Canadian Philosophical Reviews

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Editor's Note

The anglophone editors of **Canadian Philosophical Reviews / Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie** are pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for electronic mail on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer. Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submission of reviews and any other messages. The E-mail address of **C.P.R/R.C.C.P.** is

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R.B. / R.A.S.

MYLES BRAND and ROBERT M. HARNISH, eds. *The Representation of Knowledge and Belief*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press 1986. Pp. xviii + 368. US$39.95. ISBN 0-8165-0971-9.

This is the first in a projected series — 'Arizona Colloquium in Cognition.' With twelve papers from philosophers, psychologists, and a linguist, this collection suggests writers working toward a common interdisciplinary goal. Several papers discuss the constraints to be imposed on mental representations — Chomsky in linguistics, Alvin Goldman in examining psychological phenomena, and Wade et al. in examining neurobiology. Other papers relate to the problems of a functional analysis of belief, issues created for methodological solipsism by Twin Earth cases. Schiffer outlines the problem, while Lycan argues that grasping both the computational and causal features of belief will lead to a new understanding. He and Bach discuss forms in which a belief can be de re in a causal sense. A third group, Dennett, Fodor, Dretske and, indirectly, Cummins try to accommodate intentional states with theories using some kind of non-intentional 'information.' Apart from Rips' criticism of mental models, and perhaps Schiffer's, the tone of this volume is broadly pragmatic, unencumbered by partisan spirit.

Chomsky's 51-page paper deals with the problems and changes in the program of generative grammar. He reviews features of language that point to structures in the representation (31), and mentions empirical support for Universal Grammar (UG).The last third of the paper is devoted to a defence of the scientific and empirical character of his theory, and in particular to the claim that Kripke's gloss of Wittgenstein does not impugn the concept of rules required for Chomsky's theory.

Dennett considers an alternative to Computationalism. The first explicit proposal for bottom-up proposals to counter the top-down ideas is the New Connectionism with such concepts as 'distributed memory and processing,' and 'appropriate connection.' Computation in it is about instructions for events in the brain, not about external objects. 'This leaves us with an almost embarrassingly ecumenical conclusion. Everything is right about something' (74). The programs of AI are thought-experiments, not explanations.

Fodor tries to relate Information and Association. Boolean networks shift around natural information, but this 'observer neutral' information is not the 'information available' (87), which is 'intentional, perspectival, and receiver relative' (88). Networks do not have access to the form of arguments needed to capture important generalizations. 'What's wrong with networks is that they transmit information without encoding it; what's wrong with the Standard notion of information is that whereas what we need is "the information encoded," what it gives us is only "the information transmitted" ' (96). Intentional phenomena still await some explanation that ties them with the research in 'psychology, semantics, and computation theory' (97).

Information is also Dretske's subject: we could wish for a Dretske-Fodor discussion section here. The reference of a representation is not always the content (103). From one we get a sort of de re representation, from the other, a de dicto. The latter is a step towards giving content to a representation that approaches the intentional. Dretsky concludes that 'our ordinary cognitive vocabulary' has explanatory force, and perhaps it will be used in scientific cognitive theory: the question is empirical.

The papers by Dennett, Fodor, Dretske and Cummins seem to form a unit organized around the desire to find a meeting-place between different levels of representation or network. If these papers had formed part of a conference with a recorded discussion, the issues could be clearer. Perhaps that has the merit of suggesting paper topics to students in a seminar.

The next set of papers relate to the problems of methodological solipsism and functionalism, which identifies a belief by its computational role. The difficulty arises because of Twin Earth cases in which two creatures are in identical computational states, but different belief states. Schiffer smoothly lays out the difficulties and argues that functionalism is in trouble.

Lycan's suggestive paper could be a reply to this objection. In delineating different degrees of 'aboutness' of an idea, Lycan elaborates his view that beliefs have both computational and de re, causal aspects. Distinguishing different degrees of 'aboutness' shows how truth conditions of beliefs can be kept better regimented. Representations de re are also Bach's subject. The relation to the object differs according to the mode of presentation: percepts, memories, and names. A discussion about the relation of Schiffer's, Lycan's, and Bach's views would have been enlightening.

Nadel, Willner and Kurz raise a theme found in Chomsky, that representations must satisfy certain constraints. Where Chomsky's were specific to language, this paper discusses the neurobiological constraints. Literature is surveyed for discussion of topology, maps, local computations, mental images, and connectionism. Distribution of elements and their joint relation to the hippocampus suggest some distinctions between knowing how and knowing that which relate to Fodor and Cummins. Alvin Goldman's 'Constraints on Representation' relates psychological research to epistemology (which is evaluative). Gestalt patterns, hierarchical structures and analogies are pervasive in a wide range of mental functions.

Bever claims that 'resolving a representational conflict by accessing a new overarching representation itself releases a momentary surge of enjoyable emotional energy' (316). Such joy is a general property of the human mind, underlying both linguistic and nonlinguistic human activities. The range of different systems of representation, various phenomena of apparently unnecessary complexity may be explained in terms of this aesthetic drive.

The collection of essays is aimed at a sophisticated audience. Much of it requires familiarity with material in the useful bibliographies. For those interested in understanding how we can learn about representing belief, this volume has much to offer.

WILLIAM ABBOTT
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LEONARD W. DOOB. *Slightly Beyond Skepticism*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1987. Pp. ix + 319. N.p. ISBN 0-300-03823-2.

Subtitled 'Social Science and the Search for Morality,' Doob's book aims at a comprehensive account of morality by drawing on the avails of social science, philosophy, and a variety of other, relatively minor sources. Untainted by any recognizable interest in, or association with theory (whether moral or scientific), however, the project neither succeeds, nor did it ever have a chance of succeeding, for without the perspective provided by some point of view — i.e., some recognizable interest in doing something with the subject — everything about it becomes equally relevant. The result is a tour through the moral universe with stops here and there, few with apparent reason, and all to no apparent end.

Doob does impose an external structure on the project, in the form of eight categories which are held to collectively exhaust the significance of 'the basic moral question': 'Why should I (or we, he, she, you, thou, they) do or not do whatever is contemplated or why should I have done or not done what occurred?' (3). The eight categories, which form the subsequent structure of chapters in the book, include, e.g., personality (what will I do?), potentiality (what can I do), rule (what may I do), duty (what must I do), etc. Besides these, Doob includes two categories which are distinctly behavioral: intention (what shall I do?), and behavior (action): (what do [did] I do?). Such a structure might have served as a ground for an interesting meeting between social science and philosophy, i.e., a pure descriptive rendering of the join at which the two meet.

Alas, even that does not occur. Instead, one finds a discussion which repeatedly (and at length) recounts the obvious. After 25 pages, for instance, we learn that 'locating principals [i.e., moral agents] or observers concerned with moral judgments or actions is essential ...' (25). After 50 pages we are told that '... normal principals tend to obey or conform to the rules of the groups and of the society in which they find themselves ...' (60). After 100 pages we are told that 'principals seek happiness for themselves' (105). After 150 pages we learn that 'social scientists and historians are fallible' (177). In addition, when Doob cites philosophical or scientific sources in his discussion, he does so only very tangentially, and without really bringing other thinkers into the discussion.

Perhaps the sole virtue of the work is that it provides some insight into the thinking of an individual who has worked in the area of social psychology for many years, and hence is a practiced observer of the passing human scene. The book does not, on the other hand, advance the discussion of morality, either from the perspective of philosophy, or from that of science.

JAMES W. VAN EVRA
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HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., ed. *'Race,' Writing, and Difference*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1986. Pp. 422. US$12.95. ISBN 0-226-28435-2.

Recently some literary critics, those espousing 'theory,' have tried with mixed results to cloak themselves in the mantle of philosophy. The present collection of essays, which grew out of a special issue of *Critical Inquiry* (**12**. 1 [Autumn 1985]), makes no such explicit claim, but there are decided philosophical underpinnings to its train of thought, more than passing (usually negative) reference to key figures of Western philosophical tradition, and a good deal of relevance for those who question the neutrality of philosophical discourse itself.

The inverted commas around 'race' in the title express better than anything else the consensus shared by the various writers, though some aboard did take umbrage at that device, most notably the French critic Tzvetan Todorov, to such extent that the editor reserved a ringing riposte in his final words (408).

Why the quotes? The device of inverted commas underscores the artificiality of a word, its function as signifier whose signified is predicated on suppositions like the opposition between black and white, Arab and Jew, colonized and colonizer. Race is not a biological category in the same way as sex (though

in the case of sex we have the term 'gender' to help us distinguish what is in nature from what is in culture). Race has no such twin. In the words of Anthony Appiah, 'the truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask "race" to do for us' (35). As other contributors demonstrate, what the term does do is to colour discourse on the Other, and hence facilitate colonial, imperialist and racist stereotyping, as well as skew other supposedly value-free realms, in particular anthropology, philosophy, mainstream literary criticism and other 'hegemonic' discourse. More than one contributor calls this process the 'othering' of non-white, non-Western, female, minority or marginal persons.

Strange that so many who claim to be deconstructionists assume this position, for if the hegemonic discourse of those who 'other' is without contest reification of a purely rhetoric entity, so is, ultimately, the very idea of 'othering,' or for that matter of a Discourse. Is not the attribution of 'othering' itself an essentialist totalization of those Others who 'other'?

Here I apologize for my own recourse to inverted commas and otherwise uncalled-for capitalizations. They *are* in the spirit of the text at hand, which often turns to jargon in order to combat cliché, but does not escape what has perhaps become a new hegemonic discourse, a certain mode one respondent calls 'the academic's burden': 'ruthlessly reducing a complex world to a simple commodity (without even bothering with quotation marks) for academic consumption, which, when successfully "produced," would lead to promotions, professional recognition... [etc.]' (397). The immediate target of these remarks, Mary Louise Pratt, parried them with grace and wit. But the underlying issue remains unaddressed: where do we stop once we begin deconstructing? And why begin?

On this quintessential point the book offers no answer. Its interest resides in the application of its primary home truth to a variety of stereotypes: of Palestinian Arabs (Edward Said), 'Indians' (Jane Tompkins), the colonial subject (Abdul JanMohammed), 'the Moor' (Israel Bushatin), 'the Bushmen' (Mary Louise Pratt), 'black female sexuality' (Sander L. Gilman), etc. There is a high level of scholarship in these essays, and they deserve wide readership. Yet the impression lingers that some contributors are beating dead horses, while a few others, at least, partake of a certain pleasure in annotating the cruelties and depravities of the (male) West. *Schadenfreude* is not quite the right word, for this implies gloating over another's pains, and these authors outspokenly ally themselves with the victimized Others. But the passion with which they dissect the minutiae of second-rate 'colonial' novels, European travel narratives, or Victorian psychological or sexual treatises is a curious and, to my mind, perverse one.

Hence the interest when editor Gates, among others, takes on bigger game like Hume, Kant and Hegel (408). Likewise, the excitement in the tension between the French-language authors, Jacques Derrida and Tzvetan Todorov foremost, and their proselytes in the English-speaking world. Even in translation, it is Derrida and Todorov who prevail as rational and moderate figures. Those who have taken up their discourse, but in English, are manifestly bogged down

in verbiage, the obsessive ideal of the other and of difference. The most unintelligible of the contributions, 'Signs of Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority under a Tree Outside Delhi, May, 1817,' by Homi K. Bhabha, is deeply indebted to the tradition obtaining from Nietzsche, Derrida, and Foucault, as conveyed into English. How 'illegible' it is compared to the remarks of Derrida himself! As for G.C. Spivak (first known as Derrida's translator but an incisive critic on her own), she rightly draws the ire of Todorov, who is baffled by her terminology (377).

As for 'African philosophy,' the best guide is Miller's footnotes to the works of Mudimbe, Hountondji and Towa (298). The constitution of African philosophy begins with what we in the West would call the deconstruction of terms attributed to Africa. The sooner that this has nothing to do with English or French terms, the better for us all.

None among the contributors has a clearer sense of the pitfalls of terminology than Anthony Appiah who, in an earlier Gates production, *Black Literature and Literary Theory* (New York: Methuen 1984), also displayed his training in 'ordinary language philosophy.' Despite the fact that his contribution to the present volume deals with the treacherous topic of W. E. B. du Bois' interpretation of racism, his stands out as an example of how a commonsensical dissection of jargon may well bear fruit, as read against English-language deconstructionism.

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F.H. HINSLEY. *Sovereignty*. 2nd edn. New York: Cambridge University Press 1986. Pp. x + 255. US$34.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-32790-3); US$11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-33988-X).

It is always a pleasure to report a new edition of a classic. Hinsley's well-known book on sovereignty, long out of print, has appeared now under a new scholarly imprint. The new edition incorporates an additional chapter, 'The Concept of Sovereignty in the Modern World,' and an up-dating of the 'Suggestions for Further Reading.' Hinsley is a political historian, not a philosopher, but his work is of philosophical interest. Legal philosophy, especially since John Austin, has often deployed the concepts of sovereignty and sovereign, and pondered the need for such concepts in any well-formed analysis of law. Hins-

ley qua social scientist seeks an explanatory framework for the actual historical relations between society as a whole and government or the state. He defends sovereignty as having an essential role in such a framework, fighting off objections from Laskian real-politikers who see sovereignty as irrelevant and natural lawyers who see it as too empirical a concept. Insofar as positivistic legal theory (and that means a great deal of what is most influential in legal theory) itself tries to find a middle road between law as necessarily authoritative or legitimate and law as a purely instrumental or political phenomenon, Hinsleyian sovereignty is a concept of great interest to legal theory. Hinsley's methodical application of his framework to the course of the world's political history only strengthens the case for its importance.

But we know all this from the original 1965 edition. What does the new edition add? Regretfully, not much. The new chapter is disappointing. Hinsley sees that post-World War II social democracies represent a new phase of the process of mutual adjustment between society and government, and that, for example, the sovereignty of parliament cannot mean what it did in earlier days. But his attempt to develop this insight is minimal. He again quite accurately sees that sovereignty is an important notion for understanding the position at international law of new ex-colonies still economically and culturally dependent on their former masters. However, the case of the European Economic Community, with its courts and parliament, and the genuine changes in the municipal law of Community members brought about by membership and de iure subjection to the European courts, invites — even, cries out for — substantial treatment in the context of Hinsley's basic analysis of sovereignty. Yet the topic receives only a perfunctory paragraph (234-5). Canadians, who have cheerfully lived for more than a hundred years under such a system, will be amazed to learn that 'the federal form of state is always a unitary state in the process of formation or dissolution' (219) — although those who oppose the power accruing to the Supreme Court under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms will do so in the name of Hinsleyian 'formation.' The up-datings in the bibliography amount to expected (and indeed necessary) references to the writings of Quentin Skinner and other Cambridge (-influenced) political historians — but not much else.

In short, if you're like me and are a fan of the original book, you'll welcome the renewed ready availability of Hinsley's work. But, if you're like me, you will also bewail the opportunity missed by a reflective historian of genuine intellectual stature to expand upon his previous work.

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MERRILL B. HINTIKKA and JAAKKO HINTIKKA. *Investigating Wittgenstein*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; New York: Basil Blackwell Inc. 1986. Pp. xx + 326. Cdn$75.75; US$37.95. ISBN 0-631-14179-0.

According to the authors, this book is a product of the enjoyment of puzzle-solving — a product of the 'literary and interpretive detective who is trying to tease out the true meaning of a philosopher's words.' As they admit, however, neither of the Hintikkas — Jaakko, nor his late wife Merrill — is a follower of Wittgenstein. Eight earlier publications by the authors, dating from 1978-83, are incorporated into this well-bound book, 'in most cases in heavily rewritten form.' As they try to grasp the general trend of the history of Wittgenstein's problems and his attempted solutions to them, the authors' method is 'to catch Wittgenstein red-handed in the act of putting forward the very view [they] are ascribing to him.'

The Hintikkas ascribe to Wittgenstein a Tractarian picture theory of language which they call 'language as a universal medium' — a theory which Wittgenstein is to have held throughout his entire philosophical career — the gist of which is the 'thesis of the ineffability of semantics,' i.e., the ineffability of language-reality relationships.

According to the Hintikkas, Wittgenstein's theory arose a result of Wittgenstein imposing Frege's principle of compositionality on Russell's theory of acquaintance, leaving the class of objects of acquaintance the *only* objects of acquaintance. Tractarian objects are really Russellian objects of acquaintance with inexpressible name-object relations, because Wittgenstein, according to the authors, rejected Russell's second kind of acquaintance — that of complex logical forms. With this interpretation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* as a background, the authors begin the sixth chapter with the main question: 'What was the change that took place in Wittgenstein's thinking when he moved away from his early philosophy to his late ideas?' The authors state that they would like to end the debate on the matter. They begin by claiming that 'all the answers to the question concerning Wittgenstein's first and decisive change of heart in 1929 that one can find in the literature are mistaken or misleading' (137). Wittgenstein, they assert, never gave up the 'picture theory of language.' The fundamentally new turning-point in Wittgenstein's philosophical development — which the authors pinpoint as occurring precisely on October 11, 1929 — was 'the replacement of ... phenomenological language by an everyday physicalistic language.' They themselves admit that the idea will strike some readers as far-fetched, but claim that Wittgenstein asserted it himself in the first section of his *Philosophical Remarks*. By 'physicalistic,' the authors mean that physical objects (the objects of physics) are the primary objects referred to by language. It is their thesis that insofar as there were just two Wittgensteins, it is 'the change of his language paradigm that marks the watershed between the two genetically and systematically' (139). The authors interpret 'everyday language' as 'physicalistic language,' and maintain that Wittgenstein's goal always remained to understand immediate experience. But, say

the authors, verification in a physicalistic language is a 'many-splendored' thing, and this yielded Wittgenstein's later idea of 'language-games.'

If there is a distinctive position which characterizes Wittgenstein's middle period, say the authors, it is that meaning is determined by understanding *rules*. In the early Wittgenstein it was the grasping of a two-place relation, whereas in the late Wittgenstein it was the mastery of a technique. Therefore, in the late Wittgenstein there is a rejecting of the primacy of rules in favor of the logic of language-games. Predictably, since physicalistic languages are public, Wittgenstein ends up rejecting private languages.

Contrary to the 'received view' that Wittgenstein gave up 'vertical' correspondences between language and reality, the authors assert that rather, it is language-games which constitute the new connecting links between language and reality. However, the role of language-games as a semantical link between language and reality remains ineffable. Therefore the only meaningful aspects of language-games one can *speak* of are its ('horizontal') external, non-semantical features, such as relationships between different language-acts, the relation of such acts to their context, etc. Language-games become 'mediating comparisons' between pictures and reality — and this change does not affect Wittgenstein's picturing idea of language at all. Language-games are not all of the same kind, however. Besides straight-forward description, there are many other kinds. In the last chapter, the authors attempt to describe some interrelations, distinctions, and differences, between language-games. They end the book with a series of theses, the most important of which argues for the necessity of the existence of 'primary' and 'secondary' (corrigible and incorrigible) language-games.

The book reads roughly for me. I suspect that it was dictated as class lectures and transcribed — perhaps *merely* transcribed. I had better luck with its repetitive phrases and lack of helpful punctuation when I imagined myself in a lecture rather than as a reader. Whatever its origin, the book is poorly edited, and therefore is not as easy to read as it should be. Sometimes colloquialisms, neologisms, and arcane phrases all tumble together. Stilted expressions abound.

Unfortunately this is not what concerns me the most about the book. The method of ascribing the 'true meaning' to Wittgenstein, accompanied by 'red-handed' quoting, would be a sound approach if Wittgenstein were always engaged in explicating his 'doctrine.' Since it is the case that the later Wittgenstein re-articulates views he is disassembling, since he often makes a series of intermediate thrusts and parries, and since he sometimes grapples with the reader as well as with himself, the method of 'red-handed' quoting is an especially treacherous method. Going on to more risky ground, the authors sometimes cite *indirect* evidence in an extended, reinterpreted sense, for their views, such as how the view fits in with the general theory or how the view is not directly contradicted by Wittgenstein, and the story becomes thin and unconvincing. Only twice in the book did I find a direct reference to the context or surroundings of the quotes used as 'clinchers.' Sometimes the authors sim-

ply reinterpret what is said, by asserting what Wittgenstein 'really' meant, or how Wittgenstein *must* have meant it, or said something in a 'disguised' way.

After making a fundamental distinction between 'saying' and 'showing,' the authors proceed mainly on the assumption that Wittgenstein is trying to *articulate* doctrines which he holds. However, one might say that in his late works, Wittgenstein is also *showing* how philosophy is to be done, in disassembling first *external* criteria, and then *internal* criteria, to which philosophers appeal, when challenged, to produce reality-determined mechanisms to correlate with, control, or otherwise determine language. Interpretation of this kind of activity is extremely precarious, and one should expect to be better convinced.

Finally, the project which the Hintikkas set out upon is possible only if they do not take seriously Wittgenstein's later remarks on the philosophical enterprise — whether or not they are followers of Wittgenstein. The idea that reality must correlate with language, even in a removed sense, was itself exorcised in the first part of the *Philosophical Investigations*. The authors apparently do not acknowledge the extent to which the ground has been cut away, since they continue to assert the basic need for language-reality relationships.

On the positive side, the Hintikkas do re-open the question of the unities of Wittgenstein's thoughts. By their sustained challenge to widely accepted views, the authors force us to re-think and refine the grounds of our conclusions concerning Wittgenstein's career.

All in all, this book is an interesting attempt to connect Wittgenstein's early, middle, and late periods. My own opinion is that it fails by forcing the later writings into the Tractarian mold.

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GEORGE F. HOURANI. *Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. xv + 282. US$39.50. ISBN 0-521-26712-9.

This volume brings together sixteen of the late author's pioneering studies of Islamic ethics in the formative and earlier classical periods of Islamic civilization. Hourani's main concern is with ethical theory, rather than normative ethics, in Sunnite legal and theological sources and in the Islamic philosophic

tradition. Most of the articles focus upon two closely related topics: (1) debates about the ontological status of value in ethics, and (2) debates about the sources of human knowledge about value. The first two essays briefly survey the principal figures and intellectual positions to be discussed. The subsequent essays explore specific issues and schools of thought along with the arguments they adduced to support their views in roughly chronological order.

Hourani understands Islamic law as an integral part of ethics and maintains that ethics constitutes the core of Islam from the Qurʾān and the traditions onward. However, attempts to support that ethical core and efforts to determine how its norms might be legitimately extended to new situations produced a variety of theological and philosophical theories about the nature and epistemic status of value. These theories all belong to the main traditions of rationalistic theology and philosophy in the West, but have rarely been recognized as such, much less closely studied. Hourani's essays provide a welcome corrective to this omission and illustrate the parallels most effectively.

On the questions of ontological and epistemic status, Hourani identifies three main positions. (1) Values have an objective existence as real qualities or relations of acts that make them right independent of the desires or opinions of those who judge them as such. So conceived, values can be known either through the scriptural tradition (the Qurʾānic view), rational intuition, or both together (the view of Mu'tazilite theology). The specifically rationalist character of this theory is supported by the existence of some true moral judgments outside Islam and the fact that Islam ascribes many ethical attributes to God, which cannot be reasonably interpreted in terms of conformity to his desires or opnions. (2) Values are essentially whatever God commands or judges right. They have their locus not in any objective facts or relations between acts, but in the divine will. As such, they are knowable ultimately only through revelation and tradition, although reason can be used in subordinate ways to extend and apply traditional norms. Known as ethical voluntarism or theistic subjectivism, this position was supported by traditionalist and Ash'arite theologians, along with most Islamic jurists. They objected to rationalist ethics for placing limits on God's power by presuming to 'know' what God could rightly command and also for overlooking the arbitrary and often contradictory character of allegedly universal rational judgments. (3) Values are objective and can be known entirely by independent reason exercised by wise individuals, such as philosophers, who understand the specific natures of human beings and the kinds of character traits and actions that perfect them. Prophets may subsequently recast the objective content of ethics in the form of commands and present them to the masses in the persuasive and imaginative language of Scripture. This is the position of the Islamic philosophers, who found support for their view in rational reflection on human well-being and analogies between ethics, political philosophy, and medicine.

Hourani is remarkably skilful both in tracing the historical development of these views and analyzing their conceptual content and implications. In 'Islamic and Non-Islamic Origins of Mu'tazilite Ethical Rationalism,' he criti-

cally surveys the possible sources of Mu'tazilite ethics in Zoroastrianism, Manichaeanism, Christianity, and Greek philosophy with impressive erudition and an acute appreciation for the difficulty of showing intellectual influence. Yet even when he can demonstrate only a 'coincidence of doctrines,' he succeeds in explaining how the socio-religious role of the Mu'tazilites, as missionaries on the frontiers of Islam, made them especially responsive to the great intellectual traditions they undertook to combat. His account of the rationalist ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbār, a late Mu'tazilite thinker, is a paradigm of both scholarly and philosophic clarity. After schematically presenting the basic categories and definitions of 'Abd al-Jabbār's moral theory, Hourani shows important correspondences between it and the views of British intuitionists like Ewing and Ross. Several of the studies are more explicitly comparative and provide illuminating clarifications about how the sources should be read. Among these, ' "Injuring Oneself" in the Qurʾān in the Light of Aristotle' shows how the impossibility of voluntarily doing injustice to oneself in Aristotle's ethics nonetheless allows for the possibility of harming or injuring oneself by acts that cause later punishment according to the Qurʾān. 'Deliberation in Aristotle and 'Abd al-Jabbār' explores the differences between teleological and deontological ethics and especially how problems of deciding between conflicting values are to be resolved.

A recurrent theme in several of these essays is the problem of theodicy. Hourani convincingly shows how the divergent ethical presuppositions of the theologians and philosophers he examines help to account for their characteristic resolutions of this problem. The objectivist and intuitionist assumptions of the Mu'tazilites imply that for God to be good, he must do what is good for man in an objectively knowable sense. Hence, suffering can only be justified as either punishment of wrongdoing or to prevent greater injury. Theistic voluntarists like Ash'arī, Juwaynī, and Ghazālī, however, deny that God is subject to any obligations whatever. As the source and standard of moral obligation, God's will cannot be questioned by recourse to any human standard. Conversely, philosophic objectivists like Ibn Sīnā and Averroes hold that pain and evil are natural but undesired consequences of the causal order God established. In order to have a preponderance of good and well-being in the world, characterized by matter and change, some evil is an inevitable concomitant. In expounding this last view, Hourani also helpfully deciphers the basic techniques of esoteric writing. The concluding essay (previously unpublished) on 'Combinations of Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics' provides a masterful summary and schematization of all the major themes discussed and insightfully shows their significance for understanding fundamentalist and liberal trends in contemporary Islam. In sum, Hourani has left us a superb collection of essays in the history of Islamic ethical thought. Written in a lucid and graceful style, it will be a valuable resource to students and scholars in Islamic studies, religious studies, history of philosophy, and ethics for years to come.

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JANET A. KOURANY, ed. *Scientific Knowledge: Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Science*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing 1987. Pp. x + 399. N.p. ISBN 0-534-06444-2.

In her one-page Preface, Kourany states that the aim of this volume 'is to introduce readers to the most basic issues in the philosophy of science without trying to minimize the prevailing controversy.' These current disagreements, she forewarns, are both about the nature of science and about the aims and methods of the philosophy of science. The consequence is a dearth of textbooks for teachers of the philosophy of science. 'The present anthology is an attempt to remedy this situation.'

What we are offered is a collection of 25 reprints to serve as an introductory text. Expect few of the aids usually provided in a textbook, however, for there is no index, no bibliography, no suggested reading lists, nor questions for reflection and discussion. There are the footnotes and references listed in individual reprints, and a few of these are so extensive they should prove useful, but they are also limited to the context and date of their original publication.

What we do have are several pages (from as few as three to as many as ten) of Kourany's own introductory comments leading into each of the five Parts around which this anthology is organized. Its usefulness as an introductory text, therefore, will depend entirely upon the choice of articles and excerpts reprinted here, and to a lesser extent, upon the organization and comments Kourany has imposed upon them. Her choices and the setting into which she has placed them work so well, and is so unlike anything else available, I am confident any of us who introduce students to the philosophy of science will find this text a stimulating alternative.

Part 1, which is comprised of a single article by E. McMullin, serves as an introduction. By relying upon McMullin's descriptive 'Alternative Approaches to the Philosophy of Science,' it provides a useful Overview of the discipline as a whole, but as it dates from 1970 its 'view' does not extend to those reprints drawn from the 1970s and as recently as 1984. What it does capture is the transition to an 'approach' to the philosophy of science which took the history of science and the specific inner workings of her different fields more seriously.

Part 2 turns directly to Explanation: A Major Goal of Scientific Knowledge, which Kourany suggests can be understood according to one of three alternatives: an inferential conception, a causal conception, or an erotetic conception. She has chosen parts of Hempel and Oppenheim's classic 'Studies in the Logic of Explanation' (plus a later excerpt from Hempel on Statistical Explanation) to exemplify the first, W. Salmon's 1978 APA Presidential Address 'Why Ask, "Why?" ' to exemplify the second, and excepts from van Fraassen's *The Image of Science* on the pragmatics of explanation for the third. Examples actually drawn from science are examined in the remaining three selections: Galilean dynamics from S. Toulmin's *Foresight and Understanding*, functional

explanations in psychology examined in a reprint of R. Cummins, and a number of other cases in two sections of D. Shapere's 'Scientific Theories and Their Domains.' These cover what Kourany distinguishes as compositional, evolutionary, functional, and transitional kinds of explanation.

Part 3 delineates six major approaches to The Validation of Scientific Knowledge. Each of these alternatives — listed by Kourany as (1) justificationism; (2) falsificationism; (3) conventionalism; (4) the methodology of research programmes; (5) a sociological approach; and (6) the testing paradigm — is presented via excerpts from the work of R. Carnap, K. Popper, P. Duhem, T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, and R. Giere respectively. More so than in any other part, Kourany has provided here not only a full cross-section of alternatives, but represented them from sources which touch most of the key styles which have emerged since the turn of the century.

Part 4 focuses on the issues which have received attention particularly in the last twenty-five years, on The Historical Development of Scientific Knowledge. Excerpts are provided from K. Popper, T. Kuhn, and L. Laudan to illustrate the evolutionary, revolutionary and gradualist models of scientific development which have been proposed as alternatives to the more conservative cumulative model long presumed. The more general issue of whether science as a whole is developing toward ever greater unity is also contrasted by setting off P. Suppes' 'The Plurality of Science' against the 'Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis' of Oppenheim and Putnam and a more recent excerpt from D. Shapere.

In the final Part Kourany has drawn from current debates within the philosophy of science, and of these has chosen to present Realism versus Anti-Realism: The Ontological Import of Scientific Knowledge. Alternatives are presented by excerpts from van Fraassen's *The Image of Science*, and A. Fine's 'And Not Anti-Realism Either,' and the issues are then further refined in the face of actual practice in excerpts from M. Gardner's 'Realism and Instrumentalism in Pre-Newtonian Astronomy' and I. Hacking's 'Experimentation and Scientific Realism.'

Wadsworth has produced 400 pages of very clean, very legible text, but whether you will want your students to use it will still depend upon how well you can work with this selection of material, and whether you find Kourany's introductory comments of use or simply something else you have to overcome in class. For myself, I find this particular set of readings a welcome alternative, and though most of the selections are excerpts, they are generous portions and well chosen. Let's hope the price turns out not to put it out of our reach.

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DAVID FARRELL KRELL. *Postponements: Woman, Sensuality, and Death in Nietzsche*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1986. Pp. x + 117. US$22.50. ISBN 0-253-34560-X.

As a contribution to Nietzsche scholarship, Krell's *Postponements* provides the textual *sub*-stance and *author*-ity some would say is required to distance Nietzsche from the droll and dreary charges of misogyny. No longer will the contemporary accounts regarding *the question of woman* in Nietzsche's texts — most notoriously attributed to Derrida but traceable to G. Deleuze, E. Blondel, and S. Kofman — be viewed as 'some far-fetched provocation' (12). Now, with the aid of Krell's archaeology of deletions, erasures, and abortive textual plans, and with the knowledge that in a 1937 lecture course Heidegger recommended an article by German classicist K. Rheinhart to his students, an article which 'anticipated many of the themes in Derrida's *Spurs*,' Derrida's reading of the question can be taken as a 'subtle, supple interpretation of an issue that is central to Nietzsche's philosophy' (12). It is here Krell begins his dig (cf. ix-x).

Comprised of seven parts — Preface, Introduction, four chapters, and an Appendix of the principal German texts (from the *Kritische Studienausgabe*) used to support Krell's exegesis — the ostensible task of this 'little book' is to bring together 'some perplexing and rarely discussed materials from Nietzsche's literary remains' and to comment briefly on them (ix). The focus of Krell's *undertaking* is Nietzsche's *Nachlass* in which one finds the sketches and plans for 'a *drama* that Nietzsche early in his career planned to write but then perpetually postponed, a drama that turns on questions of woman, sensual love, and tragic death' (ix). The plans for this drama extend over the years of 1870-1886, the years of Nietzsche's major publications; the texts which Nietzsche saw through editorial revision and publication, the texts which Nietzsche desired to have published.

Krell traces the appearance of woman — the incessantly transformed figure or image of woman, *nature*, the possibilities of *life* — and how the themes of sensuality and tragic death converge in this figure throughout Nietzsche's writings, beginning with a discussion of the well-known 'Ariadne' (Chapter 1), as she appears in 'The Plaint of Ariadne' in the *Dionysos Dithyrambs* (1888-89). Krell provides captivating accounts of three other 'major' disguises assumed by woman in Nietzsche's texts: 'Corinna' (Chapter 2), 'Pana' (Chapter 3), and 'Calina' (Chapter 4). Could there be more?

Corinna appears in the drafts of the *Empedocles* drama, drafts which were written 'under the shadow of Hölderlin's three mighty drafts of *The Death of Empedocles*' (12). As the prominent female voice, Corinna 'embodies sensual love, plague, and death for the tragic philosopher,' and yet her only line is ' "Empedocles!" ' (48). The themes of love, pestilence, and death are embodied in each of the other two figures Krell describes, Pana and Calina. Pana, who appears in the second cluster of plans for this drama, the plans for *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, is, according to Krell, an essential figure in the 'commu-

nication of Nietzsche's 'thought of thoughts,' the eternal recurrence of the same.' Pana's significance lies in the impossibility of her integration into the four parts of *Zarathustra*. If Pana played a more prominent and integral role in the drama of Zarathustra's going down and crossing-over, it would spell Zarathustra's tragic fate, his death, which is postponed throughout the text (62-6). Does Nietzsche plot Zarathustra's death behind the scenes, only to be foiled by his own characters? Or is Nietzsche engaged in an even more duplicitous act where the postponement of Zarathustra's death is plotted because of its integral role to the economy of the eternal recurrence?

Even though Nietzsche had completed the work that 'stands altogether apart,' the notebooks contain plans for Part V of *Zarathustra*. Once again, as with the earlier drafts of *Empedocles* and *Zarathustra*, Zarathustra's tragic fate is deferred. Ariadne re-appears in the 'eerie guise' of the 'orgiastic soul of woman' (73); however 'death is reserved for the Christian God, and earth for the race of rulers' (72). Ariadne, woman, figure of nature in its most duplicitous form '— if it is she —' (80), reissues herself under the name of Calina. Who or what is Calina? Nietzsche identifies her twice: ' ... Calina brown-red, everything too acrid nearby in high summer. Ghostly (my *current* danger!)/ ... Calina: my current danger, in high summer, ghostly, brown-red, everything too acrid nearby' (80). Is this how Nietzsche *finally* envisages woman, nature, *life*? Ghostlike, enigmatic, affirmed as an attempt at self-affirmation? Or did he understand her/it *to be* this way always?

Woman in Nietzsche's texts never remains the *same*, she is always already differ*ant*, to invoke Derrida's neologism, or postponed in Krell's idiom. Woman *is* (?), in Nietzsche's eyes, as Krell's mastery of the *Nachlass* demonstrates, *masked as a mask*. Perhaps it would be more appropriate here to say woman *masks* possibilities which in turn are *masks of themselves* — possibilities always delayed and, as such, always already there, already posted or delivered in a singular fashion in Nietzsche's texts, and yet always and already duplicitous, and in complicity with one another, yet possibilities never realized *fully* (?), never brought to completion. But how could it be otherwise for Nietzsche? for *woman*? Is this not said, and said explicitly, in *The Gay Science* (339) where Nietzsche affirms, 'Yes, life is a woman'?

Krell's postponements certainly affirm the tenor of these questions. But, as with any book on Nietzsche, big or small, *Postponements* is only a propaedeutic. It offers some instructions, some warnings, and some directions that need to be heeded by any reader of Nietzsche before they proceed on the '*crooked* trails' blazed in his texts. '*Ich bin dein Labyrinth* ...,' '*I am your labyrinth* ...' Nietzsche claims in the voice of Dionysos. But for whom do *they* speak? Is it not Ariadne? ... Calina? woman? *life*!?

If Nietzsche is a little lost in this web of duplicities, as Derrida claims in *Spurs*, and as Krell repeats (3), then Krell needs to say why. He needs to say why Derrida thought Nietzsche 'might well be a little lost in the web of his text ....' It is because 'he was ...,' 'he dreaded ...,' 'he loved ...,' and he knew, as Nietzsche claims, the 'castrated,' 'castrating,' 'affirming,' and duplicitous woman ... because, as Derrida remarks, 'Nietzsche was all of these. ...' After

all, Nietzsche claims to know *both* man and woman, to be *both* ... And yet, in *Zarathustra* he asks, '... who can wholly comprehend *how* strange man and woman are to each other?' (III, 10).

Is this '*dual* series of experiences, this access to apparently separate worlds' not Nietzsche's Dionysian dowry? Giving expression to 'the first language for a new series of experiences'? Knowing that woman, nature, life ... has 'a "second" face in addition to the first. *And* perhaps also a third' (*Ecce Homo* I, 3 and III, 1)?

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LOUIS MACKEY. *Points of View: Readings of Kierkegaard*. Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1986. Pp. xxv + 205. US$19.95. ISBN 0-8130-0824-7.

Points of View is another volume in the *Kierkegaard and Post-Modernism* series, which is edited by Mark Taylor, who also wrote a preface to the present volume. Mackey himself is an associate editor of the series, and of course his is a well-known name in Kierkegaard studies. The book is part of an attempt to look at Kierkegaard from the perspective of such 'post-modern' thinkers as Derrida, and to see Kierkegaard himself as a source for deconstructionist thinking.

Points of View is a collection of essays with no particular relation to each other, except that they are all by Mackey, and all about Kierkegaard. All of the essays except the first and last have appeared elsewhere, two in the Kierkegaard anthology edited by Josiah Thompson, the others in lesser-known volumes. The essays cover a wide time-span of Mackey's career, with the earliest appearing in 1961, and as is to be expected in such a case, show quite a change in Mackey's own point of view on Kierkegaard.

It is evident that, from a deconstructionist point of view, these characteristics are not seen as potential flaws, but virtues. One of the theses of the book, if such a book can properly be said to have theses, or at least a contention of Mackey's later essays, is that there is no unity to Kierkegaard's authorship: 'There is no such thing as the point of view for Kierkegaard's work: no superintendent signified that organizes, finally, its inscriptions. There is just another perspective, and then another, and then ...' (190). In effect, 'Soren Kierkegaard' becomes another of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, since the views of the authorship represented in Kierkegaard's own *Point of View* are discount-

ed. The whole idea of an author is in fact viewed as a kind of fiction; we are left with texts to play with in true Derridean style.

These deconstructionist games are reduplicated in the perspectives of Mackey, and his editor and preface-writer, Mark Taylor. Taylor, in commenting on the book, insists that it is not a book, and hints that we should no more take 'Louis Mackey' seriously as the author than we should take 'Kierkegaard.' For good measure, Taylor signs his own preface 'Mark C. Taylor,' as well as Mark C. Taylor.

In Mackey's own preface, he 'reviews' the essays and in some cases indicates some embarrassment over the chronologically earlier ones. This is understandable, since some of the earlier essays seem to attempt to gain the kind of point of view on Kierkegaard which Mackey now sees as impossible. At the very least, the earlier essays advance and argue philosophical theses at times, in a way which is quite similar to the 'young philosophers' Mackey excoriates for the sin of 'wanting to take Kierkegaard seriously as a philosopher' (xviii). It is likely that readers who are attracted to deconstructionist thought will share Mackey's own assessment, and will value most highly the later essays, particularly 'Starting from Scratch: Kierkegaard Unfair to Hegel,' and 'Points of View for His Work as an Author: A Report from History.' Other readers, such as myself, will be more inclined to value the earlier essays, particularly 'The View from Pisgah: A Reading of *Fear and Trembling*,' which is beautifully written, sensitive, and — to make a claim which makes no sense from a deconstructionist perspective — accurate.

One twist that Mackey gives to the deconstructionist perspective is that he sees it as a potential source of religious meaning. Just as 15 years ago Wittgensteinian fideism was seen by many as the salvation of religion, so some now look to Derrida's radical skepticism and relativism to give religion a fresh start. Derrida's attack on the philosophical tradition as a whole is conflated with Kierkegaard's more limited attack on a certain type of abstract speculation and system-building, in the hope that 'the end of philosophy' will be the re-birth of *something*. This seems to be the message of 'Starting from Scratch,' which reads *The Concept of Irony* as an argument that the discovery of nonbeing and nihilism provide the possibility of a new beginning.

'The Analysis of the Good in Kierkegaard's *Purity of Heart*' is a more traditional essay. Here Mackey argues that purity of heart is primarily to be understood as the consciousness of guilt, and he sees a parallel between Kierkegaard's view of the good as a consciousness of one's negative condition and Socratic ignorance, which constituted true wisdom. This essay is well-argued, but I found the thesis that there is no positive content to Kierkegaard's concept of the good to be less than compelling.

'The View from Pisgah' I have already praised. I will only add that I think Mackey is quite right to read *Fear and Trembling* as a figurative treatment of the situation of the Christian believer, and to insist that the true significance of the book cannot be grasped without paying special attention to the concept of sin. Mackey also rightly emphasizes that the real either-or of *Fear and Trembling* is between faith and despair, not faith and the ethical life. The real

meaning of the book does not become clear until one sees that to a sinner, the ethical life does not loom as a genuine possibility. It is because Abraham is a man of faith and offers an alternative to despair that he can be 'the guiding star who saves the anguished.'

'Once More with Feeling' is an intricate reading of *Repetition*, which pays close attention to the literary structure of the book, and again shows the heavy influence of Derrida. 'A Ram in the Afternoon' is a reading of *Philosophical Fragments* which understands the critique of 'reason' in *Fragments* by way of the deconstructionist critique of language and meaning. If Mackey wants to argue that Christianity is fundamentally irrational (which I do not think Kierkegaard wanted to do), he ought to be a bit clearer about what 'reason' is. In one place he notes Kierkegaard's view of reason as 'the broker of the finite,' but he then unhesitatingly identifies reason in this sense with the Western philosophical tradition, an identification which I do not find plausible.

'The Loss of the World in Kierkegaard's Ethics,' one of the earlier-written essays in the book, harshly criticizes Kierkegaard's ethics for its 'acosmism.' This essay is clear and I agree that the position criticized is open to censure, but I found Mackey's claim that this was Kierkegaard's view unconvincing.

The final essay, 'Points of View,' in a sense unifies the book, or rather makes sense of the disunity, by arguing that no unified interpretation of Kierkegaard is possible. I will not comment further on this essay, except to say that at times it exhibits a mean-spirited, cynical tone in its reading of Kierkegaard's life, a tone which is similar to that struck by Josiah Thompson in his biography of Kierkegaard, and in places by Henning Fenger, in his *Kierkegaard, the Myths and Their Origins*.

It is interesting to note that almost at the same that Mackey published what could have been called his 'Collected Papers on Kierkegaard,' another eminent American Kierkegaard scholar, Merold Westphal, published a collection of his articles, *Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society*. Both books are well-written, and both bring Kierkegaard into relationship with contemporary philosophical movements, as well as continue the dialog with Kierkegaard's nineteenth-century opponents. From my perspective, Westphal's book, taken as a whole, is far more interesting and insightful than Mackey's attempt to hitch Kierkegaard to the Derridean star, a star which seems to me virtually certain to be a momentary flash.

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RICHARD C. McCLEARY. *Imagination's Body*. Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America 1986. Pp. x + 137. US$25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-5237-4); US$10.25 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-5238-2).

Because McCleary's orientation in this work is towards pedagogical praxis, it is necessary to keep reminding oneself about the conditions of education in a particular environment. The essays collected here were written and presented at various occasions over a period of twenty years, from 1964 to 1983. Together they trace something of the reception or non-reception of phenomenological theory during those years. It would be fairly difficult, I imagine, for someone in a French or German context to grasp the total and adamant indifference to philosophical issues on the part of educators, professors and administrators in the United States of America. McCleary's oblique tactics of emancipation, advocating 'collective social transformation' (88) by means of a pedagogy which could free the imagination, are unable to overcome the constraints imposed by the situation.

McCleary's arguments do not mark major advances in philosophical theory. The basis is Merleau-Ponty's analysis of embodied perception, and the concomitant importance of aesthetic experience for enhanced understanding of what it is to live in the world. What makes the book interesting is the effort to derive some practical lessons for the classroom out of the insights of phenomenology. McCleary's main point is that we must grasp, remember and use the awareness of 'imagination' when we are teaching. 'Imagining' is defined by him as 'a matter of experiencing the here-and-now as expressing, through analogy, the not-here-and-now' (90-1). It is this activity of imagining which makes it possible for people to tell and understand jokes and riddles (74-88), their own history (101-11), or other cultures (89-100). Imagining is a projection from embodied knowledge and feelings to possible knowledge and feelings. The task of education should then be to 'develop imaginative techniques which, like riddles, make contexts which are familiar to learners strange and enigmatic, yet offer them meaningful directions for using their imaginations to come to know — and even to laugh at — what they had not known as the unknown reality they have been seeking to know' (72). Unfortunately, it is precisely when attempting to teach us about how to teach such techniques that McCleary runs into serious difficulties.

These difficulties are not wholly of his own making, but arise out of a fundamental mistake transmitted in phenomenological discourse. Repeatedly, McCleary performs this mistake in these essays. For example, speaking in 1968 to a group of teachers of English, McCleary used the example of the optical illusion of two lines of equal length which can be made to appear different lengths by adding arrows to the ends. It is one of the little teaching tricks passed on in philosophy. McCleary employed this demonstration in order to alienate the members of his audience from their mundane understanding of and confidence in perception. Having been shown how their perception could be de-

ceived, they were ready for the lesson that perception operates differently than they had thought. A similar performance takes place around the gender of nouns in French (62-4) or with the film about seal butchering (89-90). Such enactment of alienation is attractive because it satisfies both philosophical and pedagogical needs. As a rehearsal of eidetic reductions, it brings even the uninitiated into the proximity of phenomenology's origins. And it is something which can be *done* in the classroom. Every lesson could become a micro-drama employing the strategies of alienation of a Sartre or a Brecht, whose presence in McCleary's discussion is quite apt (101-11).

The error is that performing an alienation upon others is not the same thing as discovering for one's self, whether such discovery takes place through imagining or reasoning. When the teacher performs the alienation, the other, the pupil, will undergo both the joy of discovering the new and the pain of abandoning the old. In such a structured event, pleasure belongs in the first instance to the originating authority. To use one of McCleary's examples, the punster is resented because every pun appropriates a potential of meaning which had previously been common property. It is the accumulating pain which moves the subjects to the resistance noted by 'a contemporary American educator': 'I have students who are so "literal-minded" and "empirically biased" by their studies that they seem unable to entertain imaginary circumstances that would reveal important truths to them because they see such imaginary circumstances only as patently contrary to well-known fact' (97). This is an important piece of evidence, one which deserves some thought. I doubt that those students are unable to imagine. Rather, what they seem to be doing is reporting what the schooled imagination does to their lives.

I was provoked by this book, but not in the direction McCleary might wish. It did indeed remind me of the importance of imagination in learning. But it also revealed the ongoing interest of the American system in harnessing all human potential, even the potential of hopes, dreams and fears, for some grand design. According to McCleary, 'a pedagogical theory which speaks of the freedom of imagining in giving rise to multiple options, directions, and routes within the minds of individual human beings, and which ignores the fact that minds and human imagining are embodied in the historical struggles of subject classes to become free, can only offer us, at the decline of the era of capitalist domination, the same sort of ideological justification for ruling classes and elites that Kant's philosophy and pedagogy of imagination provided in the era of its rise' (61). The inability of Americans to imagine first that not everyone desires to be free, and second that freedom might be as Kant imagined it as an historical thinker: this inability is hard to understand.

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PETER J. McCORMICK, ed. *The Reasons of Art: Artworks and the Transformations of Philosophy / L'art a ses raisons: Les œuvres d'art: défis à la philosophie*. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1986. Pp. xviii + 496. Cdn$34.95. ISBN 0-7766-0097-4.

This is a collection of sixty-nine papers presented at the Tenth International Congress in Aesthetics at Montreal in 1985. It is excellent in many ways: there are important contributions by major aestheticians; there are informative and often imaginative historical pieces; there are helpful presentations of 'difficult' (e.g., deconstruction) or 'foreign' (e.g., Taoist) perspectives. If because of the importance and cultural diversity of the aestheticians represented it accurately reveals the aesthetic *Zeitgeist*, it is in better shape than we might have imagined — there is not nearly so much cynicism about art and about the possibility of aesthetics as recent debates in the English language literature would indicate. We can only discuss a fraction of the articles here. (About seventy percent of the articles are in English; the rest are in French or German.)

The lead article in the first ('Art and Philosophy') of the book's five sections is by Arthur Danto. It is a version of the title article of his recent book, *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art*. Here Danto continues in an elegant and provocative way his pessimistic musings about the death of art at the hands of philosophy. The villain of the piece is still Plato but Plato's accomplices, from Kant to Dickie, are indicted as well. They are all party to a conspiracy to neutralize art, which they see as magnificent and dangerous. The conspirators are the threatened practitioners of a political metaphysics having no other end than the emasculation of art. The history of philosophy is simply the history of their ideological ploys to destroy or limit art by making everyone, including the practitioners of art, believe art to be innocuous and ineffectual. Mutatis mutandis, the history of art is the history of the suppression of art. The pay-off, were the philosophical suppression of art not self-destructive, is political control. But philosophy does self-destruct in disclosing the insubstantiality and irelevance of art: being *nothing but* critique of art it publicizes its own pointlessness in disclosing the pointlessness of its object. The death of art is the death of philosophy.

Like all melodrama, Danto's heady essay ends on a happy note: art's malaise will not prove terminal if it can disengage itself from philosophy. Nor, for reasons which baffle me, will ailing philosophy perish if art frees itself from it. The same procedure which liberates art will 'cure philosophy of a paralysis it began its long history by infecting its great enemy [art] with' (22). (One would think rather that philosophy so conceived would vanish in the face of an autonomous and wholesome art.)

Rudolf Arnheim leads off the second section ('Theories of Art') with a challenge to the relativism popular in contemporary philosophy and in contemporary art. He calls upon aestheticians and critics to reassume their historial responsibility to articulate and defend the criteria which enable us to make the art/non-art, good art/bad art distinctions. His central notion is that art is

a qualitative category, not some domain of entities. What makes things 'art' is their capacity to express networks of forces reflecting features of the dynamics of human existence. Art is then something which deepens our awareness of ourselves and of the world. It *does* something, something rather 'philosophical' in a Socratic sense, and the power and completeness with which it does its proper work is the standard of its goodness. This probably allows for, particularly under the rubric, 'bad art,' most of what counts as art now. Arnheim is sensible to the fact that what 'art' is calls for a decision on our part, but there are objective criteria (psycho-/socio-/historico-...) in terms of which to make a decision, and once that decision has been made, there are objective criteria for interpretation and evaluation.

Francis Sparshott contributes a meaty piece in which he catalogues the ways in which art works are inherently contestable, derives the conclusion that 'an artwork is an artwork only under an interpretation' (128), shows what is wrong with Danto's version of this thesis, discusses the ways in which the status of interpretation is itself contestable, and concludes by showing that, supposing philosophy is essentially hermeneutical (concerned with the nature of meaning and meaning analysis) then philosophy and artworks condition one another. That is, philosophy is limited by (or its pretensions are exposed by) certain 'facts' about artworks (facts of meaning following from artworks being interpreted in determinate ways). Artworks for their part are limited by philosophy in that philosophy can show them to bear a determinate variety of legitimate interpretations. The limitation of philosophy by artworks is harmless except in pathological times, such as those we presently enjoy. Sparshott draws from his argument for the contestability of artworks an argument for the contestability of philosophy, and for the contestability of contestability claims. Along the way he uses the argument for the plurality of legitimate interpretations of artworks (and for a plurality of legitimate aesthetic theories) to suggest that there might also be a plurality of equally legitimate philosophical perspectives. Sparshott's commentator, Tore Nordenstam, attempts to kick the prop — the view that all interpretations are inherently contestable — out from under Sparshott's argument, but three and a quarter pages is too little space within which to rehabilitate epistemology.

In the third section ('Turning Points in the History of Aesthetics'), Joseph Margolis offers a very fine account of deconstruction and its victims. He shows deconstruction's importance, its significant difference from other fashionable philosophic movements of an historicist stamp, deconstruction's hopeless position of having to subvert itself in subverting everything else, and its valuable payoff: it shows us the limits of a theory of the nature of the text, of the nature of the undeniable *achievement* of reading and interpreting a text. He races with wit and verve through large chunks of theory but still ends up with what is probably a just account of what is wrong and right about deconstruction and why we do not want to hear what is right about it. His commentator, José Jiménez, tries to don a cheery face before the wreakage of aesthetics and philosophy with which Margolis and his enemies leave us.

In the fourth section ('Art, Knowledge, and Evaluation'), George Dickie takes another shot at Danto's *mafiosa* and at the same time covertly garners evidence for use in his attack against specifically aesthetic characteristics and experiences. According to Dickie, Kant got it wrong when he proclaimed the non-referential character of aesthetic experience. Hume got it right when he accomodated referentiality in his theory of taste. Yet Kant prevailed and we must now undo the damage.

Göran Hermerén leads off the final section ('The Real, the Fictional, and the Artworld'). He argues that art works function like metaphors (à la Max Black) — they provide us with a filter through which we view the world permitting us to see features of it that we missed before. He strikes a fine balance in his theory between the claims of realism and the claims of hermeneutics.

In a very important article Nicholas Wolterstorff develops a theory of the nature of fictional entities. He shows (a) how the fact of literary characters creates embarrassment for orthodox analytic philosophers who make being and existence co-extensive and who refuse to allow predications *re* non-existent objects; (b) how a Meinongian revision of the orthodox perspective fails to eliminate the paradox. Out of the ruins of the Meinongian strategy he constructs a solution: fictional characters are not possessed of non-ordinary properties, but stand in non-ordinary relations to ordinary properties. But he then comes perilously near to Meinong again by discriminating, following van Inwagen, between properties which one *possesses* and properties which one *holds*. (The distinction is left a bit obscure — a liability in the case of distinctions meant to dissipate paradoxes.) Supposing we could get clear on the distinction we might, Wolterstorff suggests, find that some properties can *only* be held and some can *only* be possessed and can use this insight to avoid making ontological commitments in talking of fictional characters. He concludes, after Aristotle, that fictional characters are kinds or types.

Kendall Walton ties up all the loose ends, aesthetic, metaphysical, and semantical, in a theory of fictional entities by his familiar ploy of subsuming everything under a Wittgensteinian game theory. The key lies in understanding what it means to be caught up in a story. To be caught up in a story is to be engaged in a game of pretending — pretending that fictional entities exist in some sense or other (they don't), pretending that 'being a fictional character' names a property (it doesn't), pretending that readers make assertions about fictional characters and states of affairs (they don't), etc. Walton's argument might just leave analytic orthodoxy proof against Wolterstorff's objections. There is however a price to be paid — our belief in the truth and seriousness of literature.

Peter van Inwagen's very fine article shows that Walton has a bit more explaining to do within the framework of quantifier logic before we are constrained to agree that all sentences about fictional entities can be recast as sentences without an ontological commitment to imaginary beings. He delimits a kind of sentence that we can accept about fictional entities that Walton has not accounted for, and challenges him to devise a paraphrase of it conform-

ing to the model he proposed. Van Inwagen has, for the moment, the last word in an interesting exchange with Walton.

There is much else of interest in this very large collection which is unduly neglected in this account of it.

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JAY NEWMAN. *Fanatics and Hypocrites*. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books 1986. Pp. 151. US$19.95. ISBN 0-87975-348-X.

Cruelty is made easier by fanaticism and hypocrisy. If a person becomes passionately convinced, perhaps by convincing himself, that a repugnant action is right because 'The Party' endorses it, or 'God' commands it, or 'Cool Reason' dictates it, such convictions tend to remove obstacles to cruelty. Thus the fanatic, if a Christian conquistador, can torture to convert; if a Nazi, can implement the Final Solution; if a Communist, can exterminate kulaks. Hypocritical talk of conversion went hand in hand with unprecedented slaughter for the sake of gold. And the conquistador could return to Spain not only rich but also as 'superbly Christian.' However, precisely because they are such effective catalysts of immorality, 'fanaticism' and 'hypocrisy' are widely misused as weapons of ideological warfare or irresponsible condemnation. Hence, there is a need for a better understanding of these concepts.

Newman's aim is to shed light on the phenomena of fanaticism and hypocrisy and show them to be parallel perversions of 'the virtue of healthy, socially constructive commitment.' The discussion is focused within the context of the Aristotelian framework of virtue. Proper commitment is viewed as 'a mean,' an intermediate state of character, between the vice of excessive commitment on the one hand, and the vice of deficient commitment on the other. To hit the mean in commitment, we must understand its extremes. It is this practical concern that motivates the proffered theories of fanaticism and hypocrisy.

Commitment is characterized as the acceptance of a world-view. Such an acceptance includes a person's most important beliefs, emotions and values: beliefs and convictions about the nature of life and the world; a system of values and principles governing action and giving life unity and meaning. Commitment is at the core of one's personal identity; through it we define ourselves. If this is commitment, its perversion cuts deep. Unlike, say, shoe fetishism,

which may not affect a person's character at all, the perversion of commitment is tantamount to perverting the whole character.

Fanaticism and hypocrisy are said to have parallel structures. The fanatic is depicted as an 'overbeliever,' 'overemoter,' 'overvaluer'; the hypocrite as an 'underbeliever,' 'underemoter,' 'undervaluer.' The marks of the fanatic are: excessive certitude and conviction which outstrip the evidence for belief; a superintensity and a raging emotional life; an obsession that prevents him from paying attention to the plurality of things he values and leads him to adopt a callous attitude and destructive course of action toward innocent human beings. This puts the hypocrite's portrait in bold relief as a 'weak' believer who leaves his central beliefs vague and fails to take them into account. He is not a conscientious thinker but forgetful and lazy; his emotional life lacks energy and vitality; his actions and behaviour conflict with the values he professes, thereby displaying deficient commitment.

But avoiding the extremes of commitment is not sufficient for proper commitment. The latter must also have an 'existential dimension' and its world-view must be 'compatible' with truth. The existential elements center on our responses to our awareness of free agency and on the reflective awareness of the role that one's commitment plays in one's life. The agent 'often contemplates his worldview's viability; while he allows that objective evidence has had a compelling influence on his basic judgments, there is a creative dimension to his having selected, shaped and systematized them.'

Admittedly, commitment often degenerates into fanaticism and hypocrisy. Perhaps we would all be better off then without it, refusing to take on world-views. Newman's answer to this sceptical challenge is that our need for commitment is a brute fact of human nature. We need commitment like we need food, shelter, clothes. Moreover, fully conscious commitment makes the burdens of life easier to bear and enables us to see human life as something that matters.

Such are the main ideas and arguments of the book. Newman writes in an accessible, engaging and inspired manner. His theories tend to illuminate neglected aspects of moral psychology; the given analyses are often perceptive and the critical discussion of the related work by social psychologists shows that philosophy can benefit, and be benefited by, the social sciences. Now for some questions and reflections.

A central claim throughout the book is that when we call someone a fanatic or hypocrite 'it is the mode of commitment that is being assessed, not necessarily what one is committed to.' Newman thinks that the 'beliefs and values of the fanatic may be true, sound and reasonable'; and one may be properly or fanatically or hypocritically devoted 'to the same thing.' But can one detach so readily the mode of commitment from the object of commitment in such assessments? If one can, then what counts as excess, mean or deficiency becomes a purely quantitative matter; as if one could determine who is a fanatic, a hypocrite or properly committed by simply determining the pitch of their conviction or emotional intensity! This is strange. For it conflicts with a salient criticism we make of fanatics: that their understanding of the object of their

commitment is somehow irrational, flawed, myopic, dangerously simple-minded. Hence their actions and emotional intensity are misdirected. Newman seems to forget this. But unless he acknowledges this point, how can he ground his view that fanaticism is a form of perversion? What is being perverted here? Could we lament with Yeats if he said in 'The Second Coming': 'and the best are full of passionate intensity' instead of 'and the worst are full of passionate intensity'?

Fanaticism is to be regarded as a vice. It can be avoided, we are told, by 'exercising our reason and will, by summoning our rational capacities ... .' We are 'responsible for this moral failing.' But if we accept excessive emotionality and conviction as the main features of 'overcommitment,' what can our *reason* and *efforts of will* get a grip on here? Newman's theory seems to lend less support to his claim that fanaticism is a vice, and more support to the claim that fanaticism is a psycho-pathological phenomenon too deeply rooted to be cured without a clinical specialist: a claim he wishes to reject.

Reading Newman enables us to see many hitherto unnoticed similarities between fanatics and hypocrites. However, this search for similarities sometimes results in ignoring some differences. (Vive le différence!) For example, the hypocrite's portrait as a 'forgetful, lazy thinker' is unconvincing. Many a successful hypocrite is a cool operator, carefully calculating his every move so that he can promote his own interest at the expense of others. This feature of self-promoting rationality contrasts with the fanatic's self-destructive irrationality.

This brings up a related point: is it clear that hypocrisy is fanaticism's fellow vice? *Some* hypocrites are committed to 'looking out for number one' and little else. Hence it would be misguided to describe them as 'deficient in commitment.' For such hypocritical amoralists, morality is an ideological device to hoodwink people. They put the mask of morality on when it serves their interest; when not, they drop it. Witness Uriah Heep in Dickens. Moral weakness seems to be a better candidate for such a contrary vice. For the weak-willed reveal their commitment by regretting their moral failures and feeling guilty about them.

One of the conditions of proper commitment is that its content must be 'compatible with the truth.' Metaphysical and moral beliefs that are 'patently false are improper objects of commitment.' Is 'compatibility' sufficient to secure *reasonableness*? Perhaps belief in accordance with the best available evidence seems more promising. But the more we stress 'the creative dimension in selecting, shaping and organizing judgments,' the more our wishes, desires and aesthetic sense influence us and the less fit there tends to be between the available evidence and our worldview.

To conclude: while reading Newman I was haunted by the following thought. Could this book be a sustained effort by a properly committed humanist to rescue and transform the traditional virtue of faith? And if so, can such a virtue be successfully invented in a cultural milieu whose most conspicuous feature is, if we are to believe Lyotard, 'une incredulité à l'égard des

métarécits.' But then, who was that obscure *penseur* who said that the task of philosophy is not to describe the world but to change it?

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TOM REGAN. *Bloomsbury's Prophet: G.E. Moore and the Development of His Moral Philosophy*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1987. Pp. xix + 307. US$29.95. ISBN 0-87722-446-3.

Like Ben Jonson, G.E. Moore is revered but rarely read. In part this is his own fault. When Moore became a legend he became unapproachable. And once Wittgenstein stole his thunder he was studied less and less. Moore's reputation as an egoless maniac whose single-minded dedication to 'analysis' made him a patron saint of contemporary philosophy did not help. As an idol Moore had quirks but no flaws. Russell once asked Moore, 'Have you ever told a lie?' Moore said, 'Yes.' Russell replied, 'That was it.' Whether to illustrate self-referential paradox or ennoble Moore's character, the story charms. Unfortunately, in Moore's case 'the myth is so much the man' (67) that it inhibits serious scholarship.

Regan refuses to be deterred. Regan's Moore is a man whose '... feet were planted squarely in different centuries at the same time' (167). He did not believe in God, but for that very reason he agonized over the meaning of life. Until he wrote *Principia Ethica* (*PE*) he was '... unable to find an object in whose intrinsic goodness' he could depend (163). From an early age, religious questions were pivotal (41), as befits a late Victorian. But for Moore the conflict was with Dionysius, not Darwin: 'with his background in the classics Moore is temperamentally at home in a polytheistic universe' (209). Yet, like Nietzsche or (thereafter) Jane Harrison and Francis Cornford, Moore intuited that the Greek gods were social and psychological metaphors, not spiritual entities or scientific principles. Hence he could not worship what he had already deconstructed. 'Once enthroned as the Defender of Common Sense, Moore was forever reluctant to give up his seat' (92) or to admit that reliance on the external world is itself a superstition.

How did Moore resolve his intellectual crisis, and set a standard for his peers to emulate? According to Regan, he did it by devising a set of six rules (objectivity, universality, natural goods, ideal, conduct, and method: see 57-8) to guide and govern ethical theory. Moore states and defends these six criter-

ia in *PE* and later essays. But as usual, the finished product conceals the mental process which generated it. Therefore, Regan excavates Moore's early (pre-1903) writings, to determine why Moore found it so necessary to rebuild ethics from the ground up. The context of discovery bears more than an accidental relationship to the context of justification. For Moore's six principles rest on a bed of imperatives that Moore adopted in the course of his struggle to affirm an identity while denying both the seductive (supernatural) and the reductive (material) world-views of the age (202). These axioms are as follows:

First, to tolerate pluralism: '... the Ideal may consist of an infinite number of instances of an infinite number of positive goods. In the Ideal infinity may be added to infinity' (130; cf. 265). Second, to insist that no one may dictate or impose a way of life on others: '*individuals* must judge for themselves what things ought to exist, what things are worth having for their own sakes ... Every attempt to take this freedom (and this responsibility) away from the individual rests on the same kind of fallacy,' the notorious naturalistic fallacy (204; italics and parentheses in original). Third, to acknowledge that 'ultimate values' may differ yet have something in common, namely, that their proponents care deeply about them. Respect for the right to make passionate commitments overcomes barriers between them, creating a meta-ideal that '... can satisfy the natural human longing for a worthy object of belief' even for an atheist or agnostic (276). Fourth and most important, always to concede the possibility of tragic error: 'the individual must make a leap of faith into the uncertain universe of intrinsic value not once but many times' (209).

So interpreted, Moore reads like a synthesis of Dewey, J.S. Mill, Kierkegaard and Paul Tillich. That is far from the genial but plodding exponent of 'some tame tigers exist' whom we have mothballed for several decades. Yet there is not an ounce of fabrication in Regan's account, despite his imagined conversations between members of Moore's circle. I am struck, too, by Moore's awareness that too much storm and stress is both self-indulgent and dangerous. Faced with the prospect of groundless choice and action, the 'happy warrior' (144, 240) leaps into the abyss joyfully and without hesitation. But '... Moore is too much the rationalist to find cognitive absolution in the universal mystical wisdom of the noble warrior' or to condone the blood-letting of the fanatic (273), phenomena all too common since Moore's time. Unlike Yoga or Loyola, 'Moore offers, not a potion, not a set of mystical exercises, not a diet of denial and restraint, but an *argument* that sets his readers free' (242; italics in original).

It follows that only those who are willing to submit to the discipline of argument are entitled to deem it a failure (274). Like Mill's competent judges, souls in pursuit of the highest good are not nihilists but experts who do not equate unprovability with untenability. It is one thing to propound a bad argument, but quite another not to argue at all. Thus to reject ethics you must practice it. But to practice it is to enter into a community of seekers who share the same regard for truth if nothing else. Hence even the nihilist is logically compelled to take part in a dialogue whose implicit premise is what Jaspers calls 'loving strife.' That is why Moore did not view the demise of traditional

ethics with alarm. One may dismantle provisional morality or wreck an ideology of long standing, but no one can undermine the basic rules that make civilized discourse possible (227). In that sense, ethics is never obsolete.

Of course, not everyone realizes this, either because they are too worldly or too inarticulate, too coarse or too preoccupied with selfish ends. At times reversion to elitism corrupts Moore's egalitarianism: 'the barbarians outside Bloomsbury did not live as they ought. The Bloomsbury elect did' (247). If this promotes human freedom, we may justly prefer bondage. Yet the vicious Edwardian stereotype does not fit either the aesthete or the Cambridge don. Underneath his poached-egg exterior, Moore was sensitive, both to hypocrisy and to official acts of injustice (178-80). He said little about politics and nothing about sex: '... spared Marx, and escaped Freud' (253). Yet he knew what was involved or implied in the games he elected not to play. And so did his disciples, especially when homosexuality or British colonialism were at stake.

How does the new Moore compare with his stilted predecessor? He is much richer, '... a Promethean figure [who] stole fire from the gods' (282). Even as an exotically crabbed stylist, 'Moore gave to the literature of philosophy a voice as unmistakably his own as Virginia Woolf gave to the novel' (285). Thus Regan creates a new myth to replace the old. Instead of Moore the enigmatic Socratic who patiently diagnosed linguistic muddles, we get Moore the liberator who taught high-strung artists to prize nonconformity and showed dialecticians how to reduce stifling moral dogmas to absurdity. But there is a less shallow side to Moore's achievement which Regan invites us to ponder. The naturalistic fallacy destroyed value, only to recreate it in the image of the isolation test (204, 273). Even when '... cast adrift in a sea of value pluralism' (267) Moore knew how to reach the shore. Though he rejected theodicies, he out-Leibnized Leibniz in positing '... the love of all that is good, including the love of love itself ... as the logical limit of what can be valued for its own sake' (266). This vision, already announced in 1898 in 'The Elements of Ethics' (122), unites Attic impulses (the contemplation of beauty, goodness, and contemplation itself; see 131) with Christian *agape*. This is the metaphysics of virtue that Moore bequeathed on an unsuspecting world. This was how he wove together the strands of a culture that was already falling apart. This is why as we near the end of a tumultuous century it pays to reconsider Moore: not just to learn the '... worldly values that are inseparable from Bloomsbury' (92), but to settle accounts with ourselves.

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HOLMES ROLSTON, III. *Science and Religion, a Critical Survey*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1987. Pp. x + 358. US$34.95. ISBN 0-87722-437-4.

In an age of penetrating scientific and philosophical analysis, the ability to synthesize and to relate disciplines becomes a rare skill. The amount of information in each discipline is overwhelming; the risks in writing sketchy summaries are enormous. Most scholars, faced with these obstacles, avoid cross disciplinary work. Rolston is admirably suited in background and in scholarly work to take on the task of synthesis of distinct disciplines. His background in philosophy of science and in theology, added to his service in the field of environmental ethics has brought him into areas of science, economics, history and theology. In environmental ethics, specialization leads to conflicts of values which the specialist is ill equipped to handle. Similarly, the specialist in science or theology is ill equipped to handle conflicts which arise between science and religion. A person with Rolston's background does have the preconditions for the task.

Science and Religion begins with four methodological concerns: first, truth is identified as a correspondence between theory and experience; second, paradigms are set out as essential to each discipline; third, scientific objectivity is contrasted with personal religious involvement; fourth, a key distinction between causal concerns and concerns with meaning is established. This last distinction is crucial to the success of the enterprise of both distinguishing and relating science and religion. By 'cause,' Ralston means empirically observable constant conjunctions; 'meaning' signifies the 'inner significance of something.'

Following the introductory methodological chapter, the book is divided into three sections: two chapters on physical and biological science; two chapters on the social sciences, psychology and sociology; and two chapters on nature, history and on God. In physics, Newtonian mechanics and study of matter and motion is seen as primary, replacing the formal and final causes of Greek and mediaeval science. Quantum mechanics adds the problem of indeterminacy and relativity theory provides a synthesis of matter and energy. Science in Newton, Bohr or Einstein need not be hostile to theology, in Rolston's view. Into these complex systems, human presence provides an historical dimension and an opening to the theological order. In a similar way, biological, biochemical, and evolutionary discoveries provide exciting but incomplete paradigms which are complemented by a 'cybernetics of life' or a 'self mastering system with a control centre' (124). The reintroduction of teleology brings back a connection with theology.

The social sciences deal with persons: psychology deals with individuals and their relationships; sociology deals with communities of persons and their relationships. In psychology, Freudian and behavioural approaches to human nature have undermined the notions of agency and of personality. Humanistic psychology brings back the self-actualizing component, but in Rolston's view it neglects the self-transcending aspect of human existence. Self-

transcendence is seen in communities but historicist and functional accounts of social organization by such experts as Pareto and Durkheim have undermined the role of agents in the social process. A more truly human social science would see social science as interpretative, and re-introduce meaning and purpose and ultimately religion.

It is in the intersection of nature and history that Rolston finds the needed integration of the causal search and the search for meaning. Various kinds of naturalisms, hard or soft, and eastern religions are unable to bring nature and history into a non-reductive unity which gives scope for appreciation of the narrative aspect of history. A rediscovery of history in its narrative form can make sense even of suffering which is the result of a narrative and a 'cruciform' history. There are at least three models for a natural and historical synthesis: a divided scientific-existential model as in Bultmann, an integral process model as in Whitehead and Hartshorne, or a 'trans-scientific' as in Barth and Rahner. The last is the preferred model, but the others have significant and complementary roles to play. Each has its own weaknesses. The best model is classically rooted, closely allied to the natural sciences, with a focus on the person and on the opening to transcendence through the person.

Ralston has succeeded in bringing his own unique background into full play in this work; when he is not at home in a discipline he calls on experts in the field to assess his survey. There could be even wider use of this salutary approach with some indications of critical reactions to his position. He succeeds as well in building bridges between science and religion. Much hangs on his use of the distinction between a causal search and a search for meaning, and on his notion of truth.

The distinction between a causal search and a search for meaning is difficult to maintain. Classical Greek and mediaeval authors integrated causal process and meaning in agent causality. Efficient and final causes were closely allied. Rolston's restriction of the meaning of 'cause' to the Humean model cuts off this interesting avenue through which persons bring causality and personhood into harmony. In exploring this avenue one would have to avoid the extreme anthropomorphic interpretation of the universe characteristic of some classical sources.

Rolston's discussion of truth is also enticing. In the beginning he holds a correspondence theory which he later modifies and finally replaces with a pragmatic theory of truth, a 'truth in doing' but even this is not sufficient and he opts in the end for a truth which makes life 'just, free, spirited and spiritual.' Much more needs to be said about this final notion of truth as somehow 'carrying value' (344-5).

Science and Religion is a penetrating and provocative book. In spite of some reservations about the distinction of cause and meaning and some concern that the conflicting notions of truth be more clearly outlined, I think it succeeds in its general concern to both distinguish and relate disciplines. It can be read by both scientific and religious specialist and non-specialist with great profit. It is also accessible to a general audience. In making a case for the synthesis of scientific and theological truths, Rolston's aim is to combine

the Greek insight that the unexamined life is not worth living with the Hebrew insight that the uncommitted life is not worth examining (338). In this quest, he merits his presence in long and distinguished philosophical company.

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JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. *The Family Idiot. Gustave Flaubert 1821-1857*. Vol. 2. Translated by Carol Cosman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987. Pp. vii + 435. US$27.50. ISBN 0-226-73510-9.

In 1971-2 Éditions Gallimard brought out the three completed volumes of Sartre's *L'Idiot de la famille*; a fourth volume, which was to include an analysis of *Mme Bovary*, remained in unpublished *brouillon* state at Sartre's death in 1980. This extraordinary study of the psychological, social and aesthetic evolution of the young Gustave Flaubert has had a profound effect on Sartrean studies. Commentators, particularly those interested in political philosophy, were caught off-guard by this apparent departure from the increasing concern to integrate in some way the tenets of Sartrean atheist existentialism (with its emphasis on the individual) with certain socio-political theses of Marxism. Theoretically, with the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1959), and practically, with his ever-increasing involvement during the 60s and 70s with left-wing causes, Sartre seemed to have discarded his interest in individual psychology and in the meaning of literature (for the creator or for the reader).

The reality of Sartre's situation was far more complex. As his friend the psychiatrist J-B. Pontalis indicates in his preface to the posthumous publication of *Le scénario Freud* (Paris: Gallimard 1984 [English translation reviewed *C.P.R./R.C.C.P.* 7. 8 (August 1987) 322-4]), Sartre had always had a deep interest in manifestations of human psychopathology (particularly in hysteria). When, in 1958, he accepted John Huston's invitation to write a film-script about Sigmund Freud's discovery (or invention?) of the Oedipus complex, he had already begun to amass notes for the study on Flaubert. To the question 'que peut-on savoir d'un homme aujourd'hui, par exemple Flaubert?' Sartre intended a response which would be, whatever the cost to himself or to the eventual reader, *totalizing*. And if the published *magnum opus* has not at-

tained this god-like omniscience, it has, at the very least, had the following consequences: it has shown how the investigations which led to the *Critique* were not so much a disavowal of the earlier personal ontology as an attempt to 'situate' this 'self' within a wider socio-political context; it has, without question, brought a new and vigorous display of interpretive scholarship to the field of Flaubertian studies (his documentary research is a model of its type); it has opened a rich field (potentially a minefield) in the domain of the 'displaced autobiography' — for Sartre who gives us such insights into the significance of Flaubert's various recorded adolescent crises reveals at the same time (this can be shown by a parallel reading of his own autobiography *Les Mots*) a disarming affinity with the subject of his study.

Fredric Jameson was no doubt right when he wrote in his review of the first volume of the American translation: 'The work can be described most simply as a dialectic, which shifts between two seemingly alternative interpretations of Flaubert's destiny: a psychoanalytic one, centered on his family and on his childhood, and a Marxist one, whose guiding themes are the status of the artist in Flaubert's period and the historical ideological contradictions faced by his social class, the bourgeoisie.' But one must be careful of terms here. Sartre's use of 'psychoanalysis' is not necessarily Freudian. As the breakaway disciple Wilhelm Stekel (much admired by Sartre) noted in *Technique of Analytical Psychotherapy*: 'An outcry would have been raised if Lister had declared only those procedures worthy to be entitled *antiseptic* which he had first utilized in the campaign against microbes' ([London: The Bodley Head 1950], xvii). Sartre's investigation of Flaubert's psyche is non-dogmatic and only rarely, and with extreme caution, uses Freudian notions. By the same token his use of Marxist terminology must be read within the framework of his personal understanding and acceptance of those terms. In fact it is only in the third volume of the French edition that Sartre steps outside the personal world of Flaubert's youth to examine in a 'Marxian' manner what he calls 'la névrose objective' of the society and period to which Flaubert belonged.

Carol Cosman is to be congratulated on having produced the excellent, and eminently readable, translation of her Volume II of *L'Idiot*. I say 'of *her* Volume II' advisedly, for what we have now available in English with the appearance of this book is merely the completion of her translation of the Gallimard Volume I. The translated text which appears here corresponds to pp. 653-1104 of Volume I in the Édition Gallimard. This is, then, the second of a projected *five*-volume English-language edition of Sartre's study.

The first volume of her translation (corresponding to pp. 1-648 of Gallimard, I) was flawed by some infelicities of style and some downright mistranslations. Victor Brombert was highly critical of the disservice done to Flaubert and to Sartre. It is heartening to see, and a fine example of scholarly co-operation, the translator's note which reads: 'I would like to give special thanks to Françoise Meltzer, Charles A. Krance, and Victor Brombert for their help in preparing this volume for publication.' The effect of Carol Cosman's modesty and Brombert's generosity has been to achieve a translation which

is accurate, readable and which manages to give to the English-speaking reader a 'flavour' of Sartre's personal style.

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CHHATRAPATI SINGH. *Law From Anarchy to Utopia*. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1986. Pp. xxi + 299. Cdn$82.50; US$29.95. ISBN 0-19-561704-5.

Chhatrapati Singh in this book attempts to provide an answer to the question: What is the nature of law? This question, Singh argues, must take priority over all social philosophies because philosophy of law presents 'the conditions of peace and justice which are necessary for economic, political, religious, scientific, and cultural growth, including the growth of all other social philosophies' (vii). Singh is seeking not an account of some particular legal system, nor even an account of some class of legal systems, e.g., constitutional democracies, but a legal theory that will accommodate any society; in other words, the nature of law.

To do this he takes on the dominant Western legal theories — Legal Positivism and Natural Law Theory. The failing of legal theorists, according to Singh, has been to suppose that these theories represent the only two alternatives for an account of law. Singh wants to defend a third alternative 'which looks for the substance and justification of basic law in the communal mode of human existence and the teleology of its development' (ix). To explore this third alternative to legal theory, he employs some basic Indian concepts, and uses Indian methodology ('every branch of knowledge must have its own theory of proof, *pramansastra*'). Nevertheless, he is working in a Western framework, drawing extensively on Kant.

Singh believes that anarchy is a 'non-legal order which [is] not based in human rationality and co-operation' (xiii). Such an order is pathological, because it will deprive people of freedom and retard natural growth. Utopia is a totally non-anarchic state of affairs within society, by which Singh means 'the best normatively possible social realm which all rational human beings intend to (or hope to) realize on Earth some day' (xiii). Legal theory can tell us 'the rational provisions (in terms of legal principle) in accordance with which conditions can exist that are conducive to the realization of the best social

system ...' (xiii-xiv). Hence, Singh sees his task as articulating the legal conditions for utopia.

The sections of Singh's book fall out of his conception of law (13), viz., that 'law is a normative system created and sustained to bring about just conditions in a society.' In the first part Singh discusses the formal characteristics of law which make it a system. They are: 1) the propositions must be systematizable, i.e., basic ones should be distinguishable from derivative ones; 2) the propositions must be complete; and 3) the correlated propositions must be consistent. Singh shows what is true of law as a system and argues that these systematic requirements are grounded in the moral purposes of law.

In the second part of the book, Singh analyzes what is true of law as a normative system by first considering the nature of normative systems in general. He begins the discussion by distinguishing normative discourse from factual discourse. Next he sets out five requirements which need to be satisfied for a system to be normative. The five include material requirements, both physical and psychological; heuristic requirements, which tell one how the elements of a system are to be organized; hermeneutical requirements; teleological requirements; and finally epistemological requirements, which include both a theory of propositions and semantics. He discusses all but the last requirement in the second part of the book. Singh's discussion of the requirements of normative systems is both original and insightful. He concludes this part of the book by pulling together the basic requirements for legal theory.

To resolve the conflict between different theories of law, Singh argues that we must investigate the epistemological status of basic legal propositions. He argues that the most basic criterion for distinguishing between different normative systems is to be found by investigating their epistemological foundations. Singh devotes a large portion of his work to the examination of the epistemological foundations of law, since, as he argues, once the legal system has been distinguished and identified on the basis of its epistemological foundations, its substantive aspects can be clearly described. He discusses, at great length, the status and function of different types of propositions. Singh then goes on to see how other legal theories have attempted to satisfy the requirements of legal theory and what sorts of propositions they have appealed to, to fulfil their task. He sets out three types of responses, exemplified in the work of Austin, Hart, and Kelsen, and offers cogent reasons to find those answers wanting.

In the final part of the book, Singh sets out the juristic requirements which he takes as necessary and sufficient conditions for a normative system to be a legal system. To explicate the juristic requirements there are four basic questions which must be answered: 1) What conditions make the legal system possible (transcendentally possible)? 2) What conditions make the legal system actual? 3) What conditions maintain the continuity of a legal system? and 4) What conditions make the legal system efficacious?

There are two significant conclusions which Singh has attempted to establish. The first is that law has its own synthetic a priori propositions and that these propositions are independent of other foundational principles. In the

Kantian tradition, the above establishes the possibility of the legal science which is neither part of political science nor theology nor any other branch of knowledge. The other significant conclusion which Singh claims to have established is that epistemological rationalism is the only viable theory of law. This is because 'all basic legal propositions are provided by reason and are also justified within the bounds of reason' (253). Singh argues that law is external morality (in Kant's sense) and hence that the classification that Kant makes of moral theories is applicable to legal theories. Legal theories can be classified as autonomous and heteronomous. Heteronomous legal theories, which he argues include the Legal Positivist theories and Natural Law theories, ground legal obligation on factors other than the individual's will to determine his actions, e.g., legal obligation is based on fear of coercion or based on the obligation to follow what God wills. On the other hand, autonomous legal theories, such as the one he presents, 'justify the basis of legal obligation in the individual's capacity to determine his actions' (253).

Singh's book puts forth some interesting and provocative theses, backed by complex and rigorous arguments. It is ambitious work that is well worth close study for all those interested in philosophy of law.

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PETER SMITH and O.R. JONES. *The Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986. Pp. xviii + 282. US$34.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-32078-X); US$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-31250-7).

This is a textbook. Its stated aim, which it fulfils admirably, is to provide a clear introduction to the main issues that arise in the philosophy of mind. The topics treated, in addition to the central theme of the overall nature of the mind, include sensation and perception, thought and belief, desire and action, reasons and causes, and the freedom of the will. After Descartes, to whose arguments for the distinctions of mind and body one chapter is devoted, the most frequently referred to philosophers are Aristotle, Hume, Ryle, Armstrong and Wittgenstein. But important ideas of quite a number of others — for example, Paul Churchland and Davidson — are expounded and discussed, and a chronological table with dates is included of the philosophers, from Socrates to Ryle, who are mentioned in the text. There is a 'Guide to Further Reading' (rather brief) and a useful bibliography.

Part I of the book is a discussion of dualism. An introduction, that makes use of the *Phaedo* and Hume, is followed by two chapters of critically considered argumentation in support of dualism and two more that raise difficulties for the theory and lead — following a brief treatment of theory-choice and mention of Lakatos — to an assessment of the dualist project as being 'in a very badly degenerating phase' (67).

This treatment of dualism, though generally excellent, largely neglects the non-Cartesian alternative of 'property dualism.' Thus the issue is made to appear to be simply that of whether or not there are immaterial *Minds*. Lacking too is any adequate consideration of what 'physical' (or 'material') *means*. The authors, like many others, are simply content to identify nonphysical objects with 'entities of a kind that are not recognized by physics (the science of matter)' (45). Their discussion (22-3) of the argument from (alleged) out-of-body experiences will be found unsatisfactory by all except those who are not disposed to take the argument seriously in the first place. For we are simply informed that 'we have no good reason to suppose that anyone ever does better than seem to have out-of-body perceptions' and the admitted-to-be conceivable case of thoroughly reliable perceptions of this sort appears to be regarded as one that, were it to be found, would need no scientific explanation. I would rather not be *told* — similar remarks occur elsewhere — that a certain point is 'fascinating and (once you understand it), deeply attractive' (34). The authors appear to believe (55) that malaria is due to a virus. The causative organism is in fact, as many readers will know, a protozoon.

Part II develops a functionalist alternative to dualism. Its first chapter portrays Aristotle (not wholly convincingly) as the father of functionalism. There follow, in accordance with a plan to approach the mind 'from the outside in,' two chapters on perception, in which an Armstrongian analysis is argued for; one on action (and volition); and two on belief. The last two chapters are devoted to a discussion of functionalist theories as such.

The functionalism advocated is of the 'soft' variety. That is, it characterizes mental states in terms of what Armstrong (as quoted on p. 71) calls 'behaviour proper,' which is behaviour so described as to imply a relationship to the mind, rather than in terms of 'physical behaviour,' which is merely physical action of the body. The authors hold, as against Armstrong, that this sort of functionalism is not viciously circular. They do not convince me. Neither am I persuaded by several of the claims and arguments that they advance on the way to arriving at their functionalist stand: that sense-data (100) and images (139) would presumably be non-physical objects; that 'if there is a problem in understanding what it is to see an outer physical object, then there is going to be exactly the same problem in understanding what it is to "see" an inner mental object' (100); and that what we know concerning the adaptability of the brain shows that there can be no way of characterizing a nonphysical state such that just those who hold a certain belief are in that state (160).

Part III has two chapters on sensations, one on thinking, one (wholly excellent) on reasons and causes, and one on causality and freedom. A phenomenological account of sensations is considered (with concentration on

the case of pains) and rejected, and a functionalist account put in its place. That we are continuously conscious of our pains while not, for example, of our beliefs is explained in terms of our having the (activated) belief that we are in pain (213). Thinking through a problem in one's head is identified with any process that has for the agent sufficiently many of the same causes and effects as would thinking through the problem out loud (235). Freedom is thought to be made possible by the non-existence of folk-psychological laws that determine our actions coupled with the existence of physical (neurophysiological) laws that do determine them (263).

This book contains little that is original, in the way either of doctrines or of arguments for them. But that, in a textbook, is hardly a disadvantage. The positions taken — the tone is rarely dogmatic although rival positions are attacked with zest — are ones that for the most part currently receive wide support. Hence many who adopt this text will be able to employ it as an aid in expounding viewpoints that they themselves favour. Those who, on the other hand, like the present reviewer, disagree with much of what the authors have to say can use it to give their students the representative statement, to which they are entitled, of a contemporary viewpoint and, allowing it to speak for itself, make it the target of their polemic.

The writing is lively throughout and about as simple as the subject matter will permit. Notably absent from the book, as my description of its contents will have indicated, is any discussion of the concept of a person or of what constitutes personal identity — topics which, together with some others not here covered, many of us will wish to include in a philosophy of mind course. Nevertheless, were I teaching such a course in the coming year, at any undergraduate level from the second year up, I would certainly use this book. Other readings can be assigned to supplement it. For what it covers it is, quite probably, the best available text.

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NORMAN SWARTZ. *The Concept of Physical Law*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. xii + 220. US$29.95. ISBN 0-521-25838-3.

Among the recent flurry of work on the nature of laws of nature, this book is a welcome addition. It begins with the standard distinction between *regularity* theories (or what are often called 'Humean' theories) and *necessitarian*

theories, and has as its aim the defense of a regularity theory. The book includes several controversial claims such as the claim that by adopting a regularity theory one can resolve traditional difficulties associated with free will and determinism.

Chapters 1 - 4 provide a general introduction to the subject of laws of nature. They include a helpful discussion that distinguishes between instrumental or *scientific* laws and the underlying *physical* laws which scientific laws often approximate, an outline of the necessary conditions for physical lawfulness, and details of the distinction between regularity and necessitarian theories. Prescriptivist theories are also mentioned briefly for the sake of completeness. A quick introduction to the modal issues involved is also provided.

Chapters 5 - 8, 12 & 13 deal with the more substantive theoretical issues. Here Swartz considers the traditional objections to regularity theories, including the most often cited objection that under any regularity theory too many physically possible events will be deemed physically impossible and that too many actual but physically contingent events will be deemed physically necessary. Objections based on statistical laws and counterfactuals are dealt with in chapters 12 and 13 respectively.

Finally, chapters 9 - 11 examine several philosophical consequences of adopting a regularity theory, including the consequences for free will and determinism and the problem of miracles. Swartz concludes that within the context of a regularity theory the problem of determinism cannot arise in its traditional guise since the physical laws which govern human action (like all other physical laws) are merely descriptive, not prescriptive, of such actions (116ff). Hume's problem of miracles is likewise avoided once it is recognized that under a regularity account 'it is *logically* impossible that a physical law should be "violated" ' (108).

How far is Swartz's defense of regularity successful? Here, the book attempts both to deal convincingly with the traditional objections to any regularity account and to discredit necessitarian theories by means of an epistemological challenge. As Swartz points out, it is commonly agreed by both the regularist and the necessitarian that physical laws are true, contingent, purely descriptive conditionals which express either a universal or a statistical proposition (29, 31). However, disagreement emerges over the question of whether these five characteristics constitute a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for physical lawfulness, or merely a necessary one. According to the regularist such conditions are both necessary and sufficient. However, if so, it follows that every (so-called) accidental universal and statistical generalization will constitute a physical law. Once this is granted the question arises of whether any unrealized physical possibility can ever be said to be consistent with the laws of nature. Kneale's discussion of a non-existent race of white ravens possibly evolving in a permanently snowy region, Popper's example of the extinct New Zealand Moa living beyond its actual lifespan and Molnar's case of a river of Coca-Cola are all examples based on propositions which our intuitions tell us are false yet physically possible. Armstrong gives the problem of all true

accidental generalizations becoming laws of nature a new twist by pointing out that, since generalizations of the form $(x)(Fx \supset Gx)$ are true whenever there are no Fs, it follows that on the regularity account it is a physical law that centaurs are both adept at philosophy and that they are inept at philosophy simply because, omnitemporally, there are no centaurs.

Swartz's response to such objections is in essence that if such conclusions strike one as unintuitive, then intuitions are simply in need of reform (55). In claiming that certain events are inconsistent with the laws of nature, the regularist is not saying that it is impossible for such events to occur. Rather, 'when we say that it is physically impossible that they do, we mean only that — as a matter of fact — they do not occur' (57). It is still possible to distinguish between failure and doom. It is just that in the crucial cases the regularist and the necessitarian will differ over which projects merely failed and which were doomed from the start (65).

The immediate difficulty with this type of defense is that it merely shifts the ground of dispute. Having appropriated the language of physical lawfulness simply to say that certain events, as a matter of fact, have not occurred, the regularist has reduced the problem to merely a verbal one. After all, Swartz still has to account for the sense in which he claims some events but not others *could* occur. In reality the question is one of whether science has need of the concept of nomological necessity and whether the distinction which necessitarians emphasize and about which regularists appear to be insensitive (54) has value either in the practice of science or for explaining its predictive success.

Related to the regularist's defense is the epistemic challenge which Swartz raises for the necessitarian (67ff, 79ff). How is it that the necessitarian can claim to distinguish between those regularities which are merely accidental and those which are governed by some form of nomological necessity? Here Swartz is on stronger ground but, even so, it is unlikely that the committed necessitarian will find the challenge compelling. After all, as Swartz emphasizes early on, physical laws (unlike scientific laws) are independent of our beliefs about them and so any epistemic challenge will be weakened accordingly.

Despite these concerns the book is a stimulating and enjoyable one to read. It is unfortunate that none of the recent work done by Armstrong and Tooley is mentioned directly, but when coupled with Armstrong's *What Is a Law of Nature?* (which gives a spirited defense of a non-regularity theory) the book provides a helpful introduction to the contemporary state of play with respect to laws of nature.

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MARTIN TAMNY and K.D. IRANI, eds. *Rationality in Thought and Action*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1986. Pp. xx + 286. US$37.50. ISBN: 0-313-25017-0.

We live in the age of the conference and the cooperative volume — loosely speaking — resulting therefrom. The present volume is one such, 18 essays on the general topic of the title — on a loose interpretation. Still another rationale is suggested for the book. It had its 'origin in a conference held at The City College of New York on the occasion of the centenary of the birth of Morris Raphael Cohen' (presumably in 1980). And it is dedicated to Cohen 'and the tradition of philosophy he created at The City College of New York.' A book dedicated to Cohen is welcome forty years after his death, and one explaining or exemplifying 'the tradition of philosophy he created' would fill a gap in our knowledge. Alas, this is not what we are given. Although the Preface states that the contributors (whether they knew Cohen or had even read his works) have 'been affected by the Cohen tradition,' the papers by and large provide little evidence of this, nor is there any hint of what the Cohen tradition is. We are told that 'most of the contributors ... were either students of Cohen or students of his students. Most have either studied or taught at The City College.' The Biographical Notes do not bear this out. The topic, it is said, 'was central to Cohen's thought.' Rationality in thought certainly was, but not rationality in action 'as it has developed in the latter half of the twentieth century.' What we have here is a stretcher. Why make so much of this? Because an excellent opportunity was missed. Although a number of the papers are interesting enough, there is no reason why they should appear in this volume. For the most part, the reference to Cohen is an exercise in artificial piety. Even the Introduction (by Irani) says nothing about the contents of the book or their Cohenian relevance. So the book is only nominally hinged to Cohen and is on the whole just another collection of essays having a central theme only nominally in common. Considering Cohen's aversion to nominalism, this is irreverence with a vengeance.

Not all the pieces, to be sure, are deficient in the way complained of. Martin Tamny's 'Rationality and Science' is an illuminating overview of developments in philosophy of science since Cohen, especially those resulting from the work of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend, and even suggests that Cohen might have changed his views about the relations of science, rationality, and truth. E.P. Reubens writes on 'Reason and Nature in Economics,' and very well too; the piece is valuable in applying Cohenian ideas to economics, the social science on which Cohen wrote least. Carol Phillips' essay on Cohen's legal philosophy is valuable as an overview of it and in setting out 'to uncover [the] idea of rationality implicit in Cohen's writings' (112). Gerald Myers compares Cohen and James, especially on religion and the will to believe, rationality and pragmatism; this is illuminating and well done. But when Myers admits that he 'owes much of his understanding of Cohen to' Hollinger's book on Cohen (134-5) and says that he regards Hollinger's book as definitive (121), he makes it evident that he knows more about James than about Cohen.

John Neulinger's 'Empirical Bases of Value Judgments' is interesting in its Cohenian relevance and in its own right. There is, unfortunately, a prima facie problem in reconciling the statements that 'values exist as states of mind in people' (50) and that 'values are derived from the interrelationships of facts' (57); together these imply that states of mind in people are derived from interrelationships of facts, which is curious. Conrad Schirokauer in 'Rationality in Chinese Philosophy' makes some references to Cohen which may be more than pious platitude, and raises some interesting questions of cross-cultural philosophy. Pheroze S. Wadia has a fascinating essay on 'Reasoning, Believing, and Willing'; anyone who knows Cohen's work will immediately recognize its Cohenian relevance (Cohen wrote the article on Belief for the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*).

Apparently communication is not a main aim of A.K. Gangadean's essay on 'Meditative Reason and the Logic of Communication'; it certainly does not manage it. Its claims that 'communication is essentially a matter of *meaning*' (167) and that 'meaning is essentially an ontological matter' (168) would appear to imply that communication is essentially an ontological matter, making this an exercise in obscurantism that Cohen would have disdained. The same is true of A.W. Collins on 'Rationality, Learning, and Language.' Its thesis (189) is absurd on its face, since it implies that no one who has a language is irrational, and the author is in the position of saying that rationality is not a matter of degree (203) and also that it is (204). Although there are epicycles working around this inconsistency, no explanation is offered of why it arose at all. One of the most curious pieces is by W. Hutcheon, who is said to be a student of a student of Cohen (284) — but to be a student of a student of *X* is not a recognized or even a determinate relationship; no doubt we are all students of students of students ... of Plato. In an essay on philosophy of history, in *this* book, Hutcheon manages to find not one occasion to refer to Cohen's work on the subject; and an essay of 27 pages containing 69 notes is not note-shy. Arthur Smullyan's 'Probability and Credibility' is also on a Cohenian theme, probability and problematic inference; it is highly technical and highly competent (and Smullyan was a student of Cohen's). Nancy Holmstrom's 'Rationality and Moral/Political Decisions' is an interesting and well-argued paper attacking the model of rationality current in much of present decision theory.

The book ends, appropriately, with Raphael Stern's 'Modalities, Rationality, and Intervention,' which is imaginative, creative, and suggestive, the sort of thing Cohen would have liked. In discussing 'The Structure of an Account of Rationality' (274), Stern has found a fitting way both to end the book and to pay tribute to the life and work of Morris Raphael Cohen.

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JAN ZWICKY. *Wittgenstein Elegies*. Ilderton, ON: Brick Books and Edmonton, AB: Academic Printing and Publishing 1986. Pp. 70. CDN$9.95. ISBN 0-919626-28-9 (Brick Books); ISBN 0-920980-16-3 (Academic Printing and Publishing).

Whilst books and collections of articles on Wittgenstein — some with a distinctly elegiac tone — continue to proliferate, few philosophers would appear to have been moved by his work to write poetry. Jan Zwicky has, however, and *Wittgenstein Elegies* is a poem in five parts. Much of it draws directly on Wittgenstein's own writings (in particular, on the *Tractatus, Philosophical Investigations*, and *Culture and Value*), and it is Wittgenstein's voice that dominates the poem, although those of Zwicky herself and of Georg Trakl, the young Viennese poet who received an anonymous grant from Wittgenstein in 1914, can also be heard. Of the many questions the poem provokes, the first that springs to mind is a simple: Why? On the face of it, a philosopher writing poetry about another philosopher's life and work is to say the least rather eccentric: after all, surely what is *philosophically* interesting about Wittgenstein is the kind and quality of his arguments, and poetry, with its focus on and appeal to emotion and feeling, seems hardly suitable as a medium for expounding or assessing argument.

Implicit in *Wittgenstein Elegies* is a rejection of both of these premises. The poem suggests that there is something seriously mistaken in the idea that one can fruitfully approach Wittgenstein's work guided by nothing more than a concern with the arguments; or rather, that a full understanding of those arguments depends on an understanding or awareness of something other than argument. Zwicky writes: 'We will only see things / Stark and dead if we see only things / Themselves and not the pattern that informs them' (15). She is concerned with the *spirit* in which Wittgenstein wrote and which informs his work, a spirit which (as he says in the Foreword to his *Philosophical Remarks*, quoted by Zwicky in her own Foreword) expresses itself in 'striving after clarity and perspicuity in no matter what structure,' in the attempt 'to grasp the world ... at its centre — in its essence.' It 'remains where it is and what it tries to grasp is always the same.' Zwicky feels that this is an aspect of Wittgenstein's work that has been neglected, and that this spirit is missing from much contemporary philosophy — a neglect and an absence which, she says, 'I hope these elegies may go some small way toward remedying' (9).

Wittgenstein Elegies also undermines the idea (reminiscent of I.A. Richards, whose 'The Strayed Poet,' in *The Screens and Other Poems*, is another Wittgenstein elegy) that poetry is merely emotive, and thus has no part to play in philosophical debate. Wittgenstein wrote in an early draft of the Foreword to *Philosophical Remarks* that although 'It is a great temptation to try to make the spirit explicit ... the danger in a long foreword is that the spirit of a book has to be evident in the book itself and cannot be described' (*Culture and Value*, 7-8). This remark brings to mind the Tractarian distinction between saying and showing, according to which only that which is part of the world

of facts can be *said*; that is, described or pictured in propositions. The spirit of a work, however, is not part of the world of facts, but has to do with the writer's — the subject's — will; it can thus only be *shown* in propositions which are used to say something about the world. Poetry is a mode of discourse particularly suited to showing; this is perhaps what Wittgenstein had in mind when he wrote: 'I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy ought really to be written only as a *poetic composition*' (*Culture and Value*, 24). The poet's wish, Zwicky writes, is for 'No clutter, stripped bare, colours / Pure, original; unsayable itself / Directly echoed' (23). The poet attempts to show us what cannot be said; in reading poetry we are alert to 'what lies behind' what is said, to echoes and resonances; we pay attention to the poet's silences as well as his speech. Thus Rilke said of Trakl, a central figure in *Wittgenstein Elegies*, that his poems were built on pauses. Zwicky says: 'Sometimes he speaks: echoes. / He speaks echoes. So pure, almost / Unrecognizable ...' (23). *Wittgenstein Elegies* suggests that if one's concern is with what can in the Wittgensteinian sense only be shown, the choice of poetry as a medium through which to express that concern is not eccentric, but a natural one. The poem asks us to approach Wittgenstein's work from a new perspective; to read his writings in the right spirit, the spirit in which they were written, it suggests, is to read his writings as poetry.

The thought that the spirit of a work must be evident in that work and cannot in itself be separately described also suggests that any attempt to reveal something of or about the spirit which informs Wittgenstein's writings must point back to those writings themselves. This *Wittgenstein Elegies* does; much of the poem draws directly on Wittgenstein's writings, and much of it thus has a familiar ring. For example: 'Think of tools: a hammer, pliers, / Glue-pot, glue, screwdrivers, saw, / Nails, rule. So might we see / The purposes of words' (41); or '*Propositions are truth-functions of* / *Assertions of prime facts*' (49). The sense of familiarity is subverted and sometimes made disturbing, however, by the play of voices in the poem. Zwicky is at her most effective in this respect in the section entitled 'The Death of Georg Trakl,' where, for example, a long 'quotation' for the *Tractatus* ending with a near paraphrase of proposition 3.262, 'What signs fail to express, their / Application shows,' is immediately followed by 'If only we / Are strong enough to see. If only / We endure the blindness and the loss' (26). The sense of struggle, expressed as the struggle to see as well as to show what cannot be said, pervades *Wittgenstein Elegies*; Zwicky is referring to her own poem as well as to Wittgenstein's work when she writes (echoing a passage in *Culture and Value* [8]), 'So solitary / Work turns ritual, like ritual rots / Unless one clings to inner sense, / Digs nails hard in the darkling core, seeks ever / For a rubric honest as a kiss' (42). The difficulty Zwicky faces here is the difficulty of poetry; in *Wittgenstein Elegies*, she suggests that it is also a fundamental difficulty of philosophy.

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