CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION, AND THE TRANSNATIONAL SUBJECT

ANGELI HUMILDE

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to explore issues of governmentality that nation-states have surrounding citizenship during this period of increased mobility and interconnectedness. Using the nation-state of the Philippines as a particular case study, I explore how transnational citizens use their citizenship rights for strategic purposes, but also how the state implements modes of governance using particular laws and policies, in order to encourage their citizens to act in certain ways despite their physical absence from the nation-state and their increased mobility.

CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE AND IDENTITY

The year of 2013 has been riddled with headlines on immigration reforms and citizenship laws not only in Canada, but the United States, and even countries in Europe such as Italy and France. Citizenship typically functions as a marker for one’s allegiance to a country and one’s identity, as well as belonging to a culture and community. Previously it was believed that culture was fixed within geopolitical boundaries, within a specific space and place; but why is it that culture was viewed as bounded, and equated within a specific space and place? Gupta and Ferguson (1992) have discussed that in
the past, people have been able to produce logics of difference based on geographical space occupied by a specific group of people in a specific place. It was believed that the culture of people was bounded within the space occupied by a specific people, which has allowed us to produce the categories that divide people into ‘us’ and ‘them’ based on perceived differences. The laws of citizenship reinforce these principles, because they dictate who are the ‘us’ group, and who are ‘the others’, who belongs to the state and is thus able to claim a certain national identity, and occupy a specific subject position. In light of globalization, and as more and more people live as transnational citizens, this illusion of a natural connection between a place, culture, and identity becomes broken; however, mechanisms still exist in which people produce these categorical differences of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Gupta and Ferguson 1992).

With the increased mobility of people during this current time due to work and career opportunities pursued abroad, citizenship has taken on a whole new set of meanings in global culture as many people choose to live as transnational citizens. I use this particular term *transnational citizen* to describe the increased mobility of people during this time due to globalization, and how these increased movements of people have changed what it means to be a citizen. People are not merely citizens of one country, but they often hold citizenship cards or residency cards to multiple countries and acquire the benefits of those states along with these cards. Transnational citizens are also never truly sedentary. They may choose to settle in one place for certain periods of time, but they also have the ability to move to different countries based on what opportunities particular states may have to offer. However, they may also go back and forth between their ancestral homelands and their host countries multiple times. Some may choose to work in one state
and maintain a family in another state; some may relocate their immediate family to one place for strategic purposes, but choose to maintain properties, businesses, and social circles in another state. Thus, these people are not only transnational citizens because they transverse through many different states, but they are often in transit from one state to another, as many of them sustain relationships, livelihoods, and families in different parts of the globe.

In the past, the symbol of the passport was typically a symbol of citizenship, allegiance to a state, and membership within a culture; however, due to the reality of certain states with a significant percentage of their population living in diaspora, they have the challenge of maintaining legitimacy in order for that state to justify its geopolitical boundaries. Therefore, states must operate on principles of difference in order for them to legitimize their power, territory, and control over their populations so that sovereignty cannot be imagined independently of the state. This idea behind states, sovereignty, and boundedness of culture, we must remember, are social constructions and depend on repeated performances by the state to legitimize itself (Hansen and Stepputat 2005). The state of India is just one of the many examples of a state which legitimizes its sovereignty based on the social constructions of citizenship. Due to the reality of the increasing mobility of peoples today, reformed citizenship laws by many countries, such as India, now allow for dual-citizenships, or ‘origin cards’ that function as a type of ‘quasi citizenship’, in order to make room for its members in diaspora. This new law not only targets these transnational citizens in order to secure remittances, but also to retain the loyalty of these upwardly mobile citizens to ‘the old country’ (Hansen and Stepputat 2005). States use these citizenship laws to promote sentimental attachments to the motherland, which in turn, allows the state to subjectify
citizens under governmentality. I use the term governmentality in the same way as outlined by Michel Foucault. Governmentality is a way of governing, unlike the powers of a sovereign ruler where power is concentrated into one place in a top-down model, governing through governmentality is about governance through self-surveillance, it was the “conduct of conduct” (Foucault 1982:220-221). This is because for Foucault power was not fixed, it can be used strategically. Governance is an activity and practice, thus power cannot be imposed, because for Foucault power was not fixed, therefore the art of governance must be to establish an upwards and downwards continuity of power. While the sovereign can impose their powers on their people, people have ways of manipulating that power to meet their means. Foucault saw people as active agents; therefore governing through governmentality has more to do with employing tactics to get men to obey the laws, and at the heart of this was this idea of self-governance. Self-governance for Foucault came from good governance from the top, so that those at the bottom may self-govern. According to Foucault, governmentality was “…not of imposing law on men, but of disposing of things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, and even using laws themselves as tactics- to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means such and such ends may be achieved” (Foucault 1991:95). However, because transnational citizens are members of more than one state, the challenge of these states now becomes being able to get these citizens to identify themselves as members of the state, in order for the state to subjectify those people under their governmentality. However, if people hold multiple citizenship cards, the question becomes, which nation-state do they actually belong to? How is one to govern these multiple passport holders, and maintain allegiance to a state? In order to be subjectified- that is become
governed by the governmentality of the state- people must first see themselves as being members of the state; while these subjects may be transnational citizens traversing through many different boundaries, and living in many different states, these people may still be able to recognize that they are members of a particular state. Thus, in recognizing that they are still members of a particular state, the state is able to maintain governance of these people through governmentality.

As more and more people choose to traverse the globe, and move away from their ancestral homelands, the legitimacy of sovereign states is questioned. Thus, citizenship laws come into play which function as a mechanism by the state in order to legitimize their geopolitical boundaries, their governance, and also to maintain control of their transnational population. This paper aims to explore the issues of nation-states during this period of increased interconnectedness and mobility of people during the age of late capitalism, and the mechanisms by states to maintain control of their transnational population, and how certain state policies and laws encourage their citizens to act in ways that benefit the state despite their absence and increased mobility. While this paper aims to explore the connections between nation-states, citizenships, and governmentality, given the time constraints and the vastness of this topic, for the purposes of this paper, we will only be able to explore citizenship in its relation to the Foucauldian notion of subject positions, and the negotiation of these multiple passport holders of the various subject positions they hold. Many of the case studies presented in this paper are ones that come from my own ethnographic field research undertaken in the summer of 2014, in the Philippines, and the preliminary research I conducted attending talks, discussions, and personal conversations I had with people who were
of Filipino ancestry, but have gained citizenship to other nation-states either by birth, marriage or naturalisation in their host country. My understanding of the Philippine culture was also aided from the fact that the Philippines is my ancestral homeland. While I have spent most of my life in Canada, and very much consider myself to be Canadian, I was able to grow up learning about and being exposed to Philippine culture. Therefore, using the Philippines as a case study for this highly politicized topic of citizenship, immigration, and governing transnational subjects, I hope that this will shed some light on the different layers surrounding this topic.

The Philippine state is an example of a nation-state that has employed such tactics of governmentality in a very effective manner within its expatriate community. Although the Philippines has been criticized by the World Bank because of its heavy reliance on its expatriates sending remittances to keep the economy afloat (Teves 2005), remittances play a very large role in Philippine culture. It has been approximated that legal remittances have totaled approximately $20.117 billion annually, although the Asian Bankers Association estimates it to be closer to $128 billion, which is about 13.5% of the country’s GDP (Remo 2012). 80% of all these remittances come from seven countries, with Canada being in the top three countries that send remittances (Magtulis 2012). Despite these criticisms by the international community, the Philippine government has praised overseas Filipinos who send remittances, and have dubbed them as ‘heroes of the nation’ (Fisher 2013). As stated previously, Philippine culture, (and now its government) heavily encourages remittances. Whether it is sending remittances to immediate or extended family, there is a sense of responsibility instilled in the expatriates. While many of them may work low-skilled jobs in their country of permanent residence, in my experience, I have found that there is a
narrative that persists that because they are the ones who were able to ‘get out’, and are considered more ‘fortunate’ than those who were ‘left back home’, the responsibility falls on them when family (of any sort) has fallen on tough times, and therefore they are the ones who are expected to contribute financially.

Many citizenship laws have been reformed, partly due to the fact that the state wishes to encourage its transnational citizens to contribute to the remittance economy. At the same time, these laws are also used by those who are eligible for citizenship as a mechanism of agency, one might even call these actions strategic reversibility as per Tania Li (2007). According to Li, the consequences of power can rarely be predicted, and the outcomes of the practice of governmentality can rarely be determined. Thus, strategic reversibility is defined as resistances against governmentality, but not resistance of the entire system altogether; it is resistance in the sense of manipulation of certain rules to the benefit of the subjects being governed. These resistances are not necessarily rebellious in nature, but instead are done for strategic purposes, in the interest of the subjects optimizing the position that they have come to occupy. Passports have typically served as a symbol of citizenship, belonging, solidarity, invoking a sense of camaraderie with others who ‘belong’ to the same nation. The very document of the passport itself is highly political and symbolic. First of all, they all do not look the same; each passport has a distinct color, lettering, and seal of the country on its cover. Many times while standing in line for the customs or immigration counter at the airport, one cannot help but notice and take note of what passport others hold in their hand, and whenever one notices others who hold a similar passport, there is a feeling or sense of camaraderie with that person, even when they may be a complete stranger. In my
experience as a traveler, many conversations in lines at the airport with strangers have started because they had noticed that we were both holding the same passport. While passports are culturally symbolic, due to the increasing mobility of people, and newly reformed citizenship laws put into place that allow people to hold multiple passports, passports are now collected like memberships to country clubs— and the more passports you hold, the better. This is because holding citizenship rights to a particular nation comes with certain perks such as subsidized post-secondary education, or rights to own land instead of paying land leases. A number of my classmates in high school, in Canada, who were born, raised, and spent most of their lives in Canada, were also American citizens. Typically, one of their parents was an American citizen, but because they had married a Canadian, they had chosen to migrate here for whatever reason. Through their American parent, some of my classmates were able to gain dual-citizenship status. These people, when asked where they were from if they were travelling in another country, would typically state that they are Canadian. Many of them saw themselves ‘belonging’ to the nation of Canada, and called it home. On the occasions when they revealed that they held dual-citizenship status and were asked about why they kept their American citizenship, many of my former classmates would explain to others that they kept their American citizenship because should they one day decide to pursue schooling at American schools, they would be able to do so, and not have to pay the exorbitant international student fees, which could go as high as $40,000-$60,000.

The Philippines has recently reformed their citizenship laws, so that those who previously had to give up Philippine citizenship due to ‘naturalisation’ in their host country can reacquire their lost
Philippine citizenship. Therefore, one is now able to hold dual citizenship, and possess both a Philippine and a Canadian passport for example, at the same time, when it was not possible to do so before. This reform has come under speculation, partly because the Philippines relies so heavily on its expatriate community to send remittances. By presenting Filipinos who live overseas, and have naturalised in their host countries, the opportunity to reacquire their lost Philippine citizenship, the Philippine state creates this connection between their transnational citizens and the homeland. Should they one day need to appeal to these citizens who live abroad, let’s say to encourage remittances in order to keep the economy afloat, they may be able to instill a sense of duty into these people as they are legally subjects of the Philippine state due to the citizenship rights they hold.

Remittances do not only come in the form of money wired from relatives abroad, but they also come in the form of investment in the homeland. Most recently, many of the investments made by transnational Philippine citizens have been in Philippine residential and vacation real estate. The recent boom of Philippine real estate due to luxury, residential, enclave, and vacation developments has been credited to Philippine expatriates, who purchase a significant percentage of these properties. Laws in the Philippines stipulate that while foreigners can buy a house in the Philippines, they cannot buy the land on which it stands, and must therefore purchase land leases. Thus, Filipinos who have given up their Philippine citizenship in order to become naturalised in their host countries would have had to pay land leases. However, because of this reform in citizenship laws, Filipinos who live abroad but wish to purchase real estate in the Philippines will no longer have to pay these land leases. Many have speculated that in the best interests of the state, the Philippine
government has reformed its citizenship laws not only to encourage expatriates to return to the home country, and maintain ties with its diasporic population, but also to encourage further remittances from its transnational population in the form of real estate investment. These reformed citizenship laws enable Filipinos living overseas the ability to hold citizenship to multiple countries, and also make purchasing real estate in the Philippines a much smoother process. Due to this reform in citizenship laws, many expatriates have been coaxed to buy these properties because as citizens, they do not have to pay land leases. These properties not only become a vacation home, but an investment at the same time. If the value for these properties increase with time, these luxury homes could be sold for profit, rented out, or used as a permanent home upon retirement. Subsequently, these properties also encourage frequent visits of the expatriates back to the home country, which means an influx of capital from expatriates with foreign currency that is typically worth a lot more (for example, one Canadian Dollar is typically worth 40 Philippine Pesos depending on the daily exchange rate). Therefore, due to the high foreign currency exchange rates, many Filipinos who come back to the Philippines from abroad are enticed to spend their foreign currency, as they are able to get more “bang for their buck” in the Philippines. This influx of Philippine expatriates from abroad coming back to the home country to spend their foreign currencies certainly plays a large role in stimulating the Philippine economy. It is no wonder that many development companies who build these vacation enclaves are offered tax breaks from the Philippine government if they sell their properties to a certain percentage of expatriates (Cardenas 2013). In the case of Philippine expatriates, these citizen law reforms have left room for strategic reversibility for those who are looking for real estate investment. At the same time,
the argument could also be made that these laws were put into place in order to coax its transnational citizens to adhere to the governmentality of the state, and become good citizens through the accumulation of capital abroad and gaining market virility, but subsequently using that capital and investing in the homeland. The implicit message here is that by investing in the homeland as a citizen, you have done your duty to the state by acquiring earnings in your host country, and using it to participate and strengthen the home country’s economy. Through capitalist participation, you keep the motherland alive and well by stimulating its economy.

Aihwa Ong’s article, “Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making: Immigrants Negotiate Racial and Cultural Boundaries in the United States” (1996), discusses Hong-Kong money elite residents, who reside in exclusive communities in the San Francisco Peninsula mountain range, where homes typically cost over a million dollars. These residents have been nicknamed ‘astronauts’, as they spend much of their time shuttling back and forth across the Pacific. Due to this high level of mobility, this elite group of residents has been accused of being un-attuned to the cultural norms of the Californian citizens by many of the other long-time residents. The key motivation for many of these Hong-Kong businessmen for relocating their families, especially their children, to California, is so that their children may be able to gain universally certified educational degrees, and eventually green cards for the entire family. By acquiring educational certifications and residence rights, this will eventually enable the entire family to permanently settle in the United States. Ong (1996) borrows from Foucault and dubs these plans, “family biopolitics”. The heads of these families make the decision to relocate their members based on the premise that in the future this relocation will pay off as the children will be able to gain
an American education and green cards, thus ensuring the prosperity of the family as a whole, while at the same time, evading the governmentality of the communist home country. While these people may do their best in evading the governmentality of the home country, at the same time the home country also tries to do its best to hold onto its transnational citizens, so that they may still internally recognize their Chinese identity. It is interesting to note that many of these parents still encourage their children to observe some Chinese customs and speak the language—meaning that these children are encouraged to maintain a part of their Chinese identity.

SUBJECT POSITIONS AND IDENTIFICATION

Previously, the notion of identity was grounded in Cartesian ideology, that is that identity was fixed and could not be shaped or molded. This ideology was grounded in the national conceptions of cultural identity which stipulated that identity was fixed and depended on geographical location. Stuart Hall (1996) critiqued this notion and instead argued that identity is a process. While identity does play a role in the politics of location, identity is not bounded in a place but instead is a process of discursive practices. Michel Foucault on the other hand, discusses the concept of identity in terms of subjectification. Subjectification is a process of people recognizing the roles they occupy within society, and these positions are informed by structures of power, such as the government, the dominant culture, or the state (Rose 1996). Subjects come to occupy these positions rather than others through discourse, knowledge and power relations, which inform these positions and thus allow subjects to recognize the roles in society that they occupy. However, these elite transnational citizens known as ‘astronauts’—as mentioned previously—occupy multiple subject positions imposed by the state,
such as the position of the Chinese migrant, the position of the American-educated student, and the position of the Chinese citizen. With all the different positions these people occupy in various different nations, how does the state encourage its transnational citizens to recognize their identity as subjects of the state, moreover how do they recognize which state they belong to, as they occupy positions in so many different ones? How do these different states get them to recognize these positions in order for them to adhere to the governance of the state?

Hall (1996) also discusses Althuser’s concept of “hailing”. Hailing is a process in which subjects come to recognize themselves as subjects, and thus must adhere to the governmentality of the larger structure of power that informs them of their roles, and thus how they must conduct themselves within society. In the case of the “astronauts”, while occupying multiple national subject positions these people must come to recognize the ‘hail’ of the state. If subjects come to recognize themselves through the concept of “hailing”, what is it about this “hail,” that allows subjects to come to recognize that they are the ones being called out to, and thus turn to respond? According to Hall (1996) subjects must first internally recognize that they are the ones being called out to, and it is through this recognition of who one is, that the subject comes to turn and respond to the ‘hail’. Therefore with the increasing number of people who choose to live as transnational citizens and occupy multiple subject positions, how does the state hail these multiple passport holders into recognizing that they are still subjects of that particular state? How does the state get people to identify as subjects when they do not physically reside in “the motherland”? While the Chinese transnational citizen- the “astronaut” who shuttles back and forth across the Pacific- may reside in California, through their conscious
choice of maintaining their mother tongue and customs of the homeland, they maintain an attachment to a national identity. In doing so, they are able to maintain a Chinese subject position, even if they may reside physically in a different society. Therefore, because a part of them still recognizes their Chinese identity, they will be able to respond to the ‘hail’ of their ancestral homeland.

Weedon (2004) discusses that identity is temporary, it changes all the time, however subject positions encourage identification, and once a subject identifies with a particular identity, they come to recognize the subject position they occupy within society. Through the maintenance of the Chinese language and customs, these ‘astronauts’ make the conscious decision to identify with a Chinese identity. Therefore, while they may constantly be in transit from one place to another, the mother state is able to impose some aspects of governmentality, so long as these subjects are making the choice to identify with a particular national identity. By identifying with a specific national identity, subjects are able to recognize internally that they are the subjects and through this recognition they are subjectified by the state. Therefore, they will recognize that they are the ones being ‘hailed’ by the state and thus, they become subject to the governmentality of the state.

GOVERNING TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENS

At the same time, the host state must try to find ways to govern and regulate these transnational individuals living in their state. Aihwa Ong (1999) discusses the agency of these transnational subjects, and the attempts of the state to regulate their activities and identities, through these attempts by the host state, people are thrown into multiple subject positions which requires them to cope with the governmentality of the cultural homeland, and the host country.
These “people in transit” are not merely nomadic subjects, but they are subject to governing practices of the host and home state. A strategy of Chinese migrants who are also prominent businessmen in the United States, has been to invest, and give very generous donations to major public institutions, such as universities and museums, in order to ease racial tensions and promote cultural acceptance of the Chinese in America (Ong 1996). In this way, these Asian investors attempt to buy symbolic capital in the West in order to ease the transition for these transnational citizens, which in turn make it easier for these migrants to settle permanently in the host country.

The challenge of many states with its population living in diaspora now becomes this mobile populous; due to pressures of governmentality, and the fact that these people occupy more than one national subject position, these mobile citizens must be able to continuously recognize the ‘hail’ of the homeland when they are called. Expatriate Filipinos hold passports for at least two countries, a number of these expatriates are constantly in transit, therefore there is a belief that they are not subject to the national subject position imposed by the Philippine or the Canadian state. While many of these subjects appear to occupy these subject positions opportunistically, many of their discourses, and ways of conduct, are still informed by state powers. These people may occupy and identify with multiple subject positions, and certainly these positions may be at certain times strategic, but they are still subject to the governmentality of the state. The strong emphasis on the remittance economy is a heavily emphasized governing principle by the Philippine state, as discussed earlier. The newly reformed laws of Philippine citizenship promote expatriates to keep their ties with the home country, physically (through the ownership of land), and
symbolically (through the privilege of being able to acquire a Philippine passport). This keeps the expatriate population heavily involved and invested in the homeland, and instills a sense of responsibility in these citizens, as these people are legally citizens of the nation. As citizens, they are required to play a part in maintaining the well-being of the nation. Therefore, these laws hold people in these subject positions, as they permanently attach the “expatriate nation” to the home nation (Hansen and Stepputat 2005). This is the challenge of every nation with a population in diaspora, for their exceptionally mobile citizens to recognize, and identify with the motherland.

SUBJECTIFICATION OF IMMIGRANTS

Immigrants have long been discriminated against by members of their host country, and much of the time, the state itself. All over Europe we see immigrants flocking to wealthy Western European countries from their former colonies, and many of these people are regarded as undesirable, threatening strangers (Stolcke 1993). Cultural identity and distinctiveness have previously been associated within a geographical space, this is why ‘others’ belonging to different cultures and being perceived to have different ways of conduct are regarded as a threat to the country. This is because there is this fear that too much influence from people who are perceived to be different will change the host society in a way that makes them unrecognizable. Stolcke (1993), also discusses how these culturally different foreigners pose a threat because the native population feels threatened when perceived ‘intruders’ exceed a certain proportion, and this is when people start to become territorial. There is this assumption that foreigners, strangers, and those who are outwardly different from ‘us’, in terms of belief, culture, and conduct, are not
entitled to share the ‘national’ resources and wealth, especially when these resources become scarce. It is this underlying dogma of ‘protecting the nation’, that promotes legislation which dictates who can become citizens of a nation and who cannot. These laws create categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’, which in turn creates the subject position of the unwanted immigrant, and the coveted position of the desirable citizen- and this is when race comes into play. In order to ‘protect the nation’, narratives surrounding race which operate on outward difference as a way to differentiate between the groups who are deemed to be the desired citizens, the acceptable immigrants, and the unwanted foreigners. In the attempts to ease these racial narratives and create cultural acceptance, immigrants try to gain cultural capital. The success of these racialized ‘others’ hinges on gaining this capital and assimilating into the dominant culture. The accumulation of cultural capital thus forms a hierarchy; labels of groups which are deemed to be the ‘acceptable others’, is based on how much cultural capital a particular racial group has gained, and in turn, it determines which immigrants have an easier time assimilating into the host society. For example, Asians have often been called, “the model minority”, in America because of their high educational achievement, increased presence in white-collar jobs, lower arrest rates, and high family stability (Kramer 2003). This ideology leads to the “whitening” and “blackening” of racial others according to Ong (1996). This white-black continuum is based on previous ideas of white supremacy; immigrants who are perceived to cause trouble in society, are labeled as ‘difficult immigrants’, therefore they are deemed undesirable, and are seen as closer to the black pole, thus they are put at the bottom of the cultural and economic ranking. Those immigrants who are deemed to be ‘model minorities’ on the other hand, are deemed to be closer to the white
pole, thus these groups become privileged almost to the same degree as the citizens of the state.

The principle here becomes that if you act according to the rules dictated by the state of what it means to be a ‘good citizen’, and succeed economically according to these principles, the host society will be more inclined to accept you, even if you are an outsider. The Philippines have been an ally of the United States since World War II when soldiers from both nations fought alongside one another against Japanese occupation of the Philippines. The United States has maintained naval bases in the Philippines ever since, and while many of these bases are now closed both countries maintain close relations. The Philippines has now become Canada’s leading source of immigrants, and they have gone as far as crediting the United States as being the ones responsible for this successful assimilation to the country because to this day, Filipinos are taught English in schools due to the historically strong American presence in the Philippines. It is because they are taught English from such a young age that they are able to settle in English-speaking countries such as Canada and assimilate (Friesen 2011). Due to the maintained amicable relationship of the Philippines with the United States, Filipino World War II veterans who have settled in the United States are now being granted fast track American citizenship, along with any immediate members of their families. This is only one of the perks that veterans are being given due to the close relations the two countries have maintained over the decades. It is interesting to note however, that this reform on the Filipino Veterans Family Reunification Act has only been passed in 2013. Initially, the United States offered Filipino soldiers full veteran benefits, and the promise of becoming ‘naturalized’ American citizens if they enlisted, along with their families, back in World War II. Many men enlisted based
on this opportunity to secure American citizenship for themselves and their families, however once the war ended the benefits were rescinded, and those who emigrated to the United States from the Philippines were considered to be ‘illegal’. It was only because these former soldiers were granted amnesty by the American government, for their service to the United States that they were allowed to stay in the country (Cuevas 2013). This unfulfilled promise is why many veterans have fought so hard, for many decades, for this reform. It goes to show however, that due to the maintenance of a close, amicable relationship, and with Filipinos being one of the perceived ‘model minorities’ of society, these legal reforms have come to pass in the American government. What if this were the case for any of the perceived ‘difficult immigrants’? If any of these groups, who are perceived to be difficult and a drain on the system, tried to call for such reforms for fast-tracked citizenship, for any reason, the result may not be the same.

In order for immigrants to gain the right to become citizens of a state, along with the benefits that come with being a citizen, they must become culturally “the same”. As Stolcke discusses,

“By building [a] case for the exclusion of immigrants on a trait shared by all humans alike rather than an unfitness allegedly intrinsic to extracommunitarians, cultural fundamentalism, by contrast with racist theories, has a certain openness which leaves room for requiring immigrants, if they wish to live in our midst, to assimilate culturally… At the core of this ideology of collective exclusion predicated on the idea of the “other” as a foreigner, a stranger, to the body politic is the assumption that formal political equality presupposes cultural identity and hence cultural sameness is the essential prerequisite for access to citizenship rights” (Stolcke 1995:8)
This creates a hierarchy, however, for those who are more similar in culture, and those who have an easier time assimilating versus those groups who are perceived to be troublesome, therefore these groups became exceptionally racialized by the state because they are “difficult”, and a perceived drain on the system. Hence these groups become “unwanted”. The process of states dictating rules of assimilation creates a categorical hierarchy, and puts people into certain subject positions that they may or may not necessarily want to occupy. The position of the “unwanted” immigrant for example, is dictated by the generalizations that the host state may have already created based on previous experiences, or exceptional cases that may have arisen with those other members of a particular culture in the past. These generalizations may lead to future acts of discrimination, and may subject certain immigrant groups to marginalized positions in society. These acts can alienate such members of society, which makes it harder for these people to assimilate and become accepted, thus keeping them in these marginalized positions. On the other hand, some immigrant groups are privileged in the sense that they are accepted by the larger host society with ease, and are thus granted certain rights, such as fast-track citizenship. With the privilege of being “model immigrants”, many of these groups are not scrutinized for keeping ties and the customs of the motherland. On the other side of this issue, despite the fact that these people are deemed to be naturalized citizens, the host state also has the challenge of regulating the activities and identities of these subjects (Ong 1999). The strong transnational movement in this era, allows many of these naturalized citizens the flexibility of migration and relocation, and therefore many of these people have the option of using their subjectivities in ways that optimize the positions they occupy. At the same time, it is also a challenge of the motherland to
be able to “hail” their subjects, and for their subject to recognize the “hail”, meaning that they still identify with the motherland, and thus the motherland is able to mobilize their transnational citizens living abroad should they need them.

As more and more people in the world have the opportunity to become increasingly mobile, many people from different cultural backgrounds will come into contact and influence one another. We see this in many places now, one only has to look around the nearest city, and already you can see how the peoples from different nations have converged, and have influenced everything from the cuisine, to the architecture of houses, and even the layout of the different neighborhoods. Due to all the presence of these people from very different backgrounds, laws have been put into place, which allow people to hold multiple citizenships. The challenge of the states which these people originally come from, will be to hold their subjects in their national subjectivities, and maintain relations with them, so that the subjects recognize that they are inherently still Canadian, Filipino, Chinese or whatever other states they hold allegiance to. In maintaining these relations, should they ever need to use their transnational citizens for any purpose, the option to mobilize these people for whatever purpose the state needs to use them for will be there. It is also the challenge of these people who hold citizenship to multiple nations, to cope with the pressures of the host-countries, and the pressures of the cultural homeland (Ong 1999), while at the same time negotiating their different subject positions, and coming to terms with the different identities they choose to hold on to. Identity, according to Weedon is a “limited and temporary fixing for the individual of a particular mode of subjectivity as apparently what one is” (2004:19). In times of increased mobility and transnational citizens with flexible
citizenship, it will be interesting to see how these subjects use their agency, and how they apply certain mechanisms to juggle these multiple identities, and negotiate the different subject positions that they occupy.

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