. Hintikka's employment of it in resolving Moore's Paradox). (ii) He appears to think that logical omniscience is a principle of Hintikka's epistemic logic in the same sense in which the KK thesis is a principle: this leads Collier to introduce a deducibility turnstile into the object language. As Hintikka remarks, this is a dangerous idea when extended beyond the propositional case. (iii) Collier ignores more or less subtle methodological questions concerning the bearing of 'ordinary language' epistemology upon epistemic logic.

Barry Richards' contribution, 'Game-Theoretical Semantics and Logical Form,' is an effort to relate Hintikka's theory of semantical games to fundamental issues in the theory of meaning. Many have noticed that game-theoretical semantics appears to have some potential for elaborating an antirealistic theory of meaning, and much of Richards' essay is devoted to following up this idea. Richards considers in particular the relation of game-theoretical semantics to the principle of bivalence and to intuitionistic logic. His discussion of these points is inconclusive. He also discusses the role of Skolem functions as representing the existence of winning strategies in semantical games; higher-order functions relate (a) to the discussion of alternative logics, and (b) to the subgame treatment of donkey sentences and related phenomena.

Richards' essay is by no means out of place in this volume, but the editor should have included a discussion of game-theoretical semanitics from the perspective of linguistic semantics. (Was Lauri Carlson contacted by Bogdan?) The absence of discussions of ordering principles, the *any*-thesis, Hintikka's nonrecursivity argument, and informational independence is inexcusable.

Hintikka's 'Self-Profile' includes a very brief autobiography, but consists mostly of an extended discussion of what he takes to be his important ideas. This is fascinating reading, though it is possible that the reader acquainted with Hintikka's work will disagree about the relative significance of the various contributions Hintikka mentions. The replies to the essays are typically very useful, both for pointing out mistakes and misunderstandings in the papers, and for expanding upon and clarifying features of the work under discussion. Hintikka's thought is often difficult, and many of his replies will aid the reader in grasping his ideas. Besides those mentioned above, the volume also contains papers on 'Hintikka's Inductive Logic' (Marco Mondadori), 'Hintikka's Views on Perception' (Romane Clark), 'Hintikka on Modalities and Determinism in Aristotle' (Richard Bosley), and 'Hintikka's Ontology' (Robert Kraut). The Hintikka bibliography included is partially annotated.

On the whole, this book is not a success: far too many of Hintikka's insights are completely neglected. If the purpose of the *Profiles* series is, as stated in the editorial introduction, 'to inform both professional philosophers and a larger readership about what is going on, who's who, and who does what in contemporary philosophy and logic,' then Bogdan has not served that purpose in this book. This is not to say that none of the included essays are successful, though: the quality of the included papers is so far from uniform that any judgment of the book as a whole is bound to mislead. Some of the essays are quite valuable, and one of them (Rantala's) is priceless.

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J. Budziszewski.
The Resurrection of Nature: Political Theory and the Human Character.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1986.
Pp. 218. US $22.50. ISBN 0-8014-1900-X.

Although not caused by the publication of MacIntyre's *After Virtue* the rash of books on virtue-based theories of morality largely dates from it. The present work falls squarely within this ancient yet currently vital tradition. Rather than applying virtue ethics to a specific sphere such as medicine or education however, Budziszewski has undertaken a restoration of the general theory, the revivification of Aristotle's and classical philosophy's central moral notion.

B. argues that the eclipse of virtue ethics in modern times is in part the result of the vagueness of the classical conception of human nature that combined both moral and non-moral characteristics in its definition. This vagueness lent a specious plausibility to an array of arguments and objections – all more or less related to the naturalistic fallacy – and all of which, according to B., are readily answerable. Thus he claims that although a moral fact cannot be derived from a non-moral fact it is obviously true that there are moral facts, e.g., 'That the rule of human life is to seek the comprehensive good, that the measure of this good is the rational activity by which we understand ourselves and order our lives according to purposes' (44). B. claims that unlike Aristotle he does not consider this to be deducible from non-moral facts about humans. But it is not to be rejected as it has been by critics of naturalism simply because Aristotle's argument is fallacious. Rather this statement of normative human nature should be taken as an undemonstrable first principle. 'This is our natural good simply in this sense: in no other understanding of our full and appropriate development can souls so constituted as we are come to rest' (39). Leaving aside the pivotal question why coming to rest is such an obvious and generic good the task of the remainder of the book is to show that this premise is vindicated by its rendering our moral experience optimally intelligible. Thus B. pays scant attention to critics beyond the pale. His focus is upon the detailed development of a moral theory within the assumptions of ethical naturalism.

An interesting internal theme is the question of the rational unity of a life, for in a moral theory in which good character is more fundamental than right action this issue demands attention. B. not surprisingly favours MacIntyre's narrative model of the unity of a human life over the Rawlsian alternative. But on a crucial point they disagree. As B. puts it, MacIntyre rejects ethical naturalism as 'metaphysical biology' only to opt for what B. terms 'metaphysical

history.' B. seems to believe that the acceptance of one or the other is a matter of arbitrary choice and that naturalism provides clear and universal standards of judgment in contrast to the well-neigh unintelligible ones of historicism. But in order for B. to make this bald claim he must ignore MacIntyre's arguments linking the narrative account of persons to traditions and thus to an account of persons as historical, not merely biological beings. Further it is a nice question whether ethical naturalism is itself even consistent with a narrative view of persons. I frankly doubt it, though for B. this issue, crucial to the coherence of his position, is not even considered.

Critics of virtue ethics observe that the key concepts 'virtue' and 'good' are defined in terms of each other making for a degree of circularity. In addition they notice that the definition of both may vary among sincere persons where there is a lack of consensus. Thus they conclude that virtue ethics is an inadequate basis for moral judgments. B. acknowledges that the slate of specific virtues has varied from society to society but argues that these differences though real enough are compatible with a higher level identity. Thus he claims that there are discoverable and definite 'dimensions of excellence,' something like meta-virtues, which transcend the cultural relativity of the particular virtues and which thus provide a non-consensual standard of judgment. But the plain fact of radical disagreement not merely regarding what the virtues are but whether virtue ethics is anything more than conformism suggests that B.'s bland confidence is misplaced.

Nowhere more clearly than in political life does it seem that virtue ethics conflicts with dominant values for it is a commonplace of modern liberalism that politics is of instrumental not ultimate worth. B. is at his most persuasive in undercutting such claims. He notes quite correctly, that although modern 'social choice theory' and other text-book accounts of political institutions are rigorously instrumentalist they are a distortion of contemporary political reality. In contrast he cites J.S. Mill as the legitimate theoretician of liberalism, and shows convincingly that Mill, like Aristotle, looked upon politics both as an instrumental good and as an area for the development of one's talents. Indeed it is the virtue-ethics component of Mill's poltical theory that justifies the educative aspect of political participation even at the sacrifice of professional efficiency. But to notice that virtue ethics is an aspect of Mill's political theory is insufficient to show, as B. intends, that ethical naturalism might ground liberal egalitarianism. It may just be that Mill is inconsistent. More basically the John Stuart Mill who speaks of man as 'a progressive being' is no more an ethical naturalist than Aristotle is 'a judicious utilitarian.'

A book such as this would not have been published thirty years ago. This very fact suggests that the history of ideas needs to be taken

more seriously than B.'s ahistorical naturalism will allow. Contemporary philosophic culture is increasingly receptive to Aristotelian notions. The assault on dualism with its attendant rejection of logical privacy makes a social morality of aspiration both more plausible and more attractive than an individualist morality of duty. Also the popularity of pragmatism and hence neonaturalism lends credence to the original model. But one would be mistaken if he took these features of contemporary philosophy as providing any justification for ethical naturalism even though they go some way in explaining its relative popularity. Paradoxically, contemporary pragmatism and its cognates tell against the very naturalism they make credible, for they recommend a picture of the human condition as unfixed and historically contingent. Nonetheless their radical historicism, by logically denying standards of intelligibility for the historical past, provides the collective amnesia that renders ahistorical naturalism compelling. This suggests that we must not only get beyond ethical naturalism but also beyond the emerging self-image of the age.

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Jonathan Dancy.
Berkeley: An Introduction.
Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press;
New York: Basil Blackwell 1987. Pp. 165.
Cdn $68.95: US $34.95
(cloth: ISBN 0-631-14525-7);
Cdn $23.50: US $12.95
(paper: ISBN 0-631-15509-0).

This is an admirable book. The author sets out 'to render Berkeley's doctrines ... accessible and interesting to comparatively inexperienced readers, and in particular to show the sorts of ways in which they contribute to contemporary [1980s] philosophical thought' (1-2). He takes pains, at every point, to make the philosophical issues plain. He provides exceptionally careful analyses, and judicious assessments, of each of the main arguments. To keep things clean, he eschews the trappings of scholarship: save in a concluding section helpfully highlighting the differences between his own and other interpretations, he makes little explicit reference to the work of other writers on Ber-

keley. He is persistently attentive (but with minimal attention to names, and without anachronism) to central, present-day philosophical concerns. The austere result is a rendering of Berkeley that is unusually stimulating both as interpretation and as philosophy. The older hand, as well as the inexperienced reader, must read with profit.

Dancy starts with Berkeley's attack on Locke's realism. For Berkeley, the idea-based empiricism he shares with Locke is inconsistent with any attempt to provide 'a complete account of the world and our knowledge of it which ... sees that world as existing completely independent of the mind' (7). It is inconsistent, too, with Locke's representative realism, and with his doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. Many, at least, of Berkeley's many arguments are designed to display the *inconceivability* of Locke's claims. With some success, he deploys his Likeness Principle ('an idea can be like nothing but an idea') against each of the components of Locke's all-in theory: it undercuts Locke's representative realism which construes representation as resemblance; since the relevant properties of ideas are 'essentially phenomenal' (15) they can't be assigned to the 'absolutely conceived' world of Locke's primary qualities; and if conceiving an object requires having an idea that resembles it, we cannot, given the Likeness Principle, conceive of anything other than an idea. Doubts that the Likeness Principle is up to its appointed tasks can be stilled by recognizing (see below) its dependence on Berkeley's attack on abstract ideas.

For Dancy's Berkeley, Locke's realism requires Locke's doctrine of abstraction, but *that* doctrine requires the impossible. The impossibility is that of conceiving of an object 'in one way and not in another, when the two are necessarily present or absent together in the way in which determinate and determinable go necessarily together' (27-8). Locke's realism requires both the stripping away, from our ideas, of everything essentially mental and the retention of something substantial as remainder. And Berkeley's point is that 'if we are to start from experience (ideas) we can never move beyond it to a conception of something to which the possibility of being experienced is merely accidental' (39). The Likeness Principle follows: if we cannot conceive of anything to which mentality is accidental, an idea can be like nothing but another idea. As Dancy notes, the attack on Locke's realism has a unity seldom noticed.

His attack on abstract ideas rules out phenomenalism as an (attractively secular) empiricist alternative to Berkeley's idealism. Surprisingly, however, a choice between *direct* realism and Berkeley's idealism (the two being otherwise on an epistemological par) must turn on attendant treatments of the primary/secondary distinction. It is characteristic of realism to make primary qualities primary if only (as in contemporary versions) by an insistence on their greater

distance from the sensory, their role in theory. Berkeley, rejecting such primacy, does not (but could) make *secondary* qualities theoretical enough.

God, the support of Berkeley's idealism, guarantees that 'reality has [not] been expunged' (42). Pace Jonathan Bennett, the independence and continuity of objects form part of a *single* argument for God's existence: spatiality and reidentification require continuity and so existence 'in the mind of God' (the intelligibility of which doctrine Dancy ingeniously defends). In modern anti-realism, Dancy remarks, 'the world is somehow constituted by the sorts of ways in which it does or at least could appear to us': such theories threaten to 'contract . . . the world by restricting it to those elements on which we can get some grasp' (75). Berkeley's theological anti-realism runs no such danger.

Empiricist theories of scientific explanation, including sophisticated regularity theories, run to anti-realist and quasi-realist variants, run counter to realist intuitions about causality and necessity, and tend to make scientific truth indeterminate. Berkeley, invoking God, takes a different tack (at least he suggests a different one in *Principles* and *Alciphron*). Viewing science as a systematic attempt to learn 'the language of God' (109) he offers 'an interpretative or semantic account' (124) of scientific explanation. The account has surprising advantages. It provides a Berkeleyan way to accommodate intricacy. It captures *something* of the realist's intuitions by introducing a relation of semantic necessity among events. It eliminates the problem of induction by construing methodological problems in science as problems about translation. To *the* obvious objection Dancy replies, on Berkeley's behalf, that every property is *both* semantic and non-semantic.

The very weapons (the Likeness Principle, the anti-abstractionism) that serve Berkeley's anti-realism so well serve also, Dancy remarks with 'glum resignation' (149), to subvert idealism. His account of human agency conflicts with his theological account of objectivity. His Likeness Principle leads to the inconceivability of spirits (Berkeley's introduction of 'notions' signaling the difficulty). His anti-abstractionism, when directed to the problem of conceiving others, leads in turn to the inconceivability of one's self: if one attempts to conceive of others in terms of the *content* of their minds one falls foul of the anti-abstractionism; if one seeks to conceive of others directly as *owners* of ideas the method one must use reveals a thing of which there couldn't be a second example, and so can't even reveal one's own self.

Dancy resists the suggestion that the damage it does here should make one suspicious of Berkeley's anti-realist use of his anti-abstractionism: even if the anti-abstractionism must be amended we

don't know that this will reduce its effectiveness against Locke's realism. One could wish Dancy had himself looked to this amendment. One could wish, too, that he had taken up more directly than he does the question whether Berkeley's anti-abstractionism can counter *non*-Lockean forms of realism. While one's at it, one could wish that (with his interest in links between Berkeleyan and present-day concerns) he had commented on the many *kinds* of realist/anti-realist contrasts that concern *us*. But it would be churlish to criticize Dancy for not having done these further things. For in doing what he has actually done he has *focused* our attention on Berkeley in a way for which we can only be grateful.

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Amy Gutmann.
Democratic Education.
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987.
Pp. xii+321. US $19.95. ISBN 0-691-07736-3.

The idea that the primary purpose of education should be to perpetuate democratic values has long been a shibboleth of American educational discourse, though it has received scant philosophical scrutiny since the era of John Dewey. Amy Gutmann's new book develops an intriguing interpretation of that shibboleth from the perspective of participatory democracy.

Gutmann's theory of education is presented as an answer to questions about how educational authority should be allocated in a democracy and how the use of authority should be constrained by democratic values. The first chapter is largely devoted to showing the superiority of her theory over prominent rivals. These include the Platonic view that educational authority should be monopolized by the state, the Lockean thesis that education should be strictly a matter of parental discretion and the liberal view that authority should go to whoever will use it to maximize the liberty of children. The common thread in Gutmann's objections to these theories is that each fails to respect the democratic ideal of conscious social reproduction. Gutmann does not do enough to clarify this ideal. But what she seems to have in mind is a community wherein all citizens have a substantive and approximately equal role in shaping their common

future, and each has learnt to fulfil that role in a rational and responsible manner.

The defects of the Platonic, Lockean and liberal theories are supposed to reveal the need for democratic polities to share educational authority among parents, professional educators and the state. More interesting perhaps is Gutmann's claim that the ideal of conscious social reproduction places two principled limits on the exercise of educational authority. Nonrepression prohibits all educational policies which restrict the rational deliberation upon which democracy thrives. Nondiscrimination rules out any practice that would deny an adequate political education to any educable child.

Gutmann insists that her political theory of education is no substitute for a moral ideal of education because it does not tell us how to rear our children or which educational policies to choose. However, the theory purports to be defensible regardless of our moral ideals, and the ideas of nonrepression and nondiscrimination are construed in a manner that closely circumscribes what counts as a legitimate educational policy. Indeed, the abundant policy prescriptions contained in the book leave one with the impression that the democratic theory is supposed to determine, at least in broad outline, the resolution of just about every serious controversy in current educational debate.

I have some serious misgivings about all this. My main objection is that a cogent political theory of education can hardly be developed without *first* offering a persuasive argument about what counts as a good education, and such arguments are not independent of our moral ideals. In choosing one distribution of authority over another, for example, it is crucial to ask which is more likely to conduce to educational success, but our criteria of success inevitably reflect divergent moral ideals such as individual autonomy or fidelity to religious tradition.

Gutmann underestimates this objection. She tends to view a commitment to conscious social reproduction as central to the deep structure of our deliberations about education. Moreover, she believes that this shared commitment to democracy can bring our considered judgments about the politics of education into reflective equilibrium, despite the persistence of intractable disagreements about moral ideals. Now if her conclusions about the myriad educational policies she discusses did have strong intuitive appeal, and if we were convinced that the conclusions had been validly inferred from the theory, then the theory would seem at least partially confirmed. But even where her policy prescriptions are appealing, they are often poorly supported by the underlying theory. I shall take an example which is likely to be especially interesting to readers of this review.

Gutmann argues for strong rights to academic freedom on the grounds that nonrepression requires a willingness to foster untrammelled inquiry. But this ignores the fact that only certain kinds of rational deliberation must flourish if democracy is to prosper. Nonrepression might provide a good defence for the Marxist scholar who is threatened with dismissal unless she keeps quiet about her Marxism, but it cannot be plausibly invoked to protect the metaphysician who is told to turn her energies to more socially relevant matters if she is to keep her job. The bare notion of democracy, even when understood in the rather broad manner favoured by Gutmann, cannot support a generous view of academic freedom; and for those of us who endorse a generous view, no political theory of education which relies exclusively upon democratic values can be acceptable.

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Jean Hampton.
Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986. Pp. xii+299.
US $42.50. ISBN 0-521-26184-8.

Hobbes' political thought has always had more admirers than defenders. His individualistic view of human nature and interaction, combined with his advocacy of absolute sovereignty ensure that *Leviathan* has something for everyone– to disagree with, that is. Hampton accepts the individualism, but rejects absolute sovereignty. Her book shows the extent to which Hobbes' analysis of the problems giving rise to political institutions can be used to illuminate regimes less extreme than Hobbes' own solution. Although only the final chapter is devoted to an alternative model of sovereignty, the aim of the book as a whole is clearly constructive: to salvage the useful parts of Hobbes' social contract.

Hampton takes Hobbes at his word in claiming to provide a geometric deduction of absolute sovereignty, and uses contemporary techniques of game theory to make that deduction explicit. After a discussion of Hobbes' views of human nature, Hampton presents the argument in three stages: a description of the sources of conflict in

'the state of nature' and its costs; an explanation of how Hobbesian persons can extricate themselves from that state; and an account of the role and powers of the sovereign.

(1) Hampton finds two accounts of conflict in the state of nature in Hobbes' texts. The first, 'rationality' account, points to the prisoner's dilemma structure of interaction: if two people each act in their own best interest, both end up worse off than if they had pursued some alternative action. This leads to preemptive attack and a more general failure of co-operative interaction. The second, 'passions' account emphasizes the destabilizing effects of the irrational concern Hobbesian persons have with relative position. People will attack one another, and be unable to co-operate even on mutually advantageous terms.

Hampton argues that neither the rationality nor the passions account will do the job that Hobbes' overall project requires: making absolute sovereignty both necessary and possible. The rationality account fails to make sovereignty necessary because in circumstances of repeated interaction, the advantages of a reputation for peaceful behavior and agreement-keeping make it rational to refrain from attacking, and co-operate with others when possible. On the rationality account, Hobbes' state of nature collapses into Locke's, and only a limited sovereign is required. The passions account provides a genuine basis for conflict, but Hampton suggests that it does so too well. If Hobbesian persons are irrational enough to risk their lives for the sake of glory, the sovereign's commands will not be able to control them.

In place of the two rejected accounts, Hampton offers an alternative in keeping with Hobbes' project: human shortsightedness. Although co-operation is rational, Hobbesian persons are too shortsighted to see this. As a result, they are in constant conflict, which their irrational passions serve to exacerbate. Hampton claims two virtues for the shortsightedness account: first, it describes a problem that a sovereign, as enforcer, is the solution to; second, it reveals Hobbes' purpose in writing *Leviathan* to be one of presenting relevant causal information that his readers previously lacked.

(2) Hampton attributes to Hobbes the argument that divided sovereignty is unstable, on the grounds that any sort of limitation to sovereign power requires rules. Because these rules require interpretation, and people with differing interests will have conflicting interpretations of them, anything short of absolute sovereignty will be unstable. Even if we grant that shortsighted people are able to recognize this claim once it is pointed out to them, Hobbes still owes us an account of how they might be able to use it. Drawing on recent work on problems of co-ordination, Hampton provides Hobbes with such an account. Because Hobbesian persons fear violent death above all else, some will readily surrender to others. As soon as this hap-

pens, a bandwagon effect will quickly led to a single sovereign in each geographical area. Crucially, such a collective authorization of the sovereign does not require any more sagacity than shortsighted Hobbesian persons are likely to be capable of. Because the process occurs in short steps, each stage can be manifestly rational.

(3) Although Hampton concedes to Hobbes the mechanisms whereby a sovereign might be instituted, and even grants that such a hypothetical history might count as a justification for a sovereign who comes to power in a more ordinary way, she rejects his claim that people must thereby surrender all of their rights to the sovereign. The very rationale that leads to surrender in the first place leads also to a limitation on the powers of the sovereign. Hampton suggests that rulers be thought of on the model of baseball umpires. Their power is legitimate because it enables those within their jurisdiction to interact in a mutually beneficial way; should their rule become arbitrary or onerous, the 'players' may rightfully replace them.

Hampton's Hobbes turns out to be more Lockean than one might have expected. Although Hobbesian persons are portrayed as so shortsighted as to require a sovereign, the justification of the sovereign's power itself rings Lockean: it is a question of the self-serving interpretation of rules, which Locke sees as the major 'inconvenience' of the state of nature. The conclusion is also Lockean: rulers are hired to serve their subjects.

Hampton's book begins with a declaration of her intent to treat Hobbes' text as providing a serious philosophical argument, rather than as 'an exhibit in a museum of seventeenth century political beliefs' (3). Yet there is something puzzling in the fact that Hobbes, who claimed that people would dispute theorems of geometry if some advantage were to be gained by so doing, should suppose that a geometric deduction of sovereignty would be likely to bring peace by supplying warring parties with a piece of causal information they lacked. [I owe this point to Don Herzog.] Hampton also fails to do justice to the role of irrationality in Hobbes' account of human motivation and interaction. Irrationality does not lend itself to the elegant techniques of game theory, which must treat it as merely an unstructured interruption of rational processes. Hobbes himself has a more structured account of passions on which they can serve peace as well as create conflict. It is unfortunate that Hobbes' treatment of this aspect of human agency, as relevant in the twentieth century as it was the seventeenth, is not given fuller treatment in Hampton's book.

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Catharine A. MacKinnon.
Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1987. Pp. 306.
US $25.00. ISBN 0-674-29873-X.

Catharine MacKinnon needs little introduction to anyone familiar with feminist theory and practise. For the past few years she has been intensely involved with the feminist campaigns against pornography. With Andrea Dworkin, she drafted the Minnesota Ordinance, the controversial and ultimately unsuccessful law which defined pornography as sex discrimination and gave women a civil cause of action against pornographers. MacKinnon has always been an engaged theorist, working tirelessly toward women's law in the inhospitable fora of courts and legislatures. Her earlier book, *Sexual Harassment of Working Women*, was instrumental in defining sexual harassment as a legal problem and creating legal remedies for its redress. *Feminism Unmodified* continues the MacKinnon tradition of engaged theory. The book is a collection of her speeches and papers presented between 1981 to 1986, most of which have been previously published. To retain the language of the speeches was a wise decision, for readers are exposed to the passion of the speaker, the emotions revealed in speaking that are so often submerged in writing. MacKinnon is a virtuoso of language; the writing is lucid and sharp, replete with illuminating descriptions and unforgettably apt metaphors.

In the papers, three themes are enunciated, explored and applied in the context of a fairly diverse range of legal issues affecting women, issues such as abortion, sexual harassment and sports. The first theme explains why she calls her feminism unmodified. Her analysis of women's oppression is not tied to existing malestream political analysis. Oppression does not originate in the sphere of production (the Marxist feminist view) or in prejudice and stereotypes (the liberal feminist view) but rather is located in the social relations of sexuality. According to MacKinnon, men have defined and controlled sexuality to their own advantage. What arouses sexual desires and urges, what men consider erotic, is not a matter of biology but a social construction by men which eroticizes male power and female subordination. In short, the male sexualization of inequality constitutes the core of the system of male supremacy. Feminists will be familiar with this theory developed at length in her two influential *Signs* articles on feminism, Marxism, method and the state. Her explication here is an abbreviated version of the earlier work, with no additions to the earlier analysis.

The second theme of her book is that gender inequality is not about differences between women and men, but about domination of women by men. Differences are noted and rendered significant only as justifications for domination. What came first, what matters and must be eradicated, is the hierarchy, the men at the top and the women at the bottom. In other words, men first dominated women, then differences arose and were deployed to justify the very domination that caused the differences in the first place. MacKinnon is challenging the Aristotelian paradigm of equality, and its manifestation in anti-discrimination law, which sees equality as being about difference and sameness. She is also opposed to the valorization of characteristics developed under male domination; for instance, the different voice of women heard by Carol Gilligan is, for MacKinnon, the voice of the victim. MacKinnon's words here are pertinent to those of us in the disciplines of law, philosophy and politics who grapple with equality issues, particularly in the area of constitutional equality rights.

The third theme is that the male supremist system of sexuality and gender is actualized in pornography. It is through pornography that the ideology and the practise of female oppression are distributed and maintained. Pornography constructs and perpetuates the message and the practice that women are not just inferior beings, they are mere objects that exist for male pleasure. Almost one-half of the book is an enlightening, powerful and perspicacious unpacking of pornography. MacKinnon engages in a detailed study of the practice of pornography and its protection in a liberal state. She defends the Minnesota Ordinance; her critique of the First Amendment and the primacy of speech in liberal theory is insightful and will be of interest to Canadian philosophers and lawyers thinking about the meaning and scope of the constitutionally protected freedom of expression in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Indeed, it is this part of the book which may prove to be its most important contribution. The passionate and often bitter disagreements about the appropriate feminist response to pornography show little sign of abatement. One may not agree with MacKinnon about the significance of pornography to women's oppression or her strategies for its eradication, but her views cannot be ignored by anyone involved in the debate.

Yet for all that the book speaks to, there remain significant silences. For example, her theory of power, its origins and replication, requires further elucidation. If sexuality is the cause of subordination, as she believes, what do we make of the economic system? Is it just part of the superstructure, determined by sexuality in the same way that classical Marxists see modes of production as determining everything else? MacKinnon also raises several fundamental questions of epistemology and jurisprudence without delving into their intricacies. In fairness, however, the book does not purport to be com-

prehensive and we ought not to expect it to explain everything. The often clipped analysis and omissions likely flow in part from the decision to publish the speeches and papers as they were presented to audiences, listeners who were not generally other professors.

In sum, although most of the papers and speeches have already appeared in print and her theory of sexuality has been more fully articulated in the *Signs* articles, the collection is a valuable one, particularly in its discussion of pornography.

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J. Margolis, M. Krausz, and R.M. Burian, eds.
Rationality, Relativism and the Human Sciences.
Norwood, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986 Pp. 00+000.
US $58.90 (cloth: ISBN 90-247-3271-0);
US $17.50 (paper: ISBN 90-247-3417-7).

The distinguished essays collected here concern the autonomy of the human sciences (H.L. Dreyfus, W.H. Dray), the rationality of science (H. Lacey, E. Lashchyk), the evolution of Heidegger's understanding of science and technology (J.D. Caputo), the role of rationality in the understanding of human action (A. MacIntyre, A. Rorty, D. Føllesdal) and the problem of relativism (R. Harré, M. Krausz, B. Muñoz, J. Margolis). In both subject matter and the range of philosphical reference, these essays are united by their being, in one case, explicit and, in the rest, implicit responses to an event of the late 1970s.

Within the academic community at large, the publication in 1979 of Richard Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* released the accumulated pressure of years of discontent with what is called analytic or Anglo-American philosophy. Rorty offered detailed criticisms of a number of philosophical strategies designed to secure our knowledge of the world against all possible attack. He also sketched a picture of what philosophical activity might become if our culture turned its back on the enlightenment's vision of intellectual security. It must be said that in each of these endeavors, Rorty did not so much invent

as crystallize and systematize styles of argument that he and others (e.g., Quine, Sellars, Davidson, Kuhn, and Feyerabend) had been employing for twenty years.

Many philosophers–frankly, most–simply explained away the arguments of this book with ad hominen attacks on its author. Nevertheless Rorty's book has had a significant effect on a minority of philosophers. Rorty's work was to release many from what they felt was their duty to criticize logical positivism and its philosophical heirs and to permit them to accept the task of thinking after turning their backs on foundational philosophy: the task of pursuing what Rorty called 'philosophy without mirrors.'

The tasks of this style of philosophy are both defensive and constructive. One main defensive task is posed by the threats of relativism and nihilism; the constructive tasks concern the actual shape of a philosophy which has relinquished the hope of perfectly and everlastingly providing a mirror to the world. That minority of philosophers who took on these tasks pursued them by reflection on texts within the traditions of philosophical writing both in America and Great Britain, and on the European continent.

The various essays in this book are contributions to an increasingly widespread genre of philosophical activity which addresses these two tasks by this sort of reflection. The negative task, defending post-positivist philosophy against the charge that it is nihilistic or relativistic, is taken up by a number of authors. Indeed there is some agreement between MacIntyre, Krausz and Margolis about how to *start* responding to the charge of relativism. The charge of relativism is directed at attempts to relativize the truth predicate to culture or species or scientific paradigm or ... . The argument that any attempt so to relativize truth refutes itself has appeared to many to be a knock out argument; so it is curious that ever since the time of Plato, this style of anti-relativistic argument has been ineffectual in holding back relativists. In some way, this apparently devastating argument misses its target. More than one author represented in this book seems to have come to the opinion that the true home of epistemological relativism is not truth but reason or rationality.

Many philosophers will agree that what we consider to be a good reason for a given belief is in part determined by history. At a mundane level this is the fact that whether we consider the presence of a certain protein to be a sign of AIDS is a result of research which has had a history and has a future. At a deeper level, the now widely-accepted work of Kuhn and the still shocking work of Foucault suggest that which styles of reasoning are popular and which are not is subject to changes which cannot be made fully intelligible to participants in both competing styles of reasoning.

The authors of this volume are in agreement over these purported facts, but they are not in agreement over the relevance of these facts to the question of relativism. The moderate consensus I discern is that there are limits to the variety of things considered reasonable but that these limits could not be given any transcendent or transcendental justification. As Krausz puts it, the limits are not necessary: they are contingent. According to this consensus, neither the regulative ideal of one Absolute Truth, nor the fact that there are some judgments about rationality that all humans share is sufficient to remove us from the risks of epistemological relativity. The combination of these two views suggests a Kantian picture of empirical realism and transcendental idealism or relativism; indeed, that is a picture Margolis invokes, but does not pursue in detail.

Some of the articles in this collection attempt to sketch the nature of the risks of epistemological relativism, and thus to accept the constructive task of continuing to philosophize but 'without mirrors.' In this vein Hugh Lacey provides a massively articulated reconstruction and criticism of Charles Taylor's defense of the universal validity of western theoretical understanding. It is Lacey's aim to understand the very real advantages of science without what he calls the 'gratuitous universality' of Taylor's view. Also in this vein, R. Harré tries to articulate the way the styles in which we think are 'cultural products' and to describe (and replace) the philosophical pictures which have kept us from recognizing this fact.

I was especially intrigued by Krausz's striking discussion of foundationalism and 'critical relativism' in music theory. As he sees it, the 12-tone idiom is the opponent of the foundationalist and the friend of the critical relativist. I am not sure this is correct. Although serialism is new and non-traditional, so were the foundations offered by Descartes for science. Descartes' work is no less foundational for being (relatively) novel. Similarly it is possible for an untraditional–and therefore liberating–style of composition to be foundational. Certainly serialism is as foundational as Carnap's novel attempt in the *Aufbau* (1928) to construct knowledge out of various classes of elementary experiences. Carnap himself sensed that the foundational orientation of the *Aufbau* was shared by then contemporary 'artistic movements, especially ... architecture.' Why not construe serialism as analogous to modern architecture's rejection of ornament (Loos) and return to the engineer's aesthetic (Le Corbusier)?

This stimulating collection of 12 essays is the inaugural publication of a new series called 'Studies of the Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium.' I look forward to subsequent publications.

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Stein Haugom Olsen.
The End of Literary Theory.
New York: Cambridge University Press
1987. Pp. vii+232.
US $34.50. ISBN 0-521-33326-1.

The End of Literary Theory is a collection of thirteen essays, all but two of which have already been published, the earliest dating as far back as 1973. The essays are clearly written, generally display good philosophical sense, and make perceptive and illuminating use of actual literary and critical texts. Moreover, despite their staggered composition and often sudden shift of focus, the essays hang together well enough to constitute a book that is worth reading. This is largely because they all share a common perspective: 'that literature is a social institution' or practice whose objects (literary works and their qualities) and their interpretation and appreciation are not only governed but defined by 'constitutive rules' or conventions (11; 197). Wary of the dangers and extravagances of global literary theories, Olsen chooses to provide us with these thematically and loosely-related essays rather than try to use their ideas and their institutional perspective to develop a systematic institutional theory of literature. This is most unfortunate, for the book remains without any detailed or rigorous account of what exactly an instituition or practice is, and how exactly the literary institution differs from other institutions (like the currency system, the legal system and the game of chess) to which he likens it. This deficiency detracts from the force of the separate essays and makes the book ultimately a disappointment, a missed opportunity to produce a significant contribution to literary aesthetics.

The essays fall roughly into four general areas: the issue of interpretation, meaning, and intention; the definition of literature and the role of literary theory or literary aesthetics; the nature and function of literary criticism and evaluation; the relationship between literature, fiction, and philosophy. I will comment briefly on Olsen's treatment of each.

The thorny issue of the intentional fallacy is handled quite deftly by Olsen's distinction between the job of identifying the work as a literary work and the task of determining its qualities once it is so identified. The first and logically prior task involves appeal to an author's intention, since any text as meaningful is an intentional object: 'an author is the final authority on what sort of text he meant to produce, and whether or not a text is meant as a literary work.' But once it is determined that the work is meant as literature, then the institutional conventions of literary interpretation are such that meaning must be determined by 'internal evidence' without 'the use

of the author's independent utterances and behaviour as evidence in interpretation' (84). This quite sensible view must however face two possible challenges: first, in actual critical practice (or institutional criticism) authorial utterances and behaviour *are* used as interpretative evidence; and second, the intentionality that determines the literary status of a text may depend not on the author but on a community of readers in the literary institution, who decide how the text is to be appropriated. Olsen makes a very good point in criticizing literary theory for its preoccupation with the so-called meaning of the work, and its unquestioned idea that the work as a whole has a particular meaning in the way that a single word or sentence does (42). This deep but dubious assumption, compounded with the whole misguided view of meanings as existing in some reified sense, makes it easy to succumb to the poststructuralist attack on the possibility of valid interpretation, since our attempts to locate a determinate object-meaning for the work as a whole are bound to be frustrated. Interpretation for Olsen is instead conceived in a more contextual, holistic, and aesthetically functional fashion, as the project of explaining the aesthetic reason or function of a particular feature of the work in terms of its contributing to a pattern (in relation with other features) which serves and is subsumed by 'the artistic purpose of the work' as a whole. 'The aim of literary interpretation is to reveal those features which make the work a good literary work ... among which are coherence and complexity.' 'Every interpretative question ... is in the end made significant because it asks how an element serves the intended artistic purpose' (51; 96; 103). The question which Olsen fails to raise here, however, is whether we can grant the work as a whole a single, determinate pattern or aesthetic purpose any more than we can assign it a single determinate meaning.

Olsen's account of interpretation reflects his general view that literary criticism should be deeply concerned with and motivated by aesthetic appreciation and value. Opposing any description/evaluation and understanding/value judgment dichotomies, Olsen insists that 'value considerations determine the very nature of interpretative judgment' and indeed the very nature of the literary work, since such 'works exist only as objects of appreciation' (154). Olsen's emphasis on interpreting literature as holistic patterns for aesthetic appreciation brings his theory very close to some kind of formalism, and he not surprisingly tries to distance himself from any formalism which would deny that 'a literary work should say something about the world, about human concerns' (160). Thematic concepts relating to human experience (freedom, guilt, human suffering, order, love) are, for Olsen, 'of the essence of literature.' But he remains close to a formalist aestheticism in asserting that literature is 'epistemologically "light"'; it employs thematic concepts for aesthetic ends, does not real-

ly deal with philosophical or theological issues and thus 'does not contribute to philosophical or theological insight.' Moreover, Olsen distinguishes sharply thematic concepts of this 'perennial' type from both 'topical thematic concepts' relating to social and political issues and what he calls 'esoteric interpretative concepts' like those employed in Freudian, Marxist, or structuralist interpretations. Only the so-called perennial concepts, those allegedly not socially or historically or ideologically tainted, can provide satisfactory aesthetic appreciation of literature. But surely one could counter that the whole notion that literature calls for a purified aesthetic appreciation is itself an historically conditioned (and fairly recent) ideology.

The attack on esoteric approaches to literature is central to Olsen's critique of contemporary literary theory and poetics, which he argues are misled by treating literature in terms of esoteric theories of language or other esoteric forms of knowledge accessible only to a small group of readers. But the line between esoteric and 'necessary' knowledge is very difficult to draw, and Olsen's own notion of the literary institution and its appreciative conventions is itself open to the charge of being esoteric to the majority of readers, since he himself regards even first-year college students of literature as 'literary innocents' lacking the requisite knowledge for literary appreciation (153). Finally, Olsen's counter-linguistic turn – that literary theory which studies literature in terms of language should be abandoned as a failure and that we should instead pursue literary *aesthetics*, i.e., the study of literature under the concept of art – is very dubious. For our understanding and theories of language are far more detailed and clear than our aesthetic theories, and our best understanding of art has itself been in terms of art's linguistic features and analogies with language.

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Francisco Peccorini.
Selfhood as Thinking Thought in the Work of Gabriel Marcel: A New Interpretation.
Queenston, ON and Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press 1987. Pp. 186.
$49.95. ISBN 0-88946-329-8.

This book focuses on Marcel's notion of the *pensée pensante* 'as the constitution of the unverifiable self' and 'the determining insight that ... accounts for the totality of aspects of man's Being, and in particular for the blinded intuition, as well as for faith, freedom, hope, the ontological appetite, love, recollection, intersubjectivity, and the moral law's attraction' (5).

Chapter I begins with a brief biography of Marcel and then outlines the first period of his thought using early manuscripts. Peccorini shows Marcel coming to the insight that Being is analogical and an infinite transcendent all-encompassing reality. Much later Marcel called this Being, which is more fundamental than any particular being, Being as ground. Peccorini identifies it with Aquinas' *esse* and *actus essendi*, and states that it is the unverifiable 'object' of a blinded intuition and the basis of Marcel's whole thought.

Chapter II discusses the self as thinking thought, rather than the object of thought. Peccorini initially states that Marcel 'equates' the thinking self with Being; later he more accurately says it is distinct from, but participates in, Being. Peccorini claims, in Hegelian fashion (often citing texts that do not even address the issue), that *pensée pensante* is the self-consciousness of Being, and Being experiencing itself, in me. In an interesting move he attempts to clarify the self's participation in Being by using Aristotle's distinction between the active and possible intellect. Insofar as the self participates in and intuits Being it is confident it can know all beings and its self-consciousness of Being becomes the horizon within which all knowledge of beings occurs. (This is similar to the Aristotelian intellect, by means of its grasp of being, bestowing on its objects their intelligibility as beings and thus enabling them to be actually known.) In the chapter's last section Peccorini uses Marcel's 1912 manuscript to clarify his intuition of being which grounds all knowledge. He presents Marcel's arguments only in general and indicates that by rejecting the identification of absolute knowledge and reality, and yet insisting that knowledge grasps reality (Being), Marcel is led to conclude that knowledge participates in and intuits Being which is therefore immanent in consciousness.

Chapter III, the meatiest and most obscure in the book, is based on Marcel's *Metaphysical Journal*, Part I, an obscure text in its own right. I will attempt to summarize. What, it asks, is the relation be-

tween the thinking self (i.e., the self of conceptual/universal thought) and the concrete empirical self? Thought, Marcel asserts, must posit this relation to be beyond both logical deduction and objectification. The two 'selfs' can be affirmed to be one only a priori in a free act of faith. Faith also affirms the transcendental unity of self and world as revealed in perception. Though its precise nature remains unclarified, this faith is a free response of the concrete self to the presence of Being within it. Most fundamentally faith is the ontological affirmation of being. It is the opposite of despair and so Peccorini links it to man's appetite for Being and, in a move I cannot follow, to the 'infallible nature of the will' (65), that part of ourselves responsible for our growth and perfection. Just as faith is rooted in the assurance of the presence of Being, so will is the assurance that what is necessary for our growth will be. Like faith, will too rests on the presence of being to me. Following a brief treatment of love, hope and fidelity as also rooted in Being for Marcel, the chapter concludes by discussing recollection which Peccorini defines (somewhat narrowly, I believe) as an attitude of heeding only our genuine natural inclinations and acting realistically.

The brief fourth chapter's thesis is that the blinded intuition of Being (light of Being) in which all humans participate does away with all frontiers and gives rise to a sense of community. Theologically speaking this light of Being is the light of Christ. Chapter V presents Marcel's arguments for immortality. Peccorini claims that the basic argument is experiential, i.e., I am assured that my dead loved one remains present because he/she continues to help me. But the author confuses matters by stating both that immortality is not certain (125) and is 'endowed with metaphysical certitude' (126).

The last chapter, entitled 'The Nuptial Bond of Life as an Ethical Arrow for a Lay World,' begins with Marcel's notion of freedom, the core of our being and our power of controlling our life and our perspective on reality. This freedom should serve human perfection, i.e., conform to human nature in all its specifically human respects and ultimately as rooted in God. However, the objective values which are rooted in the demands of human nature must be interpreted in the light of our concrete situation. Thus, for Peccorini, Marcel's philosophical ethics is surprisingly close to Thomistic natural law, though in my opinion he offers few texts which unambiguously support this, but continually repeats one single passage. (I personally think Marcel is much more an intuitionist, à la Scheler.)

In general there is much in Peccorini's interpretation of Marcel that I agree with, and I commend him for grappling with the very difficult and often ignored writings of the early Marcel. While I would have preferred a more detailed explanation of these obscure texts, Peccorini's use of Aristotle to clarify some of them was quite helpful.

I'm afraid I do have to say that I found the book to be unclearly written in a number of places. Sentence structure was awkward, choice of words questionable, typographical errors frequent (e.g., in one place 'freezing' instead of 'freeing,' 132). Also, adequate textual support was sometimes lacking for positions alleged to be Marcel's. Finally, I think the work would have benefited greatly by clearly distinguishing the two senses of Being that Marcel sets forth in *Tragic Wisdom and Beyond*, Being as ground and Being as plentitude. Peccorini conflates the two throughout.

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Stephen Priest, ed.
Hegel's Critique of Kant.
Don Mills, ON and New York:
Oxford University Press 1987. Pp. xii+229.
Cdn $61.95: US $43.00. ISBN 0-19-824752-4.

This book contains an Introduction by the editor, and twelve essays by eleven authors on Hegel's attitudes and relations to various aspects of the Critical Philosophy.

In the Introduction (which is as long as any three of the essays) Priest gives a clear and critical summary of H's three official accounts of K's thought. He could have spared this effort because many of the contributors go through the same texts – while all of them save one (Llewellyn) ignore the running battle with K in H's *Science of Logic*. It would have been better to print W.H. Walsh's essay 'K as seen by H' (which closes the volume) as the Introduction. Priest could then have reprinted 'H's Attitude to K's Ethics' by T.M. Knox (*Kant-Studien* 49 [1947-48] 70-80) and solicited an essay from someone about the enormous influence of 'Religion within the Bounds of Reason' on H. This is one of the two vitally important (and, one would have thought, very *obvious*) topics that are ignored. The other is (incredibly!) the 'Moral World-View' in the *Phenomenology*. No one even *notices* this (or Jonathan Robinson's book on it – *Duty and Hypocrisy* [Toronto 1977]).

First in order among the essayists is Michael Inwood on 'Space and Time.' He gives an excellent account both of H's reaction to K's theory, and of what is distinctive in H's own views. He argues – correct-

ly, as I think – for the essentially *phenomenological* character of H's philosophy of inorganic nature. Those who are more *ontologically* inclined (and Inwood acknowledges that H himself *writes* ontologically) will now have to say – if they can – what is *left out* of this interpretation. This is in every respect an excellent essay.

Graham Bird ('K's Epistemology in H's *History of Philosophy*') shows that H typically gives a stereotyped account of K's theory of knowledge, and that K's real doctrine is much more subtle. He does not notice that the more subtle doctrine very often provides H's starting point for his own systematic projects. Nor does Bird seem to realize that H does not (as an historian) want to 'evaluate' K's argument (76) but to eliminate one of its premisses (the *Ding an sich*) by adopting a different strategy. (H *always* assumes that we have studied the philosophers for ourselves. 'History' is concerned with the *impact* they made, and with the *problems* they bequeathed.)

Justus Hartnack ('Categories and Things-in-themselves') considers two of H's criticisms of K. The claim that he wants to swim before going into the water is shown to be a sophism. But the fact that he presupposes an 'object' of knowledge which is unknowable is a serious objection, which Hartnack shows to be justified. (W.H. Walsh in 'The Idea of a Critique of Pure Reason' takes a similar view, but shows that K and H can both be defended, and that their projects are not necessarily incompatible. Although not placed together, these two essays should be read together.)

John Llewellyn ('Kantian Antinomy and Hegelian Dialectic') discusses H's use of the 'antinomies of Pure Reason,' and defends H's claim that a 'speculative' significance is really present in K's view against M. Gueroult's claim (in 1931) that the 'speculative' reading is a distortion of K's own meaning.

Stephen Priest ('Subjectivity and Objectivity in K and H') offers an interesting argument that K (when interpreted in a Wittgensteinian way) is not guilty of 'subjective idealism' in the vicious sense that H gives to that label in his Berlin discussions. What is interesting (as Priest shows) is precisely that H himself had given the sounder interpretation of K in *Faith and Knowledge* (1802).

Timothy O'Hagan ('H's Critique of K's Moral and Political Philosophy') begins from the 'Natural Law' essay (1802), and examines H's critique of the Categorical Imperative in both of its forms. He also gives a good bird's eye view of the evolution of H's political theory (with some reference to the associated polemic against *Perpetual Peace*). But he totally ignores the great confrontation with the 'Moral World-View' in the *Phenomenology*.

Patrick Gardiner ('K and H on Aesthetics') examines H's main debts to K in his aesthetic theory. He characterizes the opposition between them well, and then picks two connected points of continuity: the con-

cept of beauty as a *reconciliation* of sense and intellect, and that of the 'aesthetic idea.' (He asks why H never *refers* to this continuity; the answer is that it was quite evident to H's hearers, and the *contrast* was what had to be underlined. H's audience read the *Critique of Judgment* as a matter of course; *we* do not.)

David Lamb ('Teleology: K and H') uses the concept of external teleology as the basis for an insightful examination of how H deals with human servitude. In this connection he makes relevant and significant references to K. But when he passes on to the 'cunning of Reason' K vanishes altogether. This is really an essay (and a good one) on 'H and Marxism.'

Leon Pompa ('Philosophical History in K and H') is unique in this volume, because he thinks that *both* authors fail. Each of them attempted to establish the existence of a *purpose* in history; and they were defeated in different ways by their own logical commitments. He is certainly right that H inherited his problem from K; and his *sceptical* conclusion is a stimulating challenge to those of us who disagree to explain how H regarded the logical dilemma that Pompa uncovers.

Howard Williams ('Politics and Philosophy in K and H') deals with the contrast between K's belief that 'philosophy might act as midwife to future society' (203), and H's claim that it can only recognize the rational in the actual, and cannot give advice. But if we examine H's ideal state, we find that it was not quite actual anywhere. So perhaps – although there *is* a real contrast between K and H – Williams has not analysed it quite correctly.

The Bibliography is a veritable disaster. Priest chose to reprint the relevant part of a bibliography published by J.C. Flay in 1974. This was compiled from a more general bibliography that used the philosopher's name as a key. Priest has added *one* item; but he did not even comb the footnotes of his contributors. So only that one item is later than 1973 – Jonathan Robinson's book is not here, for instance; and even Guéroult's article, which Llewellyn discusses ('Le jugement de H. sur l'Antithétique de la Raison Pure,' *RMM* 38 [1931]) escaped Flay's name-guided net. But there are a lot of items here (for purely nominal reasons) which are hardly relevant to the topic of the book.

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Steve F. Sapontzis.
Morals, Reason, and Animals.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1987.
Pp. xix+302. US $34.95. ISBN 0-87222-493-5.

People who are concerned with the well-being of animals have a whole range of philosophical arguments at their disposal to back up their concern. In *Animal Liberation* (New York: Avon Books 1975) and again in *Practical Ethics* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1979) Peter Singer has amply demonstrated that utilitarianism strongly supports the animal welfare cause. More recently Tom Regan has made *The Case for Animal Rights* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1983) and thereby provided a non-utilitarian rationale for animal liberation. Nonetheless, there is considerable dissatisfaction with the current state of debate on the moral status of animals. Few people are prepared to fully embrace Singer's utilitarianism. While this has rendered Regan's non-consequentionalist view initially attractive, it does not suffice to treat the shortcoming of the latter view more charitably. An animal ethics position that strays clear of both these theories would certainly not be a superfluous luxury in that context. Sapontzis' book is precisely an endeavour to develop such a position: it aims at a coherent blend of non-consequentionalist and consequentionalist considerations, a combination that, furthermore, '[keeps] in close touch with current, common moral beliefs and practices' (xi) and yet is forceful enough to sustain the radical, animal liberationist goal of banning all forms of animal exploitation.

Unfortunately, Sapontzis' project is riddled from the outset by a lack of philosophical ambition. He admits having 'no theoretical moral ax to grind' (xi). This may be true, but it is not exactly a desideratum. For the result is that theoretical haziness pervades the whole book: Sapontzis shuttles back and forth between consequentionalist and non-consequentionalist considerations, justifies this philosophically quite unorthodox swing of the pendulum by his insistence that it corresponds with common-sense moral thinking, but simultaneously rejects this form of thinking when it conflicts with his radical animal liberationist goals.

Sapontzis' reluctance to take a theoretical stance is reflected in the structure of his book. In the first three chapters he challenges the view that we have a moral obligation to be rational, as well as the view that one has to be rational in order to be moral. His arguments in these chapters are not always convincing, but they are at least thought provoking. It is with no little surprise, then, that from chapter 4 onwards one is confronted with a whole new mode of argumentation that bears little relevance to the discussion of the first

three chapters. The surprise is even bigger if one has read Sapontzis' previous verson of chapter 4, published in *Ethics* in 1981. In this first version Sapontzis does not hesitate to draw substantial conclusions from his critique on rationality: 'Moral status,' he writes there, 'is properly due, earned and lost on the basis of moral character, that is on the possession of moral virtues, and on that alone' (616). In his 1987 book, however (non-rational) moral virtues are stripped of their theoretical significance and attention to them is relegated to the status of a minor afterthought. One can only conjecture that Sapontzis does no longer believe that his critique of rationality provides him with a sound basis for doing ethics. But, if this is so, what is the point of including the first three chapters in the book?

The rest of the book can be divided into two parts: chapters 4 to 10 build up a defense for the position that animals are moral persons, i.e., that they are beings that have rights to life, dignity and a fulfilling life (51). In chapters 11 to 14 'a few consequences' of this strong animal rights position are discussed. Overall, these chapters in applied ethics are the most original and persuasive ones of the whole book. Sapontzis successfully shows there, for instance, that a strong animal rights position can be effectively protected against reductio ad absurdum arguments (e.g., against the argument that this position obliges us to prevent predation), and that it is therefore undeserving of the ridicule that has escorted much of its history.

This success is offset, though, by the weakness of the preceding part. Contrary to what he pretends, Sapontzis does not even fully try to argue for his view there. First of all, he simply assumes – not even openly – that there are only two ways of regarding animals from a moral perspective: as persons that possess the whole gamut of moral rights or as nonpersons that 'may be treated as mere means to fulfilling the interests of persons' (51). This Kantian distinction between means and ends is a very crude categorizing tool, though. Most contemporary moral philosophers seem to hold that we have a strong direct duty not to inflict suffering on animals, but that animals, unless moral agents, do not have rights to life and liberty. From Sapontzis' point of view such a moderate position is not even conceivable. He seems to presuppose that this position is necessarily unstable and, therefore, not worth any critical attention. While this presupposition may be *bon ton* with radical animal liberationists, it can, without further argument, only alienate those who do not already embrace radical animal liberationism.

This brings a second critique to the fore: Sapontzis allegedly distances himself from the theories of Regan and Singer by keeping 'in close touch with current, common moral beliefs and practices' (xi), but his strong animal rights position suggests otherwise. He has no second thoughts, for instance, about rejecting the anti-cruelty view

as a basis of an animal ethics position, despite his admission that this view squarely corresponds with commonly held moral beliefs (see 77). Furthermore, instead of developing an alternative, Sapontzis seems rather intent on cloning and fortifying the theories of Singer and Regan. His critiques on Frey in chapter 7 and on Cigman in chapter 9 are repetitious if one is familiar with the critique of Regan on these authors. His discussion of the replacement argument in chapter 10, on the other hand, is original, but only appropriate as a defence of utilitarianism, for that is the target of the argument.

One can only be baffled by this generosity of Sapontzis in defending utilitarianism as well as the rights view, the radical animal liberationist position as well as common-sense morality. That Sapontzis himself is never puzzled by this cornucopia of views has to be explained, I think, by his acknowledgment that he has no theoretical ax to grind. He remains true to that approach, except in chapter 6, where he develops three reasons for liberating animals. There again, however, philosophical eclecticism rather than theoretical uniformity is the main motto.

His point of departure there is the stipulation that morality has three goals that jointly define the moral value of an action:

> [1] developing moral character, so that our actions will be based on compassion, respect, courage, and other moral virtues,
>
> [2] both reducing the suffering in life and otherwise making life more enjoyable and fulfilling, and
>
> [3] insuring that opportunities, goods, punishments, and rewards are distributed fairly. (89)

Sapontzis' argument is that in order to further these three goals animals should be 'liberated,' i.e., should be granted roughly the same moral rights as humans have. If one takes only the first two goals into account, this is certainly a highly debatable claim. To further the first goal it seems sufficient that we are kind and compassionate towards animals. The promotion of the second goal seems to require no more than a stringent duty not to inflict suffering on animals and humans alike. Implementing both goals would already radically change the current treatment of animals, but would still be a far cry from granting animals *rights* to life, dignity and a fulfilling life.

Presumably, the latter rights follow from furthering the third goal of morality, the fairness goal. It is hard to see, however, how the concept of fairness can be meaningfully applied to our dealings with animals. Fairness is tied up with expectations of reciprocity: if I distribute goods in a fair manner, I expect that the beneficiaries of this distribution will respect its outcome. Otherwise there would be no

point for me in trying to distribute goods in this specific manner. That explains why the fairness or unfairness of an action does not make any difference to animals: they cannot be made to *respect* the outcome of a fair distribution, they can at best be *forced* to accept it. In other words, animals lack a sense of justice and are, therefore, also insensitive to injustice.

By way of rebuttal of this line of argument Sapontzis has observed that

> even if some our institutionalized senses of "fairness" may not apply to our dealings with animals, our intuitive sense of fairness can be meaningfully applied here. When animal liberation advocates talk about the unfairness of research animals bearing all the burdens while we reap all the benefits and about our "taking unfair advantage" of the fact that we are so much more powerful than other animals, we understand what they mean, even if we do not agree. Consequently, questions about the fairness of our consuming animals cannot be dismissed as category mistakes. (105)

The examples adduced by Sapontzis to prove his case only further weaken it. There is indeed something wrong with the use of animals as research tools, but the wrongness has not to do with unfairness, but with the suffering that characteristically is involved in animal research. Similarly, the way we handle our power over animals does not exemplify unfairness, but rather indifference to their feelings of pain and happiness. Our treatment of animals is, thus, pace Sapontzis, not a matter of fairness. That is not to say, of course, that it is impossible to treat animals as if they can be benificiaries of fairness, or as if they have a right to liberty. I do not see, though, what would be the point of this move, except to burden us with an extra moral load. Anyway, if there is a point, Sapontzis has not indicated it and for this reason his book is most disappointing.

In conclusion, Sapontzis' *Morals, Reason, and Animals* contains many interesting and good discussions, which justified their previous publication as articles, but these lack the theoretical coherence, which would have justified their publication in book format. Moreover, the book does not contain any new argument in favor of the strong animal rights position, but merely suggests in an unwarranted way that those who reject this position must be insensitive to the plight of animals. In this way, Sapontzis' book is rather a step backward than a step forward in the animal ethics debate.

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Alan Soble.
Pornography: Marxism, Feminism, and the Future of Sexuality.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1986. Pp. x+202. US $23.00. ISBN 0-300-03524-1.

This is an important and elegant book. Marxists have had nothing of interest to say on sex – till now, till Soble. The book is a member of that small genre of works that are both academically respectable yet intelligible to the generally educated reader. With confidence, you could assign parts of it to undergraduates. And Marxists especially would do well to take its virtually jargon-free account of Marxist doctrines as a model for their prose.

The book ranges more widely than its title would suggest and bases its theory and defense of (some) pornography on a general theory of sexuality. That theory is a type of Marxism – Marxism without Nature. S. believes that human 'nature' and its categories of sexuality are social constructs without roots or mappings in biology. Because the concept of Nature has been so abused in moral debates on matters sexual, S. seems willing to dispense with it altogether, even when hard-wiring might seem the most likely explanation of at least some needs, desires, pleasures and ecstasies. By his own account, S. offers no defense for his Marxism and, as far as I can see, no defense of the social construction of sexuality. Both are simply assumed, and by S.'s own account the book is a work in applied ethics: 'I apply a number of Marxist themes to pornography' (2). But libertarians, liberals, and realists should not lay down the book upon being hit with this preemptive strike. For much of the insight, richness and delight of the book lies in S.'s microlevel analyses of arguments and social forms. Virtually everyone will be offended by and learn from this book. Read it.

The chapters of the book are loosely linked and can be profitably read independently of each other. After an Introduction, a chapter attacks the naturalistic assumptions of the Freudomarxian Wilhelm Reich. S. claims that the very repression of sexuality asserted by Reich should have led Reich to a skeptical view of what 'natural' (for Reich, porn-free, gay-free, prostitution-free) sexuality would be like after liberation from repression. S., wrongly I think, presumes that (Reich presumes that) repression is so uniform that it has no backwaters, interstices and varying densities from which and through which we get glimpses of and can make inferences about what is behind the veil of repression.

Then a chapter praises Engels' skepticism about what the future of sexuality will look like, at least in its details, after liberation, but also reveals a great deal of vacillation and contradiction in Engels'

views of sexuality. We get the expected Trotskyite caveat: no current communist country is *really* communist.

The heart of the book is the chapter (the 4th) giving S.'s Marxist account of sexuality under capitalism and of current pornography. For S. 'male and female sexuality in capitalism, respectively an atomistic and a holistic sexuality, are explainable in terms of the different locations of men and women in the realms of production and reproduction' (7). In using pornography, men try haplessly to recoup power lost in alienated and desensitizing labor – by mentally dominating and dismembering women's wholistic sexuality. Curiously, S.'s account of sexuality holds *by definition* only for heterosexuality. In counterpart, S. leaves entirely unremarked the existence and nature of now highly ramified gay male pornography. Both omissions leave his analyses open to wide counterexample – males under capitalism may not need be the alienated sensory-deprived predatory wimps his analysis makes them out to be. Pleasure may be its own bottom. Pornography may simply enhance pleasure.

Here S.'s anti-naturalism is at its zenith. For S. the focus of male sexuality is on the penis because alienated from his work a man becomes fragmented and casts about for something sexual that is a substitute for power and wholeness – to wit, his dick. That the penis is the place where more sensory nerve-endings come together than anywhere else on a man's body is passed over unmentioned. Masters and Johnson are nowhere in sight: men masturbate to pornography because masturbation produces the greatest orgasms of any sexual act and the use of pornography is simply useful to that end. S.'s social constructivist analysis would apply far better to heterosexual men's fear of their nerve-engorged tits. Playing with and getting pleasure from them makes such men appear feminine in their own and others' sexist eyes. But S. wishes to deny that issues of gender raise issues for sexuality over and above those raised by class.

S.'s chapter on the nature of porn under future real communism begins with a useful analysis of the concept of degradation. Contra liberals, it is capable of reasonably crisp definition through intersubjectivity. But when the chapter turns to its announced theme – futuristic porn – it takes on a certain unearthly hue, like viewing the Northern Lights or glowing stones under black light. All is not clearly foreseen, but technology is going to enhance our senses, produce 'sensuous wealth,' transform alienated labor (including prostitution) and proliferate the types of enjoyable sexuality. All this (smell-o-porn aside) is about where gay male sexuality was in the 1970s as manifest in bathhouse complexes, where sexual encounters were regulated by purely libertarian principles and which typically showed porn movies in which everyone by turns does everything to everyone, aggression does not entail domination, pleasure is its own

self-sufficient ground, and visual focusing on parts occurs not as a comment on a nonpresent gender but because that's what works for pleasure. See any current hypermasculinist Colt or Buckshot video.

The last chapter is a counterattack on popular feminist attacks on pornography. S. deftly shows many feminist views on pornography to be overinclusive, underinclusive or to turn on loaded or vacuous definitions. S. does, though, agree with feminists that much of contemporary pornography is degrading to women. However, he simply punts – quite consciously so – on what the legal consequences of this and indeed of the rest of his views should be. And we are left, by default, with millennialism.

Thoughout the book, S. seems to waver on what the relation between sensuality and affection should be – both in reality and its images. At one point, their separation is taken as a mark of alienation; later we are told real Marxist porn will sometimes portray sex without love; elsewhere we are faced with skepticism about the future; and still again we are told it is a not very interesting question. Perhaps these views will all be sorted out in S.'s soon forthcoming book, *The Structure of Love.*

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S. Tweyman.
Scepticism and Belief in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
Norwood, MA: Martinus Nijhoff 1986.
Pp. xv+167. US $45.00. ISBN 90-247-3090-2.

This outstanding work is one of the most interesting recent books on Hume. It is a model of what a good commentary ought to look like. It is original, careful, and well-argued. The author has obviously lived these texts for years and understands them thoroughly.

Before discussing the content of the book itself, it will be useful to reconstruct Tweyman's presuppositions. He writes as though he believes that a satisfactory reading of the *Dialogues* must show that: 1) Philo speaks for Hume; 2) Philo is in some sense the victor of the *Dialogues*; and 3) every statement in the *Dialogues* is to be taken seriously from a philosophical point of view. Despite the intuitive plausibility of these criteria, they are by no means universally shared. The

difficulty, of course, is to maintain Philo's case in the face of passages such as the end of Part III where he is 'embarrassed and confounded' or in the famous 'confession' of Part XII, where Philo seemingly gives up his earlier views to endorse something closer to Cleanthes' position. Kemp Smith, for example, felt that Philo represented Hume's views throughout; but Kemp Smith also discounted significant passages in the *Dialogues* as being placed there for dramatic rather than philosophical reasons.

Tweyman tries to find a meaning to these passages that still maintains Philo's position as Hume's victorious spokesperson. In order to do this he draws heavily on Hume's earlier writings, specifically the first *Enquiry* and the *Treatise*. In his analysis, two main theses emerge: 1) that the *Dialogues* chart Cleanthes' philosophical growth from dogmatism to mitigated scepticism; and 2) that although Hume rejects the argument from design, he does affirm the design hypothesis as a 'natural belief.'

In Book XII of the *Enquiry*, Hume hints at a course of philosophical growth that begins with dogmatism. If the dogmatist is properly exposed to Pyrrhonistic arguments he or she can evolve to a mitigated scepticism. Both the original dogmatism and the Pyrrhonian arguments are thus dialectical moments in an education process that ends in moderate scepticism – a more thoughtful version of scepticism that, in Hume's words, is 'corrected by common sense and reflection' (*Enquiry* Sec III, part iii). Tweyman uses this passage as a means of charting the progress of the argument of the *Dialogues*, which he sees as a description of the philosophical education of Cleanthes. He argues that in the beginning of the *Dialogues*, Cleanthes is, by Hume's definition, a dogmatist. Despite Cleanthes' healthy interest in empirical evidence, Cleanthes fits the pattern of all dogmatists: '... while they see objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising argument, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles, to which they are included; nor have they any indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments' (*Enquiry* Sec III, part iii).

In the course of the *Dialogues* Philo exposes Cleanthes to Pyrrhonian arguments and destroys Cleanthes' dogmatic position. By Book XII, Philo and Cleanthes can come together as one. Now that Cleanthes is ready to drop his dogmatism, Philo can drop his Pyrrhonianism. Philo's earlier arguments have now played their role as a heuristic device and can now be replaced by a more moderate version of scepticism that both can share. Although Philo does soften his tone in Book XII, he does so in victory, not in defeat.

Tweyman finds support for this thesis even in the introductory remarks by Pamphilus where, at one point, an opposition is set up between 'the accurate philosophical turn of Cleanthes' and the 'careless scepticism of Philo.' According to Tweyman, the phrase 'the accurate

philosophical turn of Cleanthes...' may refer to 'the philosophical conversion which the dogmatist undergoes to achieve the position of mitigated scepticism.' Tweyman also reminds us that in the *Treatise* Hume sees 'carelessness and inattention' as part of the cure for Pyrrhonian scepticism. He concludes that 'careless' may be 'a technical (non-pejorative) term which carries great philosophical significance' (23). This reading may be forced but it is certainly ingenious.

The second major thesis of the book is that Hume is making a clear distinction between the design argument and a 'natural belief' in the design hypothesis. On Tweyman's reading, the design argument is thoroughly discredited. What survives, however, is a natural belief in purposiveness in nature. Based on an analysis of the *Treatise*, Tweyman argues that natural beliefs are certain universal and unavoidable beliefs that provide 'the basis for certain types of empirical knowledge' and which also 'provide us with essential ways of approaching our experiences in order to get on in the world' (17-18). They also cannot be supported by argumentation. The clearest examples of natural beliefs are our beliefs in causality, the existence of external objects and personal identity. Tweyman argues that the design hypothesis fulfills all of Hume's criteria for a natural belief.

Tweyman's overall interpretation is interesting and suggestive. But he may be buying himself the luxury of being pristine about the text of the *Dialogues* by playing fast and loose with the *Treatise*. As Tweyman tells the story, the *Dialogues* are a success because the design hypothesis is shown to conform to the analysis of other natural beliefs (personal identity, external objects and causality) that is presented in the *Treatise*. But when we look at the *Treatise*, Hume seems to have severe reservations about his own treatment of these topics. His most explicit reservations, of course, are expressed about the theory of personal identity, but he also leaves us with unresolved problems about his theories of the external world and causal reasoning. Hume apparently does *not* have a satisfactory theory of natural beliefs in the *Treatise*. On the face of it, repeating the *Treatise* analysis would be a failure for Hume, not a success. To put it another way, the fact that Philo defends a version of the *Treatise* does not in itself prove that Hume regards Philo as the winner of the *Dialogues*. It is at least possible that Philo's 'embarrassment' is caused by the fact that Cleanthes is exploiting unresolved problems in Hume's own approach.

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