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William Barrett

Death of the Soul:

From Descartes to the Computer.

Garden City, NY:

Anchor Press/Doubleday 1986.

Pp. xvi + 173. US \$16.95.

ISBN 0-385-15965-X.

The central theme of this book is 'the drama of mind within our modern Western civilization' (14). Modern man is 'in danger of losing any grasp of the human mind altogether' (xvi); Barrett traces the history of this sad state of affairs from its origins in the 17th century. The book, is wide-ranging, if nothing else. It discusses Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre, Wittgenstein, Turing, Derrida; on its way it also manages to cover the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, the Gödel theorems, the naturalistic fallacy – and all this in 170 pages. But it is difficult to see for whom the book was intended as no one with any knowledge of philosophy is going to gain much from its potted and misleading accounts of these philosophers.

Barrett is obviously upset by what has happened to the soul since Copernicus, Descartes and Galileo 'launched' (favorite verb) upon their intellectual 'adventures' (favorite noun). First, the world was decentered, then it was bifurcated (split in two, he explains); the consequences of that split is the degeneration into the fractured, soulless modern world where computers are seen as capable of producing Shakespearean sonnets.

Barrett believes that to question whether there is a mind beyond the physical is a sign of schizophrenia, which plagues ordinary people some of the time, and philosophers and psychologists most of the time. Throughout the book he assumes that there is such a thing as the 'soul,' and an unchanging 'human nature'; but if any proof was needed then the fact that human beings are troubled by questions

of the meaning of life and the universe, while his dog is not, demonstrates that we are dualistic animals (13). After this defense of dualism, Barrett traces the way in which various philosophers have treated the subject.

Barrett believes that we can understand the works of philosophers better by considering the traits of their 'national character' and their personalities. Thus, Locke reflects British practicality, preference for common sense, and mistrust of intellectuals; Hume is a cool cautious Scotsman; Berkeley, as a typical Irishman, is bold and has a fanciful and sweeping imagination. (I wonder what Frege and Heidegger show about the German national character.) Furthermore, Sartre's political involvements and his admiration for the 'criminal and homosexual' Jean Genet 'tells us a good deal about some of the peculiar traits of his mind' (133). And the fact that 'Turing insisted on being an indiscreet homosexual' (155) shows how incapable he was of running his own life.

Much of Barrett's discussion of the works of these philosophers is misleading, if not downright false. Thus Hume, whose 'thought left ravages upon the European mind' (48) is accused of making a 'categorical mistake' [sic] in expecting the self to be exhibited as a *sensatum*. Wittgenstein is introduced as the 'creator of logical positivism' (148). And his version of Kantian ethics, without mention of the categorical imperative, reduces the account of a lying promise into a contradiction between saying out loud 'I will do something' and intending the opposite (93-4).

The book preaches the renewal of the soul, the re-establishment of the self and the rediscovery of God through an assault on what Blumenberg calls 'the legitimacy of the modern.' Barrett is a kind of anti-Copernicus who wants the soul back in the centre of the moral world. According to him any ethical system implies that we belong to a 'community of souls.' The most drastic failure of the modern world is in our neglect of the questions of the existence of God and the meaning of life. The alienation and fragmentation of modern times cannot be overcome, Barrett claims, without the belief that the universe has 'some meaning in harmony with our spiritual and moral aims - which means, in effect, the discovery or rediscovery of God' (91).

Barrett outlines a two part argument loosely based on Leibniz, for the existence of God:

1) If we accept that the world does not have a reason then we are reduced to accepting that it and our lives are absurd. Instinctively we rebel against this.

2) If we accept that there is a reason or cause for the chain of being we will have to acknowledge the existence of a necessary being or God.

But the argument won't do. First, as Nagel has suggested, even if we were to accept God's plans as the purpose of our existence we

will be faced with questions about the meaning and justification of God and its plans. Second, putting aside Kant's famous criticism of Leibniz, Barrett does not explain why the causal chain cannot extend backwards into infinity, each prior link in the chain providing a potential explanation for a subsequent one. Furthermore, why could we not believe that while evolution is the reason (or cause) of our existence on this planet, the reason (or meaning) of our life is given to us by what each of us does with our lives.

But for Barrett it is questionable whether the soul can be truly human if it is not seeking God. Hence, scepticism on these issues becomes a further sign of degeneration into the world of computers. Some of the culprits in this degeneration are analytic philosophy and the teaching of logic in philosophy departments which lead to 'a decided insensitivity to the human subject' (145). The unsuspecting reader would be well advised to be sceptical about any comments on logic in a book where *modus ponens* is defined as 'whenever two things are always found together, or one following the other and you find the first, you will find the second' (151).

Barrett finishes the book with a warning about the tendency to replace consciousness with the computer (I assume he means with the model or the metaphor of computer). But there isn't a single reference in his discussion to the vast recent literature on the subject. Some of the works of the dreaded analytic philosophers, for instance Searle, might have actually helped his case.

Barrett has written a book, indirectly addressing what he calls 'the question of questions,' viz. 'Why there is anything at all, rather than nothing?', a question that even Heidegger, who is by and large on the side of the angels, 'never came to grips with' (28). I suspect that Heidegger, like most philosophers, knew that any attempt in that direction would only lead to failure.

Maria Baghramian

Trinity College, Dublin

Joan Boyle and James Morriss

The Mirror of Time:

Images of Aging and Dying.

New York: Greenwood Press 1987.

Pp. xiii+225. US \$35.00. ISBN 0-313-25597-0.

This is an engrossing book (unfortunately flawed by smallish and tiring print). Basically, the book is an historical survey of conceptions of time, aging, and death, but there are philosophically interesting comparisons drawn and implications noted. A final chapter offers some intriguing speculations, and a brief but useful bibliography is provided. My overall impression is that the book is better suited to stimulating browsing than sustained reading. With respect to classroom use, the book would be most productive as a complement to a main text, such as Patrick McKee's *Philosophical Foundations of Gerontology* (Human Sciences Press 1982). I intend to use it with my own *Rethinking How We Age* (New York: Greenwood Press 1987).

Before saying something about the various topics dealt with in *The Mirror of Time*, I want briefly to state a philosophical worry. The authors rely fairly heavily on Stephen Pepper's notion of 'world hypotheses.' I had the good fortune to hear Pepper—well after his retirement—while I was an undergraduate at Berkeley in 1961, and found his views exciting. But that was over a quarter-century ago. There is no place here for discussion of Pepper, but I think it important to note that given the amount of criticism of conceptual-scheme pluralism there has been in the last couple of decades, beginning most notably with Donald Davidson's 'On the very idea of a conceptual scheme,' much that is central in Pepper's work has become problematic. *The Mirror of Time* too often suggests that its authors endorse conceptual-scheme pluralism in a rather unreflective way. My recommendation is that interesting and perceptive points in the book about varying conceptions of time, aging, and death, not be jeopardized by being taken as implying incommensurability of the sort now so suspect. These points can be taken as about the way history, culture, and context shape our thinking, without the highly dubious implication that the end-products of that shaping constitute incommensurable 'conceptual schemes.'

The Mirror of Time begins with a comparison of Hopi and Western-European conceptions of time, aging and death, to set the scene with respect to differences among 'root metaphors' or 'world hypotheses' or conceptions. The next three chapters take us through Greek, Jewish and early Christian, and Middle-Ages conceptions of time, aging and death. The authors use quoted bits of poetry and prose very effectively to illustrate the conceptions they discuss; they also produce some very quotable prose themselves. I particularly liked the line:

'It was acceptable, in ancient Greece to reach old age, but not to linger there' (31), which illustrates the authors' nice way with brief characterizations.

In order to give a better idea of the content of the book, I will say a bit more about the next chapter, five, selecting it more or less arbitrarily. In 'The Split Image,' Boyle and Morriss begin with the idea, novel in the seventeenth century, of the prolongation of life. The conceptual shift involved was from acceptance of life and death as God's will to a reconception of (earthly) life as manipulable by the new science. The role of the machine metaphor with respect to the body carried with it the possibility of *repair*. Descartes is a central figure in the discussion, and is notable for having kept a foot in the other camp, the earlier religious world-view, with his commitment to the immortality of the soul. Descartes also reconceived time, on the metaphor of a sequence of numbers, in essentially spatial-divisible-terms (91), a conception which Newton took up. The upshot of seventeenth-century thought on time and death was an essentially optimistic view that the future would bring scientific techniques which would master the one and defeat the other. But it is evident from the discussion that, in moving away from the divine-plan view, there was recognition of the fleetingness of human life and the merciless progressiveness of time. The promising scientific conception of time as quantifiable duration, and of human life as the ongoing career of a soul-endowed mechanism, had a dark side, namely, the transitoriness of human life in the context of an uncaring universe.

It is in chapter seven that *The Mirror of Time* begins to offer more than one might expect from its subtitle. The authors sum up material covered in this way: 'The Greeks looked into the mirror of time and saw the order of nature; the Judeo-Christians observed the ... creation of God. The leaders of the Enlightenment saw ... an earthly paradise ...' (123). But with Kant things get complicated. Chapter seven is aptly titled 'Behind the Looking Glass'; it is basically about the new sophistication *about* conceptions, the beginning of reflection on our own root-metaphors. Chapter eight, 'The Shattered Mirror,' concerns the Victorian reconception of time in terms of the progress/decay contrast, and the distancing of death and aging through the initiation and growth of institutions such as old-age homes and mortuaries. Chapter nine, 'Broken Images,' surveys the diversity of conceptions of time, aging and death of the twentieth Century, focusing on what relativity did to our notion of time.

In chapter ten, 'Stepping Through the Looking Glass,' the authors offer some more speculative views on such matters as the growing dissatisfaction with chronological age as the definitive measure of aging, the media's role in determining our conceptions of aging, medicine's new power, and the threat of 'megadeath.' I found of greatest

interest a brief discussion of models of cognitive development in aging, namely, David Hulstsch's 'associative,' 'information-processing' and 'contextualist' models. In this connection, I was glad that the authors do not conclude with overly optimistic remarks on aging and dying, but rather with a balanced comparison of mechanistic and 'contextualist' models. As indicated, I intend to use this book, and anyone interested in aging should own it.

C. G. Prado

Queen's University

Robert Dunn

The Possibility of Weakness of Will.

Indianapolis:

Hackett Publishing Company 1987.

US \$25.00 (cloth ISBN 0-915145-99-5);

US \$14.50 (paperback ISBN 0-915145-87-7).

Weakness of will is obviously a practical problem. Being occasionally weak-willed, we try to devise strategies to overcome it or lessen its frequency of occurrence. By contrast, the philosophical tradition is skeptical about the possibility of weakness of will. Thus Robert Dunn's central question in this book: Is it possible for an agent to be weak-willed in what he does? This is to be read as: Can a person knowingly and intentionally act against his all-out better judgment, when he is free to act in accordance with it, has the relevant know-how, and has present to mind the judgment that now is the time to act? Dunn answers 'yes'; the tradition says 'no.'

A common reaction to this as a problem is one of incredulity. The late E.J. Lemmon gave a succinct formulation of this sense of incredulity: 'in view of its existence, if you find *akrasia* a problem, you have already made a philosophical mistake.' Dunn argues that our best philosophers have made this mistake. Plato, Aristotle, and recently Hare and Davidson have given us arguments for the incoherence of weakness of will. They thought that the expression has to be withdrawn from language, sent for cleaning and then put back into circulation again. But these philosophical launderers have shrunk or transformed the concept and the phenomenon beyond recognition. The early Plato redescribes *akrasia* as a *kind of ignorance* where the agent mis-estimates what is best because of the proximity of a certain pleasure. The mature Plato allows for action knowingly done con-

trary to one's evaluation. But such action is *compulsive* rather than intentional action. For the putative *akrates* is tyrannized by overpowering and unreasoning appetites and passions. Aristotle discusses two sorts of *akrasia*. The first sort is due to impetuosity. Here the agent does not deliberate but is simply led by his feelings. He is incontinent in ignorance; for he does not know what he should be doing. The second sort of *akrates* has reached a conclusion as to what he should do. But under the influence of appetite or passion, he comes to have only an *impaired knowledge* of this: he does not *really* know what he is to do in the particular circumstance. Hare, like the mature Plato, redescribes weak-willed agents as *psychologically powerless* to do as they think they should: they act from irresistible desire. This seems recognizably different from weakness of will where the agent possesses the requisite will power but he fails to make the effort of will that would be its exercise; he gives in to countervailing desire. Davidson is also revealed as inhospitable to the possibility of weakness of will at issue here. For Davidson claims that the weak-willed agent acts in accordance with his *unconditional judgment*, but flouts his conditional judgment, the judgment based on evidence available to the agent. Dunn's concern is with the strongest case: a person knowingly and intentionally acting against his all-out, *unconditional judgment*. He acknowledges that these other phenomena merit being thought of in terms of weakness of will, but none seems more central than the ranges of cases indicated by the central question. It is these which have provided the standard focus of discussions whether weakness of will is possible.

What is the source of this pervasive mistake which makes us inclined to think that there is a logical problem here? Dunn traces the mistake to an incorrect interpretation of one's evaluative thinking about one's own action. The traditional assumption is that there is an alignment between such evaluations and appropriate desires to act. In Plato and Aristotle this alignment is a fact about human nature. In Hare and Davidson this alignment between sincere (or unconditional) judgment and intentional action becomes a matter of logical necessity. According to Dunn there is no such alignment. Evaluative thinking allows a complete dissociation between itself and any corresponding desire to act. Evaluation and volition are separate and distinct. Evaluative thinking is 'wholly theoretical and non-volitional.' Nor need it be grounded in utilitarian or prudential judgments. Hence, there is no logical problem about the possibility of weakness of will because it is perfectly coherent for us to be unintegrated in a certain way, namely, not to have any volitions to act that correspond to our felicitous all out unconditional judgments about our own action. It is a purely contingent fact whether an agent has the required volitions to promote morality or his own well-being. For,

as a result of certain moods or frames of mind, we can be hostile or indifferent toward another and hence not have the good or interest of the other as an object of volition. Similarly, as a result of certain moods or frames of mind, we can be indifferent or hostile to ourselves, and hence, not have our own good or interest as a object of volition. The necessity of ever present self-love or love of others is a chimera.

The book reveals a rare blend of virtues: a mastery of the literature, a lucidity of mind, a rigor of argument and a robust sense of psychological realism. It soars yet rarely loses sight of the terrain. Here are some comments:

1. Granted that self-indifference and self-hostility, just like indifference or hostility to others, are possible psychologies for us, do these attitudes really help us to locate weakness of will? Dunn illustrates these neglected aspects of our psychology from Simone de Beauvoir's *The Woman Destroyed*. Monique, to begin with, is in a cheerful mood, and adopts a runaway as a protégée. Monique is concerned about the girl's fate. But then Monique changes and she becomes indifferent to the girl's fate as well as her own. Monique's life collapses, she is in despair, her energy is drained, she thinks of herself as a dead woman. Dunn remarks that a frequent effect of being in such depression is that one sees all the good to be won or gained and one lacks the will, interest, or desire or strength. However, these frames of mind point to somewhat different phenomena than Dunn's central case of weakness of will. If Plato and Hare reduce weakness of will to powerlessness, do these frames of mind that Dunn cites not achieve the same effect? Can one intentionally and freely act against one's better judgment in such circumstances?

2. The tradition assumes such a tight connection between evaluation and volition that it is impossible to drive a wedge between them to make room for *akrasia*. Dunn makes us abandon this assumption. But in doing so we are left in a bizarre predicament. For now the space between evaluation and volition is so big that *akrasia* becomes entirely *unremarkable*. It is intelligible for us to be unintegrated in certain ways. However, ascriptions of weakness of will presuppose as a background considerable integration in the agent between evaluation and volition. This intuition deserves protection. It fuels traditional theories although it is exaggerated by them.

The cover of the paperback edition has the picture of a red apple with a bite in it. Who says you can't tell a book by its cover?

Béla Szabados

University of Regina

**Allan C. Hutchinson and
Patrick Monahan, eds.**

The Rule of Law.

Toronto: Carswell 1987.

Pp. xiv + 167. Cdn \$45.00.

ISBN 0-459-39540-8.

In 1971 Robert Paul Wolff's edited volume entitled *The Rule of Law* appeared. Its essays, three of which have 'conspiracy' or 'violence' in their titles, evidence the turbulence of those times. Its two philosophical pieces are by Dworkin and Fuller. In 1987 another volume entitled *The Rule of Law*, containing essays from a 1984 conference at Osgoode Hall Law School, has appeared. It likewise bespeaks the times more than it illuminates what the editors call 'a rare and protean principle of our political tradition' (ix). Politically, the fear of administrative rule-making has replaced the fear of social unrest; academically, Critical Legal Studies (CLS) has overtaken positivism and natural law.

In her opening essay, 'Political Theory and The Rule of Law,' Judith Shklar observes that it would not be difficult 'to show that the phrase "the Rule of Law" has become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use' (1). This incoherence results from ignoring the political settings and purposes that infused the Rule of Law with meaning when it occupied 'a very significant place in the vocabulary of political theory' (1). There are, in Shklar's view, two 'archetypes' of the Rule of Law. One, associated with Aristotle, refers to an entire way of life ruled by reason; the other, associated with Montesquieu, represents the institutional restraints that prevent oppression. The descendants of Montesquieu are Dicey and Hayek on one political side and Unger on the other; the descendants of Aristotle are Fuller and Dworkin. Each line has abused its legacy, Shklar charges, by removing the Rule of Law from its historical context and subjecting it to political and philosophical abstraction.

In the volume's longest essay, 'The Welfare State, The New Regulation, and The Rule of Law,' Theodore Lowi is concerned with what the recent binge of regulatory laws and programs in the United States means for the Rule of Law. Previous liberal legislation conforms fairly well to the Rule of Law, but the regulatory laws of the 1970s are different because they ordain only broad goals, rather than specific conduct or means of achieving these goals, and thereby accord administrators significant discretion to formulate rules or standards of conduct. The danger in this approach is government's 'entropic tendency': 'the general tendency of governments to run down toward patronage policies and client relationships through the resort to delegations of discretion to administrative agencies' (58). And because

no interest group supports the Rule of Law, Lowi worries that liberal, radical-right, and radical-left approaches to politics all could be on the road to serfdom.

Michael Sandel's short essay, 'The Political Theory of the Procedural Republic,' which incorporates previously published material, presents familiar communitarian criticisms of liberalism and advocates a revival of civic republicanism. The editors' contribution, 'Democracy and the Rule of Law,' recapitulates party-line CLS objections to liberal individualism, which, they feel, along with the Rule of Law sustains elitism at the expense of rigorous, direct democracy. Neither piece responds to Shklar's jibe at those who 'pine for those familial and communal traditions' that liberalism is accused of having destroyed (8).

Three essays in the volume are fascinating. In 'The Rule of Law: Is That The Rule That Was?' Philippe Nonet recounts an experience he had delivering his annual lectures on the Rule of Law to law students in California. At the conclusion of his lectures, several students asked: 'Is that still the rule in this land?' This question posed a moral dilemma for Nonet – he had to choose between his obligation to the truth and his responsibility for the moral education of his students. The students resisted Nonet's explanation that the Rule of Law is not simply conformity to positive law, but rather rectitude founded in practical reason and involving harmony and freedom: 'my students were young, and youth must rebel at the thought one must practice and age before one can lay claim to knowledge of law' (137). As with movie reviews, it would be wrong to divulge the ending. Nonet's essay deserves to be read for both its answer and its arguments.

Duncan Kennedy's 'Toward A Critical Phenomenology of Judging' is valuable because it suggests what, in addition to ideology, law is for CLS. Kennedy imagines that he is a judge who must decide a case in which there initially appears to be a conflict between what the law requires and how he wants to come out. 'Judge' Kennedy carefully investigates, from 'inside the situation,' how and how tightly the law constrains him. His ratiocinations lead him to the surprising conclusion that the judge's situation is similar to that of a lawyer advocating for a client: 'The situation of having to work to achieve an outcome is in my view fundamental to the situation of the judge' (146). Kennedy nevertheless views law as constraining a judge in the way that a physical medium constrains a sculptor. He also raises the redoubtable issue of the connection between law and morality by regarding legal argument 'as a branch of ethical argument' (152).

Ernest Weinrib's essay, 'The Intelligibility of The Rule of Law,' is at the opposite pole. Weinrib's aim is to make a non-instrumentalist conception of law respectable in order that law can be 'insulated from the purposes which might be projected on to it by political and eco-

conomic interests' (61). Weinrib wants to revive an Aristotelian understanding of law, according to which law has an immanent intelligibility which 'resides at the congruence of form and content' (64). This intelligibility imposes a constraint upon legal decisions because their content must be adequate to the forms of the legal relations involved. A non-instrumentalist approach is, Weinrib claims, particularly apt for private law, which he analyzes in terms of the formal relationships of Aristotle's corrective justice. Weinrib concedes that he has produced only a 'conceptual possibility,' and the viability of his program must remain questionable until its details emerge. Nevertheless, he has articulated a sophisticated alternative to CLS and pragmatic approaches to law in general.

In addition to representing the extremes of legal thought, the essays by Kennedy and Weinrib are important because they raise the issue of the appropriate starting-point for legal theory. Kennedy believes one must begin with 'particularization': 'I don't find myself at all convinced when people start out claiming they can tell us what the Rule of Law is without some...grounding in an imagined situation' (141). Weinrib's view, on the other hand, could not be more abstract. Does this methodological difference matter, and if so, why? Legal theory needs to address this question.

As with all conference proceedings, the quality of these essays is uneven. The latter three are, however, engaging, provocative, and philosophically rich.

Barry Hoffmaster

University of Western Ontario

D.S. Hutchinson

The Virtues of Aristotle.

New York: Methuen 1986.

Pp. ix + 139. US \$25.00. ISBN 0-7102-0858-8.

Hutchinson limits the scope of his inquiry to answering a single, narrowly defined question: What is a virtue of character? He also believes this question can be adequately answered without considering the doctrine of the mean or Aristotle's account of the individual virtues. Thus construed the objective of the book is the articulation of Aristotle's positions on *hexeis*, *erga*, traits of character and choice, and Hutchinson discusses each of these in turn.

In the introductory chapter, Hutchinson motivates the study of virtues of character by arguing that for Aristotle 'what matters for ethics is acquiring the virtues' (3): Moreover, the texts that purport to give an analysis of virtues of character, namely, *Nicomachean Ethics* II 5 and *Eudemian Ethics* II 2, are opaque and can only be understood against the background of related discussions found throughout the corpus. Hutchinson then goes on in the second chapter to survey various definitions of 'hexis' found in the *Metaphysics*, the *Categories*, the *Physics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He concludes that a *hexis* is a well-entrenched, relatively stable disposition and dispositional trait that is either a perfection or a defect capable of producing only one of a pair of opposite results.

The third chapter examines the *ergon*-arguments of *Eudemian Ethics* II 1 and *Nicomachean Ethics* I 7. On Hutchinson's reading, *EE* 1218b32-1219a40 is 'an impressively sustained argument, valid throughout' consisting of twenty-nine steps and concluding with the claim that happiness is activity of a perfect life in accordance with perfect excellence (45). This argument provides the missing premises for the briefer argument at *NE* I 7, 1097b22-1098a20 for the same conclusion. Both arguments employ a notion of the human *ergon* as the form of activity of the human soul. Scanning a number of possible objections to Aristotle's position leads to the conclusion that none of them constitutes a serious threat to the cogency of this argument.

Traits of character are described in Chapter Four. Again using the *Eudemian Ethics* to elucidate claims made in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Hutchinson reconstructs Aristotle's grounds for distinguishing between reason and feeling. Analyzing the relation between feelings and desires prompts Hutchinson to claim that a trait of character is a disposition with respect to feelings that leads to a disposition for a desire, and thus he concludes that such traits are tastes in an area of conduct. 'Virtue is good taste in practical matters' (78).

Because virtues are excellences of human character involving rationality, Hutchinson addresses the relation between practical thinking and dispositions of character in the fifth chapter and finds that the concept of choice provides the key to understanding Aristotle's view. Choice translates the goals and ideals of a person into immediate expression, and pure choice consists in choosing things for their own sake. Indeed, Hutchinson avers, whenever an agent chooses anything for its own sake, the choice issues from a stable disposition. This provides the key to meeting criticisms of the restrictions Aristotle places on acting with virtue. Chapter Six brings the conclusions of the earlier chapters together by using them to explicate the description of virtues of character in *Eudemian Ethics* II 2 and *Nicomachean Ethics* II 5. In sum, virtue is a disposition to perform the human *ergon* well, a disposition for pure choice, and a *hexis* of character.

Hutchinson's project is one of explication and reconstruction. No doubt reading this book which surveys a variety of texts dealing with particular key concepts will increase the background knowledge a reader brings to the study of *NE* I 7 and *EE* II 2. It will also serve to familiarize the reader with some of the controversies surrounding these texts. In addition, Hutchinson is a charitable critic who wants to save Aristotle's arguments, and this too is all to the good.

However, the reader who comes to *The Virtues of Aristotle* in search of in-depth analyses of the Aristotelian texts or the critical literature will be disappointed. An underlying assumption of the whole project is the belief that the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* do not differ in important particulars and can (indeed should be) read together. This is a controversial assumption. Many distinguished scholars have argued against it. Hutchinson is far too quick in his dismissal of the opposing viewpoint. He also claims that the *ergon*-arguments of *NE* I 7 and *EE* II 1 arrive at the same conclusion. As stated by Aristotle, the two conclusions are: 'Happiness is an activity of a perfect life in accordance with perfect virtue' (*EE* 1219a37-8) and 'the human good is activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are several virtues, in accordance with the best and most perfect' (*NE* 1098a16-18). The object of the second chapter is a study of Aristotle's uses of '*hexis*.' Yet Hutchinson looks at only a fraction of the texts cited in Bonitz and thus provides, at best, only an incomplete explication of the term.

A more serious problem, however, is the conflict between the ethical significance assigned to virtues of character and the emphasis placed on the role of reason in human conduct. Hutchinson contrasts Aristotle's conception of moral theory with modern theories that 'share this (ultimately Platonic) assumption that what we need, to live properly is knowledge about practical matters. Aristotle does not share this assumption' (2). As character traits, virtues are tastes that issue in predictable actions. Even choice, deliberate desire, is a disposition to enjoy or dislike certain courses of conduct (101). Hutchinson's virtue-adaequacy postulate holds 'that the possession of a virtue is sufficient for a man's correct behaviour in that area' (82). Here there seems to be no question of rational deliberation; like a well-trained pup the virtuous man jumps when he should. A quite different line of interpretation finds expression in the analysis of the *ergon*-arguments in Chapter Three. 'We can discover what the standards are for human conduct by discovering what it is reasonable to do, and the discovery of what it is reasonable to do is the output of the possession of excellence in rationality' (51). Nowhere does Hutchinson confront the apparent incompatibility between these different conceptions of moral action and the basis for ethical decision-making.

In Hutchinson's defense, it should be said that this difficulty reflects a similar tension in Aristotle's thinking, but one might have hoped for some progress on this vexing problem.

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I. C. Jarvie

*Thinking About Society:
Theory and Practice.*

Norwall, MA:

D. Reidel Publishing Co. 1986.

Pp. xx + 519. US \$68.00. ISBN 90-277-2068-1.

The twenty-five essays, lectures and articles collected in this volume were written over the period 1965-1985 and fall, according to their author, into two broad groups: methodological and conceptual features of the social sciences, and the application of functionalist ideas to specific problems in social life. Except for two papers not previously published most appear to be photo-reprints from their original places of publication; this has resulted in a book containing a variety of type sizes and styles, different conventions for paragraphing, footnoting, section numbering and citing references, numerous uncorrected typographical errors and at least one article which requires the use of a magnifying glass in order to read it.

Though ostensibly on the social sciences Jarvie's work is broad-based and concerned with traditional philosophical issues, such as the nature of science, the possibility of knowledge, the objectivity of criticism, and the integrity of scientists. Many of the papers treat topics in a manner appropriate to general audiences or introductory courses. Some were written as lectures or symposia contributions, others were clearly written for scholarly journals. In each, however, the author's plain style, sense of authority and perspective leave the reader with a serious appreciation for the complexity and importance of the ideas being discussed.

In the lead essay, a symposium paper entitled 'The Notion of a Social Science,' Jarvie rehearses familiar arguments for distinguishing between the natural and social sciences. His reply is characteristic of his approach to philosophical issues throughout the book: he neither accepts, repudiates nor revises standard formulations and distinctions. Rather, he gets us to see the problem in a different light.

Nature and society, he argues, are not two completely different objects of study but represent categories through which we filter our experience. Science, he holds, is a critical inquiry into problems that interest us and the distinction between nature and society is simply one of those problems.

In 'Limits to Functionalism and Alternatives to It in Anthropology' he discusses the view that to explain social events is to describe their function. Jarvie points out that since functional explanations cannot be both valid and informative at the same time, functionalism as an ideology must be renounced. But as a heuristic or method for studying people in society, functionalism can and has been highly useful. For Jarvie the underlying issue is how to vindicate the study of people in society while conceding that such studies will lack the exactitude and universality of the physical sciences. Anthropology must study man in all his complexity and folly, together with his institutions, relationships and dependencies. Most important, it must do so in ways 'which preserve the human meaning and significance of what we are privileged to be studying' (147).

Jarvie's early training was in social anthropology, and after studying philosophy with Popper he applied philosophical techniques and criticisms to the basic problems and practices of anthropology. One of these is the dilemma of the participant observer. As scientists, anthropologists should not interfere in the lives of the people they observe. Yet unless they participate as fully as possible in the cultures they study their observations will lack depth, genuineness and meaning. Their position also involves an ethical dilemma. Should the observer of a lynch mob intervene to warn its intended victim? Should the observer of a gang of thieves report their crime to the police? Should the anthropologist watching leaves being put on sores intervene with penicillin? Contrary to accepted teaching Jarvie argues that anthropologists ought to intervene where it will help. His argument is that remaining neutral is a kind of deception, a practice that gives a mistaken impression of the scientist's values. 'Integrity,' he argues, 'cannot be overridden in the name of science' (159).

In 'Technology and the Structure of Knowledge,' Jarvie builds on Ryle's distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that. Technology as ordinarily understood, he allows, is knowing how to make machines do what you want them to without knowing why they do what they do. Nothing new here. Shortly, however, he turns the discussion around and is thinking on a larger scale, of man's attempts to control his environment, and of efforts to come to terms with culture and society. Technology reinterpreted turns out to include all knowledge, theoretical as well as practical, a Platonic ideal. Good Socratic teachers have this knack, the ability to turn an argument on itself, to show how a distinction firmly held may exclude the per-

son who applies it, to make a categorization unwittingly include the categorizer.

As I have suggested, Jarvie's interests are not exclusively theoretical but are guided by political and humanistic concerns. This is equally evident in the papers devoted to specific issues: the arts, technology, nationalism and the movies. Two are published here for the first time, one surveying the rise and fall of motion pictures as a business, the other examining the relation between pornography and violence.

To anyone who cares to look them up the figures will show that the motion picture industry is in its dotage, it is being shoved aside by television and popular music. In 'Business and Religion' Jarvie spends too much time chronicling its rise and fall and only in his last paragraphs offers an insight about movies' significance and influence on contemporary culture. Motion pictures, he holds, are a secular religion. They offer fantasy versions of fulfillment to their viewers, and concrete fulfillment to their acolytes, the movie stars. Though they occupy a weakened financial position films are still powerful as a medium of communication. They offer 'a rich seam of myths, formulas and meaning' (386) that is regularly mined by popular culture. He proposes that their artistic strength is in their ability to 'evoke' various subcultures into an audience and give expression to their values and sentiments. To pursue this further would have been valuable but Jarvie stops short, arguing that movies are 'in some sort of transition the outcome of which is unknown' (387).

A bolder attempt to analyze the social effects of motion pictures occurs in 'Methodological and Conceptual Problems in the Study of Pornography and Violence.' While its references show it to be the most recent article in the book it is incomplete in at least two respects, reflecting perhaps a rush to get into print. Authors and works are discussed as if they had been introduced in a previous section when they are actually introduced in a later one (cf. the reference to Andrea Dworkin on p. 397, while her book is introduced on p. 402), and many items referred to in the text go unnoted in the bibliography (cf. Barry, Carter, Dworkin, Faust, Griffin, and others). Jarvie tries to disentangle the confusions of writers who blur the distinction between sexuality and violence, and questions the motivations of feminists who endorse both sexual freedom and various forms of censorship. He finds that 'the trouble with pornography is sexist society and its sexism, not pornography, whatever that is' (400, 405, 407, et infra). Jarvie's skill as a comparator is evident throughout, showing most arguments against pornography to be either politically motivated myths or misdirected attacks on sexism (see especially Sec. 9). In addition to giving a courageous analysis of the function of pornography (Sec. 14), he winningly defends the individual's right to view

it against society's attempt to deter crime and violence by censoring it. When the evidence is examined closely, Jarvie concludes, 'the bulk of commercially available movie pornography is thoroughly safe and bourgeois' (417). A properly edited version of this longish but thorough article should soon find its way into classes in the philosophy of sex, sexism, feminism, philosophy of film, philosophy of art and social philosophy.

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Ernest Joos

*Poetic Truth and Transvaluation in
Nietzsche's Zarathustra:*

A Hermeneutic Study.

New York: Peter Lang 1987.

Pp. xix + 180. US \$24.00.

ISBN 0-8204-0432-2.

According to the author of this study the 'ultimate issue' in Nietzsche's work is his call for a 'transvaluation of all values.' Moreover, Joos argues, in order to understand properly what Nietzsche means by such a transvaluation, we must appreciate the unique status of Nietzschean writing, that Nietzsche is engaged in a project not easily captured by the traditional distinctions between poetry and philosophy. Insofar as we make use of such categories, we must see Nietzsche as a proponent of 'poetic truth,' 'hermeneutic evaluation,' 'intuition,' 'inspiration,' or even something Joos calls the 'leap into the *finiteness* of the *infinite*' (166).

Such a hermeneutic approach to meaning is required, it is claimed, because the 'contingency' of the 'events' of human 'praxis' occupies a 'domain' in between 'reason' and 'belief,' or the 'knowable' and the 'unknowable,' even 'phenomena' and 'noumena.' There is a 'non-rational' intelligibility for such a domain, requiring 'intuitive,' 'inspired' interpretation. Such unusual conditions of intelligibility for human praxis (historically as well as personally conceived, I assume) is, somehow, why 'transvaluation' must enter the picture: 'Then, that transvaluation has to be conceived as the attribution of new meanings to already existing entities or institutions' [sic] (5).'

Accomplishing such a 'hermeneutic of the phenomenal world' requires the 'rules of the game' appropriate to poetry, or the 'revela-

tion of mysteries' (27). Such revelation requires paradox, and aphorism. Paradox is defined as 'an instrument to reach out for the absolute, an absolute wrapped in a metaphor' (ibid.). The 'absolute' in question is, I assume, what Joos means by 'life,' which he calls the 'highest principle of evaluation' (31). Understanding 'meaning' in human life requires attention to its concreteness ('Nietzsche abhors escapism' [32]), and to the radically 'open-ended,' 'free,' 'subjective' character of such life. ('When Nietzsche speaks about life he is definitely a poet' [38].)

Accordingly, much of this approach to Nietzsche resonates with Kierkegaardian ('truth is subjectivity') and Heideggerian themes (Being as 'existence'). We thus get, although Joos denies it, an existentialist reading of Nietzsche, one wherein Nietzsche's most 'abysmal' thought – the Eternal Return of the Same – a sense of inevitability or an 'obstacle' to the 'attribution' of meaning or transvaluation, can be overcome once we accept the 'affirmation of our absolute freedom in the shaping of our *attitude* toward the inevitable' (111).

Consequently, Heidegger is said to be wrong in classifying Nietzsche as the last metaphysician of the West. In fact, Heidegger and Nietzsche, contrary to Heidegger's own interpretation, stand in 'fundamental agreement.' This is so because 'both tried, indeed, to make sense of the world, not a world of abstract thought, but of life as it had to be lived here and now' (152).

The book closes with an extraordinary 'Appendix' about 'Nietzsche on Women.' I am not exactly sure as to the point of this Appendix, but it appears to be a kind of *apologia* for some of Nietzsche's more outrageous claims about women. (E.g., 'Are you visiting women? Do not forget your whip.' Joos's 'response': 'Does Nietzsche instruct us how to use the whip when we take it to a woman? No. He only hints that one might have to resort to it' [180].) Central to this '*apologia* for modern ears' are such incredible claims as: 'Is not the essence of women's love sacrifice, devotion, and the unconditional giving of oneself? Surely, the superiority of woman resides in that: devotion and sacrifice reach their height in motherhood' (177). With friends like Joos...

According to the title, Joos's study is focused mainly on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, but there is little real attention to the text, the structure of the narrative, the inter-relation of episodes, and so forth. Joos simply dips in to the work when he feels compelled to interrupt his meandering series of pronouncements with quotations. There is no attention to when Zarathustra is speaking, to whom, in what context, or to what end.

The thesis of the work picks up a theme central to the German tradition since Kant first posed the issue of the unique problem of

intelligibility for aesthetic objects and since Schelling first made use of that problem to expand the problem of intelligibility and knowledge within all of critical philosophy. Nietzsche himself, later in his career, did indeed begin to refer to an 'aesthetic justification of existence,' and produced a work, *Zarathustra*, that appears to embody such a justification and so to suggest quite a different view of the traditional relation between 'poetry' and 'philosophy.' But little in this study illuminates that theme or its place in Nietzsche. For all its celebration of concreteness, it is relentlessly abstract and meta-level. There is no discussion of Nietzsche's own concrete genealogy of Christian humanism, or of the details of his 'interpretation' of the 'meaning' of the last stages of European liberal democratic culture or of how these issues surface, as they often do, in *Zarathustra*. No attention is paid to the question of false or bad interpretations, and the connection between the issue of interpretation and transvaluation – an issue that divides Nietzsche and Heidegger as much as the 'existence,' anti-metaphysical moment unites them, is nowhere accounted for. The style of the work is somewhat self-congratulatory, even occasionally smug, full of large scale, unsupported claims, and the general level of discussion seems aimed at a freshman audience in a Western Civilization course, those who might be inclined, by the temperament of that age, to respond favorably to this romanticized and rather simplistic reading.

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Peter Langford

*Modern Philosophies of Human Nature:
Their Emergence From Christian Thought.*

Norwall, MA: Martinus Nijhoff 1986.

Pp. 265.

US \$48.00 (cloth: ISBN 90-247-3370-7);

US \$20.00 (paper: ISBN 90-247-3371-5).

Langford's thesis is that modern conceptions of human nature do not result from innovative methodological techniques as their proponents claim, but result primarily from the demise of Christian authority. Further, the claim to have discovered so-called 'new continents' of human nature through the use of psychoanalytic, phenomenological and semiotic techniques is arguably false, because the justification

for the claim always parts from the methodological commitment made. Langford sees it as his task to unmask the pretense of modernity and to recommend what he calls 'a return to educated common-sense' (3).

Human nature is dialectical and thrives on the tension between immanence and transcendence, becoming and being, change and stability, as Langford argues. These are the tensions motivating both Christianity and modernity. Though modern theorists (Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger and Sartre) thrive on the same dialectical drama, they fail to acknowledge that they do and indeed that they must. For example, despite Nietzsche's intent to use the doctrine of the will to power to eliminate Christian metaphysics, it turns out in the end that he requires an appeal to a transcendent metaphysical justification in the same way as does Christianity. The *übermensch* as a model for human excellence is trans-moral and represents the next stage in human evolution, an ideal being (222). The lack of a substantive difference between the drama in Christianity and in modernity means that the problems plaguing humanity and philosophy have not changed. These problems are expressed in two questions, 'Do we consider primarily socialization, redemption or both?' and 'Do we admire stability and safety or change and fascination?' (220). The real problem for philosophy then is not to break out of the Christian dilemma, but is to find an adequate interpretation for it.

Beginning with a survey of the major Christian thinkers, Langford differentiates Christianity into two distinct camps: Augustine the pessimist who believes man to be hopelessly evil and unable, apart from grace, to realize his higher (divine) nature; and Aquinas the optimist who champions the cause of reason in its striving and ability to know God. Rationalists are seen as Thomists (50), and empiricists as Augustinians (62). Kant is the great synthesizer of both traditions (75). With Kant's successors however, the synthesis is not maintained (83) and philosophy once again falls into onesidedness with an over-emphasis on consciousness.

Modernism, as represented by Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger and Sartre, focuses on consciousness to find the core of human nature. Here Langford is much more detailed in his exposition. His descriptions are interlaced with criticism and sarcastic hyperbole which at times inject a humorous tone into his exposition. Langford explains psychoanalysis, phenomenology and semiotics in such a way as to reveal that, though two thinkers may have the same starting point, their conclusions can be significantly different. For example, Lacan and Baudrillard who claim to fall into the camp of semiotics have very different conclusions regarding the underlying motivations for the use of signs and symbols. For Lacan it is the Freudian Oedipal complex and for Baudrillard, the Sartrean struggle between being and

nothingness. Langford uses this comparison to show that common methods do not necessarily produce common conclusions which implies that the claim to have discovered new continents of human nature through given techniques is highly suspect. Langford goes further than this, however, in discrediting modernity.

Modernity's emphasis on consciousness is onesided because it is forgetful of its roots. Consciousness was clearly studied by the scholastics, rationalists and empiricists, but it was not studied apart from a study of the world. Modernity's forgetfulness of the consciousness-world relationship and rejection of transcendence reveals its negative underpinning. This coupled with a strong desire to become credible produces the birth of a reactionary spirit. The resulting radical understanding of human nature therefore is inadequate in virtue of its lack of purview (e.g. 218). It is nevertheless politically and religiously dangerous as radical movements are prone to be.

Perhaps because he sees the danger in radicalism, Langford goes one step further to argue that the need for transcendence is unavoidable and that no modern philosopher has been successful in grounding his doctrine without sneaking in an appeal to transcendence, because of the need for redemption. Nietzsche's ultimate reliance on the eternal return and Sartre's ultimate dependency on being's dominance over nothingness are examples of this need for redemption. Thus, he concludes that methodology in modernity is largely 'window-dressing' (3). The radicalness of modernity's thinkers, therefore, seems ultimately motivated by a perverse desire to 'make a name for themselves' (3). We must admit what our attitudes (biases) are, he says, and admit that the basic questions which plagued Christianity are still the ones plaguing our own view of human nature (220).

Though he claims to be giving a handy survey of the field, Langford's polemical intents definitely determine which writers he selects to examine. He seems more interested in polemics than in description. Despite the fact that the book is considered to be an introductory text, Langford's polemical leanings seem to be at odds with his intent to provide a general survey. He restricts himself to a survey of only three European traditions. He thereby for all intents and purposes ignores behaviorism, materialism and its related theories (e.g., functionalism). This, however, could be his strong point if one is looking primarily for a text, for example, with which to engage students in dialogue. Langford makes his criticisms clear and sometimes very pointed. The arguments thereby provide a good focus for discussion.

Though I am sympathetic to the book's overall thesis, I have difficulty in determining who its readership should be. It is not an introductory text for novice philosophers. The presentation is too selective and presupposes too much familiarity with classical and con-

tinental traditions. His focus on thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty, Lacan, and Baudrillard is also too specialized for novices.

Langford's arguments seem aimed more at intermediate readers than novices, and intended to provoke argumentation in someone who has already established some position on the history of ideas on human nature. Since Langford's intent is to be both polemical and descriptive, exegesis of historical figures can tend to be creative. If anything, the polemical intent seems to override the descriptive, making the book unsatisfactory as an introductory text but perhaps a interesting one for intermediate readers.

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Ingrid Leman-Stefanovic

The Event of Death:

A Phenomenological Enquiry.

Norwall, MA:

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987.

Pp. xvi+345. US \$66.50. ISBN 90-247-3414-2.

I will pass on to the contents of this book after mentioning some complaints which, though quite trivial, determine much of what I have to say about it. The first is that the publisher tells me nothing about the author, providing no information to situate her in the space of her inquiry, and that she herself maintains this anonymity, not even acknowledging (except in a brief footnote referring to one individual) the existence of a circle of teachers and colleagues within which she may have worked. Thus the position I found myself in was that of a blind referee. But reviewing is not refereeing. Ideally, I should be able to engage in dialogue with the author, not just correct her text or recommend that it be accepted or rejected. I had thus first to learn her identity. She is Ph.D. Toronto '79, and her book is a somewhat expanded version of her dissertation under a different title.

The second complaint is the book's title (at least as supplied to me, without subtitle, by *CPR*). What reader of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* could fail to suppose that 'The Event of Death' refers to 6.4311 ('Death is not an event in life')? It was on this supposition that I accepted the task of reviewing this book; I thought it would constitute or at least include a critique of 6.4311. But Wittgenstein is nowhere mentioned in the book, which is in fact about Heidegger. In spite of this

misunderstanding, I am apparently still a member of the intended audience of the book, which includes not only 'those well-versed in the phenomenological thought of Martin Heidegger,' but also 'those who approach the Heideggerean ontology for the first time or with little background' (xii). So I proceeded in the hope that some questions that have long plagued me about Heidegger's view of death would be dealt with.

My third complaint is that they were not; I am still left with questions such as the following: What am I certain *of*, if I am certain that I must die? And what is the source of this certainty? Surely it is not an inductive generalization?! Or is it implied by biological entropy? There ought to be some way of finding in the very structure of consciousness the necessity that for Dasein to be is to be mortal. To be sure, the author tells us that 'Death is the very structure of being-mortal' (6). But this seems a tautology. What needs to be shown is that death is necessary in some way relevant to the inquiry.

Leman-Stefanovic is primarily concerned with the death of the other. She agrees with Thomas Langan that Heidegger's account of such death is too general. There is nothing in this account that corresponds to the characterization of *my* death as my individualization, 'my ownmost possibility,' nothing to distinguish the death of one other from that of any other other. Her solution to this problem is that the death of an other to whom I am related in the bond of Authentic Solicitude (which seems to be Heideggerean jargon for 'love') has much the same particularity as my own death. Such a death is an 'E-vent'; this hyphenation is how Leman-Stefanovic translates the Heideggerian term '*Ereignis*' (which of course is the word that is translated 'event' when Wittgenstein uses it); it accounts for her use of the title she has chosen for her book. Another's death is *prima facie* ontic, but in the course of her work, the author tells us, she has come to see 'how very fundamental ... the description of the ontic moment can be for an understanding of the ontological' (xvi).

The book is divided into two long parts and a short one. Part One is entitled 'Ontological Roots of the Phenomenon of Death: A Heideggerean Interpretation.' While admitting that 'there are a number of books already in print summarizing Heidegger's views on death,' Leman-Stefanovic claims that 'Part One of this book is meant to not only introduce these views once again in a somewhat different form, but it is also meant to set the foundation, particularly through the discussions of individuation, transcendence and temporality, for a firm understanding of Heidegger's ontology' (xii-xiii). I cannot feel, however, that the explanatory power of the author's exposition exceeds that of Heidegger himself, and even after puzzling over what I take to be the key section on 'Ontological roots: the temporal structure of Advancing Resoluteness' I am left without a clear understanding

of Heidegger's ontological concerns as they are connected with his treatment of death. The problem may be partly that Leman-Stefanovic is too thorough a scholar; the impressive familiarity with the entire corpus of Heidegger's writings that she demonstrates seems to stifle any inclination on her part to carry out an independent exposition.

Part Two is 'Death as an Ontic E-vent: coming to terms with the phenomenon of death as a determinate possibility.' Solicitude is the 'condition of the possibility of an ontological awareness of the ontic e-vent of the death of the Other' (193). Leman-Stefanovic remarks that 'several commentators have claimed that there is simply no real place for authentic solicitude in the Heideggerean enterprise' (ibid.). But, moving beyond Heidegger's text, she seeks to establish 'negative' conditions for 'Positive' or 'Authentic' solicitude. The main negative condition is that we are *not independent* of others. But this does not mean that we are dependent on them (211). It means simply that we entertain a solicitude for them that we do not entertain for buildings or sidewalks, of which we *are* independent.

The final Part is an afterword. Solicitude can take the form of an ontic concern. Are ontic concerns necessarily inauthentic? Can they 'reveal ontological significance' (303)? The author tries to show how they can.

I have mentioned one place where the author moves beyond Heidegger's text. Throughout the book, however, especially in Part II, while she often seems on the verge of breaking through Heideggerean discourse to comment on her own observations and the work of recent thanatologists beside Heidegger, she seldom quite succeeds.

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Herbert Marcuse

*Hegel's Ontology and the
Theory of Historicity.*

Translated by Seyla Benhabib.

Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1987.

Pp. xliii+360. US \$25.00.

ISBN 0-262-13221-4.

This book, first published by Klostermann in 1932, was written as Marcuse's *Habilitationschrift*, under Heidegger's direction. Owing to circumstances still obscure (despite the translator's efforts to sort them

out in her excellent introduction), it was never accepted as such: either Heidegger had reservations about it, or else Marcuse himself realized the futility of pursuing an academic career with the Nazis poised to take over. Whichever the case, its belated appearance in English, as part of the series 'Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought,' is welcome.

The work will likely be read by those interested in Marcuse's rather than Hegel's philosophical development. Some have judged it his best book. Yet its combination of a heavy style ('tortured and convoluted,' Benhabib calls it) with the obligatory explicative mode does not make for an easy read. The translator's task is thankless; and if Benhabib does not always achieve lucidity or idiomatic smoothness, that is hardly her fault. She provides a helpful glossary of technical terms, as well as good explanatory notes (though she misidentifies a reference on p.235—it surely is to vol. I of Dilthey's works, p.xviii).

Marcuse's angle of interpretation is original, and prefigures the existentialist approach of Hyppolite, with its emphasis on *life* and *historicity*. Heidegger, Dilthey, and the early Hegel are the fixed points for Marcuse's survey. The main debt is to Heidegger, and is acknowledged at the outset. But if Hegel's '*Leben*' is occasionally made to sound like Heidegger's '*Existenz*,' Marcuse also supplies a corrective to his mentor in urging a return to Dilthey, with his understanding of historicity against the background of objective structures in society and history. In turn Dilthey's *Lebensphilosophie* is restored to the context of the ontology of life put forward by the young Hegel, which Dilthey was instrumental in discovering: 'Hegelian ontology is the ground and basis of the theory of historicity developed by Dilthey and thereby the basis of the current tradition of philosophical questioning about historicity' (2).

Where then is Marx (on whom Marcuse was writing at the time)? He shows up only in the margins, via references to the transformative and actualizing power of philosophy. Marcuse takes to heart Hegel's 1801 claim that the need of and for philosophy arises from a state of cultural division, and that philosophy can go some way to healing the rift. Where Kantianism merely reflects division, Hegelian speculation seeks to unify, not just epistemologically but also ontologically, and to do so through interpreting objective structures in the world as suffused by subjectivity and subjectivity as grounded in those historical structures (Marcuse uses a Hegelian formula to express this—'*Sichselbstgleichheit im Andersein*,' here rendered as 'equality-with-self-in-otherness').

Marcuse's main interpretive term is not so much 'life' but rather its logical correlate, '*Bewegtheit*,' usually translated as 'motility' and often coupled with the 'happening' (*Geschehen*) or 'having become' (*Gewordensein*) of truth. Marcuse in fact begins with the *Science of*

Logic, the exposition of which takes up the bulk of the book, over 200 pages. He argues that all its categories are marked by an inner movement and restlessness, culminating in the 'Idea of life.' Yet life is ultimately subordinated (or subordinates itself) to the Idea of cognition and absolute knowing, its inherent historicity abstracted away in a move said to be typical of the mature system.

To gauge what may thereby get lost, Marcuse turns back to the early theological writings—for which 'life' is central of course – to the Jena Logic, and especially the *Phenomenology*, which receives almost 100 pages of exegesis. Here Marcuse focuses on action, work, wealth—notably in the proto-Marxian 'animal kingdom of spirit' – and on spirit as 'the I that is We and the We that is I.' 'Life' springs forth fully armed in chapter 4 of the *Phenomenology* as a form of self-consciousness. Like Hyppolite, Marcuse takes this moment as crucial for the entire work, and sees Hegel as torn between making consciousness a practical, lived relation and understanding it as a theoretical demand for (self-)knowledge. He sees a similar split in Hegel between history as a process of self-interpretation through externalization/internalization (memory, *Erinnerung*) and history as the self-realization of spirit (the sense dominant in the Philosophy of World History). It is the first, one might say Diltheyan, sense that Marcuse wants to rescue from (and for) Hegel.

Marcuse's first major work remains thoroughly Heideggerian in its ontological framework, despite Adorno's hopeful judgment that it showed a shift away from historicity towards history (a movement in reaction to Heidegger that Habermas now sees himself as having experienced). At the same time we can trace in embryo many elements of Marcuse's later thinking: a notion of negation as human practice, as transformation and actualization; a stress on the 'two-dimensionality' of essence/appearance, and on memory as key to liberation from 'the nightmare weighing on the brains of the living'; and lastly, a reliance on some permanent underlying measure of the defects in real life.

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**Deborah Poff and
Wilfrid Waluchow, eds.**
Business Ethics in Canada.
Scarborough, ON:
Prentice-Hall Canada 1987.
Pp. xiv + 447.
Cdn \$24.95. paper: ISBN 0-13-095621-X.

This is a collection designed to be used in undergraduate courses in business ethics for students usually not specializing in philosophy. The question here is whether it is well conceived for that end. I can report, having used it once in that setting, that it works better than the U.S. texts I have tried and better than David Braybrooke's somewhat Canadianized collection in the field, which I have used several times. The book is consciously (but not self-consciously) directed to Canadian students, especially in the case material. Most of the domestic essays are new to print and all those by U.S. writers have been previously published and often have been anthologized before. Canadians slightly outnumber U.S. writers. This P-H entry (if I may so describe it) is about right for a substantial one-semester course (a 'half-course'). It should remain interesting to a professor for about four or five trips through, after which enthusiasm will have to be faked. These sorts of collection do not have a long life, for even the central essays in them are not especially strong intellectually. Yet this collection is welcome, in the on-going process of bringing some philosophical light into the lives of Canadian students who might not otherwise ever see it shed.

However, one will not teach them any ethical theory using this text – at least not easily, for almost no one writes here of the war among the Isms, though there are occasional nods in that direction. It is clear that the editors decided that *issues* must be examined, at their own level, and that no contribution will be made by an examination of 'deontology' or 'teleology' even in their splendid multiforimity. And the editors were right to make this decision under the circumstances that prevail. The reason is not that the students are too thick but that most ethical theory, as it has been written, is too thin.

The following topics broadly are available through the readings: the moral responsibilities, if any, of business; the claim that corporations are morally, as well as legally, responsible agents as such; professionalism and professional ethics; health and safety in the workplace; employee loyalty and whistleblowing; affirmative action, job discrimination, and mandatory retirement; environmental effects of business activity; cost/benefit analysis; bribery and extortion internationally; Canadian businesses in South Africa; advertising; decep-

tion and competition; and finally 'Challenges to the Capitalist System,' such as Marxism. Yet, there are other important topics which do not easily flow from the readings. Employment at will and the freedom of contract; the role of unions in capitalist economies; companies moving out of company towns; personal bargaining (selling your wheels or getting the wrong change at the store); cheating the government; fraudulent bankruptcy; writing off business lunches; child labor; market inalienability (selling that which ought not be a market thing, e.g., blood or babies); provincial human rights codes and sexual preference problems; opportunism and contract breaking; sexual harassment; overworking employees and interfering with their private lives; greenmail and golden parachutes; insider trading; the rights of minority stockholders; excess profits; the use of the law to promote and sustain competition (anti-trust law); and participatory democracy in the workplace. I do not list these in criticism of the Poff-Waluchow collection as such; the field has many topics, not all of which can be included in a single volume. As one can see, the matters included are largely satisfactory.

It seems to me that the most serious philosophical omission (and this is typical of many business ethics collections anyway) is a good discussion of the concepts of property and ownership, which are matters of fundamental importance to the theory of what one is permitted to do in business. Jan Narveson, for example, argues that private business owners may hire whomever they wish according to their fancy: '... if there is no right to a job at all, how can there be a right that people like you be hired rather than people like anybody else, if anyone is hired at all?' (188) Narveson's argument assumes that an employer gives away a job as property is given to another, so (sporting a robust notion of ownership) why should not an employer morally be able to discriminate racially or sexually if one wishes? Hiring, Narveson seems to imply but does not say, is similar to giving to charity if one gives at all; the state compels no gifts be given and does not interfere with the choices when made. It should in principle be the same with jobs in a right-going world. Narveson's is one of the more substantial pieces and a challenging one. Its answer requires a discussion of property. The paper by Hawkesworth in the same section does not have it unfortunately, though it well could have, given her thesis.

Among the philosophers, I think that the best paper in the collection is by Nathan Brett on 'Equality Rights in Retirement' which is both well written and well argued, in certain contrast to the three appearances by Alex C. Michalos whose essays are remarkably casual or, as in the particular case of 'The Loyal Agent's Argument,' ill written and ill argued—a paper that need not have been included even though the topic is important.

The editors had to make an important decision about the final section. The choice, as I see it, would be between material on participatory democracy in the workplace (with something on the notion of business 'stakeholders') and theories involving much greater government regulation. Unfortunately, it seems to me, material that ignores participation was selected. It is not that the essays included are especially poor (John McMurtry's Marxist discussion is a good philosophical piece though the Mel Watkins thing is just a 'case' of political rhetoric), rather, the book ends on less than a positive note. If one is going to discuss or lecture on problems within capitalism for a term at university (about negative externalities, affirmative action, advertising, competition, etc.), some ideas to improve *the system* are more in order than a discussion that suggests the need now for something completely different. The antecedents in the book do not prepare the student or the professor to approach this kind of inquiry usefully during the final week of the course.

Richard Bronaugh

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John Sallis

*SPACINGS – of Reason and Imagination
IN TEXTS of Kant, Fichte, Hegel.*

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987.

Pp. v+177.

US \$26.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-73440-4);

US \$10.50 (paper: ISBN 0-226-73441-2).

The thesis of this book, characteristically expressed in the form of a question, is that reason, at least the reason thematized by Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, despite assurances and dialectical leaps, is systematically haunted by otherness, difference, absence, even madness. Philosophy that finds its anchor, ground, root in self-presence, in completeness – the philosophy of the system of reason – cannot bring philosophy to an end, cannot quell the need to wonder (157).

The corroboration of the thesis occurs in the five chapters of the book: each chapter attempts to deconstructively expose the failure of reason to totalize itself, internalize otherness, darkness. Deconstructive 'reason' is deployed to unearth the gnoseological tricks of the masters of what may be called German Idealism. An attempt is made to expose the vulnerability of reason to history (Chapter One), the im-

agination (Chapters Two, Four, and Five), and dispersal (Chapter Three). The deconstructive 'history' of the texts of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel is the story of suppressions, the power of the margin over the body of the text.

Accordingly, Chapter One, 'Tunnelings,' traces the 'suppression of the history of metaphysics, of the historicity of thought' (1) in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The problem that motivates this genealogical suppression is the self-dispersal, self-alienation of philosophical reason in its historical development. The critique is a flawed attempt to constitute the unity of reason (8). The flawed constructivist projection of the *Critique* is explicated on the basis of its Prefaces, Introduction, and Transcendental Aesthetic. The *Critique* objectifies a dispersal; the *Critique* itself, far from being a unified projection, as Kant alleged, is, on the contrary, 'a radically heterogeneous text' (8) – a Fichtean critique. Instead of a unified, integral reason, Sallis finds a 'fissure' in the *Critique*.

Fichte's 'perfected Kantianism' is deconstructed in Chapter Two, 'Hoverings.' The drive to posit a unitary reason that is immediately present to itself is again aborted, according to Sallis, by the 'imagination ... this displaced center, this moving point, this hovering between opposites, this spacing of truth' (65). This result is reached through a rigorous interpretation of Fichte's *Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre* and *Die Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*, which Sallis, following a problematic interpretive tradition, (mis)interprets as a *Wissenschaftslehre* (65). (See my *Fichte's Kant-Interpretation and the Doctrine of Science* [Washington, DC: The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America 1988], 73.) In the third chapter, 'Enroutings,' Sallis attempts to corroborate his thesis through a consideration of the Kantian problematic of the common root of knowledge. Here reason finds itself between a rock and a hard place: the question of the common root of knowledge is 'unassimilable to the critical project' (75). Consequently, the alleged absolute interiority of reason is once again seen as a bluff; the *Sache* itself negates the intention. The same result is reached in the fourth chapter, 'Tremorings,' in which Sallis critically delineates the attempts of Kant to bring the imagination, to posit the sublime, within the luminosity of reason. The project founders (130).

If the imagination proves to be problematic, unwieldy for the Kantian and Fichtean reflective projections, perhaps Hegel – if one is oriented by the standard, but Hegelian histories of philosophy – fares better, overcomes the resistance of the imagination through the dialectic. Claiming that Hegel completes Aristotle's theory of the imagination (134), Sallis, relying on Hegel's *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* and the *Zusätze* by Boumann,

attempts, in the fifth chapter, 'Ending[s],' to locate 'the place of the imagination in Hegel's philosophy of spirit' (133). It is constitutive of spirit, according to Sallis' interpretation (151), but Hegel would not be Hegel without a definitive *Aufhebung* of the imagination. But Sallis is not persuaded: 'The question is whether on the way from pit to pyramid, the way of imagination, there is not an excess, a darkness that is irreducible to mere irrationality, that cannot be merely coaxed back to the life of spirit' (157).

The Hegelian answer to this 'philosophical' wonder is 'no.' Sallis' answer is the thesis of his book. Yet, this thesis, deconstructively corroborated by Sallis, has ancient non-deconstructive origins. It will be recalled that the background of Dilthey's critique of historical reason was his claim that Kant's *Critique* is a-historical, a paradoxical situation, since, as Sallis competently points out, the problematic of the *Critique* grew out of the historical adventures of metaphysical reason. Hegel's critique of Fichte suggests that Fichte intended to totalize reason, but failed. Schelling attributed the same intention to Hegel. Hegel, according to Schelling, failed because the system had its shadow: the positive philosophy. If one synthesizes these critiques of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, then the assertion that Kant, Fichte, and Hegel intended to totalize reason is unavoidable. Sallis' contribution is that he attempts to project the unified critique as the ground of identity of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel on the basis of a deconstruction anchored in the (alleged) opposition of reason and imagination in the texts of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. If this interpretation holds, then the chief merit of Sallis' book is that it shows that an informed *Auseinandersetzung* between deconstruction and 'philosophy' is not impossible.

The thesis of the book holds for Hegel; it cannot be said to hold for Kant and Fichte. Kant's regressive reflective program and Fichte's assertion of an absolute difference make it impossible to include them in the camp of the fanatics of reason. It should be recalled that Hegel vigorously accused both Kant and Fichte of empiricism, of affirming otherness and difference.

The ruling drive of the book is the attempt to unify the discordant gnoseological notes of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, a difficult task, and for a deconstructively tinged reflection, a paradoxical task as well. Given the methodological interests of the author (xv), the book succeeds in expanding the research horizon of students of Kant and German idealism, although students of German idealism would have to learn to decipher the language of deconstruction before they can competently judge the contribution of Sallis' book to the problematic of the unity of Kant and German idealism, assuming that a deconstruction of Sallis' deconstruction of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel is not necessary.

Chernor M. Jalloh
Howard Unvers

Irving Singer

The Nature of Love, Volume 3.

The Modern World.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987.

Pp. xiii+473. \$24.95. ISBN 0-226-76098-7.

The Nature of Love, Volume 3. The Modern World is the final volume of Irving Singer's philosophical history of the idea of love. It critically discusses Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, Nietzsche, Freud, Proust, Bergson, Lawrence, Shaw, Santayana, Sartre, Beauvoir, McTaggart, and Tillich, among others. Singer also spends time on contributions made to our understanding of love by assorted contemporary experimental psychologists, Wilsonian sociobiologists, and moderate and radical feminists. Like the earlier volumes (1: *Plato to Luther*; 2: *Courtly and Romantic*), Volume 3 – this is an understatement – is an admirable achievement. It successfully combines comprehensiveness and depth, and presents widely disparate views with equal clarity, rigor, and insight. The only omissions worth mentioning (if I wanted to nitpick) are: the Kantian position, an example of 20th-century Catholic philosophy of love, developed intriguingly by Karol Wojtyla in *Love and Responsibility* (good to discuss as a contrast to Medieval Catholicism); and the quite different orientation of the American 'sons' of Lawrence (after all, Singer is not reluctant to include novelists in his history, and this group has a distinctive perspective).

Three themes occupy Singer throughout Volume 3, as they did in the first two volumes. First, Singer investigates the roles of 'appraisal' and 'bestowal' in love (roughly, the distinction between the lover's responding to value he or she finds in the beloved, and the lover's creating value in the beloved). Second, 'realism' and 'idealism' are compared as philosophical presuppositions underlying competing theories of love (the distinction between naturalistic, biological, or psychological causal analyses of love, on the one hand, and nonnaturalistic or spiritualized analyses, on the other). And, third, the various 'relationships' (my word, inadequate for the richness of the topic) between sexuality and love are thoroughly dissected. Indeed, the three volumes are almost as much a philosophical history of thought about sexuality as they are about love.

Singer begins his trilogy (Vol. 1, Chapter 1, 'Appraisal and Bestowal') and concludes it (Vol. 3, Chapter 10, 'Toward a Modern Theory of Love') with a statement of his own position on these three themes. In between, he scrutinizes everyone from Plato and Aristotle, through Augustine, Aquinas and Luther, to Shakespeare, Rousseau, Stendhal, Schopenhauer, and the writers mentioned above, in terms of these themes. A pattern that emerges from this history (to simplify matters tremendously; Singer himself is not prone to such oversimplifi-

cation), is that realist accounts of love tend to emphasize the role of appraisal in love to the detriment of bestowal, and often claim that sexuality is the central element in the love experience. Idealist accounts give bestowal its due but often eliminate the sexual from love. Before and after critically examining this history, and occasionally *in medias res*, Singer argues that love must be understood naturalistically; that it incorporates, but is not reducible to, sexuality; and that it involves both appraisal and bestowal. Singer therefore sweepingly rejects a great deal of the history of the idea of love because some of it is too idealistic for his blood, some of it either attenuates or exaggerates the place of sexuality in love, but primarily because most of it fails to bring together appraisal and bestowal. Singer's thesis, then, is that an adequate account of human love must reconcile *erōs* and *agapē*.

Although the meat of Singer's trilogy is his critical history itself – a number of his separate treatments of particular thinkers are original and illuminating scholarly contributions to our understanding of these great figures – contemporary philosophers will probably judge Singer's attempt to spell out, in preliminary fashion, his own view of love to be the most challenging part of his work. In this regard it is unfortunate, given that his laudable project was to provide a comprehensive history, that Singer had neither the rationale nor the space for considering post-1950 analytic philosophy, much work published in the professional periodical literature. Other than very brief discussions of or passing references to Russell Vannoy's ambitious and vicious attack on love in *Sex Without Love*, Robert Solomon's strangely anti-philosophical and anti-theological *Love: Emotion, Myth, and Metaphor*, and Roger Scruton's equally literature-insensitive *Sexual Desire*, Singer pays no attention to the literature. Admittedly, doing so would have had little value for his history, but it might have had value for developing his own theory about love. The recent literature is important for coming to grips with the moral dimensions of love, the inherent value of love, the nature of the intentional object of love, and what it means (an elusive notion) to 'love the person.' In light of what Singer has accomplished, this is a minor complaint, on the order of the complaint that no volume of *The Nature of Love* includes a formal bibliography.

At the beginning of *The Modern World*, Singer writes: 'I shall be arguing that romantic love is part of a search for a long-term relationship such as marriage, and that married love not only completes the aspirations of romantic love but also permits some vestige of its continuance within the new context of marriage' (6) – which sounds (*sans* the ethics) like Judge William in Kierkegaard's *Or and Stages on Life's Way* (or even Willard Gaylin in *Rediscovering Love*). Singer said this to advise the reader that he would be contesting Bertrand

Russell's 'unwholesome dichotomy between romantic love and married love,' although his main opponents are the Walsters (whose dichotomy is between 'passionate love' and 'companionate love' [380] and Freud ('a woman loses her lover when she takes him as a husband' [378]). Singer does admit that the intensity of sexual passion diminishes with time in a marriage (386, 439). Yet he insists that 'a type' of passion remains in married love (381), and concludes that romantic love and married love are not incompatible: 'Far from precluding passionate love, [a couple's] companionate love will make them more thoroughly dependent on one another. That alone can *increase* their marital passion' (382). Russell and Freud, I think, would not have been much impressed by this 'vestige' of romanticism in marriage, and would have read Singer as confirming, rather than refuting, their 'unwholesome' prognosis.

Alan Soble

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John E. Thomas and Wilfrid J. Waluchow

Well and Good:

Case Studies in Biomedical Ethics.

Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press 1987.

Pp. viii+192. Cdn \$13.95.

ISBN 0-921149-12-3.

This book is a collection of case studies, taken from real life rather than contrived (some are relatively famous, such as the cases of Baby Fae and William Schroeder), chosen so as to fit in with the topics in Thomas' other text for courses in medical ethics. Thomas, as many people know, runs a spectacularly popular course in the Philosophy of Medicine at McMaster University. I myself teach a course to some degree patterned on Thomas' at my own university. I have used *Well and Good* and will comment on it as a text in terms of my experience working with it this fall.

I will start by eliminating the petty: there is a very annoying systematic misprint in Case #5:2, where both 'segmental mastectomy plus irradiation' and 'segmental mastectomy *sans* irradiation' are symbolized in exactly the same way, making hash of the following discussion. Although I was able, with some time, to correct it, I chose not to use it in class because of the misprint.

I would have liked to, since the class discussion of the previous case, another example of a protocol for 'Experiments with Human Subjects,' was the subject of the best case discussion in the class. For some reason, imagining themselves as committee members, rather than as individual medical personnel, elicited more thoughtful discussion from the students. In that case, by the way, the class decided to return the proposal to the research team for rewriting, for very good reasons. There was otherwise the usual temptation to revert to 'How can we know, there are so many factors we don't know, it depends on the circumstances, who am I to make a decision?' etc., with which we are all too familiar. With that result in mind, I am tempted to suggest that another edition might involve more cases in which something like a committee decision was involved. This question might depend on the make-up of the class: most of my students are not prospective medical personnel; at McMaster the situation is probably different.

Aside from that, I thought that on the whole the cases were quite well chosen. The cases in 'Death, Dying and Euthanasia' presented excellent contrasts, and involved the students in discussions which pushed them very quickly back into basic questions about personal autonomy and rights to medical care, and into questions of policy decision. With that in mind, I think that it would have been useful in the section on 'Abortion' to have another case which presented a similar sort of contrast. As it was, with the single case offered, the students found themselves reverting to questions about decision making within a family, rather than questions directly involving abortion, which I take it was really the point of the exercise.

I found the sections on 'The Doctor-Patient Relationship,' 'Medical Intrusion into Human Reproduction,' 'Mind and Behavior,' and 'Esoteric Medicine' to be non-problematic; the cases were interesting and prompted fairly good discussion. I would have been happier if the section on 'Pre-Natal Screening and Non-Treatment of "Handicapped" Newborn Infants' had actually been two sections rather than one, and would have appreciated an example of a spina-bifida case, since that is a particular problem which is discussed in Thomas' other text, *Medical Ethics and Human Life*, which I was also using. The problems presented, although obviously related, are not the same, and it would have been more useful to have them separated out.

As well as the cases, Thomas and Waluchow add discussions at the end of the cases. These the students found to be quite useful. I was somewhat worried by the fact that it did not seem clear whether these were meant to be discussions of the particular case, or discussions of a more general nature of considerations which might be relevant to the particular case. They actually varied between the two: some were quite clearly detailed discussions of *this* case; others did

not mention the case at all. I think rather more consistency on that point would have helped me as an instructor. Nevertheless, these discussions are very worthwhile, and are among the crucial things missing from most other collections of case studies.

There is also an introductory section on 'Ethical Frameworks for Decision Making.' This too was very useful for the students, except, since we were using both this and Thomas' other text, they were somewhat confused by what they saw as a lack of consistency or continuity between the two comparable sections. For example, in *Medical Ethics and Human Life*, Thomas discusses Christian Ethics; in *Well and Good* Thomas and Waluchow do not. It is not clear whether *Well and Good* is meant to be a companion text; it does not claim to be, and obviously one would not need to use both; on the other hand, it does fit in very neatly with the topics in *Medical Ethics and Human Life*, and so one is tempted to believe that it is. If it is, in future editions I would like to see those two sections more continuous.

On the whole, I think this is quite a good collection of case studies. I certainly intend to continue using it, since it is more satisfactory than other collections I have used or been tempted to use. This is partly because of Thomas and Waluchow's discussions of the cases. I am convinced of the value of incorporating case studies, in one way or another, into courses in Philosophy of Medicine, and this particular collection elicited in most cases the sort of thought and discussion that is desired.

Carole Stewart
University of Guelph

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Editors' Note

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R. Burch
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