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En général, les rédacteurs ne publient que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, ils prendraient en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais. Les manuscrits devraient être envoyés au rédacteur francophone ou à un rédacteur anglophone selon le cas.

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SHABBIR AKHTAR. *Reason and the Radical Crisis of Faith*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. 1987. Pp. ix + 281. US$40.00. ISBN 0-8204-0451-9.

Discussing Western religions' confrontation with post-Enlightenment rationality, Akhtar sees religious apologists either amending faith to reconcile it with reason or trying to isolate it from reason. He argues that Judaism, Christianity, and Islam cannot escape rational scrutiny, and that in response their apologists always confine themselves to these two basic strategies.

Akhtar's comment on Kierkegaard's rejection of reason in the passionate involvement of faith (a paradigm of 'isolation' strategy) is very revealing. He admits that 'infinite passion' is possible, but discusses it as a claim to 'knowledge by acquaintance,' insisting that real knowledge is 'knowledge by description' (20), founded on objective factual and historical evidence. Revelation, if it is not be an affront to our rationality (55), must defer to 'overwhelmingly unfavourable evidence,' even if Kierkegaard implicitly denies the relevance of such criteria. Summarizing Barth's similar rejection of reason in theology, Akhtar repeats reason's demands, thus simply rejecting neo-orthodox appeals to the certainty of revelation. When Akhtar says that it is not an argument to tell an unbeliever that he is contradicted by God himself (42), one is tempted to respond, on behalf of the fideists, 'Who said it was? Revelation is not argument.'

Even when Akhtar advocates a broad concept of reason, in which 'a maximum wealth of experience' would be taken into consideration, this seemingly sympathetic appeal grounds his demand for strict rational criteria. For him, rational integrity demands that no human experience should occur in isolation (46ff), and that beliefs should not exist *in vacuo*, as they seem to in 'pure' fideism. Although some fideists might claim that their beliefs are not *in vacuo*, but in an experience that combines subjectivity and objectivity in union with God, Akhtar exhibits little sympathy for such appeals to religious experience.

His critique of the other major strategy, 'reconciliation,' begins with 'reductionists,' whom he criticizes for representing faith too narrowly. Kant, for example, reduces religion to moral experience. Such strategies avoid threats connected with falsifiability, but tend to throw out the substance of faith too.

Of course, Akhtar knows the history and variety of doctrines, and the difficulty of determining what the substance of faith is. To illustrate, he traces a debate between Meynell and Thornton on how to identify 'traditional,' non-reductionist accounts of Christian belief. Yet, discussing MacIntyre's critique of Tillich's evasion of doctrinal language, he comments that Christian knowledge may exist without an accomplished analysis of it. This remark is puzzling relative to his overall critique, which is essentially a repeated demand for rational, proven, traditional doctrines.

In fact, no apologist is allowed to evade these requirements. For example, D.Z. Phillips, who responds to historical and factual criticism by depicting faith as participation in a language game, is faulted for his neglect of traditional metaphysical beliefs. (Akhtar insists on calling traditional beliefs 'metaphysical,' although prophets, priests and saints are surely not metaphysicians.) On the other hand, Akhtar criticizes Tillich (who was somewhat of a metaphysician) for minimizing personal references to God. Apparently the beliefs whose proof Akhtar demands will have to be not only traditional and metaphysical but also about a particular transcendent personal being (120).

Akhtar criticizes another reconciliationist strategy, which he calls 'revisionism.' Surprisingly, he attributes it to such orthodox champions as Penelhum and Swinburne, whom he depicts as occasionally attenuating faith by excising parts that seem unreasonable. Yet, while requiring that all essential traditional beliefs be retained and justified, he also demands that, with reference to 'history, science and logic,' there be 'error-free revelation' (145). In sum, he seems to present religious apologists with the onerous task of locating error-free knowledge and then showing that it is true in all senses for all time. We may wonder why believers might not be allowed to commit themselves to relatively imperfect human expressions of revelation, without having knock-down proofs of all essential doctrines. Akhtar's implicit answer appears in his rejection of 'parity arguments' advanced by Plantinga, Malcolm, Hick and Penelhum. Their central strategy is, in one way or another, to try to justify belief in God as part of a possible world-view that is as reasonable as secular unbelief. Akhtar says that parity arguments concede too much to secular thought and lack the traditional confident theistic claim that the world proclaims the presence of God.

Akhtar's first chapter promised suggestions for a defence of religious belief. In his final chapter, 'The Religious Imagination,' he reviews the philosophical roots of the present situation, with its reliance on a narrowly focused scientific epistemology that has extended its scope to judge theological statements. He notes that knowledge of God does not arise through reasoning alone, but through an experiential process (219-20). Yet he rejects appeals to religious experience in a few words (234-5), as we might expect from his total set of requirements, and from his obvious lack of interest in mystical, numinous, I-Thou, and other kinds of religious experience. His own solution appears to rest on the Penelhum-Hick answer to the religious language problem, plus hope for a faith whose articles would all be, if not proven rationally, at least consistent with the strictest canons of rationality. Although Akhtar does not expli

cate his methodology in detail, his book does include excellent expositions of the alternative routes that modern theologians might have taken. Unfortunately, like Kai Nielsen, he also argues that every such route is impassable.

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P.S. ATIYAH. *Pragmatism and Theory in English Law*. Agincourt, ON: Carswell Methuen 1987. Pp. xii + 193. Cdn$24.95. ISBN 0-420-47590-7.

In the 1987 Hamlyn Lectures, P.S. Atiyah addresses the question of the extent of theory in English law. He explores and defends the claim that English judges are more committed to pragmatism than theory. Canadian lawyers and philosophers will be interested in the lectures because they give an insight into the character of English law and because Atiyah's analysis helps to determine the commitment to theory of any legal system.

The first of the four lectures develops four distinctions which show what Atiyah means when he says English law is more practical and pragmatic than theoretical. These distinctions contrast logic and experience, rights and remedies, precedent and principles and, finally, the practical and the academic.

In describing the contrast between logic and experience Atiyah offers many examples where English courts have refused to endorse logical conclusions which would produce a result contrary to 'justice, ethics and commonsense.' In *DPP v Majewski* ([1977] AC 443) an accused too drunk to be able to form any intent was found guilty even though such a result could not be endorsed by strict logic. Atiyah's general point is that while English courts apply logic they are prepared to avoid general principles if a particular rule works 'without serious difficulty or complaint' (13). The differing rules for postal and telex acceptance serve as an example here.

Atiyah then turns to the rights and remedies distinction to show that English law tends to be pragmatic. This distinction is developed by contrasting rights with duties and then with remedies. Atiyah maintains that English law has tended to start with duties because they can be more easily enforced by sanctions. Rights, on the other hand, are more awkward for courts. An intriguing discussion which supports this claim has to do with the law's treatment of the 'right to strike.' Because it is treated as a series of immunities for actions that would otherwise be illegal, it is of no help where an interest is raised for which no immunity was given. In contrasting rights with remedies, Atiyah

points to the Habeas Corpus Acts, the development of an independent judiciary and 'the jury's practical power of acquittal' (22) as important examples of the emphasis in English law on remedy and the practical.

The third contrast, between precedent and principle, is developed in interesting ways beyond observing that English courts favor a cluster of precedents rather than a principle to decide a particular case. Atiyah observes that often legislation in England, rather than being drafted in terms of general principles, consists of particular rules addressing particular types of situations so that statute law follows 'traditional common law methodology' (31).

The final contrast discussed deals with the practical and the academic. Atiyah notes that within the contrast, academic refers both to the scholar and to the theoretical work he does. In the English system academics orient theoretical work towards case comment and putting judge made law into 'some sort of shape or order' (37), while more general research tends not to be done.

Atiyah uses his four-fold contrast to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the English system. This he does in great detail with many fascinating examples, only two of which are mentioned here. Both are taken from rights and remedies sections. As an example of strength, Atiyah offers 'the *Mareva* injunction' (*Mareva Comania Naviera v International Bulk Carriers SA* [1975] 2 Lloyds Rep 509) which he discusses in lecture two. This remedy is sought when a plaintiff, who is owed money, expects that an asset that could help to pay the debt will be removed from the country. An ex parte injunction (a procedure involving no notice to the debtor) is granted until the liability for the debt is resolved. To provide a just remedy in such cases courts have been innovative about the 'rights' of debtors. In lecture three Atiyah considers the weaknesses of pragmatism. Some of the cases he considers involve freedom of the press. In the *Harman* case ([1983] 1 AC 280), a solicitor made documents obtained under a discovery order (but read in open court) available to a journalist. The majority of the court confined the case to the issue of the 'use of documents obtained in discovery proceedings' while denying that the case also 'raised issues about the right of the press to make use of information' (116). The court, by avoiding 'rights' did not have to address the delicate question of the balancing of interests.

In his fourth and final lecture, Atiyah shows in general that theory is unavoidable in a legal system. If theory is not made explicit, it will operate implicitly. More importantly, certain fundamental questions such as the sovereignty of parliament and the role of the courts will not be satisfactorily addressed by a pragmatically-oriented system. In the closing section of lecture four, Atiyah sets out the contributions of academics in developing general theories for fundamental legal topics, e.g., Anson and Pollock in contracts. He believes that basic theoretical work is needed today and calls for cooperation between academics and the judiciary, each mindful of their role, to produce it. Atiyah's purpose in the lectures therefore is not to be dogmatic about the importance of theory for a legal system but rather to establish a general

framework, sufficiently detailed through examples taken from cases decided by the courts, to encourage principled discussion about the character of the English legal system and possible fundamental changes within it.

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JOHN E. ATWELL. *Ends and Principles in Kant's Moral Thought*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986. Pp. xiii + 226. US$44.50. ISBN 90-247-3167-4.

Kant was concerned that morality be understood as human conduct guided by no ends whatsoever except those that rational human beings would give to themselves. This is perhaps why Kant's test of moral behavior was formulated as a principle of self-legislation and not as a principle of ends. The categorical imperative, therefore, reads: 'Will that your maxim be universal law' and *not*: 'Will that your maxim further a universal good.' Law is generative for Kant, and self-generative in his practical philosophy. While Kant's problematic is couched in the language of ends and ends-directedness due to his psychology of Will, the positive doctrine is synonymous with a theory of autonomy and is emphatically non-teleological.

Atwell maintains that his fundamental aim 'is to show that Kant, despite all he says about ends, puts forth a fully consistent formalist theory of moral obligation, that is, that he advocates a principle-oriented theory untainted by an ends-oriented one' (10). Atwell does an excellent job discussing the doctrine of teleology in Kant's ethical writings and, using the teleological interpretation of Keith Ward, opposing it with a theory of principledness. We are not told what a principle-oriented theory is but one can assume that it is synonymous with a formalist theory — one that maintains that the *form* of conduct — the rationale — is that which is obligating in human conduct. Atwell doesn't tell us *why* the rationality of conduct itself should matter so much but he assumes, as most Kantian ethicists do, that it is reducible to an a priori interest we have in rationality per se.

Principle-orientedness provides the organizational theme for the book and quite early on we are offered a traditional attempt to elucidate the categorical imperative as a criterion for moral action. Using all of Kant's critical ethical works, Atwell addresses the five moral principles popularized by Paton: PU (Principle of Universality); PUN (Principle of Universality of Nature); PH (Prin-

ciple of Humanity); PKE (Principle of the Kingdom of Ends); PAW (Principle of Autonomy of the Will), as well as the ambiguous examples Kant gives in the text surrounding the discussion of these principles. Atwell makes an extremely helpful distinction between three kinds of maxims: *actional* (that pertaining to the principle of one's action); *incentival* (that pertaining to one's interest in being moral); and, finally, *dispositional* (that pertaining to an originary disposition to 'good' or 'evil,' e.g., to morality per se).

Atwell tells us that he is finally unsure if all five formulations function as principles in the sense of providing criteria (particularly the principle of autonomy of the will as the 'supreme principle of morality' [*Gr.* 392]) but he treats each in great depth and ties them to the various levels of maxims outlined above. The strongest feature of the book is the extensive treatment given the principles and the examples Kant uses to illustrate them. Atwell not only gives various ways out of Kant's confusing suggestions with respect to perfect and imperfect duties, he also takes on the secondary literature in a most systematic fashion. The footnotes to the book are a compendium of larger Kantian problematics and their implications for other ethical theories.

As a text, Atwell's book is quite useful if one seeks immersion in a current ethical debate concerning Kant. The issue of teleology is highlighted and functions as the theme of the treatment of Kant's ethical criteria; there are many issues here that Atwell treats with ease and depth. Chapter VIII, for instance, picks up Kant's *Rechtslehre* and tries to do justice to it as an extension of his moral theory. Woven as a polemic into the chapter is the issue of Kant's 'rigorism' and how it relates to the issue of revolution. Although the chapter is perhaps too compressed as a treatment of Kant's political theory, Atwell's attempt to cover all the issues and to relate them to Kant's 'rigorism' with respect to ethical duties provides a kind of continuity not usually found in Kantian ethical literature.

As an interpretation of Kant, however, Atwell's treatment is ultimately untenable. This is not because Atwell's interpretation is individually incoherent but because his approach to Kant's ethical writings is not sufficiently broad or sufficiently responsive to Kant's governing concerns. One simply cannot treat Kant's various moral writings as all concerned with establishing criteria of conduct. Kant's various writings are not all on the same level of explication or, for that matter, exhortation. There are, as there are in Kant's theoretical philosophy, distinctions to be made between levels of description (or criteria; or principles) and the *conditions* of the possibility for such description. For instance, Atwell's own very interesting addition to Kantian ethical theory (the distinction between actional, incentival and dispositional maxims) would be more felicitous as a distinction between cognitive rule, principledness and practical subjectivity. That is, it would be more evocative (and accurate) as a distinction between a priori criteria and their transcendental grounds. The clue to this distinction (which is the main concern of the *Critique of Practical Reason* to draw out) is precisely the equation of morality with autonomy and the fact that, for Kant, autonomy is 'the fundamental law of pure practical reason' (*KdpV.*, 30).

Atwell's chapter on autonomy (not until Chapter VII of a nine-chapter book) sets out a very specific relation that obtains between autonomy and morality. What it lacks is an appreciation of the final transcendental relation that obtains between law and its cognitive realization (and actualization). This is because Atwell treats the second *Critique* as yet another work concerned to arrive at ethical criteria. After giving an adequate description of autonomy as the core concept of Kant's theory, he tries to equate the *principle* of autonomy with the principle of universality and resists Keith Ward's suggestion that the principle of autonomy is, in fact, not such a criterion:

> ...It is the basic principle which is the condition of the possibility of having any moral rules at all. To say that reason can set purposes autonomously is to state a fact. The formulae of the categorical imperative set out the formulae according to which reason does this.... (Ward, *Kant's View of Ethics*, 125)

In an attempt to keep Kant's ethical theory a unidimensional doctrinal one, Atwell goes to great interpretive pains to equate the principle of autonomy with the categorical imperative; quite overlooking the possibility that *Prinzip* in the second *Critique* is to be taken in the *same way* that it is taken in the *Critique of Pure Reason* — as a description of the essential causal process at the heart of human reality. Autonomy is the principle of change in the human world and one actualizable only through the cognition of reasons formalized as the categorical imperative. Such a causality, like the causality of the phenomenal realm, produces the reality to which it refers (*KdpV.*, 68).

At the point that one finds Kant's ethical theory not quite intelligible as a set of criteria for human conduct, one should begin to look past the framework of mere criteria to the source of the befuddlement. And the befuddlement is clearest if we reflect upon what we have learned in two centuries of analysis of the first *Critique*. Kant's critical works are both doctrinal in so far as they provide structural features of Nature, and critical in so far as they show the conditions for the possibility of asserting the necessity of those features. Kant's merely ethical works are merely doctrinal. But it is unclear that the *Critique of Practical Reason* is a merely ethical work.

If the principle of autonomy is not a criterion of moral conduct yet it is the core concept of Kant's practical philosophy, what is its status? Is it an element of a descriptive framework like the principle of mechanical causality in the phenomenal realm? If so, what is our justification for assuming another order of intelligibility besides phenomenal causality? The 'fact of morality'? The disposition of humans to think normatively? The interest humans have in the way the world 'ought' to be? These are questions Kant himself asks at the beginning of the second *Critique*.

The analysis that would have to take place to answer these questions, to justify an 'intelligible order,' would be one that is fully deductive and one capable of exposing this 'order' as a form of objectivity contained in this 'fact of morality.' This objectivity itself would contain the principle of autonomy *as a* principle of causal intelligibility. It would employ the Understanding, and,

hence, categories of causality as a relation among persons. Finally, the argument would demonstrate modalities of a priori interest in (duties to) the world it creates (*KdpV.*, 68-9). The argument as a whole is a critical reading of the principle of autonomy and is nothing less than an answer to Kant's specific question, 'How can reason be practical?' It also provides an answer to the larger question of why we have an a priori interest in rationality per se.

Atwell's work goes a long way in completing a debate about Kant's ethical theory. And it does so by clarifying some quite interesting distinctions at the heart of Kant's psychology and philosophy of the Will. What it does not do is take us past the seeming inconsistencies of Kant's criteria for moral conduct. And, as I have indicated, to get past such a problem one would have to acknowledge that Kant's practical philosophy is as 'critical' as his theoretical project — an acknowledgement that is long overdue.

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KENNETH BAYNES, JAMES BOHMAN and THOMAS McCARTHY, eds. *After Philosophy: End or Transformation?* Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1987. Pp. xii + 488. US$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-02254-0); US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-262-52113-X).

In the eyes of many, the philosophical enterprise, for perhaps not the first time in its history, is in a stage of transition. Some proclaim the end of philosophy; others recognize the need for a radical transformation which would turn philosophy away from its traditional aims and methods. *After Philosophy* is a collection of thirteen essays by the representatives of both the continental and analytic traditions who are the major voices in this debate. The range of views spans the distance between Michael Dummett, who argues that Frege's account of language has finally set the stage for a successful systematic philosophy, to Jacques Derrida, who maintains that an irreducible plurality of 'styles' is necessary to articulate the closure of philosophy and the solicitation or trembling of philosophical thought. The volume testifies to the liveliness and variety of positions on the nature and future direction of philosophy, and it is very useful to have the full spectrum of approaches gathered together in one place.

The editors have also supplied an introductory essay which succinctly maps out the issues at stake. As they note, the authors in this volume are not the

first generation of critics of modern philosophy. They are the descendants of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Quine, whose work is not included in this collection. The editors identify four major themes which form a common ground for most of this second generation of philosophers and which is their inheritance from their predecessors. First of all, they recognize that there is a need to reject the traditional conception of reason as the locus of necessary truth and to open thought to the contingency and irreducibly 'local character' of justification and argument. Second, they criticize the 'sovereign rational subject,' the subject as atomistic and autonomous, disembodied and self-transparent, which is the heritage of Descartes' inauguration of modern philosophy. Third, they reject 'the associated picture of *knowledge as representation*, according to which the subject stands over and against an independent world of objects that it can more or less accurately represent' (4-5). Finally, many of the philosophers undermine the traditional distinction between philosophy and rhetoric, on the basis of which, since Plato's time, philosophy has attempted to define itself.

As the editors note, however, there is wide disagreement about what the consequences are of rejecting these tenets of modern thought, although certain similarities in position and approach can be identified. Some such as Richard Rorty, Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard, and Derrida, are more radical in their approach, rejecting at least, Philosophy with a capital P, in Rorty's terms, along with a 'Platonic' notion of an objective, timeless truth. Others such as Dummett, Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam, Karl-Otto Apel, and Jürgen Habermas, keep the door open for a systematic philosophy based on social and linguistic practice. A third group, including Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricœur, Alasdair MacIntyre, Hans Blumenberg, and Charles Taylor, would preserve philosophy as an interpretive enterprise sensitive to the power and influence of history and myth.

After Philosophy has the virtue of exhibiting the fruits of the cross-fertilization of the analytic and continental traditions. The influence of pragmatism runs through many of the essays, and gives a certain structural similarity, for example, to the work of Putnam and Habermas. Nietzsche's critique of truth also makes itself felt in many essays, eliciting both its expansion and elaboration in the work of Foucault, and a critical response in Taylor. One of the salutary effects of this collection can be to introduce continental philosophers to the variety and subtlety of analytic programs in the philosophy of language, while communicating to analytic philosophers the grounds for the 'hermeneutic suspicion' of our commonplace intuitions and beliefs. This kind of synthesis is of course associated with Rorty's work, and responses to him figure prominently in many of the essays collected here.

The editors should be complimented on their selections for the anthology. For the most part, the essays are readable without any previous acquaintance with the authors' work. They consist mostly of programmatic statements on the state and direction of philosophy, but, remarkably, much of the substance of the authors' views comes through these essays, with the exception, perhaps, of the selections from Habermas and Foucault. The editors have in-

cluded short, unintrusive introductions to each author's work, some more informative than others, since some merely summarize the content of the selection which follows. They also include a selective bibliography on each author which should provide the interested reader with the opportunity to explore in more detail that author's work and the critical response to it. Only the essay by Charles Taylor was written expressly for this collection, though several of the essays have either not appeared in English before or have been retranslated. All in all, *After Philosophy* provides a useful introduction to the current debate on philosophy's future.

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RICHARD W. COAN. *Human Consciousness and Its Evolution: A Multidimensional View*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1987. Pp. viii + 189. US$35.00. ISBN 0-313-25619-5.

This is a fascinating and important study of the nature, development and possible evolutionary goals of human consciousness. Unfortunately, it is a difficult book to read, not because of its content, but because the print is too small, it is faint and the lines are too close together. It looks as though it is a cheap print-out from a word processor. Despite this flaw, it is indeed well worth the reading.

Coan begins by describing several general theories of the evolution of the universe and of the ultimate nature of things. Most of these views are as arbitrary as one could imagine. Because they are not empirically testable, they are utterly groundless speculation. But many people find myths more interesting than theories which are testable (at least by retrodiction, as the Darwinian theory of evolution is) and anyway the former tend to be more glamorous and intriguing. They also sometimes have the bonus of offering each of us immortality. To be more charitable, we could say that such myths are honest attempts to find a pattern or meaning for the whole universe and that if that is one's goal, then myths are all that we are likely *ever* to get here.

Coan displays an excellent command of a wide range of data and theories and he wisely tries to find a way to accomodate seemingly inconsistent accounts of the 'real' nature of thought, its most significant contents, tasks and revelations and the true nature of the self and the world.

The broadest split in the history of thought about the important modes of consciousness, as R.E. Ornstein has noted in *The Psychology of Consciousness*, is roughly divided between the East and the West. Repeatedly (too often) Coan points out that Westerners have developed and prized the following traits of thought: rationality, analytical thinking, reductionism, orderliness, atomism, objectivity, separate individuality, detached observation and scientific explanation. In general, Easterners have sought to develop the opposite mental virtues: tapping the unconscious by dream analysis and meditation, holistic experiences and understanding, the subjective or phenomenological aspect of experience and an intuitive, enlightened (if sometimes ineffable) selfless grasp of reality. One brief way of characterizing all these differences is to say that the West has tended to deanimate and objectify nature and to understand it in order to control and change it while the East has tended to animate the world and to seek salvation by losing the self in, or merging it with, some (alleged) world soul, spirit or ground of Being (or something).

What is most interesting and novel about the work is Coan's original contribution to our understanding of the complex nature of consciousness, its possible future paths of development and the variety of research protocols that will be needed if we are to truly begin studying consciousness in a serious, systematic way.

Coan detects five major modes of consciousness or 'fulfillment,' viz., efficiency, creativity, inner harmony, relatedness (to others and to the world) and transcendence. He sheds light on each of these by showing different ways in which each can be developed and the many ways in which they are interrelated. Coan notes a classic split between what he calls a fluid (humanistic) orientation of thought and a restricted (behavioristic) orientation. I agree: there are these two broad patterns or styles of thought and action and we ought to look for ways to bridge the apparent gap between them and encourage the legitimate exercise of both styles.

Realizing that neither progress nor evolution is inevitable with regard to human consciousness (174), Coan wisely pleads for research to be done on consciousness with a view to developing maximum flexibility so that we can have a ready access to all its dimensions. We should try to develop all our powers of experiencing, perceiving and understanding ourselves, others and the world. As Coan intimates, the world is complex and varied enough to warrant our approaching it with a wide variety of styles of experience and thought, including conscious states, dreams, meditation, scientific experiments, extrasensory perception (if it exists [J.O.]) and even psychotic states. In this way, as Coan puts it, whether life is a tragedy or a joke, we will not arbitrarily blind ourselves to genuine and important features of reality.

Coan rightly argues that one worthy goal in psychic evolution is a holistic integration of the self coupled with an empathetic understanding and appreciation of all other living things and nature. Otherwise, as he says, we are in grave danger of blowing ourselves up in a nuclear holocaust, thus precluding any further psychic evolution, at least on this planet.

Aside from that goal, Coan says (172) that 'if there is one ultimate common goal in the evolution of human consciousness, I believe that the goal must be understood as the maximal realization of all our potentials for perceiving, understanding, and judging, and that maximal realization requires having ready access to all these potentials. It means being able to choose the states of consciousness and modes of awareness that best meet our needs at any time.' These seem to me to be wise words indeed. Coan believes, along with R.E. Ornstein and others, that West and East should learn from each other, incorporate the genuine insights and fruitful methods of each other and stop assuming that their two different pathways in the evolution of thought are mutually exclusive. In some respects, Coan seems to say, the world is *both* One and Many, changing and unchanging, temporal and eternal, and so on. And surely the world *is* amenable to many different, complementary visions and interpretations.

It is significant that Coan pretty well ignores the question of how the human brain has evolved and might evolve. This is because he implicitly and correctly, in my view, rejects reductive materialism. He knows that we can try to understand the nature of consciousness on its own terms. Even if consciousness is just a feature of the brain at a certain level of organization and activity then, there is a need to consider it as a subjective, holistic activity or state of the person. That is, the brain has many different sorts of things going on at various levels and we can dispose of the mind-brain or mind-body problem by adopting an holistic materialism which acknowledges an irreducible subjective aspect to which each of us has a kind of privileged access (as I argued at length in my book *The Mind and the Brain*). But even if this is correct, I think that it is going to be important some day to incorporate the cerebral story into our total picture of consciousness. Presumably the evolution of our brain has something to do with the evolution of consciousness and perhaps vice versa too. Thus neurophysiologists may one day join phenomenologists and mystics in contributing toward a genuinely insightful science of the mind (but don't hold your breath) — one which recognizes that the many levels and aspects of mind require more than one sort of discipline to describe and explain the phenomenon of human consciousness.

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BERNARD EDELMAN. *The House that Kant Built: A Moral Tale*. Translated by Graeme Hunter. Toronto: Canadian Philosophical Monographs 1987. Pp. xii + 68. Cdn$9.50. ISBN 0-7727-9401-9.

Edelman, a Parisian lawyer and man of letters, practises deconstruction without finding it necessary to use the word. Ignoring Kant's arguments, he presents an imaginary person to whom he gives Kant's name and whom he builds up out of selected passages and images from Kant's works having to do with the relation between timid man and menacing world. Most of the material is from the *Anthropology*, the *Conflict of the Faculties*, and the *Metaphysics of Morals*, supplemented by classical Greek citations in which a similar sensibility is expressed. The person imagined is an elderly, timid, misanthropic male, dominated by fear of the universe as embodied, successively, in the natural universe, in woman, in growing children, and finally in spontaneity in his own make-up. Against the universe he constructs a home; within this house he defends himself against the wildness of woman by confining her sexuality to the living death of the matrimonial bed and her general vitality to the parlour. He defends himself against children by imposing on them rigid discipline and exhausting work, and against his own spontaneity by thorough self-analysis and a rigid regime of rules. In a final chapter the philosopher's self-constraint ironically issues in a cerebral freedom that makes him a secure citizen of an intelligible universe. The irony here is hard to read: in an epilogue, Odysseus' escape from Ogygia is construed as a flight from sexual bliss into emptiness, with no mention of the fact (of which readers are surely meant to remind themselves) that Odysseus actually wanted to go home to his kingdom, his wife, his farm, and all the fullness of social life.

Is this imaginary character Kant? In his introduction, Graeme Hunter describes the book as satirical in content and lyrical in manner — a strange combination, as he says. He defends its basic stance by saying that Kant's thought remains philosophically vital only in the First Critique, where the scope of human reason is indeed confined to the comfortable villa in which the understanding is accommodated. Kant becomes sponsor of a way of thought in which the universe is comprehensively domesticated in sets of rules that have their origin in the human mind. Hunter ignores, and Edelman suppresses or represses, the Third Critique, which was (and indirectly remains) as widely and deeply influential as the First in the world at large, if not in the universe of the American philosophical profession. In the end, for Kant as for Wittgenstein, legalism and logic exist for the sake of faith and hope.

'Lyrical' is perhaps not quite the right word for the tone of this book. In Hunter's elegant and altogether convincing translation, the atmosphere is no more that of contemporary lyricism than it is that of Enlightenment Prussia: it is old-fashioned French high-bourgeois, of the Second Empire perhaps, overblown and fruity and cloyingly belletristic. And the image of femininity that arouses dread in the supposedly Kantian heart is, overtly and comically, Baudelairean in inspiration and substance. Perhaps Edelman is emulating the tone of Gaston Bachelard's *Poetics of Space* and has got it wrong somehow.

Fairness and historical accuracy are not merits in satire, and the cultural displacement of Edelman's imaginary sage simply adds to the hilarity. But how effective is the satire? Not completely. Checking the references does reveal an awful truth in Edelman's caricature, and the fact that there is more to Kant than a terrified and life-denying legalism does not invalidate it. But when we turn from Edelman to some at least of his sources, especially in the *Anthropology*, we find Kant's tone more socially and culturally advanced than that of his satirist: Kant wields a many-sided, urbane and courtly wit, firmly entrenched in the real social and cultural world that was, for better or worse, his own. Edelman breathes an air that is simply less civilized. In one passage, the 'nature' to which Kant refers is that of Aristotle; Edelman in his satire construes the passage as if the 'nature' were that of Rousseau. A satirist must somehow contrive to appear to occupy a higher ground than his victim; Edelman achieves this air of superiority so long as one does not look up the references he so amply supplies, but the effect of that spoilsport exercise is to destroy the illusion. Kant has the sharper wit, the broader culture, the more versatile mind.

This little book is great fun, a pleasure to read. We are indebted to the translator first for discovering it, and then for giving it such a fine English dress.

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JAMES M. EDIE. *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology: A Critical Commentary*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1987. Pp. xviii + 150. US$27.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-31854-8); US$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-20411-9).

In the Foreword, Maurice Natanson accurately describes this book as a 'reliable and insightful study of Husserl' which provides a 'lucid account of phenomenology' to philosophers and non-philosophers alike (xiv). It is clearly written, immediately intelligible, and well worth considering as a textbook in phenomenology courses in particular and contemporary European philosophy courses in general.

While most of Edie's remarks are exegetical, he does make a number of substantive points of his own. For instance, he rebuffs Husserl for being too quick to dismiss the possibility of a dialectical logic as a necessary supplement to formal logic. Edie argues, reminiscent of Hegel and Heidegger, that formal logic has metaphysical presuppositions. Formal logic is a logic of external re-

lations, and hence is inadequate for a logic of wholes and parts (75). He also goes beyond an explication of Husserlian phenomenology in arguing that a phenomenology of modes of consciousness gives an account of 'what was traditionally discussed as the theory of the analogy of being' (109).

The rest of the text involves an explication of the main points of Husserl's philosophy, seven of which are worth highlighting here.

(1) Edie presents a clear account of the difference between Plato and Husserl on essences. Husserl's distinction between the fact and the *eidos* avoids the twin dangers of reifying the *eidos* or eliminating it. The phenomenological distinction between the real and the ideal is also clarified.

(2) A helpful account is given of Husserl's views on logical grammar and the universal structures of language. Husserl explicates the deep structure of language without committing himself to innate ideas or psychologism. To this extent Husserl's philosophy of language fares well in comparison with Chomsky's (49f).

(3) Edie adjudicates the dispute between Husserl and Sartre (or Gurwitsch) as to the fundamentality of an egological conception of consciousness. Both Husserl and Sartre agree that the empirical ego is bracketed by the phenomenological reduction, but they disagree as to whether what remains still deserves to be called 'ego.' Husserl says 'yes,' Sartre 'no.' Edie thinks that Husserl is right and that Sartre's disagreement is ultimately terminological (68f).

(4) Edie follows Fink et al. in holding that the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical ego is one of meaning not reference (68). Edie might have developed this point in more depth, since it is a point which the 'idealistic' interpretation of phenomenology (as in Ingarden and De Boer) has obscured. Fortunately, this interpretation is on the wane, and Edie adroitly avoids being ensnared by it. He also follows a number of recent commentators (e.g., Reeder, Kohak, and Carr) in (correctly) explicating the concept of constitution in terms of objectification as opposed to creation (85).

(5) Noteworthy is Edie's phenomenologically-grounded observation that sensations have an indigenous structure prior to ordering activities of consciousness (88). Edie doesn't make the following point, but it is well worth making in this connection: recognition of the indigenous structure of sensations partially explains how phenomenology can be an explication of subjectivity without being a form of subjectivism in any sense implying relativism.

(6) Edie points out that there is a continuity between transcendental phenomenology and existential phenomenology. This is not merely an historical or ad hoc continuity, but rather one which is internal to the phenomenological problematic itself. As Edie says, the phenomenological disclosure of the transcendental ego imposes 'strong and actual epistemological and ethical demands' (70). In other words, the disclosure of the (phenomenologically understood) transcendental dimension of human existence has existential significance. This too is a key point, frequently overlooked by those who interpret phenomenology as an kind of other-worldly philosophy (no doubt Husserl himself shares part of the blame for this misinterpretation).

(7) Helpful too is Edie's overview of the main points of a phenomenological description of perception, imagination, thought, memory, dream experience, and emotion.

Three of Edie's main points invite requests for further clarification. First, Gurwitsch is cited with approval as saying that the perceptual object is 'the system of all of its possible appearances' (75). How is this claim to be interpreted in order to maintain the distinction between phenomenology and *phenomenalism* (a distinction Edie also rightly draws)? The object is not just a set of appearances; rather, for Husserl, the object is the correlate of the harmonious coherence — disharmonies are ironed out — of all (de facto and conditional) *evidences* (in the Husserlian sense), evidences which would be available to an ideal experiencer in an infinite experience (something which actual intersubjective subjects can approach only asymptotically as experience proceeds).

Second, in talking about the distinction between *real acts* of consciousness and the *ideal objects* of consciousness, Edie writes: 'Conscious processes are thus *real*, distinguishable, datable psychic *events* within a physical organism ... . But the "objects" which such processes enable us to entertain ... are not of the same physical order' (7). Since Edie presents neither defense nor clarification of this point I suspect he intended something harmless by it. Nevertheless, the claim itself is phenomenologically objectionable, expressing as it does an identity theory of mind and brain. Pace Smart, Rorty, et al., 'mental events' have an ineradicably subjective status as elements of the temporal dynamic which is the lived-experience of conscious subjects (uncovering the physiological correlates of subjectivity is something else again). Charles Taylor, Erazim Kohak, T.L.S. Sprigge, and Thomas Nagel have made similar points of late (though the *panpsychism* endorsed by Sprigge is phenomenologically free-floating, as far as I can tell).

Edie also tells us that part of the enduring credit of Husserlian phenomenology is the circumscription of the domain of the '*properly philosophical*' (21). Worth asking is how this claim squares with Edie's favorable discussions of the analogy of being and the problematics of existential phenomenology, both of which appear to indicate a broadening of the 'properly philosophical' domain.

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G.W. FITCH. *Naming and Believing*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. 1987. Pp. vii + 215. US$44.50. ISBN 90-277-2349-4.

The principal purpose of this work is to develop solutions for two classical puzzles in philosophy of language: Russell's problem of non-designating names and Frege's problem of the failure of substitutivity of identity in belief contexts. Along the way Fitch discusses a variety of related issues in philosophy of language and mind. He defends a Russellian account of definite descriptions and a direct reference theory of names and indexicals. He also develops a novel theory of belief as a three-term relation between a person, a thought, and a proposition. In the process of articulating his own views, Fitch provides illuminating and useful commentaries on positions taken by Donnellan, Kripke, Kaplan, Plantinga, Castañeda, David Lewis, Chisholm, and several others.

In Chapter 1 Fitch defends a version of Russell's theory of definite descriptions. Russell's theory must be modified to account for *indeterminate* descriptions, that is, descriptions which are grammatically similar to normal definite descriptions but which do not provide a uniquely distinguishing characteristic. Fitch maintains that the text of an indeterminate description is completed by the contextual situation in which a description is uttered. Thus, 'I find the novel obscure,' becomes, in the context of a particular conversation, 'I find the first novel by Pynchon obscure.' No satisfying explanation is provided of just how features of the contextual situation manage to determine the right words for completing an indeterminate description. Aside from this problem, there is a difficulty raised by cases in which the reference of an indeterminate description is established by an English indefinite article. Consider 'A burglar broke into my office last night. The burglar stole a typewriter.' Fitch's discussion of a similar example (34) suggests that one might fill in the missing text of the indeterminate description with 'the burglar who broke into my office last night and who the speaker has in mind.' But it is doubtful that the original indeterminate description commits the speaker to the Russellian implication that only one burglar was involved in the break-in. In any case, the speaker need not have any particular individual in mind. The claim about the break-in could normally be uttered on the basis of no more evidence than a broken lock and a missing typewriter.

Propositions are conceived by Fitch simply as ordered sets whose atomic constituents are individuals and properties. Thus the proposition that Socrates is wise is the ordered pair < Socrates, being wise >. If the constituents of a proposition do not exist at a world, then the proposition does not exist there either. Nevertheless the above proposition can have a truth-value at a world where Socrates does not exist provided that Socrates exists at the actual world. However, Fitch opposes unactualized possibles, so entities which do not exist at the actual world do not exist at any other worlds. This eliminates Pegasus and any propositions which contain Pegasus from even possible existence. One would think that this move should also rule out winged horses as possibilities since such entities do not exist in the actual world. Fitch nevertheless attempts

to allow for the possibility of winged horses by appealing to a distinction between *members* of possible worlds and *parts* of possible worlds. Unfortunately, Fitch's excessive reliance on metaphors in explaining the distinction leaves one with considerable uncertainty as to just what the distinction really amounts to.

Fitch's theory of belief is perhaps the most innovative doctrine developed in the book. Fitch contends that each belief involves a thought in the believer's mind and a separate proposition. Hence, a belief turns out to be a three-place relation among a person, a thought, and a proposition. If Jones believes that Phosphorus is a planet, Jones is related to the proposition <Phosphorus, being a planet>. The constituents of the extra term, Jones' thought, include Jones' speaker-sense for the name 'Phosphorus' and the property of being a planet. A speaker-sense of a name is a description which a person associates with the name and which the person uses to individuate the named entity. Different speakers normally associate different speaker-senses with the same name. In Fitch's notation, the constituents of Jones' thought are represented in parentheses, and 'Jones [Phosphorus]' represents Jones' speaker-sense for the name 'Phosphorus.' Thus the full representation of the proposition about Jones' belief is <Jones, (Jones[Phosphorus], being a planet), <Phosphorus, being a planet>, believing>. The three-term conception of belief explains the failure of substitutivity of identity. The inference to 'Jones believes that Hesperus is a planet' is blocked because only one occurrence of 'Phosphorus' is in referential position. The most one can infer from Jones' belief about Phosphorus is <Jones, (Jones [Phosphorus], being a planet), <Hesperus, being a planet>, believing>. Fitch's conception of belief inevitably gives rise to new questions and problems. For example, on his view one cannot infer the proposition believed from the thought in the mind of the believer. Hence, it is not clear what would prevent nonsense beliefs such as <Jones, (Jones[Phosphorus], being a planet), <Socrates, being a philosopher>, believing>.

Fitch develops his theory of empty names in the final Chapter. A sentence such as 'Romulus founded Rome' expresses no proposition because 'Romulus' denotes nothing. Nevertheless, Fitch allows that the sentence is meaningful and even has a truth-value. The truth condition for such a sentence is, roughly, ' "Romulus" denotes an entity, and that entity founded Rome.' Fitch's position on empty names raises problems for the views developed earlier concerning propositions and beliefs. For example, propositions are first introduced as the prime bearers of truth-values. Yet if 'Romulus founded Rome' can have a truth-value without expressing a proposition, one wonders why we must have propositions at all as bearers of truth-values. Also, if there is no such proposition as <Romulus, Rome, founded>, then what is to be the third term of a belief for someone who believes that Romulus founded Rome? Fitch's solution for the latter problem is that such mental states are only *apparent* beliefs since there is no propositional object of belief. To his credit, he does acknowledge the counterintuitive nature of this solution.

The new theories which Fitch sketches in this book at least require further refinement. Nevertheless, the book is worthwhile if only for its excellent critical discussions of other authors.

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RICHARD E. FLATHMAN. *The Philosophy and Politics of Freedom*. Chicago: Chicago University Press 1987. Pp. x + 360. US$42.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-25316-3); US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-25317-1).

To facilitate a 'moral and political theory of freedom' (e.g., 223), Flathman discusses five alternative notions of freedom arranged on a negative-positive spectrum. At the negative pole, freedom is conceived as self-activated and unimpeded physical movement. Against this Flathman insists that freedom and unfreedom presuppose agency (i.e., intentional movement motivated by reasons, desires, purposes, and the like) and that unintentional self-activated movements of human bodies are not freedom-evaluable and hence neither free nor unfree.

At the positive pole, actions are considered free only if they are 'morally or otherwise right, good, virtuous, or some such' (53). Flathman rejects such moralized notions as elitist, hoping moreover to keep his notion of freedom at some distance from other controversial values. The somewhat less positive notion of freedom as autonomy is opposed for similar reasons, and on the further ground that freedom and autonomy should be kept distinct so as to be clear, for example, about the difference between an Andrei Sakharov, who is autonomous but largely unfree, and an 'obsequious, sycophantic toady,' who has much more freedom but much less autonomy (177). (Similarly, Flathman would say that unintelligent persons, insofar as they are unable to conceive of many options, lack freedom-evaluability rather than freedom.) Having rejected the extremes, Flathman endorses a moderately negative account of freedom that presupposes only the minimal rationality involved in agency and is otherwise content to 'take agents as we find them' (225) with whatever interests, desires, ends, and purposes they may have.

On Flathman's telling, the proponents of competing notions of freedom disagree only about the internal constitution a being must have to be capable of freedom. All agree about what external constraints will render someone unfree to perform an action: namely 'impediments to that action placed or

left by another agent or other agents acting with the intention of placing or leaving those impediments' (322). Other external constraints remove freedom-evaluability, not freedom. But this papers over a crucial aspect of the debate about negative and positive notions of freedom, and thus shows the inadequacy of Flathman's one-dimensional reproduction thereof. Proponents of positive notions have often urged that a person can be unfree in various other ways: on account of systemic social impediments that are not intended or produced by anyone in particular, natural impediments that could be removed or overcome through collective efforts, or social disadvantages with respect to means such as education, health-care, employment, or wealth. Flathman has almost nothing to say about these familiar and pressing issues. In the text he writes, 'even if the poor, ignorant, or feeble come to have contempt for their legal rights ... and actively seek their abolition, it will remain the case that they are (legally) free to take the actions protected by those rights' (30). But let's stick to the realistic scenario: What if the poor, ignorant, or feeble — unable to afford a lawyer or to acquire the requisite legal expertise — cannot *exercise* their legal rights, though they would very much want to do so? What about those too poor to *take advantage* of their legal right to purchase heating fuel, food, or a college education, though they desperately need or desire these goods? It seems quite reasonable to call such persons unfree in the relevant respects, and Flathman needs to explain why he stipulates otherwise. He has two footnotes bearing on the issue (323f, 325f), the latter asserting, 'as we move toward clear cases of knowing, intentional, and deliberate action by B to prevent A from doing X, the case for saying A is made unfree by B gets progressively stronger.' But this, I submit, is not an interesting fact about the word 'unfree,' but a boring fact about the verb 'to make.' Flathman never says why a person should *be* unfree only insofar as she has been deliberately *made* unfree. His assumption to this effect is certainly at odds with ordinary ways of speaking: It would forbid us to say, for example, that women in some societies enjoy little freedom to participate in politics, unless we could point to particular persons deliberately impeding female political participation.

Wittgenstein is the most frequently cited author in the essay, and reliance on him reinforces its conservative drift. Many critics of modern societies believe that, due to excessive conformist pressures, individual freedom is a mere shadow of what it could be. (For a nice statement see Mill, *On Liberty*, III, sixth paragraph.) Flathman responds to (Goffman's version of) this critique by insisting that freedom is *situated* within an ongoing language game in which certain rules, conventions, and norms play a constitutive role. Moreover, 'because Goffman himself must use public language to ... express his ideal of the self, his attempt to do so tacitly invokes the very features of sociality that his ideal seeks to eliminate' (170). Such a prioristic arguments may apply to fictional critics who reject all sociality, all rules and rule-following (cf. 145). But they are meaningless in response to those actual critics of concrete societies who, comprehensibly enough by the standards of our public language, invoke the notion of freedom to express constructive criticisms of received norms and practices. Against them Flathman can still claim that 'statements about

freedom and unfreedom are not merely descriptive but normative ... Given
the rules and conventions ... of the parking game [it would be] inappropriate,
and even false ... for Able to complain about interference with [her] freedom
[when] the fact that Baker has occupied a parking place prevents Able from
taking it' (203). If judgments about freedom are thus relative to prevalent games
and practices, then such practices themselves cannot be appraised in terms
of freedom. But is this plausible? Whether a woman whose husband keeps her
locked up is therefore unfree would then come to depend on how the mar-
riage game is played in their society.

Flathman might say that the lack of freedom-evaluability suffered by the
women in my two examples is also regrettable. But then lack of freedom-
evaluability (unlike lack of freedom) is often morally irrelevant (as when I can-
not fly unaided, or when Able cannot park where Baker parked first). Flath-
man offers no criterion for distinguishing the regrettable from the indifferent
cases. In order to tidy up the notion of (un)freedom, he reshuffles the diffi-
cult issues to another concept and leaves them there unaddressed.

Because the notion of freedom is widely understood to be situated, inter-
woven with existing norms and practices, more specific conceptions of free-
dom should be endorsed only for a particular society at a particular time. Thus,
while viewing Rawls' account of basic liberties to be true *to the U.S. now*,
Flathman criticizes Rawls for his wider ambitions. This critique suggests that
Flathman would similarly relativize his own (thinner) characterization of free-
dom as negative and elemental. (The latter adjective expressed the claim that
we take for granted one another's freedom-evaluability and freedom, and also
prize freedom as an important — albeit instrumental [235] — good [7].) How-
ever, the last two sentences of the book run thus: 'I claim that modern West-
ern societies regard freedom in this way. If they don't, they should' (321).
This is puzzling. For how can Flathman claim for himself the kind of stand-
point outside existing language games that he denies to Rawls? How can he
insist that all Western societies *ought* to be committed — now and for the
future — to conceive of freedom as negative and elemental?

More than by its lack of philosophical sophistication, I was disappointed
by this book's political emptiness. It has nothing interesting to say about the
crucial question, passionately debated for several centuries — 'What sort of
a society would be entitled to claim freedom as its central value?'

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RODOLPHE GASCHÉ. *The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1986. Pp. viii + 348. US$25.00. ISBN 0-674-86700-9.

At last — a work on deconstruction that measures up to Derrida's rigorous philosophical demands. Gasché's *The Tain of the Mirror* is an amazingly lucid description of the whole range of the Derridean enterprise elaborated in great detail with respect to the history of reflection. In a readable style Gasché accomplishes the difficult task of interlacing scholarly precision with philosophical creativity. This elegant symbiosis is reflected in the subtitle of his text: *Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection*. Against deconstructive criticism, it is demonstrated most clearly that deconstruction is, first and foremost, a profoundly philosophical operation, 'a subtle economy that recognizes the essential requirements of philosophical thought while questioning the limits of the possibility of these requirements' (7).

The thrust of Gasché's argument against convenient literary theories, which attempt to account for deconstruction's non-philosophic standpoints, lies in showing that Derrida's thought cannot be conceived as a 'false exit' from philosophy. Indeed, dissemination's play of writing inhabits 'more naively and more strictly than ever the *inside* one declares one has deserted' (cf. Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. A. Bass [Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982], 135). Gasché consistently argues that deconstruction is infinitely challenged by the discourse of philosophy without ever being reduced to its logocentric plane.

Divided into eleven chapters, three of which in part have been published previously, *Tain* weaves together the themes of reflection, deconstruction, and literature. It is distinguished from much of contemporary scholarship on deconstruction precisely because it attends to the *unthought* genealogy of Derrida's philosophy with its historical delimitations of reflection. In turn, the book succeeds in clarifying Derrida's thought in relation to literature whose suspension enables 'a radical interrogation of philosophy' (258).

Chapters one to five of part one set out to show that reflexivity emerges as the key methodological concept of philosophy in general. It is shown to be not only the medium of metaphysics but its very foundation. Gasché begins with Descartes' minimal definition of reflection disclosed in *cogito me cogitare* and mentions briefly the outer and inner theories of reflection ascribed to Locke and Leibniz. From there, he proceeds to Kant's transcendental transformation of *Denken* which grounds the empirical and logical modes of reflection. Gasché maintains that the philosophy of reflection reaches its climax with Hegel's attempt to exceed the subjective and objective expositions of reflection in the texts of Fichte and Schelling. Hegel's absolute, speculative phenomenology desires completion of reflection, demands *Aufhebung* of reflection to the dialectic presence of *Geist*, secured by the totality of his system. The first part of the book, particularly chapters five and six, concludes with the idea that any philosophical debate with reflexivity must begin with Hegel's specula-

tive dialectic drifting into the 'end of reflection,' ever challenging a philosophy that stretches from Heidegger to Derrida.

As its title suggests, Gasché's study gives a systematic reading of Derrida's philosophy, especially with respect to the unthought limits of reflection, initially glimpsed in Husserl's notion of *Abbau* and in Heidegger's naming of *Destruktion*. '*Abbau* seems to stand for a nonreflexive way of reaching the roots of the pregiven world, its idealization, and the sense-constituting structures of transcendental subjectivity' (111). Heidegger's *Destruktion* of reflexivity involves a turning back to a prereflexive understanding of *Dasein* which releases *Denken* from the speculative idiom of *Begriff* to a radical phenomenological ontology without 'the debt' of self-consciousness. At this point, Gasché announces Derrida's interest in questioning 'the orchestrated mirror play of reflection' and in exploring 'the lusterless back of the mirror,' the surface of mirroring 'without which no reflection and no speculative activity would be possible' (6).

Chapters eight and nine of part two offer a scrupulous and engaging investigation into the deconstructive problematic concerning the limits of the tain of reflection disclosed in the process of dismantling the philosophical discourse of method. Gasché manages not merely to illustrate the economy of Derrida's 'constructs,' but also to bring out the richness and complexity of deconstruction's unique 'infrastructural accounting' of the ethico-metaphysical 'aporias and contradictions of philosophical discourse' (147). Indeed, for Gasché, deconstruction's original contribution to philosophy resides in the very concept of 'infrastructure,' 'as the *formal rule* that each time regulates differently the play of contradictions in question' as that which 'displaces the logic of philosophy and inscribes it within a general heterology' (147).

The entire force and clarity of *Tain* is derived from the idea of a relevant order of 'infrastructural accounting.' How does Gasché conceive this order which subverts and yet makes possible the spacings of philosophical discourse? Considering the entirety of Derrida's writings up to *La Vérité en peinture* (1979), Gasché exposes essential traits of infrastructural heterology which can be summarized in the following observations.

The non-Marxist notion of 'infrastructures' concerns a preontologic, prelogic, synthetic, and open matrix in which reflection's oppositions and contradictions are engendered. As a transformed concept, 'infrastructures' are eminently plural, always already preceding the alternative of absence and presence. Irremediably resisting philosophy's desire to establish the ground of oppositions in totality, 'infrastructures' refer to an order that accounts for the binary relations of the sensible and the intelligible without ever grounding those relations. Thus they emerge as 'instances of an intermediary discourse' (151), inevitably maintaining contradiction, nevertheless resisting its sublation into a higher unity. That, in effect, is the space in which Gasché situates deconstruction, distinguishing it from the Romantic *eros* of annulling or neutralizing the philosophical enterprise. In fact, he argues that only in the region of 'infrastructures,' only in the subversive spacings of postreflective interlacing is a connection of deconstruction and tradition, of thinking and 'the end of

philosophy' possible. The search for meaning is therefore not abolished but intensified.

Gasché opposes the idea that deconstruction involves a rejection of philosophy and a naive accommodation of literature. In part three of his text, he shows that Derrida resists the dominant concept of literature and is only led toward literature in so far as its discourse is better able to challenge philosophy's dialectic moorings. Hence, with philosophy, literature questions the dialectic interplay with reflection's traditional order of totality. Gasché proposes that deconstruction interweaves philosophy and literature. This infrastructural interlacing does not merely provide polythematic strategies, as literary critics surmise, but rather a 'chiasmatic structure' of grafting one gesture upon another in the 'bipartite operation of deconstruction.' The infrastructures, therefore, dissolve and do not offer themselves up to mediation. Constantly withdrawing from the dialectic, they play within the closure of metaphysics while attempting 'a breakthrough toward a certain outside of philosophy' (173). Gasché claims that this 'double gesture' is precisely what has generally been overlooked by deconstructive criticism.

In the end, Gasché notes that deconstruction takes up the question of both the possibility and the impossibility of philosophical discourse. 'To exceed the discourse of philosophy cannot possibly mean to step *outside* the closure, because the outside belongs to the categories of the inside' (169). And yet, a crevice is still possible, a glimpse, 'an unnameable glimmer beyond closure' (Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. G.C. Spivak [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1976)], 14) if only in the 'tain of the mirror.'

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KAREN GRANDSTRAND GERVAIS. *Redefining Death*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1987. Pp. xiv + 231. US$22.50. ISBN 0-300-03616-7.

Gervais' *Redefining Death* defends four theses. First, despite some disclaimers, the shift to a brain death criterion for human death involves a departure from the traditional definition of death as the permanent and irreversible cessation of an organism's homeostasis. Second, no current definitions of death (other than her own) have adequate philosophical underpinnings. Third, the correct and new definition of human death, which according to Gervais is consciousness-based, requires that one accept that it is a human person rather

than a human organism for which a definition of death is being sought. Fourth, the correct definition of death is compatible with public policies which respect the preferences of those who continue to adhere to the traditional definition. Of course the defense of these four theses drives Gervais to accept other controversial claims. But it is to her credit that she does not hesitate to follow her argument where it leads.

The book has good architecture. Readers unfamiliar with the controversies and options in the debate over the definition of death, and the related controversy concerning the conditions that a patient should meet to be *declared* dead, which need not involve the satisfaction of the definition, will discover that Gervais' good design mitigates the pain of first acquaintance. She briskly reviews the history relevant to the death controversy. Moreover, she sorts theoretical approaches to the definitional question in a manner that, although familiar enough, aids understanding. There are three of these approaches: (i) the biological, (ii) the moral, and (iii) the ontological. Crudely put, biological theories hold that death is definable with reference to biological events alone; moral theories stress the need to define death in a manner which accounts for the shift in the moral standing of the dead; and ontological theories emphasize the need to identify the appropriate kind of thing for which a definition is being sought. For those who know the literature, the biological approach covers theories such as Becker's or Lamb's; the moral, theories such as Ramsey's or Jonas's; the ontological, theories such as Wikler and Green's or Youngner and Bartlett's. Gervais' own theory emerges as a mix of moral and ontological approaches with biological considerations purportedly given their due.

The chief novelty in Gervais' own theory of death is her manner of arguing for it. For her there is not a fact of the matter about what the correct definition of death is. As she puts it, 'our concept of death is not a fact awaiting our discovery; rather, it must be chosen on the basis of ethical reflection' (155). Nevertheless, she believes that moral arguments will settle the issue as follows. First, once one is mindful of the kind of moral work death is supposed to do, one will recognize that it is human persons, rather than human organisms, for whom a definition of death is being sought. Second, a correct understanding of what a person is reveals that 'consciousness per se (the most conservative criterion for the preservation of personal identity, and the only one that is defensible) is a sufficient sign of the continuation of a personal existence' (169); consequently, death has not occurred until consciousness has irrevocably ceased. Gervais' approach, then, is to use moral argument to justify the selection of a particular sortal — human person. Once she has done that and given what she takes the essential property of a person to be, she is in a position to identify what kinds of biological occurrences must transpire for a patient to be dead. Of course it will not always be the case that doctors will be able to tell whether a patient satisfies the definition. Reliable tests for picking out patients who have permanently lost consciousness are not always available. In fact, in the case of many comatose patients, clinicians will have no way of telling who is and is not dead. Hence, on Gervais' view, it will not be cur-

rently possible to make the circumstances in which a patient is dead coincide with the circumstances in which a patient may be declared dead.

Gervais' moral argument for redefining death, which is the book's chief novelty, is contractarian. To her mind, the contractarian argument is the best way to proceed to determine what public policy ought to be in regard to declarations of death. If I have understood her, rational contractors need to decide on 'what contract would be in everyone's interest for the management of Jones, a hypothetical, permanently insentient individual in a persistent vegetative state' (169), and presumably need to recognize what conception of death — person or organismic — offers the best underwriting for the policy selected. Gervais rightly observes that treating such patients as if they are alive serves no useful purpose. She also points out that holding such patients to be alive would require revisions to common sense morality if such patients were treated as dead, which is what Gervais thinks rational contractors would prefer. But what follows? At most Gervais' argument shows that rational contractors would opt to treat such individuals as dead. Why should they take the further step of selecting the sortal 'person' and the related *definition* of death on contractarian grounds? A rational contractor might agree to declare a man absent for 7 years dead without thinking that any lessons could be drawn about what death is. And, more to the point, and deplorably enough, a convention of rational restauranteurs might agree to declare and treat margarine and butter as butter without thinking themselves committed on the correct definition of butter. Undoubtedly Gervais believes that the appropriateness of her procedure depends on reality not dictating the definition of death, but for that to be so, her arguments against, say, a biological definition would need to involve an impossibility result. If she has a result that strong, it escaped my notice. What is perhaps even more controversial, Gervais' own definition makes a univocal definition of death a conceptual error. It is not just that the criterion for establishing that death has occurred changes from species to species, but that the definition itself changes *if* the organism in question is a person. Only in the case of persons is the absence of consciousness taken as sufficient for death. To my mind that verges on confusing when something has ceased to be an organism to whom a particular predicate applies with its death.

Despite my reservations, I do think that Gervais has produced a good book. It ably summarizes relevant literature. It attempts to develop new arguments for the consciousness-based definition of death. That is also to the good. I do, as I have tried to indicate, have doubts about Gervais' positive arguments for her own position, as well as doubts about the arguments employed to eliminate positions with which she does not agree. I was, for example, extremely dissatisfied with her criticisms of Green and Wikler's paper. But on the whole, I think the book's survey of a confusing diversity of philosophical analyses of death is a welcome service.

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MARJORIE GRENE and DEBRA NAILS, eds. *Spinoza and the Sciences*. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company 1986. Pp. xix + 336. US$54.50. ISBN 90-277-1976-4.

This volume contains twelve essays, five of which were presented at the Spinoza Sesquitercentenary Symposium on Spinoza and the Sciences. Of the other essays, one (by H. Jonas) is reprinted from an earlier collection, and another (by A. Lecrivain) was published previously in another form; the rest are published here for the first time (two in English translations). The essays vary in length (10 to 45 pages) and cover a wide variety of topics, focused on, but not limited to, the central theme of Spinoza and the sciences. There is a short Introduction (by M. Grene), an extensive Annotated Bibliography (by D. Nails) of works dealing with Spinoza and science, an Index Locorum, and a General Index. Taken collectively, the essays may be regarded as an extension of the present tendency to view Spinoza as a naturalist and exponent of a unified science conceived on the model of modern natural science, rather than a speculative rationalist or religious mystic. By calling attention to the many links between Spinoza's thought and science, several of the essays confirm a strong empirical element in Spinoza's thought and his interest in the newly emerging experimental sciences. But they also confirm the common view that Spinoza did not contribute directly to the body of scientific knowledge and that his conception of science, especially physics, was predominately Cartesian. N. Maull, for example, argues that Spinoza's experiments with nitre were not primarily intended to contribute to the science of chemistry but to teach Boyle 'a philosophical lesson, namely, that (as we would put it) hypotheses are underdetermined by experiment' (5). Similarly, D. Savan affirms that Spinoza made no contribution to optical theory (65-6) and H. Siebrand that Spinoza's short works on probability and the rainbow are minor and derivative (73-8). (Savan, however, claims that Spinoza's real place in the history of science is determined by the 'scientific hermeneutics' in the *Theological-Political Treatise* for interpreting Scripture [97].)

One of the best essays is that by A. Lecrivain, which deals in a masterly way with Spinoza's *Principles of Descartes' Philosophy*. The essay presents a learned, insightful, and thorough comparison of Descartes' and Spinoza's physics. Particularly instructive is Lecrivain's discussion of the connection between the principle of inertia (derived from Descartes) and the concept of *conatus*. Many are tempted to view Spinoza's doctrine of *conatus* (*Ethics* III, P6) as a mere metaphysical generalization from the physical law of inertia. Lecrivain shows convincingly that (however Spinoza himself may have arrived at his view) the text of the *Ethics* shows that inertia is derived from *conatus*, indeed, is the extreme limiting case of it. *Conatus* is an effort to persevere in being, whereas inertia implies merely continuance in the same state. *Conatus* is a 'struggle' 'to increase and expand' being. [On this point, cf. *Ethics* III, P12.] Furthermore, the doctrine of *conatus* is a universal truth about each thing (*unaquaeque res*), whereas inertia holds only of the simplest bodies (*simplicissima corpora*): it is 'an ultimate limit of being' (48).

A. Matheron has contributed a lengthy, learned, and technical discussion of the meaning and relevance of Spinoza's famous example of the fourth proportional. He tries to show that, contrary to what many have thought, the example really does succeed in doing what Spinoza intended, namely, to elucidate the difference between *ratio* and *scientia intuitiva* and the peculiar nature and advantage of the latter. This essay, like Lecrivain's, is clearly an important contribution to Spinoza scholarship.

Three essays deal with Spinoza's relation to 20th century physics. H. Jonas constructs an insightful comparison and contrast between Spinoza's doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism and Bohr's thesis of the complementarity of descriptions of light. Two essays (by J.D. van Zandt and M. Paty) deal with Spinoza's relation to Einstein. Both make a number of interesting philosophical points and provide useful historical information. Paty cites passages from unpublished letters showing Einstein's great admiration of Spinoza, but is rightly cautious about ascribing direct influences. Van Zandt, although urging caution, deliberately yields to temptation and makes a number of claims about congruence of doctrine which seem too anachronistic to be acceptable. For example, he describes Spinoza's attribute of extension as 'a space-time continuum' yet warns that 'space, as the place of modifications' 'should not be confused with the Attribute of Extension' (257-8).

R.H. Popkin has contributed an informative essay in which he uncovers some recondite historical material relating to the influences on the development of Spinoza's views about Scripture. Other essays deal with Spinoza and science in the Netherlands (by H. Siebrand), the relation between self-knowledge and self-preservation (by J.T. Cook) and the eternity of the mind (by G. Lloyd). The single essay devoted to Spinoza and political science (by J. Agassi) may be safely ignored; it contains too many confusing and eccentric claims to be of use.

Most of the essays in this volume are well worth reading and should be of interest not only to Spinoza scholars but also to those interested in 17th century philosophy and science (especially Descartes) and the history of modern philosophy and science generally. Serious students of Spinoza should find some of the essays indispensable. The book is attractively planned and produced, although it contains a large number of printing errors.

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PIOTR HOFFMAN. *Doubt, Time, Violence*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1986. Pp. xix + 146. US$25.00. ISBN 0-226-34791.

In this thought-provoking and recommended book Piotr Hoffman's intentions are at once systematic and hermeneutical. He intends his book not just as a piece of historical scholarship but as a philosophical study of violence as a fundamental problem. Violence is an ingredient in the education of human selfhood in its coming to mitigate its own assertion of power and the threat of the other, and to take its properly human place in social and political institutions. At the same time, Hoffman's hermeneutical intent is evident in his views of the related problems of doubt and time, particularly as dealt with in modern philosophy by major figures like Descartes, Hegel and Heidegger.

After a general introduction which situates the question, two long chapters deal with doubt and time, followed by a conclusion on the theme of violence. Generally Hoffman seems to take seriously the Hegelian dialectic of master and slave, and would appear to be very much influenced by a Kojèvian reading of it. Not that he merely reduplicates Kojève, for he has a wide sense of the importance of violence for modern political philosophy from Hobbes and Machiavelli to Hegel and Marx. What is distinctive in the book is not the reassertion of this importance but the application of the theme of violence to areas of philosophy other than political philosophy.

Thus in his discussion of Descartes' doubt, a stress on violence helps one understand the sense of vulnerable separateness that marks the Cartesian *cogito*, and the distrust, scepticism it brings to bear on the whole. I found Hoffman very perceptive on how Descartes' methodic doubt is intended to communicate the sense of vulnerability and impotence, especially in connection with the evil genius. He suggestively situates epistemological doubt in a concrete context filled with the anxieties of human power and powerlessness. Not surprisingly he treats of Heidegger in similar terms, particularly in terms of anxiety as a being-disclosing mood. Focusing on *Being and Time* Hoffman finds an incoherence in Heidegger in terms of a dualism between the everyday and philosophical attitudes.

Hoffman claims that this incoherence is not present in Hegel: his philosophical scepticism tries to vindicate the truth of the everyday world by denying, Hoffman claims, that doubt about knowledge can ever be total. I am not sure that this does justice to the radicality of the *Phenomenology* as what Hegel calls a 'highway of despair,' a dialectical logos of the *Golgotha* of *Geist*. When Hoffman says that a dialogue of the sceptical and everyday attitude is only possible if anxiety is rechanneled into fear (63), I wonder if this betrays the problem in both Heidegger and Hegel. Anxiety is ultimately anxiety of *nothing* in particular, while fear has always a determinate, hence manageable object. But it is just the unmanageability of the former that constitututes the problem at its deepest, I suspect. The radical undermining power, say, of Descartes' evil genius gets humanized into 'the aggrandized features of *another man* as he is positioning himself to threaten my life' (63).

This theme is continued into the chapter on time, where Hoffman again shows the influence of Kojève. The virtues of this approach are the virtues of Kojève's interpretation, which already was a reading of Hegel through the eyes of Marx and Heidegger. The question is not strongly raised about the adequacy of Kojève's views, though an argument could be made that Hegel's overall project is seriously misrepresented if we give a singularly privileged status to the struggle to the death in the dialectic of master and slave. Interestingly, he here grants a certain superiority of Heidegger to Hegel, particularly with respect to the question whether time allows total recuperation of meaning. This is denied by Heidegger, affirmed by Hegel, it seems. The overall conclusion of this chapter points to the need to go beyond Heidegger and Hegel.

The conclusion opens with a Hobbesian Apocalypse in which we are to suppose that all Hell has broken loose in 'an all-out life-and-death struggle among men' (117). I did not find this conclusion convincing. It operates entirely within the presupposition of such a Hobbesian Apocalyse in which, to borrow Sartre's famous words, Hell is the other. Hoffman is not persuasive in trying to find 'peace' in this Hell by self-interested calculation. He does not go deep enough into the hell of the other à la Sartre, nor does he envisage a self of agapeic good-will. Despite his protestations of 'peace,' the relentless struggle of willful violent selves he offers us does not give us adequate philosophical terms to escape the Sartrean Hell. On these terms alone there is no way to make sense of the promise of deep human *solidarity*, a more primordial constitutive solidarity of self and other.

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'If value judgments were capable of being true then they could have no logically necessary relevance to any choice of conduct' (1). This 'principal claim' of *The Language of Decision* rests on the point that no purely factual propositions entail a prescriptive conclusion. The argument is weakly organized. It occurs in five chapters devoted to overlapping topics somewhat loosely linked together by the book's introduction.

1: *The relevance of morality to practice.* Ibberson argues that the question whether certain moral and empirical properties are identical has no bearing on practice. If the empirical features of action give sufficient reason to do something then the moral rightness of the action gives no more reason to do it. But if the empirical features do not give reason to perform an action, its rightness doesn't either.

2: *Aspects of prescriptive logic.* A statement of fact can be said to entail a prescription only if it cannot be the case that the statement is true and the prescription unsatisfied. Hence, if moral judgments were statements of fact, 'It is wrong to do X' could not entail 'Do not do X.' If moral judgments follow from statements of fact, they entail no prescriptions; if moral judgments do entail prescriptions they do not follow from statements of fact.

3: *Reasons for action.* Facts can be sufficient, but not logically sufficient, reasons to do something. That something is a reason is not a fact; for to say of a fact that it is a reason is not to state a fact about it; it is to say (roughly) 'Do this because of this fact.' As long as we do not confuse explanations and justifications it will be clear that one can have a reason to do something without any desire to do it, though without the desire a factual belief will not motivate action.

4: *The error of ethical naturalism.* Defenders of naturalism 'de re' maintain that certain evaluative and empirical properties are identical, although the words for these properties are not synonymous. But in order to identify these empirical features they must identify the sense of their evaluative terms with the sense of some empirical descriptions; and if they disagree in this identification they are involved in a verbal misunderstanding rather than a genuine ethical disagreement.

5: *The rejection of subjectivism.* No facts entail prescriptions or have an intrinsic capacity to motivate anyone aware of them, but this does not show that values are subjective, i.e., that 'all value judgments are equally good.' This being a prescription to value everything equally, it cannot follow from any statement of fact or any prescriptivist theory of ethics.

Yes, these arguments were published in 1986, not in the 1950s, but they are strongly impressed with the influence of R.M. Hare and *The Language of Morals* (Oxford 1952). Hare was one of the examiners for the dissertation of which this book is the outgrowth, and his appetite for dichotomies — freedom and reason, fact and value, description and prescription, belief and desire — pervades the account.

Ibberson discusses these concepts in his own way and with analytical acuity. He shows, for example, that the notion of a universal prescription entailing imperative sentences in all tenses cannot easily accommodate past-tense imperatives (although he couples his argument with a peculiar refutation of the existence of negative numbers). He shows that, within the ambit of prescriptivism, nothing is to be gained from arguments about which kind of reasons are moral reasons. He also claims plausibly that statements of fact provide reasons in support of prescriptive claims even though calling a fact a reason says nothing true or false about it.

Oddly, as Mark Vorobej suggested to me, Ibberson does not consider the problem of disjunction-introduction for his 'principal claim': a factual proposition p entails p or q for any q, but if q is prescriptive then it is arguable that p or q is as well. The stress on entailment and logical modalities is also part of a more general problem. Hare's work was valuable in showing against emotivism that reasoning has a place in moral judgment, but attention to logical relationships in moral reasoning seems to leave almost everything else interesting out of account. Both Hare and Ibberson advance contemporary versions of Hume's repeated and consistent assertions that 'reason *alone* can never produce any action' (*Treatise*, ed. Selby-Bigge [Oxford 1960], 414-15); 'reason *alone* ... can never have any ... influence,' 'reason *of itself* is entirely impotent,' 'reason *alone* [cannot] distinguish between moral good and moral evil' (457). It is the emphasis on 'reason-*alone*' that sustains the above dichotomies. One may ask if this emphasis gets us down to the basics of moral philosophy or whether it prevents examining the complexities which are central to understanding moral problems and decisions? It certainly makes it difficult to advance our understanding of how facts justify or warrant prescriptions without entailing them.

Ibberson's discussion is liveliest when he engages John McDowell and other recent critics of Hume's assumptions, but there is little of this — and little attention to what Bernard Williams calls 'thick' concepts. It is easy to sustain theses about 'facts' and 'values' when these descriptive-cum-prescriptive concepts are neglected, much less so when they are seriously considered. Then it cannot simply be asserted that 'desires and beliefs are *distinct* kinds of mental states' (4), or that 'when we say that certain considerations are good evidence for a conclusion we must not be *stating any fact* about those considerations [but] ... *prescribing* that we have a certain degree of conviction because of those considerations' (101).

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ISAAC LEVI. *Hard Choices: Decision Making under Unresolved Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1986. Pp. xii + 250. US$34.50. ISBN 0-521-32527-7.

Picture an executive about to hire a secretary. She has a difficult choice before her: Tom has scored 99 out of a possible 100 in typing, but only 90 at dictation. Dick has done just the reverse, scoring 99 at dictation and 90 at

typing. The executive is confronted with a conflict of values. This example lacks but one ingredient before it becomes what Levi calls 'a moral struggle of the second kind' (5). This extra ingredient is the commitments our executive makes to these values. If she has made value commitments which impose incompatible constraints on how she evaluates the feasible options in this choice situation, then the case involves conflict between value commitments, not just between values.

The possibility of value conflict is obvious. However, it has been traditional in choice theory to assume that such conflicts are resolved by the time a choice is made, either explicitly, or implicitly in the very making of the choice. This assumption is the central target of Levi's book. Levi's aim is to give an account of the rational constraints on choice which remain when we are unable to decide how to balance conflicting values. The book focuses on deliberation in the face of conflict, an aspect of conflict situations which is difficult at best to deal with in purely deontic terms. Thus Levi's book represents an important extension of the current discussion of conflict situations.

Levi's account is founded on what he calls 'value structures.' These are built up from our value commitments; relative to each value commitment, there is a set of permissible ways of evaluating the options in the feasible set of options, U. When our value commitments are not in conflict, V(U) is the set of all ways of evaluating which are permitted by all of our value commitments, and the options in U which are optimal relative to at least one of V(U) are the V-admissible options. When our value commitments are in conflict, Levi proposes that we instead regard all the ways of evaluating permitted by any of the competing value commitments as permissible. The V-admissible options in a conflict situation are the options which are optimal according to any of the ways of evaluating permissible according to one of the competing value commitments. A complete value structure is made up of lexicographically ordered value structures defined on U. Options V-admissible by the first of these (and options not ranked in a unique order by the first) may be ruled out (or ranked) by appeal to the second, and so on. Thus to revert to our initial example, given that both hiring Tom and hiring Dick are V-admissible relative to the executive's first order value commitments with regard to hiring decisions, she is entitled to appeal to second order value commitments in choosing between these options. She might, for instance, appeal to affirmative action considerations.

The 'ways of evaluating' which make up these value structures are, Levi argues, best represented by real-valued functions defined over the options in U, unique up to a positive affine transformation. Levi favours this over the use of weak orderings for two reasons. First, these functions make it possible to capture the difference between two extensions of our executive's problem: suppose that a third candidate, Harry, does almost as well as Tom at typing, and almost as well as Dick at dictation (he scores 98 on both tests). It seems that hiring Harry ought to be a V-admissible option. But suppose Harry does almost as badly as Tom at dictation, and almost as badly as Dick at typing, scoring 91 on both. Now it seems that hiring Harry should not be V-admissible.

Yet as far as weak orderings go, the two cases are indistinguishable. Second, we can compare the mixed option of hiring Tom or Dick on the basis of a coin toss with the option of hiring Harry. If the executive is neutral with respect to gambling, it seems that if Harry is 'second-best' hiring Harry should rank at least as highly as the mixed option, while if Harry is second-worst hiring Harry should rank below this mixture. Again, differences in values, not just the ordering of options, seem to be important. Levi also assumes that the set V(U) is closed under positive weighings of V-functions which are not positive affine transformations of each other (ie. V(U) is convex); these weighings represent potential resolutions of the differences between the various values.

For Levi our commitments to values generate recognizably deontic restrictions on what evaluations of options are open to us. There is something odd about these deontic restrictions, however. So long as they do not conflict, we are constrained to evaluate our options in accord with all of them. But as soon as they conflict, we are only required to evaluate our options in accord with at least one of them. Here I differ with Levi. In order to deliberate in the face of conflicting commitments, we must consider some evaluative options ruled out by our commitments. However, at least often we will not consider all the evaluative options allowed by any of the competing commitments to be acceptable. We might reasonably require, for instance, that as many of the competing commitments as possible be satisfied (in a case where more than two commitments have given rise to the conflict). And often we would regard those ways of valuing which assign zero weight to one of the conflicting values as impermissible.

Levi applies his system to a wide range of puzzles and issues. He provides a unified and persuasive account of Ellsberg's and Allais' problems which preserves the 'sure-thing' principle using conflict of values to account for the choices typically made in these situations. He treats questions about social benevolence, utilitarianism and social choice theory. And he addresses conflict over epistemic values. The book is challenging, and sometimes quite technical. In particular, the argument in chapter 6, indicating how his account of value structures and admissibility of options differs from accounts based on revealed preference rankings, and the discussion of social benefit structures and social choice theory in chapters 9 through 11, require (and repay) close study.

Levi's writing is usually clear and easily followed; unfortunately at some points in *Hard Choices* this isn't the case. And the book leaves a puzzle: how are the theme of unresolved conflict between values and the theme of unresolved conflict between value commitments related? Levi seems to treat the two as more or less equivalent in much of the book, despite the central role that value commitments play in his account of value structures. The relation between the axiological and the deontic seems to me to call out, at least, for more discussion. Nevertheless, the book's strong points more than make up for its weaknesses. Selections from the book would make useful

supplementary material for graduate courses in value theory or social choice theory. Those whose special interests fall within the book's scope will find much here to interest them.

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A.A. LONG and D.N. SEDLEY. *The Hellenistic Philosophers*. Volume I: Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary. New York: Cambridge University Press 1987. Pp. xv + 512. US$19.95. ISBN 0-521-25561-9.

The project was prestigious and great-souled. The Cambridge University Press consulted many (including this reviewer) as to how it should be carried out. The result, sadly, has been a Renaissance failure. A glance at the Preface will give the discerning reader some idea of how this heroic but unhappy result has been achieved.

(According to the blurb) Long and Sedley aimed to produce a sourcebook in English, plus commentary, suitable for use by students and teachers of Greek thought. In fact the book is too difficult to be put into the hands of all but a few brilliant and well-prepared undergraduates, and even the majority of graduates will find much of the commentary too advanced. This is, rather, a book which can be used, for the most part, only by that small network of people, to be counted in the dozens rather than the hundreds, who are specialists in Hellenistic philosophy. But for them the book has flaws of a different kind, and they may also use it as an excuse for laziness. It is *not* a complete treatment of the thought of the Hellenistic age, even if that age is rigidly defined in terms of political history rather than in terms of the history of ideas: the early Academy and Peripatos are neglected while Pyrrho is not; we hear little of the intellectual background of individual thinkers (Kirk, Raven and Schofield do much better in this respect for the Presocratics); Philo and Antiochus of the New Academy are very hastily dismissed; the revival of Pyrrhonism is treated in the person of Aenesidemus without consideration of Agrippa on causation; we hear only in passing of Diodorus Cronus and Philo of Megara, despite the expertise of Long and Sedley, shown elsewhere, in such matters. In brief some of this incompleteness is, in my view, the result not of haste or substantive error but of miscalculation of what is needed — since the book is in any case only of use to more-or-less professional scholars.

But if the book is for that audience, other problems arise. Only half (or at least only a part) of the commentary appears in Part 1, so that it is not (despite the blurb and p. xi) 'entirely self-sufficient.' We must also await volume 2 for the bibliography, so although Long and Sedley are by no means always conventional interpreters, at the moment we have to rely on realizing this only when they care to tell us (unless we are *very* up-to-date on the scholarship).

Again, if the book is for professionals — and they will be grateful for it — it is a pity that many of the texts are so short and detached from their context. And it is a pity that comment on the intellectual background of the Hellenistic themes is sometimes offered, sometimes not. Thus we read (319) that 'so much of Stoic psychology recalls Aristotle,' but we get no notion that the relation between Stoicism and Aristotelianism is a broad, important and controverted topic. Moreover, we get little inkling of the primacy of ethics in Hellenistic thought, especially in Epicureanism, nor of the reasons for that. Indeed, the reader might be excused for thinking that Epicurus' chief interest was in the philosophy of science or in science itself. He might also deduce that the 'disreputable' side of Epicureanism was an invention of the malicious, ancient and modern, although it is by no means certain that Epicurus himself would have agreed with that unworldly but humanistic reading. As for Long and Sedley's version of Epicurean theology (in this case we are warned by the authors that their thesis is unusual), I do not think that I will be the only one to find it perverse. Epicurus' Gods are not 'thought-constructs' like Centaurs or giants (145-9).

The best parts of the book are on the Stoics (especially on matters of logic, semantics and physics, particularly causation), though *pneuma* gets short shrift (287-9), and Long and Sedley's admitted unwillingness to deal with the differing views of individual Stoics is a major difficulty here. But I should not be grudging. Professionals will learn a great deal from the close commentary and careful analysis of the selected texts, and Long and Sedley have made the 'principal texts available to the widest audience since classical antiquity,' as the blurbographer says. Despite the missing Cynics, Sceptics, etc., that is all true, and laudable — but how much better it might have been. Such a grand project will not, I fear, be attempted again for decades. But at least for students (I mean graduates as well as undergraduates) we can still look forward to the production, by other hands, of a simple source-book of basic texts: something useful for teaching purposes.

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DONALD M. MAcKINNON. *Themes in Theology*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press (for T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh) 1987. Pp. 243. Cdn$37.75; US$26.95. ISBN 0-567-09446-4.

Thirteen papers in theology and the philosophy of religion and two in politics, first published between 1975 and 1984, are collected in this extremely welcome addition to Professor MacKinnon's highly influential published work. It would not be appropriate to try to summarise them here, even if it were practical, since with their characteristic scale of thought, scholarly range, and literary power they are best read at first hand; indeed some, such as those on Kant and mortality, are classic examples of their kinds. But some of their themes are connected by arguments which can properly be pulled out, and the book provides an invaluable opportunity to discuss these: so long as this is not taken to imply that other aspects are less interesting or important. The themes include negative theology, involved in papers on the inexpressibility of God, Kant's philosophy of religion, and time and space; the Incarnation and Trinity, in articles on Teilhard's *Le Milieu Divin*, Crucifixion and Resurrection, Christology and Schillebeeckx' Christology, and Kenosis and self-limitation; and the British Idealists, metaphor in theology, mortality, power-politics and religious faith, and nuclear warfare.

'Negative' theology holds that we can say only what God is not, not what He is. Thus, theologians use negative expressions such as that God is 'infinite' love, in order for example to avoid identifying God with our necessarily limited notions of love, and so to prevent a kind of idolatry. But on MacKinnon's Kantian treatment, such statements can at the same time point beyond themselves, as merely negative, to God. Perhaps so stated the theory can be described as 'indexical,' as distinct from 'foundational.' At any rate, these statements thus concern what we believe 'as a matter of faith,' rather than know, 'ultimately to be the case.'

A difficulty is that this theory involves a step from 'it' to 'Him,' that is from 'ultimate reality' to 'God,' which is presumably a matter of religious faith, and so is not justified by this Kantian treatment. The Kantian argument is from ordinary experience to ultimate reality, and that experience could be anyone's, not necessarily a believer's. It purports to show that ordinary morality and experience presuppose certain beliefs such as freedom and causality, that we cannot not believe in them, and that they are subjects of belief not knowledge. Kant thus has a metaphysical faith that we can indicate the subject matter of certain statements we cannot know are true, yet cannot question as we might empirical claims. Since this metaphysical faith is not necessarily theological, the success of a Kantian theology would depend on added assumptions based on religious faith. It is a matter for religious faith that an infinite love is necessarily divine (rather than non-theological). Perhaps MacKinnon could readily show there is in the end no need to justify his connecting these different sorts of faith, or even to distinguish them. But meantime this does seem to need discussing.

Apparently then it is on metaphysical, not religious, grounds that MacKinnon can allege that theological statements point not only away from what God is not, but also to what He is; that although they speak only of what is not this or that object, not in this or that place and so on, they also somehow succeed in indicating something inexpressible; and that as so indicating, they have a meaning, and can be believed or disbelieved. Likewise it is metaphysical faith in the theory, as ruling out 'foundational' description, that meets the objection that while it distinguishes theological discourse as negative and indexical, it leaves underspecified the other side of the distinction, and thus the distinction itself.

Kant's argument is that we cannot not believe certain things. But religious faith is apparently not like that, since for example it is commanded, and commands can be disobeyed. So what is this faith that we can choose or leave alone, and what is choosing it like? MacKinnon describes Kant as 'blind to prayer': can we be blind to faith also? Suppose for example what is believed on faith can be indicated but not expressed: is it impossible also to express the nature of believing, or even (since it is not propositional) to indicate it?

It is not of course that MacKinnon objects to describing religious faith. (One might object for example that to assume that such faith is not presupposed in, or part of, common human experience is to imply the contradiction that it is special, and thus for cognoscenti, and hence for knowledge not faith: so that faith is either special and incoherent, or general and ex hypothesi not faith.) Rather it is that while he rejects any suggestion that faith consists in blind obedience to whoever happens to command, and acceptance of his or her statements without testing or adequate comprehension, he does not try to say what such faith is once this suggestion has been discounted.

Perhaps, however, faith as a believing disposition, for instance, can be analysed so far as to yield some understanding of the related sorts of actions, feelings, habits and indeed beliefs (and possibly even of reasons why people cultivate or destroy faith, means by which they acquire or lose it, and causes of its growth or decay). And in fact the studies of metaphor, tragedy and humility and the other themes contribute greatly to such an understanding. For example, they call for enlivened metaphor; and perhaps the cliche comparing faith in God to trust in a friend, for instance, can still help unravel the seamless web of unanalysed religious faith by reminding us of basic conditions for that trust, such as ignorance rather than knowledge (of where the friend has been for the past hours or days, for instance). Such an analysis of the disposition would be consistent with negative analysis of the propositions, premised as it is on ignorance confessed rather than knowledge claimed. I cannot know that human experience is not ultimately tragic, for example, but my recognition (which is both a disposition and a confession) of such ignorance is a prior condition and part of the faith that reality, beyond conceiving, is not tragic. His discussion of tragedy thus illustrates the connection for MacKinnon between Kantian metaphysical faith and religious faith, if not also the ultimate resistance of religious faith to analysis. Again, since acknowledging ignorance

also implies humility, faith so far analysed parallels, or perhaps reciprocates, the humility of God before His creation.

MacKinnon's discussion of God's humility is particularly original and poignant, and of the last consequence for theology. Its object is to defend the traditional doctrines of the Incarnation and Trinity by showing they are explained and required by a theology of *kenōsis* and self-limitation. But in addition it could well imply also, for example, that pride is not arrogant disobedience so much as obedience ('the most insidious temptation') to a greater power with a view to sharing that power, by as it were 'joining the system'; and thus that pacifism is not merely one vaguely 'Christian' attitude among others, but follows from a rigorous theology, on which it depends for its Christian meaning.

To finish, two somewhat carping comments. In discussing the grounds for religious belief, the book does not shrink from the suggestion that perseverance in holding beliefs is evidence for their truth, as in the example of believing Jews in Auschwitz. But while it does not treat believing as self-validating, that is, as establishing the truth of the beliefs merely by asserting them, or treat the beliefs as exempt from standards of evidence applying without compromise elsewhere, it does not attempt to explain the suggestion, or to find any means to distinguish it from such treatment. Also, despite the revision claimed for this edition, several pages still need many corrections in punctuation. But these two very minor criticisms should only highlight the towering achievements of the book generally, its searching authority and immense interest both for new readers and for the many already incalculably in debt to this author. No one concerned for truth in fundamental matters can afford to ignore it. It could scarcely be more highly recommended.

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In this book Macnamara attempts to find a place for logic in psychology that does not result in psychologism (the view, most vigorously attacked by Frege, that logic is the study of the mind: a subbranch of psychology). Macnamara argues for a middle position between psychologism and the current understanding, by psychologists, according to which logic is a learned discipline

which can serve as a 'quarry from which to extract hypotheses for psycho-logical experiment, a standard against which to measure general performance' (3) or can serve the normative role of providing a check on the validity of conclusions. The middle position rejects that logic is a learned discipline like 'Latin or a flawless knowledge of the history of the Hapsburg family' (5) and it rejects that logic is the study of the mind such that its basic principles are discovered by psychological investigation.

Instead, the middle position accepts that we can know and employ the laws of logic without acquiring them through empirical generalization. The relation between logic and psychology that can embody this feature of the laws of logic without falling into psychologism is to be found in 'the idea that a logic constitutes a competence theory for a part of cognitive psychology' (22). The logic which Macnamara believes enters into a general theory of cog-nitive psychology is, as he carefully points out, not the formal logical systems of the professional logician but the logic that reflects a basic logical intuition which is common to all adults and which is present to some degree in child-ren such that preschool children are not 'alogical or nonlogical in the sense that the majority of them are illiterate' (2). It is this basic logical intuition or 'everyday logic' that is an essential part of a general theory of cognition.

Macnamara succinctly spells out this competence-theory thesis as follows: 'The mind in part of its functioning applies the principles of [a] logic. It is this that entitles us to say that to each ideal logic (true to intuition) there cor-responds a mental logic. By *mental logic* I mean (1) linguistic resources in the mind sufficient to express propositions, (2) the ability to understand sentences formed with those linguistic resources, and (3) the ability to grasp inferences among such sentences. ... I can attribute logical errors to performance fac-tors, that is, to factors other than the mental logic whose principles are vio-lated by the errors. The distinction between competence and performance gives us a glimpse of how we might account for logic's errorless ideals and the real-ity of logical blunders in a single theory of the mind' (22).

This thesis is worked out more fully in chapter 2. In chapters 3 through 8, Macnamara examines a number of specific psychological problems on which this thesis has an impact (e.g., psychology and name learning, self reference, basic-level sortals, etc.). In the last chapter, he briefly sketches the type of science that he envisages cognitive psychology to be by discussing some rele-vant issues in philosophy of science.

This book is well written and the arguments are compelling. It is an im-portant reexamination of a longstanding problem and it offers a well-developed and well-argued new approach to its resolution. Its value, however, extends well beyond the confines of the author's immediate concerns: the proper place of logic in cognitive psychology. It extends into sociobiological theorizing and into literal evolutionary epistemology. Literal evolutionary epistemology is the attempt to place epistemological theorizing *within* a biological evolution-ary theoretical framework in contrast to evolutionary epistemologies that un-derstand epistemology by *analogy* with biological evolution. On a literal evolutionary epistemology, cognitive abilities are in part a function of the ge-

netically based neurophysiology of the organism. And, this neurophysiologi-
cal basis of cognitive abilities is a product of biological evolution. Hence, cog-
nitive abilities are also, in part, a product of biological evolution.

An example that springs quickly to mind in this context, and that has been
exploited by Michael Ruse (*Taking Darwin Seriously* [Oxford: Basil Black-
well 1986], 155-60), is human reasoning: our logical intuition. Ruse's argu-
ment is that the sentential calculus captures, in a formal system, the rules of
thought that contribute to our deliberations and *behaviour*. And, because they
contribute to our deliberations and behaviour, they affect our survival. Con-
sequently, if everyday logic is genetically based, as he believes the evidence
indicates it is, then everyday logic is as much a product of evolution as the
number of toes on our feet. Hence, the nature and content of human know-
ledge is, in part, a product of evolution. This is an example of the general the-
sis of a literal evolutionary epistemology. Another part of the explanation of
the nature and content of human knowledge is learning from experience and
by the acquisition of culturally transmitted information. These aspects fall,
in part, into the domain of cognitive psychology and it is on this side of the
larger theorizing about human knowledge that Macnamara's book makes an
important contribution by offering a promising account of logic, as intuition,
within cognitive psychology.

In summary, this is an extremely interesting book on a very important topic
and its value extends beyond the scope of the issues discussed in the book
to broader questions about the foundations of human knowledge. I found this
book challenging and informative, and I highly recommend it to those interest-
ed in cognitive psychology and epistemology.

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CARL MITCHAM and ALOIS HUNING, eds. *Philosophy and Technology II:
Information Technology and Computers in Theory and Practice*. Boston:
Reidel 1986. Pp. xxii + 352. US$59.00. ISBN 90-277-1975-6.

PAUL DURBIN, ed. *Philosophy and Technology III: Technology and Respon-
sibility*. Boston: Reidel 1987. Pp. ix + 392. US$24.00. ISBN 90-277-2415-6.

These two volumes consist of selected papers from the 1983 and 1985 inter-
national conferences of the Society for Philosophy and Technology held in
New York and the Netherlands, respectively. Even though they have differ-

ent themes, their subject is still the same — technology and its relationship with society and the human being — which makes it pertinent to review both together. The volumes also share a core of common authors.

The first volume, devoted to information technology and computers, is divided into three parts, preceded by Carl Mitcham's introduction and concluded with an annotated bibliography. Part one focuses on the metaphysical and epistemological aspect of information. It includes papers by Sybille Kramer-Friedrich, Paul Levinson, Friedrich Rapp, Günter Ropohl, and Werner Strombach. Even though there are important differences in the points of view of these authors, they all agree in stressing the limitations of our understanding of information and the need to develop a more complex philosophical and epistemological approach.

Part two is dedicated to philosophical analyses of the interactions between human beings and computers. The consensus here is against the idea that computers can think. Computers cannot even do simple arithmetic, argues Fred Dretske; 'they merely manipulate electrical impulses to which human beings have assigned certain numerical meanings' (9). Arguing about the differences between human experts and expert systems, Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus find that 'expert systems are never as good as experts' (121). Patrick Heelan emphasizes the peculiarities of human and machine perception. Even though there are some similarities between them, he argues, human perception is qualitatively different. In his words, 'humans, like machines, process the physical embodiments of algorithmic terms, but humans, unlike machines, can come to articulate in a natural language the symbolic or algorithmic systems they embody' (153). And Earl MacCormac concentrates on the computer as metaphor, arguing that 'a careful examination of the similarities and dissimilarities of minds and computers, prevents the all too easy identification of the two' (169).

Part three is devoted to analyses of the social, political, and moral implications of computers. The great majority of authors in this part express serious reservations about the role of information technologies in society. Nathanaiel Laor and Joseph Agassi, Daniel Cérézuelle, Mitcham, and Walther Zimmerli agree in stressing the dangers of an uncontrolled and irresponsible increase in the power of computers. Albert Borgmann and Edmund Byrne likewise emphasize the role of computers and automation in exacerbating the social problem of unemployment. Borgmann and Langdon Winner reject the pretended revolutionary character of current computer technology and emphasize its alienating features. Some contributors (Mitcham and Zimmerli) further call for certain controls in computer development and application.

On the opposite side is Wolfgang Schirmacher's argument in regard to the question of privacy in a computer society. Schirmacher ascribes to information technology a certain emancipating role. In his view, computers lead to a society where people 'will no longer need protection' and will live and show themselves 'openly, just as everything in the world shows itself' (266). A similar social utopianism, though based on a different argument, is held out by Hans Lenk. Like many other social utopias, both ignore real social contradictions

and the active role of people in the process that leads to a new social order, and project certain imaginative aspects of human life into a magic demiurge. In this case such a demiurge is found in computer and information technology. However, even though Schirmacher's arguments are the most audacious and provocative, his criticism tries to go beyond the limits of the present social and political order toward what he considers a more humane society.

The second book, focusing on responsibility and technology, is divided into six parts, again opening with what amounts to a general introduction by Mitcham and concluding with his annotated bibliography. Part one, dedicated to the general relationship between technology and responsibility, consists of two papers. Mitcham's historico-philosophical introduction points out that 'in their earliest forms the notion of what we now call responsibility and the technical activities of making and using artifacts were seldom related' (3). It was with the increase of technological power that there took place the increase of 'legal, social, professional, religious, and moral responsibilities in conjunction with various technical activities' (3). A second general paper by Maarten Coolen is devoted to what he calls the 'pragmatic paradox' that appears when the development of technology is such that its responsible use is more necessary than ever but the coodinate development of society seems to undermine the possibility of such practice. Three major philosophies of responsibility are then indentified: instrumentalist, transcendentalist, and dialectical.

Part two is devoted to responsibility and the autonomy of technology. It includes papers by Gilbert Hottois, John Jalbert, Joseph Pitt, and Willem Vanderburg. Jalbert, Pitt, and Vanderburg agree, with different nuances, in rejecting the existence of such a phenomenon as autonomous technology, understood as something wholly outside human control. According to Vanderburg, who tries to clarify Ellul's argument on this issue, Ellul never claims that modern technology, understood as 'thinking about and discourse on technique' (122), could be a strictly autonomous phenomenon. Hottois and Vanderburg also argue for a new ethics of non-power as an alternative to the ethics of power based on the acceptance of doing everything technology makes feasible.

Part three is devoted to responsibility in medicine and biotechnology. Kurt Bayertz, Anne Donchin, and Schirmacher stress the necessity of increased responsibility in the development of gene technology. Donchin and Schirmacher, in particular, reject the commercial use that has taken place. Both Bayertz and Schirmacher agree that the possibility of a genetic transformation of human nature, as Bayertz says, is 'an indication that the genetic constitution of man is a part of nature that like any other part of nature can be changed or manipulated through technical intervention' (144). However, contrary to Schirmacher, Bayertz is not too optimist about the possibility of a radical 'improvement' of humanity. Thus, in his view, 'the lofty claim that *homo sapiens* become *homo autofabricus* is surely exaggerated' (144), while Schirmacher maintains the same optimistic position he has in relation to information technology. Gene technology will lead to the creation of a 'new human being' and therefore, a new humankind free from egoism and aggression. In counterpoint, George Guilmet and David White describe the existence of incontinence in

the application of biomedical technology among the Puyallup Indians of Washington State.

Part four contains two papers on religion and technology. Egbert Schuurman, on the basis of a Calvinist reformational philosophy, provides a critical insight on modern technological culture. Anthony Wesson and Ronald Brown offer a second negative evaluation of modern technology. It brings, they maintain, 'more malign possibilities' than 'earlier forms of technology' and threatens 'to reduce the person to an appendage of the machine' (243).

Part five is an attempt to apply responsibility to diverse specific technical problems. It contains papers by Jacqueline Cramer, John Crane, Paul Durbin, Ted Lockhart, and Kristin Shrader-Frechette. Cramer raises the question of the social role of Dutch fresh-water ecologists in environmental policies. Crane analyses two contrasting tendencies in risk assessment research: risk assessment research as 'an ethically neutral disinterested enquiry' and as 'a captive body of knowledge put at the disposal of limited parochial interpretations of the evaluative missions' (302). Durbin sketches what he calls a 'comprehensive philosophy of engineering' and its relationship with philosophy of technology. Lockhart raises the question of 'uncertainty ... as an ethically significant aspect of the [engineering] decision-making situation' (330). And Shrader-Frechette discusses the pros and cons in the arguments about risk-cost-benefit analysis.

The two reviewed volumes give a fresh and broad insight into the relationship of modern technology, human beings, and contemporary, highly developed society. However, the amazing thing is that in analyzing such a relationship, all authors completely ignore the fact that the great majority still live in a part of the world where modern technology is far from being the determinant factor.

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TORIL MOI. *Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory.* London and New York: Methuen Press 1985. Pp. xxi + 206. US$11.95. ISBN 0-416-35370-3.

Sexual/Textual Politics, the first book-length introduction to contemporary feminist critical practices, aims to give an accurate, comprehensive account of 'the methods, principals, and politics' (xiii) at work within the field, as well as to develop a critical presentation of the debates which animate it. But what

Moi claims to be an introduction, accessible to both general readers and students of literature, is in fact an intensely polemical interpretation of two very different bodies of work.

Moi organizes her book in terms of an extremely problematic opposition: between 'Anglo-American Criticism' (itself a questionable synthesis) on the one hand, and 'French Feminist Theory' on the other. The book's very structure reflects a distinction between criticism and theory which Moi's introductory remarks deny. For although she proposes 'to present the two main approaches to feminist literary theory, the Anglo-American and the French, through detailed discussion of the most representative figures on each side' (xiii), thereby implying that both groups are engaged in the same *theoretical* enterprise, the respective titles of the book's two parts, 'Anglo-American *Criticism*' and 'French Feminist *Theory*' (emphasis mine) undercuts the opposition Moi wishes to uphold. The consequences are important, because Moi, who assumes the existence of a symmetry she never examines, employs theory as the lever through which to critique Anglo-American feminist criticism. 'Criticism' is to the Anglo-Americans as 'theory' is to France, and the theoretically naive Anglo-Americans are perpetually criticized for, and shown to be deficient with respect to, the work of their philosophically sophisticated French sisters. Moi ignores the fact that the two fields are vastly different, produced by diverse national and linguistic identities, and in response to distinctive kinds of historical and institutional demands.

Part One outlines the development of feminist literary criticism in the United States and England from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Discussions of the work of such influential authors as Kate Millett, Mary Ellman, Ellen Moers, Elaine Showalter, Sandra Gilbert, Susan Gubar, Annette Kolodny, and Myra Jehlen helps to situate the field's major developments, from the early 'Images of Women' criticism ('the search for female stereotypes in the work of male writers and in the critical categories employed by male reviewers commenting on women's work' [32]), to the development of 'Gynocritics' in the mid 1970s. This 'woman-centered' approach, which studies the work of women writers and 'seeks to discover a distinctively female tradition in literature' (52), has now become the dominant trend in Anglo-American feminist criticism.

Moi's critique rightly emphasizes the fundamental affiliation between this version of feminist literary criticism and humanistic thought. By exploring the relationship between 'feminist critical readings and the often unconscious theoretical and political assumptions that inform them' (1), she shows that 'the traditional humanism they represent is in effect part of patriarchal ideology. At its centre is the seamlessly unified self — either individual or collective — which is commonly called "man" ' (8). This is an extremely important point. One of the strengths of Moi's book is its attention to the subtle links between feminist aesthetics and patriarchal thinking. For as Moi points out, Anglo-American critics are alike in presupposing an essential nature of feminine difference and a correlative identity of women's writing, and thereby risk complicity with the empiricist and masculinist varieties of criticism they seek to resist. Moi's treatment of French feminist theory highlights the ways in which it cor-

rects these patriarchal biases, and thereby may rescue feminist criticism for feminist political practice.

Whereas Anglo-American feminist critics study the work of women writers and search for a uniquely feminine identity, French feminist theorists write mainly about male authors and would seem to eschew any notion of it: at first glance each group appears to be the inverse of the other. Part Two, which begins with a brief history of French feminist thought, primarily discusses the work of Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva. With the possible exception of Kristeva, Moi makes the same basic criticism: while praising their strong anti-humanist critique of identity, she locates the moments when each reinscribes a universal, feminine 'essence.'

Moi's treatment of Cixous is paradigmatic. She first applauds Cixous' effort 'to undo logocentric ideology ... to hail the advent of a new feminine language that ceaselessly subverts those patriarchal binary schemes where logic colludes with phallocentrism in an attempt to oppress and silence women' (105). But Cixous' work is 'riddled with contradictions: every time a Derridean idea is evoked, it is opposed and undercut by a vision of woman's writing steeped in the very metaphysics of presence she is out to unmask' (110). Cixous insists, for example, on a distinctively feminine 'libidinal economy' characterised by spontaneous generosity, and a feminine writing marked by its privileging of the voice. In each case, Moi points out how such an inscription of a feminine identity perpetuates rather than displaces patriarchal discourse and politics.

Moi's summaries of French feminist theory lack the nuance of their author's complex elaboration. Work that cries out to be read as both literature and philosophy — perhaps distinguishing a new genre of twentieth-century women's writing — is reduced to a mere collection of signifieds, as if the text's meaning were not also a matter of its context and style. Thus Moi ignores the ways in which words such as 'the feminine' and 'woman' take on multiple, even contradictory shades of meaning, so that they refer not to some pre-given identity, but rather to a necessarily *double* textual practice: one which lays waste any version of stable identity at the same time that a feminine specificity is posited and affirmed. What is signifigant about Cixous, in this regard, is not that she contradicts herself, but the logic by virtue of which such contradictions are inevitable, and an acknowledgment of the kind of reading they demand. The most important flaw of Moi's book is perhaps its failure to address this crucial, textual domain. The unfortunate consequence may be that potential readers, unfamiliar with feminist criticism and theory, may take Moi's oversimplified summaries at face value and thus be led away from an encounter with some of the most challenging but rewarding theoretical writing of our time.

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THOMAS NAGEL. *The View from Nowhere*. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1986. Pp. 244. Cdn$27.95; US$19.95. ISBN 0-19-503668-9.

The 'view from nowhere' is objective knowledge, of which scientific knowledge is a paradigm, but which of course derives from the human being's natural capacity for thinking objectively. This 'objective capacity,' writes Nagel, 'is a complete mystery' for which 'there is no credible explanation ... in terms of anything more basic' (78). All that can be said is that apart from being ordinarily subjective, each one of us possesses, or rather 'is,' an 'objective self' which is to be conceived as 'the subject of a perspectiveless conception of reality' (63-4). To be more precise, 'what happens when I consider the world objectively is that an aspect of my identity comes into prominence which was previously concealed and which produces a sense of detachment from the world. It then comes to seem amazing that I am in fact attached to it at any particular point' (65). He does agree that this 'aspect of my identity' is not really a 'distinct part of my mind' and that even referring to an 'objective self' is not really 'innocent.' Nevertheless, the essential purpose of this work is to 'explore' the 'operations' of this 'objective self.'

At this point, it is perhaps useful to emphasize that the basic framework within which Nagel is himself operating is the body/mind framework which he spontaneously assumes to be the unavoidable ultimate framework. This conditions his analysis throughout. The first three chapters concern problems of the relationship between body and mind. One instance of how the framework conditions his analyses is Nagel's acceptance of the seventeenth-century distinction between so-called 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities. This is, in effect, acknowledging the deep divide between body and mind. Expressions of this distinction occur throughout the work (14, 75-7, etc.). And since the distinction is a consequence of the fundamental separation between body and mind, it is natural that he should hold this problem to be virtually insoluble. But conversely, holding firmly to the distinction as ultimate leads Nagel to reject both the 'reductionist program that dominates current work in the philosophy of mind' as 'completely misguided' (16), as well as 'idealism with regard to the mind. The world is not my world, or our world' (26).

This leaves Nagel with the traditional Cartesian framework, but without Descartes' reification of 'mind' (34-5). Alluding to his own tentative panpsychism in earlier papers, and holding that in fact 'the correct model has never been thought of' (30), he himself opts for a cautious 'dual aspect theory' because of 'the apparent intimacy of the relation between the mental and its physical conditions,' and because of his own 'attachment to the metaphysics of substance and attribute' (30). It is within this dual aspect theory that he situates personal identity (35ff). Holding, 'with mild exaggeration' that 'I am my brain' (40), and holding that the 'concept of the self' is 'something essentially subjective' (40), it follows that personal identity is the subjective or mentalistic aspect of the functioning of the brain, which itself is the material aspect of this dual-aspect theory. This position leads him to reformulate his earlier

panpsychism as an expression of the problem of the unity of consciousness in a brain (50).

Having sketched out a tentative framework, himself indicating many of the difficulties involved in it, Nagel is now free to pursue the phenomenological descriptions of 'the objective self' and its 'operations.' Chapter IV has to do with 'the objective self' and the curious fact of its attachment to what Nagel refers to as 'a mere *person*' (55). Since this 'objective self' is capable of understanding 'the world as simply existing, seen from no particular perspective' (56), as what in fact '*is* the world' which 'contains everybody, and ... contains not only their bodies but their minds' (56), Nagel is here operating a crucial ontological inversion which is a direct consequence of the dual-aspect theory, together with the double rejection of metaphysical materialism and idealism. Ordinarily, the problem is to formulate conditions for the possibility of conceptual understanding, which is to say the use of language as a requirement for objective knowledge. But since Nagel holds that conceptual understanding is a 'complete mystery' and must therefore simply be taken for granted, what he is, in effect, doing is transposing his standpoint to that of objectivity as the central problem of his metaphysical analyses. From this standpoint, the problem of how generalization is possible is transformed into the paradox of how the individuality of 'a mere person' can be 'attached' to the basic fact of the operations of objective knowledge. And so we have the non-innocent inversion of a problem of how a 'thinking subject' can conceive the 'centerless world,' to a different and perhaps misguided formulation of the same problem in terms of how 'the objective self' can think this world 'through the person' (60). In point of fact, the 'austere, universal objective self' (63) becomes the presupposed ultimate foundation of Nagel's metaphysics. Not, it must be emphasized, as an entity, but as a paradoxical capacity of particular subjects. However, the metaphysical consequence of viewing the problem from this angle is to depreciate the very source from which this mysterious capacity derives: the 'mere person.'

Chapter V is concerned with knowledge, and not surprisingly Nagel's analysis is 'in terms of an epistemology that is significantly rationalist' (70, 82ff). But since a full-fledged rationalism would lead, ultimately, to the metaphysics of idealism, Nagel tempers his rationalism with an essential scepticism (72-3), of which the more positive aspect is the long argument holding 'that reality extends beyond the reach of possible human thought' (95ff). The upshot of this general position is to define the human situation as that of 'creatures with a glimpse of the view *sub specie aeternitatis*' (88). Chapter VI concerns thought and reality, and in keeping with a purely epistemological rationalism, Nagel is led to the quasi-Kantian (cf. 101) position referred to above: that 'the world may be inconceivable to *our* minds' (91). There seems to be here a very precarious, if not impossible, balancing act between the 'glimpse of the view *sub specie aeternitatis*' and this Kantian assertion of a radical ontological scepticism. It seems doubtful that one can really have it both ways.

The latter part of the book, chapters VI to XI, deals with problems of freedom, of value and ethics, and of the meaning of life and death. Given Nagel's

basic framework, it follows that there can be no satisfactory solution to the problems of free will (112) and responsibility (120ff). All we can do is 'to develop as complete an objective view of ourselves as we can' (127) by the use of 'the strategy of objective tolerance,' whereby I will act in terms of 'my personal perspective that will not be *rejected* from a larger point of view' (130ff). In effect, this means that 'the objective self' includes an 'objective will' (134-6). The consequences of this position are developed in the chapters on value (VIII) and on ethics (IX).

Nagel's uneasy dialectic between the subjective self and the objective self gives rise to foreseeable antinomies in the last two chapters. The meaning of life is what one can make of it for oneself (215), though we must also recognize that there is a basic absurdity in the human situation. In keeping with the basic framework, this dual position is attributed to the 'unqualified commitment' to one's personal aims coupled with the knowledge that from the objective standpoint one's 'life (is) objectively insignificant' (218). This should lead, according to Nagel, to a 'humility' which 'falls between nihilistic detachment and blind self-importance' (222), though the necessary connection involved in this inference is as obscure as the relationship between subjective and objective selves. Similarly, from the subjective standpoint, death is an unqualified evil (224-5), though the objective standpoint tells us that 'the vanishing of this individual from the world is no more remarkable or important than his highly accidental appearance in it' (229).

This work expresses some of the consequences of much of contemporary philosophy. But its source in a metaphysical framework which takes for granted the fundamental separation between subjective self and objective self raises the question of the validity of that framework itself. Perhaps its main virtue is to implicitly raise once again the traditional problems of metaphysics after the collapse of metaphysical idealism and metaphysical materialism.

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This book is a study of Wittgenstein as a 'religious personality' and of the role of ethical and religious convictions in his philosophy. While Nieli rightly stresses the importance of these aspects of Wittgenstein's thought, he only gives glancing attention to the rest of his work. As a result he produces an interpre-

tation of Wittgenstein as a religious visionary who chose to express his views by writing philosophy.

Nieli sets the scene with a discussion of Carnap's critique of Heidegger's metaphysics, a critique inspired by Carnap's reading of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Carnap ridiculed Heidegger's use of the term 'the Nothing,' arguing that it typifies the metaphysician's evocative but meaningless use of language. Nieli defends Heidegger's usage, arguing that 'Nothing' refers to a 'derealization-depersonalization' experience. In such an experience, one is alienated from both one's environment and one's body. A severe case is literally dreadful: one is engulfed by a mood in which our normal sense of self is entirely gone, the world utterly unreal. Nieli contends that Heidegger's 'Nothing' is directly descended from the Dark Night of the Christian mystic tradition, the purgative experience of mystic flight which destroys the self-love keeping us within the profane world, preparing the soul for the Beatific Vision. This lengthy prelude provides the background for Nieli's interpretation of the *Tractatus*. For Nieli's central contention in his reading of the *Tractatus* is that it has the form of a mystical *via negativa*. In other words, he takes the *Tractatus* to be a characterisation of the profane world which mysticism transcends. 'Far from being, as both Russell and Carnap thought, an unitegrated work, a treatise on logic with mystic themes sprinkled "here and there" (or perhaps only in the last pages), the *Tractatus* is in its entirety, so conceived from the first lines, an explication and interpretation of an experience of mystic flight' (69). In mystic flight, the self becomes disembodied and one is absorbed into another realm, altogether beyond space, time and matter. Because this realm is so utterly different from the mundane world, it cannot be described in language; to attempt to do so is a profanation. Nieli draws on an abundance of quotations from the literature on mysticism to illustrate parallels between Wittgenstein's mysticism and the mystical tradition.

Nieli has no trouble in making a good case for taking Wittgenstein's mysticism seriously. What is more problematic is his inability or unwillingness to discuss the issues in the philosophy of logic and language which occupy the bulk of the *Tractatus*, the topics which had occupied Wittgenstein since reading Russell and Frege. As a result, he never gives us the close reading of the *Tractatus* and the *1914-16 Notebooks* which might substantiate his claim that the entire book is an 'explication and interpretation of an experience of mystic flight.' The closest Nieli comes to explaining this lacuna is in the Preface, where he says that the *Tractatus*' 'logical system was instrumentally subordinate to its higher purpose' (xii). As a result, he treats the fact that Wittgenstein wrote a logico-philosophical treatise rather than Heideggerian metaphysics as though it were purely a matter of Wittgenstein's taste for austerity. Nieli justly criticises those who separate Wittgenstein's mysticism from his logical analysis and then concentrate on the logic. But in concentrating on the mysticism and summarily treating the analytic work as instrumental, he too fails to give a unified account of the *Tractatus*. If the majority of interpretations have underestimated the *Tractatus*' mysticism, treating it as if it were an afterthought, Nieli commits the opposite error, regarding the analysis as merely a means

to an end. If we are to understand the *Tractatus* we must see how the argument and the vision of that book are interwoven. For the *Tractatus* does not simply make use of logic in order to show its limitations; it is also the product of a deep respect for the power of reason.

The remainder of the book presents Nieli's summary dismissal of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. He tells the reader that after Wittgenstein wrote the *Tractatus* he came to see that the time for Tractarian prophecy was past. Instead, he became a 'rabbinical' figure, taking the language of the common man as his scripture and accepting the 'overall world-view of the common man against the corrupting inroads of a positivist-oriented intelligentsia' (240). He also tells us that Wittgenstein introduced the concept of a language-game in order to bring God back into the world: 'Wittgenstein came to realize that the world cannot do without the gods, and thus a manner was sought to bring a sense of enchantment back into the world. This, it would seem, Wittgenstein hoped to achieve not only through a return to the living discourse of the common people, but, in addition, through participation in this discourse in the mode of play. A new *Lebenswelt* was to emerge which would possess all the enchanted magic of a game' (254). On the other hand, Nieli characterises Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mind as 'hardly distinguishable from conventional behaviourism' (212) and claims that it receives 'systematic elaboration and further development' in Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*. The private language argument is disposed of in a few pages, as Nieli thinks it depends entirely on the claim that one can never trust one's experiential memory. The extreme behaviourism which Nieli imputes to Wittgenstein is not only highly implausible, it is also entirely at odds with Wittgenstein's later respect for ordinary language — not to mention his extended discussions of the nature of experience. So one is hardly surprised when Nieli explains this inconsistency in terms of Wittgenstein's struggle for sanity. On this reading, Wittgenstein obsessively focused his attention on external, practical affairs, in order to prevent himself 'from slipping into [his] own inner, private world, and the madness that threatens to engulf [him] there' (228).

In short, Nieli takes Wittgenstein's later philosophy to be a failed attempt to redeem our society from moral and spiritual corruption. Given this interpretation, it is hardly surprising that he can see almost nothing of value in Wittgenstein's later work. But Wittgenstein's aim in his later philosophy was more modest: to combat philosophical preconceptions. His appeal to ordinary language was motivated by a distrust of the motives which lead us to create new languages in philosophy, just as his apparent behaviourism was a response to the dangers of Cartesianism. In all his psychobiographical speculation, Nieli never pauses to consider why Wittgenstein never published any of his later philosophy. Perhaps it was to save himself the trouble of having such readers.

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ROY W. PERRETT. *Death and Immortality*. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. Pp. ix + 202. US$38.50. ISBN 90-247-3440-1.

The most striking feature of this book's wide learning is Roy Perrett's familiarity with Sanskrit texts on death and immortality. In welcome passages the author explains some intriguing Indian arguments. He also discusses such varied thinkers as Aquinas, Hume, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, John Hick, Thomas Nagel, Terence Penelhum and Bernard Williams. The first four chapters include reasoning about the allegedly unique notion for a person of *my death*; the rationality of the fear of death; the relations between concepts of death and of the meaning of life. The last four chapters are entitled 'Immortality,' 'Disembodied Existence,' 'Resurrection' and 'Rebirth.' The latter contains much Hindu and Buddhist material of a readable kind and is followed up by a more specialized Appendix, 'Karma and the Problem of Suffering.'

Unfortunately, if Perrett is right about dominant strains in Hindu metaphysics, then the main Indian ideas about reincarnation are considerably less interesting than, say, Plato's. Hindu talk of 'Rebirth' will turn out to be too much like talk of a misnomer for Western purpose. For what is said to be reborn will not be personally continuous with someone who was living. At least this is so if most European ideas of personal continuity are followed. Here, of course, Perrett is to be thanked for putting intellectual honesty before his enthusiasm for Sanskrit thinkers. Now harsher things should be said.

A teeming antheap of philosophical issues may remind one of a brilliantly compounded symphony or of a series of increments leading to cacophony. When I study Perrett's words on a single issue about death or immortality, I can often find some exegesis and a technical discussion very useful. But his overflowing chapters can make such a horn of plenty come to resemble a dust of dry points. He does not deserve this treatment from his own hand.

Perrett throws some useful light on his philosophical conclusions: 'in each case I was careful to indicate that there are metaphysical and ethical costs to be counted ... This sort of concern with indicating the philosophical costs of a position is ... of course, a general feature of the methodology of this work ... Whether someone is willing to pay these costs will be up to that person and the reasonableness of the decision has to be judged holistically in terms of criteria like the overall coherence and explanatory power of the implied system of beliefs when compared with rival systems ... I have argued for a number of controversial arguments and theses ... proposed solutions to philosophical questions typically raise in turn yet other problems to be considered' (171-2). Surprisingly, there is no mention of Quine in the Bibliography. There is none of holism in the Index.

Perrett's procedure rests on the assumption that the most rational philosophers must accept their conclusions in the face of radical and (infinitely) interminable uncertainty. He holds that always, at each resting place, however well defended it may be against old arguments for earlier alternatives, good philosophy will discover impressive new arguments for changing any belief.

If this is so, it follows then, that Perrett's rational agent selects a philosophical view in the face of severe uncertainty about the strength of known counter-arguments, as well as in the face of radical uncertainty about presently unknown objections. If the probabilities of any point in question keep oscillating, there must then be a stable equivalent of (*high*) expected utilities to give a rationale to such takings of unbounded risks. The author, as was seen, mentions 'costs,' 'coherence' and 'explanatory power' where some would explicitly speak of utilities, positive and negative. Pages 174 to 179 are devoted to explanation and the doctrine of *Karma*. But here he is just one more thinker who somehow manages to deliver by the back door the contextually relevant type of *explaining*, which is that of providing a moral and religious *justification*, while he purports to be dwelling exclusively on other kinds, like causal chains and self-sustainers. If the doctrine of *Karma* — or the teaching of the Resurrection and the Last Judgment — provides a wise person with an almost uniquely plausible conclusion about life, as being *justified* and *redeemed*, there is some utility in the context for its kinds of explanatory power. Thus while the final chapter on Rebirth is the most unusual in the book, it looks highly confused on matters of relevant explanation.

The preceding discussions of Resurrection are often quite striking. Perrett gives his own reasons for believing the differing uses of the type-token distinction will make some claims about Resurrection invulnerable to former criticisms. The preservation of type-identity is said to fulfil many requirements for continuation: 'nominalistic scruples are misplaced because the type-token distinction has to be accepted by *everyone* ... Thus there is a dilemma here. If there is an adequate nominalist account of the ... distinction, then there can be no nominalistic objection to the resurrection theory using this distinction ... if no adequate nominalistic account of the type-token distinction can be given, then this is an objection to nominalism and not to the resurrection theory that utilizes the distinction' (147-8). Religious faith, one gathers, is to be propped up by adding a dogmatic secular faith in types! Such reasoning typifies many of the book's tokens of reflection. For it is good in reading *Death and Immortality* to find softer items like resurrection, rebirth and the meaning of life supported with tough-minded analysis. But the author's cleverness and broad studies do not always appear to be matched by a suitable taste or passion for the ultimate questions which he means to explore. In Chapter Four's treatment of the Meaning of Life the level of reflection is steadily buoyed up with passages from Tolstoy and with Perrett's direct responses to Tolstoy. The result is a truly consistent and moving chapter whose qualities are in keeping with the ideal of an admixture of logical concerns and Ultimate Concern about death and immortality.

But less satisfying, for example, is the discussion of 'the case of non-consenting necrophilia' in Chapter Three, 'The Fear of Death.' The author's related bout of pedantic capering on the banks of retrocausation may remind a reader of Aristophanes' portrayal of a philosopher in *The Clouds*. The text seems to totter between dignity and self-parody. Roy Perrett's *Death and Im-*

mortality is worth a philosopher of religion's owning. But it is almost a collector's item for devotees. It's rather like a rare tonic water to which one must add one's own gin.

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SHIRLEY R. PIKE. *Marxism and Phenomenology*. Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books 1986. Pp. 201. US$28.50. ISBN 0-389-20659-8.

There is a crisis in Marxist theory, a crisis that is no longer different and apart from the crises of science and capitalism. If a rational solution to this general crisis through a liberating praxis is possible, its theoretical articulation is more than problematic for any theory implicated and compromised by the crisis it claims to disclose and critique. Extricating Marxist theory from the general crisis is thus the task of a liberating praxis that still holds fast to the Marxian legacy. Such a commitment requires that the Marxian legacy must be retained as a critique that is radically historical on the basis of a philosophically developed understanding of being human.

For those who still struggle to retain the Marxian legacy while knowing that the theory must be extricated from the general crisis it expresses rather than critiques, *Marxism and Phenomenology* is a very important work. Of crucial import is Pike's argument that Husserl's phenomenology, unlike Hegel's, is a development of a critique. Hegel's phenomenology is the exposition of the dialectical development of supra-human reason. Such a standpoint places the expositor outside historical consciousness, and thus against the critique of alienation as developed by Marx. The philosophical-humanist standpoint of Marx is thus radically different from the scientific standpoint of Hegel. It is Pike's argument that Husserl shares Marx's position in opposition to Hegel: 'Husserl aims to make science philosophical whereas Hegel makes philosophy scientific' (41).

Although Marx articulated a philosophically prepared naturalism-humanism (being human as the creative-social appropriation of nature), he did not succeed in formulating a liberatory praxis whereby human beings could recover their being from the world of commodified objects. There is, to be sure, the theories of commodity fetishism and class consciousness, but the latter is especially Hegelian and heavily relies on the negation of the negation sleight of hand. This dialectic always operates behind the backs of the actors, with

the result that the Idea, not human being, recovers itself. Thus Marx reverted to the Being of the proletariat when projecting the way to the future beyond capitalism. The praxis of creative-social life is thereby subsumed by the ontological-dialectical unfolding of the Idea (the presuppositions of Capital unfolding in historical development), and this is precisely how Marxist theory will unfold to become part of the crisis of science-capitalism.

Husserl's phenomenology is a way of getting back to one-self, of tracing thoughts and intentions back to their original horizons. Husserl also develops this phenomenological way of recovering oneself from the occlusions of the objective world with a radical critique of the priority of the theoretical over the practical life. In addition Husserl shows that while the *cogito* constitutes the world and the object, access to objects is dependent upon their essences. Thus our consciousness of objects cannot be described without reference to the objects it aims at, and the intentional aims of consciousness are not kinds of knowledge. The world in its being is a center of intersubjective action. In this manner Husserl shows that reflection and knowledge are grounded in the intersubjective world of creative activity.

The difficulty in Husserl's later formulations of the phenomenology of the life-world arises from his insistence that theoretical activity, although derived, flows into the life-world as fulfillments of previous aims. He also insisted that this flow does not change the invariant structures of the life-world: subjectivity continues to shape the world 'through its concealed internal "method" ' (*Crisis*, 177). The claimed difference between transcendental subjectivity and its objectification in the world ('mankind') is supportable, therefore, only if transcendental subjectivity's concealed internal 'method' can be phenomenologically displayed or unconcealed. For Husserl this is the task of philosophy: to show 'that being human is teleological being and an ought-to-be, and that this teleology holds sway in each and every activity and project of an ego' (*Crisis*, 341).

Pike's proposed synthesis of Marx and Husserl is especially sensitive to the difficulties involved in developing a political analysis to further liberatory praxis and the recovery of human teleological being while, simulanteously, avoiding the pitfalls of reified theoretical praxis. It is here that her critique of Paci's Hegelian influenced phenomenological Marxism shines: 'any specific view [of what human life ought to be] would be difficult to reconcile with the Marxian idea that a post-revolutionary future cannot be delineated in terms of present conditions' (179). The contribution which Pike makes for a phenomenological Marxism is that such a synthesis would maintain the primacy of action and thus the openness of the future against all occluding objectivist reductions of human creativity, including those of Marxist theory, at the same time that it maintains 'the structural force of Marx's analysis of the social formations in capitalist society' (181).

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JAY F. ROSENBERG. *The Thinking Self*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1986. Pp. ix + 267. US$37.95. ISBN 0-87722-434-X.

This very dense and difficult albeit rewarding book is a sophisticated defence of a 'Mutuality Thesis' to the effect that conceptual representation of the world is possible only for self-conscious subjects of experience. Rosenberg develops this familiar Kantian thesis within a rather non-Kantian framework by drawing upon the resources of phenomenology, pragmatism and analytic philosophy. The result is a spirited and erudite meditation on the contemporary relevance of Kantian epistemology.

The core argument runs through chapters four to seven where Rosenberg begins by positing what he calls 'pure positional awareness' (PUP) — a being with an intentional awareness of objects who is explicitly not self-conscious or apperceptive. Contrary to first impressions, PUP does not violate the Mutuality Thesis because PUP does not represent the world conceptually. Concept use, for Rosenberg, is tied to the mastery of a natural language. The mental life of non-linguistic animals therefore constitutes Rosenberg's strongest case for PUP. A dog which is stalking its prey thus *non-conceptually represents* the world. However, employing the method of 'logical phenomenology,' we can use our concepts to illustrate that non-conceptual structure which is present in the dog's awareness of the world. We are entitled to do this in so far as these structural features of consciousness are behaviourally manifested by the stalking dog viewed as a teleological system interacting with its environment. Although the dog has no concept of a cat, it is conscious of the cat as something over and above a mere sensory impression. The dog does not give up its hunt when the cat disappears behind a tree. In some primitive sense, the dog believes the cat is still there.

This discussion of animal consciousness is important for two reasons. First, it deals effectively with an apparently strong counterexample to the Mutuality Thesis. Second, it sets the stage for the next major move in Rosenberg's argument which is to determine what must be *added* to PUP to transform it into an apperceptive consciousness. Rosenberg criticizes Sartre for treating reflective consciousness as if it had come into being *ex nihilo*. Any adequate account of reflective consciousness must represent it as developing out of some more primitive form of non-reflective consciousness. The non-conceptual intentional states of PUP are therefore the proto-structures from which apperceptive consciousness evolves (101).

Rosenberg claims that there are three grades of apperception. The first two grades involve fitting consciousness with a spatial and temporal perspective on the world plus an ability to report and remember its own sensory experiences. Rosenberg refers to an awareness of this sort as CHILD. However, full-blown self-consciousness arrives on the scene only with the third grade of apperception wherein CHILD acquires the ability to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical awarenesses or, more generally, between reality and appearance. The Mutuality Thesis follows in so far as this ability presup-

poses the possession of normative conceptual standards for appraising representations. Thus, what must be added to PUP to transform it into a self-conscious consciousness is *exactly* what must be added for PUP to conceptually represent an objective world order.

The argument for these latter claims is essentially a revamped version of Kant's Refutation of Idealism. This is one of the most interesting and most disappointing sections of the book. CHILD is an idealist, disposed to believe whatever is said to him. The crux of Rosenberg's argument is that the coherence of CHILD's perspectival world-picture will be destroyed once CHILD interacts with fully mature rational apperceptive intelligences who possess both perspectival and a-perspectival world-pictures. MOM and DAD, in other words, can report both how things seem to them and how things are independently of any point of view. CHILD can ascertain that MOM's a-perspectival reports almost always agree with DAD's a-perspectival reports. CHILD then comes to grasp that there *is* an a-perspectival point of view and that he is the subject of a personal series of experiences which need not correspond with the way things independently are (146-50).

This account is disappointing because it begs the question on two different levels. First, one of Rosenberg's professed aims is to explain how reflective consciousness evolves out of non-reflective consciousness. But on his account CHILD achieves self-consciousness only in interaction with other beings who are *already* apperceptive! Now, Rosenberg does say that the above account is really just a myth (150) and that his primary intention is not to give an etiological account of how self-consciousness is acquired. Still, he cannot have it both ways. Either a developmental account of the origins of self-consciousness is a desideratum or it is not. If it is not, his criticism of Sartre loses its force. If it is, Rosenberg appears guilty, like Sartre, of positing *ex nihilo* what he is trying to explain.

My second worry concerns Rosenberg's somewhat magical account of how CHILD renounces idealism by grasping that certain of MOM's and DAD's reports 'don't conflict,' and then bundling all these reports together to form his own a-perspectival world-picture. These a-perspectival reports are expressed using various concepts. But Rosenberg fails to explain how CHILD can even understand reports couched in concept-talk in the first place, and how an idealist can understand how another's reports can *conflict* with his own unless he *already* understands the distinction between perspectival and a-perspectival points of view.

Rosenberg discusses a multitude of other issues which lie outside the core argument of the book. There is a good deal of history of philosophy here, and Rosenberg is not one to shy away from some very unorthodox interpretations. At one point we read that the empiricist Hume claimed that we can know a priori that the self is not a substance (49); at another point that Descartes claimed the self is not intuitable (65)! There are also worthwhile discussions of anti-foundationalist epistemology, proper names and anaphoric pronouns.

It is a pity that Rosenberg's penchant for convoluted syntax and excessively jargonized prose renders his writing so inaccessible. The book deserves a wide audience. I doubt whether it will find one.

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STEPHEN SATRIS. *Ethical Emotivism*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987. Pp. xii + 201. US$48.50. ISBN 90-247-3413-4.

In the Preface, Stephen Satris writes that his book makes primary contributions in three overlapping categories: '(i) the history of ideas (and in particular the history of the idea of value) and moral philosophy in both continental and Anglo-American traditions, (ii) the identification and interpretation of ethical emotivism as one of the major twentieth-century ethical theories, and (iii) the evolution of a philosophically viable form of ethical emotivism as an alternative to utilitarianism and Kantianism' (vii). He addresses the first point mainly in Chapter I but also in Chapters III and V. Discussions of the second point, in which the author uses Stevenson as the principal exponent of ethical emotivism, are carried on throughout the book; elaboration of the third point occurs mostly, but not exclusively, in the final three chapters.

In his historical discussions Satris is concerned to distinguish two forms of ethical emotivism, that of Stevenson and that of the logical positivists, particularly Carnap and Ayer. He does this by examining their quite different historical roots. Concentrating on Stevenson he traces his thought back to beginnings in earlier German and Austrian philosophers — Lotze, Brentano, Meinong, Ehrenfels, Marty — whose ideas were brought to America in part by Münsterberg at Harvard and inspired Perry and, through him, Stevenson. This historical discussion, although brief, is both interesting and informative, helping to illuminate Stevenson's views and thus to deepen our knowledge of an episode in the history of recent ethical theory. The author's account of the other version of ethical emotivism is, however, less satisfactory. In pursuit of his aim of separating Stevenson's views as much as possible from those of Carnap and Ayer, to the detriment of the latter, he argues that their form of emotivism is neither the historical nor the theoretical expression of logical positivism in ethics. In support of his first contention he points out that certain other positivists — Schlick, Neurath, Kraft, and Menger — did not adopt emotivism. But to conclude from this that the emotivism of Carnap and Ayer

was not the pre-eminent outcome in ethics of the positivistic movement is to distort the historical facts. In support of his second claim Satris maintains that the proper ethical implication of positivism is naturalism rather than emotivism. Given the central importance of the verification principle to positivistic epistemology, such a thesis, while arguable, is far from persuasive. To conclude, as Satris does, that, from the point of view of positivism, both Carnap and Ayer are 'value-theoretical renegades' (25) seems scarcely justified.

In pursuit of his second aim, Satris devotes much of his book to an exposition of the views of Stevenson, whom he describes as an ethical emotivist and a non-cognitivist. His discussion covers such features of Stevenson's writings as disagreements in attitude as distinguished from disagreements in belief, emotive meaning, persuasive definitions and various other concepts that structure the Stevensonian theory. Although he is not without criticisms of Stevenson, pointing out confusions resulting mainly from Stevenson's idiosyncratic use of ethical and psychological terms, his principal purpose is to rehabilitate the Stevensonian position as a viable ethical theory.

There is a special reason, of which Satris is well aware, that makes the need to rehabilitate Stevenson's emotive theory a matter of critical importance. He quotes a judgment made by Pitcher in 1970: 'It has been twenty-five years since Stevenson's *Ethics and Language* appeared. The emotive theory of ethics, which came to maturity there, is now dead, if anything in philosophy is' (166, n.2). Even granting Pitcher's remark to be something of an overstatement, it offers clear evidence of the historical fact that, after twenty-five years, most ethicists were convinced that the criticisms that had been brought to bear against emotivism had succeeded in destroying it. Under these circumstances any writer who claims that his work 'initiates the rehabilitation of emotivism' (viii) must provide satisfactory answers to these destructive objections. Satris does not succeed in this task.

One can find answers to criticisms of emotivism scattered throughout the book, but these are sporadic and usually address minor points, concerned more with linguistic and psychological questions than with ethical issues. Only in the last two chapters does Satris offer a sustained defense of emotivism, by answering various objections raised against it by Hare. He claims not only that Hare's theory does not supercede emotivism but, on the contrary, emotivism 'is shown to be superior to Hare's prescriptivism' (viii). I shall not review the debate between Hare and Satris because the points on which they differ, since they consist mainly of disputes of relative detail within a generally-shared broader ethical framework, contribute little to resolving the deeper issues ethicists have raised concerning emotivism. As for Satris' contention that emotivism is superior to prescriptivism, its relevance to the issue of the viability of emotivism is moot. To conclude from this fact, if it be a fact, that emotivism is a viable ethical theory, as Satris apparently wants his readers to do, is to commit an obvious *non sequitur*. But, more important, this debate leaves the fundamental objections raised against emotivism, whether by naturalists, intuitionists, or rationalists, unanswered. I cannot review all of these here but will limit myself to mention of two: (1) Stevenson's non-cognitivism and (2)

his failure, at least as Satris presents his theory, to address the subject of moral obligation. Satris does raise the first issue on occasion in his book but his defenses of emotivism are cursory rather than sustained. The subject of our duties to each other is noticeably absent from mention in the book. Such an omission is decisive. An ethical theory that does not or cannot make the concept of moral obligation a central part of itself, rather than being viable, stands condemned as a failure, because it is largely irrelevant to the human lives we lead and hence to serious ethical thought.

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S.G. SHANKER, ed. *Philosophy In Britain Today*. London: Croom Helm 1986. Pp. 240. US$44.50. ISBN 0-88706-489-2.

It is important to pay attention to the title of this book, if one wants to avoid being misled. What is common to most of the contributors is that they were teaching in Britain when the volume was being prepared. No fewer than seven of the eleven authors were not born in Britain. Four settled in the U.K. as a result of the political upheavals on the continent of Europe in the thirties and the war. The youngest three contributors came from the Commonwealth to study with distinguished teachers in Britain, or to work there. According to the blurb, the editor, a Canadian, is a special Associate Professor at York University, Ontario. If Ernest Gellner is right in claiming that 'philosophy in the U.K. is not separable from the rest of Anglophone Philosophy' (98) it seems rather arbitrary to limit the selection of contributors to those who are at a certain time teaching in Britain.

I do not want to suggest that the contributors to this volume are not distinguished philosophers, but it would be a tall order to show that they are the most distinguished philosophers in Britain. Suffice it to note the absence of distinguished women, such as Elizabeth Anscombe, Iris Murdoch and Philippa Foot.

The editor ends his preface by claiming that philosophy ought to improve your 'thinking about the important questions of everyday life.' All of us are now faced with crucially important moral problems and it is decidedly odd that only one of the authors writes about ethics if, as the editor claims, the practical importance of philosophy 'stands uppermost' in the mind of each one of the contributors to the book.

The volume opens with a long, but interesting essay by Gordon Baker, which traces the influence of Frege and Wittgenstein upon British philosophy, but is most noteworthy because of observations made about the nature of philosophy. The style is eloquent and almost arrogant. Is it necessary to have the title in Greek? He tells us that he is a Greek scholar. It seems unnecessary to display it as well.

Renford Bambrough's piece is short, but sensible. He seems to take seriously the challenge of philosophising in a manner intelligible to non-professionals. One learns something about him from the article. This is as it should be in a book that is meant to reveal how a philosopher sees his development. Antony Flew's 'Apologia pro Philosophia Mea' is also quite charming. He certainly does not need to apologise for his philosophical career, although he may owe an apology to certain philosophers about whom he has made contemptuous remarks in other places. If the volume is meant to be intelligible to non-academic readers, it seems an undesirable affectation to have the title in Latin.

Ernest Gellner points out that many people in Britain went into philosophy because they were clever and the route to philosophy was marked out through Classics being considered appropriate education for intelligent youngsters. It is for this reason that many philosophers in Britain had no deep needs for philosophy. This helps to make intelligible both why there were so many able philosophers in Britain and why they should have been able to accept the trivialisation of philosophy which became fashionable after the war. Gellner came to philosophy because he was troubled by philosophical questions and this led him to become disillusioned by the prevailing view that, when our linguistic muddles were cleared up, philosophical problems would be dissolved. His discussion of three conceptions of philosophy is, as one would expect, clear and interesting.

Hare's essay, in which he attacks Alistair MacIntyre's alleged relativism, suffers from lack of context. If MacIntyre had spoken on his own behalf or Phillippa Foot or many other thinkers on ethics in Britain had contributed, a truer picture of ethics in Britain would have been presented.

Harré gives an interesting account of his concern with the philosophy of Psychology, and Körner presents an illuminating analysis of different kinds of philosophical analysis. Karl Popper's essay on how he sees philosophy is by far the most lucid contribution. It should have been used as a model to show how one writes philosophy for non-professional philosophers. Czelaw Lejewski's 'Logic, Ontology and Metaphysics' deals with an important philosophical issue. It does, I believe, need philosophical training to understand it. Technical terms like 'stereology' are not easy to grasp, nor is it clear that the author has improvement in thinking about everyday life uppermost in his mind.

Neither Shanker's 'Computer Vision or Mechanist Myopia' nor Crispin Wright's 'Theories of Meaning and Speaker's Knowledge' seems to be written with non-specialists and practical importance for problems of everyday life in mind. They look to me like competent professional articles written for other

professionals. But, they are long. Herein may be found a justification for the volume as a whole. Long essays are not readily accepted by the learned journals. A book like this one may help to get published articles that are both illuminating and long.

Finally, three minor points: It does not seem to me correct to say that the contributors need no introduction. This claim by the editor is particularly strange since he seems to me to need to be introduced. Crispin Wright has been omitted from the list of contributors on the blurb. Who are the 'we' that the editor refers to in the introduction? Is it the royal 'we'?

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JAMES C.S. WERNHAM. *James's Will-to-Believe Doctrine: A Heretical View*. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1987. Pp. 130. Cdn$20.00. ISBN 0-7735-0567-9.

William James's 1896 essay 'The Will To Believe' has few rivals for its capacity to arouse rival interpretations, so many in fact that one might not suspect its having been overtaken by orthodoxy. But, because he does detect an orthodox reading of James's will-to-believe doctrine which he means to challenge, Wernham subtitles his study 'A Heretical View.' Wernham's self-advertised heresy is to deny both that James's is a *right*-to-believe doctrine and that it is a right-to-*believe* doctrine.

Since heretics typically arrive at their versions of the correct doctrine by showing how others have allegedly distorted it, and since Wernham-as-heretic is no less concerned to get certain Jamesian commentators wrong than he is to get James right, he writes for readers already acquainted with the problematic character of 'The Will To Believe.' The book's thirteen chapters plus a Conclusion are compressed into 105 pages. The first three short chapters trace the beginnings of the will-to-believe concept from an 1875 book review by James, and these are followed by five brief chapters on 'The Will To Believe' essay. The third section of the book, titled 'James and Some Others' and its (equally brief) chapters devoted to W.K. Clifford, B. Pascal, A. Bain, C. Renouvier, D. Miller, and C.J. Ducasse, while relevant and interesting, is more loosely related to the first two sections than they are to each other.

James never held, according to Wernham, a duty-to-believe policy. If properly understood, an encounter in 1875 between James and Chauncey

Wright that involved a book review by James, taken together with other pre-1896 Jamesian writings, seem to reveal that what James meant, even years before the 1896 essay, is not that one is obligated to believe religiously but only that it is 'foolish' not to believe. Consequently, James's subsequent and contrite statement, after the 1896 essay created a furor, that he meant merely to affirm the 'right' to believe, cannot be construed, as orthodoxy has it, as a retreat from an earlier duty-to-believe position. The earlier position, on Wernham's analysis, had always been prudential rather than moral; one has no moral duty to believe, but, since it is foolish not to believe, then one indeed ought (but only prudentially) to believe.

Wernham never tires of reiterating that this conclusion contradicts standard interpretations of what James really intended in his 1896 essay. These are wrong in supposing that only a right but no obligation was intended, and that if an obligation is involved it must be moral. Not so, Wernham argues, for James thought that, besides the right, one has the duty, but only a prudential one, to believe what it would be foolish not to believe. It would be imprudent though not immoral not to believe.

This conclusion, which Wernham thinks is also supported by his chapters about the 1896 essay itself, about James's concepts of forced and momentous options, religion, belief, and faith, is not unpersuasive. Yet his claims of heresy often seem exaggerated when compared to what he accepts in the so-called orthodox view. Although he suggests that to understand James's doctrine as a duty-to-believe or an *ethics* of belief response to Clifford and Huxley's duty-not-to-believe doctrine is to belong to the tradition that 'is mistaken in all of its essential ingredients' (3), he elsewhere admits that James's theory is in part an ethics of belief mounted against Clifford and Huxley, but only a 'minor part' (74). Other examples could be cited, prompting one to see Wernham as less a heretic than a more conventional toiler cogently fussing with colleagues' readings of a controversial text.

Furthermore, Wernham's claim that the force of James's theory is prudential but not moral presumes a sharper distinction between prudence and morality than would be acceptable to James. When a prudent concern becomes crucial, it may become moral as well. James, tolerant of the rights of others, would not require more than a prudential duty on another's part to hold religious beliefs. But, for himself, as anyone appreciates who has absorbed James's testimony about the personal importance of religious belief and who has also grasped how broadly he used the term 'moral,' it was *so* prudent to believe that it amounted to a moral urgency.

The other part of Wernham's heresy claims, despite James's own declarations and their echoes in standard interpretations, that the will-to-believe is not really about belief. What James said is allegedly of little help in deciding whether his focus was on believing theism, treating it as a working hypothesis, or betting on theism. Wernham's probing of James's position here is interesting, as is his comparison of that position with Pascal's; he rightly observes that due largely to James's own comments about a possible comparison, his interpreters too quickly follow suit by ignoring Pascal.

According to Wernham, 'it is as an argument for gambling on theism that James's argument fares best' (103). It then claims in effect that, since by hypothesis we are unable to produce evidence for deciding between theism and atheism, we are advised to suspend belief. But we cannot suspend action, being forced to opt for living either as if theism is true or as if it is false. But the option is a gamble, not an exercise in belief, and it would be foolish or imprudent not to gamble on theism. So James and Jamesian orthodoxy have erred in calling it a right-to-*believe* argument.

Nevertheless, despite Wernham's sensible analysis with its useful distinctions, the conclusion is less heretical than it seems on its face. Gambling does not require but neither does it exclude believing, as Wernham acknowledges; and James, speaking for himself, insisted upon a mixture of both. Gambling on religion without belief could not have satisfied his kind of religiosity. Nor, as he remarked in his correspondence, was the thrust of the 1896 essay to induce belief; it was rather to legitimate a belief already in place albeit somewhat unsteadily because threatened by hostile philosophical arguments.

Anyone seriously interested in James's will-to-believe theory will be stimulated by Wernham's book, by its other points of interpretation that necessarily go unmentioned here. Although he chose not to pursue the question, Wernham is evidently concerned with whether an argument for religious gambling is also a justification of faith. Even if James did not endorse pure gambling as faith, Wernham in his allusion to Abraham seems inclined to commend its religious significance; whatever the orthodoxies and heresies may be here, this is a question worth pondering.

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In *Laws and Other Worlds*, Fred Wilson develops a Goodmanesque analysis of counterfactuals and criticizes the possible-worlds approach to counterfactuals championed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. To do this, he argues for an empiricist model of science; defends an Hempelian nomological-deductive model of scientific explanation; argues that the positivist can accommodate the insights of Hanson and Kuhn, properly understood; sketches

and defends a Humean subjectivist account of what it is to be a law of nature; develops an analysis of counterfactuals as collapsed arguments; attacks Lewis' modal realism; argues that Lewis' talk of possible worlds can be understood without committing oneself to modal realism; and tests his account against this 'empiricized' similarity account and other competing accounts. If he had managed to accomplish all of this convincingly in 328 pages, it would have been a major philosophical miracle; inevitably, there are some hits and some misses.

Perhaps the best way to locate Wilson's approach to counterfactuals is to see him as picking up where J.L. Mackie left off in 'Counterfactuals and Causal Laws' (*Analytical Philosophy*, edited by R.J. Butler): Wilson's claims that counterfactuals are collapsed arguments; that the generalities to use in these arguments are the ones you have arrived at via induction and the scientific method; that the difference between accidental and lawful regularities lies in how we are willing to use them; that counterfactuals normally involve causal recipes for changing the world; that the problem with using accidental generalizations to ground counterfactuals is that these generalizations are often undercut when we try to put them together with the antecedent; that our interest in causal laws and counterfactuals often involves an interest in closed deterministic systems, etc. — all these can be seen as naturally flowing out of Mackie. (In fact, given the complexity of Wilson's argument, I would strongly suggest one read — or re-read — Mackie's article before one starts on Chapter II of the book, and refer back to it now and again; it can serve as a useful road-map.)

Some readers — I am one of them — will find Wilson's Humean subjectivism uncomfortable, especially since it is not altogether clear why he needs to go that far merely to reject rationalism: even if there are no *necessary* connections between events, why does this mean that there can be no *objective* connections between events? There is also a bit of a disappointment at the end of book, where, after developing some hefty formalized machinery to define cotenability, Wilson's analysis fails to rule out Goodman's 'If the match had been struck, it would have been wet' counterexample; Wilson's analysis rules that this conditional, and the others like it, are true — they are just odd. To be fair, this is *not* an ad hoc move on Wilson's part, for he offers an explanation of why these examples are odd — they cannot readily be used in our quest causally to reshape the world — but since this merely seems a way of restating that these counterfactuals are counterexamples, perhaps the reader can be forgiven for wanting more. But perhaps, as Wilson argues, there simply *is* no more to be had; if so, it is unfair to ask more of him.

Leaving aside the philosophical questions, *Laws and Other Worlds* has certain problems as a book. In keeping with the spirit of the text, let me deploy two counterfactuals of my own:

1) 'If the book had been longer, it probably would have been better.' Reading this book is not easy. Wilson assumes you share his familiarity with the vast literature on counterfactuals, laws, explanation, empiricism, etc., and makes few concessions to the reader. Given the size of Wilson's project and the large range of issues he feels he must address, many of the arguments are

compressed; given the difficulty of the subject matter, the technical terminology of the philosophy of science, etc., this often makes things hard on the reader, and hurts Wilson's case. To take just one example, the section in which Wilson argues against Lewis' ontology of possible worlds takes only 11 pages, of which only six and a half actually focus on why Lewis is wrong. (The remainder argue that we can translate most of what Lewis says into Humean terms.) Because Wilson has to make his points so quickly, he often fails to make them convincingly.

At one or two places, the compression and complexity take their toll on Wilson himself, leading to lapses in exposition, argument, and scholarship. For example, what is the bemused reader to do when footnote 30 reads, 'See Note 43, below,' and footnote 43 says only, 'See Note 30, above' (308)? And on pages 97 and 98, Wilson seems to borrow some passages from Mackie while failing to cite him (see Mackie, 70-1).

Or look at pp. 192-3, where Wilson analyzes 'If Caspar had done A, then B would not have happened' as 'A → B' and then renders 'If Caspar had done A, then B would still have occurred' as '~ A → B'; he proceeds to argue that since both 'A → B' and '~ A → B' could be true on Lewis' account of counterfactuals, but since the two original conditionals are clearly incompatible, Lewis must be wrong. Unfortunately for Wilson, if the first conditional is translated as 'A → B,' the second must not be translated as '~ A → B' but as 'A → ~ B' — the *consequents* differ, not the antecedents. Since on Lewis' account 'A → B' and 'A → ~ B' are *inconsistent* rather than consistent, Wilson's point evaporates.

2) 'If there had been a page 330 in this book, it would have had an error on it.' Opening the book to page 20, we find 'connetions' for 'connections'; 22 yields 'reaons' for 'reasons'; on 24 we see 'absorbtion' twice and 'be' instead of 'the' in 'lead us ... to be belief'; and 26 introduces us to '*ex past facto*' for '*ex post facto*.' From this, we could derive the generalization, 'All even-numbered pages of this book exhibit typographical errors,' which on Wilson's view would support (albeit weakly) the counterfactual above. While not every even-numbered page of Wilson's book has a similar gaffe, there are plenty of errors on the odd-numbered pages as well — in the hundred pages between p. 20, when I decided to keep track, and p. 120, when I simply gave up, the typos, wrong or missing words, verb-subject disagreements, and other mechanical errors averaged nearly one every other page. This is not counting mispunctuations: if we counted those, the average would be over one error per page! Nor are all these errors innocuous. For example, on p. 227 Wilson reprints a diagram from Lewis, and then goes on to discuss it; but what Wilson says about the diagram seems to make no sense. Wilson's logic is not at fault, however: the subscripts in the diagram in the text have been switched, so that while Wilson is talking about the original diagram from Lewis, the reader is looking at a very different diagram!

The book should also have been better edited: despite his other virtues, Wilson is no stylist, and awkwardnesses abound, compounding the other

difficulties facing the reader. What is frustrating is that most of these awkward sentences could have been healed by the lightest touch of the most elementary editing. Between the editing and the typesetting, Reidel has done a serious disservice to the book and the reader. Given the prices they charge for their wares, we deserve better.

<div style="text-align: right">STANLEY J. KAMINSKY
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